Will the Liberal Order Survive? PDF - Foreign Affairs

DATE DOWNLOADED: Mon Feb 17 15:28:54 2025 SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline Citations: Please note: citations are provided as a general guideline. Users should consult their preferred citation format's style manual for proper citation formatting. Bluebook 21st ed. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Will...

DATE DOWNLOADED: Mon Feb 17 15:28:54 2025 SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline Citations: Please note: citations are provided as a general guideline. Users should consult their preferred citation format's style manual for proper citation formatting. Bluebook 21st ed. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Will The Liberal Order Survive: The History of an Idea, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 10 (January/February 2017). ALWD 7th ed. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Will The Liberal Order Survive: The History of an Idea, 96 Foreign Aff. 10 (2017). APA 7th ed. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2017). Will the liberal order survive: the history of an idea. Foreign Affairs, 96(1), 10-[ii]. Chicago 17th ed. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Will The Liberal Order Survive: The History of an Idea," Foreign Affairs 96, no. 1 (January/February 2017): 10-[ii] McGill Guide 9th ed. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Will The Liberal Order Survive: The History of an Idea" (2017) 96:1 Foreign Aff 10. AGLC 4th ed. Joseph S. Nye Jr., 'Will The Liberal Order Survive: The History of an Idea' (2017) 96(1) Foreign Affairs 10 MLA 9th ed. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. "Will The Liberal Order Survive: The History of an Idea." Foreign Affairs, vol. 96, no. 1, January/February 2017, pp. 10-[ii]. HeinOnline. OSCOLA 4th ed. Joseph S. Nye Jr., 'Will The Liberal Order Survive: The History of an Idea' (2017) 96 Foreign Aff 10 Please note: citations are provided as a general guideline. Users should consult their preferred citation format's style manual for proper citation formatting. -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use: Copyright Information  Like their counterparts elsewhere, Will the Liberal U.S. policymakers sought to advance their country's national interests, usually Order Survive? in straightforward, narrowly defined ways. They saw international politics and economics as an intense competi- The History of an Idea tion among states constantly jockeying for position and advantage. When the Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Great Depression hit, therefore, U.S. During the nineteenth century, officials, like others, raced to protect their domestic economy as quickly and fully as possible, adopting beggar-thy- the United States played neighbor tariffs and deepening the crisis minor role in the global bal- in the process. And a few years later, ance of power. The country did not when aggressive dictatorships emerged maintain a large standing army, and as and threatened peace, they and their late as the 1870s, the U.S. Navy was counterparts in Europe and elsewhere smaller than the navy of Chile. Ameri- did something similar in the security cans had no problems using force to sphere, trying to ignore the growing acquire land or resources (as Mexico dangers, pass the buck, or defer conflict and the Native American nations could through appeasement. attest), but for the most part, both the By this point, the United States had U.S. government and the American become the world's strongest power, but public opposed significant involvement it saw no value in devoting resources or in international affairs outside the attention to providing global public goods Western Hemisphere. such as an open economy or international A flirtation with imperialism at the security. There was no U.S.-led liberal end of the century drew U.S. attention order in the 1930s, and the result was a outward, as did the growing U.S. role "low dishonest decade," in the words of in the world economy, paving the way W. H. Auden, of depression, tyranny, for President Woodrow Wilson to take war, and genocide. the United States into World War With their countries drawn into the. But the costs of the war and the failure conflagration despite their efforts to of Wilson's ambitious attempt to reform avoid it, Western officials spent the international politics afterward turned first half of the 1940s trying to defeat the U.S. attention inward once again during Axis powers while working to construct the 1920s and 1930s, leading to the strange a different and better world for afterward. situation of an increasingly great power Rather than continue to see economic holding itself aloof from an increasingly and security issues as solely national turbulent world. concerns, they now sought to cooperate with one another, devising a rules- JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., is University Distin- based system that in theory would guished Service Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and the author allow like-minded nations to enjoy of Is the American Century Over? peace and prosperity in common. 