7 International Rules (PDF)

Analysing International Relations 7 – International rules Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas Will this be on the exam?  Format and scope of the exam Scope The exam will cover lectures, slides and assigned readings. It will test your understanding of analytical concepts (anarchy, tw...

Analysing International Relations 7 – International rules Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas Will this be on the exam?  Format and scope of the exam Scope The exam will cover lectures, slides and assigned readings. It will test your understanding of analytical concepts (anarchy, two-level game, multistakeholderism, etc.). No data, no historical events, no minor points from pg.36… Format Multiple Choice Questions (50%) About 25 questions For each, choose the best 1 of 4 possible answers Open Questions (50%) Choose 2 of 6 concepts. Write 2 mini-essays (200-300 words each) that define the chosen concept and discuss how it helps us to understand IR.  Types of MCQ questions (a sample) Which of the following best summarizes Concept X? Which of the following best summarizes Author X’s concept of Concept X? Which of the following arguments is not associated with Concept X? According to Concept X, which of the following is likely to occur under conditions ABC? Under which of the following conditions is the phenomenon described by Concept X most likely to be found?  AIR part III: Basics of global goverance 19 Nov: International cooperation 21 Nov: International rules – Overview of int’l institutions – What are they? – Sources of int’l rules – Where do they come from? – Effects of int’l rules – Do they matter? 26 Nov: Creation and design of international organisations  International institutions Types: International norms ‘International International law rules’ Inter-governmental organisations International regimes (usually a mix of rules and organizations) May be effective or ineffective May be fair or unfair, morally good or bad May involve only states or also non-state actors  What do int’l institutions do? A functional definition: Int’l institutions are rules and organisations that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations in world politics. prescribe roles: define the characteristics, rights and responsibilities of actors with certain identities (state, member state, NGO, ambassador, prisoner of war, refugee, etc.) constrain activity: establish positive and negative incentives for acting in certain ways (do this and you will benefit, do this and you will pay a cost) shape expectations: provide ideas and information that  Rules Organizations (today’s lecture) (coming lectures) Formal International law Formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs) International regimes Informa International norms Informal l intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs)  International norms What are int’l norms? Informal but widely accepted standards of appropriate behavior for international actors of a particular type. Procedural norms: define how actors should interact, how decisions should be made Reciprocity Consultation Substantive norms: define what outcomes should be achieved Territorial integrity National self-determination Respect for human rights Stop killing whales  International law What is int’l law? Rules and principles that are generally recognized as binding on states and other international actors. What does it do? Public IL defines rights and responsibilities in relations between states, and between states and individuals/other private bodies. Private IL defines rights and responsibilities in relations between private bodies (individuals, companies, etc.) in different countries.  Anarchy and law? If there’s no government above governments, how can there be international law? The int’l legal system is decentralized, not hierarchical like a domestic legal system. Rule making, rule commitment, rule enforcement, rule compliance depend heavily on voluntary choices by states and other actors.  2 big questions: Where do int’l rules come from? Do int’l rules make a difference?  Dynamics of international rules ‘International rules’ = international norms + international law I. Sources II. Effects  Sources of int’l law (in legal doctrine) 1. Treaty Law: Rules that states have agreed to follow by signing and ratifying treaties or conventions. 2. Customary Law: Rules that most states follow most of the time based on a sense of legal obligation.** – Sometimes unwritten; sometimes later formalised in treaties. – Ex. diplomatic immunity 3. General principles of law: Rules found in many national legal systems. ** Special type of ‘customary law’: jus cogens -- rules that are widely considered binding on all actors, whether or not they have agreed to be bound. An exception to the general norm that int’l law is based on consent.  