Nightmare In Bhopal PDF 1984

NIGHTMARE IN BHOPAL O n the night of December 2, 1984, 40 tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC) was accidentally released from a chemical plant located in Bhopal, India, owned and operated by a subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation. The MIC formed a toxic cloud that drifted over residents o...

NIGHTMARE IN BHOPAL O n the night of December 2, 1984, 40 tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC) was accidentally released from a chemical plant located in Bhopal, India, owned and operated by a subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation. The MIC formed a toxic cloud that drifted over residents of Bhopal while they were asleep, leading to catastrophic consequences: 3,800 fatalities and 11,000 injuries, with many residents still suffering from the long-term effects of chemical exposure. Plant workers allowed water to seep into the MIC tanks, causing a reaction that led to the re- lease, following which poorly maintained safety systems failed to con- tain its movement. In 1934, the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) became one of the earliest U.S. companies to establish a subsidiary in India. The country was seeking to attract foreign investors in order to strengthen its econ- omy and often did so, like many other developing countries, by relax- ing safety standards or ignoring violations. Over the next 50 years, this safety culture, low labor costs, and untapped markets in India would help UCC to gain a competitive advantage. Unfortunately, it also led to the worst disaster in the history of the chemical manufacturing industry. In the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries around the globe were becoming participants in the ‘‘Green Revolution,’’ an agricultural movement utilizing improved practices and technology. These countries were able to increase domestic food harvests drastically and thus reduce reliance on imported crops. In India, as in other Green Revolution countries, rising crop production led to a growing demand for pesti- cides. In keeping with India’s economic goals, the country decided to manufacture the necessary pesticides domestically rather than obtain them through foreign import. Consequently, in 1969, UCC and its In- dian subsidiary, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), established a pes- ticide factory in Bhopal, India. By the late 1960s, UCIL had expanded to encompass 14 factories with over 9,000 employees. Its stock was publicly traded on the Calcutta Stock Exchange with UCC retaining majority (51%) ownership. The re- maining UCIL shares were held by Indian financial institutions and pri- vate investors. Bhopal, located in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh (see Exhibit 3.1), was a growing city of several hundred thousand people in 1969. Building a pesticide factory in Bhopal was a logical choice for UCC and UCIL based on the city’s central location in India, access to electricity, existing rail infrastructure, a large potential labor force, and the avail- ability of a reliable water supply. The plant was situated near a residential area just north of the city. Soon after the facility was constructed, more densely populated settle- ments began to grow around it. These settlements became so large that, in 1975, Bhopal’s administrator of municipal planning requested that the plant be relocated to protect these inhabitants. This idea was re- jected by both the company and local government officials. MIC was one of many chemicals used in the production of pesticides at the Bhopal plant. MIC is a highly reactive, extremely hazardous sub- stance and is known to cause severe damage to the lungs, digestive tract, skin, reproductive organs, and eyes, even under very short-term expo- sure. Furthermore, MIC vapor is heavier than air, which causes the chemical, when released, to stay close to the ground where it can come into contact with humans, animals, and plants. On the night of December 2, 1984, 132 gallons of water seeped into MIC storage tank 610 at the Bhopal facility. The water reacted with MIC, causing approximately 40 tons of deadly vapors to leak out of the tank. Around 11:30 PM, MIC unit workers, noticing their eyes EXHIBIT 3.1 Map of India depicting the location of Madhya Pradesh and the city of Bhopal beginning to water and burn, notified the shift supervisor of a sus- pected leak. The supervisor did not take any action until 12:20 AM (December 3), when he contacted the plant superintendent. By 12:25 AM, MIC had completely filled the air in the unit, yet opera- tions were allowed to continue for another 20 minutes. Shortly after 12:50 AM, the first toxic gas alarm was activated to notify workers and the local rescue squad. Responders initially tried to stop the spread of gas by spraying it with water. When this approach proved futile, both plant workers and responders began to flee upwind from the plant. The public was finally notified of the leak more than two hours after it was first discovered, at approximately 2:00 AM, when plant officials sounded the toxic gas siren. Residents awoke, coughing uncontrollably and unable to catch their breath. Victims experienced a burning sensa- tion in their eyes and throat, often followed by vomiting, with some losing consciousness. The gas eventually spread as far as five miles downwind, covering an area of over eight square miles, affecting a population of nearly 900,000 people. As many as 4,000 people died that night while in bed or trying to escape the fumes. Estimates of those injured or disabled are as high as 400,000 people. Within three days, estimated fatalities had risen to 7,000 to 10,000 people, the