Gender and Paid Employment - Chapter 6 PDF

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How likely are you to recommend Top Hat for other classes? Dismiss 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very unlikely Neutral Very likely Exported for Justin Trottier on Tue, 03 Dec 2024 07:53:01 GMT Chapter 6: Gender and Paid Employment “In October 2017, five days after the New Yorker published Ronan Farrow’s first article on Harvey Weinstein, the actress and activist Alyssa Milano was lying in bed with her daughter when her phone buzzed; her friend... had sent her a screenshot. It read: ‘Suggested by a friend: if all the women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted, wrote “Me too” as a status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.’ Milano added a sentence to her friend’s message and posted it on Twitter: ‘If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted, write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.’... “When Milano woke up the next day, #MeToo was trending number one on Twitter. It had been retweeted fifty- five thousand times. In the next six weeks, the hashtag appeared on Facebook eighty five million times. Milano didn’t know it at the time but the actual #MeToo hashtag was started by African American activist Tarana Burke and had a long history online as a grassroots movement against sexual abuse of women of color.... In the December 2017 issue of Time magazine, the impact of the stories empowering marginalized victims and humiliating the abusers was clear. Time named the women who came forward, including Milano and Tarana Burke, as its People of the Year. The Silence Breakers, Time called them.” Source: Linda Hirshman. (2019). Reckoning: The Epic Battle Against Sexual Abuse and Harassment. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, p. 209-212. Introduction In 2015, after winning the Canadian federal election, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made headlines around the world by appointing a gender-balanced cabinet. Asked why gender equity was such an important priority, Trudeau replied simply: “Because it’s 2015.” Despite some criticism of the move, most Canadians seemed to agree that recognition of women’s leadership ability was welcome and long overdue.1 Among the 15 women appointed to cabinet was Jody Wilson-Raybould, a lawyer and former chief of the BC Assembly of First Nations, and the first Indigenous woman to hold the post of Minister of Justice and Attorney General. Also appointed was Chrystia Freeland, a former Financial Times journalist, who as Minister of International Trade would go on to negotiate the free trade agreement between Canada, the United States, and Mexico (USMCA), discussed in Chapter 2. Yet just two years after Trudeau’s historical act, the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements provided an abrupt reminder that, for many women, gender equity at work still remains far out of reach. In selecting the #MeToo movement (and the “Silence Breakers” who sparked it) as 2017 Person of the Year, Time magazine noted the critical role the movement had played in sparking debate and change, and renewing attention to persistent gender inequities in paid work. Despite women’s increased education and career goals, today sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and unequal pay remain all too common problems. Perpetuating the situation, men continue to hold more lucrative, powerful positions, while persistent barriers to women’s leadership remain. Illustrating this, Jody Wilson-Raybould later resigned after a high-profile dispute with Trudeau in which she defended the integrity of Canada’s justice system in the wake of the SNC Lavalin scandal. Tackling these issues, this chapter examines contemporary gender patterns of work in Canada. We discuss the dramatic rise of women’s participation in higher education and paid work in recent decades, but also the marked gendering of work in the labour market. Central to our discussion are two seemingly contradictory trends: on the one hand, significant gains in women’s employment opportunities, aspirations, and rewards, and on the other, the persistence of major work-related gender inequities. As we will see, despite gains by some women, a great deal of women’s work continues to be undervalued and poorly rewarded. Consequently, gender remains a key determinant of inequality in our society. To better grasp the causes and consequences of gender inequity in the work world, we examine historical and contemporary questions: What forces in the past created a gender divide between the home and paid labour market? What factors have either pushed or pulled women into paid employment in recent decades? Why do women remain concentrated in a limited range of jobs at the bottom of the occupational ladder? How did these jobs come to be labelled “female”? Conversely, why do men still predominate in the most rewarding jobs that have come to be defined as “male”? Finally, what barriers and practices operate to preserve gendered patterns of work, and how can gender equity and inclusivity in the workplace be achieved? Before we proceed, a word of clarification on terms. We use a common sociological distinction between sex and gender. Basically, sex is the biological distinction between men and women; gender is socially constructed, reflecting how a particular society defines “masculine” and “feminine” roles. Thus, we can observe sex segregation in occupations—that is, men and women holding distinct jobs. But to explain this, it is necessary to look at how jobs are gendered—that is, how they become associated with “masculine” and “feminine” roles, practices, and identities. Following sociologists of work and organizations, we prefer the term gender, given that male–female differences in employment are almost solely a product of socially constructed ideas about gender. Reflecting recent insights, we also note that gender identity and expression more typically reflect a continuum, than a strict male–female dichotomy and may not always correspond to biological sex. Equally important, gender intersects with other important categories of social difference, such as ethnicity and race, sexual orientation, class, age, and generation (Messerschmidt et al. 2018). Gender and Work in Historical Context Although history has, for the most part, been written from the perspective of men, even a quick glance back to the past reveals that women have always performed a vital, if somewhat unacknowledged, economic role. Indigenous women, for example, were indispensable to the fur trade, the major industry during much of Canada’s colonial period. Sylvia Van Kirk’s (1980) important historical work Many Tender Ties demonstrates how male traders relied on Indigenous women to act as interpreters, prepare food, clean pelts for market, and teach them wilderness survival skills. Little wonder that fur traders sought them out as wives (see also Racette 2012; Williams 2012). When an agrarian economy began to develop in Upper Canada (now Ontario) during the 19th century, the family was the basic production unit, in which women played a key role. Men worked the fields, while women looked after all domestic work associated with child rearing, tending the livestock and garden, making clothes, and preparing food.2 Similarly, in the Canadian West in the early 1900s, women contributed significantly to agricultural development by working on their family farms and by making the farm home “a haven of safety and healthfulness.”3 Industrialization and Women’s Work In Chapter 1, we noted that one consequence of the rise of large-scale factory production was a growing separation between the work that men and women did. Men were drawn into the industrial wage-labour market; women were increasingly confined to the domestic sphere of the household. Marjorie Cohen’s feminist analysis of economic development in 19th-century Ontario reveals that, prior to wide-scale industrialization, an integration of family and household existed within the emerging market economy (Cohen 1988). Traditional theories of industrialization, Cohen points out, tend to ignore the contribution of households to the economy. Ontario’s early economy was primarily based on two staple exports, wheat and timber, which were subject to unstable international markets. Consequently, women’s household labour had to fulfill two functions: generate family income by producing agricultural goods to sell in the local consumer market, and perform the domestic chores necessary for the family’s survival. Cohen’s research underlines the importance of examining how the public and private spheres of market and household have been intertwined in diverse ways during all phases of economic development, with women always performing pivotal roles, albeit quite different from those performed by men. The absence of a wage-labour market and the necessity of contributing to the household economy meant that few women were formally employed outside the home before the rise of industrial capitalism. Even in late 19th- century Canada, only a fraction of women were engaged in paid employment. In 1891, for example, 11.4 percent of girls and women over the age of 10 were employed, accounting for 12.6 percent of the entire labour force (Lowe 1987: 47). But as factories sprang up in the late 19th century, they began to redefine women’s economic role. Employers in some light industries, such as textiles, recruited women as cheap unskilled or semiskilled labourers who, according to prevailing stereotypes, would be less likely to unionize and more tolerant of boring tasks. By focusing only on paid employment, we risk ignoring the work activities of most women during this era. The unpaid domestic labour of women—raising the future generation of workers and feeding, clothing, and caring for the present generation of workers—was an essential function within capitalism (also referred to as social reproduction). Out of these competing pressures on women emerged a gendered division of labour that persists today. As we discuss in more detail in Chapter 7, this now takes the form of the double day (or, in equally graphic terms, the second shift), whereby many women spend their days in paying jobs, yet still assume most of the responsibilities of childcare, eldercare, and domestic chores when they get home. Early-20th-century attitudes about women’s economic roles reflected traditional ideas about marriage and motherhood, as well as about class, race, and ethnicity (Campbell 2009; Patrias 2016). Expanding manufacturing and service industries had an almost insatiable demand for both blue- and white-collar workers. The employment of young, single women prior to marriage came to be tolerated and socially acceptable in domestic, clerical, sales, and some factory jobs. Once married, however, women were expected to retreat into the matrimonial home. Of course, some wanted to remain in the labour force, and others were forced to stay through economic necessity. In these cases, married women laboured at the margins of the economy in domestic and other menial jobs that usually had been abandoned by single women.4 Industrialization accentuated age, gender, and other divisions in the economy. Examining the work patterns of working-class women in Montreal, Canada’s first large industrial city, Bettina Bradbury documents how age and sex determined who was drawn into wage-labour. Women made up about 35 percent of the city’s industrial workforce during the 1870s. In certain industries, such as domestic work and the sewing and dressmaking trades, four out of five workers were women, and most of them were single. Given the scarcity of wage-labour for wives because of strong sanctions against their employment, such women could make a greater contribution to the family economy by being household managers. In this role, wives “stretched the wages” of male family members and single daughters as far as possible, occasionally supplementing this by taking in boarders or turning to neighbours or charities for help (Bradbury 1993). The Family Wage Ideology Powerful social values justified this division of labour. Especially influential in perpetuating women’s subordinate role as unpaid family workers was the ideology