Unravelling British Euroscepticism (PDF)

**Unravelling British Euroscepticism: from Post-War Britain to Brexit** Dissertation, of 2H. **REVOIR TOUS LES DESSINS, LES PHOTOS, etc. des PWP.** **Introduction lesson** End of the War in 1945; Schuman Plan in 1950 ("*declaration du 9 mai 1950"*); foundation of the EEC (Treaty of Rome - 1957)....

**Unravelling British Euroscepticism: from Post-War Britain to Brexit** Dissertation, of 2H. **REVOIR TOUS LES DESSINS, LES PHOTOS, etc. des PWP.** **Introduction lesson** End of the War in 1945; Schuman Plan in 1950 ("*declaration du 9 mai 1950"*); foundation of the EEC (Treaty of Rome - 1957). UK asks to join 4 years later (First request in 1961); membership nearly 20 years later after the EEC is created (Treaty of Accession -- 1973); decides to leave 40 years later (Brexit Referendum -- 2016) quits the EU in 2020. Characters: Winston Churchill, Conservative PM (1940-45, 51-55) Charles de Gaulle, French President (1958-69) Margaret Thatcher, Conservative PM (1979-90) David Cameron, Conservative PM (2010-16) Nigel Farage, UKIP Leader (2006-09, 10-16) **Strong European roots:** Romanisation (British Latin), beginning of Christianisation Scandinavian settlements (5^th^-6^th^ century) Viking invasions (8^th^-9^th^ century). A largely common History with France: **Norman conquest** (1066) **Norman French** as the elite's language. At the peak of the Plantagenet dynasty's power most of current France is under English control. **UK slowly takes its distance with the rest of Europe:** the **19^th^ century's** "**splendid isolation**". Religion (Anglicanism) + avoiding permanent military alliances with the continent, (ex-)**Empire** as the main trade partner **Commonwealth + Special Relationship with USA**. UK = better politic stability: the authority of the King was never absolute ; parliamentarism is a very early concept in British history. Parliament sovereignty is central in Bo **Chapter I: 1945 - 1957: Uncertain attitudes towards the continent** First picture: Bevin = sitting in front of the train of Europe. Written: "the train is leaving; we're waiting for you". 1. Seemingly positives attitude towards Europe Churchill for example, agrees to form "the United States of Europe", because there's still danger even if "the fighting has stopped". Series of treaties going in this direction: Dunkirk Alliance Treaty (with France, 1947), Treaty Brussels (1948, founding treaty of Western Union, ancestor of Europe. Treaty of London (1949, creation of the Council of Europe). US agree to all these treaties: they need allies et united allies against USSR, and are afraid of the communist rise, especially in France (also in Italy). Churchill's "three great circles": Commonwealth, "United" Europe, and the countries where English is the main language. 2. Taking distance with European integration Labour + Conservative: rejection of Schuman Plan (1950, founding declaration of the ECSC). Treaty of Paris = treaty of the ECSC, Britain refuses. NATO and Commonwealth = more natural allies (1949). Britain thought that ECSC would not last. Schuman plan: 9 may 1950 -- "Schuman Declaration" - Promote peace through binding economic cooperation - Pooling of Coal and Steel Production of different countries - Formation of a Supranational Authority "above the members of the union" - Initially thought around France and Western Germany but will open to other countries 1945: British Empire = still the main commercial partner of the UK. France, Italy, etc. = agricultural countries, but Australia et N-Z were very competitive. Previously the "workshop" of the world, and still a colonial Empire. ECSC or ACP would harm this strength. 3. Flipflopping between rejection and cooperation Labour's European Unity Manifesto (1950), Churchill speech in favour of a European Army (1950). Failure of the European Defense Community in 1952, among other things because Britain refused to accept some things. Bonn-Paris conventions impulsed by the UK (1952): agreement between western countries, to end Germany occupation (creation of RFA), and agreements about arms, about Germany joining NATO, and independent government for Germany. Negotiation of an agreement with the ECSC (1954). Suez crisis (1956) = very important moment. US are not there to help, whether they were everywhere at the time to prove they were better than the USSR. Also a symbol of decolonization. FRA = understand that it is not a superpower anymore ≠ UK understands that it is time to stop talking with the others. No participation in the treaty of Rome (1957). European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA, 1960): Britain participates. Conclusion: refusal to join the Common Market = not a principled position; not a black or white situation. Mostly historical (Commonwealth) and economic reasons (industrial economy, importance of the Empire). Not political: Labour and Conservative. Fear of going further towards a political union? **1957-73: facing inner and outer adversities to the UK's membership to the EEC** 2 characters on the second cartoon: CDG and McMillen. "Kom binnen": you can come, but stay at a certain distance. Hugh Gaitskell: leader of the Labour Party (1955-63). At the right of the party. Against the European Union. VOIR PWP. 17 july 1956 = plan G alternative plan for a large free trade in Europe. Goal = protect the advantages of the colonial Empire for Britain manufactured goods mostly, in the plan G, but no agricultural goods, no political union. Possibility of exportations of manufactured goods only = very interessant. 13 february 1957: OEEC council of ministers agrees to negotiate the plan G, but the treaty of Rome is signed on the 25^th^ March, which slows down the negotiations. VOIR PWP. March 1958: The French come with their OWN plan. Between march and September 1958: several attempts/commissions and eventually agreement. 