Helping Cooperation PDF

Situational determinants of altruism  Diffusion of responsibility  Pluralistic ignorance  Cost of helping/not helping Altruistic views  Empathy DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY ESP The epileptic seizure study...

Situational determinants of altruism  Diffusion of responsibility  Pluralistic ignorance  Cost of helping/not helping Altruistic views  Empathy DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY ESP The epileptic seizure study Proportion of help decreases Feeling of responsibility diminishes as the and time delay to help number of bystanders increases increases with increasing number of bystanders EPILEPTIC SEIZURE STUDY DARLEY & LATANÉ (1968) EPILEPTIC SEIZURE STUDY EPILEPTIC SEIZURE STUDY 90% Proportion who 180 helped 80% Average time 160 (seconds) to help 70% 140 60% 120 50% 100 40% 80 30% 60 20% 40 10% 20 0% 0 1 2 4 Number of Bystanders PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE People who are unsure how to act in a situation will use others’ behaviors to guide their actions Based on Festinger’s social comparison theory  we use other people as guides when we are unsure of the appropriate behavior  SMOKE-FILLED ROOM DARLEY & LATANÉ (1968) Only 10% intervened. Most stayed past 6 minutes 75% sought help Situational determinants of altruism  Diffusion of responsibility  Pluralistic ignorance  Cost of helping/not helping Altruistic views  Empathy BYSTANDER-CALCULUS MODEL (THE AROUSAL: COST-REWARD MODEL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERVENTION: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. DOVIDIO,-JOHN-F; PILIAVIN,-JANE-A; GAERTNER,-SAMUEL-L; SCHROEDER,-DAVID-A; CLARK,-RUSSELL-D III. BOOK SOURCE: CLARK, MARGARET S. (ED). (1991). PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR. REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 12. (PP. 86-118). THOUSAND OAKS, CA, US: SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC.) Physiological Arousal  Aroused by suffering and distress of others  Influenced by clarity and emergency (interpretation) of the situation Intensity  Among those who witness an emergency; Individuals with higher arousal (e.g., faster heart rate) are more likely to help than those with lower arousal (e.g., slower heart rate) STUPID LADDER EXPERIMENT (THE ATTRIBUTION OF AROUSAL AND EMERGENCY HELPING: A BIDIRECTIONAL PROCESS. STERLING,-BRUCE; GAERTNER,-SAMUEL-L. JOURNAL-OF- EXPERIMENTAL-SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGY. 1984 NOV; VOL 20(6): 586-596.) Interact via intercom with another subject (a confederate)  Develop bond with partner Do various levels of push-ups  Produce different levels of physiological arousal Heard partner mutter spilling a glass of water, footsteps searching for a towel, a loud bang, “This stupid ladder” STUPID LADDER EXPERIMENT (THE ATTRIBUTION OF AROUSAL AND EMERGENCY HELPING: A BIDIRECTIONAL PROCESS. STERLING,-BRUCE; GAERTNER,-SAMUEL-L. JOURNAL-OF- EXPERIMENTAL-SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGY. 1984 NOV; VOL 20(6): 586-596.) Oh, my head! Low arousal This stupid ladder! BANG! High arousal STUPID LADDER EXPERIMENT High Phy. Arousal Low Phy. Arousal Helping Behavior Clear Emergency Ambiguous Situation STUPID LADDER EXPERIMENT Interaction between interpretation of situation and intensity of arousal Under clear emergency, high arousal induces MORE helping behavior than low arousal  Misattribute physiological arousal (due to exercising) to situation emergency --> more help Under ambiguous situation, high arousal induces LESS helping behavior than low arousal  Misattribute physiological arousal (due to emergency of the situation) to exercising --> less help The attribution of arousal and emergency helping: A bidirectional process. Sterling,-Bruce; Gaertner,-Samuel-L. Journal-of-Experimental-Social-Psychology. 1984 Nov; Vol 20(6): 586-596. COSTS OF HELPING & NOT HELPING Empathy costs of not helping  The cost of not helping when feeling empathic concern of the victim Empathy cost Personal costs of not helping of not helping:  Norm of reciprocity “It makes me  An expectation that people will help uncomfortable those who have helped them  Norm of social responsibility not to help  An expectation that people will help people in those dependent upon them danger” COSTS OF HELPING & NOT HELPING Empathy costs of not helping http://news.mingpao.com/ins/instantnews/web_tc/article/20160624/s00001/1466743165753  The cost of not helping when feeling empathic concern of the victim Personal costs of not helping Feeling upset that fire fighters  Norm of reciprocity have nothing good to eat Giving away free lunch boxes  An expectation that people will help those who have helped them  Norm of social responsibility  An expectation that people will help those dependent upon them COSTS OF HELPING & NOT HELPING Empathy costs of not helping  The cost of not helping when feeling empathic concern of the victim Personal costs of not helping  Norm of reciprocity Steven在IG發文「我住在中國廣東的叔叔，15年前，  An expectation that people will help 送給我們一台PS2，因為叔叔知道我們沒有錢能買玩 具，所以他花了一個月的薪水400元(約3,120港元)， those who have helped them 買了當時最夯的PS2給我們，收到禮物我就默默許下 心願，一定要報答叔叔的恩情；如今我做到了，我送  Norm of social responsibility 他一台全新的SUV。」  An expectation that people will help Uncle bought me PS2 with his entire those dependent upon them monthly income knowing we had no money for toys. I made a wish I would repay him. Now I bought him a new SUV. COSTS OF HELPING & NOT HELPING Empathy costs of not helping  The cost of not helping when feeling empathic concern of the victim Personal costs of not helping  Norm of reciprocity  An expectation that people will help those who have helped them  Norm of social responsibility  An expectation that people will help Domestic helper got hurt those dependent upon them saving young master 【中國式攙扶】扶起老人遭起訴索償 校門前被抱腳辱罵 安徽高中男生：法律何在！