Unified Actions and Unique Environments PDF

PART THREE Considerations for Operations and Environments Chapter 7 IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments SECTION I – UNIFIED ACTION 7-1. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities...

PART THREE Considerations for Operations and Environments Chapter 7 IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments SECTION I – UNIFIED ACTION 7-1. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1, Volume 1). Under unified action, commanders synchronize military actions with activities of other government agencies, nongovernment organizations, unified action partners, and the private sector. 7-2. The Army’s contribution to unified action, as well as its operational concept, is unified land operations. +Unified land operations is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large- scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). This chapter discusses specific considerations for IPOE conducted to support unified land operations. (For further discussion on unified land operations, see ADP 3-0.) Army forces conduct decisive and sustainable land operations through the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations appropriate to the mission and environment. +OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 7-3. +Offensive operations is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). +A commander may also conduct offensive operations to secure decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources, to gain information, to deceive and divert the enemy, to hold the enemy in position, to disrupt the enemy’s attack, and to set the conditions for future successful operations. +Intelligence requirements generally associated with offensive operations include the following: ⚫ Determine what type of defense the enemy is employing area defense, maneuver defense, and retrograde. ⚫ Determine location, disposition, and orientation of enemy defense: ◼ Main battle area. ◼ Battle positions. ◼ Battle handover lines. ◼ Obstacles. ◼ Engagement areas. ◼ Reserves. ◼ Fire support assets. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 7-1 Chapter 7 ◼ Specialty teams. ◼ CAS and other aviation supporting the defense. ◼ Other assets supporting the defense. ⚫ Determine the enemy commander’s end state, objectives, decision points, decisive point, critical event, and win, lose, and tie options. ⚫ Determine enemy commander’s intent for denial and deception operations, information activities, reconnaissance and surveillance, and fires. ⚫ +Identify terrain and weather effects that support enemy defensive operations: ◼ Physical areas that allow the commander to tie in obstacles and battle positions to existing terrain features. ◼ Air and ground AAs (CAS, reserve, and counterattack forces). ◼ Terrain that canalizes attacking forces. ◼ Prevailing winds, temperature inversion, humidity, precipitation, visibility, illumination, and other weather effects. ⚫ Identify terrain and weather effects that support friendly movement and maneuver: ◼ Air and ground AAs. ◼ Primary and alternate attack routes. ◼ Landing zones. ◼ +Terrain management (C2, air defense, signal, and reconnaissance). ◼ Prevailing winds, temperature inversion, humidity, illumination, and other weather elements. ⚫ Determine the impact of civil considerations on friendly and enemy operations: ◼ Rural communities. ◼ Refugee camps. ◼ Displaced persons. ◼ Refugee movement. ◼ Aid organizations located in the AO. 7-4. +Forces may engage in four types of offensive operations: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. +In addition to the intelligence requirements listed in paragraph 7-3, each type of offensive operation has its own unique requirements. (See ADP 3-90 for information on offensive operations.) MOVEMENT TO CONTACT 7-5. +Movement to contact is a type offensive operation designed to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact (ADP 3-90). It may also include preliminary diversionary actions and preparation fires. The extent and nature of the movement to contact depends on whether threat forces were previously in contact. If forces are not in contact, then the central feature of the movement-to-contact operations is gaining or reestablishing contact with the enemy. Conducting movement to contact relies heavily on assumptions made during IPOE. This is because the relationship of friendly and enemy forces in time and space is an unknown. Conducting this type of operation includes considering the following intelligence requirements during IPOE: ⚫ Enemy location and intent. ⚫ Location and time of potential meeting engagements. ⚫ Location of danger areas (enemy defensive locations along routes, engagement areas, observation posts, and obstacles) where friendly forces may encounter enemy forces. ⚫ Attack routes that protect friendly forces from ground observation or surprise by the enemy. ⚫ Natural and/or man-made obstacles along attack routes that can affect friendly advance. ⚫ Location, type, and size of security forces along attack routes. ⚫ Location of enemy flanks and other weak points in the enemy’s posture. ⚫ Threats to friendly force flanks and rear. ⚫ Location and extent of CBRN contaminated areas. 7-2 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments ATTACK 7-6. +An attack is a type of offensive operation that defeats enemy forces, seizes terrain, or secures terrain (FM 3-90). Movement supported by fires characterizes the conduct of an attack. An attack differs from a movement to contact because enemy main body dispositions are at least partially known. Conducting this type of operation includes considering the following intelligence requirements during IPOE: ⚫ Location of areas where friendly forces could become disoriented, such as rough or restrictive terrain. ⚫ The most favorable routes to the objective. ⚫ Areas that friendly forces can use to support flanking fire and maneuver, such as support by fire and attack by fire positions. ⚫ Template positions of known enemy forces and obstacles (combat surveillance and observation posts, observation posts, simple battle positions, tank ditches, minefields). EXPLOITATION 7-7. Exploitation is an offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (JP 2-0). The objective of exploitation is to complete the enemy’s disintegration. Exploitation takes advantage of previous successes and friendly force continuing activities. Conducting this type of operation includes considering the following intelligence requirements during IPOE: ⚫ Location of enemy reserves prior to commitment. ⚫ Location of enemy countermobility assets before their employment on routes friendly forces are using to conduct the exploitation. ⚫ Location of enemy forces attempting to reestablish the defense. ⚫ Location of enemy logistics and/or resupply operations. PURSUIT 7-8. +Pursuit is a type of offensive operation to catch or cut off a disorganized hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (FM 3-90). A commander often plans for an enemy retrograde operation as either a branch or sequel to an operation. When recommending pursuit, the staff must consider possible enemy deception (whether the enemy is in retreat or attempting to draw friendly forces into a position where the enemy can be destroyed by conventional means or by WMD). Conducting this type of operation includes considering the following intelligence requirements during IPOE: ⚫ Possible routes the enemy might use to conduct retrograde operations. ⚫ Availability and condition of pursuit routes. ⚫ Location and accessibility of blocking points. ⚫ Location of critical terrain features that affect enemy and friendly movement. ⚫ Location of enemy uncommitted forces. ⚫ Identity of fire support and air assets that can affect friendly force movement. ⚫ +Indications the enemy can no longer maintain defensive positions nor cohesively execute defensive operations. ⚫ Indications the enemy can only conduct limited counterattacks. ⚫ Indications the enemy is increasing reconnaissance efforts. ⚫ Indications the enemy is destroying weapons and equipment. ⚫ Decrease of enemy indirect fire throughout the AO (intensity and effectiveness). ⚫ Increase of enemy indirect fire in one or more sectors of the front at a time when the amount of overall defensive fires is decreasing. ⚫ Indications of retreating forces. ⚫ Location of enemy second echelon defensive lines. ⚫ Location, type, strength, and size of bypassed units. ⚫ Presence of new forces on the battlefield. ⚫ Indications of increased resistance. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 7-3 Chapter 7 +DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 7-9. +A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). Intelligence requirements generally associated with defensive operations include the following: ⚫ Determine, locate, and/or track the enemy’s main and supporting efforts. ⚫ Locate and/or track enemy reserves. ⚫ Locate and/or track enemy reconnaissance assets. ⚫ Identify the enemy’s use of special munitions (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives [also called CBRNE]); artillery; scatterable mines). ⚫ Locate and/or track enemy CAS. ⚫ Locate enemy information capabilities. ⚫ Locate enemy sustainment assets. ⚫ Determine enemy offensive sustainment needs based on size and type of enemy force. ⚫ Determine enemy offensive endurance/culmination point without sustainment reinforcement. ⚫ Identify enemy deception operations. ⚫ Determine the enemy commander’s end state. ⚫ Determine the enemy commander’s objectives. ⚫ Determine the enemy commander’s decision points. ⚫ Determine enemy decisive points. ⚫ Determine the enemy’s critical events. ⚫ Determine the enemy commander’s intent for— ◼ Reconnaissance and surveillance. ◼ Fires. ◼ Denial and deception. ◼ Defensible terrain. ◼ Battle positions. ◼ Engagement areas. ◼ Indirect fire assets positions. ◼ Counterattack routes for reserves plan. ⚫ Develop TAIs for indirect fire and CAS. ⚫ Determine the effect of civil considerations on friendly and enemy operations for— ◼ Rural communities. ◼ Urban areas. ◼ Displaced persons. ◼ Refugee camps. ◼ Refugee movement. ◼ Aid organizations located in the AO. ⚫ Threat forces using the civilian populace to cover movement. 