15 November 1958: De Gaulle rejects it singlehandedly. Spring 1959: Seven OEEC countries decide to unite and open negotiations between each others. 20 November 1959: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden and the United Kingdom sign the EFTA in Stockholm. EEC countries are neighboring countries trade is facilitated. EEC aims at political/economic coordination while EFTA is more of a loose alliance. EFTA countries are separated, on the periphery of the EEC. "The inner 6 versus the outer seven". Voir le cartoon. A first exploratory application: recognition of weakness of UK and immediate economic success of the EEC. Although, little **to no mention of Europe in any manifesto in 1959** (Labour or Conservative). Inner pressure form informed circles (media, etc.). In July 1961, MacMillan announces his desire to apply to the EEC. Going in to negotiate: Edward Heath is chosed as the negociator (will become PM at the moment UK will join). Surprisingly, this is the Labour Party which is against joining the European Community. According to MacMillan the party was divided mostly on the question of **imperial preference**.1961: Anti Common Market League. 1962: Creation of the Common Agricultural Policy within the EEC ( very scary for the UK) Evolution from political reasons towards economic reasons. 1963, CDG finally says no : very strong anti-US sentiment. Official reasons: the UK is too linked with the Commonwealth, more atlantic-oriented ; sneaky Britain is trying to renegotiate everything; different economic structure (UK = + industrial, - agricultural). **Christian-Democratic parties in Europe relied on farmer's vote**, not-taxing them was non-negotiable. An ideal situation for Britain would have been "free trade in agriculture" and "protection in industry" but **the EEC was the exact opposite**. The path to the second attempt: labour victory in 1964 PM Harold Wilson elected on a broadly Eurosceptic, [but ambiguous] platform. Labour party = split, with some prominent supporters of membership (in Europe) like George Brown and Roy Jenkins. Brown thought that being part of Europe would help against the economic decline. Also, idea of a geostrategic decline of the UK, that a membership would help to fix. Between 1964 and 1966, government = tiny majority (4 seats disagreements very easy to find) of the Labour in Parliament and set up economic policies which ran counter to EEC. Elections of 1966: Heath leader of Conservative party, very pro-membership. Wilson said he favoured entry under conditions, so could please both pro- and anti- in his party. Labour victory. Economy deteriorated further, with inflation increasing. A freeze on prices and wages was instituted. There were also problems within the Commonwealth (Rhodesia) and in the special relationship (Vietnam). EEC seen as a possible
solution November 66: Wilson announced Intention to apply (2^nd^ time), provided Commonwealth interests were safeguarded. April 1967: HoC approves massively the decision to apply. George Brown is the negotiator. Straight up refusal by CDG, did not even allow negotiations to begin (without consulting any other country, and taking the time). Two "humiliating" press conferences follow for the UK: "just the fifth act of a play". However, Wilson refuses to give up. Cartoon of the Moodle: Wilson jumps above every country, but CDG is too high. A one-man issue? The only problem is CDG: MacMillan was saying that CDG had "all the stiffness of a poker, without is occasional warmth". This refusal is among other reasons linked to the CDG's anti-Americanism. But UK continues to hope, thinking that this is just temporary, and History will do what is has to. But CDG becomes isolated, even with the Six. Conclusion: The **1961 application to the EEC was :** - A recognition of weakness by the UK (in a much worse position by then) - An **exploratory application** It **faced a strong inner opposition from both sides** (Conservative : Empire Stalwarts ; Labour) ; Both applications were **met by a French veto** (in 1963 and 1967) ; De Gaulle's opposition to the UK entry was based on multiple factor ; **both French inner politics and international politics were at play.** **1957-1973: facing inner and outer adversities to the UK's membership to the EEC pt. 2** Characters: Georges Pompidou, French president from 1969 to 1974. CDG: "no" to the referendum demission. Edward Heath: leader of the Conservative Party (1965-1970, and 1974-1975). PM 70-74. The PM who managed to get UK in Europe. Successor = Thatcher. Enoch Powell: conservative MP (1950-74). Shadow Secretary of State for Defense. (1965-68). Shadow Secretary of State of Defense (1965-68). James Callaghan: Labour PM 76-79. Cartoons: conditions of entry = a lot for UK. A new hope: Pompidou replaces CDG, then this is time to re-apply. Wilson refuses to give up the negotiations. 1970: general election. Heath become PM. Product of pro-european thoughts. Sees European Unity as a mean to maintain peace. Balliol College, Oxford = international outlook. Economically liberal (European construction is at the time essentially economic, and by essence liberal). Parenthèse : Keith Joseph = philosopher of the neoliberalism. Gets Friedman and Hayek in UK. Mental of Thatcher. The stakes: 2 main contention points for Britain: Common Agricultural Policy, and Common Fisheries policy (acted just before the reopening of the negotiations). European Monetary Union in project, but not an obstacle for the Britain. Common Agricultural Policy: UK is independent on food imports. It would mean that agricultural goods would be more expensive for British people + benefits for UK = very small: even If it boosts the sector, it is only 3% of the British economy (≠ France). UK would pay as much but get less. Leads to new divisions: each party has to face oppositions. Conservatives: 30MP majority, but a lot of