ACE Workbook Combo PDF

Security Module 1 – Objectives Explain the functions and requirements of the Airport Security Coordinator Explain the specific threats to aviation, airports and aircraft Explain the various elements of the layered security system and their functions Explain the impact...

Security Module 1 – Objectives Explain the functions and requirements of the Airport Security Coordinator Explain the specific threats to aviation, airports and aircraft Explain the various elements of the layered security system and their functions Explain the impact of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 Know the pilot programs from ATSA 2001 Know the roles of each agency and job title within aviation security 6 of 56 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 1 Introduction to the ACE Program The Airport Certified Employee (ACE) – Security program is designed by the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), as the first comprehensive certification program for airport security personnel at a public-use airport, anywhere in the United States. Designed for airport security personnel, particularly Airport Security Coordinators (ASCs) or Assistant ASC’s, it is also educational for airport operations, planning and airport management professionals. Now in its fourth edition the ACE-Security program is largely based on Title 14 CFR Part 1542 (Airport Security) and over the course of time has become an “expert ASC” style program. Previous editions of the program placed focused more on historical events and Congressional response but this edition takes a different approach. While not minimizing the impact of those events, this edition is focused more on roles and responsibilities and the application of knowledge and processes while maintaining some historical elements and Congressional responses as triggering events or to provide context to a particular policy or procedure. The 2014 module re-write this year features a new format and style. The modules are written from a training perspective, meaning that context is provided throughout the modules with plenty of programmed repetition. When you see a concept the first time, it typically is not the last time – the next time you see it the information should be a summary of what you’ve read previously about that topic and then include more detailed information about the subject. The research on how the brain learns has indicated that this technique should enhance retention of the material. While these modules will be as up-to-date as possible upon publication, the industry never stops evolving, and threats and attacks on aviation are ongoing. If you see something out of date, please write to me at [email protected] so I can correct it in future versions. While Airport Security Coordinators and airport directors have different perspectives on the role of the TSA and the Federal Security Director at their airports, it is the position of AAAE that the best practices approach to airport security is to work cooperatively rather than uncooperative with the federal government. Additionally, although regulations and certain guidance documents, such as the TSA’s Airport Security Program Guide and 49 CFR 1542 Implementation Guide, which delineate actions necessary to ensure compliance, Federal Security Directors and others have differing interpretations of the regulations and the guidance. Therefore, what may be approved (or not approved) at one airport may not be the case at another simply due to different interpretations from the TSA. One size does not fit all. The ACE-Security program contains three modules: Module 1: Aviation Security Roles and Regulations Module 2: Airport Security Module 3: Aircraft Operations, Screening and Module 4: Security Management Issues The modules are based on the regulations under Title 49 Part 1500 series and accepted and best practices in use throughout the United States. Some processes and policies that are covered by Security Directives (SDs) or the TSA’s compliance guidance but are already in the public domain (i.e. can be researched open-source) are also included. The 3-1-1 rule would be an example of a process that is required by an SD but the details of which are widely available through numerous public sources, including the TSA’s own website. Since the ACE-Security program is a non-SSI program, participants in the program are encouraged to review their own sources of information, their own Airport Security Programs and SDs and amendments, and locally approved procedures. However, the ACE-Security exam is only based on information within these modules. The ACE-Security program is offered in three different formats: self-study; a three-day review course with other students from around the country; or a three-day on-site course at an individual airport for that airport’s personnel. Although self-study may be appropriate for some, the three-day course allows students the opportunity to spend uninterrupted time with the material, while engaging with their peers in a professionally- facilitated environment. Upon completion of the review course students have the opportunity to immediately apply their knowledge by taking the written ACE-Security exam. Regardless of whether the student chooses a review course or self-study, this 100 multiple-choice question exam must be successfully passed with a minimum score of 70% to enable the student to earn the ACE-Security certification and use the initials ACE after their name. Personnel interested in an ACE-Security review course are encouraged to contact the AAAE Training Department via email at [email protected] or via phone at (703) 824-0500. ACE Security – Module 1 / 7 of 56  Security Abbreviations AIT Automated Imaging Technology EAA Exclusive Area Agreement Aircraft Communications Addressing and EDS Explosives Detection System ACARS Reporting System EOC Emergency Operations Center AC Advisory Circular EOP Emergency Operations Plan ASAC Aviation Security Advisory Committee ETD Explosives Trace Detection ADASP Aviation Direct Access Screening Program FAA Federal Aviation Administration AFSD Assistant Federal Security Director FAM Federal Air Marshal AOA Air Operations Area FIO Field Intelligence Officer AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation AOSC Aircraft Operator Security Coordinator FBO Fixed Base Operator ASC Airport Security Coordinator FFDO Federal Flight Deck Officer ASIS American Society of Industrial Security FPS Federal Protective Service ASP Airport Security Program FSD Federal Security Director ATR Automated Threat Recognition FSP Full Standard Security Program ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security 2001 Act of 2001 GA General Aviation ATSP Airport Tenant Security Program GSC Ground Security Coordinator AVSEC Aviation Security Contingency Plan HRT Hostage Rescue Team BAO Bomb Appraisal Officer IAC Indirect Air Carriers BATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms IAC Incident Action Plan BCP Business Continuity Planning IATA International Air Transport Association BDO Behavior Detection Officer ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screen- ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization CAPPS ing System IED Improvised Explosive Device CASFO Civil Aviation Security Field Office IFSC In Flight Security Coordinator Nuclear/Biological/Chemical/Explosive IMS Ion Mobility Spectrometry CBRNE Weapons Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security CBP Customs and Border Protection IACSSP Program CCSP Certified Cargo Screening Program IPP Isolated Parking Position CERT Community Emergency Response Team JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force CIRG Critical Incident Response Group LEO Law Enforcement Officer CHRC Criminal History Records Check LRBL Least Risk Bomb Location Crime Prevention Through Environmental MANPAD Manned Portable Air Defense System CPTED Design National Explosives Detection Canine DAC Designated Aviation Channeler NEDCP Program DEA Drug Enforcement Administration NIMS National Incident Management System DHS Department of Homeland Security NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 8 of 56 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 1 PCSSP Private Charter Standard Security Program PIC Pilot in Command PIV Personal Identity Verification PNR Passenger Name Record PPBM Positive Passenger Bag Match RAM Random Anti-terrorism Measures RT Registered Traveler SAM Surface to Air Missile SARP Standards and Recommended Practices SeMS Security Management Systems SD Security Directive SIDA Security Identification Display Area SOC Security Operations Center Screening of Passengers by Observation SPOT Techniques SPP Screening Partnership Program SSI Sensitive Security Information SSCP Security Screening Check Point STA Security Threat Assessment TDC Travel Document Check TFSSP Twelve-Five Standard Security Program TLO Terrorism Liaison Officers TSC Terrorist Screening Center TSA Transportation Security Administration TSI Transportation Security Inspector TSO Transportation Security Officer TSOC Transportation Security Operations Center TSR Transportation Security Regulations Transportation Worker Identification TWIC Credential USAR Urban Search and Rescue VBIED Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction WTMD Walk Through Metal Detector ACE Security – Module 1 / 9 of 56  Security The Airport Security Coordinator The position of Airport Security Coordinator was originally created in 1991, under Title 14 CFR Part 107.29 (formerly called “FAR Part 107”). The regulations specified that a specific individual within the airport organizational chart needed to be responsible for ensuring a consistent application of the aviation security regulations. Prior to 9/11, this was many times a collateral duty of an airport manager or one of his assistants. However, at large, commercial service airports, particularly after 9/11, the role of Airport Security Coordinator has had to expand. Today, Airport Security Coordinators (ASCs) are the primary point of contact for the TSA and must maintain a high level of awareness of aviation security policy and procedures, along with an awareness of the changing threats to aviation and developing technologies and procedures to defeat or mitigate the threats. To be a highly effective an ASC should become an expert in the knowledge and application of the regulations for airport security, and the best practices for general facility security. They should also be able to build bridges with other Federal, State and Local agencies, airport tenants, air carriers and surrounding law enforcement agencies. The ASC should be the go-to person who, if they do not have the right answers, knows where to find them. An airport director will look to the ASC to keep the airport in compliance with regulations and avoiding costly civil penalties for non-compliance. The director will also look to the ASC to provide guidance on the application of new security systems, measures, procedures and technologies, particularly when new threats or vulnerabilities are identified. The focus of the ACE-Security modules is the role and the responsibilities of the Airport Security Coordinator. Title 49 CFR Part 1542.3 describes the regulatory responsibilities of the ASC which include: §1542.3 (1) Serve as the airport