7-10. +Forces may engage in three types of defensive operations: area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. In addition to the intelligence requirements listed in paragraph 7-9, each type of defensive operation has its own unique requirements. (See ADP 3-90 for information on defensive operations.) AREA DEFENSE 7-11. +Area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADP 3-90). +The focus of the area defensive operation is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between these positions. The decisive operation focuses on fires into engagement areas possibly supplemented by a 7-4 ATP 2-01.3, C1 06 January 2021  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments counterattack. The reserve may or may not take part in the decisive operation. Commanders use their reserves to— ⚫ Reinforce fires. ⚫ Add depth, block, or restore the position by counterattack. ⚫ Seize the initiative. ⚫ Destroy enemy forces. 7-12. Conducting an area defense includes considering the following intelligence requirements during IPOE: ⚫ +Location of natural lines of resistance, well-defined AAs, intervisibility lines, and other terrain features that support defensive operations. ⚫ Whether the terrain better supports a forward defense or a defense in depth. MOBILE DEFENSE 7-13. +Mobile defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADP 3-90). A mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying the enemy by allowing enemy forces to advance to a point where they are exposed to a decisive counterattack by the striking force. Striking force is a dedicated counterattack force in a mobile defense constituted with the bulk of available combat power (ADP 3-90). A fixing force supplements the striking force. Commanders use their fixing force to— ⚫ Hold attacking enemy forces in position. ⚫ Help channel attacking enemy forces into ambush areas. ⚫ Retain areas from which to launch the striking force. 7-14. Conducting a mobile defense includes considering the following intelligence requirements during IPOE: ⚫ Methods to deceive the enemy regarding the purpose of the defense. ⚫ Terrain that will hide the striking force. RETROGRADE 7-15. +Retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). The enemy may force these operations, or a commander may execute them voluntarily. In either case, the higher commander of the force executing the retrograde must approve the retrograde operation before its initiation. A retrograde is a transitional operation; it is not conducted in isolation. It is part of a larger scheme of maneuver designed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy. Conducting a retrograde includes considering the following intelligence requirements during IPOE: ⚫ Possible routes friendly forces can use to conduct retrograde operations. ⚫ Possible pursuit routes enemy forces may use. ⚫ Blocking points enemy forces may use to prevent the retrograde. ⚫ Areas enemy movement can be disrupted by using obstacles, indirect fire, and CAS. 7-16. +As in supporting planning for offensive operations, the primary intelligence products and work aids necessary to support planning for defensive operations include the following: ⚫ MCOO. ⚫ Weather effects matrix. ⚫ Threat organizational chart. ⚫ Threat capability statement. ⚫ Threat situation templates, including those depicted as overlays with COA statements. ⚫ Event template and event matrix. ⚫ Relative target value matrix. ⚫ HVT lists. ⚫ Intelligence requirements specific to the enemy operation. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 7-5 Chapter 7 +STABILITY OPERATIONS 7-17. +A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). 7-18. Stabilization actions are conducted across the conflict continuum from peace to war and can be conducted by military forces before, during, and after conflict. These actions may be conducted to support other U.S. Government departments and agencies as part of an integrated country strategy. Commanders appropriately combine stability actions with offensive actions and defensive actions to achieve objectives. 7-19. +The purpose of stability operations is to provide a secure environment, gain support for the host- nation government, meet the critical needs of the populace, build support for host-nation governments and institutions, and shape the environment for interagency and host-nation success. 7-20. IPOE aids commanders in gaining the situational understanding needed to accomplish these tasks by— ⚫ Understanding the root causes of the insurgency. ⚫ Identifying external and internal support for the insurgency. ⚫ Understanding how insurgents appeal to the population. ⚫ Identifying the targets/audiences on which insurgents focus. ⚫ Identifying groups or populations vulnerable to insurgent influence activities and determine why they are vulnerable. ⚫ Understanding insurgent motivation and depth of commitment. ⚫ Understanding insurgent TTP. ⚫ Understanding the conditions insurgents want to create to achieve their objectives. ⚫ Identifying and verifying identities and tracking insurgents, criminals, and known or suspected terrorists. ⚫ Identifying demographics for groups supporting, neutral to, or hostile to insurgent organizations and operations. ⚫ Identifying the means to gain legitimacy among the population and its leaders (formal/informal). ⚫ Accurately assessing the needs and security requirements of the population. ⚫ Providing assessments for all lines of operations. ⚫ Identifying the themes insurgent organizations use. ⚫ Assessing the effects or consequences of friendly operations. 7-21. +The purpose of IPOE in stability operations is the same as in offensive and defensive operations. However, the nature of these tasks and the intelligence requirements associated with them are unique. The principal difference is the focus and degree of detail of analysis required for the civil aspects of the environment. +Unlike major combat, an environment dominated by offensive and defensive operations directed against an enemy force and stability operations encompasses various military missions, tasks, and activities that are not enemy-centric. 7-22. +FM 3-07 constitutes the Army’s current doctrine on stability operations and contains the operational discussion that intelligence personnel must understand to conduct effective IPOE to support stability operations. +The primary intelligence requirements associated with stability operations are generally based on lines of operations identified by the commander. They are also focused on assisting governments in securing the environment, restoring essential services, and promoting infrastructure and economic development. 7-23. +Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information aspects of OE through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities, and coercive actions in response to crises. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances regional stability and economic prosperity simultaneously. +When conducting IPOE for stability operations, a good technique is balancing the analytical effort in the same manner. Commanders and staffs should be wary of becoming too focused on enemy forces and not conducting the necessary analysis on civil 7-6 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments considerations. +A greater emphasis may need to be placed on civil considerations than on the enemy during stability operations. 7-24. +The primary stability operations tasks, as discussed in ADP 3-07 and FM 3-07, are— ⚫ Establish civil security. ⚫ +Support to civil control. ⚫ Restore essential services. ⚫ +Support to governance. ⚫ +Support to economic and infrastructure development. ⚫ +Conduct security cooperation. (FM 3-0 added this as a stability operations task.) 7-25. A consistent observation from commands involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom is that planning can become too enemy-centric and ignore other lines of operations. The lesson learned is that while enemy analysis is required, so is the analysis related to all lines of operations identified by the commander as important. This means that the analysis of civil considerations may have equal or greater importance to the analysis of enemy forces. 7-26. In addition to providing intelligence about these lines of operations, IPOE provides intelligence about people. U.S. forces must understand the people of the nations where they operate in order to accomplish their missions. Commanders and planners require accurate intelligence assessments into the culture, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests, and decision-making processes of the individual and groups that comprise the various social networks of the population. ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY 7-27. +Establishing civil security is the first responsibility of military forces in stability operations and involves providing for the safety of the host nation, including protection from active enemy forces. When dealing with internal and external enemy forces that pose a direct threat to the host nation and its people, there are three basic subtasks associated with civil security that require detailed IPOE: protect external borders, combat internal threats, and separate insurgents from the general population. Table 7-1 identifies intelligence requirements that may be associated with each of these subtasks. Table 7-1. Civil security intelligence requirements Separate insurgents from the general Protect external borders Combat internal threats population Identify all external state and Identify all regular and irregular forces Identify the objectives and concerns of nonstate actors attempting to that pose a military threat to U.S. and stakeholders. influence United States (U.S.) host-nation security forces. Determine methods to protect the operations. Identify threat characteristics for each population from insurgents. Identify the objectives of these threat group. Locate sectarian fault lines. groups/individuals. Develop templates for each threat Locate sectarian and ethnic enclaves. Identify the tactics, techniques, and group. Identify conditions that can promote procedures these groups/individuals Develop a situation template overlay civilian opposition to insurgents. use to accomplish their objectives. for each threat group. Identify the physical locations these Identify high-value targets. groups/individuals use to transport Identify and verify individuals as weapons, equipment, personnel, insurgents, known or suspected money, media, and ideas across the terrorists, and/or criminals. border. Identify actors in the population Identify the locations, methods, and providing support to the enemy. operations of organizations within the Identify external actors providing host nation aiding external state and support to the enemy. nonstate actors. Identify groups and populations Identify good locations for friendly vulnerable to enemy influence observation posts, checkpoints, (persuasion, coercion, other). engagement areas, and friendly approach and withdrawal routes. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 7-7 Chapter 7 Protect External Borders 7-28. +When conducting stability operations, U.S. forces generally do not have to prepare for an attack by a regional power across an international border. The primary cross-border threats U.S. forces encounter are foreign nation special forces, terrorist organizations, regionally based irregular forces, and criminal organizations. Note. Nation-states may use proxy forces to conduct cross-border operations to subvert friendly operations. (See paragraph 5-11 for more information on proxy forces.) 7-29. The primary threat activity U.S. forces have to counter are— ⚫ Infiltration of foreign operatives and fighters. ⚫ Movement of weapons, equipment, money, and other resources needed to support an insurgency. ⚫ Criminal smuggling. 7-30. Commanders need to know what external forces and/or individuals are supporting enemy forces in their AO in order to develop friendly COAs to counter these forces. Failure by the intelligence staff to provide this intelligence can result in the unchecked reinforcement and resupply of these forces. Although commanders may not be able to act directly against these forces, they can request support from the next higher command. Detailed intelligence on these forces provided by the intelligence staff can assist commanders in gaining this support. Table 7-2 provides methods for evaluating external threat organizations and for presenting this information. Table 7-2. Evaluating external threat organizations Step Requirement Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) Identify all external state and nonstate Identify all organizations and their objectives during mission analysis. actors attempting to influence United Develop organizational charts for each of these groups during mission States operations and their objectives, analysis. including— Present this information during the mission analysis briefing. Identity. Include this information as part of the intelligence estimate. 1 Location. Maintain up-to-date data files for each of these organizations. Objectives. Operations. Methods. Defeat mechanisms. Develop a situation template (digital overlay) that depicts border-crossing points, movement routes, safe houses, cache sites, and high-value targets Within the area of operations, identify associated with each organization. physical locations these groups or Develop a course of action statement describing the operations of each of 2 individuals use to transport weapons, these organizations during mission analysis. equipment, personnel, money, media, Present this information during the mission analysis briefing. and ideas across the border. Include this information as part of the intelligence estimate. Maintain the situation template as part of the joint common database. Identify these methods during mission analysis. Develop special assessments (text and graphics) that describe TTP in Identify TTP these groups or detail. 3 individuals use to accomplish their Present this information during the mission analysis briefing. objectives. Include this information as part of the intelligence estimate. Maintain up-to-date data files for each of these TTP. Develop a digital terrain overlay (geospatial and imagery intelligence) Identify good locations for friendly during mission analysis that describes these locations. observation posts, checkpoints, 4 Present this information during the mission analysis briefing. engagement areas, and friendly approach and withdrawal routes. Include this information as part of the intelligence estimate. Maintain digital terrain overlays as part of the joint common database. 7-8 ATP 2-01.3, C1 06 January 2021  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments Combat Internal Threats 7-31. +When engaged in stability operations, U.S. forces can be contested by one or more armed and organized groups that oppose U.S. presence and objectives in the area. These groups may vary in size and capability. Their motivations and objectives may or may not be the same. They may actively oppose each other or they may work together. The one characteristic these groups share is achieving their goals through violence. Beyond that, these groups can generally be characterized as follows: ⚫ Neither locatable nor easily detected by U.S. information collection assets. ⚫ Often unidentified early in an operation. ⚫ Usually operate under a decentralized chain of command. ⚫ Organized under a cellular, militia, or special forces structure. ⚫ Operate in complex terrain usually within urban centers or severely restricted natural terrain. ⚫ An enemy that thinks, adapts, and modifies TTP, as needed, to operate against conventional forces. ⚫ Target four general groups: host-nation political and civil authorities, host-nation military and police forces, general population, and U.S. armed forces and other international military and civilian agencies. ⚫ Sustain themselves through external and/or internal support mechanisms (usually differs by function—for example, weapons, equipment, and finances from external support, but recruiting, replacements, and information-related capabilities from internal support). ⚫ Establish sanctuary in complex terrain or among civilian populations. ⚫ Avoid massing forces. ⚫ Employ— ◼ Commercial-off-the-shelf communications technology (telephone, cell phone, internet). ◼ Tactical radios. ◼ Nonelectronic methods of C2. ◼ Civilian transportation (public transportation, privately owned vehicles). ◼ Small arms and crew-served weapons. ◼ IEDs. ◼ Mortars. ◼ Shoulder-fired antiaircraft weapons. ⚫ Capable of conducting operations directed against U.S. forces, such as— ◼ IED attacks. ◼ Sabotages. ◼ Mortar attacks. ◼ Suicide bombings. ◼ Complex attacks. ◼ Information activities. ◼ Sniper attacks. ◼ Information for effect. ◼ Drive-by shootings. ◼ Misinformation. ◼ Infiltration. ◼ Propaganda. ◼ Ambushes. ◼ Reconnaissance and ◼ Raids. surveillance. ⚫ Can also conduct operations directed against host-nation political, civil, and security targets, and the general population. These operations include but are not limited to assassination and murder, kidnapping, coercion, intimidation, and recruitment. 7-32. +The commander needs detailed intelligence on all insurgent organizations in the AOs to prevent their activity from affecting the command’s ability to complete all other assigned stability operations tasks. Failure by the intelligence staff to provide this intelligence can result in a continual escalation of insurgent activity that may prevent the command from accomplishing the mission. When evaluating this type of enemy, the intelligence staff maintains up-to-date data files relating to the threat characteristics and historical and current reporting to produce the predictive assessments required by the commander to plan operation. Table 7-3 on page 7-10 provides TTP for evaluating internal threat organizations. 06 January 2021 ATP 2-01.3, C1 7-9 Chapter 7 Table 7-3. Evaluating internal threat organizations Step Requirement Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) Identify all organizations and their objectives during mission analysis. Develop organizational charts for each of these groups during mission Identify all regular and irregular forces analysis. 1 that pose a military threat to United Present this information during the mission analysis briefing. States and host-nation security forces. Include this information as part of the intelligence estimate. Maintain up-to-date data files for each of these organizations. Develop a situation template (digital overlay) that depicts the border- crossing points, movement routes, safe houses, cache sites, and high- Within the area of operations, identify value targets associated with each organization. physical locations these groups or Develop a course of action statement describing the operations of each of 2 individuals use to transport weapons, these organizations during mission analysis. equipment, personnel, money, media, Present this information during the mission analysis briefing. and ideas across the border. Include this information as part of the intelligence estimate. Maintain a situation template as part of the joint common database. Identify these methods during mission analysis. Identify TTP these groups or Develop special assessments (text and graphics) that describe TTP in detail. 3 individuals use to accomplish their Present this information during the mission analysis briefing. objectives. Include this information as part of the intelligence estimate. Maintain up-to-date data files for each of these TTP. Develop a digital terrain overlay (geospatial and imagery intelligence) Identify good locations for friendly during mission analysis that describes these locations. observation posts, checkpoints, 4 Present this information during the mission analysis briefing. engagement areas, and friendly Include this information as part of the intelligence estimate. approach and withdrawal routes. Maintain digital terrain overlays as part of the joint common database. Separate Insurgents from the General Population 7-33. Paramilitary elements, terrorists, militias, and other insurgent groups of elements conducting irregular warfare depend on the cooperation of the general population. These groups do not have the capability to sustain operations against armed conventional forces without that support. +Denying support from the general population to these groups is a critical component of an overall strategy to prevent them from influencing other stability operations tasks. Armed groups involved in insurgent operations directed against the host-nation government draw their strength from the population. These groups— ⚫ Establish sanctuary locations among segments of the population. ⚫ Use civilian transportation, communications, and financial and general services to sustain operations. ⚫ Receive funding by winning the approval of segments of the population or by extortion. ⚫ Use segments of the population to provide indications of U.S. operations. ⚫ Conduct information activities targeting the population. ⚫ Use the threat of violence or specific actions to coerce the population. 