anti-common market in the group needs some members of the opposition to support the government. Labour : if Wilson is not against the common market himself, he is surrounded by anti-marketeers and has to please them to stay Leader. Withint the Conservative party : 1970 voter's Veto Campaign (joining without the agreement of the population). Enoch Powell as the central figure of anti-marketeers (more than 30 MPs associated with the Anti-Common Market League). Around 60 Conservative could be considered anti-marketeers. Surfing on a wave of Anti-EEC sentiment in the population: 70% of the people against joining in 1970. Powell's attacks on the conservative party as "the party of one class" vs "the party of the nation". Within the Labour party : Wilson was not particularly anti-market but has to rely on the left wing of the party to stay Leader: "*Never been emotionally a Europe man*". Described by an advisor as "*basically a north of England, non-conformist puritan... The continental Europeans, especially from France and southern Europe were to him alien. He disliked their rich food, genuinely preferring meat and two veg with HP sauce".* Needs to oppose Heath to stay credible as Leader of the Opposition + Party is divided between radical anti-marketeers (Callaghan, Castle, Benn) and radical europeans (Jenkins). May 1971: Callaghan's "Non, Merci beaucoup" on the choice of French as Language of EEC. 39 Conservative MPs rebelled and voted against (over 330 total). 69 Labour MPs rebelled and voted for (over 288 total). If all Labour MPs had voted according to party line, then Heath would have been defeated Semi-victory. Into the EEC: 22^nd^ January 1972, Treaty of Accession. 23^rd^ April 1972: French European Communities enlargement referendum (yes 68%). 17th October 1972: European Communities Act, 1972. 1st January 1973: the UK enters the EEC. **The Rise of Rebels in both Camps and the 1975 Referendum** Roy Jenkins, Deputy Leader of the Labour Party (1970 -- 72), Home Secretary (1974 -- 76). Tony Benn, Chairman of the Labour Party National Executive Committee (1971 -- 72), Secretary for Industry (1974 -- 75) Enoch Powell, Conservative MP (1950 -- 74); rebels in 1974; Shadow Secretary of State for Defence (1965 -- 68) Margaret Thatcher, Leader of the Conservative Party (1975 -- 90), Prime Minister (1979 -- 90) Barbara Castle, Labour MP (1945 -- 79), Secretary for Health and Social Services (1974 -- 76) Alistair McAlpine, Treasurer of the Yes Campaign **The labour party from 1967 to 1974:** - Rejection of De Gaulle and defeat of 1970 pushes the party towards a more Eurosceptic stance (why ?) - October 1970: motion narrowly avoided at Labour conference for unconditional opposition to entry in EEC - Opposition « on tory's terms » - October 1971: 69 Labour MP break the whip on the vote on membership in parliament - Need to unite the party - 1970: Tony Benn suggestion of a referendum in 1970 - The fact that no party campaigned against the EEC in 1970 raised democratic questions - 1972: Neil Martin (conservative) asked for a referendum, Labour Shadow Cabinet opposed it - 1972: Two other referendums announced (France on British membership/Irish independence) push Labour NEC to accept the idea - 1974: Labour campaigns on idea of a renegotiation + referendum - February 1974 and October 1974 : Labour Victory - Mostly "cosmetic" but claimed to be a major thing by Wilson \> proof that EEC was flexible - Minor budget contribution readjustment - Open the common market to New-Zealand dairy products (butter & milk) - Mostly a tool to prevent anti-marketeers to organise too strongly - Cabinet less divided after (12 vs 11 first, 16 vs 7 then) **The referendum itself:** - Not a british tradition (actually one was refused by Attlee as early as 1945) - No constitutionnal value - 10 April 1975 : Referendum Act (312 v 248) - *The Government has announced the results of the renegotiation of the United Kingdom\'s terms of membership of the European Community. Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (the Common Market)?* **The Campaign:** - Two camps: Britain for Europe (For/Yes) VS National Referendum Campaign (Against/No) - Not along party lines, deeply dividing issue - Wilson even authorised the anti and pro marketeers of his own cabinet to campaign against each other **Britain for Europe:** Who: - Liberal Party - Most of the right of Labour - Most of the Conservative party - Businesses - Most of the press Important figures: Roy Jenkins (LAB), Harold Wilson (LAB), Shirley Williams (LAB), Margaret Thatcher (CON) (voir son pull avec les drapeaux), Edward Heath (CON), William Whitelaw (CON), Jeremy Thorpe (LIB) Campaign: - Very well funded campaign, backed by businesses, the press and the banks - Alistair McAlpine and the Dorchester Hotel Main arguments : (voir diapo, PWP4) - Economic Benefits: including increased trade, investment, and access to a larger market - Jobs - Security and Stability - Influence - Sovereignty untouched - Consumer Benefits: lower prices and greater choice **National referendum campaign:** Who: - Left of Labour - Right of Conservatives - Trade Unions - SNP - Plaid Cymru - Unionists Important figures: Tony Benn (LAB), Barbara Castle (LAB), Enoch Powell (UNI), Neil Martin (CON), Teddy Taylor (CON), Peter Shore (LAB), John Mills (LAB), Michael Foot (LAB). Campaign: - Way less funded campaigned. "Operated on a shoestring" - Not much backing by the press (Morning Star, Spectator...) - People vs the Elite campaign - Divisions from within Main arguments: - Sovereignty - Securing jobs and prices - Diversifying trade Cost of membership **Case study: Enoch Powell's plea (étude de texte qui est dans le syllabus)** *Doc 6 of the syllabus* National referendum Campaign Speech, 22 February 1975 - L 6-7: "Any decision \[in favour of staying in\] can only be provisional" - L 11-12: idea of self determination - L 