公道何在！ (19:53) - 20160502 - 兩岸 - 即時新聞 - 明報新聞網 Being sued for helping elderly From 內地多次發生好心人在路上扶起跌倒的老人後，反遭誣告索償，於是有人提出「中國式攙扶」的詞指， 指攙扶老人前要先拍照證明清白，以免被冤枉。近日安徽蚌埠三中的高三男學生，就遭遇到好心扶人反 被纏上的事件。網名「立方霖」的男生在微博表示，今年1月25日，有老人跑向前門時摔倒，他正好下 車看見，上去相扶時被老人抓著不放，後來更被起訴到法院。  To help or not to help, that is the question. 內地於今年國慶日（10月1日）實施俗稱俗稱「好人法」的「中華人民共和國民 法總則」第184條規定，列明救助人不承擔民事責任。惟新法實施前，中國藝術 體操隊前隊員張豆豆日前在微博發帖，講述因好心扶起跌倒的老人，繼而被3名 老人圍攻，最終要給了對方100元人民幣了事，她慨嘆：「馬路邊，遇到跌倒的 老人，扶不扶？」  Cost of Helping Low High Directly help Indirect intervention or High Cost of reappraise the NOT situation helping Depends on Not help Low norms Situational determinants of altruism  Diffusion of responsibility  Pluralistic ignorance  Cost of helping/not helping Altruistic views  Empathy EMPATHY-ALTRUISM MODEL (MOOD EFFECTS OF UNSUCCESSFUL HELPING: ANOTHER TEST OF THE EMPAT HY-ALTRUISM HYPOTHESIS. BATSON,-C-DANIEL; WEEKS,-JOY-L. PERSONALITY-AND-SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGY- BULLETIN. 1996 FEB; VOL 22(2): 148-157.) (CURRENT STATUS OF THE EMPATHY-ALTRUISM HYPOTHESIS.BATSON,-C-DANIEL; OLESON,-KATHRYN-C. CLARK, MARGARET S. (ED). (1991). PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR. REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 12. (PP. 62-85). THOUSAND OAKS, CA, US: SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC) Witnessing others in distress stimulates two reactions:  Distress  Is unpleasant and we are motivated to reduce OUR OWN distress  Egoistic motivation  Empathy  Directs attention towards others’ distress and we are motivated to reduce others's distress  Altruistic motivation Either distress or empathy can motivate helping behavior EMPATHIC JOY (EJ) HYPOTHESIS We enjoy others' relief at being helped  Empathy -- feeling the relief that others feel  We help because we want to feel that others are happy, not just to improve our own mood If we cannot witness the "happy ending", we may not help Altruism reconsidered: The effect of denying feedback on a victim's status to empathic witnesses. Smith,-Kyle-D; Keating,-John-P; Stotland,-Ezra. Journal-of-Personality- and-Social-Psychology. 1989 Oct; Vol 57(4): 641-650. COVER STORY How students perceive others' methods of coping with the university environment One of his or her tasks would be to watch and rate several interviews of freshmen discussing the college adjustment problems The consent form ended with a request that the subject can consider making a videotape discussing personal experiences in adjusting to life on the university campus The subject is the only person who could respond to that interview EMPATHY MANIPULATION Imagine-set  increase empathic emotion  While watching the interviews you will see today, try to imagine how the person who is being interviewed feels. Try to take the perspective of the person being interviewed, imagining how he or she feels about what is happening and how it has affected his or her life. In addition to listening to what s/he says, pay attention to the interviewee's tone of voice and facial expressions as cues for how s/he must he feeling. Try not to concern yourself with attending to all of the information presented. Just concentrate on trying to imagine how the person interviewed on the tape feels. Observe -set  While watching the interviews you will see today, please watch exactly what the person on the tape does. Your job will be to watch all of this person's body movements that you can see. Carefully attend to the head movements, bearing, and posture of the person who is being interviewed. You are to notice anything that this person does, whatever it is. Try to he as objective as possible. Do not concern yourself with how the person who is being interviewed feels about the topic of the interview. Just concentrate on trying to watch the interviewee's body movements, objectively. Table 1 Rates of helping Predicted by the Empathic Joy Hypothesis When Empathy and the Potential for Feedback Are Varied From: Smith: J Pers Soc Psychol, Volume 57(4).October 1989.641–650 STIMULUS INTERVIEW A young woman of moderate attractiveness designated as “Subject 042” (she was actually an actress). Disclosed stressors familiar to many first-year college students.  Felt a great deal of pressure from her father to excel in her coursework, which was much more difficult than she had expected.  Felt isolated and largely without friends on a large campus.  Transition to life in a dormitory made college much more stressful than she had expected.  Confessed that other people seemed to her to be adjusting more easily than she  Wondered if she was the only one feeling overwhelmed. HELPING OPPORTUNITY Helping option  Provide a more detailed response to the problems and coping strategies discussed by Subject 042 (the woman in the tape)  The woman purportedly would read the subject's responses (if any) on her next visit to the lab, scheduled for the following day. Nonhelping option  Watch and rate a videotaped interview of another subject, unrelated to Subject 042, without the possibility of communication with that subject. Subject was told that either option would add to the researchers' understanding of how the subject perceived coping styles in others, and that the choice was being offered because of the necessity that the subject remain interested and involved in the procedure. FEEDBACK MANIPULATION Feedback  If subject decided to offer advice to Subject 042, they would see another videotaped interview with Subject 042 during their second appointment.  This interview would be recorded after Subject 042 had had time to read their suggestions and to begin applying them to her living situation, if she chose to do so.  