DBS Transformation (B) Going Digital & Creating a 22,000 Person Start-Up PDF Case Study

IMD-7-1837 v. 01.05.2019...

IMD-7-1837 v. 01.05.2019 IMD902 DBS TRANSFORMATION (B): GOING DIGITAL AND CREATING A 22,000-PERSON START-UP Researcher PC Abraham It had been a busy week in India for Piyush Gupta, CEO of DBS. The prepared this case under the launch of DBS digibank in India on 26 April 2016 had gone well, and supervision of Professor Seán the months leading up to it, although intense, suggested the Meehan as a basis for class transformation of DBS from a world-class multinational bank to a discussion rather than to 22,000-person start-up was well on track. The digibank team had illustrate either effective or delivered on time, leaving Gupta optimistic that they would achieve ineffective handling of a their ambitious new business targets. But was this enough? Ant business situation. Financial, the three-year-old financial services spin-off from Alibaba, had just announced another successful funding round that valued it at US$60 billion. It already had a banking license in China, its payments arm had 451 million active users and its wealth management business boasted $760 billion assets under management. As his flight to Singapore reached cruising altitude, Gupta asked himself whether DBS had gone far enough, fast enough. And, crucially, was it fit to compete, win and grow in a world in which the financial services landscape was changing beyond recognition? Copyright © 2017 by IMD - International Institute for Management Development, Lausanne, Switzerland (www.imd.org). No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of IMD. This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.  -2- IMD-7-1837 Making Banking Joyful The board were persuaded by Gupta’s argument, in late 2013, that the competitive set it needed to understand and address was the so-called fintech space. This was a diverse space with three types of players emerging: start-ups, spin-off financial institutions and evolutions of internet platforms. In general these were often start-ups initially focused on one product market, they were founded by experienced bankers, staffed heavily by technology experts and heavily backed by private equity. Among them were Qudian, Oscar, Atom Bank and Avant. Other fintechs were established by one or more major financial institutions – for example, Lufax (backed by Ping An, a major Chinese insurer) and ZhongAn (established by Ping An, Tencent and Alibaba). And lastly there were the internet platforms that entered the space with enormous numbers of customers in their ecosystem, most of whom were engaging in a financial transaction (buying or selling goods or services) – most notable among these was Ant Financial, founded and owned by Alibaba. Ant operated far beyond facilitating e-commerce – it created an ecosystem where customers could invest, secure loans, make reservations for taxis/movies/travel/dining, chat and consume digital entertainment and news. The board were satisfied with the transformation journey. They liked the direction and the approach and they could see progress. Further, the bank’s financial performance remained robust (refer to Exhibit 1: Company Financials). They supported Gupta 100% as he pivoted from the earlier transformational ambition of creating a world-class multinational bank to that of becoming a 22,000-person start-up. As the senior management embraced this mandate, they stepped back to situate the strategy, the ongoing transformation and, indeed, the enterprise in the context of its purpose. Gupta reflected that consumers and business customers did not care about banking per se, rather they cared about accomplishing their own underlying objectives, be it buying a home or a car or educating their kids or, for businesses, securing a credit facility to enable a significant trade. But he and his colleagues felt it was not enough to be a bank that could address such basic needs. They needed to go further in a world in which banking was a chore – something that had to be done, but that people did not look forward to doing. DBS should work to make banking per se “invisible,” seamlessly integrated with customers’ everyday activities, fitting into their lives on their terms – helping them live life, not getting in their way. Achieving this would be a real game changer. If you could make banking joyful, you could really be very distinctive. If you can deliver on joyful banking, then you will be a very different kind of company. Piyush Gupta, DBS CEO The management team revisited their transformation journey with this changed mandate and heightened clarity as to DBS’s purpose. They agreed DBS would need to focus on and drive change to transform three key elements: technology, the customer journey and culture. Fixing the Technology As a result of recent efforts, common systems and processes were in place throughout DBS and, although functional, more improvements were needed to make them fit to compete effectively with the rising fintechs. Fintechs are nimble and quick. They have a completely different technology architecture, allowing them to think in terms of turnaround times, cycle times and end-to-end customer experiences that are exponentially different from those of a bank. Piyush Gupta, DBS CEO This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.  -3- IMD-7-1837 A key enabler in the DBS transformation was building a middleware layer on top of the core banking platform using service-oriented architecture and an Application Programming Interface (API) framework. This allowed DBS to easily and quickly create plug-and-play links, both within the bank and with external partners, making it possible to develop and roll out new products at a faster pace (refer to Exhibit 2: Adding a Middleware Layer). It also allowed the bank to implement Straight-Through Processing (STP), whereby the majority of transactions could be completed electronically (without human intervention). Transactions were completed instantaneously – a big differentiator compared with the other local banks in Singapore. Our digital journey has been inside out. A lot of other banks say, “Let’s create a great app.” Their user experience is sometimes better than ours, but there is no STP. You can’t actually trade. They will tell you what funds to buy, but you can’t actually execute. We might take a little longer, but we want to do it right. Tan Su Shan, Group Head of Consumer Banking & Wealth Management Rethinking the Customer Journey DBS had fixed many of the basics. Long queues and ATMs without cash were generally a thing of the past. Now, DBS moved forward on three tracks to make banking joyful. First, it redesigned its customer interactions to make them faster, easier and more pleasant. For example, it redesigned branches so that customers could sit down while waiting to be served and also implemented a system that allowed customers to obtain a queue number before visiting a branch so they could be notified by SMS a few minutes before their turn. Second, it sought to seamlessly embed itself in customers’ lives. The DBS Home Connect mobile app provided customers with helpful and relevant inputs to help them in their decision making (e.g. recent transaction prices and amenities available at different locations) as well as information on home mortgages. Food and beverage entrepreneurs were offered an F&B Starter Package including both banking (a bank account and working capital support) and technology (point-of-sale and back-office) solutions. Third, in a departure from the traditional approach in which assumptions about process failures informed the operations support remit, it embraced “Design for no ops.” Operations would be digitized and automated wherever possible to improve completion times and lower failure rates – and costs. Its internet and mobile banking platforms enabled customers to carry out most transactions without visiting a branch or phoning the call center. Further, “Design for customer struggle” insisted the bank’s systems flagged up, in real time, when customers had a problem. This allowed for a refreshing level of proactivity. For example, if a credit card transaction approval was being refused, DBS could send an SMS explaining why this had happened and what to do next, so that the customer did not need to contact the call center. Rewiring Mindsets toward a Start-up Culture If DBS was to compete successfully with fintechs, it would need to cultivate a culture that: …embraces innovation, decisiveness, entrepreneurship and nimbleness, one that places the customer’s perspective at the center. Piyush Gupta, DBS CEO, 2014 Annual Report This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.  -4- IMD-7-1837 The bank’s drive to improve customer experience changed its culture by exposing staff to new tools and ways of thinking and working. In 2013 it began experimenting with customer journey projects, redesigning how customers interacted with the bank to complete a specific task. It introduced the concept of human-centered design thinking, which involved deeply understanding customer needs, rapidly prototyping and iterating possible solutions, and finally implementing the chosen solution. The bank decided to go with a model of integrating innovation into the businesses, instead of setting up a standalone unit. As such, the Innovation Group provided guidance but the work was done by the business units themselves. In 2014 the bank set a target of a hundred customer journeys and conducted over a thousand “looking” activities – including customer interviews, surveys and immersion – to understand consumers better. It set up a new Human-Centered Design Lab and trained 700 staff in human- centered design. It partnered