Ch. 7 FM 3-13 Information Ops PDF

Chapter 7 Targeting Integration 7-1. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). IO is integrated into the targeting cycle to...

Chapter 7 Targeting Integration 7-1. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). IO is integrated into the targeting cycle to produce effects in and through the information environment that support objectives. The targeting cycle facilitates the engagement of the right target with the right asset at the right time. The IO officer or representative is a part of the targeting team, responsible to the commander and staff for all aspects of IO. TARGETING METHODOLOGY 7-2. Army targeting methodology is based on four functions: decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) (see Figure 7-1, page 7-2). The decide function occurs concurrently with planning. The detect function occurs during preparation and execution. The deliver function occurs primarily during execution, although some IO- related targets may be engaged while the command is preparing for the overall operation. The assess function occurs throughout. 7-3. The targeting process is cyclical. The command’s battle rhythm determines the frequency of targeting working group meetings. IO-related target nominations are developed by the IO officer and by the IO working group, which validates all IO-related targets before they are nominated to the targeting working group. Therefore, the IO working group is always scheduled in advance of the targeting working group. DECIDE 7-4. The decide function is part of the planning activity of the operations process. It occurs concurrently with the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). During the decide function, the targeting team focuses and sets priorities for intelligence collection and attack planning. Based on the commander’s intent and concept of operations, the targeting team establishes targeting priorities for each phase or critical event of an operation. The following products reflect these priorities—  High-payoff target list.  Information collection plan.  Target selection standards.  Attack guidance matrix.  Target synchronization matrix. 7-5. The high-payoff target list is a prioritized list of targets whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets (HPTs) are those high-value targets (HVTs) identified during COA development and validated in subsequent steps that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander's mission. Examples of IO-related HPTs are threat command and control nodes and intelligence collection assets/capabilities. 7-6. The information collection plan, prepared by the G-3 (S-3) and coordinated with the entire staff, synchronizes the four primary means information collection to provide intelligence to the commander. The G-2 (S-2) ensures all available collection assets provide the required information. Information requirements submitted by the IO officer can require longer lead times to detect targets and dwell times to assess the effects of IRCs directed against these targets. 6 December 2016 FM 3-13 7-1 Chapter 7 Figure 7-1. The operations process, targeting cycle and IO-related tasks 7-7. Target selection standards establish criteria for deciding when targets are located accurately enough to attack. These criteria are often more complicated for IO, especially when attempting to identify actors and audiences with precision. 7-8. The attack guidance matrix addresses how and when targets are to be engaged and desired effects of the engagement. For IO-related targets, effects are diverse, running the gamut from destruction of assets to changed behaviors. 7-9. The target synchronization matrix is a list of HPTs by category and the agencies responsible for detecting them, attacking them, and assessing the effects of the attacks. It combines data from the high-payoff target list, information collection plan and attack guidance matrix. 7-10. The targeting team develops or contributes to these products throughout the MDMP. The commander approves them during COA approval. The IO officer ensures they include information necessary to engage IO-related targets. IO-related vulnerability analyses done by the G-2 (S-2) and IO officer provide a basis for deciding which IO-related targets to attack. MISSION ANALYSIS 7-11. The two targeting-related IO products of mission analysis are a list of IO-related HVTs and recommendations for the commander’s targeting guidance. The IO officer works with the G-2 (S-2) during IPB to develop IO-related HVTs, and with other members of the targeting team to develop IO targeting guidance recommendations. 7-2 FM 3-13 6 December 2016  Targeting Integration Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 7-12. IPB includes preparing templates that portray threat forces and assets unconstrained by the environment. The intelligence cell adjusts threat templates based on terrain and weather to create situational templates that portray possible threat COAs. These situational templates allow the intelligence to identify HVTs. The IO officer works with the intelligence cell throughout IPB to identify threat information-related capabilities and vulnerabilities and other key groups in the area of operations. These capabilities and vulnerabilities become IO-related HVTs. Targeting Guidance 7-13. Issued within the commander’s guidance is targeting guidance. This guidance describes the desired effects the commander wants to achieve. IO targeting focuses on HVTs that support critical, information- related threat capabilities that underpin their objectives and are vulnerable to friendly IO exploitation. 7-14. The IO officer develops input to targeting guidance based on the initial mission and available and anticipated IRCs. The IO officer identifies the functions, capabilities, or units to be attacked; the effects desired; and the purpose for the attack. The IO officer uses the targeting guidance to select IO-related HPTs from among identified HVTs. These HPTs are confirmed during COA analysis. 