Chapter 2 Psych PDF

CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World Source: © Alexandra Dean. CHAPTER OUTLINE Spotlights and Illusions: What Do They Teach Us About Ourselves? Self-Concept: Who Am I? What Is the Nature and Motivating Power of Self-Esteem? What I...

CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World Source: © Alexandra Dean. CHAPTER OUTLINE Spotlights and Illusions: What Do They Teach Us About Ourselves? Self-Concept: Who Am I? What Is the Nature and Motivating Power of Self-Esteem? What Is Self-Serving Bias? How Do People Manage Their Self-Presentation? What Does It Mean to Have Perceived Self-Control? At the centre of our worlds, more pivotal for us than anything else, is ourselves. As we navigate our daily lives, our sense of self continually engages the world.  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 31 C onsider this example: One morning, you wake up to find your hair sticking up at strange angles on your head. You can’t find a hat, so you smooth down the random spikes of your hair and dash out the door to class. All morning, you are acutely self-conscious about your very bad hair day. To your surprise, your friends in class don’t say anything. Are they secretly laughing to themselves about how ridiculous you look, or are they too preoccupied with themselves to notice your spiky hair? Spotlights and Illusions: What Do They Teach Us About Ourselves? What is the spotlight effect? And how does it relate to the illusion of transparency? Why do we often feel that others are paying more attention to us than they really are? The spotlight effect means seeing ourselves at centre stage, thus intuitively overestimating the extent to which others’ attention is aimed at us. Timothy Lawson (2010) explored the spotlight effect by having university students change into a sweatshirt emblazoned with “American Eagle” before meeting a group of peers. Nearly 40 percent were sure the other students would remember what the shirt said, but only 10 percent actually did. Most observers did not even notice when the students changed sweatshirts after leaving the room for a few minutes. In another experiment, even noticeably embarrassing clothes, such as a T-shirt with singer Barry Manilow on it, pro- voked only 23 percent of observers to notice—much less than the 50 percent estimated by the unfortunate students sporting the 1970s soft-rock warbler on their chests (Gilovich et al., 2000). What’s true of our dorky clothes and bad hair is also true of our emo- tions: our anxiety, irritation, disgust, deceit, or attraction to someone “There are three things else (Gilovich et al., 1998). Keenly aware of our own emotions, we often extremely hard: steel, a suffer an illusion of transparency. We feel especially transparent when diamond, and to know one’s we feel self-conscious and worry about being evaluated negatively by self.” others (Vorauer & Ross, 1999). If we’re happy and we know it, then our Benjamin Franklin face will surely show it—and others, we presume, will notice. Actually, we can be more opaque than we realize. Savitsky and Gilovich (2003) next wondered whether informing speakers that their ner- vousness isn’t so obvious might help them relax and perform better. They invited 77 more university students to come to the lab and, after five minutes’ preparation, give a three-minute videotaped speech on race relations at their university. Those in one group—the control con- dition—were given no further instructions. Those in the reassured conditionwere told that it was natural to feel anxious but that “You shouldn’t worry much about what other people think.... With this in mind you should just relax and try to do your best. Know that if you become nervous, you probably shouldn’t worry about it.” To those in the informed condition he explained the illusion of transparency. After telling them it was natural to feel anxious, the experimenter added, “Research has found that audiences can’t pick up on your anxiety as well as you might expect.... Those speaking feel that their nervousness is transparent, but in reality their feelings are not so apparent.... With this in mind, you should just relax and try to do your best. Know that if you become nervous, you’ll probably be the only one to know.” After the speeches, the speakers rated their speech quality and their perceived ner- vousness (this time using a seven-point scale) and were also rated by the observers. As Table 2–1 shows, those informed about the illusion-of-transparency phenomenon felt bet- ter about their speech and their appearance than did those in the control and reassurance conditions. What’s more, the observers confirmed the speakers’ self-assessments. 32 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING TABLE 2–1 Average Ratings of Speeches by Speakers and Observers on a 1 to 7 Scale Type of Rating Control Condition Reassured Condition Informed Condition Speakers’ self-ratings Speech quality 3.04 2.83 3.50* Relaxed appearance 3.35 2.69 4.20* Observers’ ratings Speech quality 3.50 3.62 4.23* Composed appearance 3.90 3.94 4.65* *Each of these results differs by a statistically significant margin from those of the control and reassured condition. So, the next time you feel nervous about looking nervous, pause to remember the lesson of these experiments: Other people are noticing less than you might suppose. We also overestimate the visibility of our social blunders and public mental slips. When we trigger the library alarm or accidentally insult someone, we may be mortified (“Every- one thinks I’m a jerk”). But research shows that what we agonize over, others may hardly notice and soon forget (Savitsky et al., 2001). The spotlight effect and the related illusion of transparency are but two of many examples of the interplay between our sense of self and our social worlds. Here are a few more: Social surroundings affect our self-awareness. When we are the only members of our race, gender, or nationality in a group, we notice how we differ and how others are reacting to our difference. For example, the only woman in an executive meeting or math class is likely to be acutely aware of her gender. When travelling abroad, you may be keenly aware of being Canadian; while at home, however, you might not think about your nationality very much. Self-interest colours our social judgment. When problems arise in a close relation- ship, we usually attribute more responsibility to our partners than to ourselves. When things go well at home or work or play, we see ourselves as more responsible. After Canadians Frederick Banting and John Macleod received a 1923 Nobel Prize for discovering insulin, they both thought the discovery was primarily their own. Banting claimed that Macleod, who headed the laboratory, had been more a hindrance than a help. Macleod omitted Banting’s name in speeches about the dis- covery (Ross, 1981). Self-concern motivates our social behaviour. In hopes of making a positive impres- sion, we agonize about our appearance. Like savvy politicians, we also monitor others’ behaviour and expectations and adjust our behaviour accordingly. Social relationships help define the self. In our varied relationships, we have vary- ing selves (Andersen & Chen, 2002). We may be one self with Mom, another with friends, another with teachers. How we think of ourselves is linked to the person we’re with at the moment. And when relationships change, our self-concepts can change as well. University students who recently broke up with a romantic partner shifted their self-perceptions and felt less certain about who they were—one reason breakups can be so emotionally distressing (Slotter, Gardner, & Finkel, 2010). As these examples suggest, the traffic between self and society runs both ways. Our ideas and feelings about ourselves affect how we respond to others. And others help shape our sense of self.  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 33 Self-concept Self-esteem Who am I? My sense of self-worth The self Social self Self-knowledge My roles as a student, How can I explain and family member, and predict myself? friend; my group identity FIGURE 2–1 THE SELF. No topic in psychology is more researched today than the self. In 2015, the word self appeared in 29 972 book and article summaries in PsycINFO (the online archive of psy- chological research)—more than 20 times the number that had appeared in 1970. Our sense of self organizes our thoughts, feelings, and actions (Figure 2–1). Our sense of self enables us to remember our past, assess our present, and project our future—and, thus, enables us to behave adaptively. In later chapters, we will see that much of our behaviour is not consciously controlled but, rather, automatic and un−self-conscious. However, the self does enable long-term planning, goal setting, and restraint. It imagines alternatives, compares itself with others, and manages its reputation and relationships. Moreover, as Mark Leary (2004a) noted in his aptly titled The Curse of the Self, the self can sometimes be an impediment to a satisfying life. That’s why religious or spiritual meditation practices seek to prune the self’s egocentric preoccupations, by quieting the ego, reducing its attachments to material pleasures, and redirecting it. “Mysticism,” adds psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2006), “everywhere and always, is about losing the self, transcending the self, and merging with something larger than the self.” In the remainder of this chapter, we examine our self-concept (how we come to know ourselves) and the self in action (how our sense of self drives our attitudes and actions). Self-Concept: Who Am I? How and how accurately do we know ourselves? What determines our self-concept? At the Centre of Our Worlds: Our Sense of Self The most important aspect of yourself is your self. To discover where this sense of self arises, neuroscientists are exploring the brain activity that underlies our constant sense of being oneself. Most studies suggest an important role for the right hemisphere. Put yours to sleep (with an anaesthetic to your right carotid artery) and you likely will have trouble recognizing your own face. One patient with right-hemisphere damage failed to recognize 34 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING that he owned and was controlling his left hand (Decety & Sommerville, 2003). The medial prefrontal cortex, a neuron path located in the cleft between your brain hemispheres just behind your eyes, seemingly helps