The interview would focus on her reactions to their advice and the difference it had made in her adjustment to campus life. No feedback  Subject would have no further contact with Subject 042, whether they decided to offer advice to her or not. DEBRIEFING After the subject had finished, the experimenter scheduled a return appointment for at least 8 days from the date of the initial session (this delay supported the experimenter's story that the subject's partner would have time to return to the lab twice before the subject's next appointment.) When the subject arrived for the second appointment, an experimenter blind to the subject's condition provided the subject with a questionnaire, presented as a procedural formality before continuing the experiment. This posttest included a check on the effectiveness of the feedback manipulation in Session 1 and a check for suspicions. After collecting the posttest, the experimenter conducted a more detailed probe for suspicions and then debriefed the subject.  Proportion of Subjects Offering Advice 100% 93% 90% 80% 69% 70% 62% 60% 50% M: Number of words in the message 40% 38% written by the participant 30% 20% 10% 0% Observe Imagine No Feedback Feedback Table 3 Proportion of Subjects Offering Advice to the Confederate Within Instructional-Set and Feedback Conditions From: Smith: J Pers Soc Psychol, Volume 57(4).October 1989.641–650 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Public goods dilemma  Social norms  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Protocols of play  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Solving social dilemmas  Communication Prisoner’s Dilemma  Coordination 34 THE ULTIMATUM GAME Two persons, A & B, share a fixed amount of resource, e.g., $26 Person A makes an allocation, e.g., A gets $16, and B gets: $10 Person B either accepts or rejects the allocation  If B accepts, A and B get what A proposes  If B vetoes, A and B get nothing 35 http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/economy/article/1778824/cathays- hong-kong-cabin-crew-union-threatens-summer-labour SOCIAL NORMS Equality Norm  Everyone should get the same Equity Norm  One person's input-to-output (cost-to-reward) ratio in a relationship should be equal to the other person's input-to-output ratio Needs Norm  Those who need more receive more 37 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Public goods dilemma  Social norms  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Protocols of play  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Solving social dilemmas  Communication Prisoner’s Dilemma  Coordination 38 SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY The basic premise is to quantify the gains and losses attached to specific interactions and use the resulting quantification to predict and explain behaviors It models exchange relationship like acquaintances, business partners in which people  Want to maximize own gain and do not care about the welfare of others 39 THE GAME OF CHICKEN 40 THE GAME OF CHICKEN Driver 1 Jump Not Jump (Swerve) (Not Swerve) Peace Hero Jump (Swerve) Driver 2 Peace Chicken Not Chicken Dead Jump (Not Hero Dead Swerve) 42 THE GAME OF CHICKEN GOLDEN BALL UK SHOW D Driver 1 Jump Not Jump (Swerve) (Not Swerve) Peace 3 Hero 4 Jump (Swerve) Driver 2 Peace 3 Chicken 2 Not Chicken 2 Dead 1 Jump (Not Hero 4 Dead 1 Swerve) 43 SOME CONCEPTS The situation can be structured in a behavior matrix The outcomes for each person in each situation can be quantified by outcome values (the numbers in the corners) Interdependence  Both persons' (husband or wife) outcomes are determined by both people's behavior People guide their behavior according to the hedonistic principle  Maximize pleasure and minimize pain at a minimal cost  Costs may include opportunity cost  Positive outcome a person must forego because of choosing another behavior (alternative)  Essentially it means choosing the outcome with the highest values, or maximizing your own gain 44 THE GAME OF NUCLEAR CHICKEN Withdrawal (W) of their missiles. A naval blockade (B), or Maintenance (M) of their missiles. "quarantine" as it was euphemistically called, to prevent shipment of more missiles, possibly followed by stronger action to induce the Soviet Union to withdraw the missiles already installed. A "surgical" air strike (A) to wipe out the missiles already installed, insofar as possible, perhaps followed by an invasion of the island. 47  Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2 Choice Choice Payoff Payoff FIND A PARTNER, NO COMMUNICATION EXCEPT REVEALING THE CHOICES. PLAY 10 ROUNDS Player 2 C D 2 3 C 2 0 Player 1 0 1 D Total 3 1 Payoff: 48 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Public goods dilemma  Social norms  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Protocols of play  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Solving social dilemmas  Communication Prisoner’s Dilemma  Coordination 49 HTTP://SETIS.LIBRARY.USYD.EDU.AU/STANFORD/ARCHIVES/FA LL1997/ENTRIES/PRISONER-DILEMMA/ Tanya and Cinque have been arrested for robbing the Hibernia Savings Bank and placed in separate isolation cells. Both care much more about their personal freedom than about the welfare of their accomplice. A clever prosecutor makes the following offer to each. "You may choose to confess or remain silent. If you confess and your accomplice remains silent I will drop all charges against you and use your testimony to ensure that your accomplice does serious time. Likewise, if your accomplice confesses while you remain silent, they will go free while you do the time. If you both confess I get two convictions, but I'll see to it that you both get early parole. If you both remain silent, I'll have to settle for token sentences on firearms possession charges. If you wish to confess, you must leave a note with the jailer before my