7-34. To separate these forces from the population, commanders need to understand how and why the population supports these forces. Many factors, such as the following, may influence a local population’s perspective and sway its support: safety from the violence of war and crime, economic viability, religious freedom, view toward government, and view toward U.S. presence. 7-35. The intelligence staff continually reevaluates the population’s role in the conflict and provides the information commanders need to conduct operations that can influence the population to support their programs. Steps 1 and 2 in table 7-4 provide TTP for presenting this information. 7-10 ATP 2-01.3, C1 06 January 2021  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments Table 7-4. Evaluating the general population’s role in a conflict Step Requirement Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) Begin this assessment during predeployment, since it can be a long and difficult process. Integrate civil affairs personnel and assessments in the intelligence preparation of the operational environment process. Consider how successful insurgent groups have conducted population surveys to determine how they view and use the population. Conduct an initial assessment of the Maintain a civil considerations assessment that accurately describes the population during intelligence civil aspects of the environment, assesses effects of friendly operations on 1 preparation of the operational the population, and identifies strategies that can influence the population environment. to assist in combating enemy forces. Determine how the enemy uses the population as part of its operations. Determine the positive and negative effects of every type of friendly operation. When determining intelligence gaps, include those related to the population. This assists civil reconnaissance as well as information collection operations. Continually update the civil considerations assessment. Continually reassess information Include the civil considerations assessment in all intelligence briefings. 2 collected as part of civil and infrastructure reconnaissance. Include the civil considerations assessment in targeting and information collection working groups. +SUPPORT TO CIVIL CONTROL 7-36. When mission and conditions warrant, U.S. forces may be required to implement populace and resources control measures to achieve civil control and protect the populace. +The military activities associated with support to civil control generally involve developing interim mechanisms for establishing rule of law and restoring the justice system. Generally, the military role is to— ⚫ Occupy and assert transitional military authority. ⚫ Establish public order and safety. ⚫ Establish military government. ⚫ Transition to other authority. ⚫ Establish interim criminal justice system. ⚫ Support— ◼ Law enforcement and policing reform. ◼ Judicial reform. ◼ Property dispute resolution processes. ◼ Corrections reform. ◼ War crimes courts and tribunals. ◼ Public outreach and community rebuilding programs. ⚫ Work with the following types of groups to accomplish the task: ◼ Host-nation political and civil leaders and military and police forces. ◼ Civil affairs teams/Civil-military operations center. ◼ Department of State provincial reconstruction teams. ⚫ Leaders of host-nation religious and ethnic groups. ⚫ U.S., host-nation, and international aid organizations. ⚫ Host-nation judicial bodies. ⚫ Local populations. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 7-11 Chapter 7 7-37. +Support to civil control occurs in conjunction with establishing civil security and involves developing interim mechanisms for establishing the rule of law. +When attempting to support civil control, the commander has two primary intelligence requirements: ⚫ Identify the appropriate methods necessary to regulate selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups to reduce the overall risk to the general population. ⚫ Determine the reliability, capability, and support requirements of the key individuals and organizations assisting with this task. 7-38. During IPOE, the commander and staff assess the indigenous nation’s ability to combat crime, as well as identify— ⚫ All vulnerable elements of the population and assess their needs. ⚫ Methods to communicate with the public to promote reconciliation. ⚫ Security requirements for humanitarian aid organizations and indigenous security forces. ⚫ The civilian police functions that need to be performed by U.S. military forces. ⚫ Major crime issues. ⚫ Critical infrastructure related to criminal justice and security institutions that require protection. 7-39. +The civil affairs staff, military police, staff judge advocate office, and other information sources, including local nationals, local government officials, and nongovernmental organizations, can provide Department of State information on support to civil control for— ⚫ Public order and safety. ⚫ Criminal justice system reform. ⚫ Law enforcement reform. ⚫ Judicial system reform. ⚫ Corrections system reform. ⚫ War crimes courts and tribunals. ⚫ Conflict resolution. ⚫ Public outreach and community rebuilding. RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES 7-40. The military activities associated with restoring essential services generally involve supporting indigenous populations and institutions as well as civilian relief agency operations addressing the effects of humanitarian crises, such as famine, dislocated civilians, displaced persons, and human trafficking. Generally, the military role is to provide— ⚫ An initial response that provides for immediate humanitarian needs (food, water, shelter, and medical support). ⚫ A transformational response from which military forces build on the unified action partner capacity to operate and maintain essential civil services. 7-41. During IPOE, the commander and staff should determine the nature and scope of the humanitarian crisis as well as the following for essential services: ⚫ Civilian dislocation/displaced person relief programs: ◼ Identify the size and location of dislocated civilian populations. ◼ Identify food, water, shelter, and medical needs. ◼ Assess the capability of local physical transport, distribution, and storage to deliver relief supplies (including government and relief agencies). ◼ Determine the command’s capability to provide services or augment the efforts of other organizations. ◼ Identify other threats to the affected population (human rights abuses, minefields, hostile forces, other). 7-12 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments ⚫ Famine relief programs: ◼ Assess the effects of conflict on food and availability. ◼ Determine food and water security requirements. ◼ Estimate total food and water needs. ◼ Assess the capability of the local physical transport, distribution, and storage to deliver food and water (including government and relief agencies). ◼ Identify most vulnerable populations. ◼ Identify security requirements for relief distribution networks. ◼ Identify other threats to the affected population (human rights abuses, minefields, hostile forces, other). ⚫ Nonfood relief programs: ◼ Identify security requirements for relief distribution networks. ◼ Identify areas that need emergency nonfood items. ⚫ Humanitarian demining: ◼ Identify mined areas. ◼ Identify populations and individuals injured by mines. ◼ Determine medical support required to treat injuries. ◼ Determine how best to educate the population to recognize and avoid mines. ⚫ Human rights initiatives: ◼ Identify previous human rights violations. ◼ Identify vulnerable populations. ◼ Determine how to secure vulnerable populations. ◼ Determine how best to support nongovernmental organizations. ⚫ Public health and education programs: ◼ Identify public health hazards (malnutrition, water contamination, sewage). ◼ Identify deficiencies in the existing medical infrastructure. ◼ Assess the need for additional medical personnel and facilities. ◼ Identify requirements to open schools. ◼ Identify nongovernment relief organizations in the area and their current progress. 7-42. The civil affairs staff, military police, staff judge advocate office, and other sources of information, including local nationals, local government officials, and nongovernmental organizations, can provide Department of State information about those programs and initiatives. +SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE 7-43. When a legitimate and functional host-nation government is present, military forces operating to support a state have a limited role. However, if the host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions, some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. +Support to governance is the fourth stability operations task requiring possible analysis during IPOE. 7-44. During IPOE, the commander and staff assess whether the indigenous government is performing its basic civil functions adequately; otherwise, the commander and staff will— ⚫ Identify founding documents that establish the nature of the host-nation government (for example, United Nations mandate, declarations of independence, constitutions, or bylaws). ⚫ Implement representative facets to government (councils, elections). ⚫ Support civil administration and unified action partners by assisting in the development of an internal defense and development plan. ⚫ Identify critical essential public infrastructure and services that must be restored and maintained. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 7-13 Chapter 7 ⚫ Establish public information and education programs that support the authority and legitimacy of the host nation. ⚫ Promote public health and welfare through foreign humanitarian assistance and humanitarian civil assistance programs to support the internal defense and development plan. 7-45. The G-3/S-3 and other sources of information, including local nationals and government officials and nongovernmental organizations, can provide Department of State information on support to governance for transitional administrations, local governments, anticorruption initiatives, and elections. +SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 7-46. The most effective long-term measure of conflict prevention and resolution is the sustainment of a viable government that is actively engaged in meeting the needs, including economic development, of its citizens. A nation’s economy affects its ability to govern and provide security for its people. The status of a nation's infrastructure affects the sustainment and growth of its economy. Understanding the economy and the state of infrastructure in the AO are critical to a commander’s ability to plan and conduct operations that improve economic conditions. 7-47. The intelligence staff conducts an analysis of the economic and infrastructure conditions within a targeting area during initial IPOE in order to focus the commander and staff on these problem sets during the remainder of planning. This analysis is briefed during the intelligence portion of the mission analysis briefing and included as part of the intelligence estimate issued with the operation plan and/or order. Additionally, to support continued operations, this analysis is continually updated to ensure planning teams and assessment working groups have the most current data. Economic Development 7-48. When assessing economic conditions, the commander and staff consider the following (not all-inclusive): ⚫ Ability of legal border-crossing sites and other ports of entry to assist the legal flow of commerce. ⚫ Positive and negative effects of cross-border smuggling of commercial goods. ⚫ Positive and negative effects of any existing underground economy. ⚫ Status of financial services provided by the private sector within the AO. ⚫ Threats to critical financial institutions, infrastructure, personnel, and transactions. ⚫ Corruption within existing financial institutions. ⚫ How the various groups of a local population earn their living (agriculture, trade, industry). ⚫ From where do the most important items come that the population consumes. ⚫ Weather or terrain effects on the availability of commodities. ⚫ How conflict has impacted the availability and movement of commerce. ⚫ What measures the population has taken to adapt to a disrupted economy. ⚫ The current and projected level of job growth without intervention. ⚫ Existence of ongoing host-nation and/or international economic recovery programs. ⚫ The economic impact of criminal organizations, insurgent groups, and corrupt political and civil elements on the host-nation government, assistance providers, and U.S. military forces. ⚫ Availability and distribution of currency. ⚫ The best use of the commander’s emergency response program or similar programs, allowing the commander to allocate funds and resources to civilian infrastructure or relief projects. ⚫ Status of dislocated civilian population and ongoing relief efforts. ⚫ Measures of effectiveness that can be used for assistance programs and civic action programs. 7-14 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments 7-49. The answers to these questions can help the commander avoid actions that might disrupt economic recovery and target efforts that improve local economic conditions through infrastructure development. Table 7-5 provides the intelligence staff with information sources for answering these questions. Additional sources include local nationals and government officials and nongovernmental organizations. Table 7-5. Information sources for supporting economic developments Economic categories Staff proponent Information sources Economic generation and enterprise creation, monetary Civil affairs Department of Treasury programs, and national treasury operation Natural resource protection Civil affairs Department of Interior Agricultural development Civil affairs Department of Agriculture Public sector investment programs, private sector development, transportation infrastructure programs, Civil affairs Department of Commerce telecommunications infrastructure programs, and general infrastructure programs Infrastructure Development 7-50. When assessing infrastructure conditions, the intelligence staff considers— ⚫ The condition of existing infrastructure and whether rehabilitation or new infrastructure development is needed. ⚫ The organizations and individuals responsible for maintaining infrastructure and providing services. ⚫ The capability of responsible organizations and individuals to meet the requirements of the population. ⚫ Corruption and favoritism in the delivery of services. ⚫ The expectations and perceptions of local communities regarding the provision of services made possible by functional infrastructure. 7-51. These considerations may assist the commander in prioritizing infrastructure development projects, maximizing existing resources, and potentially leveraging external resources. Data collected during infrastructure reconnaissance can assist with these considerations. Infrastructure reconnaissance is a multidisciplinary reconnaissance focused on gathering technical information on the condition and capacity of existing public systems, municipal services, and facilities within an assigned area of operations (ATP 3-34.81). Infrastructure reconnaissance results assist in developing situational understanding of the local capability to support the infrastructure requirements of the local populace within a specific area. CONDUCT SECURITY COOPERATION 7-52. Security cooperation, as part of consolidation of gains, enhances military engagement and builds the security capacity of partner states. Security cooperation comprises multiple activities, programs, and missions; it is functionally and conceptually related to security assistance, security force assistance, internal defense and development, foreign internal defense, and security sector reform. As an example, security sector reform involves disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former warring factions in the aftermath of an insurgency, assists the host-nation reform its security forces (for example, military and police), bolsters rule of law through constitutional reform, and conducts advisory missions. Army forces may be granted special authorities and called upon to execute tasks to support these programs, which build partner capacity to support broader national security interests. Security cooperation activities can be executed discretely or in concert with each other across the range of military operations, consolidating many requirements, authorities, and force structures. (See FM 6-22 for more information on security cooperation activities.) 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 7-15 Chapter 7 SECTION II – UNIQUE ENVIRONMENTS 7-53. This section discusses IPOE considerations for littoral, urban, and subterranean environments. LITTORAL ENVIRONMENTS 7-54. The littoral comprises two segments of operational environment: 1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Due to globalization, and subsequently to world trade and access to global markets (including those that use them), the importance of littoral zones to friendly and threat forces has increased. Securing littorals from threat forces, as well as using them as places from which to project forces further inland, may increase opportunities for threats to affect regions worldwide. UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF LITTORAL ENVIRONMENTS 7-55. Work performed by the staff during generate intelligence knowledge is critical to understanding littoral areas and zones in the OE. Integrating the staff into IPOE and using outside resources (such as Service-level intelligence centers, relevant geographic combatant command intelligence operation centers, and intelligence community agencies that may operate in and/or maintain databases on these areas more frequently) can be useful to formulate assessments. 7-56. As with IPOE products for other environments, littoral products should address the relevant aspects that may affect friendly and threat operations. Characteristics to consider include but are not limited to— ⚫ Coastal terrain and composition. ⚫ Commerce and trade. ⚫ Infrastructure development. ⚫ Navigable bodies of water (rivers, lakes, bays, estuaries). ⚫ Population density. ⚫ Threat groups. ⚫ Tidal and current information. ⚫ Transportation networks. 7-57. IPOE products for littoral operations stem from identifying relevant characteristics of the OE and determining how to best portray those characteristics. Intelligence staffs must also consider using additional tools (such as riverine and coastal navigational charts) that may offer more detail than standard military maps. Table 7-6 depicts one method of determining relevant aspects of littoral environments. Table 7-6. Framework for determining relevant aspects of littoral environments Step Relevant aspects of littoral environments Hydrography: Tidal flow rate and current direction, high and low tide (times), gradient and slope of beach, water Step 1 depth, surf and wind effects Step 2 Beach type: Shape, delta, cliffs, levies Step 3 Soil consistency: Trafficability concerns Step 4 Beach landing site criteria: Size of force involved Step 5 Mobility corridors and avenues of approach Step 6 Lines of communications: Roads, rivers/canals, railways, subways, lines of sight, rubble effects, beach exits Step 7 Obstacle types: Sandbars and shoals, rocks, mud flats, dunes, man-made obstacles such as mines and abatises Step 8 OAKOC factors: Imagery overlays, navigation charts, riverine charts Threat: Coastal defense batteries (antiship and air), minefields, enemy shipping trenches, bunkers, piracy, criminal Step 9 networks, antiaccess and antiarea defense systems, trafficking (narcotics, human, black-market goods), antiaccess threats (submarines, fast surface craft, mines) OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment 7-16 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments 7-58. Determining the type of littoral terrain on which friendly and threat operations may occur assists in identifying relevant aspects to mission accomplishment. Each type of littoral environment has different characteristics that may affect those operations. Factors to consider include but are not limited to— ⚫ Status of treaties and other agreements among regional territories that may potentially create conflict. ⚫ Boundaries of international and territorial waters. ⚫ Contested waterways and their proximity to land. ⚫ Status of and access to waterways. ⚫ Types of commercial and military watercraft in the area and their ranges. ⚫ Regional trade patterns, including legal and illicit trade. 