stitch together your sense of self. It becomes more active when you think about yourself (Zimmer, 2005). The elements of your self-concept, the specific beliefs by which you define yourself, are your self-schemas (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Schemas are mental templates by which we organize our worlds. Our self-schemas—our perceiving ourselves as athletic, overweight, smart, or whatever—powerfully affect how we perceive, remember, and evaluate other people and ourselves. If, for example, athletics is central to your self-concept (if being an athlete is one of your self-schemas), then you will tend to notice others’ bodies and skills. You will quickly recall sports-related experiences. And you will welcome information that is consistent with your self-schema (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984). The self-schemas that make up our self-concepts help us organize and retrieve our experiences. Social Comparisons How do we decide if we are rich, smart, or short? One way is through social comparison (Festinger, 1954). Others around us help to define the standard by which we define our- selves as rich or poor, smart or dumb, tall or short: We compare ourselves with those around us and become conscious of how we differ. We then use others as a benchmark by which we can evaluate our performance and our beliefs. Consider a study conducted by Penelope Lockwood of the University of Toronto and Ziva Kunda of the University of Waterloo (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). They exposed first- year or fourth-year accounting students to an article about a superstar accounting student who had won numerous awards, attained a very high grade average, and landed a spectacu- lar job. For first-year students, this role model represented achievements they could hope to attain. But fourth-year students knew that—at this point in their studies—they could not hope to achieve such spectacular heights. As you can see in Figure 2–2, comparisons to the superstar had strong effects on these students’ self-evaluations. When first- and fourth-year 9 No comparison Superstar comparison Self-evaluation 8 7 First Fourth Participants’ year in school FIGURE 2–2 SOCIAL COMPARISON AND SELF-EVALUATION. People are inspired by a role model if they can attain similar success, but they are demoralized if they cannot.  ource: Adapted from P. Lockwood and Z. Kunda, “Superstars and me: Predicting the impact of role models S on the self,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(1), 91–103. Copyright © 1997 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 35 students did not read about the superstar, they had similar self-evaluations. But when they were exposed to the superstar, first-year students seemed inspired; their self-evaluations were substantially more positive. Fourth-year students, on the other hand, seemed dejected; their self-evaluations plummeted. As this study demonstrates, our comparisons to others powerfully affect our self-views. Social comparison explains why students tend to have a higher academic self-evaluation if they attend a school with mostly average students (Marsh, Kong, & Hau, 2000) and how self-concept can be threatened after graduation when a student who excelled in an average high school goes on to an academically selective university. The “big fish” is no longer in a small pond. Much of life revolves around social comparisons. We feel handsome when others seem homely, smart when others seem dull, caring when others “Make no comparisons!” seem callous. When we witness a peer’s performance, we cannot resist King Charles I, 1600–49 implicitly comparing ourselves (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995). We may, therefore, privately take some pleasure in a peer’s failure, especially when it happens to someone we envy and when we don’t feel vulnerable to such misfortune our- selves (Lockwood, 2002; Smith et al., 1996). You might have heard the German word for this: schadenfreude. Sometimes social comparison is based on incomplete information. Have you ever been on Facebook or Instagram and thought, “All of my friends are having a lot more fun than I am”? If so, you’re not alone. Among students in one study, those who spent more time on Facebook were more likely to believe that other people were happier and had better lives than they did (Chou & Edge, 2012). Of course, it can’t be true that everybody is having more fun then everyone else. More than likely, Facebook users are choosing to feature the more exciting and positive aspects of their lives. This biased social comparison might be one reason young adults who used Facebook more often were more anxious, more lonely, and less satisfied with their own lives (Kross et al., 2013). Social comparisons can also diminish our satisfaction in other ways. When we experi- ence an increase in affluence, status, or achievement, we “compare upward”—we raise the standards by which we evaluate our attainments. When climbing the ladder of suc- cess, we tend to look up, not down; we compare ourselves with others who are doing even better (Gruder, 1977; Suls & Tesch, 1978; Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982). When facing competition, we often protect our shaky self-concept by perceiving the competitor as advantaged. For example, college swimmers believed that their competitors had better coaching and more practice time (Shepperd & Taylor, 1999). Even sexual activity is sub- ject to social comparison. Adults who have sex more often are happier—you might have guessed that! But then social comparison kicks in: Even people who have a lot of sex are less happy if their peers are having more sex than they are (Wadsworth, 2014). Apparently, we judge not just how much fun we’re having—but how it measures up to the fun everyone else is having. Other people’s judgments When people think well of us, it helps us think well of ourselves. Children whom others label as gifted, hard-working, or helpful tend to incorporate such ideas into their self- concepts and behaviour (see Chapter 3). If minority students feel threatened by negative stereotypes of their academic ability, or if women feel threatened by low expectations for their math and science performance, they may “disidentify” with those realms. Rather than fight such prejudgments, they may identify their interests elsewhere (Steele, 2010) (and see Chapter 12). The looking-glass self was how sociologist Charles H. Cooley (1902) described our use of how we think others perceive us as a mirror for perceiving ourselves. Fellow soci- ologist George Herbert Mead (1934) refined this concept, noting that what matters for our self-concept is not how others actually see us but the way we imagine they see us. 36 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING People generally feel freer to praise than to criticize; they voice their compliments and restrain their insults. We may, therefore, overestimate others’ appraisal, inflating our self- images (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979). For example, people tend to see themselves as more physically attractive than they actually are (Epley & Whitchurch, 2008). Our self- esteem, moreover, corresponds with how we see ourselves on traits that we believe are valued by others (Anthony, Holmes, & Wood, 2007). Self and Culture How would you complete this statement: “I am _____”? Would you give information about your personal traits, such as “I am honest,” “I am tall,” or “I am outgoing”? Or would you also describe your social identity, such as “I am a Pisces,” “I am a MacDonald,” or “I am a Muslim”? For some people, especially those in industrialized Western cultures, individualism pre- vails. Identity is self-contained. Becoming an adult means separating from parents, becom- ing self-reliant, and defining one’s personal, independent self. One’s identity—as a unique individual with particular abilities, traits, values, and dreams—remains fairly constant. The psychology of Western cultures assumes that your life will be enriched by believ- ing in your power of personal control. Western literature, from The Iliad to Anne of Green Gables, celebrates the self-reliant individual. Movie plots feature rugged heroes who buck the establishment. Songs proclaim “I’ve Gotta Be Me” and extol the virtues of loving yourself (Schoeneman, 1994). Individualism flourishes when people experience affluence, mobility, urbanism, and mass media (Freeman, 1997; Marshall, 1997; Triandis, 1994). Most cultures native to Asia, Africa, and Central and South America place a greater value on collectivism by respecting and identifying with the group. They nurture what Shinobu Kitayama and Hazel Markus (1995) call the interdependent self. In these cultures, people are more self-critical and focus less on positive self-views (Heine et al., 1999). Malaysians, Indians, Japanese, and traditional Kenyans, such as the Maasai, for example, are much more likely than Australians, Canadians, Americans, and the British to complete the “I am” statement with their group identities (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001; Ma & Schoeneman, 1997). When speaking, people using the languages of collectivist countries say “I” less often (Kashima & Kashima, 1998, 2003). Compared with U.S. church web- sites, Korean church websites place more emphasis on social connections and participation and less on personal spiritual growth and self-betterment (Sasaki & Kim, 2011). Of course, pigeonholing cultures as solely individualist or collectivist oversimplifies because within any culture individualism varies from person to person (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, & Coon, 2002). There are individualist Chinese and collectivist Americans, and most of us behave communally at some times and individualistically at others (Bandura, 2004). Individualism–collectivism also varies across a country’s regions and political views. Conservatives tend to be economic individualists (“Don’t tax or regulate me”) and moral collectivists (“Legislate against immorality”). Liberals tend to be economic collectivists (supporting universal health care) and moral individualists (“Let people choose for themselves”). Despite individual and subcultural variations, however, researchers continue to regard individualism and collectivism as genuine cultural variables (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005). Growing individualism within cultures Cultures can also change over time, and many seem to be growing more individualistic. One way to see this is using the Google Books Ngram Viewer, which shows the usage of words and phrases in the full text of 5 million books since the 1800s. (Try it yourself; it’s online and free.) In the 2000s, compared to previous decades, books published in the United States used the word get more and give less (Greenfield, 2013), and used I, me, and you more and we and us a little less (Twenge et al., 2013) (see Figure 2–3).  