operator’s primary and immediate contact for security-related activities and communications with TSA. §1542.3 (2) Is available to TSA on a 24-hour basis. §1542.3 (3) Review with sufficient frequency all security-related functions to ensure that all are effective and in compliance with this part, its security program, and applicable Security Directives. §1542.3 (4) Immediately initiate corrective action for any instance of non-compliance with this part, its security program, and applicable Security Directives. §1542.3 (5) Review and control the results of employment history, verification, and criminal history records checks required under §1542.209. §1542.3 (6) Serve as the contact to receive notification from individuals applying for unescorted access of their intent to seek correction of their criminal history record with the FBI. While the above list seems like a large enough job, the ASC functionally must perform many more tasks and possess a tremendous skill set in order to effectively perform their job. As an example, while TSA or the Aircraft Operator is largely responsible for the “front door,” of airport security (the screening checkpoint), the ASC is largely responsible for the “back door,” which includes the issuance of credentials for employees to access the Security Areas1 of the airport. While the control of the checkpoint is primarily the TSA, the ASC is often involved in management of the queue lines at the screening checkpoints, security of the sterile area exits, and access control of certain personnel going through the checkpoints, such as law enforcement officers or visitors having business in the sterile area but not going onto an aircraft. Further the ASC will often set forth (with TSA) the procedures for allowing non-passengers into the Sterile Area. The ASC must be an effective relationship manager in order to fulfill their role as the liaison to the airline station managers, the TSA’s Federal Security Director2 and the associated TSA personnel (Transportation Security Inspectors3, Transportation Security Officers4, Federal Air Marshals, and numerous others), while also getting along and working with State and Local law enforcement agencies. Within each of the above regulatory citations is a significant amount of actual work that an ASC must perform, and must perform under the possibility of civil penalties from the TSA, legal blowback from employees and passengers and pressure by their own agency’s directors and managers. 1 The four security areas are the Air Operations Area, the Sterile Area, the Secured Area and the Security Identification Display Area. 2 The FSD is the primary responsible party for the TSA related to transportation security matters. They possess a tremendous amount of authority; they can approve Airport Security Programs, airport and air carrier procedures derived from Security Directives and have a straight line of contact to TSA Headquarters. They also have the ability to close an airport or deny an aircraft permission to operate. 3 TSI’s are the compliance investigators for TSA. They can conduct tests of the airport security system, write Letters of Violation and audit airport security records. 4 TSO’s are screening officers or document check personnel. 10 of 56 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 1 Understanding that these roles may be one-in-the-same at some airports, here are the key relationships for an ASC: Primary Relationships5 (should have routine communications on a weekly or even daily basis when possible. Airport Director Airport Police Chief Airport Director of Operations Federal Security Director (TSA) (or Regional or Assistant Federal Security Director if applicable)6 Transportation Security Inspectors FBI Special Agent assigned to handle aviation matters locally Air Carrier Station Managers Security Officer Director Secondary Relationships (should have known points-of-contact and at least monthly communications during normal operations) Airport Director of Emergency Management Field Intelligence Officer (TSA) Joint Terrorism Task Force Fusion Center Trade association representatives Regional and State emergency management representatives ASC’s should add to this list relevant tenants or agencies unique to their own location. For example, if the airport is co-located with a military base, then the appropriate base point of contact should also be included. If there is a large tenant, such as a major FBO (or several) or a large corporate presence then those points of contact should also be included in the ASC relationship circle. Regulatory Translation This section explains the required practical actions of the ASC as they relate to the regulations. §1542.3 (1) Serve as the airport operator’s primary and immediate contact for security-related activities and communications with TSA. The ASC is the point-of-contact for the TSA when the TSA must communicate with the airport operator. The ASC is the airport’s representative and that individual must be designated in the Airport Security Program (ASP). The ASC must have access to the TSA secure WebBoard in order to receive Security Directives, Information Circulars, and communicate Criminal History Record Check and Security Threat Assessment information, along with other secure communications. The WebBoard also provides access to the ASP template and the review the Airport Security Program Guide and 49 CFR 1542 Implementation Guide, which replaced the previous “Complete Airport Security Program guide”,7 and the Supporting Airport Security Program guide8, which explain the regulatory intent and compliance requirements of the Airport Security regulations. §1542.3 (2) Is available to TSA on a 24-hour basis? The ASC must be available to the TSA on a 24-hour a day, 7-day a week basis, every day of the year. Since this is a logistical improbability with vacation schedules, needed time off and the fact that the ASC often has numerous other duties ASC’s often appoint assistant ASCs (sometimes call “Alternate ASC”) to perform certain duties, which usually includes being on call to the TSA.While an “assistant ASC” is not specified in the regulations, this is a position generally created as a matter of practicality with duties such as: Be on-call to TSA for periods of time (it is common for the ASC and their assistants to rotate who is on-call). Manage certain processes like the badging office, or the Authorized Signatory process. Manage the security officer workforce. Manage, supervise or maintain liaison with the airport law enforcement officer workforce (in some cases the airport police chief is the ASC and designates civilians to perform other roles, such as credentialing). 5 This list is by no means wholly representative nor is it meant to be in any particular order of priority. 6 In some cases an airport will only have an AFSD or lead TSI on site to oversee compliance with the Airport Security Program. 7 An SSI document 8 An SSI document ACE Security – Module 1 / 11 of 56  Security Each ASC and assistant ASC must complete the required training for an ASC under §1542.3(c) (d) An individual’s satisfactory completion of initial ASC training required under paragraph (c) of this section satisfies that requirement for all future ASC designations for that individual, except for site specific information, unless there has been a two or more year break in service as an active and designated ASC. The training syllabus must include Parts 1540, 1542, 1544, 1546, law enforcement responsibility, crisis management, TSA communication/coordination and the local airport security program. While many airports have their ASCs trained through a nationally sanctioned TSA training program (such as AAAE’s ASC course, or the ACE-Security review course), the ASC can also be trained by any other qualified ASC who follows the proscribed syllabus. This type of training however is typically a stop-gap for an airport operator that has an immediate need for a trained ASC9. The nationally sanctioned programs contain a tremendous amount of information and industry best practices and often provide a well-trained ASC. Also, upon completion of an ASC syllabus, each ASC must also complete site-specific training for their Airport Security Program. There is not a nationally approved syllabus for this type of training as it is site-specific. The TSA requires that the ASC or alternate ASC must provide, via the ASP, a 24/hour contact number. This number can either be the ASC or alternates direct cell phone, home number and work number, or can be a central contact number, such as an airport operations center whereby airport personnel can reach the on-duty ASC. As a practical matter, ASCs often have exchanged their personal cell phone numbers with the FSD and TSI’s responsible for regulatory activities. ASCs must also be trained in NIMS, the National Incident Management System, to at least the ICS 100, 200, 700 levels and if in an incident management capacity, ICS 300 and 400. §1542.3 (3) Review with sufficient frequency all security-related functions to ensure that all are effective and in compliance with this part, its security program, and applicable Security Directives. This section of the regulations puts a great deal of responsibility on the ASC which includes drafting the Airport Security Program and ensuring the airport operator, its tenants, air carriers, contractors, vendors and others working on the airport comply with the ASP. This also includes drafting memorandums to other airport personnel (police, badging office, airport operations), that define the actions to meet new regulatory requirements as set forth in TSA Security Directives. The regulation says to review all security-related functions - this means that any element within the ASP must be reviewed for regulatory compliance, including the protection of the security areas (including the Sterile Area), the access control and credentialing systems, the contingency and incident management plans and the law enforcement support requirements. Law enforcement actions at security screening checkpoints are being conducted. Personnel are displaying their airport Access/ID media within the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA). Personnel are challenging individuals not displaying proper airport Access/ID media. Access systems, measures and procedures pertaining to Secured Areas, Air Operations Areas (AOA) and SIDAs are working properly. Appropriate changes are made in security responsibilities for doors, gates, and other access points in accordance with airport and Aircraft Operator Exclusive Area Agreements. Airport Tenant Security Programs are carried out in accordance with the approved programs. §1542.3 (4) Immediately initiate corrective action for any instance of non-compliance with this part, its security program, and applicable Security Directives. Closely associated with §1542.3 (3), this regulatory citation directs the ASC to correct any instance or situation in which the airport is not in compliance with the ASP. The TSA refers to these instances as Changed conditions affecting security (§1542.107). Whenever there is a situation on the airport that is different than specified in the ASP, the ASC must notify the TSA. There are certain time and method requirements for these notifications that are addressed elsewhere in the modules. An extension of this regulation is the Amendment process. Once approved, the ASP will undergo periodic amendments, particularly as airport construction change airport activities, boundaries and processes. The timelines and requirements of the amendment process are covered in another portion of these modules. 