with A*Star 1 to support its use of big data. In 2015 the bank trained all 250 managing directors in customer journey techniques and asked each of them to lead a customer journey project. As a result, DBS had more than 300 customer journey projects running in 2016 in every part of the bank. Thousands of bank staff across functions, levels and geographies were involved in these projects, which pushed them to think and act differently. As part of its digital immersion programs, DBS conducted 15 hackathons in 2015. Teams consisted of three members from a start-up and three from different DBS levels and geographies. After an initial two days’ training of DBS members, the team worked for three days to solve a business problem. They developed concepts, talked to customers to get feedback and then decided whether to pivot or persevere. Once they had decided on a concept, they had to codify and test it and develop a business case. The objective was to be able to pitch to the business after three days. DBS conducted over a thousand experiments in 2015, in which teams used the new tools to try and find solutions for business problems. More than a hundred prototypes were developed across the bank as a result. The bank also established start-up accelerators, which allowed bank staff to interact with people who had very different mindsets. These programs touched about 2,000 staff throughout the bank in 2015, and an increase to 5,000 staff in 2016 was on track. Collectively, these activities supported a mindset shift – the self-belief that we are the best bank in the world. To be the best bank in the world, you have to be willing to do things differently, and the bank’s staff is beginning to fundamentally get this. Neal Cross, Chief Innovation Officer Innovation activities were initially focused on external customers, but over time they began to address internal customers and employees. The Innovation Group’s biggest client in 2016 was Human Resources, and they also worked with Finance and Compliance and Risk. DBS digibank: India’s First Mobile-only Bank As DBS proceeded to drive change in technology, customer journey and culture, it was imperative that it push ahead in the market at home and in overseas markets (China, India and 1 A*Star – Agency for Science, Technology And Research – was established by the Singapore government to support Singapore’s economic growth and enhance the lives of both the community and the industry. This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.  -5- IMD-7-1837 Indonesia) where it sought to grow. It rejected the option of becoming a niche corporate bank in these markets because it felt that to be meaningful, it should serve the mass SME and retail market. Regulatory hurdles made growing through acquisitions difficult. Cost constraints made building out the branch network in any one country unattractive. DBS recognized that while a digital-only strategy would not guarantee success, it became the preferred route-to- market overseas. The investment was manageable and failure would not imperil the bank. DBS decided to attempt this first in India and to go with a pure mobile-only model because the digital infrastructure was available in the country. The Indian government had begun rolling out the Aadhaar card to provide a unique identifier to every Indian resident, which meant companies could use it to authenticate potential customers digitally and remotely (refer to Exhibit 3: Aadhaar and the India Stack). Creating the Platform DBS set up a separate group to create the digibank India platform so that it could think differently and not be constrained by the bank’s established norms. We put them in a separate building. We looked at how a tech company would operate. Dave Gledhill spent time in Silicon Valley and we copied shamelessly. We got into agile and lean, co- located people, went to a completely different style of working. Piyush Gupta, DBS CEO The group set a stretch goal of designing the platform to operate with 10% of the staff that a normal banking operation would require. The bank had to completely rethink every aspect of banking operations and make some tough decisions. We had to get everybody’s buy-in that what we can’t digitize, we won’t do. Cheques are very big in India, but they were manual so we decided not to offer them. There was massive discussion and disagreement before this was settled. Dave Gledhill, Head of Group Technology and Operations The platform had three key features. First, the account opening was completely paperless and electronic, with customer authentication being done using biometrics and the Aadhaar card. DBS partnered with a popular national café chain allowing potential customers to visit any of over 500 designated outlets to complete the authentication process. Second, customer service was delivered through an artificial intelligence driven virtual assistant developed in partnership with Kasisto, a US-based fintech. Third, it used a dynamic soft token security system embedded in the customer’s smartphone which was much more secure than inputting one-time passwords received via SMS. The bank opted for a completely branchless model. 