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 37 0.9 0.8 I, me, my, mine, myself 0.7 0.6 0.5 You, your, yours, yourself, yourselves 0.4 0.3 We, us, our, ours, ourselves 0.2 0.1 0 2002 2005 2008 1960 1990 1966 1969 1996 1999 1963 1993 1984 1972 1975 1978 1987 1981 FIGURE 2–3 CHANGING PRONOUN USE. In the Google Books database, American books in the 2000s (vs. those from the 1960s–1970s) used I, me, my, mine, and myself and you, your, yours, yourself, and yourselves more often.  ource: Twenge, J. M., Campbell, W. K., & Gentile, B. (2013). Changes in pronoun use in American books and S the rise of individualism, 1960–2008. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 44, 406–415. Popular song lyrics also became more likely to use I and me and less likely to use we and us between 1980 and 2007 (DeWall et al., 2011), with the norm shifting from the sappy love songs of the 1980s (“Endless Love,” 1981) to the self-celebration of the 2000s (Justin Timberlake singlehandedly bringing “SexyBack,” 2006) and 2010s (Meghan Trainor’s narcissistic self-celebration, “Me Too,” in 2016). These cultural trends have had an effect on individuals, too: Today’s young Americans report significantly more positive self-views than young people did in the 1960s and 1970s (Gentile et al., 2010; Twenge & Campbell, 2008; Twenge et al., 2012; but for an opposing view, see Trzesniewski & Don- nellan, 2010). Chinese citizens in their early twenties are more likely than older Chinese to agree with individualistic statements, such as “Make a name for yourself” and “Live a life that suits your tastes” (Arora, 2005). Even your name might show the shift toward individualism: Parents are now less likely to give their children common names and more likely to help them stand out with an unusual name. Although nearly 20 percent of boys born in 1990 received one of the ten most common names, only 8 percent received such a common name by 2010, with the numbers similar for girls (Twenge et al., 2010). Today, you don’t have to be the child of a celebrity to have a name as unique as North, Suri, or Apple. Americans and Australians, most of whom are descended from those who struck out on their own to emigrate, are more likely than Europeans to give their children uncommon 38 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING names. Parents in the western United States and Canada, descended from independent pioneers, are also more likely than those in the more established east to give their children uncommon names (Varnum & Kitayama, 2011). The more individualistic the time or the place, the more children receive unique names. These changes demonstrate a principle that goes deeper than a name: the interaction between individuals and society. Did the culture focus on uniqueness first and cause the parents’ name choices, or did individual parents decide they wanted their children to be unique, thus creating the culture? A similar chicken-and-egg question applies to song lyrics: Did a more self-focused population listen to more self-focused songs, or did listen- ing to more self-focused songs make people more self-focused? The answer, although not yet fully understood, is probably both (Markus & Kitayama, 2010). Culture and cognition In his book The Geography of Thought (2003), social psychologist Richard Nisbett con- tends that collectivism also results in different ways of thinking. When shown an animated underwater scene (Figure 2–4), Japanese respondents spontaneously recalled 60 percent more background features than did Americans, and they spoke of more relationships (the frog beside the plant). Americans look more at the focal object, such as a single big fish, and less at the surroundings (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005; Nisbett, 2003), a result duplicated when studies examine activation in different areas of the brain (Goh et al., 2007; Lewis, Goto, & Kong, 2008). When shown drawings of groups of children, Japanese students took the facial expressions of all of the children into account when rating the happiness or anger of an individual child, whereas Americans focused on only the child they were asked to rate (Masuda et al., 2008). Nisbett and Takahido Masuda (2003) concluded from such studies that East Asians think more holistically—perceiving and thinking about objects and people in relationship to one another and to their environment. If you grew up in a Western culture, you were probably told to “express yourself”— through writing, through the choices you make, through the products you buy, and perhaps through your tattoos or piercings. When asked about the purpose of language, American students were more likely to explain that it allows self-expression, whereas Korean students focused on how language allows communication with others. American students were also FIGURE 2–4 ASIAN AND WESTERN THINKING. When shown an underwater scene such as this one, Asians often describe the environment and the relationships among the fish. Americans attend more to a single big fish (Nisbett, 2003).  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 39 more likely to see their choices as expres- sions of themselves and to evaluate their choices more favourably (Kim & Sherman, 2007). The individualized latté—“decaf, single shot, skinny, extra hot”—that seems just right at a North American espresso shop would seem strange in Seoul, noted Heejun Kim and Hazel Markus (1999). In Korea, people place less value on express- ing their uniqueness and more on tradition and shared practices (Choi & Choi, 2002) (Figure 2–5). Korean advertisements tend to feature people together; they seldom high- light personal choice or freedom (Markus, 2001; Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008). Collectivist cultures also promote a greater sense of belonging and more inte- The Self in a Social World gration between the self and others. When Source: © Jack Ziegler/The New Yorker Collection/www.cartoonbank.com. Chinese participants were asked to think about their mothers, a brain region asso- ciated with the self became activated—an area that became more active for Western participants only when they thought about themselves (Zhu et al., 2007). Interdependent selves have not one self but many selves: self-with-parents, self- at-work, self-with-friends (Cross, Liao, & Josephs, 1992). As Figure 2–6 and Table 2–2 suggest, the interdependent self is embedded in social memberships. Conversation is less direct and more polite (Holtgraves, 1997), and people focus more on gain- ing social approval (Lalwani, Shavitt, & Johnson, 2006). Among Chinese students, half said they would stop dating someone if their parents disapproved, compared with less than one-third of American students (Zhang & Kline, 2009). In a collectivist cul- FIGURE 2–5  WHICH PEN WOULD ture, the goal of social life is to harmonize with and support one’s YOU CHOOSE? communities, not—as it is in more individualistic societies—to When Heejun Kim and Hazel Markus enhance one’s individual self and make independent choices. (1999) invited people to choose one of these pens, 77 percent of Americans Culture and self-esteem but only 31 percent of Asians chose In collectivist cultures, self-esteem is malleable (context-specific) the uncommon colour (regardless of rather than stable (enduring across situations). In one study, four in whether it was orange, as here, or five Canadian students but only one in three Chinese and Japanese green). This result illustrates differing students agreed that “the beliefs that you hold about who you are cultural preferences for uniqueness and conformity, noted Kim and Markus. (your inner self) remain the same across different activity domains” (Tafarodi et al., 2004). For those in individualistic cultures, self-esteem is more personal and less relational. If a Westerner’s personal identity is threatened, she’ll feel angrier and sadder than when her collective identity is threatened (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999). Unlike Japanese subjects who persist more on tasks when they are failing, people in individualistic coun- tries persist more when succeeding because, for them, success elevates self-esteem (Heine et al., 2001). Western individualists like to make comparisons with others that boost their self-esteem. Asian collectivists make comparisons (often upward, with those doing better) in ways that facilitate self-improvement (White & Lehman, 2005). So when, do you suppose, are university students in collectivist Japan and individualist United States most likely to report positive emotions, such as happiness and elation? For 40 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING Mother Father Father Mother Sibling Self Self Friend Sibling Friend Co-worker Friend Friend Co-worker Independent view of self Interdependent view of self FIGURE 2–6 SELF-CONSTRUAL AS INDEPENDENT OR INTERDEPENDENT. The independent self acknowledges relationships with others; the interdependent self is more deeply embedded in others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Japanese students, happiness comes with positive social engagement—with feeling close, friendly, and respectful. For American students, happiness more often comes with disen- gaged emotions—with feeling effective, superior, and proud (Kitayama & Markus, 2000). Conflict in collectivist cultures often takes place between groups; individualist cultures breed more conflict (and crime and divorce) between individuals (Triandis, 2000). When Shinobu Kitayama (1999), after ten years of teaching and researching in America, visited his Japanese alma mater, Kyoto University, graduate students were “astounded” when he explained the Western idea of the independent self. “I persisted in explaining this Western notion of self-concept—one that my American students understood intuitively— and finally began to persuade them that, indeed, many Americans do have such a discon- nected notion of self. Still, one of them, sighing deeply, said at the end, ‘Could this really be true?’” When East