9 Typically, an airport operator will elect to provide some “quick,” training for another person at the airport until a nationally sanctioned program becomes available at which point they will often send the individual to that program. This has the benefit of immediately being in compliance with the TSA regulations that an airport operator has a qualified ASC, but also provides the additional information, insights and industry best-practices to the ASC later on. 12 of 56 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 1 §1542.3 (5) Review and control the results of employment history, verification, and criminal history records checks required under §1542.209. This portion of the regulation places the credentialing process squarely upon the ASC. The ASC is required to establish procedures for the collection of data and fingerprints and the processing of such information through the appropriate agencies. The phrase control the results of … implies that the ASC is the entity that grants the authority for an employee at the airport to receive an Airport Identification Badge, otherwise referred to as Access/ID. §1542.3 (6) Serve as the contact to receive notification from individuals applying for unescorted access of their intent to seek correction of their criminal history record with the FBI. Closely associated to §1542.3 (5) this citation places the responsibility of working with individuals that have applied for an airport Access/ID upon the ASC. On occasion a Criminal History Record Check will show that an individual was arrested but that there was not a disposition (i.e. it says the person was arrested but doesn’t explain what for or what the outcome is). It is the responsibility of the Access/ID applicant to provide the evidence that shows that the arrest did not result in a conviction of one of the 28 disqualifying offenses, or no finding of not-guilty by reason of insanity. While the ASC may not have to do the actual research to determine whether an individual’s criminal history is accurate, the ASC is the point-of-contact for the airport operator to review the evidence from the applicant, in order to determine whether the individual has not been found guilty (or not-guilty by reason of insanity) of one of the 28 disqualifying offenses. Additional Duties of the ASC Not specified in the regulations are two other key responsibilities of an ASC. These responsibilities were articulated in a 1997 FAA security amendment but are still in effect to this day. These requirements are: Maintain liaison with the air carrier station managers, sharing information of concern to the station manager or, if the station manager is not available, the Ground Security Coordinator10. M aintain liaison with foreign air carrier station managers or their designated representative. By extension, an ASC must also manage the access control system, which often includes the closed-circuit TV systems that monitor the airport’s access points, public, non-public and security areas. An extension of the access control system is an understanding of cybersecurity requirements to protect the information technology systems used to manage access and the badging process. Not On My Watch Some ASC’s are content to perform to the regulatory minimum. Others however see it as their personal mission to ensure they are taking all possible steps to ensure that a terrorist attack does not begin or come through their airport. While no one can control everything, there is a military and law enforcement-born concept that is highly effective – it is the concept of not on my watch. The theory is that while much is beyond ones control, there is still much that is within ones control and that one should focus on those elements to the extent possible. It was this practice that US Customs Agent Diana Dean used effectively that prevented the bombing of the LAX terminal building in 199911. For ASCs that desire to do more than the regulatory minimum, there are several effective and cost-efficient strategies that can be implemented including: Reach out to operators of nearby transportation and infrastructure facilities such as the FAA control tower or radar facilities, maritime, trucking or rail facilities12, power plant operators, etc. Ensure everyone is familiar with each other’s contingency and incident management plans and understands the interrelationships of each facility. Reach out to Federal, State and Local emergency response personnel, regional emergency command centers, etc., to understand the role of the airport in certain emergencies such as terrorist threats or attacks to the city or community, natural disasters and aircraft related emergencies13 – such as an aircraft going down in a nearby community. 10 A GSC is usually a gate or cargo agent who works for the air carrier – the GSC is responsible for the security elements of a particular flight. 11 Referencing the Millennium bomb plot, highlighted elsewhere in the modules. 12 In September 2014 a radar facility in Chicago was set afire by a contractor employee – the resulting disruption to air traffic control lasted for several days. FAA is responsible for security of their own facilities, but there may be some crossover as control towers are frequently located within an airport Secured Area or Air Operations Area. 13 Airports are often included as resource centers in community disaster plans. ACE Security – Module 1 / 13 of 56  Security ASC’s should also connect with the industry to stay abreast of current events and issues. ASC’s can connect with the industry through the trade associations and their committees such as the AAAE Transportation Security Policy Committee. The TSPC provides a summary of the monthly call with TSA (which airport operators are also encouraged to participate in), and helps ASCs with regulatory issues. Getting involved in other organizations like the National Safe Skies Alliance, or the Smart Card Alliance can also provide ASCs insights into developing technologies. In order to stay informed on industry developments ASCs should attend industry seminars on aviation security and subscribe to relevant publications and digital feeds such as: AAAE’s SmartBrief AAAE’s Transportation Security Policy notifications Aviation Security International magazine14 AAAE’s Annual Security Summit ACI’s Public Safety and Security Summit Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network (ALEAN) annual meeting The ASC should have excellent communication skills, as he or she will be working to implement procedures and enforce policies that are often unpopular with airport tenants. Additionally, at Category X and Category I airports (defined in Module 2), the ASC should have few other duties that are not related to aviation security, as the aviation security functions themselves are very time consuming. The ASC also must be a person of trust, as he or she will be responsible for Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and controls the results of Criminal History Record Checks (CHRCs) on badging applicants. Some airport directors believe that the ASC should be a law enforcement officer. In these cases, airport management must weigh the cost/benefit of taking a law enforcement officer off patrol duties and assigning them to essentially an administrative function. When this occurs it is typical for the ASC/Police Chief to assign civilians to manage the credentialing process, the access control system and other non-law enforcement related functions. Another possibility is to designate a civilian as the primary ASC and a law enforcement officer as an associate ASC. This structure still brings in the law enforcement element, which can improve relations with other law enforcement agencies, but also allows the administrative functions to be handled by an administrator. The TSA does not specify who must be the ASC and typically does not concern itself with whether the ASC is a law enforcement officer or a civilian. There is not a regulatory requirement that the ASC be a specific job title, only that an airport designate certain personnel as an ASC. In some cases, ASC’s are also given additional duties in the areas of airport safety, or at smaller airports the Airport Director may also act as the ASC. Threats to Aviation The primary threats against aviation have mostly been aircraft bombings and aircraft hijackings. There have been incidents of airline offices being bombed (or bomb threats made), active shooter incidents at airports, surface-to-air missiles fired at aircraft, and some odd attacks such as mortar attacks or sniper attacks on an airport. Attackers have included terrorist organizations, nation-states, disgruntled employees, family members of victims, drug lords and disenchanted lone-wolf’s who decided to commit an act of violence and further decided to do that at an airport or on an airplane to satisfy whatever internal demon or perceived slight they may have been struggling against. Added to the threats to aircraft and airports, Airport Security Coordinators must also be aware of criminal activity taking place at an airport, such as drug smuggling, theft, assault, human trafficking, and the day-to-day crimes experienced on the streets. Bombings Bombings and bomb threats have been used in aviation throughout its history, but for different purposes. Early bombings in the 50s and 60s were often to collect on insurance money. Jack Graham was convicted in 1955 of loading dynamite into his mother’s suitcase without her knowledge. She boarded a flight out of Denver, Colorado with the suitcase, which detonated north of Denver killing all 44 on board. Graham had taken out a life insurance policy on his mother that same day. He was caught within hours, convicted and died in the Colorado Gas Chamber a year later. 14 A U.K. based publication that features an extensive amount of information and articles on aviation security topics, and the Air Watch list, which lists aviation security incidents throughout the world. 