Army Design Methodology PDF

Chapter 4 Army Design Methodology This chapter begins by defining Army design methodology (ADM) and describing its key concepts. Considerations for employing ADM and forming a planning team follow. Next, the chapter describes framing an operational e...

Chapter 4 Army Design Methodology This chapter begins by defining Army design methodology (ADM) and describing its key concepts. Considerations for employing ADM and forming a planning team follow. Next, the chapter describes framing an operational environment (OE), framing problems, and developing an operational approach. The chapter concludes with a description of transitioning to detailed planning and reframing. (See ATP 5-0.1 for more details and techniques for employing ADM.) FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY 4-1. Successful planning requires the integration of both conceptual thinking and detailed analysis as discussed in Chapter 1. Understanding an OE, determining the operation’s end state, establishing objectives, and sequencing an operation in broad terms all illustrate conceptual planning. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to operational art, as discussed in Chapter 2, and it is the focus of a commander with staff support. ADM assists commanders and staffs with conceptual planning and the application of operational art. 4-2. Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). It entails framing an OE, framing problems, and developing an operational approach to solve or manage identified problems. ADM results in an improved understanding of an OE, a problem statement, and an operational approach that serves as the link between conceptual and detailed planning. 4-3. During execution, assessment helps measure the effectiveness of operations and determine if the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable within the context of the higher echelon commander’s intent and concept of operations. If the current operational approach fails to meet these criteria, or if aspects of an OE change significantly, the commander may decide to reframe. Reframing involves revisiting earlier hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational approach. Reframing can lead to a new problem statement and operational approach, resulting in an entirely new planning effort. 4-4. ADM is an interdisciplinary approach to planning and problem solving. It combines military theory, writings on the nature of problems, and the challenges of critical and creative thinking. Some of these concepts, such as operational art, have long been associated with planning. Other concepts such as systems thinking and framing have taken on increased emphasis. Key concepts associated with ADM include— z Operational art. z Critical thinking. z Creative thinking. z Systems thinking. z Collaboration and dialogue. z Framing. z Narrative construction. z Visual modeling. OPERATIONAL ART 4-5. Operational art is a cognitive approach to planning in which commanders and staffs design operations that organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risk. ADM 0D\ FM 5-0 4-1 Chapter 4 assists commanders in the application of operational art through the development of products that describe how (ways) the force will employ its abilities (means) to achieve objectives (ends), given an understanding of unacceptable consequences (risk). 4-6. Within ADM, commanders and their staffs use the elements of operational art to understand an OE, frame problems, and Elements of Operational Art visualize an operational approach. For example, end state and x End state and conditions help frame the desired state of an OE. Decisive points, conditions lines of operations, lines of effort, phasing, and operational reach x Centers of gravity help commanders and planning teams formulate operational x Decisive points approaches. (See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of operational x Lines of operations and art and its elements.) lines of effort x Tempo CRITICAL THINKING x Phasing and transitions 4-7. Critical thinking is central to ADM, helping commanders x Operational reach and staffs understand situations, identify causes of problems, arrive x Culmination at justifiable conclusions, and make good judgments. Critical thinking is purposeful and reflective thought about what to believe x Basing or what to do in response to observations, experience, verbal or written expressions, or arguments. Critical thinking involves questioning information, assumptions, conclusions, and points of view to interpret data and information, evaluate evidence, and clarify goals. (See ATP 5-0.1 for more information on critical thinking.) CREATIVE THINKING 4-8. ADM helps identify problems that often require new or original approaches to solve them. This requires creativity and a willingness to accept change, newness, and a flexible outlook of new ideas and possibilities. Creative thinking seeks to examine problems from a fresh perspective to develop innovative solutions. Creative thinking helps generate new and useful ideas, and it reevaluates or combines old ideas to solve problems. Creative thinking involves breaking old habits of thought, questioning the status quo, visualizing a better future, and devising unique responses to problems. There are many creative thinking tools available to commanders and staffs, including brainstorming, mind mapping, and the four ways of seeing explained in ATP 5-0.1. SYSTEMS THINKING 4-9. A system is a functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole (JP 3-0). Systems have a purpose with their parts arranged in a way (or structure) to carry out their purpose. Understanding why a system exists, how the parts of the system serve that purpose, and appreciating how that system interacts with its broader environment helps develop ways to change that system. 4-10. Systems thinking is a process of understanding how elements of a system work and influence each other within a greater whole. It is an approach to problem solving that views problems as part of the greater system and that these problems are interrelated. By understanding components and problems in a system in relation with each other (as opposed to in isolation), problem solvers are better equipped to develop a holistic approach to solving or managing identified problems. 4-11. In applying systems thinking, planning teams view an OE as a system of interrelated systems and subsystems. A planning team reflects on how elements of the system relate to each other from an internal perspective to understand the system’s purpose, structure, and processes (internal logic) operate together. A planning team also seeks to understand how a system interacts with, and is influenced by, its surrounding environment (using external logic) as shown in figure 4-1. In doing so, system thinking helps planners understand how a system receives inputs, adapts to those inputs according to its internal logic, and provides outputs to the surrounding environment. 4-2 FM 5-0 0D\  Army Design Methodology Figure 4-1. Systems thinking 4-12. A systems thinking approach is also useful during execution as commanders and staffs assess changes in their OE. Military, economic, political, and social systems are not static but adapt based on inputs. Collecting feedback from actions through assessment helps commanders reinforce successful action while altering actions not leading to intended results. Examining events and studying patterns and trends in a system among systems enable commanders and staffs to develop actions which create desired changes in an OE. COLLABORATION AND DIALOGUE 4-13. ADM is a team-based approach to understand, visualize, and describe operations. It includes considering diverse perspectives through collaboration and dialogue. Collaboration is two or more people or organizations working together toward common goals by sharing knowledge and building consensus. Dialogue is a way to collaborate that involves the candid exchange of ideas or opinions among participants and encourages frank discussions of areas of disagreement. Collaboration and dialogue help develop shared understanding between the commander and staff and externally with other commanders and unified action partners. 