of the family wage. As working-class men began organizing unions to achieve better wages and working conditions, one of the labour movement’s demands was that wages should be high enough for a male breadwinner to support a wife and children. The labour movement’s successes in this regard had the effect of drastically reducing women’s presence, and the cheap labour they provided, in the workplace (a policy typical of unions until a serious male labour shortage arose in World War I). Middle-class reformers also lobbied for restrictions on female industrial employment due to its presumed harmful personal and social effects. In response, employers limited their hiring mainly to single women, further reinforcing this ideology. Despite its sexist tone, the family wage ideology may have helped raise the standard of living in working-class families. The price, of course, was female dependence and the restriction of women’s labour market opportunities to areas where they did not compete directly with men—hence the endurance of the term male breadwinner.5 The family wage ideology tells only part of the story of women’s lives during early industrialization, however. Joy Parr’s (1990) study of two Ontario industrial towns, Paris and Hanover, between 1880 and 1950, clearly shows there was variation in the broad contours of gendered work patterns. On the surface, both Paris and Hanover appeared to be typical small, thriving manufacturing communities. But the knit-goods industry based in Paris relied on a largely female workforce, while in Hanover’s large furniture factory, the workers were almost exclusively male. Consequently, different gender identities, attitudes, and behaviours arose to maintain each town’s labour force. In Paris, employers organized production to fit around childbearing and child rearing, and it was common for women to work for pay throughout their lives. Certainly, Paris was the exception at the time in Ontario. Nonetheless, its flow of daily life during the 80 years covered by Parr’s study forces us to reconsider a model of industrialization based on one dominant mode of production in which males are the breadwinners. This brief historical sketch has identified a number of prominent themes. First, although their widespread participation in the paid labour force is a recent development, women have always made essential economic contributions. Second, women’s entry into paid employment occurred in ways that reproduced their subordinate position in society relative to that of men, although the specific forms this took varied across time and place. Women’s position was also shaped by class, ethnicity, age, and other social differences. Third, the changing interconnections among households, families, and the wage-labour market are crucial to understanding women’s roles in the continuing evolution of 21st-century capitalism. Gender and Labour Force Participation Patterns Few changes in Canadian society since World War II have had as far-reaching consequences as women’s influx into paid work. Virtually all industrialized nations have experienced rising female labour force participation rates since the end of World War II. This trend has been especially rapid in Canada. Figure 6.1 provides a comparison of labour force participation rates among adult women (ages 15 and older) for nine major industrial nations, over nearly four decades, from the mid-1970s to the early 2010s. Note that rising female employment is a trend in virtually all countries. Canada experienced one of the largest changes, along with Australia, Germany, and Italy. The tremendous expansion of white-collar service-sector jobs, coupled with rising education and a declining birthrate, drew millions of Canadian women into employment at an accelerated rate. As early as the mid-1980s, Canada’s female labour force participation rate had surpassed that of all countries in Figure 6.1 except for Sweden. The latter is an interesting case, as it shows far less change than nearly all other countries during this time: women’s employment had been actively encouraged by Swedish state policies for decades. Factors Influencing Women’s and Men’s Employment What social and economic factors account for this remarkable increase in Canada’s female labour force participation? Clearly, there was no single cause. The huge postwar baby-boom generation was completing its education and flooding into an expanding job market by the late 1960s. Young women were becoming much better educated, which raised their occupational aspirations and made them more competitive with men in the job market. Traditional stereotypes of women’s work no longer fit reality. The massive expansion of white-collar service-sector jobs boosted the demand for female labour, and the growth of feminism contributed to more liberal social values regarding women’s work roles. As we have seen (Chapter 4), service-sector growth also fuelled a trend to part-time jobs, which are convenient for women with family responsibilities. Shrinking family size, due to accessible and reliable birth control (Nelson 1996), enabled married women to pursue employment more readily. Rising divorce rates in the 1980s and 1990s forced a growing number of women to earn their own income. Finally, in many families, the reality (or threat) of declining living standards made a second income essential. In short, the interaction of supply and demand factors underlie the sharp rise in female employment. How women make choices and trade-offs between paid work, family life, and child rearing has been the subject of much debate. On one side, researchers such as Catherine Hakim (2000) argue that women’s ­“preferences” explain the growing diversity in female employment. Downplaying the role of gender segregation or discrimination, Hakim contends women choose one of three patterns: “home-centered” (where family is the priority), “career-centered” (where work is the priority), or “adaptive” (where non-career jobs are blended with family responsibilities). Similar ideas have informed public debates over the “opt out revolution” (Belkin 2003), suggesting that highly educated women are choosing motherhood over paid work. Yet while work preferences play a role, so do many other factors, including workplace inflexibility, access to childcare, discrimination, and the availability of suitable work. For instance, Joan Williams and colleagues (2013, 2014) critique the “opt out” thesis. They show that “maternal walls” and “glass ceilings” play an equal role in shaping women’s work, while noting that for many women, work is a necessity, not a choice. Likewise, Stone’s (2007) study of professional women shows they are more likely to be “shut out” than to “opt out” of the workplace. Warner (2013) also highlights the challenges faced by working mothers who have “opted out” as they try to re-enter paid work. All of this suggests, as McRae (2003: 317) has argued, that an adequate analysis of women’s work “depends as much on understanding the constraints that differentially affect women as it does on understanding their personal preferences (see also Lewis and Simpson 2017). Indeed, there is no question that many factors have a bearing on the labour force participation of women and men. Figure 6.2 identifies important variations in 2018 participation rates in seven provinces and by age, ­marital status, family status, and educational level. Women in Alberta have the highest participation rate (66.1 percent), followed by those in Manitoba (62.3 percent). Newfoundland and Labrador has the lowest rate at 55.3 percent. Men’s rates in all seven provinces are higher than women’s, though the gender gap is more pronounced in some provinces than others. Local and regional job opportunities have a direct bearing on female and male participation rates, as do regional differences in age structure and educational attainment. For example, until recently, Alberta has had a relatively strong economy, with a young and well-educated workforce—hence, its high rate of labour force participation for both women and men. But Alberta also has a higher gender gap, given a population in prime childbearing years and an oil and gas dominated economy in which “male jobs” often pay considerably more than “female jobs” in other sectors. In contrast, Newfoundland and Labrador has far fewer employment opportunities for women (and men) given economic underdevelopment, the decline of the fisheries, and an older population, resulting on lower employment rates overall. Personal characteristics, such as education and family status, also influence work patterns. For instance, women with higher levels of educational attainment are more active in the labour force—76.0 percent of women with university degrees compared with 29.3 percent who do not complete high school. For men, we see the same pattern of rising labour force participation with education, though participation rates are higher for less-educated men than they are for comparable women. Family status situation also matters; however, because a high proportion of mothers with children under the age of 15 are relatively young and well educated, their labour force participation rates are also above average. For example, well over 80 percent of mothers with school-aged children (6–15 years) and an employed spouse participate in the labour force, either part time or full time. Indeed, this rise of “working mothers” is one of the most significant changes of the past several decades in Canada. Still, rates of labour force participation for mothers are somewhat lower when they have younger, preschool children, or are raising children alone. Though not shown in Figure 6.2, age is also a key consideration. Among young people 15 to 24 years old, both women and men are less likely than adults of 25 to 54 years old to work for pay, largely because more of them are full-time students. Financial necessity is often a major factor in the decision to seek paid work. Generally, wives in low-income families or women who are lone parents may be compelled to work to meet basic expenses. As Figure 6.2 shows, the participation rate for female lone parents with school-aged children (6–15 years old) was 82.0 percent in 2018, just below that of mothers with similarly aged children who had an employed spouse. Rates fall for lone mothers with preschool children, especially when children are under three years of age. For many single mothers, finding or keeping a job may be difficult, depending on level of educational attainment and availability of childcare. Low-paid, unstable work is a major reason for the high incidence of poverty in this group.6 In contrast, better-educated, urban, middle-class women who are married and whose spouse or partner is a professional or a manager have greater opportunities and the luxury of choice with regard to employment. Among families with the highest incomes in Canada, it is very likely that the female partner is a high-earning manager or professional. This reflects a recent trend in Canada, the United States, and other advanced industrial countries towards “assortative mating” in opposite-sex families, whereby highly ­educated women and men become partners.7 Gender Segregation in the Labour Market At the heart of gender inequality in the workplace is the structuring of the labour market into male and female segments. Occupational gender segregation refers to the concentration of men and women in different occupations.8 Sociologists distinguish between horizontal segregation (segregation across distinct occupations) and vertical segregation (segregation at different levels within the same occupation). A potent combination of gender-role socialization, education, and labour market mechanisms continue to channel women into a limited number of occupations in which mainly other females are employed, or at lower occupational levels in more integrated occupations. Female Job Ghettos and Gender Labelling Female job ghettos typically offer little economic security and opportunities for advancement; furthermore, the work is often unpleasant, boring, and sometimes physically taxing. Women in job ghettos lack ready access to the more challenging and lucrative occupations dominated by men. These male segments of the labour market operate as shelters, as discussed