10 FOREIGN AFFAIRS  Will the Liberal Order Survive? Called to order: Barack Obama chairinga UN Security Council meeting, September 2009 The liberal international order that 1950, and signed a new security treaty emerged after 1945 was a loose array of with Japan in 1960. multilateral institutions in which the These and other actions both bol- United States provided global public stered the order and contained Soviet goods such as freer trade and freedom power. As the American diplomat George of the seas and weaker states were given Kennan and others noted, there were institutional access to the exercise of five crucial areas of industrial productiv- U.S. power. The Bretton Woods institu- ity and strength in the postwar world: tions were set up while the war was still the United States, the Soviet Union, the in progress. When other countries proved United Kingdom, continental Europe, too poor or weak to fend for themselves and Northeast Asia. To protect itself and afterward, the Truman administration prevent a third world war, Washington decided to break with U.S. tradition chose to isolate the Soviet Union and and make open-ended alliances, provide bind itself tightly to the other three, substantial aid to other countries, and and U.S. troops remain in Europe, Asia, deploy U.S. military forces abroad. and elsewhere to this day. And within Washington gave the United Kingdom this framework, global economic, social, a major loan in 1946, took responsibil- and ecological interdependence grew. ity for supporting pro-Western govern- By 1970, economic globalization had ments in Greece and Turkey in 1947, recovered to the level it had reached invested heavily in European recovery before being disrupted by World War I with the Marshall Plan in 1948, created in 1914. NATO in 1949, led a military coalition to The mythology that has grown up protect South Korea from invasion in around the order can be exaggerated. January/February2017 11 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Washington may have displayed a countries on a case-by-case transac- general preference for democracy and tional basis, making sure it "wins" openness, but it frequently supported rather than "loses" on each deal or dictators or made cynical self-interested commitment. Others claim that the moves along the way. In its first dec- foundations of the order are eroding ades, the postwar system was largely because of a long-term global power limited to a group of like-minded states transition involving the dramatic rise centered on the Atlantic littoral; it did of Asian economies such as China and not include many large countries such India. And still others see it as threat- as China, India, and the Soviet bloc ened by a broader diffusion of power states, and it did not always have benign from governments to nonstate actors effects on nonmembers. In global mili- thanks to ongoing changes in politics, tary terms, the United States was not society, and technology. The order, in hegemonic, because the Soviet Union short, is facing its greatest challenges in balanced U.S. power. And even when generations. Can it survive, and will it? its power was greatest, Washington could not prevent the "loss" of China, POWER CHALLENGED AND the partition of Germany and Berlin, a DIFFUSED draw in Korea, Soviet suppression of Public goods are benefits that apply to insurrections within its own bloc, the everyone and are denied to no one. At creation and survival of a communist the national level, governments provide regime in Cuba, and failure in Vietnam. many of these to their citizens: safety for Americans have had bitter debates people and property, economic infra- and partisan differences over military structure, a clean environment. In the interventions and other foreign policy absence of international government, issues over the years; and they have global public goods-a clean climate or often grumbled about paying for the financial stability or freedom of the defense of other rich countries. Still, seas-have sometimes been provided by the demonstrable success of the order coalitions led by the largest power, which in helping secure and stabilize the benefits the most from these goods and world over the past seven decades has can afford to pay for them. When the led to a strong consensus that defending, strongest powers fail to appreciate this deepening, and extending this system dynamic, global public goods are under- has been and continues to be the produced and everybody suffers. central task of U.S. foreign policy. Some observers see the main threat Until now, that is-for recently, the to the current liberal order coming from desirability and sustainability of the the rapid rise of a China that does not order have been called into question always appear to appreciate that great as never before. Some critics, such as power carries with it great responsibili- U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, ties. They worry that China is about to have argued that the costs of maintain- pass the United States in power and ing the order outweigh its benefits and that when it does, it will not uphold the that Washington would be better off current order because it views it as an handling its interactions with other external imposition reflecting others' 12 FOREIGN AFFAIRS  Will the Liberal Order Survive? interests more than its own. This con- with a veto in the UN Security Council cern is misguided, however, for two and has gained from liberal economic reasons: because China is unlikely to institutions, such as the World Trade surpass the United States in power Organization (where it accepts dispute- anytime soon and because it understands settlement judgments that go against it) and appreciates the order more than is and the International Monetary Fund commonly realized. (where its voting rights have increased Contrary to the current conventional and it fills an important deputy director wisdom, China is not about to replace position). China is now the second-largest the United States as the world's domi- funder of UN peacekeeping forces and nant country. Power involves the ability has participated in UN programs related to get what you want from others, and to Ebola and climate change. In 2015, it can involve payment, coercion, or Beijing joined with Washington in devel- attraction. China's economy has grown oping new norms for dealing with climate dramatically in recent decades, but it change and conflicts in cyberspace. On is still only 