4-14. During ADM, and throughout the operations process, the commander promotes and encourages collaboration and dialogue. Effective collaboration and dialogue are not possible unless the commander ensures it. Commanders establish a culture of collaboration and dialogue in their organization. They recognize that they do not know everything and can be wrong. They also recognize that they have something to learn from even the most junior Soldier. Commanders establish a command climate where collaboration and dialogue routinely occur throughout the organization through personal example, coaching, and mentorship. (See paragraphs 1-92 through 1-95 for more details on collaboration and dialogue.) FRAMING 4-15. Framing is the act of building mental models to help individuals understand situations and respond to events. Framing involves selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of an OE and a problem by establishing context. How individuals or groups frame a problem will influence potential solutions. For example, a group that frames an organization as “freedom fighters” will approach solving a conflict differently from a group that frames that organization as “terrorists.” 4-16. ADM involves deliberately framing an OE and problem through critical thinking, creative thinking, systems thinking, and dialogue by a group. A planning group considers the perspective and world views of 0D\ FM 5-0 4-3 Chapter 4 others to understand the situation fully. This contextual understanding of an OE serves as a frame of reference for developing solutions to solve problems. Framing facilitates constructing hypotheses or modeling that focuses on the part of an OE or problem under consideration. Framing provides a perspective from which commanders and staffs can understand and act on a problem. Narrative construction and visual modeling facilitate framing. NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION 4-17. In a broad sense, a narrative is a story constructed to give meaning to things and events. Individuals, groups, organizations, and countries all have narratives with many components that reflect and reveal how they define themselves. Political parties, social organizations, and government institutions, for example, all have stories bound to them chronologically and spatially. They incorporate symbols, historical events, and artifacts tied together with a logic that explains their reason for being. To narrate is to engage in the production of a story—an explanation of things and events—by proposing a question or questions. These questions may include— z What is the meaning of what I see? z Where does the story begin and end? z What happened, what is happening, and why? z What information is missing? 4-18. Planners seek to understand the narratives of relevant actors within an OE and construct their own narrative to help understand and explain an OE, the problem, and the solutions. Not only is the narrative useful in communicating to others, the act of constructing the narrative itself is a key learning event for the command. VISUAL MODELING 4-19. ADM relies heavily on forming and presenting ideas in both narrative and visual form. Visual information tends to be stimulating; therefore, creativity can be enhanced by using visual models and constructs. A visual model, based on logical inference from evidence, helps creative thought to develop into understanding. A graphic can often point to hidden relationships that were not considered through conversation alone. In other words, seeing something drawn graphically helps individuals think through challenging problems, especially when examining abstract concepts. Planners must revisit the elements of the visual model to ensure their assumptions remain valid or update the model as necessary. Graphic modeling techniques available to the team include— z Rich picture diagrams that use symbols and sketches that graphically tell the story of a situation. z Influence diagrams that use symbols and words to show relationships among variables in a system. z Mind maps that use symbols and words to show relationships to an idea or a thing. z Causal loop diagrams that use symbols and words to show reinforcing and balancing loops among actors and things to show cause and effect between variables. (See ATP 5-0.1 for techniques for using these tools.) WHEN TO EMPLOY ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY 4-20. Planning begins upon receipt of or in anticipation of a mission or as directed by the commander. Upon receipt of mission, commanders, supported by their staffs, determine available time for planning and preparation and decide on a planning approach. An important consideration for commanders is how best to integrate the conceptual and detailed components of planning. When problems are difficult to identify, the operation’s end state is unclear, or a course of action (COA) is not self-evident, commanders may choose to conduct ADM. Some questions commanders consider when assessing whether conducting ADM is appropriate include— z Is there enough information about the situation to conduct detailed planning? z Are problems and solutions generally self-evident? z Is there a clear desired end state? 4-4 FM 5-0 0D\  Army Design Methodology z Is a COA evident? z Are the known unknowns significant enough to distort detailed planning? z Are means (resources and force structure) undetermined? z Are there unexpected effects to actions? z Are actions falling short of achieving the expected impact? 4-21. When problems are intuitively hard to identify or an operation’s end state is unclear, commanders may initiate ADM before their headquarters engages in detailed planning. This is often the case when developing long-range plans or orders for an operation or a new phase of an operation. When using this approach, a complete evolution of ADM is employed with the resulting products (environmental frame, problem frame, and operational approach) informing the development of a plan or order using the military decision-making process (MDMP). This approach is time consuming, but it provides the greatest understanding of an OE and associated problems. 4-22. Commanders may also conduct ADM concurrently with the MDMP. This technique allows both planning efforts to inform each other. In this instance, the commander forms separate planning teams. One team performs ADM while the other team leads the staff through the mission analysis step of the MDMP. Results from both ADM and mission analysis inform the efforts of each team and help the commander develop the initial commander’s intent and planning guidance. Smaller headquarters, such as brigades and battalions, may not have enough personnel to execute this approach. 4-23. During operations, commanders may initiate ADM to help reframe their understanding and visualization of an operations. The may also initiate ADM to address specific problems within the operation or to help them think through follow-on phases and possible transitions. FORMING THE PLANNING TEAM 4-24. Commanders form a planning team (sometimes referred to as a design team) to perform ADM. The team consists of a lead planner, normally from the assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5) or assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) or battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3) operations section, or battalion or brigade plans staff officer (S-5), plans section, functional planners (for example, fires, protection, or sustainment), and other subject matter experts as required. Teams offer advantages over individuals. The interaction of personalities can lead to a set of team dynamics that require attention and energy to manage for a quality outcome. Selecting the right individuals to serve on the planning team is important to successful ADM. Some considerations when forming the planning team include— z Skills and characteristics of team members. z Diversity of team members. z Size of the team. z Team roles. TEAM MEMBER SKILLS AND CHARACTERISTICS 4-25. A key aspect of assembling the team is considering the knowledge, skills, abilities, work styles, and personality characteristics needed for the team’s tasks. Commanders consider the scope of the problem and personnel resources when forming a planning team. While individuals are often selected for a team based on their expertise associated to the problem (for example, functional or regional knowledge), individuals should also possess these characteristics— z Having an open mind for new ideas. z Having an inquisitive mindset and being curious and eager for knowledge. z Being comfortable with ambiguity. z Possessing critical thinking and creative thinking skills. z Being willing to listen to others and valuing differing points of view. z Being able to take and offer different perspectives. z Possessing an investigative mindset and research skills. z Being able to communicate complex ideas in simple words. 