return tomorrow morning." The "dilemma" faced by the prisoners here is that, whatever the other does, each is better off confessing than remaining silent. But the outcome obtained when both confess is worse for each than the outcome they would have obtained had both remained silent. A common view is that the puzzle illustrates a failure of individual rationality. A group whose members pursue rational self-interest may all end up worse off than a group whose members act contrary to rational self- interest. More generally, if the payoffs are not assumed to represent self-interest, a group whose members rationally pursue any goals may all meet less success than if they had not rationally pursued their goals individually. Puzzles with this structure were devised and discussed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand Corporation's investigations into game theory (which Rand pursued because of possible applications to global nuclear strategy). The title "prisoner's dilemma" and the version with prison sentences as payoffs are due to Albert Tucker, who wanted to make Flood and Dresher's ideas more accessible to an audience of Stanford psychologists. 50  Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2 Choice Choice Payoff Payoff PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME Player 2 C D 2 3 C 2 0 Player 1 0 1 D 3 1 51 PRISONER’S DILEMMA Proposed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand Corporation's investigations into game theory (which Rand pursued because of possible applications to global nuclear strategy). The title "prisoner's dilemma" and the version with prison sentences as payoffs are due to Albert Tucker, who wanted to make Flood and Dresher's ideas more accessible to an audience of Stanford psychologists. Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of speaking to or exchanging messages with the other. The police admit they don't have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. They plan to sentence both to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the police offer each prisoner a Faustian bargain. If he testifies against his partner, he will go free while the partner will get three years in prison on the main charge. Oh, yes, there is a catch... If both prisoners testify against each other, both will be sentenced to three years in jail. 52 PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME (PDG) PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME For each player at the individual level, defection always results in a better outcome than cooperation  defection dominates cooperation For both players at the collective level, mutual defection results in a worse outcome than mutual cooperation  mutual cooperation is better than mutual defection 54 PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME B Class Teacher Class Teacher Choice Choice Payoff Payoff Cooperate Defect Reward 2 Temptation to Defect 3 Cooperate A 2 Reward 0 Sucker’s Payoff Sucker’s Payoff 0 Punishment 1 Defect 3Temptation to Defect 1 Punishment In general, (1) T > R > P > S, and (2) T + S < 2R 55 THE TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY A strategy to play iterative PDG  Cooperate on the first trial  On subsequent trials, imitate the opponent's response on the previous trial TFT is a reciprocal strategy It has been shown that when naive subjects play against TFT for many trials, naive subjects will cooperate eventually (after some 150-200 trials) 56 THE TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY (2) TFT is effective in inducing cooperation because it is…  Nice  never the first to defect  Can be provoked and cannot be exploited  Forgiving  return to cooperation if the other person does so  Clear and can easily be understood 57 THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION Robert Axelrod (1984). The evolution of cooperation.  Summaries results on two computer tournaments on iterated PDG Basic rules  A round robin that each program was paired with each other, including its own twin, and with RANDOM (C & D with equal chance) First tournament  14 entries  200 trials for each game  Entire round robin was run five times  Tit-for-tat, submitted by Anatol Rapoport at University of Toronto, won Second tournament  62 entries from six countries, including a 10-year-old computer hobbyist  Contestants knew results of the first tournament that pointed out the importance of niceness and forgiveness  A 0.00346 chance of ending after each trial (averaging 151 trials per game)  TFT won again Hypothetical tournaments  Programs survive to a future generation in proportion to their scores  TFT was the most populated program after 1000 generations  TFT was also the most populated program in five of six tournament variants EFFECTIVENESS OF TFT Nice  Never the first to defect Cannot be exploited  Immediately retaliates if opponent defects Forgiving  Returns to cooperation if opponent cooperates after a defection Clear and easily understood NICE First tournament  All 8 top ranking strategies are nice  No other entries are nice  Nice strategies  472-504 points  The best of not-nice strategies received 401 points  Nice strategies playing against each other got 600 points (mutual cooperation on all trials) Second tournament  All top 15 rules were nice, except one not-nice rule ranked 8th  All bottom 15 rules were not nice, except one  Correlation between “niceness” and score was.58 NOT BEING EXPLOITED Differentiating among the nice strategies is the property of “retaliatory”  Whether it immediately defects after an “uncalled for” defection  Some programs prey on the “softies” by using a controlled number of deliberate defections to see what they could get away with, e.g., TESTER  Defects on first move  If opponent ever defects, TESTER then cooperates and plays TFT thereafter  Otherwise, it cooperates on 2nd and 3rd move and defects every other move after that  TESTER TF2T TESTER TFT D C (5,0) D C (5,0) C C (3,3) C D (0,5) C C (3,3) C C (3,3) D C (5,0) C C (3,3) C C (3,3) C C (3,3) D C (5,0) C C (3,3) C C (3,3) C C (3,3) (27,12) (20,20) TESTER Defects on first move If opponent ever defects, TESTER then cooperates and plays TFT thereafter Otherwise, it cooperates on 2nd and 3rd move and defects every other move after that FORGIVING Among all nice strategies, the least forgiving strategy, FRIEDMAN, scored the lowest.  