Social Cognition (CN9) - PDF

**[Social Cognition]** - Where am "I" in my brain? - Do we process information about others and ourselves in the same way? - Is social information processing the same for everyone, or is it affected by individual and cultural differences? - To what extent is emotion involved in s...

**[Social Cognition]** - Where am "I" in my brain? - Do we process information about others and ourselves in the same way? - Is social information processing the same for everyone, or is it affected by individual and cultural differences? - To what extent is emotion involved in social cognition? **[Anatomical structures of social cognition]** - **Prefrontal cortex (PFC)** - Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) - Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) - **Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)** - Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) - Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) - Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) - Automatic nervous system (ANS) - Hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) - Superior temporal sulcus (STS) - Fusiform face area (FFA) - Temporoparietal junction (TPJ) - Medial parietal cortex **[LO:]** 1. How and where do we process information related to the 'self'? 2. What is the role of the orbitofrontal cortex in social cognition? 3. How does theory of mind work, what are mirror neurons? 4. Why do we have empathy? How is this processed? **[Social isolation]** Socially isolating rats tends to cause changes to PFC function, synaptic plasticity, increased aggression etc, all leading into adulthood (Lukkes et al., 2009) BUT... not just social isolation as non-play also leads to similar effects (Schnieder., 2016). Findings that when rats whi had no social play between 21 and 42 days postnatal, when they were adults they had impaired decision making. **[HPA activation (hypothalamic pituatry adrenal]**) Rats under stress found to activate pariventrual nucleus in the hypothalamus (which activates HPA stress response) showing prolonged corticol levels in adult rats compared to prepubal) showing long lasting effects of stress (Lui., et al 2012) Human perceived isolation P: humans perceiving social isolation (sense of loneliness) have affects neuology E: higher morbity, higher vascular pressure, higher HPA activity and it's a prediciter of cognitive decline. Thus showing that the central nervous system is vulnerable to stress during childhood and adolence. Even the perception of this causes the same results. (Cacioppo., 2014) **[Socrates]** He emphasised the importance of knowing 'thyself' We do this through self-perception (knowing physical and essence self) **[How and where do we process information related to the 'self'?]** ***Self-reference effect:*** Remembering stuff that relates to us better as we processes it to be with us How to measure 1. 'does this trait describe you or Geogre Bush' 2. Ppts were most likey to remember the words that they associated with themselves. **[Where in the brain is the self-represented?]** - Medial frontal cortex - Found to be more active in 'self' related words than in other people - More deactivation when relating to other people - The mFC deactivates when obtaining information, so it's a matter of how deactivated it is **[Summary]** 1. Self reference tests tell us how we process and store information about ourselves compared to information about others. 2. Information about the self is processed in more depth. 3. The **medial prefrontal cortex** is heavily involved in the processing of self-referential information -- it shows less deactivation during self-referential tasks than other areas. 4. Why less deactivation? -- other areas become more active Self exists outside of general knowledge E: patient DB was asked to describe his tarits and his daughter traits. He struggled to say his daughters traits but was fine with his own. Therefore showing trait based semantic knowledge occurs outside of general sematic knowledge. (Klein et al., 2002) E: furthermore, this suggests that the self is not a unitary process because trait based semantic knowledge seems to be different to self knowledge. One might know theyre suborn, but don't know their own birthday. Personal Agency and Self knowledge P: one can have personal agency but not self knwoedlge E: for example, desmurgent 2009 found that he could make someone think they had moved their hand, when they hadn't. this activated the posterior parietal cortex showing that personal agency area. E: also damage to medial tmeproal lobes allow for self knowledge to be in tact but impairs episodic memory. Thus self knowledge is a vast system **[The resting state network: introspection, idling, day dreaming]** This is active when you do nothing and active during day dreaming -- thus is relevant to ourself. Deactivation of these areas when we think about the external world and other people. This is the default network: Including the mPFC (the dorsal MFC, ventral MFC) precunus, posterior cingulate cortex etc Higher metabolic rates in the mPFC reflect self-reference such as evaluating our current conditions. The default network is there so we know what is going on around us: called the sentinel hypothesis 1. The **resting state brain network** is more active when people are at rest (daydreaming, idling). 2. It largely consists of areas of the **medial frontal and parietal cortex** and the **lateral parietal cortex**. 3. It is assumed to be involved in the processing of '**self-referential'** information (me in relation to the world). 