in Chapter 5, conferring advantages on workers through entrance restrictions. The concepts of ghettos and shelters emphasize the unequal rewards and opportunities built into the job market on the basis of a worker’s sex. It is especially important to recognize that job opportunities determine an individual’s living standard, future prospects, and overall quality of life—in Max Weber’s words, life chances. One fundamental mechanism underlying segmentation is the gender labelling of jobs. Employers do not always make hiring decisions on strictly rational grounds, despite what economics textbooks would have us believe (Rivera 2012). If all hiring decisions were completely rational, women would have been recruited much earlier in the industrialization process and in far greater numbers, given they were routinely paid less than men. But, as discussed, men historically opposed female employment for fear of having their wages undercut. Traditional values also narrowly defined women as being naturally suited to child rearing and homemaking. Women, therefore, were relegated to the poorer jobs that men did not want. Because these occupations came to be labelled “female,” future employers would likely seek only women for them, and, regardless of the skills demanded, pay and status remained low. Dominant social values about femininity and masculinity have long been used to define job requirements. For instance, by the late 19th century, teaching, social work, nursing, and domestic work were seen as socially acceptable for women. Society could justify this on the ideological grounds that these occupations—caring for the sick, the old, and the unfortunate, transmitting culture to children, and performing domestic chores— demanded essentially “female” traits. Exclusive male rights to the better jobs and higher incomes thus went unchallenged, and the role of homemaker and wife was preserved for women. Once a job was labelled male or female, it was difficult for workers of the other sex to gain entry (Lowe 1987). These processes continue to be evident, in modified form, today. Trends in Labour Market Gender Segregation In Chapter 3, we noted a number of gender differences in the occupational distribution of the labour force. Figures 6.3a and 6.3b explore this further, summarizing employment distribution and concentration in 2018. Figure 6.3a identifies the percentage of female and male employees in each occupation. Here we see that health occupations, such as nursing, have high concentrations of women (nearly 80 percent). So do jobs in business, finance, and administration (69.4 percent), which include administrators, secretaries, and various professionals such as accountants and financial planners; and in education, law, social, community and government services (69.7 percent), which include teachers, civil servants, social workers, and lawyers. Sales/service occupations (e.g., jobs in restaurants, bars, hotels, hairdressing, and child-care facilities, and as domestics and building cleaners) are more mixed, with just over 55 percent women. By contrast, women form a small minority of workers in the sciences, trades, primary industries, and manufacturing. Here men predominate, accounting for over 75 percent of jobs in natural and applied sciences (e.g., engineers, computer programmers), over 93 percent in trades, transport, and equipment operation, over 80 percent in primary industries (e.g., forestry, mining, fishing, farming), and over 70 percent in processing and manufacturing. Figure 6.3b shows the distribution of the female and male labour force across all occupations in 2018. Of note, two broad occupational groups account for more than half of the female labour force, attesting to women’s continuing concentration and overrepresentation in key sectors. Sales and services jobs employ well over one in four women workers, as do jobs in business, finance, and administration, which are largely clerical and secretarial. Health occupations (12.6 percent), and education, law, social, community, and government service jobs (16.2 percent), together employ just over another quarter of women. It is notable that among men, there is more dispersion across occupational groups, although they also cluster into distinct realms. Trade, transport, and equipment-related occupations employ over one in four men, while sales and service jobs account for one in five male workers. Three other broad groupings—­management jobs; business, finance, and administration; and natural and applied science—are important, accounting for 3 in 10 male workers overall. Interestingly, these gender-based patterns have barely changed over the past several decades. For a more complete understanding of where men and women are located in the labour market, we must also investigate the industrial distribution of employment. Recall from Chapters 3 and 4 that Canada’s service-based economy is generating polarization between good jobs and bad jobs. How then are men and women distributed within the upper and lower tiers of the service sector? Referring back to Table 3.1 (see Chapter 3) helps to answer this question. Here, we can see that nearly one-third of the male labour force are in the goods sector—a trend with potential downsides for men given dramatic restructuring and outsourcing in manufacturing areas such as the auto sector. Women’s jobs are far more likely to be in services; indeed, nearly 90 percent of women worked there in 2018, with nearly 25 percent in lower-tier services such as retail and over 65 ­percent in upper-tier sectors. Women’s greater likelihood to be in upper-tier services (65.2 percent of women compared to 48.7 percent of men) is a result of women’s strong presence in the education, health, and social services sectors. Despite there being good jobs in these areas, however, we know from discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 that relatively more women than men are in nonstandard, precarious jobs. Indeed, there is a growing body of research on the gendered nature of ­nonstandard or precarious work, such as self-employment, part-time, and temporary contract work (Rubery et al. 2018; Vosko 2010; Wall 2015). The notion of “standard job” or a “standard employment relationship” reflects a masculine norm of employment—the husband as family breadwinner, working full time and in a permanent job with the same employer throughout his working life. These standard job assumptions underlay the postwar employment contract, which has changed dramatically with the spread of nonstandard and more precarious work arrangements (Vosko 2000, 2005, 2010; Fudge and Owens 2006). A major reason some women seek self-employment, for example, is to gain the flexibility they need to balance work with family life (Thébaud 2015). But there are costs, including lower wages than employees receive and the lack of benefits and career supports, such as access to training or business networks (Hughes 2005). Linked to gender is also a racial dimension of nonstandard work (Zeytinoglu and Muteshi 2000; Fuller and Vosko 2008; Premji et al. 2014). Visible minority women are employed in economically marginal forms of work, family- run businesses, domestic labour, or the garment industry. Perhaps the most feminized form of nonstandard work is temporary employment (Vosko 2000; Fernandez-Mateo 2009). As Leah Vosko (2000) argues, the expanding temporary-help industry is based on traditional stereotypes of “women’s work,” even though the flexible and impermanent employment relationships it offers are seen as a hallmark of the “new economy.” With women’s rising participation in the labour force, how has the segregation of women’s work changed over the long term? Table 6.1 shows that, in 1901, 71 percent of all employed women were concentrated in five occupations. Within this small number of socially acceptable women’s jobs, that of domestic servant employed the greatest portion of working women at 36 percent. Next in importance were those of seamstress and school teacher, each employing roughly 13 percent of the female labour force. These three occupations fit our description of a job ghetto, given that three-quarters or more of all workers in the job were female. In the early 20th century, outright exclusion was the prominent form of gender-based labour market segregation, with professions such as law and medicine barring women, while others, such as dentistry, allowed women to enter but under conditions that ensured their marginalization (Adams 1998). This pattern was not the case, however, for the two other main female occupations. Clerical work at the turn of the century was still a man’s job, although by the 1940s, the gender balance had shifted toward women. It is interesting to note that clerical work was one of the few traditionally male jobs to undergo this feminization process. Behind this change was the rapid expansion of office work accompanied by a more fragmented and routinized division of labour. As a result, a layer of new positions emerged at the bottom of office hierarchies, opening office doors to women (Lowe 1987). Finally, the fact that farmers and livestock raisers appear as one of the five prominent female occupations may seem peculiar. Considering that Canada was an agricultural economy in 1901, it is understandable that women would form a small part of the paid agricultural workforce (Carter 2016). The 20th-century march of industrialization saw a decline in some female jobs, such as those of domestic servant and seamstress, and the rise of new employment opportunities in booming service industries. By 1951, the two leading female occupations were in the clerical area. Along with salesclerks, hotel, café, and domestic workers, and teachers, stenographers and typists and office clerks made up 44 percent of the female workforce. As we have seen, female job ghettos still exist. Office and sales jobs have topped the list since World War II. Still, while gender segregation remains a persistent problem in many countries (Charles and Bradley 2009), it is also important to note that women have entered a broader range of occupations and professions, and secretarial and support functions have diminished with the proliferation of mobile technologies and a younger generation adept at using them (Twenge et al. 2018). By 2011, the top five female-dominated jobs accounted for just over 18 percent of the entire female labour force—a dramatic decline. This change is a positive sign of occupational diversification, but how far have women moved into non-traditional (in other words, male-dominated) occupations? Karen Hughes’s analysis of the 484 detailed occupations in the 1971 Census shows that 86 percent of women worked in traditionally female occupations.9 Over the next 15 years, the proportion of women in these traditional occupations declined to 79 percent, then changed little between 1986 and 1991. This pattern raises questions about the degree to which women can move out of gender-typed occupations over their working lives — “female” jobs can be seen as a way station through which some women pass on their way to better jobs that are not gender typed (Chan 2000). Having said this, however, some women did make gains into non-traditional jobs. By the early 1990s, women had achieved equal representation with men in optometry and financial management, and nearly equal representation in sales management and government administration (Hughes 1995, 2001). Trends for the 2000s, in both Canada and the United States, suggest that progress toward gender equity has stalled (England 2010; Guppy and Luongo 2015; Levanon and Grusky 2016), a point we return to later in the chapter when discussing the gender wage gap. Additional insights about gender and work can be gleaned by focusing on professional occupations. Because professions are organized around specific bodies of knowledge and expertise, usually acquired through a university degree, access to these jobs is strongly shaped by changing gender patterns in education. Figure 6.4 shows the steady rise of women in university programs over the last few decades. From the early 1970s to 1990s, women’s share of undergraduate registrations jumped from 43 to 53 percent, and then again to 58 percent in 2006–7. Gains are also notable at the master’s