casualties coming primarily from the poor, overcrowded communities surrounding the plant. Animal life and vegetation also suffered as a result of MIC exposure. Thousands of livestock were killed along with numerous dogs, cats, and other animals. Ecological damage included extensive tree defoliation. On December 4, UCC headquarters in Connecticut was notified of the disaster. The company’s initial response was to downplay the toxic- ity of MIC. One UCC official stated that the released chemical was no more harmful than tear gas, despite internal company documents de- scribing MIC to be potentially deadly. Chairman and chief executive officer Warren Anderson and a small technical team traveled to Bhopal on December 4. Upon arrival, Ander- son was placed under arrest and charged, along with UCC, as having committed culpable homicide. Anderson promptly posted $2,000 bail and returned to the United States. In the meantime, the UCC technical team helped dispose of the remaining MIC on site and began an inquiry into the cause of the leak. The disaster sparked an enormous legal battle between UCC and the Indian government, which had assigned itself the authority to act on behalf of the victims. The Indian government filed an initial suit in U.S. court, seeking $3.3 billion in damages. However, the court refused to hear any suits related to Bhopal because of the location of the incident, the nationality of the victims, and the fact that UCC did not appear to closely manage operations at UCIL. The two parties eventually settled out of court in February 1989. The settlement called for UCC to pay $470 million to victims of the disaster, with the stipulation that the money was not an indication of any civil or criminal wrongdoing. Unfortunately, victims soon discovered that obtaining a share of this settlement would be a difficult task. Those who filed claims had to regis- ter, prove their identity with photos and medical records, receive notifi- cation of a hearing, be categorized according to the severity of their injuries, receive a judgment, and, for some, undergo the appeals proc- ess. As a result, over the ensuing three years, the Indian government had distributed only a small portion of the financial settlement to vic- tims. This process continued until July 2004, when the Indian Supreme Court ordered the government of India to distribute the remaining set- tlement funds to victims of the gas leak. An initial deadline for compli- ance was set for November 2004, but it was later extended to April 2006, more than 21 years after the disaster. In 1994, the Indian Supreme Court allowed UCC to sell its assets in India for the purpose of funding a hospital in Bhopal. The sale of UCC’s stock in UCIL provided $90 million for the hospital, which eventually began operating in 2001. With no holdings left in India and UCC offi- cials ignoring court summonses (for which Anderson was declared a fu- gitive from justice in 1992), criminal cases against the corporation became increasingly difficult to pursue. In 1999, UCC merged with and was subsumed by the Dow Chemical Company. Dow subsequently disavowed responsibility for any UCC liabilities in India despite accepting responsibility for UCC liabilities within the United States. Three years after the merger, the Indian government reaffirmed its charges of culpable homicide against Warren Anderson and, in 2003, formally sought his extradition from the United States. A year later, this request was rejected in the U.S. court.  The environment in and around Bhopal continues to show the ef- fects of the disaster. As many as 15,000 more people have since report- edly died from residual MIC exposure. Hundreds of thousands of other victims continue to deal with effects of the disaster, suffering from blindness, chronic eye disease, lung and gastrointestinal ailments, neu- rological disorders, reproductive issues, muscular and skeletal prob- lems, weakened immune systems, miscarriages, infant mortality, and cancer. Moreover, many victims were forced to change occupations, work fewer hours, or stop working altogether as a result of their ill- nesses or due to business disruption. Today, groundwater containing high concentrations of toxic chemicals is still used for drinking and other purposes. Soils in the area are simi- larly polluted. The UCIL factory remains, although it has not been in operation since the night of the gas leak. Stocks of hazardous chemicals lie scattered and abandoned throughout the facility, serving as a constant threat and reminder to the people of Bhopal of that fateful night. The Bhopal disaster can be attributed to such a large number of risk factors, that the occurrence of a catastrophe was not so much a matter of ‘‘whether’’ but more a case of ‘‘when.’’ The event that initiated the leak on the night of December 2, 1984, was the introduction of water into a MIC holding tank. UCC contends that this was the result of sabotage by a disgruntled employee, citing the results of an independent investigation by a third-party consulting firm. However, the name of the saboteur has never been released and no charges have ever been filed. Workers at the plant generally believe that the water seeped into the tank while being used as part of a routine cleaning procedure. It is unclear whether this seepage stemmed from an inability to follow proper procedures or if it was due to inadequate training. Once the leak occurred, the toxic gas was able to escape due to a series of failures attributed to poor design and deferred maintenance (see Exhibit 3.2). Initially, water was unable to drain because of clogged bleeder lines. Eventually the water worked its way through a series of leaky valves into the MIC tank. Because