4. Thus, **other (non-resting state**) areas **deactivate during self-referential** processing, but the resting state network does not! **[Socrate's imperative: know thyself]** ++ memorise word ?  **[Judging the self]** 'I am not good at X' -- negative judgement 'I am good at Y' -- positive judgement - When rated positive less activation in the ventral anterior cingulate cortex (vACC) - Allows us to differentiate between positive and negative world outcomes. Similar findings in the anterior cingulate cortex when asked to imagine a positive event compared to a negatice event. Thus anterior cingulate cortex is important ofr distinguishing positive and negative self-relevant information. vACC is disturbed in depressed patients. Inserting currents into the right side of the brain made bulls become less aggressive. **[The OFC, social emotion and social knowledge]** Lhermitte has patients with OFC lesions. They suffered from 'utilisation behaviour'. They tend to have an unrealistic positive view of self, and engage in inappropriate social behaviour. Syringe on a tray. Doctor shows his bum to the ppts. What would the patient do? The ppt put the syringe in. Patients with OFC lesions can't help but do the behaviour.  OFC Medial frontal cortex **[The OFC ]** Subjects conformed with new person, asked to do small talk. The patent then is asked about how they think they performed. **[OFC lesions ]** - Talk about boring subjects for hours - Think they did well - Misjudge how they did in social context Then made them watch the video back. They **[change]** their judgement when in the 3^rd^ person. People with OFC lesions, once seeing what they have done, get more embarrassed. Thus they know they are right, but cant tell when in 1^st^ person. **Patients with OFC damage engage in utilization behaviour and are unable to rely on somatic markers to guide their behaviour.** Phineas Gage **Prefrontal** and **OFC** **damage** canes Gage's personality. He couldn't plan the future in a meaningful way, became aggressive, anti-social. **[Lobotomies]** - Attempts to cure the mentally ill - Go through orbital bone and destroy OFC - Made the patients appear zombie like (no personality) **[Perception of other people]** 1. Hearing phrases people said 2. Asked to remember order of faces and statements (sequence formation) 3. Asked about the phrase and infer about the person (impression formation) mPFC activation - If subjects were asked to make inferences about others (impression formation) mPFC inactivation -- when asked to do the ordering task (not making impressions) ACTIVATION not DEACTIVATION because +++ **The mPFC shows more deactivation than other frontal areas when judging self-referential information, is critical involved in judgement/perception of other people and for self-perception.** **[Theory of mind: inside the other self ]** *'What is the intention of that person'* **Sally-Anne False Belief Task** TPJ invigored in theory of mind -- thinking about what other people are thinking about **ToM** = can tell where sally will look (basket) **No ToM** = can't tell where sally will look ***Where do we process other people's projected thoughts?*** **False belief**: putting self into mind of people *EXAMPLE*: John told Emily that he had a Porsche, but his car is a Ford. Emily does not know anything about cars, so she believed John. When she sees his car she thinks it is a.... (**Porsche**/Ford?) **False photograph**: EXAMPLE: Emily takes a photo of an apple hanging on a branch. While going home the wind blows the apple off the tree. In the evening she shows the photo to John. John sees the apple on the (**tree**/ground)? **BOLD responses** **in the TPJ** were greater for the false belief as this is theory of mind. Further research shows more activation when thinking about someone elses THOUGHTS in comparison to other people's bodily sensations and appearances. When people think about what others are thinking about, the **TPJ** shows activity.  Saxe and Wexler (2005) found that rTPJ is more activated when thinking about others mental states, not about where they are in social backgrounds or life events. Thus showing the rTPJ is about someones mental state. **[Nonverbal cues, gaze direction and mental states]** We learn about the perception of other people through their facial expressions and eye gazes. ***Superior temporal sulcus (near TPJ)*** 1. Watch a person looking left right left right 2. When person looks left when checker board moved left 3. Inferring the person is tracking the checker board 4. Congruent = look left when left 5. Incongruent = look left when right **Congruent**: can infer what they looking at - **superior temporal sulcus** is active **Incongruent**: cant infer what they're looking at -- superior is not active More research on eye gazes STS more strongly activated when virtual reality chcaracters make eye contact with the ppt than when they avert their eyes from the ptt (Pelphrey et al., 2004). Showing the STS appears to singal the focus of attention of another rindividual as well as improtnact social signals. Therefore showing that the SPS is important in infering other peoples mental states through eye gazes. Theory of mind in ASD rTPJ was less responsive in a physical or mental judgment task of self or others. Finding that mental judgment task of self and others showed less activation in rTPJ compared to typically developed people. STS showed activation in both congruent and incongruent eye gazes -- showing people with ASD could not understand the specific inferences of people. The default network ASD people tend to find no difference between active and resting brain states when doing self reference tasks (Kennedy et al., 2006) PET studies suggest this is because the default network is always off. Judgement tasks of self Findings that ASD had reduced vPFC and vACC during judgement and resting states. Mirror neuron networks Asked children to do a task involving: reaching for food, grabbing, bringing to mouth Then asked children to WATCH someone do it Findings: MH (mylhoid) was activated in typical children during both action and observing. In ASD children, the MH only activated in last bringing to mouth movement and non in the observatins. 