7-15. Targeting guidance is developed separately from IO objectives. IO objectives are generally broad in scope. They encompass all IO weighted efforts (attack, defend, stabilize). The IO officer develops recommendations for targeting guidance that supports achieving objectives. 7-16. When developing IO input to the targeting guidance, the IO officer considers the time required to achieve effects and the time required to determine results. Some IRCs require targeting guidance that allows for the acquisition, engagement, and assessment of targets while the unit is preparing for the overall operation. For example, the commander may want to psychologically and electronically isolate the enemy’s reserve before engaging it with fires. Doing this requires electronic attack of threat command and control systems and military information support operations (MISO) directed at the threat 24 to 48 hours before lethal fires are initiated. Successfully achieving IO objectives for this phase of the operation requires targeting guidance that gives IO-related targets the appropriate priority. COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT 7-17. Feasible COAs, that integrate the effects of all elements of combat power, are developed by the staff. The IO officer prepares a scheme of IO that identifies objectives and IRC tasks for each COA. The IRC tasks are correlated with targets on the HVT list. A single IRC or multiple IRCs can be planned against a single HVT. 7-18. For each COA, the IO officer identifies HVTs that will support attainment of an IO objective. IO- related HVTs that subsequently support friendly IO objectives, and that can be engaged by IRCs, become HPTs. The targeting team also performs target value analysis, coordinates and deconflicts targets, and establishes assessment criteria. The IO officer participates in each of these tasks. Target Value Analysis 7-19. The targeting team performs target value analysis for each COA the staff develops. The initial sources for target value analysis are target spreadsheets and target sheets. Target spreadsheets (target folders) identify target sets associated with adversary functions that could interfere with each friendly COA or that are key to adversary success. IO-related targets can be analyzed as a separate target set or incorporated into other target sets. The IO officer establishes any IO-specific target sets. Each target set is assigned a priority based on its contribution to the success of a friendly objective, its impact on an enemy or adversary COA, and friendly capability to service the target. 7-20. The targeting team uses target spreadsheets during the war game to determine which HVTs to attack. The IO officer ensures that target spreadsheets include information on threat capabilities and IO-related HVTs and that the IO target set, if designated, is assigned a value appropriate to IO’s relative importance to 6 December 2016 FM 3-13 7-3 Chapter 7 each friendly COA. If an IO target set is not designated, the IO officer ensures that IO-related targets are assigned an appropriate priority within the target sets used. 7-21. Target sheets contain the information required to engage a specific target. Target sheets state how attacking the target affects the threat’s operation. The IO officer prepares target sheets for HVTs to analyze them from an IO planning perspective. These HVTs are expressed as target subsets, such as decision makers. Information requirements concerning them include:  What influences these decision makers.  How they communicate.  With whom they communicate.  Weaknesses, susceptibilities, accessibility, feasibility, and pressure points. Deconflicting and Coordinating Targets 7-22. The IO officer and working group consider the possible consequences of attacking any target or target set. Their purpose is to identify possible duplication or attenuation of effects. The attack of physical targets always has second- and third-order effects (informational and cognitive) that could diminish or enhance their value to the overall operation. For example, fires that result in the collateral deaths of civilian non-combatants can have a negative cognitive effect, while using fires to destroy the enemy’s fiber network so that it relies on radio communications vulnerable to jamming can have a positive informational effect. Also, the effects achieved by one IRC might compete with or diminish the effects of another IRC. Thus, IRC synchronization and the integration of IO into other lines of effort requires methodical coordination and deconfliction efforts. 7-23. IO working group members consider all targets from their various perspectives. Deconfliction in this context means ensuring that engaging a target does not produce effects that interfere with the effects of other IRC tasks or IO-related targets, or otherwise inhibit mission accomplishment. Coordination ensures that the effects of engaging different targets complement each other and further the commander’s intent. 7-24. IO officers at different echelons may seek to engage the same targets and, possibly, desire different effects. Therefore, IO-focused targeting includes coordinating and deconflicting targets with higher and subordinate units before the targeting working group meets. Some IO-related targets may also be nominated by other staff elements. The IO officer presents the effects required to accomplish the IO objective associated with those targets when the targeting team determines how to engage them. IO officers must also coordinate and deconflict targets with unified action partners whose doctrinal use of IRCs and policies governing their employment differ. Such coordination extends the planning horizon and may limit how IRCs are integrated. 