61 percent of the size of the balance, China has tried not to overthrow U.S. economy, and its rate of growth is the current order but rather to increase slowing. And even if China does surpass its influence within it. the United States in total economic The order will inevitably look size some decades from now, economic somewhat different as the twenty-first might is just part of the geopolitical century progresses. China, India, and equation. According to the Interna- other economies will continue to grow, tional Institute for Strategic Studies, and the U.S. share of the world econ- the United States spends four times omy will drop. But no other country, as much on its military as does China, including China, is poised to displace and although Chinese capabilities have the United States from its dominant been increasing in recent years, serious position. Even so, the order may still observers think that China will not be be threatened by a general diffusion of able to exclude the United States from power away from governments toward the western Pacific, much less exercise nonstate actors. The information revolu- global military hegemony. And as for tion is putting a number of transnational soft power, the ability to attract others, issues, such as financial stability, climate a recent index published by Portland, a change, terrorism, pandemics, and cyber- London consultancy, ranks the United security, on the global agenda at the States first and China 28th. And as same time as it is weakening the ability China tries to catch up, the United of all governments to respond. States will not be standing still. It has Complexity is growing, and world favorable demographics, increasingly politics will soon not be the sole province cheap energy, and the world's leading of governments. Individuals and private universities and technology companies. organizations-from corporations and Moreover, China benefits from and nongovernmental organizations to terror- appreciates the existing international ists and social movements-are being order more than it sometimes acknowl- empowered, and informal networks will edges. It is one of only five countries undercut the monopoly on power of January/February2017 13 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. traditional bureaucracies. Governments pack. The United States comes first in will continue to possess power and the Lowy Institute's ranking of nations resources, but the stage on which they by number of embassies, consulates, and play will become ever more crowded, missions. It has some 60 treaty allies, and they will have less ability to direct and The Economist estimates that nearly the action. 100 of the 150 largest countries lean Even if the United States remains the toward it, while only 21 lean against it. largest power, accordingly, it will not be Increasingly, however, the openness able to achieve many of its international that enables the United States to build goals acting alone. For example, interna- networks, maintain institutions, and tional financial stability is vital to the sustain alliances is itself under siege. prosperity of Americans, but the United This is why the most important chal- States needs the cooperation of others lenge to the provision of world order to ensure it. Global climate change and in the twenty-first century comes not rising sea levels will affect the quality of from without but from within. life, but Americans cannot manage these problems by themselves. And in a world POPULISM VS. GLOBALIZATION where borders are becoming more porous, Even if the United States continues to letting in everything from drugs to infec- possess more military, economic, and tious diseases to terrorism, nations must soft-power resources than any other use soft power to develop networks and country, it may choose not to use those build institutions to address shared resources to provide public goods for threats and challenges. the international system at large. It did Washington can provide some so during the interwar years, after all, and important global public goods largely in the wake of the conflicts in Afghanistan by itself. The U.S. Navy is crucial when and Iraq, a 2013 poll found that 52 percent it comes to policing the law of the seas of Americans believed that "the U.S. and defending freedom of navigation, should mind its own business interna- and the U.S. Federal Reserve undergirds tionally and let other countries get international financial stability by serving along the best they can on their own." as a lender of last resort. On the new The 2016 presidential election was transnational issues, however, success marked by populist reactions to global- will require the cooperation of others- ization and trade agreements in both and thus empowering others can help major parties, and the liberal interna- the United States accomplish its own tional order is a project of just the sort goals. In this sense, power becomes a of cosmopolitan elites whom populists positive-sum game: one needs to think see as the enemy. The roots of populist of not just the United States' power reactions are both economic and cultural. over others but also the power to solve Areas that have lost jobs to foreign problems that the United States can competition appear to have tended to acquire by working with others. In such support Trump, but so did older white a world, the ability to connect with others males who have lost status with the rise becomes a major source of power, and in power of other demographic groups. here, too, the United States leads the The U.S. Census Bureau projects that in 14 FOREIGN AFFAIRS  Will the Liberal Order Survive? less than three decades, whites will no that 65 percent of Americans thought longer be a racial majority in the United that globalization was mostly good for States, precipitating the anxiety and the United States, despite concerns about fear that contributed to Trump's appeal, a loss of jobs. And campaign rhetoric and such trends suggest that populist notwithstanding, in a 2015 Pew survey, passions will outlast Trump's campaign. 