meets West, does the self-concept become more individualized? What hap- pens when Japanese are exposed to Western promotions based on individual achievement, with admonitions to “believe in one’s own possibilities” and with movies in which the heroic individual police officer catches the crook despite others’ interference? As Steven TABLE 2–2 Self-Concept: Independent or Interdependent. Independent Interdependent Identity is Personal, defined by individual Social, defined by connections traits and goals with others What matters Me—personal achievement We—group goals and solidarity; and fulfillment; my rights and our social responsibilities and liberties relationships Disapproves of Conformity Egotism Illustrative motto “To thine own self be true” “No one is an island” Cultures that support Individualistic Western Collectivistic Asian and developing world  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 41 Collectivism in action: Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, people acted together to help one another. Source: © AP Photo/Julie Jacobson. Heine and his co-researchers (1999) report, they become more individualistic. Being an exchange student has a similar effect: Personal self-esteem increased among Japanese exchange students after spending seven months at the University of British Columbia. Individual self-esteem is also higher among long-term Asian immigrants to Canada than among more recent immigrants (and higher than among those living in Asia). THE INSIDE STORY We began our collaboration by wondering out How could you know someone if she didn’t tell loud. Shinobu wondered why American life was you what she was thinking? so weird. Hazel countered with anecdotes about On the other hand, Shinobu was curious the strangeness of Japan. Cultural psychology is about why students shouldn’t just listen to a lec- about making the strange familiar and the familiar ture and why American students felt the need to strange. Our shared cultural encounters aston- be constantly interrupting each other and talk- ished us and convinced us that when it comes to ing over each other and the professor. Why did psychological functioning, place matters. the comments and questions reveal strong emo- After weeks of lecturing in Japan to students tions and have a competitive edge? What was with a good command of English, Hazel wondered the point of this arguing? Why did intelligence why the students did not say anything—no ques- seem to be associated with getting the best tions, no comments. She assured students she was of another person, even within a class where interested in ideas that were different from hers, people knew each other well? so why was there no response? Where were the Shinobu expressed his amazement at Ameri- arguments, debates, and signs of critical thinking? can hosts who bombard their guests with Even if she asked a straightforward question—for choices. Do you want wine or beer, or soft drinks example, “Where is the best noodle shop?”—the or juice, or coffee or tea? Why burden the guest answer was invariably an audible intake of air fol- with trivial decisions? Surely the host knew what lowed by “It depends.” Didn’t Japanese students would be good refreshment on this occasion and have preferences, ideas, opinions, and attitudes? could simply provide something appropriate. (continued) 42 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING Choice as a burden? Hazel wondered if this could be the key to one particularly humiliating experience in Japan. A group of eight was in a French restaurant, and everyone was following the universal restaurant script and was study- ing the menu. The waiter approached and stood nearby. Hazel announced her choice of appe- tizer and entree. Next was a tense conversation among the Japanese host and the Japanese guests. When the meal was served, it was not what Hazel had ordered. Everyone at the table was served the same meal. This was deeply disturbing. If you can’t choose your own dinner, how could it be enjoyable? What was the point of the menu if everybody is served the same meal? Could a sense of sameness be a good or Offering a guest a choice of beverage may be greeted with surprise by people from some cultures. a desirable feeling in Japan? Source: Pixtal/SuperStock. When Hazel walked around the grounds of a temple in Kyoto, there was a fork in the path and a sign that read, “ordinary path.” Who would by psychologists in middle-class white Ameri- want to take the ordinary path? Where was the can settings studying middle-class white special, less travelled path? Choosing the non- American respondents. In other socio-cultural ordinary path may be an obvious course for contexts, there can be different ideas and prac- Americans, but in this case, it led to the temple tices about how to be a person and how to live dump outside the temple grounds. The ordinary a meaningful life, and these differences have an path did not denote the dull and unchallenging influence on psychological functioning. It is this way; it meant the good and appropriate way. realization that fuels our continuing interest in These exchanges inspired our experimental collaboration and in cultural psychology. studies and reminded us that there are ways of life beyond the ones that each of us knows best. Hazel Rose Markus Stanford University So far, most of psychology has been produced Shinobu Kitayama University of Michigan Self-Knowledge “Know thyself,” admonished an ancient Greek oracle. We certainly try. We readily form beliefs about ourselves, and we in Western cultures don’t hesitate to explain why we feel and act as we do. But how well do we actually know ourselves? “There is one thing, and only one in the whole universe which we know more about than we could learn from external observation,” noted C. S. Lewis (1952, pp. 18–19). “That one thing is [ourselves]. We have, so to speak, inside information; we are in the know.” Indeed. Yet sometimes we think we know, but our inside information is wrong. That is the unavoidable conclusion of some fascinating research. Predicting behaviour Inevitably, dating couples tend to predict the longevity of their relationships through rose-coloured glasses. Their friends and family often know better, reported Tara MacDonald and Michael Ross (1997). Among Univer- “You don’t know your own sity of Waterloo students, their roommates were better predictors than mind.” they were of whether their romances would survive. Medical residents Jonathan Swift, weren’t very good at predicting whether they would do well on a surgi- Polite Conversation, 1738 cal skills exam, but their peers in the program predicted each other’s  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 43 performance with startling accuracy (Lutsky, Risucci, & Tortolani, 1993). Observers predicted psychology students’ exam grades better than the students themselves— mostly because observers relied on past performance rather than on the students’ hopes for acing the test (Helzer & Dunning, 2012). So, if you’re in love and want to know whether it will last, don’t listen to your heart—ask your roommate. And if you want to predict your routine daily behaviours—how much time you will spend laughing, on the phone, or watching TV, for example—your close friends’ estimates will likely prove at least as accurate as your own (Vazire & Mehl, 2008). One of the most common errors in behaviour prediction is underestimating how long it will take to complete a task (called the planning fallacy). The Sydney Opera House, for example, was supposed to be completed in 6 years; it took 16. In 1969, Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau proudly announced that a stadium with a retractable roof would be built for the 1976 Olym- pics; the roof was completed in 1989. Less than a third of couples engaged to be married com- pleted their wedding planning in the amount of time they had anticipated, and only four out of ten sweethearts bought a planned Valentine’s Day gift by their self-imposed deadline (Min & Arkes, 2012). Coursework doesn’t fare any better. Wilfrid Laurier University students writing an honours thesis were asked to predict when they would complete the project. On average, students finished three weeks later than their “most realistic” estimate—and a week later than their “worst-case scenario” estimate (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 2002). However, friends and teachers were able to predict just how late these papers would be. Just as you should ask your friends how long your relationship is likely to survive, if you want to know when you will finish your term paper, ask your roommate or your mom. You could also do what Microsoft does: Managers automatically add 30 percent onto a software developer’s estimate of comple- tion—and 50 percent if the project involves a new operating system (Dunning, 2006). So, how can you improve your self-predictions? The best way is to be more realistic about how long tasks took in the past. Apparently, people underestimate how long some- thing will take because they misremember previous tasks as taking less time than they actually did (Roy et al., 2005). Another useful strategy: Estimate how long each step in the project will take. Engaged couples who described their wedding-planning steps in more detail more accurately predicted how long the process would take (Min & Arkes, 2012). Are people equally bad at predicting how much money they will spend? Johanna Peetz of Carleton University and Roger Buehler of Wilfrid Laurier University (2009) found that the answer was yes. Undergraduates predicted that they would spend $94 over the next week but actually spent $122. Considering they had spent $126 in the week before the study, their guess should have been more accurate. When they came back a week later, they still predicted they would spend only $85 in the coming week. Students who said they wanted to save money were more likely to predict they would spend less—but ended up spending the same amount as everyone else. So, just as we think we will complete tasks quickly, we think we will save our money. The difficulty lies in actually doing so. If Lao-tzu was right—“He who knows others is learned. He who knows himself is enlightened”— then most people, it would seem, are more learned than enlightened. Predicting feelings Many of life’s big decisions involve predicting our future feelings. Would “When a feeling was there, marrying this person lead to lifelong contentment? Would entering this they felt as if