1. Theory of mind is our ability to infer the **intentions, plans, actions of other people.** 2. The **temporo-parietal junction** is active during **theory of mind** processing. 3. The **temporo-parietal junction** (**superior temporal cortex**) is also active when judging **other person's intentions from their actions** (e.g. where do they look?). **[Mirror neurons ]** Simulation theory, empathy, mirror neurons: a shared substrate for perceptions about our 'self' and about others Disgust measured through foul odours Comparing real disgust with seeing other people experience disgust. - Findings that the ventral anterior **insular cortex** activates when **seeing others being disgusted into tempral lobe epilepsy patients** - *Fusiform gyrus doesn't differentiate between different emotions* Patient with inslua lesion - Could not distinguish disgust emotions (Calder et al., 2000) Inslula also been seen to be relevant in pain - Perception of pain of a loved one = anterori insula activation - Actual pain of self = anterior insula activation Singer and Lamm. 2009 How do we know who is feeling what if they are the same brain regions? They aren't the exact same. **Do we have embodied awareness?** - Findings show that anterior insula activation only occurs within self and clos eothers, not public figures - Murray et al., 2012 **Activation for self vs others** Schmiter and Johnson., 2007 Self = right vmPFC Others = left vmPFC Public figures = dmPFC Showing that who we are percieiving is involved in different areas **[Experience sharing theory]** Some aspects of inferring others mental states is based on our ability to minic (unconisoully) other peoples actions. Research suggests this is th ehuamn ability to put ourselves into other peoples shoes. In the default network, the mPFC is associated with the perception of self and others. Experience sharing theory states that mPFC is involved in these two because, in order to think about others, we must think about the self. JP Mitchell et al., 2006 found that when someone is thinking about themselves and a similar person, the mPFC is activated. But when thinking about self and dissimilar person, it isn't active. The task was to read descriptions of similar political viewed and on similar political views. Then measuring brain activity when answering questions about their own and the other persons preferences. However... research suggests its not just about similarities with people, its more detailed complex commonalities such as familiairly, warmth and emotional improtnace (Ochsner er al., 2005) as ot was found that self perception and perception of roomatic partners were similar. **[Empathy and the perceived pain of others]** Empathy = survival value 1. Electric shocks in a scanner that are painful and unpleasant, what areas are activate? 2. Then watching panners receiving shocks *Findings*: the brain activity was similar for own pain and pain of partner with pain being correlated with empathy scores **Right insula cortex** is relevant for **shared pain** and empathy Green = self-pain Red = partner pain Correlations of empathy and perceived pain Empathy is aided by different types of mirror neurons that help to emulate what others perceive. **[Empathy, lust for revenge and the perceived pain of others ]** **[Singer et al]** 1. Ppts play a game with 'someone' aka a computer 2. They had to exchange money with someone they know or don't know 3. Every time move penny to other player, it gets doubled (hoping they move it back to get doubled), and the other player picks how much ot give to the other 4. If other player ends up with similar amount of money then they be seen as 'fair' WOMEN: The anterior insula (reflecting own pain) is affected when fair and unfair players occur due to higher empathy for fair players. MEN: found increase in no empathy areas, such as nucleus accumbens **Direct link to pain of unfair and fair players** 5. Then lust for revenge was estimated 6. Asked ppt 'would you like this person to be punished' More activation in **nucleus accumbent when wanting reveng**e. **Nucleus accumbens is the reward** centre, showing the punishment is rewarding (giving us joy) MEN: effect was stronger and so was the desire for revenge **Empathy activated the anterior insula (perceiving pain of person eel empathise)** Revenge activated the nucleus accumbent This activation level was correlated with desire to revenge (on a self report) **[Summary]** 1. Empathy activates brain networks that are normally active when we (ourselves) perceive pain, pleasure, fun, agony,..... 2. The strength of empathy feelings is related to the strength of 'liking' and that in turn differentially activates empathy brain centers when feeling for others. 3. Revenge (when obtained and desired) activates centers in the brain that normally process rewards. Lecture summary 1. The 'self' is likely processed by the 'default mode network'. 2. Orbitofrontal cortex is vital to monitor behaviour according to social norms and to support decision making. 3. Theory of mind tests activate the rTPJ, and other structure involved in default mode processing. 4. Is empathy a reflection of mirror neuron activity?