14 of 56 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 1 Julian Frank was the first suspected aviation suicide bomber. He may have placed dynamite into his own carry-on suitcase in 1960 on National Airlines 251115 flight, which went down on January 6th. The Civil Aeronautics Board determined that the flight was bombed and Frank was suspected of running a charity scam worth millions of dollars. His injuries were consistent with having been very close to an explosion. The explosion sparked demands for baggage to be inspected but that process was still at least a decade away. In the late 60s however, the purpose of airline bombings changed. As terrorist groups started using aviation to forward their agendas, bombings were found to be a method of retaliation against a country, and a way to get the media to pay attention to their cause or issue. Airline bombings experienced a defining moment in 1972. Moments after the takeoff of an airliner from JFK airport bound for Los Angeles the airline received a bomb threat for that particular flight. The flight returned to JFK and a bomb-sniffing dog discovered the device 12 minutes before it was set to detonate. The FAA Explosive Canine Detection Team was subsequently created so that any aircraft receiving a bomb threat can be quickly and effectively searched. To this day, the Canine Detection program is still in effect and is managed by the TSA. On May 19, 1972 the FAA issued Federal Aviation Regulation Part 107 Airport Security which required airports to develop an Airport Security Program. FAR 108 Airplane Operator Security was created on January 15, 1981 and contained proscribed security measures for commercial aircraft operators. Shortly after the implementation of carry-on bag screening in 197416 with the passage of the Anti-Hijacking Air Transportation Security Act, it became much more difficult to smuggle a bomb on board an airplane. However, checked bags were still unscreened and by the 1980s terrorists and criminals switched tactics. The 1974 Act also brought the United States up to ICAO17 standards. While there have been over 100 bombings of aircraft in aviation’s history, the two most significant bombings were Air India Flight 182 and Pan Am Flight 103. On June 22, 1985 Air India Flight 182 exploded off the coast of Ireland, killing all 359 people on board. About the same moment in time a bomb detonated at the Narita International Airport in Japan killing two baggage handlers who were transferring bags to another Air India flight. Both flights had originally departed from Vancouver, Canada and authorities believed that the same individual placed bombs on both aircraft. That individual did not board either flight and was eventually caught. The tragedy prompted Canada to implement checked bag screening and ICAO to recommend the practice of matching passengers with their bags on the same flight, known as Positive Passenger Bag Match. However, no other country would begin screening checked bags leaving the door wide open for another attack. On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 en route from London’s Heathrow Airport headed for JFK airport, exploded over the town of Lockerbie, Scotland killing 259 people in the air and 11 on the ground. The air carrier was required to conduct the positive passenger bag match for international flights (as a result of the Air India bombings in 1985), but the investigation discovered that Pan Am did not do the procedure. Further, the bomb used was Semtex, a military grade explosive that was undetectable by x-ray machines in use at the time. Regardless, the bomb was concealed in a large radio/tape player (known as a “boom box,” at the time) and was introduced to the aircraft via checked baggage so it would not have gone through the passenger checkpoint anyway. The United Kingdom implemented checked bag screening shortly after the disaster. Although this was the deadliest aviation attack on the United States subsequent legislation nor rulemaking would require the U.S. to screen checked bags. The attack did prompt the creation of the Associate Administrator for Aviation Security, within the FAA18. It was discovered that Libyan intelligence operatives working as airline personnel in Malta were responsible for the bombing. Further, a powerful victims advocacy group, the Families of the Victims of Pan Am 103 was formed – its influence on aviation security policy-making remains to this day and its representatives even provided input on the 9/11 Commission Report. 15 This incident served as the premise for the 1970 “disaster” movie “Airport,” later parodied several times in the “Airplane” movies. This is not a testable question, just a fun fact. 16 Some airlines had actually initiated this process themselves in 1970 but the requirement for all domestic air carriers was put into effect in 1973 with the passage of the Act. 17 ICAO stands for the International Civil Aviation Organization. It is part of the United Nations and establishes the global policies and practices for aviation security. Prior to 9/11 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was the responsible agency for aviation security. TSA was created as part of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 and took over 18  aviation security responsibilities from the FAA. ACE Security – Module 1 / 15 of 56  Security Bombings are still a primary concern of aviation security professionals. After 9/11 there have been numerous attempts to bomb civilian airliners, most notably: On December 22, 2001, Richard Reid attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight en-route from Paris to the U.S. by concealing a bomb in his shoe. The attempt was unsuccessful - passengers and flight crew subdued him. In 2004, Chechen suicide bombers who bribed airline ticket agents to board a flight and smuggled explosive devices in their braziers brought down two Russian aircraft. This prompted the U.S. to deploy Portal Trace Detectors19, conduct more aggressive pat-down procedures and accelerated the development of the whole-body imaging technology. In 2006, U.K. intelligence agencies discovered an attempt to blow multiple United States registered aircraft departing from the United Kingdom en-route to the United States using liquid based explosives. However, this was not the first time an attempt was made to bring down multiple aircraft in a bombing incident nor was it the first time that liquid based bombs were used. In 1994, Ramzi Yousef, as part of the Bojinka Plot, planned to bring down 12 airliners on Pacific-Asian routes by putting liquid based bombs underneath passenger seats20. In 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253 en route from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan by concealing a bomb in his underwear. The attempt was unsuccessful - passengers and flight crew subdued him. In 2010, two ink printer cartridges each containing a plastic explosive were introduced to cargo aircraft departing from Yemen. The bombs were discovered through Saudi intelligence assets who notified the U.S. In 2014, U.S. officials warned that an offshoot of Al Qaeda, known as Khorasan Group were planning to put bombs in electronic devices and place them on U.S. aircraft. It is expected that terrorists, criminals, profiteers and mentally disturbed individuals will continue to try to blow up airplanes and this remains a primary threat to aviation security. Hijackings The first recorded aircraft hijacking was on February 21, 1931, in Arequipa, Peru. Armed revolutionaries approached Byron Rickards who flew a Pan American Ford Tri-Motor mail plane. They demanded to use the plane to drop propaganda leaflets over Lima, Peru. Rickards refused but after a ten-day stand-off where he was held prisoner, he was released after agreeing to fly one of the hijackers to Lima. Rickards would later be the victim of another hijacking, this time out of El Paso, Texas as the captain of a Boeing 707. The first fatal hijacking took place on board a Romanian Airlines flight when terrorists killed three crewmembers on July 25, 1947. Early hijackings were motivated by the intent to leverage money by using the passengers as hostages, then hijacking the aircraft to escape to a foreign country. Several hijackings in the 1960s were for these purposes with hijackers demanding to be taken to Cuba or Mexico, but by the late 1960s the motive began to change. With the rise of certain terrorist groups most notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), hijackings were more about getting global recognition for a cause, leveraging a country to release political prisoners or leveraging a country to take some other action (pull troops out of an occupied area, etc). Out of over 700 hijackings in history, one of the fewest reasons for hijacking a plane was to crash it into a ground target, as conducted on 9/11, but there were several incidents. In 1970, Eastern Airlines passenger John Devivo stormed an aircraft cockpit with a gun, ordering the pilot and first officer to fly around until the plane ran out of fuel and crashed. Shots were fired, wounding the copilot, and Devivo was shot twice as bullets flew out the cockpit door into the passenger cabin. Devivo was subdued, and the plane landed safely. In 1972, three accused rapists took over a commercial flight and threatened to crash the plane into a U.S. nuclear power plant. In 1974, Samuel Byck, armed with a handgun and a gasoline bomb, shot his way onto a Delta Airlines jet at the Baltimore Airport intending to crash the plane into the White House. A police officer and the aircraft’s First Officer were both killed. The aircraft never left the gate and Byck was shot by a police officer. Also in 1974, Army Private Robert Preston flew a stolen helicopter to the White House, hovering for several minutes before landing on the South Lawn. The use of Portal Trace Detectors (PTD), otherwise known as the ‘puffers’ was short lived as the machines had high failure rates and were eventually replaced with the Automated Imaging Technology 19  (AIT), otherwise known as the whole body-scanners. The unsuccessful plot also included a plan to load a Cessna 172 light General Aviation aircraft with explosives and crash it into CIA headquarters, and plans to assassinate Pope John Paul and President 20 William Clinton. Yousef’s plot was exposed when an assistant set their bomb-making lab on fire in the Philippines. Yousef fled to Pakistan and was eventually caught, brought to the U.S. and convicted of bombing the World Trade Center in 1993. 16 of 56 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 1 Frank Corder crashed a Cessna 15021 into the White House clipping the edge of the building. In 1994, the Armed Islamic Group took over an Air France jetliner and planned to crash it into the Eiffel Tower in Paris. French commandoes stormed the plane and killed the hijackers while the plane was on the ground refueling. In 1999, the diary of Columbine killer Eric Harris contained a plot to hijack an aircraft and crash it into New York City. Even in fiction, using an aircraft as a Weapon of Mass Destruction had been imagined. In the 1994 Tom Clancy novel, Debt of Honor, an airline captain is himself the hijacker; he intentionally crashes his Boeing 747 into the U.S. Capitol. While there have been a few incidents prior to 9/11 in which hijackers attempted to crash an aircraft into the ground, in virtually all instances, few believed that the hijackers themselves would pilot the aircraft. In all of the previous actual incidents, the hijackers attempted to force the pilots to fly into the ground – which is an unlikely expectation. There are only three exceptions – two incidents in which the aircraft captain crashed his own plane, and in the fictional Clancy novel above, the captain was also the “hijacker.” The legend of the hijacker known as DB Cooper offers some lessons about crime and terrorism in aviation. With most hijacks in the U.S. in the 19780s ending on airport taxiways with the death or arrest of the hijackers, one intrepid hijacker devised a new plan. Whether it was his real name or not, Dan Cooper, alias D.B. Cooper, hijacked an aircraft and forced it to land in Seattle, Washington, where he demanded $200,000 in cash and several parachutes. He released the passengers and flight attendants, and then ordered the pilots to fly to Reno, Nevada, and to stay below 10,000 feet. At one point during the flight, he ordered