16: pride in Britain's democratic tradition - L 20-27: Sovereignty - The continent vs the British - L 44: Idea of a British exceptionalism - L 55: Nationalism - L65+: Redundancy of an agreement with the EEC in industry - L75+: Advantages of being outside of the EEC for agriculture - L85 +: Attack on the paradoxes of a military alliance with the EEC - L94-95: rebuttal of the "xenophobia argument" - Clear victory but no real enthusiasm - Voting was leader-based more than opinion-based - Extremists' vs moderates? **Conclusion:** - In 1975 the divisions around the EEC were still not party based - Way more divisive within the Labour Party - At this stage the Conservative Party is the party of Europe - "The end of 14 years of National argument"? **1973-1990:\ A Membership Constantly Renegotiated\ Part -- II** **The last stand of the Labour Party as a Eurosceptic Party** **Michael Foot**, Leader of the Labour Party (1980 -- 1983) **Tony Benn**, Chairman of the Labour Party National executive Committee (1971 -- 72), Secretary for Industry (1974 -- 75) **Peter Taaffe**, Militant's Editor in Chief **Ted Grant**, Member of Militant's Editorial Board **Roy Jenkins**, Founder of the Social Democratic Party (1981), President of the European Commission (1977 -- 1981) **David Owen**, Founder of the Social Democratic Party (1981), Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1977 -- 1979) **Neil Kinnock**, Leader of the Labour Party (1983 -- 1992) **Margaret Thatcher**, Leader of the Conservative Party (1975 -- 90), Prime Minister (1979 -- 90) Social Democratic Party: "The Gang of Four": Shirley Williams, David Owen, Roy Jenkins, Bill Rogers **Labour in power after the 1975 referendum**: Wilson resigns in 1976 \> enters James Callaghan. Sterling crisis leads to an **IMF loan** which leads to cuts in public spending. **Callaghan was an Atlanticist** rather than a Europeanist. **Fall in support for EEC as Britain becomes biggest contributor to budget but 7th in GNP/capita**. First European Parliament elections postponed to 1979 because of inaction of Labour. Refusal to take part in the European Monetary System (only country to refuse to do so). **The rise of the labour left in the late 70s**: the 1970s were critical years. The failure of the moderates in government gave momentum to the left, increased further by the 1979 defeat. The crisis of the 1970s called for new approaches (Socialism/Thatcherism). Increased influence from the trade-unions, the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, entryism. The Labour Party has been the target of numerous entryist organisations since the 1920s. "Militant" is the most known although it only officially started to exist in 1964 as a newspaper. Evolution of the "Revolutionary Socialist League" who formed in 1957, which was itself a reformation of the "International Socialism Group" of 1952, which was a split from "the Club" founded in 1947. This split from "the Club" was mostly composed of the remnants of the "Revolutionary Communist Party" who didn't want to enter the Labour Party in 1947 (those who did formed the Club). The Revolutionary Communist Party was founded in 1943 but can trace its origins in many smaller Trotskyists "sects" from the 1930s. Militant was the "fifth biggest political party in Great Britain" while being an entryist organisation; could boast more than 6000 members in the 1980s. Very active membership, very organised, with a complex -- long term strategy. Capturing local sections \> get elected as delegates to the National conference of the Party. Actually, obtained seats in the National Executive committee of the Party, field candidates at elections under the Labour label. Was very influential at the beginning of the 1980s. Profoundly anti-EEC ("a capitalist club"). Labour left in general: by 1980, election of Michael Foot as Leader of the Party, with a mostly left wing National Executive committee. Dominance of the anti-marketeers within the governance of the party. **The split of the social democratic party**: 25 January 1981 = Limehouse declaration Manifesto for change, advocated for the creation of a "Council for Social Democracy"; against the militant Trade-Unions movement and against unilateral nuclear disarmament but in favour of more European integration. "*We want Britain to play a full and constructive role within the framework of the European Community, Nato, the United Nations and the Commonwealth*." 26 march 1981: formation of the Social Democratic Party by the "Gang of Four": Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams, David Owen, Bill Rodgers. The birth of the SDP would have a profound impact on British Politics. **The 1983 Labour party manifesto**: « The New Hope for Britain » : very Radical, Democratic-Socialist agenda : nationalisations of industries, massive investment in public education, prohibition of school selection, free public healthcare, transferring private empty houses to the public sector, ecological measures, schooling schemes for adults, etc. And **unconditional withdrawal from EEC.** Very divisive among the party**, fruit of Militant and Tribune's action: e**ntryism's high tide and strong ability to organise. "Moderates" still in the process of reforming after the departure of the SDP**.** "The longest suicide note in History" -- Gerald Kaufman (Labour MP, Secretary for Industry 1975 -- 79). *"In particular the rules of the Treaty of Rome are bound to conflict with our strategy for economic growth and full employment, our proposals on industrial policy and for increasing trade, and our need to restore exchange controls and to regulate direct overseas investment".