and doctoral levels. Most programs saw rising female enrolments. Despite ongoing attempts to attract more women into STEM fields, math, science, and engineering are the only fields in which women did not make up more than half of all students; in fact, women are significantly underrepresented in these areas, and female enrolment has declined or stabilized in recent years. Data for 2015– 16 from Statistics Canada, which uses a different classification than that in Figure 6.4, shows that women made up just 27.8 percent of students in math, computers, and information systems and 23.6 percent in architecture, engineering, and related areas (Statistics Canada 2017). Higher education has contributed to women’s growing presence in professional and managerial positions. In 2017, for instance, well over half (56.8 percent) of new graduating physicians were women (AFMC 2018). Roughly 50 percent of graduate law students are women (Kay et al. 2016). Pharmacy is also an interesting case, having become 50 percent female by the mid-1980s (Tanner et al. 1999). Compared to other professions, at least on the basis of evidence in the United States, pharmacy is also the leading profession in offering gender parity in pay (Goldin 2014). Still, many professions present hurdles to female entry and mobility, and gender segregation by specialization is notable. For instance, despite the sharp rise in female physicians in Canada, they are concentrated in areas such as pediatrics, gerontology, and obstetrics (AFMC 2018). Similar patterns exist in the legal profession, where women predominate in areas such as family law and are less likely to become senior partners in private practice (Kay et al. 2016). Equally if not more important, there has been relatively little movement of men into female- dominated occupations. While men have entered some previously “female occupations,” such as nursing, librarianship, and elementary-school teaching, their presence still remains low (Williams 1995, 2011). Thus, to the extent that occupational gender segregation is breaking down, it is largely due to women moving into male- dominated areas, not vice versa (England 2010; Hughes 1995; Statistics Canada 2000: 128).10 Equally important, many occupations that have seen changes are small, compared to other occupations in the labour force. Thus, when we look at the top 20 largest occupations for women and men, in Table 6.2, we still see firm boundaries between “female” and “male” jobs. Nursing, administrative support, and childcare remain strongly female dominant. Conversely, truck driving, carpentry, auto mechanics, construction, and other trades such as welding are predominantly male. This does not mean that gender change is not taking place, but that it typically occurs in elite occupations. Of note, too, in Table 6.2, the top 20 jobs account for a larger portion of the female labour force (20 percent) than is the case for the male labour force (15 percent). Gender Stratification within Occupations Thus far, we have traced broad historical patterns of horizontal occupational gender segregation—that is, segregation across different occupations. Now we will examine a related obstacle women face: vertical segregation, or the gendered division of status, responsibilities, and tasks within specific occupations. As a rule, men experience more upward mobility than women in organizations, and thus tend to have positions of greater authority and receive better job rewards. Consider the teaching profession. Women made up 84.3 percent of elementary and kindergarten teachers, and 78.4 percent of educational counsellors in 2016. In contrast, men composed just 15.7 percent of elementary and kindergarten teachers, and only 3.6 percent of early childhood educators. Looking at the education profession overall, men are also far more likely to be found in higher-status, better-paying jobs in universities, colleges, high schools, and educational administration. Yet women have made some inroads into leadership roles. In 2016, they held 58.1 percent of school administrative and principal positions in elementary and secondary schools (Statistics Canada 2016). As noted earlier, this situation is similar in other professions, such as law and medicine. But it is not just that women occupy “different” areas, such as family law or pediatrics. It is that these positions are of lower-status, with fewer economic rewards.11 Driving such patterns are gender stereotypical assumptions that women are well suited to tasks involving supposedly “natural skills” as caregivers. Such assumptions not only channel women into certain specialties but also shape ideas about their career aspirations. In a classic study of the changing legal profession in Canada, John Hagan and Fiona Kay (1995) portrayed a gender-stratified profession in which work environments were not family-friendly. Large numbers of women entered law in the 1970s and 1980s, when the profession was expanding and reorganizing into larger firms. According to Hagan and Kay (1995: 182), women were recruited into the profession during a period when they were needed to fill entry- and intermediate-level positions and were perceived to be compliant employees....It is possible that... many partners in law firms were encouraged by the belief that as in the teaching profession of an earlier era, women would assume entry-level positions in the profession, work diligently for a number of years, and then abandon their early years of invested work to bear children and raise families, leaving partnership positions to men assumed to be more committed to their occupational careers. While these types of gender assumptions and bias have been increasingly challenged, more recent empirical studies suggest they are still in play. For instance, law firms restrict opportunities for both men and women to attain partnerships—a financial and management stake in the firm that results in much higher earnings. However, women are still less likely to attain partnership and appear to lose out more than men, because of conflicts and compromises made in the interplay between professional demands and family responsibilities. For instance, women who continue to practise law full time after having children have high work commitment but lower earnings than men. Women are less likely than men to have children once they become lawyers and more likely to leave the profession because of work–family conflict, relatively low pay, and discrimination. Finally, women appear to face barriers with respect to mentoring and promotion, making it more difficult to keep moving up the ranks relative to their male peers (Gorman and Kmec 2009; Kay and Gorman 2012; Kay et al. 2016; Sterling and Reichman 2016). Medicine, dentistry, and business are also areas where women have made breakthroughs. According to the 2016 Census, women made up 49.0 percent of general practitioners, 39.3 percent of specialist physicians, 38.8 percent of dentists, and 37.9 percent of all managers. However, in management, especially at the senior levels, women have lower representation and distinct patterns of segregation. For instance, the 2016 Census shows that women accounted for just 14.0 percent of senior managers in construction and 24.9 percent in finance, communications, and other business services. Likewise, few female managers are found in natural sciences and engineering or in the mining and oil sector. Instead, women are concentrated in “female” enclaves, such as health, education, community and social services (56.9 percent) or human resources (67.4 percent) where they make up the majority of managers. Women still encounter a glass ceiling—barriers to advancement that persist despite formal policies designed to eliminate them. Looking at the 561 employers covered by the federal Employment Equity Act (discussed in more detail below) in 2017, women made up 40.2 percent of the 740,420 employees (8 percentage points below their representation in the labour market overall). Women’s share of senior management posts is strong, just slightly above the labour force overall, but they are overrepresented in support and mid-level occupations, especially in clerical and administrative positions. Men are well-represented at senior management levels and in semiskilled and technical jobs. In short, gender segregation persists in this workforce, despite women’s gains into professional and middle management jobs. Of note, women’s success has occurred largely in the banking sector; in other industries, especially transportation, their presence remains low, as does their likelihood of being hired and promoted. Comparing salaries, women are less likely to be top earners—just 14.4 percent of women earn $100,000 or more, compared to 23.5 percent of the full-time male workforce.12 At the executive and board levels, women remain few in number. Despite select appointments of women to top corporate jobs—such as president, chief executive officer (CEO), executive vice-president, or chief operating officer—Canadian women held less than one in five (19.5 percent) senior officer positions in the Financial Post 500 firms in Canada in 2018 and just 24.5 percent of board seats, a trend that is in line with a many other industrialized countries (CBCD 2019: 14, 31). While women’s board presence in Canada is up from 10.9 percent in 2001, we see more significant change in other countries, such as Norway and France, where legislation requires over 40 percent of board seats to be held by women (Deloitte 2017). Striking differences also exist between industries in Canada. For instance, in finance and health care sectors, one-third of board seats are held by women. This compares to just 15 to 17 percent in mining and construction (CBDC 2019: 15). Many analysts argue that much greater progress is needed with respect to gender diversity on corporate boards, as well as visible minority, Indigenous, and LGBTQ representation. Illustrating this, the Canadian Board Diversity Council which produces an annual report each year, notes that of the board seats held by women in TSX60-listed firms (top 60 firms listed on the Toronto stock exchange), just 6.3 percent of those women are visible minorities and 0 percent are Indigenous (CBDC 2018: 35). In sum, although women now experience much wider employment horizons than was once the case, we are a long way from gender equity. Achieving change requires women and men to be more evenly distributed across occupations and industries, rather than segregated along the gender lines we now observe. We also need to see more women at senior occupational levels. More fundamentally, however, shifting the numerical representation of women and men requires significant change in workplace cultures. This immediately raises the question of how such change might be achieved. The Wage Gap One obvious consequence of labour market segmentation is the gender wage gap (or female–male earnings ratio). Looking back historically, Figure 6.5 outlines how the wage gap has changed over time in Canada, from 59.4 percent in 1976 to 72.0 percent in 2011 for those in full-time, full-year employment. Focusing only on full- time, full-year employees provides a more valid estimate of changes over time in the gender wage gap since the proportion of part-time workers who earn less and are disproportionately female has been increasing (Chapter 4). The changes charted in Figure 6.5 are particularly interesting when we remember gender changes in occupational location during this time as well. Despite women entering some of the higher-paying managerial and professional jobs, the wage gap narrowed by just 9 percentage points from 1980 to 1995. It then plateaued at the low 70 percent range for nearly two decades. This pattern reflects the way in which employment growth trends often counteract each other. During the 1970s, the number of women in the 20 highest-paying occupations swelled more than fourfold, compared with a twofold increase for men (Boulet and Lavallée 1984: 19). But this trend was offset by an expansion of female employment at the lower end of the pay scale. According to the most recent Census data, the wage gap in 2016 was 74.2 percent for full-time, full-year workers. While this is a significant narrowing of the gap, for reasons we discuss below, we