temperature and pressure gauges in the MIC unit were known to be unreliable, workers initially ignored the gauge readings that indicated a problem was occurring in the storage tank. The refrigeration system for keeping the MIC cool, and therefore less likely to overheat, was also not functioning. An alarm that should have indicated the temperature rise in the storage tank did not work. The gas scrubber, used for neutralizing any escaping MIC, was designed to handle only one-fourth of the gas that was actually re- leased; moreover, it had been shut down for maintenance at the time of the incident. A flare tower for burning off any escaping MIC also had a EXHIBIT 3.2 Some of the major safety and containment failures during the Bhopal gas leak Source: SEMCOSH, ‘‘Bhopal Diagram,’’ 2004. www.semcosh.org/bhopal_diagram.htm. design capacity of less than the volume of the release; it, too, had been turned off for maintenance. The water curtain (for containing any gas that may have escaped the scrubber and flare tower) was operational, but proved to be too short to reach the source of the escaping MIC. Finally, the storage tank that ruptured was filled beyond its recom- mended capacity and an overflow tank designed to capture excess MIC was already full of the chemical. That MIC was allowed to be stored at the factory was, in itself, a recognized hazard. The Bhopal plant kept a 30-day supply of MIC on hand, which the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research deter- mined to be both unnecessary and hazardous. This situation prompted a local attorney, in March 1983, to write a letter to the Bhopal plant manager threatening legal action for storing hazardous substances and releasing toxic waste to the local environment. What is remarkable about these design and operational flaws is that these system components were implemented to provide redundant ca- pability in containing a potential release. It was only through their col- lective failure that an event of such disastrous proportions could occur. Economic pressure faced by UCIL likely contributed to such dilapi- dated conditions. From the time MIC production began until the release occurred, the Bhopal plant had not been profitable. This led UCIL to search for ways to reduce expenses. As a result, over one-half of the MIC workers had been laid off and the maintenance staff was reduced to only two people. Those who remained behind suffered from job inse- curity, low wages, and no promotion potential, often forced to fill in as needed to perform jobs for which they were not trained. The work force reduction and limited resources also took a toll on equipment perform- ance, resulting in decisions to use temporary or inferior low-cost solu- tions, defer maintenance, or shut down system components altogether. Additionally, the Bhopal operation was plagued by poor communica- tion, attributable perhaps to UCC’s hands-off approach to managing UCIL. It has been alleged that UCC did not effectively transmit infor- mation to its subsidiary about the hazards present at the Bhopal facility. Such communication breakdowns are not unusual in multinational corporations, as they involve parties separated by distance, working under different cultural norms, and speaking different languages. For example, operating manuals at the Bhopal plant were written in English rather than in Hindi, the predominant native language of the region. Communication problems were not limited to international dialogue, however, for interactions within the plant, and between the plant and the community, were also suspect. Lack of planning and preparedness is also present as a risk factor in this case. There is no indication that any formal emergency response plan existed in the event of a chemical spill, as evidenced by the inability of the responders to perform effective mitigation and the inexcusable length of time before the public was notified of the release. When resi- dents finally were made aware of the threat, most did not know what to do and many fled into low-lying areas where conditions were even worse than what they had left behind. Furthermore, when hospitals in Bhopal became overwhelmed by the enormous flood of patients, staff could do little to help since UCC did not make known what type of gas had escaped from the factory nor how to treat the victims. Looming larger than all of these other risk factors, perhaps, was the culture in which the Bhopal facility was designed, constructed, and op- erated. Many of the plant’s safety hazards were well known to UCIL and UCC management but were never addressed. In fact, chemical- related accidents began occurring at the site shortly after the plant be- gan manufacturing MIC. In the early 1980s, there were at least three incidents involving the release of MIC and one of its constituents (phos- gene) that exposed numerous workers, killing one and injuring dozens of others. Two separate safety investigations followed these incidents, one conducted by UCC and another by the Madhya Pradesh govern- ment, the findings of which were provided to company executives. UCC’s audit report cited over 60 safety hazards at the plant, 30 of which were considered major, with 11 of these associated with the phosgene/MIC units. The report specifically discussed the significant likelihood of a major release of hazardous chemicals due to mechanical and operating problems. An August 1984 letter from the secretary general of the facility’s workers’ union to company officials voiced a similar concern about deteriorating safety conditions at the plant. A number of articles also appeared in the local press, including one pub- lished in June 1984 entitled ‘‘Bhopal: On the Brink of a Disaster.’’ While no remedial measures were taken by UCC or UCIL at the Bhopal plant in response to any of the audits, letters, or articles, ironi- cally, action was taken to address similar problems at a UCC plant in West Virginia. The improved safety at the West Virginia plant, in comparison to its Indian counterpart, can be explained only by a dif- ferent standard of health and environmental safety regulations im- posed by the two countries. Disadvantages faced by Bhopal workers not experienced by their West Virginia counterparts included high storage time for MIC, no emergency scrubber to neutralize MIC, no computerized monitoring of equipment, use of a storage tank coolant that is highly reactive with MIC, poor worker training, and inad- equate personal safety gear. The blame for allowing such a culture to exist rests squarely on the political agendas of both the Indian government and UCC. From the outset, it was apparent that economic development was India’s highest priority, motivating a desire to create a highly favorable business cli- mate for foreign investment. Among the incentives offered was a set of lax safety laws and an ‘‘understanding’’ that enforcement of safety practices would not be taken seriously. This strategy likely influenced UCC to create UCIL and build substantial operations in India. Culpa- bility does not belong to the Indian government alone, however, be- cause it was UCC’s decision to apply a different safety standard to its U.S. plants than to those operating in India. In doing so, UCC abdicated corporate responsibility to treat employees equally on a worldwide ba- sis, in deference to maximizing the bottom line. To a large extent, such arrogance on the part of both UCC and the Indian government did not change in the aftermath of the MIC release. UCC distanced itself from responsibility for the incident and engaged in a relatively passive relief effort that reflected poorly on the company’s image. By designating itself as the legal representative for all disaster victims, the Indian government removed any rights individuals had for restitution based on their particular circumstances. Moreover, by al- lowing UCC to rescind its holdings in UCIL, the Indian Supreme Court effectively closed the door on any further recourse that victims may have had. Some contend that the process established by the Indian gov- ernment for obtaining a share of the settlement was made purposely difficult to discourage timely and widespread distribution of funds, serving notice to other foreign investors that India was still a welcoming place for business development. Bhopal served as a bellwether event for the chemical industry and a cat- alyst for safety reform. In the year following the disaster, the Chemical Manufacturer’s Association (now known as the American Chemistry Council [ACC]) began implementing a number of voluntary initiatives designed to reduce the possibility and effects of chemical accidents. It began with the launch of the Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) program. This program was designed to encourage ACC member plants to inform local communities about chemicals lo- cated on site and to coordinate response efforts in the event of a release. A year later, the ACC adopted the Canadian Responsible Care Pro- gram, which established industry practices to reduce risks to workers, the community, and the environment. Subsequently the CAER program was incorporated into the Responsible Care program. In order to avoid another tragedy like Bhopal, all ACC members, which account for over 90% of U.S. chemical production, are required to follow Responsible Care guidelines. Other industry trade groups, such as the Synthetic Or- ganic Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA), have followed this lead. In August 2003, the United Nations created a set of guidelines to protect human rights in the face of increasing economic globalization. The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights define standards to ensure that multinational corporations, their overseas plants, and sur- rounding communities are connected by a common set of values. Many of these guidelines would have applied directly to the Bhopal plant, including principles calling for multinational corporations to be responsible for the impact of their activities on human and environmental health, to report actual or anticipated releases of hazardous or toxic substances, and to use best management practices to reduce the risk of accidents or damage to the environment. Despite these changes in the aftermath of Bhopal, not everyone is convinced that chemical safety has reached an acceptable level. Critics of the Responsible Care program charge that it is a purely voluntary measure on the part of the chemical industry, primarily a public rela- tions campaign with no major effect on plant safety. They argue that government regulations and stringent enforcement are required to effect real change in industry practices. The jury is still out on the UN reforms, as well. For this initiative to be successful, it will require a meaningful partnership between an indus- try willing to make reforms and governments willing to adopt and en- force stricter safety standards. Many people doubt that the pendulum has swung far enough in this direction, acknowledging that all too often the fervor over promoting economic development trumps safety concerns. Meanwhile, chemical accidents continue to occur, in the United States and abroad, resulting in casualties and community evacuations. Yet nothing of Bhopalian proportions has been experienced since that December night. Whether something so dreadful could happen again, and how likely that would be, is a much-debated subject.