* *Tony Blair : "we'll negotiate a withdrawal from the EEC which has drained our natural resources and destroyed jobs"*. Process: - Preliminary negotiations - Timetable - White paper - Repeal Bill: *"first, in order to amend the 1972 European Communities Act, ending the powers of the Community in the UK; and second, to provide the necessary powers to repeal the 1972 Act, when the negotiations on withdrawal are completed"* - Main negotiations - Abrogation of the treaty of accession - Period of Transition 1983. = defeat, and backlash against the left: Conservative win 61% of the seats. Conclusion: The problems of the 1970s paved the way for the rise of the left in the Labour Party. Adoption of a clear democratic socialist agenda + a profoundly Eurosceptic stance, which led to a massive defeat at the GE of 1983. This defeat enabled for a backlash against the left and the rise of the moderates who will bring the party towards more pro-European lines. **1973-1990:\ A Membership Constantly Renegotiated\ Part - III\ Margaret Thatcher's Premiership** **Margaret Thatcher**, British Prime Minister (1979 -- 1990) **Jacques Delors**, President of the European Commission (1985 -- 1995) **Geoffrey Howe**, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1979 -- 1983) ; Conservative Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1983 -- 1989) ; Deputy PM (1989 -- 1990) **Michael Heseltine**, Secretary for Defence (1983 -- 1986) Was Thatcher always eurosceptic? Elected leader of the Conservative Party in 1975. Elected Prime Minister after the Winter of Discontent (1978 -- 79) on a neoliberal platform (reducing State intervention in the economy, fight inflation, reduce power of the trade-unions). Was very close to the US but strong personality & convictions, doesn't like to concede or compromise ("The Iron Lady"). In line with her party on Europe: in favour. Voted yes in 1975, campaigned (although not actively). Even attacked the Labour Party for being "obstructive" and "malevolent" about the EEC. The refusal of the Labour Party to join the ERM was described as a "sad day" by Thatcher. BUT: never a firm believer like Heath, campaigned yes because did not want to oppose him publicly. Disliked Europe but was good at hiding it. Conservative party membership was still extremely divided on the question of the EEC. EEC was a constraint, became even more so with the rise of social-democrats in France. Three different phases about the EEC: 1979 -- 1984: Before Fontainebleau 1984 -- 1988: The Single European Act 1988. -- 1990: After the Bruges' speech Before Fontainebleau: constant issue with the UK contribution to the European budget. Attempt to get "our money back\". Defending British interests abroad, while the situation at home was difficult 1979-81: recession and soaring unemployment following 2nd oil shock. The EEC became a scapegoat for difficulties at home. Speech at EEC council summit 29-- 30 November 1979, Dublin: "we want our money back" want more money from EU for UK strategic / crucial event. Good way to conciliate the line of the party with her own ideology / budgetary demand. Introduction of the premises of Thatcherian monetarism through the defence of free-trade principles. Part of Thatcher\'s ideology was to **reduce public spending**, **including at the European level**, so to limit EEC budget any way. Problem was going to arise anyway, as **the agreement in 1971 was not satisfactory**. UK payed a **disproportionate amount** of the total budget: in 1979, £1 billion and growing: the CAP took up 70% of expenditure whereas British agriculture did not benefit a lot from it. EC revenues consist of customs duties, agricultural levies & a maximum 1% of VAT. General problem of funding for the EEC in these years because of the world crisis & looming enlargement to Spain & Portugal. 1979: dismissed the first offer of a rebate of £350 million. 1980: 760 million rebate in 1980-1: also rejected at first. Had to eventually accept under strong government pressure 2 years agreement. 1982 & 1983 again conflict, which blocked progress on other more important issues. Settlement at Fontainebleau Council: VAT ceiling was raised from 1 to 1.4% + rebate of 1 billion ECUs for 1984, and after that an annual rebate equivalent to 66% of the difference between GB\'s VAT contributions and its receipts. [Conclusion of the part 1:] European agenda of Thatcher is not so clear; not purely a "Eurosceptic" but a pragmatic. Not opposed to the common market but rather in its administration. Absence of question of political governance but a question of economic governance. Strategic dimension of her opposition to Europe. After Fontainebleau: Europe, the future? New phase: no need to play the nationalist card anymore. A document was addressed to EC heads of government by Thatcher : *Europe -- The Future* - *Strengthen European democracy* - *Accept Portugal and Spain* - *Extension of internal market (particularly on services sector)* - *European defence, environmental policy* - *"Agree urgently on certain organisational changes"* - *"Heighten the consciousness among our citizens of what unites us"* The Westland affair: Political scandal that erupted in 1985 \> Westland Helicopters, a British company. Thatcher and Trade and Industry Secretary Leon Brittan wanted to see Westland merge with Sikorsky, an American company. Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine was opposed to this, and he campaigned for Westland to be taken over by a European consortium. At a Cabinet meeting in January 1986, Heseltine threatened to resign if Thatcher did not allow a free discussion of the Westland affair. Thatcher refused, and Heseltine walked out of the meeting. Heseltine\'s resignation was the first Cabinet resignation over the EEC. It was a sign of the growing Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party. The path towards the single European act: Euroscelorisis. New generation of European leaders emerged, calling for further integration and economic reform: François Mitterand, Jacques Delors. Belief that further European integration was necessary to promote economic growth and prosperity. Contrary to Thatcher's neoliberal beliefs: skeptical of further European integration, fearing that it would lead to a loss of British sovereignty. Resented working with Mitterand and Delors BUT she was also interested in the idea of a single European market: not opposed to a more economically liberal Europe, to create new opportunities for British businesses and consumers. Single European Act : Draft by the British Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Arthur Cockfield ; seen as an opportunity to implement economic liberalism at a European level Concessions were made by Thatcher which paved the way for the rise of the Eurosceptics in her party Yet, several gains were made in order to make the UK sign the treaty : a rebate on the UK\'s contribution to the EC budget, a right to opt out of certain EC policies, such as the Social Chapter, a veto on changes to the EC\'s agricultural policy and a commitment to intergovernmentalism, meaning that decisions would continue to be made by the member states rather than by the European Commission. The negotiations: - **September 1985:** The Intergovernmental Conference on the Single European Act opens in Milan. - **December 1985:** The Intergovernmental Conference reaches an agreement on the SEA. - **February 1986:** The SEA is signed by member states of the EC (with a slight delay for Denmark, Italy and Greece) - **June 1987:** Ireland, the last country to not have done so ratifies the SEA. - **July 1987:** The SEA comes into force. What was inside the single European act: major revision of the Treaty of Rome. - The removal of tariffs and quotas on trade in goods within the EC. - The harmonization of technical standards and regulations. - The liberalization of financial services and capital movements. - The introduction of new policies on research and development, environmental protection, and social affairs. - The extension of the European Parliament\'s legislative powers. - The strengthening of the European Commission\'s role in implementing the single market. A move towards a federalist Europe? Technically, the SEA paved the way towards the Maastricht Treaty and the birth of the European Union. [Conclusion part 2:] The period (1984-87) is even more ambiguous. Both a moment of rising Euroscepticism (resignation of Heseltine, negotiation of exceptions with EEC reforms), and a moment of movement towards more European Integration (Single European Act), which shows that the UK remained an awkward partner for the EEC. The path to Bruges : February 1987, Delors proposal: package of reforms on budget, reform of CAP & increase in regional aid, research, transport & environment. Thatcher was opposed to almost everything, but in Feb 1988 she conceded on increase in funds and method of funding the EC. Economic and Monetary Union became a major goal for France & Germany in 1988 series of clashes between Delors and Thatcher. Last straw : Delors Speech during the debates in the European Parliament on 6 July 1988 : "*What I am afraid of is that some of these national parliaments are going to wake up with a shock one day, and that their outraged reaction will place yet more obstacles in the way of progress towards European Union".* Thatcher had a clash with her Chancellor Nigel Lawson and rejected idea of a European central bank but she was isolated and could not prevent setting up of the Delors committee. The fact that Delors was supported by the TUC added fuel to the fire in Thatcher's animosity towards what she increasingly considered to be a socialist project. Voir dessin diapo 29. The Bruges speech: 20^th^ September 1988. One of the most important evens defining the UK's attitude towards the EC: describes Margaret Thatcher's vision of Europe as an association of independent States. Still quoted today and was referred to over and over again during the Brexit campaign. Consequences of the Bruges speech: antagonisation of European partners + division of her supporters (Heath, Heseltine, Howe) + division of the Conservative Party between Europhiles and Eurosceptics + 1989: Creation of the Bruges Group. ERM (monetary union) debate: Delors report, 3 phases: - **Stage 1 (1990-1992)**: European Monetary System (EMS), which pegged the exchange rates of member states\' currencies to each other. - **Stage 2 (1993-1998)**: European Monetary Institute (EMI), which was responsible for preparing for the introduction of the single currency. - **Stage 3 (1999-present)**: Introduction of the euro and establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB). Joining the ERM (which was set up in 1979) was initially opposed by Thatcher, despite her cabinet being in favour of it Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson threatened to resign if MT refused to join. (No, no, no speech, October 1990 at the HoC : idea that the European institutions would replace national ones). The UK eventually joined the ERM in October 1990. Obtained an opt-out from joining EMU. Had to agree to the next major Treaty amendment, the Maastricht Treaty. Further fueled Eurosceptic feelings. Thatcher's defeat: people wanted her to stay but got kicked out by people of her own party. December 1989: First Challenge (Anthony Meyer). 1 November 1990: Resignation of Geoffrey Howe. 14 November: Heseltine's challenge 20 November: First Ballot (54,8 vs 40,9). 