7-59. When identifying littoral areas, it is important to determine if the areas are encompassed by either open or marginal seas, enclosed or semienclosed seas, or archipelagos, or (see figure 7-1): ⚫ Open seas are unenclosed oceans or seas usually outside of territorial waters. ⚫ Marginal seas are parts of open seas or oceans that bound land masses such as peninsulas, archipelagos, and islands. ⚫ Enclosed and semienclosed seas are bodies of water surrounded by a land mass and connected to either an ocean or another enclosed sea by a connecting body of water such as a straight. ⚫ Archipelagos are groups of islands. Figure 7-1. Types of seas and land masses encompassing littoral areas EVALUATING THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN IN LITTORAL ENVIRONMENTS 7-60. The analysis of the military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) also applies to the littorals. Terrain variances in littoral environments are very diverse due to season, weather, and intended use, or are often abrupt, ranging from coastal regions with large populations to inland marshes and swamps with smaller populations. 7-61. Analysis of the relationships between varying littoral environments is necessary to understand how these environments may affect different phases of an operation. For example, phase 2 operations may focus on the establishment of a seaport of debarkation on the coast, while phase 4 operations may focus on humanitarian assistance inland. Analysts must be able to determine the effects of varying terrain on friendly threat forces over time and distance. 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 7-17 Chapter 7 Observation and Fields of Fire 7-62. Littorals are one of the most diverse environments worldwide. This diversity often creates significant changes in observation and fields of fire over short distances. For example, many littoral areas in Central and South America contain large urban areas, but they also contain dense jungle environments in close proximity. In instances like these, detailed MCOOs are needed to ensure accurate depiction of impacts, including but not limited to areas where vegetation hinders observation; coastal weather phenomena, such as sea fog, that may impact observation; and terrain transitions (jungle to urban) that may impact fields of fire. Avenues of Approach 7-63. The seaward and landward portions of littoral areas may provide different accessibility for operations: ⚫ Seaward portions are generally more accessible to large vessels and typically offer unimpeded travel to ports. ⚫ Landward portions are typically more canalizing with chokepoints as they move inland into rivers and estuaries. 7-64. Littorals are often centers for trade and have the requisite networks to facilitate movement by land and waterways. AAs vary by location and consist of but are not limited to open seas leading to ports and harbors; shipping lanes; river, marsh, estuary, and delta networks; road and rail networks; and highways leading from coastal areas inland, facilitating trade and transportation. Key Terrain 7-65. Littoral regions are often important parts of a country’s or region’s economic infrastructure. Often, they include key financial and trade hubs, and are used by military forces for projection of power and to secure borders. For these reasons, littorals often contain key terrain essential to the success of the friendly mission. When considering the aspects of key terrain in relation to littorals, analysts should consider the following aspects: ⚫ Ports, harbors, and anchorages. ⚫ Military infrastructure, including coastal defenses and antiaccess and area denial systems. ⚫ Canalizing terrain. ⚫ Terrain supporting weapon and radar emplacements. ⚫ Shipping lanes. Obstacles 7-66. Obstacles in littoral terrain are often used to prevent an opposing force from encroaching closer to shores and inland terrain. Obstacles may vary from offshore mines and abatises to waterways bordering population centers. Coastal terrain, wave and tidal surges, reefs, shoals, and levies are other obstacle considerations. Cover and Concealment 7-67. Cover and concealment vary by location. Littoral environments range from urban areas providing substantial cover and concealment to rural areas where cover and concealment may be limited. EVALUATING ASPECTS OF THE THREAT IN LITTORAL ENVIRONMENTS 7-68. Littorals are often complex and multilayered environments. The ability to understand a holistic littoral OE, including threats, can be difficult. Friendly forces operating in littoral areas may encounter a multitude of threat forces across multiple domains. 7-69. Threat forces may use a multitude of COAs to counter friendly operations in littoral zones. It is important to leverage all Service intelligence organizations to determine which threat forces are present within the OE. Depending on a unit’s mission and location, threat forces in littoral zones may range from conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, insurgents or guerillas, terrorists, common criminals, drug traffickers, and street gangs. These forces may work together or separately. 7-18 ATP 2-01.3 1 March 2019  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 7-70. The effective conduct of urban operations requires a basic understanding of urban environments. Currently more than 50 percent of the world population lives in urban areas and is likely to increase to 70 percent by 2050, making military operations in cities both inevitable and the norm. An urban environment is a physical urban area—the terrain (natural and man-made), population, and infrastructure. The complex and dynamic interactions among those key components create an overlapping and interdependent system of systems (see figure 7-2). As witnessed during the 2014 operations in Raqqa, Syria, and the 2016 operations in Mosul, Iraq, urban environments can be resource-intensive, require significant planning and coordination, create security challenges, and often draw international media attention. (See ATP 3-06.) Figure 7-2. Interaction among key components of the urban environment 7-71. Urban environments may vary in size—from small villages with as little as 500 inhabitants living in one-story homes, to megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants—and consist of buildings that range from high-rise apartment complexes to single-story homes and commercial areas. Currently, there are more than 20 megacities worldwide. This number is expected to increase to 40 megacities by 2035. In some areas, population increases have occurred more quickly than the local and national governments’ ability to provide adequate governance, infrastructure, security, and basic services. These shortfalls can contribute to political instability, increase the likelihood of man-made crises, and compound the adverse effects of natural disasters within cities. (See ATP 3-06.) 7-72. Critical elements of the infrastructure within an urban environment may be located beyond the physical confines of the urban area. For example, power stations and communications hubs may be located outside the physical urban area in rural or neighboring urban areas. This is critical in understanding the totality and scope of urban dynamics and the various locations that may affect urban environments. 7-73. An urban area is a topographical complex where man-made construction or high-population density is the dominant feature. The evaluation of urban areas during IPOE is most effective when the staff views the environment as a triad consisting of man-made physical terrain, a population of significant size and density and varying sociocultural groupings, and an infrastructure. The staff must consider the effects of the natural terrain, sea, air, and weather on each portion of the triad during its analysis. Chapters 3 and 4 provide a discussion on terrain analysis for natural terrain and urban areas. (See JP 3-06.) 7-74. The evaluation of urban areas during IPOE is directed at the physical aspects of the area and their effects on operations. This approach is effective when population density is not a factor in the operation. When it is a factor, there are several considerations when performing IPOE, including the area’s homogeneity and social divisions (physical, ideological, economical). Treating an urban population as a completely homogenous entity leads to false assumptions, cultural misunderstandings, and poor situational understanding. Whether an urban area is the AO or a relevant aspect of a larger AO, the intelligence staff and the rest of the staff must consider the importance of the population. (See ATP 3-06.) 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 7-19 Chapter 7 URBAN OPERATIONS 7-75. The Army defines urban operations as operations across the range of military operations planned and conducted on, or against, objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where man- made construction or the density of population are the dominant features (ATP 3-06). During urban operations, the primary terrain effect in an urban environment is the multidimensional nature of the environment. Urban areas comprise horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural relief, drainage, and vegetation. Special considerations for urban operations extend beyond the uniqueness of urban areas. The characteristics of the urban environment affect friendly and threat forces based on their doctrine and tactics. When performing IPOE for urban operations, the staff evaluates the effects of those characteristics on friendly, neutral, and threat forces. This section discusses IPOE considerations normally associated with planning requirements for urban operations. 