the pilots to deploy the rear air stairs. When the plane touched down in Reno, Cooper was not on it. The incident remains a mystery to this day, although some of the money (marked by the FBI) was discovered years later in a riverbed in Washington State. After Cooper’s “escape,” approximately 20 more hijackers attempted the same feat. Boeing aircraft manufacturers eventually invented the “Cooper Vane,” which would prevent the rear air stairs from being deployed while in flight. Regardless of the methods that have been put into place to prevent, deter or mitigate hijackings and bombings, criminals and terrorists have always come up with other methods to circumvent these preventative measures. This face demonstrates that aviation security is a game of constant and never ending improvement – on both sides. Terminal Bombings In 1974, a bomb detonated in the Los Angeles International Airport terminal building killing two skycaps and several others and in 1975 another bomb exploded at the LaGuardia Airport in New York, killing11 and injuring 75. Both bombs were concealed in public lockers leading to their use being restricted to only the sterile area. In 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested at the Port Angeles, WA dock when he attempted to smuggle a car filled with explosives through the Customs checkpoint. U.S. Customs22 agent Diana Dean noticed that Resseam was acting hinky. Inspectors found several green bags filled with explosives which he intended to use to attack the International Terminal at LAX. Years later, in 2011, the Moscow Domodedovo International Airport was attacked with by suicide bombers in the main terminal building. Bombs inside the terminal building are certainly a threat and should be mitigated by employee awareness, training of cleaning personnel to spot suspicious items and individuals and reducing areas where bombs can be placed unnoticed. Also, reducing line waits in the ticketing and screening areas will help mitigate a bomb blast. Airport designers should attempt to design terminal areas in a way that reducing the clustering of individuals in one place, without bollards, planters or other methods to mitigate a blast. Although the 300-foot rule was instituted in the 1990s in response to the Oklahoma City and WTC bombings, Ressam’s attempt demonstrates that the use of a VBIED against an airport has been considered and attempted. To this day, the entry lanes to LAX are guarded with armed LAX police officers that conduct targeted and random searches of vehicles. This practice is common at Ben Gurion Airport in Israel; however, the practice has not been adopted at most other U.S. airports, nor is it required by regulation during normal security conditions23. In 2007, two men attempted to drive a mid-sized sport utility vehicle filled with explosives and propane tanks into the terminal building in Glasgow, Scotland. Bollards placed outside the terminal building prevented a more significant damage from taking place. 21 A Cessna 150 is a very light single-engine airplane with two seats and is most often used in flight training. 22 US Customs would not become “Customs and Border Protection” until after 9/11. 23 This is a common measure when the National Terrorism Advisory System increases the threat level ACE Security – Module 1 / 17 of 56  Security Should an individual successfully detonate a bomb next to the terminal of a major airport it would likely kill hundreds and shut down the airport for weeks or months, causing tremendous economic damage. The resulting regulations and changes that would occur as a result of such a successful attack would cost more money and make it harder for individuals to use commercial aviation. ASCs should seek to reduce the likelihood of such an attack by training patrol personnel in inspecting vehicles for explosives, frequent patrol of the landside areas, vulnerability assessments on the airport, and random vehicle searches. Active Shooter The November 1, 2013 active shooter incident of the Los Angeles International Airport shined light on a rarely used but devastating threat to aviation security. In that attack, TSA officer Gerardo Hernandez was shot and killed in the line of duty and three others were injured by the shooter. The attack created a disruption of more than six hours to flight operations and forced the industry to focus on the active shooter threat. One of the first active shooter incidents occurred at the Lod Airport in Israel (now known as Ben Gurion International Airport) when members of the Japanese Red Army disembarked from an inbound flight and walked to the baggage claim area to retrieve their bags which contained automatic weapons. They opened fire in the baggage claim area killing 26 and injuring 80. Airport security at the time focused on Palestinian’s attacking the use of Japanese attackers took airport police by surprise. In December 1985, armed gunmen attacked the public terminal areas of the airports in Rome and Vienna with guns and grenades. The attacks targeted passengers at the El Al ticket counters killing 18 and injuring more than 120. Also, the November 1st 2013 active shooter was not the first at LAX. On July 4, 2002 an armed gunman opened fire at the El Al ticket counter in the Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT) killing two and wounding four others before the he was shot by an Israeli security agent. Organized groups, lone wolves and those with mental impairment have committed airport assaults but the rise of active shooters at airports has not mirrored the rise of active shooters in other environments such as schools, businesses and military bases. In some respects airports are in a better position to respond to an active shooter due to the regulated presence of police personnel on site. Surface to Air Missile Attack The use of surface-to-air or air-to-air missiles against civilian aircraft has occurred over 80 times. Most of these occurred during a time of war over a country experiencing armed conflict. In many cases, the aircraft was hit while still on the ground or shot down by military aircraft. From the perspective of aviation security when surface-to-air missiles are discussed the topic is typically narrowly focused on the use of shoulder launched heat-seeking missiles known as MANPADS (manned portable air defense systems). While a Malaysia flight was apparently brought down by a vehicle-based radar or infrared homing missile over the Ukraine in 2014, this type of threat is typically beyond the purview of the Airport Security Coordinator. Some of the more notable surface-to-air missile attacks have been the firing of two SA-7 missiles at an Israeli flagged Arkia regional aircraft over Mombasa, Kenya in 2002 and the November 2003 surface-to-air missile attack on a DHL flight as it departed Baghdad, Iraq. While the Israelis did respond by equipping its airline fleet with antimissile flare defense systems, the United States and the rest of the world has not yet done so. Again, fiction may provide us a lesson before the tragedy. In another of his books, the late techno-thriller author Tom Clancy in his novel Against All Enemies wrote of a attack on U.S. airliners by surface-to-air missiles, smuggled into the country using drug smuggler routes. The topic was again fictionalized in another novel, Tier One Wild, by author Dalton Fury. From the perspective of the ASC, surface-to-air missiles present a unique threat in that they do not need to be fired from airport property in order to be effective. Surface-to-air missiles are more of a regional threat as they can be fired from virtually anywhere in a community. However, to be effective, a surface-to-air missile should be fired within certain parameters that give it a greater chance of detonating on target, rather than chasing the sun, or the heat from a glimpse of sunlight on an office building or another nearby heat source. TSA has conducted MANPAD assessments to determine the best locations from which to fire a surface-to-air missile around each commercial service airport. ASC’s should include these areas in their off-site security and law enforcement patrols and may even consider using CCTV cameras or periodic drone flights to inspect these locations. ASCs should also work with local law 18 of 56 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 1 enforcement personnel that surround the airport on MANPAD mitigation efforts. The use of a large-scale surface to air missile, like the type that may have brought down Malaysia Flight 17 is typically outside the purview of the Airport Security Coordinator. Airport Crime The most common airport crime is theft – theft from cars in the parking areas, theft from checked baggage by employees and screening personnel, and theft from passengers who leave their bags or personal belongings in an area accessible to thieves. Much of the theft at an airport takes place in the restrooms (as does other criminal activity, such as prostitution). Parking lot theft is common, particularly at airports with large parking lots and lots that are not connected to the airport. Airport parking garages also provide an opportunity for theft and crimes against persons such as physical and sexual assault, armed robbery, and vandalism. Other “snatch-and-grab” types of crime occur in the restrooms, as women often remove their rings to apply hand lotion, and at restaurants when patrons leave their wallets open and visible when paying for meals. Many airport bag thieves work in groups of two or three and conduct distraction type theft on passengers. Prior to 9/11, distraction theft was common at screening checkpoints, when one criminal would cause a disruption at the checkpoint while his or her confederates would steal items from the X-ray baggage belt. Since a valid boarding pass is now required, this type of theft has dropped, but it has not gone away. Not all members of the traveling public are honest, law-abiding citizens, and sometimes the quick availability of a laptop, a wallet, or jewelry is simply too tempting to some travelers. Los Angeles International Airport still experiences enough of this kind of distraction theft that they have a special unit assigned to the problem. Additionally, the cost of a cheap airline ticket, $200 or so, to get access to the screening checkpoint is often worth the cost of doing business for the opportunity to steal a laptop that may be worth $1,000. An airport crime that is often very difficult to detect is theft from checked baggage and cargo. Airline employees and screening personnel often have complete access to the contents of most passenger baggage and usually without anyone else watching. There have been numerous arrests over the years of airline employees stealing from passenger baggage. Since the inception of TSA, there have also been numerous incidents of a limited number of TSA personnel stealing from passengers. Bag locks are often not an effective deterrent, as all locks must now be accessible by TSA keys in order to conduct the bag search. In some cases, TSA can track whether TSA personnel, who can reduce the loss rate, have accessed a particular bag. TSA personnel must also work in pairs to search baggage, adding another layer of protection against theft. Several airports have been victims of bag theft or parking lot theft rings. Bag theft rings often occur when “ringmembers” travel to various airports and get jobs working for the airlines. They spend several weeks or months stealing from passengers’ bags, then move on before law enforcement catches up with them. In some cases, organized crime operations utilize aviation. In 1978, the “Lufthansa heist,” which was a robbery at John F. Kennedy International Airport, where an estimated $5 million cash (nearly $20 million in 2014 dollars) and $875,000 in jewelry were stolen from a storage facility at the airport. The heist was a key element in the 1990 film Goodfellas. Another type of crime at airports is insurance fraud, which usually occurs in airline maintenance and work areas. A set of tools to work on an airliner can cost between $10,000 and $20,000 for a complete set. These are often purchased by the airline mechanics themselves. Not only are these items occasionally stolen by co-workers, but are also “stolen” by the owners themselves, who then file an insurance claim. Drug smuggling is unfortunately common in aviation, as is human trafficking, which is a particularly monstrous crime. In 2014, four baggage handlers at the San Diego International Airport were accused of smuggling cocaine and methamphetamine into airplanes by exploiting their ability to get through security screenings unchecked. In May of 2014, five employees of Delta and JetBlue were accused of smuggling $417,000 in drug money through Boston Logan Airport and in June 2014 authorities charged that two rings of nearly 50 corrupt employees at Puerto Rico’s main airport smuggled thousands of kilograms of cocaine onto commercial flights bound for mainland U.S. cities, including Miami, Orlando and New York. Airport personnel are in a unique position to spot human trafficking, particularly at the ticket counter areas and on aircraft. In the United Kingdom, Operation Pentameter was launched to try to slow down and ultimately of course, to stop human trafficking. To date, the program has resulted in 188 women being rescued, including 12 minors between the ages of 14 and 17 and over 232 arrests. The kids traveling by themselves were between 11 and 15 years old. Airlines are now charging fees for the service, leaving children who need to travel unassisted through airports, if they’re parents can’t afford the fees. ACE Security – Module 1 / 19 of 56  Security Training sessions are available through a variety of resources to help airport and airline personnel identify the signs of human trafficking. Other Threats A variety of other threats exist to the airport environment and to aircraft. These include high energy lasers fired at aircraft, rocket- propelled grenades or long arm weapons fired at aircraft, chemical, biological, nuclear, radioactive elements used in an attack on an airport or aircraft and cyber attacks on the air traffic control, airport access control, power grid or other essential systems. Although not a security concern just yet, the civilian use of drones around an airport can cause a risk to flight safety, and potentially security. Presently, drones and radio-controlled aircraft are not allowed to operate within five miles. ASCs must include incident management plans for bomb threats at the airport and on aircraft and address how to handle potential improvised explosive devices; hijackings; active shooters and other threats to aviation security as identified through (ideally) a security risk assessment24. A System of Systems Aviation security is often referred to as a system of systems. Within each of these systems are policies and procedures, people and technology that ideally function together to protect one or more elements of the aviation transportation supply chain. Responsibilities for aviation security throughout the system are spread between the federal government (TSA, DHS, CBP), state and local governments (airport operators, police), and private enterprise (air carriers, tenants, vendors, contractors). The system of systems also means that a change to one component of the system can impact other areas of the system. For example, when the liquid bomb threat was discovered in 2006, authorities in the United Kingdom initially prohibited nearly all types of carry-on items including cameras, laptops, and cell phones. This forced passengers to place these expensive items in checked baggage, which resulted in a high level of theft carried out by baggage handlers. Further, the threat brought to a standstill passenger movement at the Heathrow airport for several days causing thousands of people to pack the terminal building. This created an unwanted situation if a vehicle bomb were to be detonated at the terminal building or if active shooters started opening fire on the crowd. This system is designed so that the failure of any one layer does not result in a successful attack on the entire system. Just as there are overlapping layers of protection within the industry there are often overlapping responsibilities. This section addresses the various layers of protection in the aviation security system and the key elements within each of those layers. It is not intended to be a complete explanation of all of the layers or elements, nor are these layers required to be grouped in the manner explained below, but it does allow for a common context to be established to better understand the roles and responsibilities. Additionally, this section addresses the principal personnel involved in the aviation security industry. Screening The screening of passengers, carry-on bags and checked bags is primarily the responsibility of the Aircraft Operator, but is a shared responsibility with the TSA, within the United States and its territories.  nder Title 49 CFR Part 1544 (Aircraft Operator Security: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators), each aircraft operator must use U the measures in its security program to prevent or deter the carriage of any weapon, explosive, or incendiary on or about each individual’s person or accessible property before boarding an aircraft or entering a sterile area (§1544.201 (a)) and each aircraft operator must ensure that each individual entering a sterile area at each preboard screening checkpoint for which it is responsible, and all accessible property under that individual’s control, are inspected for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries... §1544.201 (b)). Outside of the U.S. and its territories, the aircraft operator must either conduct the screening function or ensure that an approved entity conducts the screening, such as a foreign government, air carrier or contractor. In some cases in the U.S., the TSA has engaged a private contractor through the Screening Partnership Program (sometimes known as opt-out), to conduct the screening. 24 A Security Risk Assessment is conducted as part of a Security Management System (SeMS), which is similar to the Safety Management Systems but with a security focus. 20 of 56 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 1 Passenger and carry-on bag screening is intended to reduce the likelihood of the aircraft being hijacked or bombed. Checked bag screening is intended to reduce the likelihood of the aircraft being bombed. Air Cargo Screening The screening of air cargo is primarily the responsibility of the aircraft operator25. Under Title 49 CFR Part 1544 (Aircraft Operator Security: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators), each aircraft operator operating  under a full program or a full all-cargo program, or a twelve-five program in an all-cargo operation, must ensure that cargo is screened and inspected for any unauthorized person, and any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, and other destructive substance or item as provided in the aircraft operator’s security program and §1544.207, and as provided in §1544.239 for operations under a full program, before loading it on its aircraft. TSA supplements air cargo inspections through the use of their canine detection teams and many Indirect Air Carriers have taken on the responsibility of inspecting air cargo through the Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program, but the primary responsibility for ensuring a prohibited item is not placed in air cargo is the Aircraft Operator. Air cargo screening is intended to reduce the likelihood of the aircraft being bombed. Employee Security Employee security relates to the individual that work at the airport, air carriers, vendors, tenants, contractors, and government agencies including the airport operator itself. A variety of regulations and processes encompass the entirety of the employee security system including access control, credentialing (the airport badging process), and the screening checkpoints where appropriate. T he airport operator under Title 49 CFR Part 1542 is most directly responsible for the majority of the employee security functions including in §1542.207 (Access control systems), in §1542.209 (fingerprint-based criminal history records checks), §1542.211 (Identification systems) and §1542.213 (training). The Aircraft Operator can also assume credentialing function roles through similar regulations under 1544. Employee security processes are intended to reduce the likelihood of many different threats to aviation including aircraft and airport bombings, hijacking, active shooter, and many types of crime. Airport or aircraft operator issued badges (otherwise known as Access/Identification or Access/ID), often allow employees to bypass many of the layers of security that are designed to prevent passengers and others from committing acts of air terror. Airport Perimeter Security Perimeter security is primarily the responsibility of the airport operator, including local law enforcement. The airport perimeter includes the actual land boundary of the airport (i.e. the property line), but also the access vehicle gates and personnel doors that lead out to the Air Operations Area or other security areas. T he airport operator under Title 49 CFR Part 1542 is most directly responsible for the majority of the access control functions including in §1542.207 (Access control systems), §1542.201 (Security of the Secured Area) and §1542.203 (Security of the Air Operations Area). Perimeter security is designed to reduce the likelihood of an unauthorized individual from accessing the AOA or Secured Area. Unauthorized personnel within this area could better facilitate a bombing or hijacking of an aircraft by bypassing the screening process. This also represents a significant airport safety issue as individuals driving on the airfield could hit an aircraft, intentionally or unintentionally. Airport Terminal Security The security of the airport terminal is primarily the responsibly of the airport operator. While not specified by a regulatory citation, the regulations do require that armed, law enforcement personnel respond to incidents within the Airport Security Program (ASP) including bomb threats, hijackings and other acts of unlawful interference with aviation. In 1979, the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski attempted to bomb an American Airlines jet by placing a bomb in air cargo. The attempt was unsuccessful – the aircraft caught fire but landed safely. 