It is never the first to defect  But if the opponent once defects, FRIEDMAN never cooperates again A more forgiving strategy, TIT-FOR-TWO- TATS, although no one has submitted it, despite that it was mailed to contestants as a sample program, could have even done better than TFT  Defects only after opponent defects twice in a row. FORGIVING Generous TFT (GTFT)  Respond with C on C, however  Respond with D probabilistically on D  E.g., respond with D one third of the times that opponent chooses D  This strategy can resist invasion by other strategies with different degree of forgiveness How about invading others?  In computer simulations with GTFT, ALL-D and other strategies, ALL-D typically wins  When TFT is also included, GTFT finally prevails Godfray, H. C. J. (1992); Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. (1992). THE ROBUSTNESS OF TFT Testing TFT in different hypothetical environments  Programs survive to a future generation in proportion to their scores  TFT was the most populated program after 1000 generations  TFT was also the most populated program in five of six tournament variants HARRINGTON, the only non- nice strategy among the top 15 in the 2nd tournament. It preys on weak strategies and HARRINGTON does well in the first 200 generations. However, as weak strategies become extinct, there are fewer preys for HARRINGTON to exploit and it becomes extinct at the end HOW TO DO WELL IN AN ITERATED PDG Don’t be envious Don’t be the first to defect  Nice Reciprocate both cooperation and defection  Cannot be exploited  Forgiving Don’t be too clever  Clear and easily understood DON’T BE ENVIOUS TFT won because it did well across a wide variety of strategies It never scored better in a game than the opponent – it can’t! TFT won not by beating the opponent but by eliciting mutually rewarding outcomes DON’T BE THE FIRST TO DEFECT It pays to defect probably when  interactions are short  Cooperation may not be reciprocated Top scoring rules are nice Defect induces escalation of conflicts HARRINGTON, a non-nice strategy, does not do well after it destroys the environment that makes it successful RECIPROCATE BOTH COOPERATION AND DEFECTION TIT-FOR-TWO-TATS would have done very well in the first tournament giving its forgiveness nature TF2T did not even score in the top-third when it was submitted in the second tournament because its willingness to forgive isolated defections was being exploited  TESTER TF2T TESTER TFT D C (5,0) D C (5,0) C C (3,3) C D (0,5) C C (3,3) C C (3,3) D C (5,0) C C (3,3) C C (3,3) C C (3,3) D C (5,0) C C (3,3) C C (3,3) C C (3,3) (27,12) (20,20) TESTER Defects on first move If opponent ever defects, TESTER then cooperates and plays TFT thereafter Otherwise, it cooperates on 2nd and 3rd move and defects every other move after that DON’T BE TOO CLEVER Sophisticated rules do not do better than simple ones  Using complex methods to make inference about opponent and these inferences are wrong (often mistaken that opponents do not want to cooperate if they try defections) Complicated, probabilistic strategies may not be understood or may be misunderstood by opponents as appearing like random or non- cooperative HOW TO DO WELL IN AN ITERATED PDG Don’t be envious Don’t be the first to defect  Nice Reciprocate both cooperation and defection  Cannot be exploited Applicable to real world?  Forgiving Do you use TFT? Why/not? Don’t be too clever  Clear and easily understood - Al Capone Preening Preening is the simplest and most common of feather care activities. It involves two different actions, nibbling and stroking. All other feather care activities seem to be a prelude to preening, or at least end in a bout of preening. Preening serves the function of returning feathers to their correct position and form and often involves the addition of oil to the feathers from the Uropygial gland. Wiping is simply wiping the feathers with the bill, pressing them into place and perhaps spreading some oil over them. Nibbling is a more serious attempt to put the feathers back into pristine condition. The bird uses its bill to nibble along the edges of feathers straightening them out and ensuring the barbules are all zipped up. MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Public goods dilemma  Social norms  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Protocols of play  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Solving social dilemmas  Communication Prisoner’s Dilemma  Coordination 82 SOCIAL DILEMMAS An extension of PDG to the n-person case  Each person is always better off to defect than to cooperate  However, if everyone chooses to defect, the mutual defection outcome is worse than the mutual cooperation outcome In a sense, you are choosing between either to maximize your individual gain versus to maximize your group's interest. 