51 percent of respondents said that It has become almost conventional immigrants strengthened the country. wisdom to argue that the populist surge Nor will the United States lose the in the United States, Europe, and else- ability to afford to sustain the order. where marks the beginning of the end Washington currently spends less than of the contemporary era of globalization four percent of its GDP on defense and and that turbulence may follow in its foreign affairs. That is less than half the wake, as happened after the end of an share that it spent at the height of the earlier period of globalization a century Cold War. Alliances are not significant ago. But circumstances are so different economic burdens, and in some cases, today that the analogy doesn't hold such as that of Japan, it is cheaper to up. There are so many buffers against station troops overseas than at home. turbulence now, at both the domestic The problem is not guns versus butter and the international level, that a but guns versus butter versus taxes. descent into economic and geopolitical Because of a desire to avoid raising taxes chaos, as in the 1930s, is not in the cards. or further increasing the national debt, Discontent and frustration are likely the U.S. national security budget is to continue, and the election of Trump currently locked in a zero-sum tradeoff and the British vote to leave the EU with domestic expenditures on educa- demonstrate that populist reactions are tion, infrastructure, and research and common to many Western democracies. development. Politics, not absolute Policy elites who want to support global- economic constraints, will determine ization and an open economy will clearly how much is spent on what. need to pay more attention to economic The disappointing track record of inequality, help those disrupted by recent U.S. military interventions has change, and stimulate broad-based also undermined domestic support for economic growth. an engaged global role. In an age of It would be a mistake to read too transnational terrorism and refugee much about long-term trends in U.S. crises, keeping aloof from all interven- public opinion from the heated rhetoric tion in the domestic affairs of other of the recent election. The prospects countries is neither possible nor desir- for elaborate trade agreements such as able. But regions such as the Middle the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the East are likely to experience turmoil for Transatlantic Trade and Investment decades, and Washington will need to Partnership have suffered, but there is be more careful about the tasks it takes not likely to be a reversion to protec- on. Invasion and occupation breed tionism on the scale of the 1930s. A resentment and opposition, which in June 2016 poll by the Chicago Council turn raise the costs of intervention on Global Affairs, for example, found while lowering the odds of success, January/February2017 15 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. further undermining public support for with many situations. Trying to control an engaged foreign policy. the domestic politics of nationalist foreign Political fragmentation and demagogu- populations is a recipe for failure, and ery, finally, pose yet another challenge force has little to offer in addressing to the United States' ability to provide issues such as climate change, financial responsible international leadership, stability, or Internet governance. Main- and the 2016 election revealed just how taining networks, working with other fragmented the American electorate is. countries and international institutions, The U.S. Senate, for example, has failed and helping establish norms to deal with to ratify the UN Convention on the Law new transnational issues are crucial. It of the Sea, despite the fact that the is a mistake to equate globalization with country is relying on it to help protect trade agreements. Even if economic freedom of navigation in the South globalization were to slow, technology China Sea against Chinese provoca- is creating ecological, political, and tions. Congress failed for five years to social globalization that will all require fulfill an important U.S. commitment to cooperative responses. support the reallocation of International Leadership is not the same as domina- Monetary Fund quotas from Europe to tion, and Washington's role in helping China, even though it would have cost stabilize the world and underwrite its almost nothing to do so. Congress has continued progress may be even more passed laws violating the international important now than ever. Americans legal principle of sovereign immunity, a and others may not notice the security principle that protects not just foreign and prosperity that the liberal order governments but also American diplo- provides until they are gone-but by matic and military personnel abroad. then, it may be too late.0 And domestic resistance to putting a price on carbon emissions makes it hard for the United States to lead the fight against climate change. The United States will remain the world's leading military power for dec- ades to come, and military force will remain an important component of U.S. power. A rising China and a declining Russia frighten their neighbors, and U.S. security guarantees in Asia and Europe provide critical reassurance for the stability that underlies the prosper- ity of the liberal order. Markets depend on a framework of security, and main- taining alliances is an important source of influence for the United States. 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