2 In mid-2016 digibank India had 35% to 40% the headcount of a traditional bank and only 10% of the normal headcount required for onboarding customers. Maintaining this discipline, however, was challenging. Some at the bank were already advocating moving away from a pure mobile-only model and offering an internet-based platform. This would address customer concerns about accessing their account if they had a poor mobile connection. 2 https://www.dbs.com/digibank/in/features.html This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.  -6- IMD-7-1837 Launching DBS digibank India DBS launched DBS digibank India in April 2016 with the objective of reaching 5 million customers and INR 500 billion (about S$10 billion) deposits within five years. With Sachin Tendulkar, a popular Indian cricket star, as its brand ambassador it targeted the 125 million English language speakers with a smartphone. The bank’s first challenge was to get customers to download the app and use it as an e-wallet. This did not require the customer’s identity to be authenticated and the process could be completed almost instantaneously. Once funded the e-wallet could be used to pay utility bills and top up prepaid mobile phone accounts. It came with a virtual Visa card for online purchases. Once customers started using the e-wallet, the bank’s next task was to get them to convert it to a savings account, which required them to complete the authentication process. India’s digital banking space was likely to be very competitive. First, India’s major private banks were taking steps to ensure that they dominated this space. The largest, HDFC Bank, had built up its mobile platform allowing customers to carry out over 75 different kinds of transactions. Second, the government had issued a banking license to Paytm, the owner of India’s most popular mobile wallet (40% owned by Alibaba and Ant Financial). Other licenses were issued to telecom companies, including Vodafone M-Pesa and Airtel. Third, easy access to the India Stack would make it easy for fintechs to build and launch product offerings (refer to Exhibit 4: India’s Changing Digital Banking Landscape). Emerging Challenges Singapore – Are We Doing Enough? In Singapore, which accounted for over 60% of DBS’s income, the initial results from its digital transformation had been encouraging. It had developed significant new income streams, most notably from DBS Remit, an online overseas funds transfer service that had almost doubled the bank’s cross-border remittance traffic since it was introduced in 2014. Costs had begun to decline, with call center volumes falling 10–15% in the previous year (with headcount dropping from over 600 to less than 500 as a result) and branch traffic declining by 4–5% over the same period. DBS was confident that these trends would continue and had told analysts that it expected its cost-income ratio to be below 40% (from 45% in 2015) in five years. Despite these achievements the growing presence of fintechs was worrying. For example, Gupta felt that Alibaba was getting further ahead of DBS (refer to Exhibit 5: Alibaba in 2016). The bank needed to maintain its change momentum in order to stay competitive. Growth Markets – Will the Digital Bank Strategy Work? Credit Suisse estimated the Indian consumer and SME loan markets would grow from US$600 billion to US$3,020 billion over the next decade. DBS digibank India had huge potential if it could compete effectively. The fact was that the India Stack was available to all comers. The Reserve Bank of India, India’s central bank, was making it easier for companies to procure banking licenses – in 2015 it had issued 2 universal banking licenses, 11 payment bank licenses and 10 small finance bank licenses. Competitors were well managed, well resourced and technologically advanced. This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.  -7- IMD-7-1837 DBS planned to launch a digital bank in Indonesia in 2017 that was similar to its Indian venture. It would be up against Indonesia’s leading banks such as Bank Central Asia (the leading private bank) and Bank Mandiri (the leading public sector bank), which were determined to protect their turf. In addition, telecoms companies such as Indosat had built a presence in mobile financial services. DBS faced a dilemma in China. Given the existence of players like Ant Financial and Tencent, which had established a commanding lead, it did not feel that the strategy it was pursuing in India and Indonesia would work. It would need to look at other ways to penetrate this market. What works in a market where there is a window of opportunity cannot work in a market where the window has been gone for two or three years. Piyush Gupta, DBS CEO, 2016 This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.  -8- IMD-7-1837 Exhibit 1 Company Financials 3 2012 2013 2014 2015 Balance Sheet (S$ billion) Total assets 353.0 402.0 440.7 457.8 Customer loans 210.5 248.7 275.6 283.3 Total liabilities 317.0 364.3 400.5 415.0 Customer deposits 253.5 292.4 317.2 320.1 Total shareholders’ funds 31.7 34.2 37.7 40.4 Income Statement (S$ billion) Total income 8.06 8.93 9.62 10.79 Profit before tax 4.16 4.32 4.70 5.16 Net profit 3.81 3.67 4.05 4.45 Financial Ratios (%) Net interest margin 1.70 1.62 1.68 1.77 Cost to income ratio 44.8 43.9 45.0 45.4 Return on assets 0.97 0.91 0.91 0.96 Return on shareholders’ funds 11.2 10.8 10.9 11.2 Loan to deposit ratio 83.1 85.0 86.9 88.5 Non-performing loan rate 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.9 Source: DBS Annual Report 2015 3 US$1 = S$1.41 (12.31.15) This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.  -9- IMD-7-1837 Exhibit 2 DBS Technology – Adding a Middleware Layer Source: Company information This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.  - 10 - IMD-7-1837 Exhibit 3 Aadhaar and the India Stack Aadhaar The Indian government first identified the need to provide a unique identity number to each Indian resident in 2000 as a tool to efficiently deliver welfare services and monitor government programs. The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) was set up in 2009 and Nandan Nilekani (who had formerly led Infosys, one of India’s most successful IT services firms) was appointed its chairman with cabinet minister rank. The UIDAI began rolling out the Aadhaar, a 12-digit unique identification number, to all Indian residents in 2009. It collected a set of demographic information (including name, verified date of birth or self-declared age, gender and address) and biometric information (including fingerprints, iris scans and facial photographs) from each person who received an Aadhaar. Enrolled individuals could also provide a mobile number and an e-mail address if they chose to do so. UIDAI used the collected information to ensure that each Aadhaar was unique and that no individual had more than one. By the end of 2013, the UIDAI had enrolled 300 million Indian residents in the program, and by early 2016 the number exceeded a billion. The India Stack Using the Aadhaar database as the foundation, the government built a digital infrastructure consisting of a set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that it referred to as the India Stack. The government and businesses could use this infrastructure to develop and deliver presenceless, paperless and cashless services digitally. It had five key elements: Aadhaar Auth was a web-enabled service through which the identity of enrolled individuals could be authenticated using their Aadhaar, individual demographic information, and either their fingerprints or an iris scan. Aadhaar eKYC could be used to electronically verify an individual’s identity, address, date of birth and gender, as well as an e-mail address and mobile phone number if he or she had chosen to provide this information to the Aadhaar database. Aadhaar eSign allowed enrolled individuals to electronically sign a form or document anytime, anywhere and on any device. Unified Payment Interface (UPI) enabled individuals who had linked their bank account to their Aadhaar to send and receive money from their smartphones using just their Aadhaar, without entering bank-specific account numbers and passwords. DigitalLocker allowed organizations to deposit electronic copies of documents and certificates directly into the digital lockers (dedicated cloud storage space linked to Aadhaar numbers) of individuals who had signed up for this service. Individuals could then give other organizations access to these documents electronically. Source: www.indiastack.org This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.  - 11 - IMD-7-1837 Exhibit 4 India’s Changing Digital Banking Landscape India’s banking landscape had changed significantly, with the market share of public sector banks declining from 80% in 2000 to 73% in 2013. The Reserve Bank of India (India’s central bank) had predicted that the market share of public sector banks would fall further, to 63% by 2025, and many observers felt that the drop would be even steeper. India’s private banks had been particularly successful in the digital space, accounting for almost 60% of the value of mobile banking transactions in March 2016, about three times their 20% share in the overall banking market. The leading private banks had spotted the digital opportunity early and had decided to take advantage of it. HDFC Bank, the largest of these, had set out to transform itself into a digital bank