83 TWO TYPES OF SOCIAL DILEMMAS Public goods (PG)  E.G., Public broadcast (TV or radio), recycling, clean air, charities Tragedy of the commons, or common resource pool dilemma (CRP)  E.G., Fishing, logging, grazing, water or energy conservation, internet bandwidth use 84 PUBLIC GOODS Two defining characteristics  Jointness of supply  One person's enjoyment of the public good does not undermine other people's enjoyment of the public good at the same time, i.e., Plenty of supply for everyone  Impossibility of exclusion  Once the PG is provided, regardless of whether you have contributed to the PG, no one can be excluded from enjoying it The free-rider problem  Enjoying the PG without contributing to it 85 http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2108835/dedicated-fans-translating-game-thrones-chinese Public Goods Dilemma https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/18/857868374/xi-defends-chinas-covid-19-actions-backs-impartial-review-of- pandemic-response Brexit Regret: I don’t know that my vote counts! 在曼徹斯特機場，文迪（Mandy ：「雖然我投了 ）說 脫歐票，但我對結 果非常失望。若我 有機會再投票，我 會投留歐的。」 阿當（Adam）同樣對投票結果 ：「我不 感到震驚。他說 認為這會發生，我 不認為我的一票有 多大重要性，因為 我以為我們會留歐 。」 http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/realtime/international/20160625/55274410  A step-level Public Goods Game m = threshold for provision of public good (r) e = endowment r = reward r > e mahjong  A step-level Public Good Game n=6 m=3 endowment = 10 reward = 20 Number of Other Members Choosing C 0 1 2 3 4 5 Your C 0 0 20 20 20 20 decision D 10 10 10 30 30 30  Number of Other Members Choosing C 0 1 2 3 4 5 C 0 0 20 20 20 20 D 10 10 10 30 30 30 n=6 Does your decision affect PG provision? m=3 (Is your behavior efficacious?) endowment = 10 N N Yes N N N reward = 20 For a step-level PG with a group size of n and a provision point of m, a person’s decision is critical to PG provision when m-1 other members have contributed. A VOLUNTEER’S DILEMMA (M=1) Number of Other Members Choosing C Your Choice 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 C R R R R R R R R D E E+R E+R E+R E+R E+R E+R E+R Prairie dog warns others of the colony of danger CRITICALITY  (Au, 2003; Chen, Au, & Komorita, 1996; de Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; Kerr, 1989, 1992; Rapoport, 1987). A person is in a critical situation if and only if his or her contribution is required to provide the PG (Rapoport, 1987) Such a condition can also be described as a necessary (only if) and sufficient (if) condition. 96 PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY  The belief that you have about the effect of your actions on the eventual result Kerr & Bruun (1983)  Dispensability of Member Effort and Group Motivation Losses: Free- Rider Effect  Perceived self-efficacy and method of PG provision  Task  Blowing air into a pulmonary testing device for 30 seconds  Pre-test  To assess (with false feedback) participant’s ability  Good ability : 73rd – 77th percentile  Poor ability: 23rd – 27th percentile  Other members  61st – 72th; 28th – 39th (in 4-p groups)  50th – 61st; 30th – 50th (2 each also in 8-p groups)  Group success depends on best vs. worst performing member  Success depends on Participant’s Best member Worst member Belief Disjunctive Conjunctive High ability High Efficacy Low Efficacy Low ability Low Efficacy High Efficacy  Perceived Dispensability of High High Ability Member Effort Ability Performance Low Low Ability Ability Conjunctive Disjunctive Conjunctive Disjunctive MANIPULATING CRITICALITY WITH SEQUENTIAL CHOICE (CHEN, AU, & KOMORITA, 1996)  n=4, m=3 1st (2,0) (2,1) 2nd (3,1) (3,2) 3rd (4,2) (4,3) 4th $ $ $ $ $ NO FEAR, NO GREED Fear Sucker effect People free ride because they fear of being taken advantage of Fear of one’s efforts going to waste Greed Desiring the public good but not wanting to contribute to it Money back guarantee / no fear Enforced contribution / no greed Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, & van de Kragt (1986) NO FEAR “If HKPS can successfully collect an amount of $4000 each from 150 or more members by 31 May 2005, HKPS would continue further actions pertinent to SR. Otherwise, HKPS would have to stop further efforts on SR. Members who have paid the $4000 would have the same amount refunded (without interest) by the end of 2006.”  Number of Other Members Choosing C 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 C 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 Provision point = 5 D 5 5 5 5 5 15 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 C 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 Provision point = 3 D 5 5 5 15 15 15 15 Number of Other Members Choosing C 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 No Fear C ? ? ? ? 10 10 10 Manipulation D 5 5 5 5 5 15 15 If PG is not provided, 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 contributors get their money C ? ? 10 10 10 10 10 back D 5 5 5 15 15 15 15  Number of Other Members Choosing C 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 C 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 Provision point = 5 D 5 5 5 5 5 15 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 C 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 Provision point = 3 D 5 5 5 15 15 15 15 Number of Other Members Choosing C 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 No Fear C 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 Manipulation D 5 5 5 5 5 15 15 If PG is not provided, 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 contributors get their money C 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 back D 5 5 5 15 15 15 15 NO GREED “To recommend to the future RB a first registration fee of $5,000 for all psychologists who attain statutory registration for the first time.” “To recommend to the future RB to waive the first registration fee for HKPS members who have paid the amount of $4,000 described in Motion 2A and attain statutory registration for the first time.”  