0D\ FM 5-0 4-5 Chapter 4 z Being not afraid of having own ideas critiqued by others. z Being able to think visually and effectively use visual graphics. TEAM DIVERSITY 4-26. Commanders and team leaders strive for a variety of skill sets, knowledge levels, and personalities among individuals when forming a planning team. Planning teams comprised of people with widely varying backgrounds and experiences have more perspectives to draw on for their work. Teams that are more diverse can be more creative, engage in higher quality dialogue, and develop more innovative solutions. Commanders and team leaders assemble a team with a mix of— z Education levels, training, credentials and qualifications. z Ranks. z Assignments, deployments, and career histories. z Functional areas of expertise (such as planning, intelligence, logistics, or special operations). z Personality characteristics. z Thinking styles and preferences (for example, abstract thinkers and detailed thinkers). z Social backgrounds. TEAM SIZE 4-27. Team size is an additional consideration when forming a team. Determining the size of a team requires a fine balance between a team big enough to provide diversity of perspective but small enough to be productive. A core team of six to nine people, with other subject matter experts participating as needed, is an effective size. Larger teams manage their work by dividing into smaller subteams to complete tasks (for example, conducting research) then come together to dialogue their findings. 4-28. The optimal team composition depends on the nature of the problems facing the command and the gaps in knowledge attributed to those problems. In many cases, it is not fully apparent what the required areas of expertise needed on the planning team are. It may only be after engaging in framing an operational environment that the commander and planning team recognize the need for a particular area of expertise. ROLES IN A TEAM 4-29. As a team forms, commanders and team leaders consider the roles of each team member. Roles assigned to team members may include, but are not limited to— z Team leader. z Subject matter experts. z Red team members. z Note takers. z Graphic artists. Team Leader 4-30. The team leader is an active facilitator of the team and its methodology. Team leaders are experienced with performing the activities of ADM, and they are skilled in leading group work among peers, subordinates, and superiors. Team leaders create an environment of learning among team members by encouraging wide participation among all members of the team, and they avoid over relying on any individual. Team leaders engage individuals on the team to think creatively. The team leader controls the planning timeline and oversees the quality of products. Team leader duties include— z Working with the commander to define the team’s purpose and set expectations. z Building and maintaining trust and cohesion within the team. z Managing personalities and team dynamics. z Minimizing unproductive (interpersonal) conflicts. z Organizing the work of the team. 4-6 FM 5-0 0D\  Army Design Methodology z Managing the team’s work pace and workflow. z Encouraging and guiding team members to exchange, discuss, and integrate information. z Helping the team avoid quick opinions that match the group consensus (for example, groupthink). Subject Matter Experts 4-31. Various subject matter experts help form a team. Routinely, members of a team engaging in ADM are internal to the headquarters. This includes members of the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) or battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2), and assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations (G-9) or battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer (S-9) staff sections. Not only do these individuals have expertise in their fields, they use the analytical and research capabilities of their respective staff sections. 4-32. As team members learn more about the situation, they recognize what they do not know. Areas and topics under consideration may require individuals from outside the existing staff who have different perspectives or specialized knowledge and expertise. Examples include human terrain teams, political advisors, economic advisors, and historians. Requests for support from subject matter experts range from requesting individuals physically present at the headquarters to requesting and integrating individuals not present using electronic means. Reception and orientation of new members to the team is vital to their integration into the core group. Red Team Members 4-33. Red team qualified individuals are typically part of the commander’s staff at higher echelon headquarters. Trained and educated to think critically and creatively, red team members help commanders and staffs think from different perspectives. They help commanders and staffs explore alternatives in plans and orders and see things from the perspective of others. Red team members help— z Broaden the understanding of an OE. z Identify problems and clarify end-state conditions. z Challenge assumptions. z Ensure the perspectives of the enemies, adversaries, and others are considered. z Identify friendly and enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities. z Identify areas for assessment. z Anticipate cultural perceptions of partners, adversaries, and others. Note Takers 4-34. As a team works together, the team’s knowledge base expands, and its understanding of the various problems deepens and evolves. A consideration for planning and problem solving teams throughout the process is how to document the knowledge, the evolving logic, and the insights that emerge during the team’s work. In part, dealing with knowledge capture is a resource issue. The team leader considers how much time the team spends thinking and talking and how much time the team spends documenting thoughts and discussion. While it is important that all members of the team keep diligent notes, the team leader should assign a dedicated note taker. Graphic Artists 4-35. Thinking visually is a skill, and some members of the team may have difficulty thinking visually. It is important for team leaders to seek out members of the team who are good visual thinkers and graphic artists. These visual thinkers capture team thought and develop clear visual models for presentation to others outside the group. 0D\ FM 5-0 4-7 Chapter 4 ACTIVITIES OF ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY 4-36. ADM includes interconnected activities that aid in conceptual planning and the application of operational art. There is no one way or prescribed set of steps to employ ADM. However, several activities associated with ADM include— z Framing an OE. z Framing problems. z Developing an operational approach. z Transitioning to detailed planning. z Reframing. 4-37. While planners can complete some activities before others, the understanding and learning in one activity may require revisiting previous learning. Thus, ADM is iterative in nature. Based on their understanding gained during ADM, commanders issue planning guidance—including an operational approach—to guide more detailed planning using the MDMP. FRAMING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 4-38. Military operations occur within a context larger than a single unit’s mission. As such, staffs support commanders in developing a contextual understanding of an OE through framing. An OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains; the electromagnetic spectrum; and aspects of the information dimension and cyberspace. Included within these areas are the adversary, friendly, and neutral actors who are relevant to a specific operation. Understanding an OE helps commanders better identify problems; anticipate potential outcomes; and understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how these actions affect attaining the end state. 4-39. An OE is not bounded by the physical boundaries of an operational area. It is a cognitive tool that helps commanders and staff account for those things that affect their operations within and outside of their area of operations (AO). 4-40. When framing an OE, the commander and planning team seek to answer questions such as— z What is going on in the OE? z Why has this situation developed? z Who are the relevant actors? z What are the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant actors? z What are the relationships among relevant actors? z What is causing conflict or tensions among relevant actors? z Why is the situation (or the projected future situation) undesirable? z What future conditions need to exist for success? 