remain a long way from gender parity. Gender-Based Inequality of Earnings Trends in earnings patterns between 1976 and 2011 deserve further comment. Figure 6.5 displays real earnings, which means that the effects of inflation have been eliminated by adjusting earnings. Looking at the 1976–2011 period (in 2011 constant dollars) illustrates the startling fact that male real earnings declined in the 1980s and 1990s, while women’s earnings slowly nudged upwards. Quite different labour market and organizational processes underlie these divergent earnings profiles. While women were being recruited into intermediate-level professions and junior- and middle-level management, males were losing ground as traditionally well-paying (often unionized) manual occupations became less common and downsizing pushed older professionals and managers (mostly men) into early retirement. Trends discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, such as globalization, free trade, new technologies, and population aging, are relevant here. Within the labour market as a whole, some of men’s losses were women’s gain. Indeed, a growing group of employed women, with incomes higher on average than women a generation earlier, kept family incomes from dropping as far as they otherwise might have. Without a second income, some two-parent families in the middle or working class would likely join the ranks of the poor. Wages are a basic indicator of overall job quality. Recall from Chapters 4 and 5 that high wages also are part of a larger package of extrinsic and intrinsic job rewards. Stated simply, in addition to paying relatively well, “good jobs” usually offer other advantages: a range of benefits, job security, advancement opportunities, and interesting and challenging work. Also recall from Figure 4.1 that access to various benefits, such as pensions and medical or dental insurance, varies by occupation, union membership, and full-time and part-time status. Access to benefits also varies by gender. Working women are less likely than men to receive a variety of non-wage benefits, such as a group RRSP, life and disability insurance, supplementary health insurance, or a dental plan (Fox and Moyser 2018: 20–21). Lack of access to benefits is especially noticeable in part-time employment, where women are highly concentrated. In short, the gender wage gap is part of a much more broadly based discrepancy between the quality of jobs performed by men and women. Women’s lower earnings also mean reduced living standards. Historically, women have been more likely than men to live in low-income households. This has been especially true for older women due to inadequate pensions. Improvements in income support programs for elderly Canadians have helped narrow this gap. Yet, some women are still at high risk of living in poverty. For example, in 2015 one-third of female lone parents with children under 18 had low income, compared to 15.7 percent of male lone-parent families. Women 65 years and older are also more likely than elderly men to have low income (16.3 percent versus 11.9 percent, respectively), notwithstanding the improvements in living standards noted above (Fox and Moyser 2018: 13–16). Looking at long-term trends, rates of low-income for these groups decreased notably from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s but have risen steadily ever since. But current rates are still lower than they were in the mid-1970s, largely because of women’s improved education and work experience, as well as government support.13 Shifting our focus from the bottom to the top of the income distribution, average male and female earnings in the 20 highest-paying occupations are displayed in Table 6.3. We draw on data from the 2016 Census, which provide median employment income for full-time, full-year employees. Observe that, in many of these jobs, but not all, the female–male earnings gap is narrower than in other occupations. Looking down the list, we see some jobs with very narrow gaps, such as mining engineers (99.8 percent), judges (93.9 percent), followed by others, such as dentists (86.8 percent) and lawyers (86.7 percent). Yet even in these 20 highest-paying occupations, women still receive a lower salary, although it is far higher than the average female worker earns. Moreover, with few exceptions, the highest-paid occupations are still very male dominated. Senior government managers have the highest female presence (45.9 percent women), followed by lawyers (42.4 percent) and university professors (40.8 percent). In large part, this is due to the public-sector employers in these industries having taken steps over the past several decades to provide women with increased opportunities. In other occupations, especially in resource-based and engineering occupations, women’s presence is in the single digits—for instance, supervisors in mining (4.4 percent) and fire chiefs and senior firefighting officers (4.8 percent). Similarly, if we examine patterns for the CEOs of Canada’s top 250 companies in 2017, we find a pay gap that is larger than the national average, with female CEOs earning just 68 percent of their male counterparts. Here, again, women are a tiny minority, composing just 4 percent of all CEOs.14 When interpreting such data, we should keep in mind that because women are more recent entrants (historically speaking) in managerial and professional jobs, they may have less experience and seniority, which could account for part of the earnings gap, though not all. That said, such explanations are less convincing than was once the case, given that women’s educational attainment and labour force participation has risen sharply in recent decades (Blau and Kahn 2017). Yet recent studies of women and men with comparable education, age, and work experience still find a wage gap (albeit a small one) immediately after graduation. Even among teenagers, we see a wage gap between boys and girls with comparable education (Besen-Cassino 2017). Studies also highlight gender bias in lower starting salaries for women (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012) and, at later career stages, a “motherhood penalty” in the form of lower pay for working mothers (Budig and England 2001; Budig and Hodges 2010; England et al. 2016). Importantly, even when we take into account many key factors (e.g., education, work experience, field of study, occupation, industry) that help explain the wage gap, some of the gap remains unexplained (Drolet 2011; Blau and Kahn 2017).15 Recent research has also explored the intersection of gender and sexual orientation in shaping the wage gap. For instance, in Canada, Waite and Denier (2015) find that heterosexual men earn most, followed by gay men, lesbians, and heterosexual women. As with other studies, education and industry, especially public-sector employment, are important factors for narrowing the observed wage gap. Interestingly, while heterosexual women experience a “motherhood penalty,” heterosexual men experience a “fatherhood premium,” but family status and the presence of children have no effect on the earnings of gay men or lesbian women. Accounting for Women’s Lower Earnings Two forms of discrimination affect female earnings. The first is direct wage discrimination, where an employer pays a woman less than a man for performing the exact same job. However, women and men typically work in different occupations as we have seen. Thus, a second form of discrimination stems from the gender-segregated structure of the labour market, discussed earlier. Occupational gender segregation results in lower female wages by channelling women into low-paying job ghettos which, in turn, provide few opportunities for mobility into more rewarding jobs. Industry segregation also has an effect as well (Blau and Kahn 2017). Historically based cultural ideas about the value of women’s and men’s work serve to depress wages in female-dominant occupations. A prime example of this is the low pay for early childhood educators. To what extent does each form of discrimination contribute to the overall wage gap? To answer this question, analysts carefully compare earnings, taking into account education, training, and work experience, as well as the ­occupation, industry, and geographic location of employment. All of these factors may influence a worker’s productivity and earnings. Historically, in Canada, Gunderson (1994) found that when productivity factors (e.g., hours of work) were taken into account (that is, statistically controlled), the gender wage gap rose from 60 percent to between 75 and 85 percent. Key determinants of the pay gap were differences in work experience and gender segregation. In short, there was little evidence of direct pay discrimination by employers. Instead, the division of the labour market into male and female jobs, and the historic undervaluing of female areas of work, are the primary drivers (Glauber 2012; Mandel 2013; Perales 2013; Yu and Kuo 2017).16 How have such patterns changed in recent years? Blau and Kahn (2017) have studied the gender wage gap extensively in the United States. They trace trends over three decades (1980–2010), finding a 91 percent wage gap, controlling for all productivity factors, such as education and work experience. Accounting for the bulk of the remaining gap are occupational and industrial segregation, as well as “penalties for career breaks and flexibility.” Education, while important in earlier periods, explained less of the gap over the 1980–2010 period, given that women’s and men’s education levels in the United States have converged, just as in Canada. This latter point is especially important as human capital theory emphasizes that education is the great equalizer. Ideally, people with identical educational credentials have the same amount of human capital and, therefore, are equally competitive in their earning power. But as Chapter 5 emphasized, human capital theory fails to explain why some individuals with equivalent education are much better paid. Education continues to matter, as we have seen in how postsecondary education has helped narrow the gender wage gap. Yet while some highly educated women have moved into better-paying occupations, as we saw in Table 6.3, far more women remain in traditional areas which pay less. Equally important, STEM areas of study—that is, science, technology, engineering, and math—remain heavily male dominated. The 2016 Census shows that women hold just 10.9 percent of all bachelor degrees in computing and information sciences, and 21.9 percent of all bachelor degrees in engineering (see Statistics Canada, Census 2016, Table 98-400-X2016241). Looking back at the high- paying science and engineering occupations in Table 6.3, we can easily see the impact these educational patterns have on female earning potential. The challenge of attracting more women into these areas has received growing attention (Canadian Committee on Women in Engineering 1992: 1).17 In Canada, organizations such as WinSETT (Canadian Centre for Women in Science, Engineering, Trades and Technology), CCWESTT (Canadian Coalition of Women in Engineering, Science, Trades and Technology), and Move the Dial have undertaken research and advocacy to improve women’s presence in the technology sector (WinSETT 2016; Move the Dial Benchmark Report 2017). In the United States, Ellen Pao, CEO of Project Include, has been a strong advocate for gender equity and inclusion in the technology sector, following her high-profile lawsuit against a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley. In her book, Reset: My Fight for Inclusion and Lasting Change, Pao—who holds an engineering degree from Princeton, as well as a law degree and MBA from Harvard University—provides a disturbing account of the pervasive sexism, racism, and sexual harassment she experienced as a visible minority woman in the technology sector (Pao 2017). Furthermore, women are vastly underrepresented not only in STEM jobs but also in well-paying trades, where they make up only a fraction of apprentices. In Canada in 2016, women composed just 3.0 percent of heavy equipment operators, 1.9 percent of crane operators, 1.7 percent of carpenters, and 1.5 percent of electricians (see also Skof 2010; Braundy 2011; Canada 2015). Given looming labour shortages in some trades, because of an aging male workforce, the Canadian federal government has dedicated significant funding to promoting gender equity in trades, with $76 million dollars allocated to programs in the 2018 budget and another $3.1 billion in 2019 to boost women’s presence, with special attention to Indigenous women (Canada 2018). Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Though #MeToo has drawn enormous attention to sexual harassment recently, it is a long-standing problem (Tippett 2019). First recognized in the mid- to late 1970s (MacKinnon 1979), sexual harassment has been widely studied by sociologists and legal scholars since. In one of the most comprehensive reviews to date, McDonald (2012: 2) defines sexual harassment as belonging to “a range of abusive or counterproductive workplace behaviours, which have hierarchical power relations at their core.” Though definitions of sexual harassment vary, most emphasize that it involves unwelcome behaviour that is sexual in nature and either directly or indirectly threatens one’s employment (Williams 2018). The Canada Labour Code defines sexual harassment as “any conduct, comment, gesture or contact of a sexual nature that is likely to cause offence or humiliation for any employee; or that might, on reasonable grounds, be perceived by that employee as placing a condition of a sexual nature on employment or on any opportunity for training or promotion” (Canada 2019). This differentiates it from general harassment, or what is called bullying. Sexual harassment can take many forms, from a one-time episode to sustained behaviour over a long time. It can range from minor incidents (e.g., an inappropriate joke) to serious behaviour involving a quid pro quo (e.g., ­- threatening job security in exchange for sexual compliance) or a toxic workplace (e.g., where sexual harassment is allowed to thrive). Harassment, or the fear of it, may lead women to quit jobs or avoid entering non-traditional occupations (Barling, Kelloway, and Frone 2005; McLaughlin et al. 2017). Sexual harassment is not limited to employers, supervisors, or coworkers; it may originate from customers as well (Hughes and Tadic 1998). New forms of harassment, such as “textual harassment,” have also become more common, with mobile technologies being used to send inappropriate, offensive messages virtually (Mainiero and Jones 2013). #MeToo has highlighted many glaring instances of unacceptable behaviour we immediately recognize as sexual harassment. But there are challenges in studying sexual harassment and getting reliable estimates of this behaviour because of its subjective nature. Christine Williams (2018) notes that studies typically ask about specific observable behaviours (e.g., unwanted touching, comments and jokes, staring). But such approaches have generated wildly different estimates over the years (ranging from 41 to 90 percent reporting sexual harassment). Moreover, individuals reporting specific behaviours (e.g., staring) do not always feel they have been sexually harassed. Though this might seem surprising, Williams observes that it highlights the “institutionalized” nature of harassment—that is, the way some workplace cultures normalize it as “part of the job.” Williams argues that a broader approach to sexual harassment is needed, which focuses not just on individual behaviours but on workplace cultures and organizational norms. One of the most comprehensive studies ever conducted, the 1993 national Violence Against Women Survey, found that 23 percent of Canadian women 18 years old and over had experienced some form of workplace sexual harassment, the most common being inappropriate comments about their bodies or sex lives.18 More recently, a 2017 study by the Canadian federal government, titled What We Heard, found that approximately one- third of respondents had experienced sexual harassment during their working lives. The vast majority (94 percent) of those reporting harassment were women. Visible minorities and persons with disabilities reported higher than average rates of sexual harassment. Harassment was more common in workplaces with high ratios of men in positions of power and low awareness of reporting or grievance procedures. While three-quarters of respondents in the 2017 study worked for employers that had a sexual harassment policy, only half felt their employer took preventive measures. A key message from the study was that there should be more strongly enforced obligations for employers to ensure that workplaces are free of sexual harassment. The 2018 federal Liberal budget allocated funds to boost legal aid funding support for sexual harassment complaints, and to develop a pan-Canadian strategy to combat sexual harassment, including stronger incident reporting.19 Theoretical Perspectives on Work and Gender Inequality How has gender inequality become so deeply entrenched in the workplace? And how can it be disrupted? Such questions have sparked research and advocacy over the last several decades, but have taken on renewed urgency in light of the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements that have unveiled the problems of sexual harassment and unequal pay, among many other issues. Research addressing these questions is vital for identifying pathways to change and informing public discussion, policies, and laws focused on creating equitable workplaces. But a comprehensive theory of work-related gender inequities has yet to be formulated. Feminist research has provided a much needed corrective to the male bias inherent in early sociological research on work. Feldberg and Glenn (1979) characterized research in the 1970s in terms of job and gender models of the workplace. Whereas studies of male workers used an implicit “job model,” focusing on working conditions and organizational factors to explain workplace dynamics and outcomes, studies of women’s employment favoured a “gender model,” emphasizing women’s personal dispositions and family roles.20 Since then, feminist analysis has probed the link between the public sphere of paid employment and the private sphere of family work, showing how the formal economy depends on unpaid caring work (largely done by women), while rewarding the “ideal worker” who is free of caregiving responsibilities. While gender remains a key consideration in the sociology of work, research is increasingly “intersectional,” exploring how factors such as motherhood, ethnicity and race, family status, sexual orientation, and age work together to create differences and similarities in women’s and men’s economic lives.21 Human Capital and Labour Market Segmentation Models Two of the main competing theories of how labour markets operate are human capital theory and labour market segmentation theory, as discussed in Chapter 5. We have already criticized the human capital model for its inability to explain the persistence of gender segregation.22 While the human capital model is concerned with worker characteristics—the supply side of the labour market—the segmentation model examines how employers organize work to generate a demand for specific types of workers. Labour market segmentation theory distinguishes between secondary and primary labour markets. Secondary labour markets are located in competitive industries that continually shave wages and operating costs. In contrast, corporations and state bureaucracies in the primary sector offer high wages, decent benefits, job security, and pleasant working conditions. They also have well-developed internal labour markets providing employees with good career opportunities and employers with a stable, committed workforce. For the segmentation model to accurately explain why men and women hold different kinds of jobs, women would have to be concentrated in the secondary segment of the labour market. This idea holds true in some part since relatively more women than men are employed in lower-tier service industries. However, many women are also employed in the primary sector. Thus, a segmentation perspective cannot account for gender differences within the same industry or establishment, or inequalities among women. It also does not explain how gender segregation developed in the first place.23 Additional factors need to be considered to explain why gender is a major source of inequality in the labour market. Some researchers, for instance, link women’s labour market position to their traditional roles within the family. Women’s family roles have centred on activities such as raising children and caring for dependents; cooking, cleaning, and other services essential to enabling family members to hold down jobs; and contributing a secondary income to the family budget—roughly in that order. Many employed women experience a conflict when forced to choose between work and family (Blair-Loy 2003). According to this view, women’s loyalty usually goes to the latter, and employers consequently often view these women as lacking commitment to their work. Barriers to interesting and better-paying jobs therefore persist. Gender-Role Socialization But how are employers’ stereotypes of women, women’s personal expectations and restricted employment opportunities, and women’s family roles linked to their employment patterns within the workplace? Are such patterns best explained by women’s early socialization, including family roles and feminine qualities, or as a response to their employment conditions? It is clear that both processes may be involved. The socialization of girls and boys into traditional gender roles creates cultural norms, expectations, and discourses that carry into the workplace. Historically this has contributed to very sharp patterns of gender segregation. Looking back to the 1980s, for instance, research on children ages 6 to 14 in Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan found that despite discourses encouraging an expansion of occupational horizons for young women, at a personal level many still held traditional aspirations. Here’s what the researchers concluded: “Many seem to be saying ‘Yes, women can become doctors, but I expect to be a nurse’” (Labour Canada 1986: 55). When girls imagined themselves as adults, most expected to be mothers with small children, supported by a husband, reflecting traditional gender norms. In the 1990s, a survey of Grade 12 students in Alberta found that while gender attitudes were becoming more egalitarian, the top three career choices for young women were still nurse, social worker, and teacher, compared with computer programmer/analyst, engineer, and auto mechanic for males.24 In more recent years, studies suggest that young women’s occupational aspirations have widened notably, but are still shaped by traditional messages (Ezzedeen 2015), especially with respect to combining work and motherhood—though this point is increasingly debated. For instance, while Bass (2015) found that future family plans had a stronger impact on career aspirations for young women, compared to young men, Cech (2016) found no gender differences in occupational choice or expectations of a continuous career. Race, class, and cultural background, not just gender, also shape young women’s ideas about their future labour force attachment and desirable work, with some expecting to work continuously in adulthood, and others holding more traditional ideas of taking career breaks to raise a family (Massoni 2004; Damaske 2011). Gendered Work and Organizations Indispensable to an understanding of female work behaviour is how socialization patterns are built upon, strengthened, and reproduced within the workplace. Early pioneering work by Rosabeth Moss Kanter established that the main sources of gender inequality are located within work organizations. Her core argument was that “the job makes the person.” As she explains: Findings about typical behaviour of women in organizations that have been used to reflect either biologically based psychological attributes or characteristics developed through a long socialization to the female sex role turn out to reflect very reasonable and very universal responses to current organizational situations. (1977: 67) In Kanter’s view, men and women employed in similar jobs in an organization react in