it would never profession make for satisfying work? Would going on this vacation pro- go; when it was gone, they felt duce a happy experience? Or would the likelier results be divorce, job as if it had never been; when it burnout, and holiday disappointment? returned, they felt as if it had Sometimes we know how we will feel—if we fail that exam, win that big never gone.” game, or take that half-hour jog. We know what exhilarates us and what makes George MacDonald, us anxious or bored. Other times we may mispredict our responses. Asked What’s Mine’s Mine, 1886 how they would feel if asked sexually harassing questions on a job interview, most women studied by Julie Woodzicka and Marianne LaFrance (2001) said they would feel angry. When actually asked such questions, however, women more often experienced fear. 44 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING Studies of “affective forecasting” reveal that people have the greatest difficulty pre- dicting the intensity and the duration of their future emotions (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). People have mispredicted how they would feel some time after a romantic breakup, after receiving a gift, after losing an election, after winning a game, and after being insulted (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999). Some examples follow: When young men are sexually aroused by erotic photographs and then exposed to a passionate date scenario in which their date asks them to “stop,” they admit that they might not stop. If not shown sexually arousing pictures first, they are less likely to say that they might be sexually aggressive. When not aroused, they easily mispredict how they will feel and act when aroused—which can lead to unexpected professions of love during lust, to unintended pregnancies, and to repeat offences among sex abusers who have sincerely vowed “never again.” Hungry shoppers do more impulse buying (“Those doughnuts would be delicious!”) than when shopping after eating a mega-sized blueberry muffin (Gilbert & Wilson, 2000). When hungry, we mispredict how gross those deep-fried doughnuts will seem when we are sated. When stuffed, we underestimate how yummy a doughnut might be with a late-night glass of milk. When natural disasters, such as hurricanes, occur, people predict that their sadness will be greater if more people are killed. But after Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, students’ sadness was similar when they believed 50 people had been killed or 1000 had been killed (Dunn & Ashton-James, 2008). What did influence how sad people felt? Seeing pictures of victims. Poignant images on TV have a great deal of influ- ence on us after disasters. People overestimate how much their well-being would be affected by both bad events (a romantic breakup, failing to reach an athletic goal [Eastwick et al., 2007a; van Dijk, Finkenauer, & Pollmann, 2008]) and good events (warmer winters, losing weight, more television channels, or more free time). Even extreme events, such as winning a provincial lottery or suffering a paralyzing accident, impact long-term happiness less than most people suppose. Our intuitive theory seems to be this: We want; we get; we are happy. If that were true, this chapter would have fewer words. In reality, noted Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson (2000), we often “miswant.” People who imagine an idyllic desert island holiday with sun, surf, and sand may be disappointed when they discover “how much they require daily structure, intellec- tual stimulation, or regular infusions of Pop Tarts” (p. 182). We think that if our candidate or team wins we will be delighted for a long while. But study after study reveals our vulnerability to impact bias—overestimating Predicting behaviour, the enduring impact of emotion- even one’s own, is no causing events. Faster than we easy matter, which may be why this visitor goes expect, the emotional traces of to a tarot card reader in such good tidings evaporate. hope of help. We are especially prone to Source: © AP Images/Gene impact bias after negative events. Blythe. Let’s make this personal. Gilbert and Wilson invite you to imag- ine how you might feel a year after losing your nondominant hand. Compared with today, how happy would you be? You may have focused on what the calamity would mean: no clapping, no shoe tying, no  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 45 competitive basketball, no speedy keyboarding. Although you likely would forever regret the loss, your general happiness some time after the event would be influenced by “two things: (a) the event, and (b) everything else” (Gilbert & Wilson, 2000). In focusing on the negative event, we discount the importance of everything else that contributes to happiness, and so we overpredict our enduring misery. “Nothing that you focus on will make as much difference as you think,” concurred researchers David Schkade and Daniel Kahneman (1998). Moreover, said Wilson and Gilbert (2003), people neglect the speed and power of their coping mechanisms, which include rationalizing, discounting, forgiving, and limiting emo- tional trauma. Because we are unaware of the speed and strength of our coping, we adapt to disabilities, romantic breakups, exam failures, layoffs, and personal and team defeats more readily than we would expect. Ironically, Gilbert and his colleagues report (2004) that major negative events (which activate our psychological defences) can be less enduringly distressing than minor irritations (which don’t activate our defences). We are, under most circumstances, remarkably resilient. The wisdom and illusions of self-analysis To a striking extent, then, our intuitions are often dead wrong about what has influenced us and what we will feel and do. But let’s not overstate the case. When the causes of our behaviour are conspicuous and the correct explanation fits our intuition, our self-perceptions will be accurate (Gavanski & Hoffman, 1987). When the causes of behaviour are obvious to an observer, they are usually obvious to us as well. Overall, the correlation between predicted feedings and actual feelings is 0.28—a modest, although far from perfect, correlation (Mathieu & Gosling, 2012). We are unaware of much that goes on in our minds. Perception and memory studies show that we are more aware of the results of our thinking than of the process. Creative scientists and artists often cannot report the thought processes that produced their insights, although they have superb knowledge of the results. Timothy Wilson (1985, 2002) offers a bold idea: Analyzing why we feel the way we do can actually make our judgments less accurate. In nine experiments, Wilson and his colleagues (1989) found that the attitudes people consciously expressed toward things or people usually predicted their subsequent behaviour reasonably well. Their attitude reports became useless, however, if the participants were first asked to analyze their feelings. For example, dating couples’ current happiness with their relationship accurately predicted whether they would still be dating several months later. But participants who first listed all the reasons they could think of why their relationship was good or bad before rating their happiness were misled—their happiness ratings were useless in predicting the future of the relationship! Apparently, the process of dissecting the relationship drew attention to easily verbalized factors that were not as important as harder-to-verbalize happiness. We are often “strangers to ourselves,” Wilson concluded (2002). Such findings illustrate that we have dual attitudes, say Wilson and colleagues (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Our automatic, implicit attitudes regarding someone or something often differ from our consciously controlled, explicit attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Nosek, 2007). When people say that they make decisions by “trusting their gut,” they’re referring to their implicit attitudes (Kendrick & Olson, 2012). Although explicit attitudes may change with relative ease, noted Wilson, “implicit attitudes, like old habits, change more slowly” (p. 104). With repeated practice, however, new habitual atti- tudes can replace old ones. This research on the limits of our self-knowledge has two practical implications. The first is for psychological inquiry. Self-reports are often “Self-contemplation is a curse untrustworthy. Errors in self-understanding limit the scientific usefulness that makes an old confusion of subjective personal reports. worse.” The second implication is for our everyday lives. Even if people report Theodore Roethke, The Collected Poems and interpret their experiences with complete honesty, that does not mean of Theodore Roethke, 1975 their reports are true. Personal testimonies are powerfully persuasive 46 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING (as we will see in Module C, “Social Psychology in Court”). But they may also be wrong. Keeping this potential for error in mind can help us feel less intimidated by others and become less gullible. What Is the Nature and Motivating Power of Self-Esteem? What is self-esteem and how does it affect behaviour and cognition? How do we decide how much self-esteem we have? Is self-esteem the sum of all our self- views across various domains? If we see ourselves as attractive, athletic, smart, and destined to be rich and loved, will we have high self-esteem? Yes, say Jennifer Crocker and Connie Wolfe (2001). When we feel good about the domains (looks, smarts, or whatever) important to our self-esteem, we will have high self-esteem. “One person may have self-esteem that is highly contingent on doing well in school and being physically attractive, whereas another may have self-esteem that is contingent on being loved by God and adhering to moral stan- dards.” Thus, the first person will feel high self-esteem when made to feel smart and good- looking; the second person, when made to feel moral. But Jonathon Brown and Keith Dutton (1994) argue that this “bottom-up” view of self- esteem is not the whole story. The causal arrow, they believe, also goes the other way. People who value themselves in a general way—those with high self-esteem—are more likely to value their looks, abilities, and so forth. They are like new parents, who, loving their infant, delight in the baby’s fingers, toes, and hair: The parents do not first evaluate their infant’s fingers or toes and then decide how much to value