7-25. One way to achieve this coordination and deconfliction is by beginning parallel planning as early as possible in the MDMP. This means that the IO officer and the targeting team should share all pertinent information with subordinate units and adjacent and higher headquarters. Assessment Criteria 7-26. Generally, the effects of lethal attacks can be evaluated quickly using readily observable and quantifiable criteria, such as the percentage of the target destroyed. Assessing nonlethal attacks often requires monitoring the target over time, using a mix of quantitative and qualitative criteria. Establishing meaningful measures of performance and effectiveness for IO-related targets requires formulating a theory or logic of change in relation to IO objectives and the desired end state. The IO officer and working group essentially ask: will successful attack of a specific target or target set contribute to the attainment of the objective and what will the observable actions or activities leading to the desired outcome look like? The logic of change is expressed in terms of the anticipated causal chain that begins when the target is engaged. (See chapter 8 for more detail on the theory or logic of change.) 7-27. IO-related targets attacked by means such as jamming or MISO broadcasts require assessment by means other than those used in battle damage assessment. The IO officer develops post-attack or post- engagement assessment criteria for these targets and determines the information needed to determine how well they have been met. The IO officer prepares IO IRs or RFIs for this information. If these targets are approved, the IO IRs for the approved targets may be recommended to the commander as priority intelligence 7-4 FM 3-13 6 December 2016  Targeting Integration requirements. If the command does not have the assets to answer these IO IRs, the target is not engaged unless the attack guidance specifies otherwise or the commander so directs. COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS 7-28. COA analysis (war-gaming) is a disciplined process that staffs use to visualize the flow of a battle. During the war game, the staff decides or determines—  Which HVTs are HPTs.  When to engage each HPT.  Which system or capability to use against each HPT.  The desired effects of each attack, expressed in terms of the targeting objectives.  Which HPTs require battle damage assessment or post-attack/engagement assessment. The IO officer submits IRs for IO-related targets to the G-2 (S-2) for inclusion in the collection plan.  Which HPTs require special instructions or require coordination. 7-29. Based on the war game, the targeting team produces the following draft targeting products for each COA:  High-payoff target list.  Target selection standards.  Attack guidance matrix.  Target synchronization matrix. High-Payoff Target List 7-30. During mission analysis, the IO officer identifies potential targets, which are vetted by the IO working group. The IO officer takes nominated targets to the next targeting working group and works within that body to get these targets onto the high-payoff target list and approved by the targeting board. Target Selection Standards 7-31. Target selection standards are applied to enemy activities to decide whether the activity can be engaged as a target. Target selection standards are usually disseminated as a matrix. Military intelligence analysts use target selection standards to determine targets from combat information and pass them to fire support assets for attack. Attack systems’ managers, such as fire control elements and fire direction centers, use target selection standards to determine whether to attack a potential target. The intelligence and fires cells determine target selection standards. The IO officer ensures that they consider IO-related targets and establish appropriate standards for engaging them. 7-32. For nonlethal attacks or engagements, the IO officer may have to develop descriptive criteria to supplement or replace criteria developed by the fires cell. For example, target selection standards during a security cooperation operation may describe what constitutes a hostile crowd, such as: a group larger than 25 people, armed with sticks or other weapons, and with leaders using radios or cellular telephones to direct it. Attack Guidance Matrix 7-33. The targeting team recommends attack guidance based on the results of the war game. Attack guidance is normally disseminated as a matrix. An attack guidance matrix includes the following information, listed by target set or HPT:  Timing of attacks (expressed as immediate, planned, or as acquired).  Attack system assigned.  Attack criteria (expressed as neutralize, suppress, harass, or destroy).  Restrictions or special instructions. 7-34. Only one attack guidance matrix is produced for execution at any point in the operation; however, each phase of the operation may have its own matrix. To synchronize effects, all lethal and nonlethal attack systems, including MISO and electronic attack, for example, are placed on the attack guidance matrix. The 6 December 2016 FM 3-13 7-5 Chapter 7 attack guidance matrix is a synchronization and integration tool. It is normally included as part of the fire support annex. However, it is not a tasking document. Attack tasks for unit assets, including IRCs, are identified as taskings to subordinate units and agencies in the body or appropriate annexes or appendixes of the OPLAN/ OPORD. Target Synchronization Matrix 7-35. The target synchronization matrix lists HPTs by category and the agencies responsible for detecting them, attacking them, and assessing the effects of the attacks. It combines data from the high-payoff target list, information collection plan, and attack guidance matrix. A completed target synchronization matrix allows the targeting team to verify that assets have been assigned to each targeting process task for each target. The targeting team may prepare a target synchronization matrix for each COA, or may use the high- payoff target list, target selection standards, and attack guidance matrix for the war game and prepare a target synchronization matrix for only the approved COA. COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND APPROVAL AND ORDERS PRODUCTION 7-36. After war-gaming all the COAs, the staff compares them and recommends one to the commander for approval. When the commander approves a COA, the targeting products for that COA become the basis for targeting for the operation. The targeting team meets to finalize the high-payoff target list, target selection