4-41. A product of framing an OE is an environmental frame. The environmental frame describes and depicts current conditions of the OE (current state) and desired conditions of the OE that represent the desired end state (or future state). There is no “one way” or set of steps for framing an OE. There are, however, several activities that help commanders and staffs develop an environmental frame. Commanders and staffs— z Understand higher echelon guidance and direction. z Understand the current state of an OE. z Project how an OE may trend in the future. z Discern desired future states of other actors. z Envision a desired end state. 4-8 FM 5-0 0D\  Army Design Methodology Understand Higher Guidance and Direction 4-42. Framing an OE involves understanding higher echelon guidance and appreciating how higher headquarters view the current state and desired end state of an OE. Army forces always operate within the context of a higher echelon headquarters, either a higher Army headquarters or a higher joint force headquarters. As such, it is essential commanders and staffs understand how their higher headquarters perceives an OE, its problems, and the operational approach. 4-43. To understand higher echelon guidance and direction, the planning team reviews relevant orders, directives, policy documents, written and oral guidance, and estimates of their higher and next higher headquarters. They also study strategic directives and guidance (described in paragraphs 2-4 through 2-18), international mandates, and other products that influence their OE. As the commander and planning team frame their own OE, they may see the OE, its problems, and approaches to solve problems differently than their higher echelon headquarters. Commanders question contradictory or ambiguous guidance and directives. Dialogue up and down the echelons and with unified action partners helps work out these differences and helps build shared understanding throughout the planning effort. Understand the Current State of an Operational Environment 4-44. To help identify problems, commanders and planners must understand those conditions, systems, and relevant actors who make up the current state of an OE. A condition is a state of something essential in an OE. Insurgent control of a certain province is an example. Not only does the team identify current conditions of the OE as informed from their running estimates, they understand how those conditions came to be from a historical and cultural perspective. Relevant actors include individuals and organizations such as leaders (including military, religious, economic, or political), enemy forces, states and governments, coalitions, corporations, terrorist networks, and criminal organizations. 4-45. One way to develop an understanding of an OE is from a systems perspective. To develop this systems perspective, the planning team identifies and discerns the relationships among relevant systems and actors in an OE. Once identified, further research and analysis by the team helps clarify the roles and functions of each actor and how they relate to other systems and actors in an OE. 4-46. Building a diagram (with a supporting narrative) illustrating relevant actor functions, relationships, and tensions helps commanders and staffs understand an OE. Often relationships among actors have many facets, and these relationships differ depending on the scale of interaction and temporal aspects (including history, duration, type, and frequency) of them. Clarifying the relationships among actors requires intense effort, since these relationships require examination from multiple perspectives. 4-47. Figure 4-2 on page 4-10 is an example influence diagram of relevant actors followed by a supporting narrative. This example includes relevant actors and the influences between them. This is a presentation diagram. The purpose of a presentation diagram is to convey the main ideas to individuals outside of the planning team. Detailed supporting diagrams, backed up by in-depth research, would accompany a presentation diagram. 0D\ FM 5-0 4-9 Chapter 4 Figure 4-2. Current state of the strategic operational environment Narrative. The legitimately elected government of Freeland has been a target for delegitimation, destabilization, and eventual expansion by their neighboring nation, Aggressland. Aggressland has routinely engaged in economic and information actions to undermine Freeland’s regional and global diplomacy efforts. Freeland’s closest democratic neighbor has been interested in both economic trade expansion and increased military partnership to strengthen their mutual defense against Aggressland, which has a large and relatively modern standing military and has begun increasing their antiaccess and area denial capabilities over the last two decades. The authoritarian Aggressland regime maintains a strict anti-U.S. policy stance. Over the last six months, Freeland has experienced several incursions by Aggressland forces into its economic zones and territorial border regions. Freeland has also experienced a significant increase in information and cyberattacks from both Aggressland and likely proxies. Most notably, the Freeland coastal defense forces have been routinely engaged from commercial vessels baring Aggressland flags and markings. The antidemocratic Aggressland oppresses its people, encourages instability in the region, and supports criminal and expansionist geopolitical activities unacceptable to peaceful allied and regional interests. Other regional nations have experienced varying degrees of information, economic, and political influences from Aggressland. Most regional partnerships are bilateral agreements based on self-defense, deterring economic interference, and preventing physical expansion by Aggressland into their economic zones or territorial border regions. 4-10 FM 5-0 0D\  Army Design Methodology 4-48. Understanding of an OE evolves as the commander and planning team discuss and debate their findings. For example, several questions may arise after the commander and team discuss their understanding of the current state of an OE. These questions may include— z What are the other sources of security for Freeland, Aggressland, and other regional nations? z What is the status of antiaccess and area denial capabilities for Aggressland and other regional nations? z Has there been a change in military readiness or activation of specific units within Aggressland’s military forces? z What are some of the other key international relationships or interests with Freeland? z Are there limits to military partnerships in the region? z What are the various interrelationships between the government, military, civil police, and various ethnic populations in Freeland? Are they supportive or dismissive of the Freeland government and armed forces? Project How an Operational Environment May Trend 4-49. Framing an OE includes an appreciation of how an OE may trend into the future. An OE evolves even in the absence of friendly intervention. If no outside actors influence an OE, that OE will change due to inherent tendencies in the system. Tendencies reflect an inclination to think or behave in a certain manner. Tendencies are not deterministic, but they are models describing the thoughts or behaviors of relevant actors. Tendencies identify likely patterns of relationships between actors without external influences. The natural tendencies in an OE have the most momentum, and therefore they are difficult to change. Tendencies can be positive and encouraged or viewed as obstacles that become the focus for change. Friendly actions or activities that reinforce (or at least do not conflict with) natural trends may have the best chance to succeed. Appreciating the natural tendencies in an OE assists commanders and staffs to better define the desired end state and development of an operational approach to promote or alter identified tendencies. Discern Desired Future States of Other Actors 4-50. The planning team describes alternative future states of relevant actors. Other actors affect an OE and have different desired end states. For example, enemy forces have a desired set of conditions for the future. These conditions describe their desired end state. Friendly or neutral actors may not have opposing mindsets, but some of their desired conditions may be different from some of the command’s desired end state conditions. Further, some desired conditions of other actors converge with the command’s desired conditions, with a possibility of exploiting this convergence. The team’s understanding of the differences between alternative future states and the command’s desired end state help in problem framing. The team captures its understanding of alternative future states of relevant actors in various visual models and narratives. Envision a Desired End State 4-51. The commander and planning team envision the desired end state based on higher echelon guidance, the current state of an OE, and alternative future states of an OE. The operation’s end state is a set of desired conditions that, if achieved, meet the objectives of policy, orders, guidance, and directives issued to the commander. A desired condition is a sought-after future state of an OE. Conditions are tangible or intangible, military or nonmilitary, or physical or psychological. When determining desired end-state conditions, the team also considers available resources to ensure end-state conditions are feasible. 