22 November: Margaret Thatcher withdraws from ballot (scrutin). Final conclusion: attempt to find balance between a strong ideological commitment, pragmatism and Euroscepticism on one hand, and the ability to maintain oneself in power after 11 years. Symbolic vs effective dimension of some of her actions such as the Bruges speech. Turning point in British politics, lasting legacy. **1990-2013: the definitive reversal of political attitudes towards the EU** Part 1: the rise of Eurosceptics within the Conservative party Plantu, 1ère diapo = dessin. John Major, chief secretary to the Treasury (1987-89). Secretary to Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1989), Chancellor of the Exchequor. Douglas Hurd, Home secretary and then Foreign secretary. Bill Cash: founder of the Maastricht Rebels (eurosceptism). John Major: calm & charming. Promoted so fast that he "appeared to be agree with whoever he's talking to", Tabbit. Ideology not so well known. Chancellor: wanted to join the ERM (October 1990). Succeeded Thatcher as a natural successor. Very consensual person. Lamont supported him because he felt Major was "safer" on Europe. Major wanted to differentiate from Thatcher, no to be "the son of Thatcher". Gave a speech saying that Thatcher would not be a "backseat driver". A new leader: change in leadership style: double edged sword. George Bush liked him a lot ≠ Thatcher. 1991: Bonn visit, "rebuild relationship with Europe", where according to him, UK belonged. That's where Thatcher stopped supporting him. Thatcher went in the media and gave many interviews. Voir Moodle. Was reelected in 1992 (he called for this election; he was surprised that he won), 5^th^ successive conservative government. Used his popularity to promote the citizen's charter of Europe, negotiated with the Maastricht Treaty. Economy in recession, and the party is really divided. "There's a part of the Party that actually never forgave him for having won the election", Matthew Parris. The path to Black Wednesday: tensions between Lamont and Major on the pound, Major wanted to keep it close to the Deutschmark ≠ Lamont who wanted to devalue the pound, couldn't negotiate against Major. Wanted Sterling to go as the benchmark currency in Europe. Needed the German bank to cut their interest rates to save the pound tried to pressure Kohl who always refused. Black Wednesday: 16 september 1992. Mass selling of the pound. Decision to increase the interest rate (when you borrow money) around the middle of the day (12%). But failure of increase of interest rate. Role of George Soros, shorting on the pound. Lamont wanted to devalue the pound, but Major wanted other cabinet members to decide. Douglas Hurd thought a quick withdrawal would be disastrous. Increase to 15% if interest rates. 7.40 PM: Lamont announces that UK suspends its participation in the ERM. "Public humiliation" for the cabinet. The withdrawal from the ERM: has been a defeat both for the monetarists and the pro-Europeans. Made the case for Eurosceptics. Conservative party conference in 1992 was all about Europe, Norman Tebbit's attack on Major at the conference. Thatcher wrote an article saying that Major was "damaging Britain's constitutional freedom by signing the Maastricht Treaty". The Maastricht treaty saga : An 18 month parliamentary process : 20-21 May 1992 : European Communities (Amendment) Act : 22 conservative rebels ; 2 June 1992 : Denmark votes no at a first referendum to ratify the treaty (50,7% against) ; September 1992 : Short majority in the French referendum (51% in favour). Mid-September: black Wednesday 4^th^ November 1992: paving motion, 26 conservative MPs rebel, government wins by 36 votes. - Many organisations against the ratification: Friends of the Burges Group, UKIP (launched in 1993) - Eurosceptics supporters in Cabinet (Michael Portillo, Peter Lilley, Michael Howard) - 20 may 1993: passed third reading (292/112) **The government's defeat and the vote of confidence**: 22 July 1993 : Amendment by Labour to postpone the treaty until the government adopts the social chapter 317 vs 317 the speaker (Betty Boothroyd vote with the government and defeated the motion). Then rebels join with Labour and defeat the government (324 vs 316). Bastards : August 1993: Major calls for a vote of confidence (passed by 40 votes). After winning the confidence vote = - Off-camera conversation with ITN's Michael Brunson was monitored, transcribed, and leaked by BBC staff, where Major talks about bastard who are traitors of the party by being eurosceptic - Michael Portillo, Peter Lilley, John Redwood, Edward Leigh or Michael Howard? **The exclusion of the rebels**: 1994: 8 rebels are excluded from the parliamentary party after a rebellion on a European finance vote. Some other prominent Eurosceptics stay in the party but organized a stark resistance against anything European. **Redwood's challenge:** 1995 = new internal election. Faced by John Redwood Major reelected but with a majority that didn't silence the opposition. Anti-Federalist League (1991) then UKIP (1993 -- now) Nigel Farage. Conclusion: Not a Thatcher on Europe. The European question proved to be a challenge for Major at an intra-party level. The rise of Eurosceptics within the Conservative Party showed that, in order to keep the party united you had to please them politically Was the Maastricht debate the "point of origin" of the Brexit referendum? Major is against the Brexit in 2020. Part 2: the European turn of the Labour party Tony Blair, Leader of the Labour Party (1994-2007), Prime Minister (1997-2007) Gordon Brown, Prime Minister (2007-10), Chancellor of the Exchequer (1997-2007) Neil Kinnock, Leader of the Labour Party (1983-92) Peter Mandelson, Minister without portfolio (1997-98), Secretary for Northern Ireland (1999-2001), European Commissioner for Trade (2004-08) The 1983 defeat: Resounding defeat, 61% of the seats for Conservative. Put an end to any radical left-wing, anti-marketeer challenge to Thatcher. A new leader: Neil Kinnock: Left wing credentials. Elected against a pro-European (Roy Hattersley). Needs to find a balance between all different factions in his party. The 1987 Labour's Manifesto and defeat: "Labour\'s aim is to **work constructively with our EEC partners** to promote economic expansion and combat unemployment. However, we will **stand up for British interests within