standards, attack guidance matrix, and input to the information collection plan. The team also performs any additional coordination required. After accomplishing these tasks, targeting team members ensure that targeting factors that fall within their functional areas are placed in the appropriate part of the OPLAN/OPORD. DETECT 7-37. This function involves locating HPTs accurately enough to engage them. It primarily entails execution of the information collection plan. All staff agencies, including the IO officer, are responsible for passing to the G-2 (S-2) information collected by their assets that answer IRs. Conversely, the G-2 (S-2) is responsible for passing combat information and intelligence to the agencies that identified the IRs. Sharing information allows timely evaluation of attacks, assessment of IO, and development of new targets. Effective information and knowledge management are, therefore, essential. 7-38. The information collection plan focuses on identifying HPTs and answering PIRs. These are prioritized based on the importance of the target or information to the commander’s concept of operation and intent. When designated by the commander, PIRs can include requirements concerning IO; obtaining answers to these requirements will assist the IO officer in assessing IO. Thus, there is some overlap between detect and assess functions. Detecting targets for nonlethal attacks may require information collection support from higher headquarters. The targeting team adjusts the high-payoff target list and attack guidance matrix to meet changes as the situation develops. The IO officer submits new IO IRs/RFIs as needed. 7-39. During the detect function, the IO officer updates the high-payoff target list and target synchronization matrix. In addition to the information collection plan, the IO officer will use other information sources, particularly culturally-attuned ones that have unique access to or knowledge of the information environment and its various audiences. Examples include atmospheric teams; cultural attaches or advisors; joint, interorganizational or multinational partner cultural experts; interpreters, or indigenous leaders. DELIVER 7-40. This function occurs primarily during execution, although some IO-related targets may be engaged while the command is preparing for the overall operation. The key to understanding the deliver function is to know which assets are available to perform a specific function or deliver a specific effect and to ensure these assets are ready and capable. Examples of delivery methods include but are not limited to:  Corps/division/brigade commander.  Provincial reconstruction team member or other unified action partner.  Host nation government leader. 7-6 FM 3-13 6 December 2016  Targeting Integration  Loudspeaker.  Media broadcast.  Social media posts and videos.  Patrols. 7-41. During this step, the IO officer executes relevant portions of the target synchronization matrix. As IO- related delivery means and methods are multi-faceted and often involve human interaction, this step includes recording the delivery act and keeping detailed accounts or notes of actions taken or the proceedings, discussions, and commitments involved. The IO officer will ensure that required reporting procedures are explained and disseminated in the operations order or as part of the unit’s standard operating procedures. ASSESS 7-42. There are multiple types and levels of assessment. Assessment within D3A specifically focuses on whether the commander’s targeting guidance was met for a specific target. From an IO perspective, such guidance may speak in terms of influence or degraded decision making, which are difficult to quantify. In the case of engagements, for example, assessment will help determine whether messages were retained by the target, whether these messages resulted in changed behavior, and whether reengagement may be necessary. An ongoing consideration in the information environment is that there may be a significant lag between the time of delivery, the effect taking place, and determination of an effect. 7-43. During this step, the IO officer and IRCs evaluate measures of effectiveness and performance to determine if desired effects were achieved. If not, it recommends re-engagement or other actions. OTHER TARGETING METHODOLOGIES 7-44. The D3A method is employed for deliberate targeting. Other methodologies exist to deal with different mission sets and types of units. They are not meant to replace D3A, but complement it. These other methodologies include:  Find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess.  Find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate. FIND, FIX, TRACK, TARGET, ENGAGE, AND ASSESS 7-45. This methodology is employed primarily for dynamic targeting, which is targeting that prosecutes targets identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in deliberate targeting (JP 3-60). An emergent target of opportunity or a change in the situation may necessitate a change to a planned target. These targets still require confirmation, verification, validation, and authorization, but in a shorter timeframe than deliberate targeting allows. Dynamic targeting focuses on time-sensitive targets and HPTs. From an IO perspective, many targets may be time-sensitive. Examples include: a hard-to-reach or inaccessible key leader, a flash mob, an accident requiring combat camera documentation, or a denial-of-service attack or other disruption to communication flow. (See ATP 3-60.1, Appendix A.) FIND, FIX, FINISH, EXPLOIT, ANALYZE, AND DISSEMINATE 7-46. This methodology is particularly useful in targeting high-value individuals. A high-value individual is a person of interest who is identified, surveilled, tracked, influenced, or engaged. Though typically used by special operations forces, find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate helps maneuver leaders at all levels with aligning intelligence and operations assets for pinpoint targeting of personalities and exploiting vulnerabilities in a given network. (See ATP 3-60, Appendix B). 6 December 2016 FM 3-13 7-7