7-76. The vast number of urban areas worldwide makes urban operations across the conflict continuum highly likely even in areas where governance or infrastructure are not the underlying causes of conflict. (See ATP 3-06.) The following includes but is not limited to reasons military forces operate in urban areas: ⚫ The urban environment offers defensive advantages. ⚫ The urban area harbors threats that can attack friendly forces at other locations. ⚫ The urban area’s infrastructure (ports, airports, railroad hubs, financial, media, electrical, water, health) can influence the local population as well as populations in distant areas. ⚫ The urban area’s capabilities and resources have operational and/or strategic value. ⚫ The urban area’s geographical location dominates a region or AA. 7-77. Threat forces strive to achieve several key objectives in urban areas: ⚫ Use the population to their advantage. ⚫ Control information as a commodity. ⚫ Manipulate key facilities. ⚫ Engage the entire enemy force. ⚫ Focus attacks on support areas, isolated groups, and individuals. 7-78. Military operations in urban environments are— ⚫ Often high in risk. (See ATP 3-06 for associated risks.) ⚫ Often part of a larger campaign. ⚫ Force tailored to include a larger infantry component. ⚫ More likely to have casualties than in operations in other environments. ⚫ Often intensive in resources. 7-79. Urban operations significantly increase the demands on the IPOE process. The scale of large urban environments presents more data points for analysts to identify, analyze, and monitor while the complexity of an urban environment requires more specifically focused intelligence resources than other environments. Urban operations require intelligence with greater targeting precision and combatant/noncombatant discrimination than operations in other environments. Commanders and staffs broaden their awareness in this environment to extend beyond threat forces and effects of terrain, including how the environment is affected by friendly, neutral, and threat operations. The volume of information produced by an urban environment can overwhelm the ability to operationalize it all. Urban offensive doctrine implies an increased troop density; likewise, a commander should consider additional capacity for all aspects of intelligence operations of urban environments in order to meet the increased demands. 7-80. +Offensive, defensive, and stability operations are the three types of operations conducted by the Army in urban environments. (See section I of this chapter). +IPOE considerations for stability operations include a more detailed focus on the population as the decisive point for operations. 7-81. +Traditional IPOE for combat operations and stability operations limits the AOI to geographical areas from which the threat can jeopardize mission accomplishment. AOIs for urban operations should also include nodes that are noncontiguous to the AO, from which information and intelligence are required to plan and execute urban operations. 7-20 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments 7-82. In addition to detailed discussions on urban operations, the listed publications provide the following information: ⚫ ATP 3-06 provides a detailed discussion of IPOE considerations for urban operations. IPOE for urban operations includes specific products that may be useful to commanders and staffs. ⚫ JP 3-06 provides an extensive discussion and appendix on joint intelligence preparation of the OE in urban areas. ⚫ JP 3-06 provides urban intelligence tools and products that may be employed in addition to traditional IPOE products to assess the urban environment. Developing the necessary intelligence products should be a cross functional effort driven by the intelligence staff that also includes the expertise of the other staff and supporting elements, such as civil affairs, engineers, and military information support. UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 7-83. Successful IPOE of urban areas depends on generating intelligence knowledge sufficiently during precombat phases. Staffs require access to data files and intelligence products generated to aid the planning and execution of combat operations. Table 7-7 depicts one method of identifying relevant aspects of urban environments. (See ATP 3-06 for more information on relevant aspects of urban environments.) Table 7-7. Example framework for identifying relevant aspects of urban environments Step Relevant aspects of urban environments Step 1 Key terrain: Critical element of OAKOC factors Step 2 General urban description: Megacity, large or small city, town, village, strip area Population: Composition, size, and density; location and proximity; beliefs; needs; agendas; leadership; and Step 3 organizations, interaction, influence, control Step 4 Functional areas: Core, outlying high-rise, military, commercial-ribbon, industrial, residential Infrastructure categories: Economics and commerce, administration and human services, energy, cultural, Step 5 communications and information, and transportation and distribution Step 6 Lines of communications: Roads, rivers/canals, railways, subway, lines of sight, rubble effects Step 7 Urban patterns: Hub, satellite pattern, network pattern, linear pattern, segments/pie slices Step 8 Street patterns: Grid, radial, irregular Step 9 Pattern effects: Blocking effect, funnel effect, funnel-fan effect Step 10 Structural types: Type of building Step 11 Mobility corridors: Air, building, intrabuilding street, subterranean, maritime Step 12 Other significant characteristics: Geo-political issues, history, demographics, politics, religion OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment 7-84. Due to the Army’s expeditionary nature and ability to project forces quickly, it is often necessary to gain access to and maintain seaports and aerial ports of debarkation located near urban areas. Threats will attempt to capitalize on friendly vulnerabilities during the projection of force operations. For example, threat forces may conduct raids and ambushes from bases of operations in the vicinity of friendly seaports of debarkation in order to delay friendly follow-on operations. Threat forces may also conduct attacks in the vicinity of aerial ports of debarkation to prevent friendly airfield seizure operations. 7-85. In urban areas, tactical-level detail often has operational or strategic significance. Therefore, IPOE must provide a higher level of detail than would be required for operations in a broader, less complex operational area. Effective IPOE of an urban environment must include the integration of information from nontraditional intelligence sources. Staffs rely heavily on the voluminous data produced by large urban environments, much of which can be accessed through open sources. During planning, commanders and staffs should consider translation capabilities and the integration of unclassified sources with classified sources of information to build the common operational picture. Open-source intelligence may provide the critical information needed to gain situational understanding of an urban environment. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 7-21 Chapter 7 7-86. In addition to the general intelligence requirements associated with IPOE and urban environments, analysts should consider effects of the following during IPOE in urban environments: ⚫ Threat forces will seek to achieve several key objectives. ⚫ Threat forces can operate in multiple domains using the depth, breadth, and height of the OE. ⚫ Threat forces will have the means to counter technological overmatch, mitigate numerical deficiencies, and forestall fighting on open terrain. ⚫ During the conduct of urban operations, threat forces can gain time and space in other locations to facilitate a larger campaign plan or decisive battle. ⚫ Urban areas often harbor critical resources or features such as air and port facilities. 7-87. The complexity of urban environments requires an understanding of the various aspects that comprise these environments. Intelligence staffs must analyze natural and man-made terrain, as well as analyze how the society interacts within and is impacted by the terrain. There are countless ways these factors can come together to affect friendly and enemy forces. Building the requisite knowledge of urban operations assists in determining which aspects of the environment intelligence staffs must focus on while performing IPOE. 7-88. Staff elements conducting urban area analysis must broaden their scope, looking not only at the air and ground but also at threats that may appear from an urban structure’s top, interior, exterior, maritime, and subsurface areas. Subsurface features and interior structures present unique challenges in mapping and monitoring threat forces. Open-source intelligence and information may assist the intelligence staff in mapping and monitoring threat forces in these areas. 7-89. An urban environment’s horizontal, vertical, exterior, interior, and subsurface areas offer threat forces many advantages in conducting operations. The combination of these spaces is often equal to or larger in size than undeveloped terrain or bare ground. For example, a multilevel parking garage may have the same surface area as a soccer field, but the layers of the parking garage account for five times as much surface area as the soccer field (see figure 7-3). Analysts must consider and account for these aspects when determining threat uses of urban areas and how they may affect friendly and threat TTP and capabilities. Figure 7-3. Urban environment surface area example EVALUATING THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 7-90. Evaluating the effects of terrain in an urban environment differs from evaluating the effects of open terrain. The analysis of the military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) still applies. However, this analysis must be in the context of urban battlefield characteristics. Chapter 4 fully discusses the evaluation of terrain effects on operations. (See ATP 3-06 for detailed urban area considerations.) 