the whole baby. Specific self-perceptions do have some influence, however. If you think you’re good at math, you will be more likely to do well at math. Although general self-esteem does not predict academic performance very well, academic self-concept—whether you think you are good in school—does predict performance (Marsh & O’Mara, 2008). Of course, each causes the other: Doing well at math makes you think you are good at math, which then motivates you to do even better. So if you want to encourage someone (or yourself!), it’s better if your praise is specific (“You’re good at math”) instead of general (“You’re great”). And it’s better if your kind words reflect true ability and performance (“You really improved on your last test”) rather than unrealistic optimism (“You can do anything”). Feedback is best when it is true and specific (Swann, Chang-Schneider, & Angulo, 2007). Imagine you’re getting your grade back for the first test in a psychology class. When you see your grade, you groan—you’re hovering somewhere between a D and an F. But then you get an encouraging e-mail with some review questions for the class and this message: “Stu- dents who have high self-esteem not only get better grades, but they remain self-confident and assured.... Bottom line: Hold your head—and your self-esteem—high.” Another group of students instead get a message about taking personal control of their performance or receive review questions only. So how would each group do on the final exam? To the sur- prise of the researchers in one study, the students whose self-esteem was boosted did by far the worst on the final; in fact, they flunked it (Forsyth et al., 2007). Struggling students told to feel good about themselves, the researchers suggested, may have thought, “I’m already great—why study?” Self-Esteem Motivation Most people are extremely motivated to maintain their self-esteem. In fact, a study found that university students preferred a boost to their self-esteem to eating their favourite food, engaging in their favourite sexual activity, seeing a best friend, drinking alcohol, or  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 47 Activity: How Good Are You? Compared to other students of the same class level as you, how would you rate yourself on the characteristics below? Use the following scale in making your response: 1 = well below average, 2 = below average, 3 = slightly below average, 4 = average, 5 = slightly above average, 6 = above average, 7 = well above average _____ leadership ability _____ athletic ability _____ ability to get along with others _____ tolerance _____ energy level _____ helpfulness _____ responsibility _____ creativity _____ patience _____ trustworthiness _____ sincerity _____ thoughtfulness _____ cooperativeness _____ reasonableness _____ intelligence Now that you have rated yourself on all of these characteristics, take a look at your responses again. Do you see yourself in a positive light? A negative one? How do you compare to others? Most people rate themselves above average on most of the characteristics. receiving a paycheque (Bushman, Moeller, & Crocker, 2011). So, somewhat incredibly, self-esteem was more important than sex, pizza, and beer! What happens when your self-esteem is threatened—for example, by a failure or an unflattering comparison with someone else? When brothers have markedly different ability levels—for example, one is a great athlete and the other is not—they report not getting along well (Tesser, 1988). Dutch university students who experienced a “double whammy” of low self-evaluation and negative feedback felt more schadenfreude (joy at another’s misfortune) when they watched a young woman sing horribly out of tune in an audition for the Dutch version of American Idol (van Dijk et al., 2012). Misery loves to laugh at others’ misery. Self-esteem threats occur among friends, whose success can be more threatening than that of strangers (Zuckerman & Jost, 2001). In contrast, researchers at the University of Toronto have found that people often react more positively to upward comparisons, rather than downward comparisons, to romantic partners (Pinkus et al., 2008). When a partner 48 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING outperforms us in a domain important to both our identities, we may reduce the threat by affirming our relationship, saying, “My capable partner, with whom I’m very close, is part of who I am” (Lockwood et al., 2004). Self-esteem level also makes a difference: High self-esteem people usually react to a self-esteem threat by compensating for it (blaming someone else or trying harder next time). These reactions help them preserve their posi- tive feelings about themselves. Low self-esteem people, however, are more likely to blame themselves or to give up (VanDellen et al., 2011). What underlies the motive to maintain or enhance self-esteem? Mark Leary (1998, 2004b, 2007) believes that our self-esteem feelings are similar to a fuel gauge. Relation- ships enable surviving and thriving, so the self-esteem gauge alerts us to threatened social rejection, motivating us to act with greater sensitivity to others’ expectations. Studies con- firmed that social rejection lowers our self-esteem and makes us more eager for approval. Spurned or jilted, we feel unattractive or inadequate. Like a blinking dashboard light, this pain can motivate action: self-improvement and a search for acceptance and inclusion elsewhere. Consistent with this view, our self-esteem tracks how we view ourselves on traits we believe are valued by others. People believe that social acceptance often depends on easily observable traits, such as physical appearance and social skills. Although people say they value communal traits—traits that denote a concern for and connection to other people, such as kindness and understanding—they recognize that appearance is often what attracts others. And self-esteem generally corresponds more closely to such superficial traits than to communal qualities (Anthony, Holmes, & Wood, 2007). But self-esteem is related to communal qualities for people whose roles make these qualities attractive to others. Soci- ety values kindness and caring in women (more so than in men) and in people in romantic relationships. For these individuals, self-esteem tracks communal qualities. Self-esteem thus depends on whether we believe we have traits that make us attractive to others, and not necessarily on the traits that we say we value most. Jeff Greenberg (2008) offers another perspective, called “terror management theory,” which argues that humans must find ways to manage their overwhelming fear of death. If self-esteem were only about acceptance, he counters, why do “people strive to be great Among sibling relationships, the threat to self-esteem is greatest for an older child with a highly capable younger brother or sister. Source: Forsterforest/ Dreamstime.com/GetStock.com.  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 49 rather than to just be accepted” (p. 51)? The reality of our own death, he argues, moti- vates us to gain recognition from our work and values. There’s a worm in the apple, how- ever: Not everyone can achieve such recognition, which is exactly why it is valuable and why self-esteem can never be wholly unconditional (or not based on anything, such as when parents say, “You’re special just for being you”). To feel our lives are not in vain, Greenberg maintains, we must continually pursue self-esteem by meeting the standards of our societies. However, actively pursuing self-esteem can backfire. Jennifer Crocker and colleagues found that students whose self-worth was contingent on external sources (such as grades or others’ opinions) experienced more stress, anger, relationship problems, drug and alco- hol use, and eating disorders than did those whose sense of self-worth was rooted more in internal sources, such as personal virtues (Crocker, 2002; Crocker & Luhtanen, 2003; Crocker & Park, 2004; Crocker & Knight, 2005). Ironically, note Crocker and Lora Park (2004), those who pursue self-esteem, perhaps by seeking to become beautiful, rich, or popular, may lose sight of what really makes them feel good about themselves. University students who tried to impress their roommates by emphasizing their good qualities and hiding their bad ones found that their room- mates actually liked them less, which then undermined their self-esteem (Canevello & Crocker, 2011). Pursuing self-esteem, Crocker explains, is like reaching into a small hole in a barrel to grasp a delicious apple—and then getting it stuck because your hand’s tight grip has made it too big for the hole (Crocker, 2011). When we focus on boosting our self-esteem, we may become less open to criticism, less likely to empathize with oth- ers, and more pressured to succeed at activities rather than enjoy them. Over time, such pursuit of self-esteem can fail to satisfy our deep needs for competence, affiliation, and autonomy. So, instead of reaching for the apple and failing, Crocker observes, it’s bet- ter to emulate Johnny Appleseed, who planted seeds so others could eat apples—not so he could eat them himself. This approach—compassion—she found, was actually more likely to lead to the higher self-esteem people sought. For example, college students who embraced compassionate goals regarding their roommates (“I want to be supportive of my roommate”) achieved better relationships with them and subsequently enjoyed higher self-esteem (Canevello & Crocker, 2011). A similar approach works for our own views of ourselves. Kristin Neff (2011) calls it self-compassion—leaving behind comparisons with others and instead treating ourselves with kindness. As an Indian proverb puts it, “There is nothing noble in being superior to some other person. The true nobility is in being supe- rior to your previous self.” The Trade-off of Low vs. High Self-Esteem People low in self-esteem are more vulnerable to anxiety, loneliness, and eating disorders. When feeling bad or threatened, those with low self-esteem often take a negative view of everything. They notice and remember others’ worst behaviours and think their partners don’t love them (Murray et al., 2002; Vorauer & Quesnel, 2013). Although people with low self-esteem do not choose less desirable partners, they are quick to believe that their partners are criticizing or rejecting them. Perhaps as a result, those low in self-esteem are less satisfied with their relationships (Fincham & Bradbury, 1993). They may also be more likely to leave those relationships. Low-self-esteem undergraduates decided not to stay with roommates who saw them in a positive light (Swann & Pelham, 2002). Unfor- tunately, trying to boost low self-esteem by repeating positive phrases (such as “I’m a loveable person”) backfires: It actually makes low-self-esteem people feel worse (Wood et al., 2009). Those low in self-esteem also don’t want to hear positive things about nega- tive experiences (such as “At least you learned something”). Instead, they prefer to hear understanding responses, even if they are negative (such as “That really sucks”) (Marigold et al., 2014). 