after its CEO, Aditya Puri, visited Silicon Valley in the summer of 2014. He came back convinced that his bank should disrupt itself rather than waiting to be disrupted by others. Since then, the bank had launched a number of innovative products in the digital space, including a 10-second loan and a digital banking platform for SME customers. Mobile and internet banking accounted for over half of the bank’s transactions in early 2016. It had built up its mobile banking platform so that customers could carry out over 75 different types of transactions. The Reserve Bank of India had opened up the banking sector by issuing 23 new banking licenses in 2014 and 2015. Two were universal bank licenses; 11 were for payment banks, which were limited in the deposits they could accept and focused more on payment and remittance services and distributing financial products; and 10 were for small finance banks, which focused on serving SMEs. One of the payment bank licenses had gone to Paytm, India’s most popular mobile wallet in which Alibaba and Ant Financial had a 40% equity stake. Payment bank licenses had also been issued to telecom companies including Vodafone M- Pesa and Airtel, which was India’s largest mobile telecom company. The creation of the India Stack (refer to Exhibit 3) was likely to increase competition in the mobile payments space, with 29 banks having announced plans to offer payments solutions using the Unified Payments Interface. The India Stack would also make it easier for fintechs to develop and launch innovative financial products, so competition from these companies was likely to increase. Source: www.indiastack.org; Reserve Bank of India; Analyst Reports; Press Reports This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.  - 12 - IMD-7-1837 Exhibit 5 Alibaba in 2016 Alibaba had gone from strength to strength since 2013. The number of active buyers on its e- commerce platforms in China had increased from 172 million in the first quarter of 2013 to 423 million three years later. The gross market value (GMV) of transactions had more than doubled from RMB 294 billion to RMB 742 billion over the same period, and the share of mobile transactions in total GMV had increased from 11% to 73%. Alibaba’s initial public offering (IPO) on the New York Stock Exchange had taken place in September 2014 and was the biggest in the world at the time, raising $25 billion. Ant Financial, under which Alibaba aggregated all the financial services it provided, was spun off as a separate entity in 2011. Alibaba had sold its SME loan portfolio to Ant Financial in the run-up to its IPO. Ant Financial had raised $4.5 billion in funding in April 2016 at a valuation of over $60 billion. Alipay, which provided payment services to both Alibaba and third-party merchant customers, had benefited from the growth of e-commerce and mobile commerce in China. By March 2016, it had a market share of 43% of China’s online payment market and 52% of its mobile payment market. It supported 451 million consumers, who were served by over 10 million merchants. Alipay had also started to move into the offline payments space and supported over 300,000 merchants as of March 2016. It had also started expanding internationally to cater to Chinese travelers and could be used to pay at about 70,000 merchants globally, which it planned to increase to 1 million merchants within three years. Yu’e Bao, a money market fund that the company had launched in June 2013, was China’s largest by March 2016, with RMB 760 billion in assets under management and 152 million active users. It had started offering other wealth management products as well. Ant Financial had teamed up with Tencent Holdings to form China’s first online-only insurance company in 2014 and had acquired a majority stake in Cathay Insurance. Ant Financial had ramped up its efforts to lend to SMEs by setting up Mybank, a private online bank, in June 2015, and the bank had made over 20 million loans by March 2016. The company had also moved into consumer finance by launching Ant Check Later, which offered consumer loans in the RMB 1 to RMB 30,000 range on Alibaba’s e-commerce platforms. The eligibility of individuals for loans was decided based on a credit rating provided by Sesame Credit (also launched in 2015), which used big data technology to analyze consumer spending data from both online and offline sources. During Singles Day on 11 November 2015, Ant Check Later had provided credit for over 60 million purchases made on Alibaba’s e-commerce platforms. Source: Form 20-F for the year ended March 31, 2016 filed with US SEC; Company Website; Analyst Reports; Press Reports This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Aditya Moses's PGPX (Term 5) : Creating High Performance Organizations (CHPO) 2024-25 at Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad from Dec 2024 to Mar 2025.