4-52. Time is important when determining desired end-state conditions. How time relates to the desired end state influences the expectation of higher authorities and influences how commanders use forces and capabilities to achieve desired conditions. The commander and planning team use diligence during the planning effort to account for the time expected to achieve desired conditions. They qualify whether the desired conditions are intended to be lasting or transient. This temporal dimension helps commanders and staffs develop an effective operational approach and manage expectations. 0D\ FM 5-0 4-11 Chapter 4 4-53. Commanders describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly force in relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. Commanders share and discuss their desired end state with their higher echelon commander to ensure unity of effort. Commanders may elect to discuss several proposed end states, and their respective costs, for the higher commander to consider. Planners develop visual models with supporting narratives to capture the desired end state. Figure 4-3 is an example influence diagram of the desired end state followed by a supporting narrative. Figure 4-3. Desired strategic end state Narrative. The country of Freeland remains a friendly democracy that is not threatened by Aggressland and engages in partnered alliances that foster military readiness, adversary deterrence, and regional stability. The society and economy of Freeland are free to continue democratic elections and global engagement without malign economic or informational influence from Aggressland. The Freeland defense forces continue to serve their society and protect the country from external aggression. The defense forces routinely partner with regional allies to increase readiness, communicate a strong regional partnership to potential adversaries, and prepare for conflict. World democracies support the elected Freeland government, increasing the democratically elected government’s legitimacy. The elected government of Freeland supports the rule of law and human rights among all world nations. Freeland participates in routine U.S. military partnership events and enables regional access to temporary basing and ports when needed. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 4-54. Identifying and understanding problems is essential to solving them. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. In a broad sense, a problem exists when there is a significant difference between what is desired and the current state. In the context of 4-12 FM 5-0 0D\  Army Design Methodology operations, an operational problem is the issue or set of issues that impede commanders from achieving their desired end state. Problem framing involves identifying and understanding those issues that impede progress toward the desired end state. The problem frame is an extension of the environment frame. 4-55. The planning team frames the problem to ensure that it is solving the right problem, instead of solving the symptoms of the problem. The planning team closely examines the symptoms, the underlying tensions, and the root causes of conflict. Tension is the resistance or friction among and between actors. From this perspective, the planning team can identify the fundamental problem with greater clarity and consider more accurately how to solve it. During problem framing, commanders and staffs answer questions such as— z What is the difference between the current state of an OE and the desired end state? z What is the difference between the natural tendency of an OE and the desired end state? z What is the difference between the desired end state of other actors and the commander’s desired end state? z What is preventing the command from reaching the desired end state? z What needs to change? z What needs to be preserved? z What are the opportunities and threats from a friendly perspective? z What are the opportunities and threats from an enemy’s and other actors’ perspectives? 4-56. The planning team captures its work in a problem frame that describes the set of interrelated problems or system of problems in a narrative supported by visual models. The problem frame supports the commander’s dialogue with higher echelon commanders and unified action partners in defining problems and developing common expectations regarding resolutions. This is vital to develop an effective operational approach to solve or manage identified problems. 4-57. Like framing an OE, there is no “one way” or set of steps for framing problems. Some activities that may help the commander and staff develop a problem frame include— z Reviewing the environmental frame. z Identifying problems and map out their relationships. z Capturing the problem frame in text and graphics. Review the Environmental Frame 4-58. The problem frame is an extension of the environment frame. As such, the planning team begins framing the problem by reviewing the environmental frame. The team reviews the— z Current state of the OE. z Projections on how the OE may trend in the future. z Desired future states of other actors. z Desired end state. z Problems identified during earlier Army design methodology sessions. Identify Problems and Map Out Their Relationships 4-59. A technique for identifying problems begins with two questions: z What is the difference between the current state of the OE and the desired end state? z What is preventing the force from reaching the desired end state? 4-60. The team also identifies the differences between the desired end state and alternative future states (the natural tendency of an OE and desired end states conditions of other actors). These differences are tensions—resistance or friction among and between actors. Combined, these tensions represent the system of problems requiring resolution. In addition to identifying differences, the planning team identifies any shared desired conditions among alternative future states and the friendly end state. Shared desired conditions represent opportunities to leverage and consider when developing the operational approach. 0D\ FM 5-0 4-13 Chapter 4 4-61. To help understand the system of problems, it is helpful to map the relationships of the problems identified. Part of this mapping is explaining the causes or contributors to the problem. For example, team members identify that a certain population group has a history of not participating in the election process. While useful information in itself, the planning team understands and explains why the group does not participate. As the planning team maps out the various problems and related causes, they see that some of the issues are symptoms of a bigger issue. In addition, the team discerns that some problems are outside the scope of their mission. Mapping helps isolate the root cause of problems that the operational approach must address. Figure 4-4 is an example of relationship mapping that focuses on the military problems that could be used to further describe a problem frame. Figure 4-4. Refined operational frame based on strategic frame 4-62. The goal of problem framing is to identify obstacles impeding progress toward achieving the desired end state. Effective commanders and planning teams recognize that few problems are solved in isolation, but most are set in relation to other problems within an OE. Rarely is there a single problem facing a command. For example, a unit tasked to neutralize insurgents, enable the host-nation government to expand its influence, and create a capable security force within an AO may be faced with the following interrelated problems: z Lack of sufficient military capabilities to deter armed conflict. z Host-nation security force systems (including training, logistics, personnel, and pay) are insufficient. z Host-nation military leaders lack capacity to plan or execute missions. z Effective insurgent resistance z Effective external information campaign. 