50 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING People with low self-esteem also experience more problems in life: They make less money, abuse drugs, and are more likely to be depressed (Orth & Robins, 2013; Salmela- Aro & Nurmi, 2007). Several studies took the crucial step of following people as they grew older (called a longitudinal study), finding that those who had low self-esteem as teens were more likely to be depressed later on, suggesting that low self-esteem causes depres- sion rather than the other way around (Sowislo & Orth, 2013). As you learned in Chapter 1 a correlation between two variables is sometimes caused by a third factor. Perhaps people low in self-esteem also faced poverty as children, experienced sexual abuse, or had parents who used drugs—all possible causes of later struggling. Sure enough, a study that con- trolled for these factors found that the link between self-esteem and negative outcomes dis- appeared (Boden, Fergusson, & Horwood, 2008). Self-esteem was seemingly a symptom of an underlying disease—in this case, a tough childhood. High self-esteem has other benefits: It fosters initiative, resilience, and pleasant feelings (Baumeister et al., 2003). Yet teen gang leaders, extreme ethnocentrists, terrorists, and men in prison for committing violent crimes also tend to have higher than average self-esteem (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Dawes, 1994, 1998). “Hitler had very high self- esteem,” note Baumeister and co-authors (2003). Nor is self-esteem the key to success: Self-esteem does not cause better academic achievement or superior work performance (Baumeister et al., 2003). “The enthusiastic claims of the self-esteem movement mostly range from fantasy to hogwash,” says Baumeister (1996), who suspects he has “probably published more studies on self-esteem than anybody else.... The effects of self-esteem are small, limited, and not all good.” Folks with high self-esteem, he reports, are more likely to be obnoxious, to interrupt, and to talk at people rather than with them (in contrast to the more shy, modest folks with low self-esteem). “My conclusion is that self-control is worth 10 times as much as self-esteem.” Narcissism: Self-esteem’s conceited sister High self-esteem becomes especially problematic if it crosses over into narcissism or having an inflated sense of self. Most people with high self-esteem value both individual achievement and relationships with others. Narcissists usually have high self-esteem, but they are missing the piece about caring for others (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002). Although narcissists are often outgoing and charming early on, their self-centredness often leads to relationship problems in the long run (Campbell, 2005). The link between narcis- sism and problematic social relations led Delroy Paulhus and Kevin Williams (2002) of the University of British Columbia to include narcissism in the “Dark Triad” of negative traits, along with Machiavellianism (manipulativeness) and anti-social psychopathy. In a series of experiments conducted by Brad Bushman and Roy Baumeister (1998), undergraduate volunteers wrote essays and received rigged feedback that said, “This is one of the worst essays I’ve read!” Those who scored high on narcissism were much more likely to retaliate, blasting painful noise into the headphones of the student they believed had criticized them. Narcissists weren’t aggressive toward someone who praised them (“Great essay!”); it was the insult that set them off. But what about self-esteem? Maybe only the “insecure” narcissists—those low in self-esteem—would lash out. But that’s not how it turned out; instead, the students high in both self-esteem and narcissism were the most aggressive. The same was true in a classroom setting: Those who were high in nar- cissism were most likely to retaliate against a classmate’s criticism by giving him or her a bad grade (Bushman et al., 2009; Figure 2–7). Narcissists are especially likely to lash out when the insult is delivered publicly—and thus punctures their carefully constructed bubble of superiority. For that, someone must pay (Ferriday et al., 2011). It’s true that narcissists can be charming and entertaining. But, as one wit has said, “God help you if you cross them.” Has the culture’s growing individualism also promoted more narcissism? It appears so. Narcissism scores rose over time on university campuses across the U.S. (Stewart &  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 51 2 1.5 High self-esteem 1 Aggression 0.5 Low self-esteem 0 –0.5 Low narcissism High narcissism FIGURE 2–7 NARCISSISM, SELF-ESTEEM, AND AGGRESSION. Narcissism and self-esteem interact to influence aggression. In an experiment by Brad Bushman and colleagues (2009), the recipe for retaliation against a critical classmate required both narcissism and high self-esteem. Bernhardt, 2010; Twenge & Foster, 2008, 2010), China (Cai et al., 2011), South Korea (Lee et al., 2014), and New Zealand (Wilson & Sibley, 2011). Narcissism correlates with materialism, the desire to be famous, inflated expectations, fewer committed relationships and more “hooking up,” more gambling, and more cheating—all of which have also risen as narcissism has increased (Twenge & Campbell, 2009). Narcissism is also linked to a lack of empathy—the ability to take other people’s perspective and be concerned about their problems—and empathy has dropped precipitously among university students. Sara Konrath and her colleagues (2011) speculate that today’s generation may be so wrapped up in online interaction that their in-person interaction skills have atrophied. Or, they say, empathy might have declined because young people today are “feeling too busy on their paths to success,” single-mindedly concentrating on their own achievement because the world is now so competitive. Yet, ironically, those high in narcissism and low in empathy are less—not more—successful in the long run, making lower grades in college and per- forming poorly at work (Judge et al., 2006; Robins & Beer, 2001). Narcissists seem to be aware of their own narcissism, too. Simply asking people if they agree with the statement “I am a narcissist” predicts narcissistic behaviour nearly as well as the standard 40-item measure (Konrath et al., 2014). Narcissists realize that they see themselves more positively than others see them and admit that they are arrogant and exaggerate their abilities (Carlson et al., 2011). They also recognize that they make good first impressions but are often actively disliked in the long run (Paulhus, 1998; Paulhus et al., 2013). “Early in life I had to choose between honest arrogance and hypocritical humility,” observed Frank Lloyd Wright. “I chose honest arrogance and have seen no occasion to change.” Self-Efficacy Stanford psychologist Albert Bandura (1997, 2000, 2008) captured the power of positive thinking in his research and theorizing about self-efficacy (how competent we feel on a task). Believing in our own competence and effectiveness pays dividends (Bandura et al., 52 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING 1999; Maddux & Gosselin, 2003). Children and adults with strong feelings of self-efficacy are more persistent, less anxious, and less depressed. They also live healthier lives and are more academically successful. In everyday life, self-efficacy leads us to set challenging goals and to persist. More than 100 studies show that self-efficacy predicts worker productivity (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). The results of 241 studies show that performance self-efficacy is one of the stron- gest predictors of students’ GPAs in college (Richardson et al., 2012). When problems arise, a strong sense of self-efficacy leads people to stay calm and seek solutions rather than ruminate on their inadequacy. Competence plus persistence equals accomplishment. And with accomplishment, self-confidence grows. Self-efficacy, then, like self-esteem, grows with hard-won achievements. Self-efficacy and self-esteem sound similar but are different concepts. If you believe you can do something, that’s self-efficacy. If you like yourself overall, that’s self-esteem. When you were a child, your parents may have encouraged you by saying things such as, “You’re special!” (intended to build self-esteem) or “I know you can do it!” (intended to build self-efficacy). One study showed that self-efficacy feedback (“You tried really hard”) led to better performance than self-esteem feedback (“You’re really smart”). Children told they were smart were afraid to try again—maybe they wouldn’t look so smart next time. Those praised for working hard, however, knew they could exert more effort again (Mueller & Dweck, 1998). If you want to encourage someone, focus on her self-efficacy, not her self-esteem. What Is Self-Serving Bias? As we process self-relevant information, a potent bias intrudes. We readily excuse our failures, accept credit for our successes, and in many ways see ourselves as better than average. Such self-enhancing perceptions enable many people to enjoy the benefits of high self-esteem while occasionally suffering the perils of pride. Most of us have a good reputation with ourselves. In studies of self-esteem, even low- scoring people respond in the mid-range of possible scores. (A low-self-esteem person responds to such statements as “I have good ideas” with a qualifying modifier, such as “somewhat” or “sometimes.”) In a study of self-esteem across 53 nations, including Can- ada, the average self-esteem score was above the midpoint in every single country (Schmitt & Allik, 2005). In recent samples of university students, the most common score on a self- esteem measure was the maximum—in effect, “perfect” self-esteem (Gentile et al., 2010). One of social psychology’s most provocative yet firmly established conclusions concerns the potency of self-serving bias. Explaining Positive and Negative Events Many dozens of experiments have found that people accept credit when told they have succeeded. They attribute the success to their ability and effort, but they attribute failure to such external factors as bad luck or the problem’s inherent “impossibility” (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). Similarly, in explaining their victories, athletes commonly credit them- selves, but they attribute losses to something else: bad breaks, bad referee calls, or the other team’s super effort or dirty play (Grove, Hanrahan, & McInman, 1991; Lalonde, 1992; Mullen & Riordan, 1988). And how much responsibility do you suppose car drivers tend to accept for their accidents? On insurance forms, drivers have described their accidents in words such as these: “An invisible car came out of nowhere, struck my car and vanished,” “As I reached an intersection, a hedge sprang up, obscuring my vision, and I did not see the other car,” and “A pedestrian hit me and went under my car” (Toronto News, 1977).  