similar ways to their job conditions. (We return to this subject in Chapters 13 and 14.) A good example is Donald Roy’s (1959–60) study of male machine operators. These men escaped the drudgery and isolation of their work— “kept from ‘going nuts,’” in Roy’s words—by engaging in idle chatter, playing games, and fooling around. Similar dynamics can be observed with women in a variety of routine jobs—domestic cleaners, sales clerks, receptionists— trying to cope with the numbing tedium of their work. In either case, management may view the coping behaviour as evidence that these workers are incapable of performing more demanding jobs. This perception creates a “double bind” for employees: the most effective ways of personally coping in jobs at the bottom of the organization are also indications to management that workers in these jobs deserve to be kept there. Kanter does not ignore possible gender differences in socialization or non-work roles. Rather, she underlines the pervasive influence of an individual’s job content and organizational position on her or his attitudes and behaviour. She also advances our understanding of gender at work by showing how management reproduces the organization through social processes that rely heavily on trust and conformity.25 To reduce uncertainty, managers recruit and promote people like themselves—a process referred to as homophily. This social cloning reproduces male dominance in management, creating enormous barriers for women. While “managers” thus become equated with “men,” in sharp contrast, perceptions of female occupations, such as secretary or executive assistant, draw on female stereotypes. Men who receive more opportunities take advantage of them, developing behaviours, values, and work attitudes that help them move ahead. Once young male management trainees are identified as “fast trackers,” the resulting halo effect creates the impression that they do not make mistakes and that gives their careers momentum. Conversely, women in dead-end jobs quite rationally decide to give up, losing both work commitment and motivation. Their supervisors will then determine that they do not deserve promotions or raises. Women who do succeed in entering management face the problem of tokenism. Kanter argues that a goldfish bowl phenomenon, resulting from being an identifiable minority, means women or members of visible minorities must work harder to demonstrate their competence—a “prove it again” pattern that reinforces the view they are different and do not belong (Williams and Dempsey 2014). Tokens also lack the support systems essential for surviving in the middle and upper ranks of organizations. According to Kanter, the problem is not sex or race per se; it is part of being a numerical minority. Other empirical research, however, suggests tokenism is specific to women in traditionally male occupations (Yoder 1991). In fact, research suggests men in non- traditional jobs may in some cases benefit from token status, depending on the context and available opportunities (Williams 1989, 2011). Yet Kanter’s general point still holds: the structure of opportunities in an organization—basically, who has access to which positions, resources, and rewards—creates self-fulfilling prophecies that reinforce the subordinate status of women. Acker (1990) further develops these ideas, showing how gender is firmly embedded in organizations at multiple levels, from organizational culture, to policies and procedures, to employee interactions, and worker identities (see Britton and Logan 2008 for a valuable review). Views of the “ideal worker” are built around masculine qualities, putting women at a disadvantage. Cultural stereotypes that women are more oriented toward pleasing others and putting domestic responsibilities first infuse organizational policies, job descriptions, managers’ assessments of employees, and promotion opportunities. Likewise, the tendency to equate stereotypically male behaviours with leadership may rule women out as “natural leaders.” Ridgeway (2011) contends that gender has a “master status” in organizations, operating through ingrained bias and assumptions to shape assessments of competency and suitability. Ely, Ibarra, and Kolk (2013) show how “second-generation bias” operates in subtle ways through stereotypes and organizational practices that position women and men unequally. Reflecting these processes, a growing number of studies show how bias operates both in hiring and pay decisions (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012; Rivera 2012; Correll 2007). In a well-known study, Goldin and Rouse (2000) found the use of “blind auditions” by orchestras led to a significant increase in the hiring of female musicians from 1970 to 1996—a period when women were commonly thought to be “inferior” players. Having musicians audition behind blinds eliminated visual cues about gender, and ultimately boosted women’s evaluations and hiring. Other studies confirm that formalized procedures are required to override bias in hiring decisions (Correll 2017; Reskin and McBrier 2000). Achieving Workplace Equality We have catalogued the inequities women face in terms of work opportunities and rewards. Some of the evidence leads to optimism that barriers to equal labour market opportunities and rewards are slowly being pushed aside. But gender equity can be achieved sooner through innovative policy and workplace initiatives. We conclude this chapter with a brief overview of some policy options that have been pursued to date. Unions and collective action can also play a decisive role in achieving gender equity at work, as discussed in Chapter 11. Employment Equity One important set of initiatives in Canada stems from the 1984 Royal Commission on Equality in Employment (chaired by Rosalie Abella, now a Supreme Court judge). It introduced the concept of employment equity as a strategy to eliminate the effects of discrimination and fully open up competition for job opportunities to those who had been excluded and disadvantaged in employment historically. Four groups were identified as “equity groups”: women, visible minorities, Indigenous peoples, and persons with disabilities. With respect to women, the Abella Commission asserted that equality in employment required a revised approach to ensure that all individuals, regardless of their personal characteristics, be treated fairly in recruitment, hiring, promotions, training, dismissals, and any other employment decisions. A central contribution of the federal 1986 Employment Equity Act was the argument that systemic discrimination creates work barriers that can only be dismantled through strong legislation. Unlike direct discrimination, which is intentional and obvious, systemic discrimination is the unintentional consequence of employment practices and policies that have a differential effect on specific groups. This form of discrimination is built into the system of employment, rather than reflecting the conscious intent of individuals to discriminate. Good examples of systemic discrimination are minimum height and weight requirements for entry into police or fire departments, which use white males as the norm; they operate to exclude women and members of certain visible minorities, even though that was not the intent. The 1986 Employment Equity Act covers federal government employees, federally regulated employers and Crown corporations, and employers that have 100 or more employees and bid on government contracts worth more than $200,000 (universities, for example). The Act has three main goals. First, it requires employers to identify and remove employment practices that act as systemic barriers to the four designated groups (women, visible minorities, Indigenous peoples, and persons with disabilities). Second, it establishes targets for achieving a more representative workforce that will reflect the proportion of qualified and eligible individuals from designated groups in the appropriate labour pool (not in the entire population). Third, it requires employers to file annual reports to assess progress in recruiting and promoting members of the four designated groups.26 Employment equity recognizes the need for positive measures to rectify historic imbalances in staff composition (e.g., targeted leadership training programs for women or Indigenous peoples) and the “reasonable accommodation” of differences (e.g. changing the RCMP dress code to permit Sikhs to wear turbans and Indigenous officers to have braids) to make workplaces more accessible and inclusive. It also encourages learning initiatives so that employees and managers become more knowledgeable about the value of diversity and techniques for building more inclusive workplaces. Through such efforts, organizations can become more representative of Canadian society, both in terms of numerical representation and workplace culture. Overall, employment equity has had some success. However, legislation covers just a fraction of Canada’s workforce and change has been uneven. On the positive side, evidence points to increased access of designated equity groups to professional, supervisory, and upper-management positions; a reduced wage gap as a result; and improved human resource practices.27 Critics of employment equity, however, have also noted limitations of existing legislation and the need for stricter monitoring and enforcement, inclusion of more workplaces, and greater employer commitment to the equity goals, timetables, and plans. Backlash and resistance to employment equity is also a problem, especially the mistaken perceptions that such equity programs involve “quotas” and ignore issues of merit, which they do not (McGown and Ng 2016). Stronger equity legislation could speed progress toward gender equity. However, many business organizations have also launched their own initiatives, focusing on “gender diversity and inclusion” (GDI) or “equity, diversity, and inclusion” (EDI). One of the motivations for employers is recognition that women and other equity groups will make up a larger share of the workforce as baby boomers retire. There is also growing awareness of the costs of gender inequality and potential lawsuits based on discrimination (Williams and Cuddy 2012). In the current language of employers, then, there is a “business case for diversity.” GDI has thus become a human resource priority for many organizations (McKinsey & Company 2019). While some believe GDI efforts will have a positive impact, others view them as largely “symbolic” and “ceremonial” (Dobbin and Kalev 2017). Pay Equity Another important policy initiative is pay equity. Pay equity, or “comparable worth,” as it is called in the United States, focuses specifically on the most glaring indicator of gender inequality in the labour market: the wage gap. Pay equity is a proactive policy, requiring employers to assess the extent of pay discrimination and then to adjust wages so that women are fairly compensated. Frequently a topic of heated public debate, pay equity recognizes that occupational gender segregation underlies the wage gap. It attempts to provide a gender-neutral methodology for comparing predominantly female jobs with predominantly male jobs in different occupational classifications under the same employer. For example, a secretarial job (female) would be compared with the job of maintenance technician (male) in the same organization. Using a standardized evaluation system, points are assigned to these jobs on the basis of four factors: skill level, effort, responsibility, and working conditions. Only after the “point value” of jobs has been determined are wages compared and (if needed) adjustments made. Underpinning the process is the recognition that women’s work is valuable but has been under-rewarded in the past. The objective is to pay employees on the basis of their contribution to the employer. Achieving this will establish equal pay for work of equal value, a more far-reaching concept than equal pay for equal work or equal pay for similar work, which compares women and men only in jobs that are the “same” or “substantially similar.” However, developing and applying a truly gender-neutral system for evaluating jobs has proved exceedingly difficult because it challenges long-standing assumptions