Number of Other Members Choosing C 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 C 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 Provision point = 5 D 5 5 5 5 5 15 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 C 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 Provision point = 3 D 5 5 5 15 15 15 15 Number of Other Members Choosing C 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 No Greed C 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 Manipulation D 5 5 5 5 5 ? ? If PG is provided, non-contributors 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 are enforced to contribute as well C 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 D 5 5 5 ? ? ? ?  Number of Other Members Choosing C 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 C 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 Provision point = 5 D 5 5 5 5 5 15 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 C 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 Provision point = 3 D 5 5 5 15 15 15 15 Number of Other Members Choosing C 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 No Greed C 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 Manipulation D 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 If PG is provided, non-contributors 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 are enforced to contribute as well C 0 0 10 10 10 10 10 D 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, & van de Kragt (1986) Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, & van de Kragt (1986) Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, & van de Kragt (1986) Rapoport & Eshed-Levy (1987) No greed is consistently more effective No fear is sometimes effective Rapoport & Eshed-Levy (1987) MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Public goods dilemma  Social norms  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Protocols of play  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Solving social dilemmas  Communication Prisoner’s Dilemma  Coordination 116 COMMON RESOURCE POOL DILEMMA  Commons Dilemma (Hardin, 1968); Resource Dilemma (e.g., Budescu, Rapoport & Suleiman, 1990); the Common Pool Resource (CPR) Problem (e.g., Gardner, Ostrom & Walker, 1990) Models the conflicts experienced by a group of self interested individuals who share a finite and limited common desirable good. 117 https://news.mingpao.com/ins/instantnews/web_tc/article/20180107/s00005/1515310949748 2018 日本秋刀魚漁穫急跌 業界怪大陸台灣過度捕撈 Saury Harvest Drop Sharply Industry Blame Mainland Taiwan Over-fishing British and French fishing boats ram each other in the Channel in a long-running dispute over the rights to shellfish beds. Stones and smoke bombs were also thrown. UK boats are legally allowed to fish for scallops in the bay off Normandy all year round, but French vessels are restricted to certain months to allow stocks to replenish. Fishing groups are calling for a new deal to be brokered between the two nations over when and where scallops can be collected. The conflict has remained unresolved for 15 years.  https://hk.news.appledaily.com/china/realtime/article/20170704/56913144 南京3萬共享雨傘 唔使3星期全部消失 30,000 Shared Umbrellas in Nanjing Disappeared in 3 Weeks COMMON RESOURCE POOL DILEMMA …CAVIAR (SOLVING) COMMON RESOURCE POOL DILEMMA Fishing ban in Cheung Kong in Spring Over-ranching Sheep eat grass Man eat sand Common Resource Pool Dilemma (Solving) Common Resource Pool Dilemma 內蒙古由過去草牧經濟區，一躍成 為中國經濟大省，全靠地下發現有 豐富的煤炭。過去20年掠奪式開採 ，令內蒙草原受到嚴重破壞，留下 眾多煤坑，高空望下猶如隕石坑。 在科爾沁和呼倫貝爾大草原，如今 已難覓「風吹草低見牛羊」，而是 「風吹滿地揚煤灰」。有地方當局 惟有在草皮上用石膏塑造「牛羊成 群」景象，裝點門庭，蒙騙遊人。 而近年北京等城市頻頻遭沙塵暴襲 擊，與當地草原遭大肆破壞，不無 關係。 霍林郭勒位於科爾沁草原北端，近年大肆開 鄂爾多斯位於內蒙古腹地，號稱盛 採煤礦和發展電力、化工項目，導致荒漠化嚴 產羊絨，但要體驗草原風光，須驅 重。當地政府竟用石膏雕塑羊群，造假景觀， 車近百公里到一個旅遊點。《蘋果 欺騙遊人。《蘋果》記者攝 》記者日前到訪時恰遇大風，當地 飛砂走石，路人蒙頭蒙腦、掩面而 記者直擊內蒙生態災難 行，令記者對華北地區談虎變色的 草原變煤坑 假羊騙遊客 沙塵暴來源有了具體認識。為睹大 20121218 - 蘋果日報 草原，記者又向東北飛行千多公里 ，到科爾沁大草原腹地的霍林郭勒 市。 COMMON RESOURCE POOL DILEMMA A fixed common resource pool of 1000 dollars shared by X individuals Each person makes a request simultaneously If total request resource pool size, each person gets nothing 127 EXAMPLE: COMMON POOL RESOURCE DILEMMA A total quota of Q = 1000 fish n = 5 fishermen Each fisherman registers a request ri If ∑ri ≤ Q  Each fisherman gets ri If ∑ri > Q  Each fisherman gets 0 128 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Public goods dilemma  Social norms  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Protocols of play  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Solving social dilemmas  Communication Prisoner’s Dilemma  Coordination 129 SIMULTANEOUS PROTOCOL All players make decisions at the same time No information regarding other players’ decisions All players have identical and symmetric information 130  SIMULTANEOUS PROTOCOL EXAMPLE 1 requests 120 requests gets 120 100 1000 gets 100 Total requests = 870 < 1000 requests requests 180 requests 220 250 gets 180 gets 250 gets 220 131  SIMULTANEOUS PROTOCOL EXAMPLE 2 requests 150 requests gets 0 200 1000 gets 0 Total requests = 1020 > 1000 requests requests 100 requests 320 250 gets 0 gets 0 gets 0 132 SEQUENTIAL PROTOCOL According to some pre-determined sequence, players take turns to make decisions Common knowledge of previous players’ decisions, thus Knowing own position Knowing amount of resources left 133 SEQUENTIAL PROTOCOL 0 50 1st requests 350 150 5th gets 350 360 requests 650 50 1000 gets 50 Total requests 2nd = 1000 ≤ 1000 requests requests 290 requests 100 210 4th 3rd gets 290 gets 210 gets 100 134 SEQUENTIAL COMMON RESOURCE POOL A common resource pool can be better maintained (sustain longer) when individuals harvest sequentially (one after another) than simultaneously (all at the same time) (Budescu, Au, & Chen, 1997) A position effect in sequential CRP dilemma  individuals in earlier positions request more than those in later positions  a negative correlation between position and size of request 135  500 Overall Game 1 450 Mean Individual Request 400 350 Game 2 Game 3 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1 2 3 4 5 Position Au & Ngai (2003). Effects of Group Size Uncertainty and Protocol of Play in a Common Pool Resource Dilemma. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations. 136 REAL-TIME PROTOCOL  Public goods  Dorsey (1992); Güth, Levati, & Stiehler (2002); Kurzban, McCabe, Smith, & Wilson (2001); Goren, Kurzban, Rapoport (2003)  Common pool resource  Au & Ngai (2003) Order of play and timing of decisions are determined by the players themselves Make a decision within a fixed time interval Decisions can either be revocable or irrevocable during the time interval Receive instantaneous update of others’ decisions 137  REAL-TIME PROTOCOL EXAMPLE 1 0 requests requests 40 40 250 190 Gets 40 Gets 250 1000 Total requests = 1000 ≤ 1000 requests requests 150 requests 260 300 Gets 150 Gets 260 Gets 300 138  REAL-TIME PROTOCOL EXAMPLE 2 -150 requests requests -150 240 350 290 Gets 0 Gets 0 1000 Total requests = 1150 > 1000 requests requests 0 requests 360 200 Gets 0 Gets 0 Gets 0 139 PROCEDURE 10 (paid) participants per session  Splitting into 2 groups Verbal + written instructions of fishing game Quiz, then practice 3 games (fixed GS), 3 games (variable GS)  Counter-balanced Incentive  $1 per fish  Randomly selected 2 persons from each session  Randomly selected 1 game  $75 + bonus (median = $200) 140 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Replicated position effect  Sequential > Real-time (Support H3) Individual requests  Sequential > Real-time (Support H3)  Real-time request > equal share (Reject H2) Provision rates?  Proportion of times that total individual requests do not exceed resource pool size  Real-time > Sequential ? 142 SUMMARY: REAL-TIME LESS EFFICIENT Real-time  Smaller individual requests in position 1  But many people requested in position 1  Lower provision rates Sequential  Larger individual requests in position 1  But only one person requested in position 1  Higher provision rates Assigning position in a sequential protocol provides a coordination mechanism 144 CHOOSE A NUMBER GAME Minimum Number Chosen (j) Your Selection (i) 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 7 100 83 66 49 32 15 -2 6 85 68 51 34 17 0 5 70 53 36 19 2 4 55 38 21 4 3 40 23 6 2 25 8 1 10 145 CHOOSE A NUMBER GAME Minimum Number Chosen (j) Your Selection (i) 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 7 100 83 66 49 32 15 -2 6 85 68 51 34 17 0 5 70 53 36 19 2 4 Others chose 55 38 21 4 3, 6, 3, 7, 5 3 40 23 6 2 You chose 5 25 8 1 Minimum Number Chosen = 3 10 146 COORDINATION GAME Minimum Number Chosen (j) Your Selection (i) 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 7 100 83 66 49 32 15 -2 6 85 68 51 34 17 0 5 70 53 36 19 2 4 55 38 21 4 3 40 23 6 2 25 8 1 10 147 Do you want 2 points or 6 points? If more than 10% of the class selects 6 points, no one gets any points. MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Public goods dilemma  Social norms  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Protocols of play  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Solving social dilemmas  Communication Prisoner’s Dilemma  Coordination 149 COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS Coordination improves cooperation  The coordination game 150 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Public goods dilemma  Social norms  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Protocols of play  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Solving social dilemmas  Communication Prisoner’s Dilemma  Coordination 151 COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS Communication improves cooperation  Without communication, people may have unwarranted expectation of others' behaviors which may hinder cooperation  Kelly and Stahelski's triangular hypothesis 152 Contribute $1 or $0 If 10 or more people contributing $1  Everyone gets $2 If 9 or fewer contributing $1  No bonus Contribute $100 or $0 If 10 or more people contributing $100  Everyone gets $150 If 9 or fewer contributing $100  No bonus  Overall effect (d = 1.01) Type of Communication Message (d =.46) Face-to-face (d = 1.21) When? Before game (d =.87) During game (d = 1.13) Balliet, D. (2010). Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analytic Review. JCR, 54(1), 39- 57. Cohen’s d:.2/.5/.8 (small/medium/large) Average effect size of psychotherapy about.8 [The great psychotherapy debate: models, methods, and findings (Bruce E. Wampold, 2001)] DAWES, MCTAVISH, & SHAKLEE (1977) Experimental Condition Coop Rate No communication 30% Communication about topics irrelevant to the game 32% Communication relevant to the game 72% Relevant communication with nonbinding announcements of intended choices Discussion on dilemma enhances cooperation and not communication per se EXPLANATIONS OF DISCUSSION EFFECT Enhanced understanding of the game Opportunities for coordination of cooperation Altered expectations of others’ likely behaviors Enhanced norms of benevolence Creating local norms of cooperation Humanizing group members Promoting group solidarity Induced commitments to mutually cooperate COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS Cooperative Your Expectation Of Other’s Behavior Competitive Comp Your Own Orientation Coop Implication: if you are competitive, you may mistake others to be competitive as well, even though this may not be right. However your (incorrect) expectation of others being competitive may lead you not to cooperate 158 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Public goods dilemma  Social norms  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Protocols of play  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Solving social dilemmas  Communication Prisoner’s Dilemma  Coordination 159