25 ACE Security – Module 1 / 21 of 56  Security Terminal security also includes law enforcement patrols to reduce or mitigate the impact of an active shooter, the inclusion of blast mitigation techniques into the airport structure and design (also known as site hardening), and the surveillance of activities in the terminal and the landside26 areas of the airport. While the airport operator may be the primary responsible party for protecting the terminal in many cases the airport might not have one of law enforcement personnel to mitigate every situation. Therefore ASC’s should include in their incident management plans potential response by local law enforcement, FBI and in extreme circumstances, military personnel. In-Flight Security In-Flight Security is most often the responsibility of the aircraft operator. In-flight security measures include reinforced and locked cockpit doors, closed-circuit TV monitoring of the cabin, procedures such as the use of secondary flight deck protection barriers to prevent access to the cockpit when the cockpit door is open and self-defense training for pilots and flight attendants. In-flight security measures also include the Federal Flight Deck Officer27 program and the Federal Air Marshal program. While not presently in use on U.S. aircraft in-flight, security measures also include anti-MANPAD flare or laser-based missile deflecting systems. Lesser known in-flight security includes certain actions and communications air carrier pilots and flight attendants can take when there is an act of unlawful interference on the plane. These procedures are Sensitive Security Information in nature and are not expanded upon here. General Aviation Security General Aviation airports are not specifically regulated from a security perspective the way that commercial service airports are. With over 5,000 GA airports in the U.S. only three require any security procedures and these three are located within the Flight Restriction Zone around Washington DC. Otherwise, GA airports are not required to adhere to any security regulations. GA security relates to aircraft that are not in commercial or military use. It is a large industry with general aviation aircraft operations comprising nearly 80% of all flying in the United States. GA includes numerous types of flying from flight training, to private business aircraft operations, agricultural, pleasure flying, and while still considered a commercial operation, air charters are also typically considered a GA operation. Intelligence and Interdiction This area of aviation security is well beyond the purview of most ASCs but there are some relevant elements. ASCs should be connected to the counter-terrorism community through the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the local fusion centers and the FBI Special Agent in charge of aviation issues. Further, there may be some instances where an individual who is of interest to the law enforcement or intelligence communities applies for a job at an airport. This was the case when Najibullah Zazi, a Denver-area airport shuttle driver pleaded guilty in a plot to bomb New York subways. Zazi held an airport ID badge and was being monitored by the FBI. The intelligence community is a group of 17 separate U.S. government agencies that conduct the intelligence activities considered necessary to protect the U.S. from enemies, foreign and domestic. It includes: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) United States Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI) United States Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Coast Guard Intelligence (CGI) United States Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) United States Department of the Treasury Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) United States Department of Defense Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 26 Landside is typically considered to be the passenger pickup and drop-off vehicle lanes, the parking garages and the vehicle circulation routes around the airport. 27 This is a program whereby certain Title 14 CFR Part 121 air carrier pilots may carry firearms while in the cockpit and use them in defense of the flight deck. 22 of 56 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 2 National Security Agency (NSA) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA), National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Branch (FBI/NSB) Drug Enforcement Administration Some ASCs have elected to be more integrated into the National Intelligence Community by becoming Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs). TLOs identify potential terror-related situations and behavior evaluating and collecting data and sharing it with the proper officials. These TLOs enhance levels of terrorism awareness within their own agencies. TLOs learn to discern suspicious criminal or terror-related activity, gather supplemental information, and report it for processing and assessment. They serve as vital links between law enforcement agencies and the community, working closely with state and federal officials to protect the country from terror-related threats. ASCs are often provided briefings on intelligence related issues by their FSD or FIO. A good example of an incident where intelligence of a potential attack on aviation changed a policy or procedure is in the summer of 2014. U.S. intelligence agencies learned of a potential bomb attack on civil airliners by an Al Qaeda cell operating in Syria. The TSA begin requiring passengers on international flights to turn on their electronic devices to prove they are in working order prior to boarding. Intelligence indicated that terrorists were working on ways to conceal an improvised explosive device inside an electronic device, such as a smart phone or laptop. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 Throughout the history of aviation there have been numerous acts that created or amended security regulations but none more significant than the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA 2001). Passed on November 19, 2001 as a result of the 9/11 attacks, ATSA represented a complete overhaul of the U.S. aviation security system. This also represented one of the first times that legislation was passed to fix problems that were not the direct result of the triggering incident. With ATSA, lawmakers aspired to fix many of the actual and perceived problems in aviation security. Further, ATSA also created several pilot programs to be implemented as test platforms, including the use of privatized screeners and risk-based security techniques. 9/11: The Triggering Incident On 9/11, at 7:55 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767, departed Boston bound for Los Angeles. It was hijacked and flown into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, destroying it. At 8:05 a.m., United Airlines Flight 93, a Boeing 757, departed Newark bound for San Francisco was hijacked; however, passengers fought back and the aircraft crashed into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. At 8:10 a.m. American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757, departs Washington bound for Los Angeles. It was hijacked and flown into the Pentagon. At 8:15 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175, a Boeing 767, departs Boston bound for Los Angeles. It was hijacked and flown into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, destroying it. Everyone on board all of the flights were killed, with a total death toll nearing 3,000, including over 300 police and firefighters. The U.S. government held international terrorist Osama bin Laden and the terrorist organization Al Qaeda responsible for the attacks. Also, in the largest aviation terrorist attack in the world, it was discovered that the hijackers trained at U.S. flight schools. In 2002, President George W. Bush commissioned The National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the U.S., also known as the 9/11 Commission. The report outlined both the structure and actions of the 9/11 attacks themselves, provided a broader look into ACE Security – Module 1 / 23 of 56  Security the issues that contributed to the attacks and provided a series of recommendations for fixing the aviation security system. The Commission concluded that, among other failures, the civil aviation did not understand the grave threat it faced, nor did it adjust its policies and practices to defeat the threat. Ultimately, while there had been previous attempted hijackings with the intent of crashing planes into a ground target in the U.S., this scenario had not entered into the thinking of aviation security practitioners. The hijackers learned how to fly at various flight schools in the United States. They boarded the aircraft with box cutters and knives, items that screening policy allowed at the time, and possibly mace or tear gas, items that were not allowed but were commonly missed at security screening checkpoints. The Al Qaeda terrorist group was held responsible for the attacks. Led by Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda had been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks worldwide, including the truck bombing of the Khobar Towers at a U.S. Air Force Base in Saudi Arabia and the suicide bombing of the USS Cole, a Navy cruiser. The specific details of how the hijackers took over the cockpit are largely unknown. However, several inferences can be drawn based on the status of the commercial aviation security system at the time. Cockpit doors were not reinforced, and in fact were quite flimsy, allowing easy access. With the pilot-in-command responsible for in-flight security, according to air carrier security and federal aviation regulations, disturbances in the cabin often brought one of the flight crew out of the cockpit to handle the situation. Therefore, another method of entry into the cockpit by the hijackers could have been to cause a commotion in the cabin area, luring one of the flight crew to open the cockpit door. The 9/11 Commission concluded that the hijackers had previously taken the same flights as the ones they hijacked in order to assess the flight crew procedures as related to the cockpit [6, pp 245]. Two of the terrorists were on CIA watch lists, but the lack of those lists being shared with the FAA resulted in their movements going unnoticed on 9/11. Additionally, two of the hijackers were selected for additional screening under the CAPPS28 program. However, at the time, CAPPS only required that their bags accompany them onto the aircraft thus still enabling the hijackers to board the plane. Without a major hijacking in several years, the industry was more focused on preventing airline bombings rather than hijackings. This attitude was demonstrated by security policies and procedures that focused more on preventing bombings. Also, at one airport, two of the hijackers set off the walk-thru metal detectors but a CCTV recording of the subsequent hand wand process showed the process to be inadequate to finding any prohibited items. The public speculated on the ability of the hijackers to be able to pilot such large commercial service aircraft. All of the hijackers held at least a Commercial Pilot Certificate, each had over 250 hours of flying time, and all had spent some simulator time in similarly sized aircraft. While it may be difficult to take off and land an aircraft, or to fly it during bad weather, flying en route in