4-14 FM 5-0 0D\  Army Design Methodology z Lack of accurate intelligence. z Civilian casualties. z Population’s level of trust in the host-nation or partner military forces. z Lack of commitment of regional allies or partner military forces. z Corruption at the national, district, or provincial level. z Security along main and alternate supply routes, rear area, or intermediate staging bases outside the area of responsibility (AOR). z The size of the AO. z Tasks assigned versus troops available. z Limited unity of effort among some unified action partners. Develop a Problem Frame 4-63. The planning team captures its work in a problem frame that describes the set of interrelated problems or system of problems in a narrative supported by visual models. The problem frame supports the commander’s dialogue with higher echelon commanders and unified action partners in defining problems and developing common expectations regarding resolution. This is vital to develop an effective operational approach to solve or manage identified problems. Here is an example of an initial problem statement based on the Freeland scenario. Problem statement: Aggressland forces are escalating their offensive activities against Freeland in an attempt to destabilize the democratic government in Freeland and expand their regional hegemony. For more than fifty years, Freeland has maintained diplomatic, information, military, and economic autonomy. Other regional nations and world democracies have provided limited diplomatic and military support to Freeland, but these efforts have been insufficient to deter border incursions from Aggressland. Freeland is a diplomatic and economic partner to the U.S., but military partnership has been limited due to potentially negative international policy impacts. Freeland’s military and civil defense forces are limited in size but are relatively modern. Aggressland has maintained a long-standing strategic rivalry with the U.S. To maintain deterrence and regional access, prevent crisis in Freeland, and bolster regional stability, the U.S. must be prepared for armed conflict in support of the defense of Freeland. 4-64. Commanders and planners continue to develop the problem narrative as they learn more about an OE and develop an operational approach. For example, the small size of the Freeland defense force is a significant issue, but not the only one. After discussing the problem narrative with the commander and others, the planning team may expand the narrative by including problems associated with— z Availability of potential ports or intermediate staging locations for military forces. z Potential for special purpose attacks against regional partners, forward deployed military forces, or sustainment nodes. z Reinforcement of Freeland armed forces. z Influence of the adversary on other regional neighbors of Freeland. z Established adversary anti-access and area denial capabilities surrounding Freeland. DEVELOP AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 4-65. Once commanders and planners agree on the problem or set of problems, they develop ways to address them. They do this by developing an operational approach—a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state. An operational approach is the commander’s visualization of what needs to be done to solve or manage identified problems. It is the main idea that informs detailed planning. The operational approach promotes mutual understanding and unity of effort between the force and unified action partners on the way ahead. 4-66. The operational approach reflects understanding of the OE and the problem while describing the commander’s visualization of ways to achieve the desired end state. The operational approach accounts for 0D\ FM 5-0 4-15 Chapter 4 higher direction, describes required resources in general terms, and accounts for risk. Commanders, supported by their planning teams, describe their operational approach in a narrative supported by visual models. Note. An operational approach is not a course of action—a scheme developed to accomplish a mission (JP 5-0). An operational approach provides focus and boundaries for the development of COAs during the MDMP. A COA is more detailed than an operational approach, including details such as task organization, unit boundaries, and tasks to accomplish. (See Chapter 4 for more details on developing courses of action.) 4-67. Like the other activities of ADM, commanders collaborate and dialogue with their staffs, other commanders, and unified action partners as they formulate their operational approach. In developing their operational approach, commanders and planning teams synthesize early work concerning the OE, problem, and desired end state and seek to answer questions such as— z How to go from the existing conditions to the desired end state? z What obstacles or tensions exist between the two? z What broad actions help attain these conditions? z What type of resources are required? z What are the risks? 4-68. While there is no prescribed set of steps to develop an operational approach, the commander and planning team use the elements of operational art to formulate their operational approach. Earlier in ADM, the planning team considered end-state conditions. When formulating an operational approach, the commander and planning team consider center of gravity, decisive points, objectives, line of operations, and phasing. The following activities help commanders and staffs apply the elements of operational art when formulating an operational approach: z Determine enemy and friendly center of gravity. z Identify decisive points. z Determine a direct or indirect approach. z Establish objectives and devise lines of operations and lines of effort. z Refine the operational approach. z Document results. (See paragraphs 2-45 through 2-76 for a detailed discussion of each element of operational art.) Determine Enemy and Friendly Center of Gravity 4-69. Commanders and staffs rely on an understanding of sufficient breadth and depth of friendly and enemy systems, the OE, and the interrelationships among the systems to permit them to understand how actors in the environment ultimately derive their physical strength, or what they use as their primary entity, with the capability to achieve their objective. Armed with this understanding, commanders and staffs attempt to identify a center of gravity by— z Identifying a friendly, threat, or other actor’s end state or goal. z Listing the primary way used to achieve that end state. z Listing the resources or means required to execute the way. z Selecting from the list of means the entity (person, organization, or force) that inherently possesses the capability to execute the way. That entity is a likely center of gravity. 4-70. Once identified, planners further analyze centers of gravity within a framework of three critical factors—capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities: z Critical capabilities are the primary capabilities essential to the achievement of the objective. z Critical requirements are essential conditions, resources, and means the center of gravity requires to perform the critical capability. 4-16 FM 5-0 0D\  Army Design Methodology z Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results. 4-71. Center of gravity analysis helps commanders and staffs understand friendly and enemy strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. This understanding helps to determine ways to undermine enemy strengths by exploiting enemy vulnerabilities while protecting friendly vulnerabilities from enemies attempting to do the same. Understanding the critical factors of a center of gravity helps commanders and staffs identify decisive points. (See JP 5-0 and JP 2-01.3 for a more detailed discussion of center of gravity analysis.) Identify Decisive Points 4-72. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are keys to attacking or protecting them. Some decisive points are geographic. Examples include port facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and bases of operations. Events and elements of an enemy force are decisive points. Examples of these events include commitment of the enemy operational reserve or reopening of a major oil refinery. A common characteristic of decisive points is their importance to a center of gravity. A decisive point’s importance requires the enemy to commit significant resources to defend it. The loss of a decisive point weakens a center of gravity and may expose more decisive points. Determine a Direct or Indirect Approach 4-73. Based on an understanding of centers of gravity and decisive points, commanders and staffs consider an approach to contend with a center of gravity. There are two approaches—direct or indirect. The direct approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. However, centers of gravity are well protected and are not normally vulnerable to a direct approach. Thus, commanders often choose an indirect approach. The indirect approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points while avoiding enemy strength. Both approaches use combinations of defeat or stability mechanisms, depending on the situation. Defeat and stability mechanisms are not tactical missions; rather, these mechanisms describe broad operational and tactical effects. Defeat Mechanisms 4-74. A defeat mechanism is the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition (ADP 3-0). A defeat mechanism is described in terms of the physical or psychological effects it produces. Physical defeat deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve their aims; psychological defeat deprives them of the will to do so. Army forces are most successful when applying focused combinations of defeat mechanisms. This produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results proportional to the effort expended. Used in combination, the effects are synergistic and lasting. Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: z Destroy. z Dislocate. z Disintegrate. z Isolate. 4-75. Destroy means to apply lethal force on an enemy capability so that it no longer performs its functions and cannot be restored to a usable condition without rebuilding. Destruction may not force the enemy to surrender; well-disciplined forces and those able to reconstitute can endure heavy losses without giving up. Defeat cannot be measured by terms of destruction. Dislocate means to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s disposition less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. Isolate means to deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action. 0D\ FM 5-0 4-17 Chapter 4 Stability Mechanisms 4-76. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0). As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. The four stability mechanisms are— z Compel. z Control. z Influence. z Support. 4-77. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. In the context of stability, control means imposing civil order. It includes securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals. It also involves physically occupying key terrain and facilities. Influence means to alter the opinions and attitudes of a population. It changes behaviors through nonlethal means. Support means establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for other instruments of national power to function effectively. 4-78. Normally, there are more decisive points in a given operational area than can be attacked, seized, retained, controlled, or protected by available forces and capabilities. Accordingly, planners study and analyze decisive points and determine which offer the best opportunities to attack the adversary’s center of gravity, extend friendly operational reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. The art of planning includes selecting decisive points that best lead to creating end-state conditions in a sequence that most quickly and efficiently leads to mission success. Once identified for action, decisive points become objectives. An objective can be physical (an enemy force or a terrain feature) or conceptual (a goal, such as, rule of law established). Combined with end-state conditions, objectives form the building blocks for developing lines of operation and lines of effort. 4-79. Commanders and planning teams devise lines of operations and lines of effort to link objectives in time, space, and purpose to attaining desired end-state conditions. Commanders describe their operational approach along lines of operations, lines of effort, or a combination of both. Commanders at all levels may use lines of operations and lines of effort to develop tasks to subordinate units and allocate resources. Commanders designate one line as the decisive operation and others as shaping operations. Commanders synchronize and sequence related actions along multiple lines. Seeing these relationships helps commanders assess progress toward achieving the end state as forces perform tasks and accomplish missions. Refine the Operational Approach 4-80. While an operational approach is broad in nature, it describes the commander’s visualization in time, space, and purpose. It also addresses resources required to support the operational approach and accounts for risk. After forming a framework for the operational approach using lines of operations and lines of effort, commanders and planning teams consider additional elements of operational art to refine the operational approach. Additional elements of operational art to consider include— z Operational reach, basing, and culmination. z Tempo. z Phasing and transitions. z Risk. Operational Reach, Basing, and Culmination 4-81. Commanders and planning teams develop the operational approach in anticipated resource constraints considered in framing an operational environment. To help visualize ways to sustain and protect the force, commanders and planning teams consider operational reach, basing, and culmination. 4-18 FM 5-0 0D\  Army Design Methodology 4-82. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ its capabilities. The skillful positioning of forces, reserves, bases, and equipment extend operational reach. Although reach might be constrained or limited by the geography, the enemy, and adversaries in and around an operational area, reach is extended by— z Forward positioning of capabilities and resources. z Increasing the range and effectiveness of weapons systems. z Leveraging host-nation support and contract support. 4-83. Basing, in the broadest sense, is an indispensable part of operational art. It is tied to lines of operations, and it affects operational reach. In particular, the arrangement and positioning of bases in an operational area underwrites the ability of the force to protect its components from enemy action while expanding the distance and duration of its capabilities. Commanders consider bases and base camps as intermediate staging bases, lodgments (subsequently developed into base camps or potentially bases), and forward operating bases as part of the operational approach. 4-84. Commanders consider culmination when developing their operational approach and visualizing resources to support it. Culmination is that point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current form of operations. Culmination means a shift in relative combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders at each level of warfare. While conducting offensive tasks, the culminating point occurs when the force cannot continue the attack, and it assumes a defensive posture or executes an operational pause. While conducting defensive tasks, it occurs when the force cannot defend itself and withdraws or risks destruction. The culminating point is difficult to identify when forces conduct stability tasks. Two conditions result in culmination: units being too dispersed to secure an AO or units lacking resources to achieve the end state. Tempo 4-85. Tempo is another element to consider when developing an operational approach. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. Tempo reflects the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep the initiative during combat operations or establish a sense of normalcy during humanitarian crises. During operations dominated by offensive and defensive tasks, commanders maintain a higher tempo than the enemy does; a rapid tempo overwhelms an enemy’s ability to counter friendly actions. It is the key to achieving a temporal advantage during operations. During operations dominated by stability tasks, commanders control events and deny the enemy positions of advantage. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders change the dynamics of a crisis and restore stability. 4-86. Army forces expend more energy and resources when operating at a high tempo. Commanders assess the force’s capacity to operate at a higher tempo based on its performance and available resources. An effective operational approach varies tempo throughout an operation to increase endurance while maintaining appropriate speed and momentum. Phasing and Transition 4-87. The ability of Army forces to extend operations in time and space, coupled with a desire to dictate tempo, presents commanders with more objectives than the force can simultaneously engage. This requires commanders and staffs to consider sequencing operations. Commanders do this by phasing an operation. A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. A change in phase involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. 