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 53 The self-serving bias. Source: Reprinted with permission of Cartoonstock. www.CartoonStock.com. Situations that combine skill and chance (games, exams, job applications) are especially prone to the phenomenon: Winners can easily attribute their successes to their skill, while losers can attribute their losses to chance. When you win at Scrabble, it’s because of your verbal dexterity; when you lose, it’s “Who could get anywhere with a Q but no U?” Politi- cians similarly tend to attribute their wins to themselves (hard work, constituent service, reputation, and strategy) and their losses to factors beyond their control (their district’s party makeup, their opponent’s name, and political trends) (Kingdon, 1967). This phenom- enon of self-serving attributions (attributing positive outcomes to oneself and negative outcomes to something else) is one of the most potent of human biases. That might be for a good reason: Making self-serving attributions activates brain areas associated with reward and pleasure (Seidel et al., 2010). Self-serving attributions contribute to marital discord, worker dissatisfaction, and bar- gaining impasses (Kruger & Gilovich, 1999). Small wonder that divorced people usually blame their partner for the breakup (Gray & Silver, 1990) or that managers usually blame poor performance on workers’ lack of ability or effort while workers blame external fac- tors, such as excessive workload or difficult co-workers (Imai, 1994; Rice, 1985). Small wonder, too, that people evaluate reward distributions, such as pay raises, as fair when they receive a bigger raise than most of their co-workers (Diekmann et al., 1997). Ironically, we are even biased against seeing our own bias. People claim they avoid self-serving bias themselves but readily acknowledge that others commit this bias 54 PART ONE SOCIAL THINKING (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002). This “bias blind spot” can have serious consequences during conflicts. If you’re negotiating with your roommate over who does household chores and you believe your roommate has a biased view of the situation, you’re much more likely to become angry (Pronin & Ross, 2006). Apparently we see ourselves as objective and everyone else as biased. No wonder we fight: We’re each convinced we’re “right” and free from bias. As the T-shirt slogan says, “Everyone is entitled to my opinion.” Is the self-serving bias universal, or are people in collectivistic cultures immune? People in collectivistic cultures associate themselves with positive words and valued traits (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, 2008; Yamaguchi et al., 2007). However, in some stud- ies, collectivists are less likely to self-enhance by believing they are better than others (Heine & Hamamura, 2007), particularly in individualistic domains (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). Can We All Be Better Than Average? Self-serving bias also appears when people compare themselves with others. If Chinese philosopher Lao-tzu was right that “at no time in the world will a man who is sane overreach himself, overspend himself, overrate himself,” then most of us are a little insane. For on subjective, socially desirable, and common dimensions, most people see themselves as bet- ter than the average person. Compared with people in general, most people see themselves as more ethical, more competent at their job, friendlier, more intelligent, better looking, less prejudiced, healthier, and even more insightful and less biased in their self-assessments. Even men convicted of violent crimes rated themselves as more moral, kind, and trustworthy than most people (Sedikides et al., 2014). (See Focus On: Self-Serving Bias—How Do I Love Me? Let Me Count the Ways.) Every community, it seems, is like Garrison Keillor’s fictional Lake Wobegon, where “all the women are strong, all the men are good-looking, and all the children are above aver- age.” Many people believe that they will become even more above average in the future— “If I’m good now, I will be even better soon,” they seem to think (Kanten & Teigen, 2008). One of Freud’s favourite jokes was the husband who told his wife, “If one of us should die, I shall move to Paris.” Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly (1979) observed that the self-serving bias is also com- mon in marriages. They found that young, married Canadians usually felt that they did more of the work of cleaning the house and caring for the children than their spouses believed they did. In a 2008 survey, 49 percent of married men said they did half to most of the child care. But only 31 percent of wives said their husbands did this much. In the same survey, 70 percent of women said they did most of the cooking, but 56 percent of the men said they did most of the cooking (Galinsky, Aumann, & Bond, 2009). The general rule: Group members’ estimates of how much they contribute to a joint task typically sum to more than 100 percent (Savitsky et al., 2005). Within commonly considered domains, subjective behaviour dimensions (such as “dis- ciplined”) trigger greater self-serving bias than objective behaviour dimensions (such as “punctual”). Subjective qualities give us leeway in constructing our own definitions of suc- cess (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Dunning, Perie, & Story, 1991). Rating my “athletic ability,” I ponder my proficient basketball play, not the agonizing weeks I spent in Little League cowering in right field. Assessing my “leadership ability,” I conjure up an image of a great leader whose style is similar to mine. By defining ambiguous criteria in our own terms, each of us can see ourselves as relatively successful. In one University Entrance Examination Board survey of 829 000 high school seniors, none rated themselves as below average in “ability to get along with others” (a subjective, desirable trait), 60 percent rated themselves in the top 10 percent, and 25 percent saw themselves among the top 1 percent! In 2011, 77 percent of incoming university students described themselves as above average in their “drive to achieve,” another subjective and desirable trait (Pryor et al., 2010).  CHAPTER 2 The Self in a Social World 55 FOCUS ON Self-Serving Bias—How Do I Love Me? Let Me Count the Ways “The one thing that unites all human beings, Intelligence. Most people perceive themselves regardless of age, gender, religion, economic as more intelligent, better looking, and much status or ethnic background,” noted Dave Barry less prejudiced than their average peer (Pub- (1998), “is that deep down inside, we all believe lic Opinion, 1984; Wylie, 1979). When someone that we are above-average drivers.” We also outperforms them, people tend to think of the believe we are above average on most any other as a genius (Lassiter & Munhall, 2001). other subjective and desirable trait. Among the Parental support. Most adults believe they many faces of self-serving bias are these: support their aging parents more than their Ethics. Most businesspeople see themselves siblings do (Lerner et al., 1991). as more ethical than the average business- Health. Los Angeles residents view them- person (Baumhart, 1968; Brenner & Molander, selves as healthier than most of their neigh- 1977). One national survey asked, “How would bours, and most university students believe you rate your own morals and values on a they will outlive their actuarially predicted age scale from 1 to 100 (100 being perfect)?” Fifty of death by about ten years (Larwood, 1978; percent of people rated themselves 90 or C. R. Snyder, 1978). above; only 11 percent said 74 or less (Lovett, Attractiveness. Is it your experience, as it is 1997). ours, that most photos of you seem not to Professional competence. In one survey, do you justice? One experiment showed 90 percent of business managers rated their people a lineup of faces—one their own, the performance as superior to their average others being their face morphed into those peer (French, 1968). In Australia, 86 percent of of less and more attractive faces (Epley & people rated their job performance as above Whitchurch, 2008). When asked which was average, while only 1 percent rated it as below their actual face, people tended to identify an average (Headey & Wearing, 1987). Most sur- attractively enhanced version of their face. geons believed their patients’ mortality rate to Driving. Most drivers—even most drivers be lower than average (Gawande, 2002). who have been hospitalized for accidents— Virtues. In the Netherlands, most high school believe themselves to be safer and more students rated themselves as more honest, skilled than the average driver (Guerin, 1994; persistent, original, friendly, and reliable than McKenna & Myers, 1997; Svenson, 1981). Dave the average high school student (Hoorens, Barry got it right! 1993, 1995). Researchers have wondered: Do people really believe their above-average self-estimates? Is their self-serving bias partly a function of how the questions are phrased (Krizan & Suls, 2008)? When Elanor Williams and Thomas Gilovich (2008) had people bet real money when estimating their relative performance on tests, they found that, yes, “people truly believe their self-enhancing self-assessments.” “Views of the future are so rosy Unrealistic Optimism that they would make Pollyanna Optimism predisposes a positive approach