good weather and good visibility was within the capabilities of pilots trained to the level that the 9/11 hijackers were trained. In describing the concept of emergency response, the 9/11 Commission stated: “Emergency response is a product of preparedness. On the morning of September 11, 2001, the last best hope for the community of  people working in or visiting the World Trade Center rested not with national policymakers but with private firms and local public servants, especially the first responders: fire, police, emergency medical service, and building safety professionals.” The faster an entity is able to recover from an attack, the less damage there will be from that attack and the less likely the attack will be repeated due to its limited impact. Although the 1993 attack on the WTC had resulted in better evacuation plans, as well as the installation of radio repeaters throughout the buildings, there were numerous problems that could have been foreseen and resolved. First, many in the WTC argued that if there was a fire, a roof rescue using helicopters could be conducted. This argument was reinforced in 1993, when a few evacuations took place by roof. Even some in the NYPD Emergency Services Unit believed that a roof rescue was part of the plan. However, the roof rescue plan had been removed. There was not a helipad on the North Tower, and the South Tower helipad was not certified by the FAA for use. As a result, several citizens attempted to gain access to the roof but found the doors locked. While there were police helicopters hovering in an attempt to try a roof rescue anyway, the intense smoke and lack of visibility, flames, updrafts and numerous antennas on both of the buildings prevented the helicopters from landing. The important lesson here is to ensure that the emergency plans are communicated throughout the agencies that are affected. Other problems with response were caused by interagency conflicts between the New York Police Department, the Fire Department of New York, and the Port Authority Police Department, which was responsible for law enforcement and emergency response throughout the towers. Chain of command issues existed between the agencies, along with a general inability of the agencies to communicate with each other due to different radio systems. Adding to the communications problems were jammed 911 phone lines and the fact that dispatchers who were fielding the calls were also not aware of the proper evacuation plans for 28  APPS – computer assisted passenger pre-screening system. CAPPS was implemented in 1996 after the crash of TWA 800. It was a computer triggered process that flagged passengers booking with C certain indicators as being a potential higher risk. These passengers were subjected to higher levels of scrutiny at the checkpoint and the positive passenger bag match requirement applied to them. 24 of 56 / American Association of Airport Executives  Module 2 the towers. Some dispatchers were advising individuals to go to the roof and await a roof rescue by helicopter. Some companies, such as Morgan Stanley evacuated immediately, an act that saved the lives of their employees. Other companies, particularly in the South Tower before it had been struck by United 175, had initially evacuated but then returned to their offices when it was discovered that it was the North Tower that had been hit, a fatal decision for many of them. Another challenge was that the security system command center for the South Tower was located in the North Tower. Many people died in the South Tower while waiting for overcrowded elevators and were unable to access stairwells due to a lock-release order to the building’s access control system. The software that would override the lock-release order was located in the North Tower and was destroyed when the first plane hit. Despite many failures in the response to 9/11, there were plenty of successes. In less than 20 minutes, over 1,000 responders descended on the Towers and initiated the largest rescue effort, ever. Thousands of lives were saved due to the mitigation and preparedness actions taken after the first WTC bombing and the dedication of police, fire and civilian personnel. Casualties were also limited at the Pentagon due to the rapid and coordinated response of police, fire and military personnel and mitigation measures, such as safety glazing in the windows of the Pentagon, installed after the Oklahoma City bombing. Ultimately, the 9/11 Commission pointed to six specific weaknesses in the aviation security system: A pre-screening process that focused on detecting potential aircraft bombers and not potential hijackers. Sloppy checkpoint screening and permissive rules regarding small knives. A lack of in-flight security measures, such as air marshals and reinforced cockpit doors. An industry-wide strategy of complying with hijackers in a non-confrontational manner. A lack of protocols and capabilities for executing a coordinated Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and military response to multiple hijackings and suicidal hijackers [8, pp 1]. Many of these weaknesses were addressed in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001. Public Law 107–71—Nov. 19, 2001 (ATSA) ATSA included numerous reforms but the most publicly visible was the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the transition of the screener workforce from private contractors hired by the airlines, to federal employees under the direct control of the U.S. government. ATSA called for the complete transition of the screener workforce to take place within one year of its passage. This called for the newly created TSA to go from a couple of employees on November 19th, to well over 80,000 by the following year. In addition to creating TSA and transitioning the screener workforce, ATSA also: Created the position of Federal Security Director for every commercial service airport29. Prior to 9/11, the FAA’s Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO) handled security inspections and enforcement at commercial service airports. The Federal Security Act of 1996 created the position of Federal Security Manager (FSM) at the Category X airports to oversee many of the security functions. This arrangement occasionally created conflict with the local CASFO’s “Cat X agent,” who was also there to oversee enforcement and compliance with the airport security plan, federal regulations and aircraft security equipment. The Federal Security Director for each airport is responsible for overseeing baggage and passenger screening and for ensuring that airports meet regulatory requirements. The FSD approves the Airport Security Program and works with the airport operator on the implementation of Security Directives and federally mandated security programs, such as behavior detection, travel document checking and random anti-terrorism measures. Brought Federal Air Marshals (FAM) back to the airways. The air marshal program began in the 1970s; however, throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s the program continued to reduce its numbers, and by 9/11, only consisted of 33 agents, mostly operating on high-risk international flights. The program was set to be retired when 9/11 occurred. 28  APPS – computer assisted passenger pre-screening system. CAPPS was implemented in 1996 after the crash of TWA 800. It was a computer triggered process that flagged passengers booking with C certain indicators as being a potential higher risk. These passengers were subjected to higher levels of scrutiny at the checkpoint and the positive passenger bag match requirement applied to them. 29  While the legislation called for an FSD at each commercial service airport, it was soon discovered this requirement was financially and operationally impractical. In some cases, the FSDs are assigned to more than one commercial service airport. There is an FSD designated to oversee security at each commercial service airport; however, not all airports have their FSD on site. ACE Security – Module 1 / 25 of 56  Security Required airports to develop procedures or methods to screen all personnel and goods entering the secure area of an airport. This requirement included establishing pilot programs to test biometric technology for access control and developing security awareness programs for airport and airline personnel. Required 100% screening of checked baggage by December 31, 2002, which was a significant requirement in terms of money and the ability to manufacture such equipment. While all TSA screening personnel were to be deployed by November 19, 2002, a deadline the TSA met, meeting the checked baggage requirement was a bit more difficult since the machines could not be built fast enough30. TSA “met” the deadline however, by accepting the definition of “screened” to include Positive Passenger Bag Match. But, it would not be for several more years before all checked bags were indeed screened using weapons detecting technology. At most commercial service airports within the U.S., passenger and baggage screening is conducted by the TSA; however, it is still the responsibility of the aircraft operator to disallow any person or item from being placed on their aircraft that has not undergone the appropriate screening process. This practice helps ensure that aircraft operators conducting operations at foreign destinations continue to comply with the same security standards they are required to comply with in the U.S. Called for procedures to be implemented as soon as practicable to screen cargo carried aboard commercial airliners. In 2006, rulemaking for air cargo operators was passed31 and was implemented in 2007. The passage of Public Law 110-53, Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Act required the screening of all air cargo carried on commercial passenger aircraft by 2010. Made it illegal to assault airport screening personnel or anyone with aviation security responsibilities. While assault is a crime in all 50 states, ATSA made it a crime, prosecutable in federal court. Required a $2.50 per passenger fee32 to help fund aviation security measures was added for all passengers flying commercially. Required those possessing access/ID, such as airport identification badges and airline crew badges to undergo a fingerprint- based criminal history record check (CHRC). Previously only certain individuals who could not pass an Access Investigation33 were required to undergo the check. Now every one must. An initial loophole in the CHRC requirement was the lack of a requirement to verify the identity of the badge applicant. A security directive later made such verification the responsibility of the issuer (airport or air carrier). In the interim however several airports across the United States had hundreds of employees arrested by the immigration officials for being illegal aliens. These employees had unescorted access to the airfield and secured areas34. Many airports now pay private contractors to verify the identity of applicants. Required air carriers to reinforce cockpit doors on commercial passenger airliners. Many commercial aircraft today also have enlarged viewing holes and, in some cases, CCTV video of the cabin. Required security programs for charter or cargo flights on aircraft exceeding 12,500 pounds. Required passenger manifests on international flights