the European Community** and will seek to put an end to the **abuses and scandals of the Common Agricultural Policy**. We shall, **like other member countries**, **reject EEC interference with our policy for national recovery and renewal**." Defeat at the 1987 GE: 57,9% of the seats for Conservative. **The policy review (1987-1990):** after the 1987 defeat need to reconcile with voters - Policy Review - Tom Sawyer (Deputy General Secretary of & member of Labour NEC (1981-94), Chair of Labour NEC (1990-91), General Secretary of the Labour Party (1994-98) - 3 years enquiry - Abandonment of the withdrawal of the EEC - Failure of Tony Benn's challenge in 1988 - 88.6% Kinnock vs 11.4% Benn - From 1990: Meet the Challenge, Make the Change: A New Agenda for Britain - **Move away from the trade-unions** - Rehabilitation of the private sector, **program based on competivity** End of the European debate **Europe as a way to oppose Thatcher**: the policy Review was not just a way to oppose Thatcher. Included in a new strategy for social democrats following French failure Jacques Delors and *l'espace social *: Social Charter, ETUC involvement (CES en français). **EC as an opportunity rather than a constraint**. More leeway in the European Parliament than in the HoC 8^th^ September 1988: Jacques Delors addresses the TUC: Workers' rights in Europe, Concept Social Citizenship. Described as "*Socialism through the backdoor*" (Margaret Thatcher). "*Each vote for a Labour Euro candidate is a vote for Labour and is a vote against Thatcher and her divisive policies for Britain and Europe*", Tony Clarke. **Enters Tony Blair**: elected leader of the LP in 1994 + Prime Minister (1997-2007). Third way ideology: New Labour, Clause IV change. Continuity with the past? Be at the "centre of Europe" no conflict between national sovereignty and belonging to the EU. **Clause IV:** **1918, Object**: "To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the **common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service."** **1994, aims and values**: "We work for \[...\]a **dynamic economy**, serving the **public interest**, in which **the enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition are joined with the forces of partnership and co-operation** to produce the wealth the nation needs and the opportunity for all to work and prosper, with a thriving public sector and high quality services, where those undertakings essential to the common good are either owned by the public or accountable to them". "The Labour Party is a **democratic socialist party**. It believes that by the strength of our common endeavour, we achieve more than we achieve alone so as to create for each of us the **means to realise our true potential** and for all of us a community in which power, wealth and opportunity are in **the hands of the many not the few**, where the **rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe**, and where we live together, freely, in **a spirit of solidarity, tolerance and respect**." **1997 Labour manifesto**: Our vision of Europe is of an alliance of independent nations choosing to co-operate to achieve the goals they cannot achieve alone. We oppose a European federal superstate. There are only 3 options for Britain in Europe. The first is to come out. The second is to stay in, but on the sidelines. The third is to stay in, but in a leading role. **At the centre of Europe:** Priority to enlargement rather than to consolidation. 1997: Amsterdam Treaty: extension of majority voting; area of free movement, security and justice (for ex: asylum) ; prepare extension of EU ; "Flexibility clause" to move further down the integrationist path. Acceptance of the social chapter. 1999: Koln European Council 1999 \> reinforcing European Security and Defence Policy. More liberal approach to economic issues. 2000: Lisbon Agenda "Make Europe, by 2010, the most competitive and the most dynamic knowledge based economy in the world". 2004: Enlargement, 10 more States, Free movement reinforced BUT phased implementation. 2009: Lisbon Treaty. Diplomatic success? Good relations with other leaders + Gerard Schröder's Neue Mitte; anthesis of Thatcher & Major. But failure to break the Franco-German couple. A problematic link with the US. **The monetary union debate:** 1996: John Major and Kenneth Clarke announce they would adopt Euro as a currency under the condition of a referendum. 1997: Blair and Brown not so keen on the idea, refuse to join first wave. Series of "5 economic tests". October 1997: Brown announces Britain would not join the Euro "during this parliament's lifetime. Blair adds "unless unforeseen circumstances" escape clause. Source of tension between the PM & Mandelson and the Chancellor, rediscussed every time: 2001, 2003. Finally ruled out completely in 2007 once Brown becomes PM. **The Europeanisation of British politics:** paradox, UK a difficult member but a good follower of EU rules, and British administration was very efficient in Brussels. In Whitehall: no Ministry of Europe before 2016; British specificity: number of lawyers had been increased within Cabinet Office, both for legal advice and litigation with the European Court of Justice ; once Britain signed something, it would implement it might have caused some of the difficulties In Brussels: UK representation = 40 civil servants; Good British representation within EU institutions, especially the Commission. **[Conclusion:]** Was the New Labour era an European Moment? More complicated than it seems: normalised the use of referendums; The Monetary Union dilemma (the five tests); More Atlanticist than Europeanist (third way theories, war in Irak). Kept the ball rolling as John Major tried to do, but never tried to overcommit. Gordon Brown absent from the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. More a rhetorical device than a commitment.