7-91. When developing a MCOO for urban environments, analysts should take a holistic approach. Urban environment airspace and surface, subsurface, supersurface, maritime, internal, and external areas (see figure 4-3 on page 4-5) are all considerations—important to either the success or failure of a mission as well as to contingencies that may arise. A MCOO should include all relevant aspects for the commander’s situational awareness and assist the staff in further planning and Army forces in better understanding the terrain associated with a given mission. 7-22 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments 7-92. A standard MCOO developed from a military map is not very useful to leaders at the company level and below. Standard military maps do not have the detail required for a thorough analysis of urban areas. Many standard military maps are old and do not reflect the more recent buildings, streets, and significant urban growth. Additionally, standard maps do not show the subsurface aspects of an urban area: sewers, subways, and underground water systems. While these military maps show key public buildings and areas, such as hospitals, clinics, stadiums, and parks, they do not identify water facilities, communications facilities, fuel supply, storage facilities, and temporary conditions (for example, construction sites) clearly. Having and providing the most recent information available lessens uncertainty. Figure 7-4 depicts an urban area-based MCOO, which can also depict the six categories of an urban infrastructure: ⚫ Economics and commerce. ⚫ Administration and human services. ⚫ Energy. ⚫ Cultural. ⚫ Communications and information. ⚫ Transportation and distribution. 7-93. This information assists the staff in planning and the commander in decision making. For example, annotating the communications and information sectors on the MCOO assists the staff in determining where to focus efforts to degrade a threat’s ability to communicate with the local population. Figure 7-4. Urban area modified combined obstacle overlay example 7-94. Gridded reference graphics offer one method of using the most recent imagery to provide situational awareness to Army forces in an urban environment. (See figure 7-5 on page 7-24.) Analysts can use these graphics to annotate the location of hazards, obstacles, and other information pertinent to forces conducting operations. Staffs can use them during operations to ensure staff members, including commanders, have the latest information on unit locations and areas where contingencies may occur. 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 7-23 Chapter 7 Figure 7-5. Gridded reference graphic example 7-95. Analysts conduct terrain analysis using maps or other imagery. While conducting terrain analysis for an entire city may be effective for planning at upper echelons, it lacks the necessary detail for the types of operations and requirements of small units (squads, platoons, and companies). Small units may request detailed terrain analysis at smaller scales to support operations such as raids and ambushes. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (also called CALL) has documented more than 10 years of terrain analysis techniques based on products developed from several urban operations campaigns such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom–Horn of Africa, and the Philippines, as well as from responses to acts of nature such as hurricane. (See ATP 3-34.81 for more information on geospatial engineering and urban considerations.) 7-96. Another aspect of urban areas that may require extensive analysis is the presence of microclimates. Dust, smog, wind channeling, night illumination, and sun reflection from buildings are atmospheric effects unique to urban areas. Before Soldiers deploy to an urban area, especially those with urban centers comprising mostly large structures, staff planners must have a good understanding of the unique weather effects in the urban environment. Chapter 4 discusses weather effects on operations. Observation and Fields of Fire 7-97. Limitations on observation and fields of fire in urban areas are less subtle than in natural terrain where the landscape often varies predictably. The man-made terrain of urban environments presents multiple complex issues to maneuver forces. Due to the built-up nature of urban environments, the best observation and clear LOSs are often from the air, on the streets or roads, or from roofs or supersurfaces. 7-98. Although roofs and supersurfaces enhance observation and fields of fire, they are limited by the angle at which an observer can see to the ground. This is important when considering the placement of observation posts and weapon systems because, unless friendly forces cover ground entrances, an opposing force may have the capability to move undetected within the look-down angle. (See figure 7-6.) 7-24 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  IPOE for Unified Action and Unique Environments Figure 7-6. Urban look-down angle example 7-99. The physical aspects of the urban environment, such as the heights and concentration of buildings, may cause significant masking and dead space: ⚫ Masking in an urban environment refers to using the terrain (or buildings) to avoid radar detection. Tall buildings can mask several blocks of area along the gun-target line. ⚫ Dead space is an area that artillery fires cannot hit directly. 7-100. Intervening buildings that stand three or more stories tall hinder close indirect fire support. Target attack dead space behind a building is about five times the height of the building for low-angle fire; the trajectory of high-angle fire reduces the dead space to about half the height of the building. (See ATP 3-06.) Avenues of Approach 7-101. The availability of AAs in urban areas is essential to accomplishing a maneuver element’s mission. When identifying AAs in urban areas, staff integration and collaboration are essential as they assist in— ⚫ Determining vehicle size limitations on road and bridge networks. ⚫ Determining weapon limitations (traverse and elevation, LOS, cover and concealment) on roads bounded by man-made structures. ⚫ Identifying air AAs to facilitate ground maneuver. ⚫ Identifying subterranean networks that can be used for counterattacks and to disrupt friendly advance. ⚫ Identifying areas where signal communications will be masked, intermittent, or experience interference due to natural and man-made structures. ⚫ Identifying observation dead space caused by natural and man-made terrain. 7-102. During mission planning, it may be determined that road networks are heavily trafficked by civilians, do not support the movement of military vehicles, or are heavily defended and covered by enemy fires. Depending on the mission, air and maritime AAs may be options that lead to both surprise and speed (see figure 7-7 on page 7-26). 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 7-25 Chapter 7 Figure 7-7. Urban environment air and maritime avenues of approach 7-103. Identifying how streets are arrayed in an urban environment provides direct support to OAKOC factors. Most of the world’s greatest cities were founded as river or ocean port cities. As these cities grew, their streets were hardened, broadened, or lengthened. Additionally, streets were adjusted based on natural features such as swamps, lakes, and hills. However, not all such modifications were associated with natural constraints. Some cities were designed to foster defense while others were designed to foster trade. Understanding these aspects can assist analysts in determining how threat forces will interact with the terrain during combat operations. For example, after conducting research, analysts determine a city has multiple large boulevards to facilitate the movement of people and goods to and from port cities. Analysts determine these boulevards are likely AAs threat forces will use in their defensive plan to prevent friendly forces from seizing key terrain. 7-104. Pattern effects are a simple form of obstacle and trafficability analysis. Pattern effects analysis of an urban area in an AO and AOI is based on a particular type of urban and/or street pattern. This analysis has less relevance when the entire AO is an urban area; AA analysis is more important. Pattern effects analysis gains more relevance when the AO has many urban areas due to the impact they may have on mobility corridors throughout the urban areas. The following includes types of pattern effects: ⚫ Blocking: Often the shape and density of the hub, as well as the width of major streets and proximity of side streets, have the effect of almost completely blocking an operation. ⚫ Funnel: The concentration and canalization of forces may occur without immediate fanning. This occurs most frequently when a linear pattern is encountered. This pattern limits the number of maneuver units that may be applied against a series of hubs that must be confronted in succession, and it forces a greater reliance on long-range and indirect fire weapons. ⚫ Funnel fan: This effect normally occurs when the hub is located between terrain features unsuitable for mounted operations. Movement of units into the area results in the concentration of forces, loss of offensive momentum, and canalization. Beyond the hub, forces are required to spread or fan out before full combat power can be developed. This favors the defense because it creates an accordion effect in units moving through the hub, reducing C2 and operating effectiveness. 7-105. Urban patterns influence the conduct of operations in urban environments. (See figure 7-8.) During step 2 of the IPOE process, analysts should consider how urban patterns shape the OE, including but not limited to how they— ⚫ Impact AAs and mobility corridors. ⚫ Create obstacles (how the layout of buildings and other man-made structures impede movement). ⚫ May assist in determining locations of key terrain (principal urban areas and hubs). ⚫ Facilitate or impede cover and concealment. ⚫ Impact the use of weapon systems. ⚫ Impact rules of engagement. 7-106. Street patterns and urban layouts are designed for ease of mobility. (See figure 7-9.) During military operations, both friendly and threat forces use inherent mobility aspects such as streets, bridges, tunnels, and rail systems