about the nature of skill (Steinberg 1990). Thus, we can see how historical ideas about “women’s work” continue to have an imprint to the present day. Pay equity legislation in Canada typically covers the public sector, although in Ontario and Quebec, which have the most extensive legislation, parts of the private sector are also included (Ontario Pay Equity Commission 2018).28 Pay equity policies are explicit in their intent. As noted in the 2004 Pay Equity Task Force Report, one of the most comprehensive reports in Canada, pay equity begins from the premise that “differences in pay for comparable work which is based solely on differences in sex are discriminatory, and that steps should be taken to eliminate these differences” (Canada 2004: 6). Pay equity legislation has gone some distance toward creating fairer compensation. For example, in Ontario, 100,000 women working in public-sector childcare and nursing homes received hundreds of millions of dollars in pay adjustments under provincial legislation. In Quebec, more than 300,000 women working in the public sector received substantial pay adjustments, as well as $1.5 billion in back pay, for a total settlement estimated at $4 billion.29 While Ontario pay equity legislation was once heralded as the most comprehensive in North America, Conservative provincial governments have legislated over the years to blunt its impact (Ontario Equal Pay Coalition 2017). Thus, while pay equity has not eliminated the female–male wage gap, it has helped narrow it. Furthermore, by increasing earnings at the bottom of the female earnings distribution, the policies have benefited more than just middle-class women.30 Opponents of pay equity argue that the economy cannot afford wage adjustments, that businesses may be driven into bankruptcy, or that pay equity interferes with the operation of the labour market. But for millions of employed women, pay equity provides long-overdue recognition of their economic contributions to society. Speaking to this point, expert testimony to the federal 2016 Special Committee on Pay Equity indicates that costs to employers have often been lower than expected (about 1.5 percent of payroll). Yet women often have waited years for settlements (Canada 2016). In fact, one of the most protracted cases in Canadian history involves the federal government itself—it took 14 years to settle with its employees (librarians, clerks, and others). Another such case involving Bell Canada took 15 years. Such delays have far-reaching effects according to one expert witness to the 2016 Special Committee on Pay Equity (Canada 2016: 2): When I speak about pay equity, I often use the phrase “justice delayed is justice denied.” So I want to remember the groups of workers who had to wait decades for complaints to work their way through the courts, such as the Bell Canada workers whose case took 15 years... By the time the settlement was reached, almost 16% of those workers had died and many more were frail and nearing end of life. Imagine for a moment their quality of life if they hadn't had to wait. Imagine the boost to the economy if that money had been in their bank accounts the whole time. Given this, a central recommendation of the 2016 Special Committee Report on Pay Equity was immediate drafting of proactive (rather than complaint-based) legislation, and action on outstanding recommendations from the 2004 Task Force on Pay Equity, such as extending pay equity to part-time, casual, seasonal, and temporary workers, and to Crown corporations and organizations in the Federal Contractors Program (Canada 2016: 37–43). Proactive federal legislation has now been passed (as part of Bill C-86). It will require employers not only to conduct pay equity analysis, and adjust wages but also to regularly maintain and review their plans. While it is too early to know what impact this legislation will have, based on evidence from provincial legislation in Ontario and Quebec, it should help further reduce the wage gap. In addition, other trends, such as the push toward greater “pay transparency” in Canada and other countries should help narrow the gender wage gap too (Castilla 2015; Kim 2015). One other important instrument for achieving gender equality in employment is Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This section of the Charter became law in April 1985. It established for the first time in our history a constitutional entitlement to full equality for women in law, as well as in the effects of law. This latter point is crucial, for regardless of the wording or intent of a law, if, in practice, it results in discrimination against women, the courts can rule it to be unconstitutional. Conclusion We began this chapter by discussing seemingly contradictory trends in gender and work—on one hand, a push toward greater gender equity, while on the other, evidence of persistent problems highlighted by recent movements such as #MeToo and #TimesUp. On the basis of a comprehensive review of past and present trends in Canada, we can conclude that while some changes have occurred for both women and men in the workplace, gender continues to be central to the organization of paid work. Certainly, we are beginning to rectify some of the most glaring problems women confront. Higher education and changing attitudes about women’s capabilities and commitment as workers have played a key role, as our analysis shows. But gender segregation, inflexible workplaces, subtle forms of “second-generation” bias, and sexual harassment, all continue to create barriers for women. Employment equity and pay equity programs now operating in Canada are reform oriented, aiming to modify existing employment institutions, values, processes, and social relationships. But how effective will these workplace reforms be? And what impact will such policies have, if any, in altering women’s traditional non-work roles—especially within the family—and the supporting socialization processes and ideologies? The limitations of such reforms prompt some to argue for greater recognition of women’s unpaid caregiving work and greater involvement of men in such activities—issues we take up in Chapter 7. For them, equity can be achieved only when women and men begin to share this work, and employers begin to recognize that all workers have family responsibilities. Any successful strategy must recognize that employment inequities are firmly embedded in the very structure and values of our society. So, while we look for ways of reducing the effects of traditional gender practices within families, schools, and other institutions, we also need to continue to focus directly on the organizational barriers that stand in the way of gender equality in the workplace and labour market. Discussion Questions Loading... Loading... Loading...  Loading... Loading... Additional Resources Work at the Movies Time 2017 Person of the Year: “The Silence Breakers” (5:02 minutes). This is a brief overview of the timeline, stories, and voices of the #MeToo movement. Albert Nobbs (directed by Rodrigo Garcia, 2011, 113 minutes). This mainstream film focuses on gender and the history of work, limited job opportunities, and a woman who chooses to “pass” as a man to improve her economic security. Rosies of the North (directed by Kelly Saxberg, 1999, 46:40 minutes). The NFB documentary is based on oral histories of women’s contributions during World War II to aircraft manufacturing in Thunder Bay. It is available through the National Film Board of Canada: http://www.nfb.ca/film/rosies_of_the_north. Norma Rae (directed by Martin Ritt, 1979, 110 minutes). Based on real events centred on a textile factory, this dramatic film explores gender and union activism in blue-collar America. North Country (directed by Niki Caro, 2005, 126 minutes). This film explores sexual harassment in mining work and is based on the true story of Lois Jenkins. The Loudest Voice. This is a television mini-series about bully and sexual predator Roger Ailes, former CEO of Fox News. Sounds of Work “Tecumseh Valley” (Townes Van Zandt). In this song, a young woman leaves her coal-mining town in search of work as a manual labourer, only to become a bartender and then a sex worker. “Working Man” (Rita MacNeil). Rita MacNeil sings about the lives of men who work in the coal mines on Cape Breton Island in Nova Scotia. “She Works Hard for the Money” (Donna Summer). Purportedly based on an experience Summer had with a female bathroom attendant, this song highlights the struggles involved in low-wage service work. “Bread and Roses” (James Oppenheim/Judy Collins). Collins brings Oppenheim’s poem to life with this song about women and men marching for fair wages and decent living conditions. Notes 1. For an overview of women’s gains in education, work, and the professions, see Moyer (2017). 2. See Cohen (1988). Useful sources for women’s history in Canada are Bradbury (1993), Campbell (2009), Sangster (2011), and the labour studies journal Labour/Le Travail. 3. See Carter (2016) and Rollings-Magnusson (2000) for useful discussions of the historical contributions of women in the Canadian West. 4. For historical background on the transformation of women’s work inside and outside the home during the rise of industrial capitalism, see Cohen (1988) and Bradley (1989). 5. For historical discussions of the family wage, see Land (1980) and Bradbury (1993: 80, and Chapters 3 and 5). For discussions of changing contemporary norms around breadwinning, see Livingstone and Luxton (1996), Coltrane (1996), and Marshall (2006, 2011). 6. For analyses of lone parents and income, see Morissette and Ostrovky (2007) and Williams (2010). 7. Van Bavel et al. (2018) discuss a growing body of research on “assortative mating” where partners share high levels of education, career commitment, and earnings. 8. For overviews and discussions of gender segregation in industrialized countries, see Charles and Grusky (2004), and Jarman, Blackburn, and Racko (2012). See Feuchtwang (1982: 251) for a definition of job ghetto. 9. Hughes (1995, 2001). Traditional occupations are those in which women constitute a greater proportion of employment than they do in the labour force as a whole. 10. On the health professions, see Armstrong, Choinière, and Day (1993), and Armstrong, Armstrong, and Scott- Dixon (2008). On men in non-traditional jobs, see Williams (1992, 1995, 2011), Synder and Green (2008), Lindsay (2007), and Lupton (2006). 11. On women in medicine, see Cassell (1998), Ku (2011), and Wallace (2014). On women’s experiences in the legal profession, see Hagan and Kay (1995), Kay and Gorman (2012), and Sterling and Reichman (2016). 12. Data for 2017 are from the 2018 Annual Report, Employment Equity Act, produced by Employment and Social Development Canada, available at https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social- development/services/labour-standards/reports/employment-equity-2018.html#h2.02-h3.01 13. Data for lone parents and elderly families come from Fox and Moyser (2018: 15–16). 14. MacDonald (2019) analyzes gender representation and pay in 2017 among Canada’s CEOs, focusing on the largest 250 companies listed on the TSX/S&P Composite Index. CEOs earned $5.1 million annually (salary plus bonuses), with a female–male earnings gap of 68 percent. 15. Drolet (2011) and Schirle (2015) discuss the wage gap in Canada, and the Canadian provinces, respectively. In the United States, Blau and Kahn (2017) review long-term trends, while Goldin (2014) analyzes how the wage gap has narrowed differently in distinct occupations in the United States. 16. For valuable discussions of the gendered wage gap in Canada, see Drolet (2011) and Cool (2010); for the United States, see Glauber (2012) and Moore (2018); for the United Kingdom, see Perales (2013). 17. For recent trends, see also Engineers Canada (2012). On the male culture of engineering, see Braundy (2011), Miller (2004), Cech (2013), and Seron et al. (2018). 18. See Johnson (1994: 11) for the 1993 survey, conducted by Statistics Canada. See Sev’er (1999) for discussions of research evidence, theoretical interpretations, and measurement issues on this topic. 19. See Leaderman (2019) for a discussion of federal government funding to support initiative by AfterMeToo and other