4-88. Phasing extends operational reach. Only when the force lacks the capability to accomplish the mission in a single action do commanders phase the operation. Each phase should— z Focus effort. z Concentrate combat power in time and space at a decisive point. z Accomplish its objectives deliberately and logically. 4-89. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities between the core competencies or among offensive, defensive, 0D\ FM 5-0 4-19 Chapter 4 stability, and defense support of civil authorities tasks involve a transition. Transitions require planning and preparation before execution to maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. Forces are vulnerable during transitions and commanders establish clear conditions for execution. Risk 4-90. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. During ADM, it is important to identify and communicate risks to mission accomplishment. Part of developing an operational approach includes answering the question, “What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in employing the operational approach?” Risks range from resource shortfalls to an approach that alienates a potential friendly actor. Commanders and staffs evaluate assumptions to develop the OE as potential areas of risk. Identified risks are communicated to higher echelon headquarters and risk mitigation guidance is provided in the commander’s planning guidance. Document Results 4-91. Similar to an environmental frame and a problem frame, commanders and staffs use graphics and text to describe the operational approach. Figure 4-5 is an example of an operational approach using lines of effort, defeat and stability mechanisms, objectives, and end-state conditions. Figure 4-5. Sample operational approach TRANSITIONING TO DETAILED PLANNING 4-92. A critical aspect of ADM is transferring the understanding and knowledge developed during ADM to others on the staff; subordinate, adjacent, and higher echelon commanders; and unified action partners. The goal of documenting the results of ADM is to capture the tacit knowledge gained during ADM and convert 4-20 FM 5-0 0D\  Army Design Methodology it into explicit knowledge for others to apply. Tacit knowledge resides in an individual’s mind, while explicit knowledge consists of written or otherwise documented information. Explicit knowledge products of ADM include— z Environmental frame. z Problem frame. z Operational approach. z Initial commander’s intent. z Planning guidance including operational timings, resources requirements in broad terms, and risk. z Reframing criteria. 4-93. The products of ADM support the development of a detailed plan or order using the MDMP. The transition between ADM and the MDMP is important to convey the understanding and logic developed by the planning team to those developing the detailed plan. Briefing the results of ADM and handing over associated products to another planning team is not an effective approach. Often the same planning team that led the design effort leads the staff through the MDMP. If not, key members of the planning team are part of the core element of the planning team performing the MDMP. 4-94. During the mission analysis step of the MDMP, products of ADM are refined as the commander and staff learn more about the situation. The planning team rechecks and validates assumptions developed during ADM. Commanders consider new information and modify their visualization as required before issuing planning guidance for the development of courses of action. REFRAMING 4-95. During execution, the commander and staff monitor the OE and assess progress toward setting conditions and achieving objectives. Assessments help commanders measure the overall effectiveness of employing forces and capabilities to ensure that the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of the higher commander’s intent and concept of operations. If the current operational approach is failing to meet these criteria, or if aspects of the OE or problem change significantly, the commander may decide to begin reframing efforts. 4-96. A reframe is a shift in understanding that leads to a new perspective on the problem or its resolution. Reframing is the activity of revisiting earlier design hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational approach. In essence, reframing reviews what the commander and staff believe they understand about the OE, the problem, and the desired end state. At any time during the operations process, the decision to reframe may be triggered by factors such as— z Assessment reveals a lack of progress or regression. z Key assumptions prove invalid. z Unanticipated success or failure. z A major event that causes “catastrophic change” in the OE. z A scheduled periodic review that shows a problem. z A change in mission, objectives, or end state issued by higher echelon authority. 4-97. During operations, commanders decide to reframe after realizing the desired conditions have changed, are not achievable, cannot be attained through the current operational approach, or because of change of mission or end state. Reframing provides the freedom to operate beyond the limits of any single perspective. Conditions will change during execution, and such changes are expected because forces interact within an OE. Recognizing and anticipating these changes is fundamental to ADM and essential to an organization’s ability to learn. 4-98. During execution, it is important that commanders, supported by their staffs and subordinate commanders, question their original understanding and visualization of operations. Commanders question early assumptions, hypotheses, and conclusions that underpin the current plan during design sessions, commander’s conferences, or long-range assessment meetings. This may lead to the commander directing an effort to reframe an OE and problems and develop a new operational approach. 0D\ FM 5-0 4-21 Chapter 4 REFRAMING CRITERIA 4-99. It is helpful to think in advance about what circumstances, events, or changes require the command to reframe. As such, commanders and planning teams develop reframing indicators. A reframing indicator helps identify a condition in an OE that has changed or that could cause a shift in the problem such that a current operational approach may no longer be valid. Although many reframing indicators will not meet the requirement for the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), some reframing indicators could be included in the CCIRs if they represent something that would cause the commander to consider near-term reframing and potential redesign. An example of such information could be the impending alliance of a regional nation with the enemy that shifts the balance of power in spite of an earlier assumption that this alliance would not occur. Reframing indicators support the commander’s ability to understand, learn, adapt, and reframe as necessary. Examples of such information include— z Changes in the original problem statement. z Significant changes in threat composition. z Significant changes in the threat’s approach. z Significant changes in friendly capability. z Higher echelon headquarters’ policy changes or directives that change the desired end state. z Unexpected lack of friendly progress toward objectives. z Shifts in international support or domestic will. z Key assumptions prove to be invalid. ASSESSMENT PLAN 4-100. The assessment plan incorporates reframing criteria in the form of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs), used to evaluate completed tasks, achieved objectives, and obtained end-state conditions. An effective assessment plan incorporates the logic used to build the plan. The logic as to why the commander believes the actions in the plan will produce the desired results is an important consideration when developing the assessment plan. Recording and understanding this logic during ADM helps the staff recommend the appropriate indicators for assessing the operation. It also helps the commander and staff determine if they need to reframe the problem if assumptions prove false or the logic behind the plan appears flawed as operations progress. (See Chapter 8 for details on building an assessment plan.) 4-22 FM 5-0 0D\