Sources of international rules How are they created, how do they spread, how do they evolve? Rational pursuit of joint gains Imposition Persuasion Norm life cycle Localization Contestation  Rational pursuit of joint gains Robert O. Keohane (1982). The Demand for International Regimes. International Organization 36:2, 325-56 States accept rules that enable them to cooperate under anarchy and thus to achieve joint gains. For example: – Rules that reduce fears of non-compliance (ex. reciprocity & consultation norms) – Rules that promote transparency (ex. rules that require information-sharing or monitoring) – Rules that facilitate the negotiation of agreements (ex. diplomatic immunity) States will continue to support these rules as long as they enable cooperation and the achievement of joint gains… even if the distribution of power among states changes!  Imposition (unrestrained power) Lloyd Gruber (2000). Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions Strong states impose rules on the international system that maximise their self-interests. Weak states accept these rules when rejecting them would be more costly. When new great powers emerge, they create & impose new rules.  Imposition (restrained power) John Ikenberry (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars After major wars, victorious powers seek to re-establish international order by imposing formal and informal rules on the international system. When the dominant state(s) accept limits on their own power and avoid maximising their self-interest, the rules they impose will be more acceptable to other states and more likely to survive re-distributions of power.  Persuasion ‘Policy entrepreneurs’ (diplomats, NGOs, activists, scientists, etc.) persuade state officials or mass publics that certain rules are right and desirable. Persuasion may be based upon: Moral arguments: ex. prohibition of slavery – Ethan A. Nadelmann (1990). Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society. International Organization 44:4, 479-526 Causal arguments: ex. environmental treaties -- Peter M. Haas (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization 46:1, 1-36  Norm life cycle Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization 52:4 (Autumn), 887-917 Q: How do norms evolve? A: 3-step process from new idea to taken-for-granted norm Norm emergence Individuals, NGOs, governments try to persuade others that a certain idea should be an international norm. Norm cascade More & more govts accept the norm. After a ‘tipping point’ is reached, it becomes unacceptable to reject the norm, so more accept it. Norm internalization Governments integrate the norm into their expectations, national legislation, and bureaucratic procedures.  Localization Amitav Acharya (2004). How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. Int’l Organization 58:2, 239-275 Q: How are int’l rules received around the world? A: When an int’l rule is spreading around the world, local actors have several options: Rejection: Sustained resistance blocks local adoption of the int’l rule. Localization: The int’l rule is merged with pre-existing ideas and rules, producing a new, hybrid rule at local level. Adoption: The int’l rule replaces pre-existing local ideas and rules. Localization = “the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant  Contestation Antje Weiner (2018). Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations Contestation is when actors challenge the meaning, legitimacy, or applicability of a prevailing rule. This is important because the strength of rules depends heavily on actors’ agreement on their meaning, legitimacy and application. Possible effects of contestation: - clarify or obscure the rule’s meaning (make it more or less clear) - reinforce or undermine the rule’s legitimacy and thus its strength  Assigned reading: Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann (2020). Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different Types of Contestation Affect the Robustness of International Norms. International Studies Review 22(1), 51-76 What are the types of norm contestation? What is norm robustness? What is the relationship between norm contestation and norm robustness? How is the relationship between contestation and robustness evident in their 2 case studies -- the Responsibility to Protect and commercial whaling? Break time  Effects of international rules Do int’l rules matter? Do they shape outcomes? “Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time.” -- Louis Henkin (1979). How Nations Behave Realist approach Managerial approach Incentives approach International socialization Domestic politics Rule evasion  The realist approach John Mearsheimer (2001). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19(3), 5-49 Anarchy  to ensure survival, all states seek to maximize their power. Int’l rules are unreliable: Godzilla doesn’t respect rules, so Bambi can’t count on them. Policy implication: To ensure your security, don’t depend on int’l rules.  The managerial approach Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (1993). On compliance. International Organization 47:2 (March), 175-205 Assumption: States generally intend to comply with int’l law, for 3 reasons: Efficiency: Routine compliance avoids costly calculations. Interests: Int’l law reflects states’ interests. Norms: States are sensitive to social pressure. Argument: Non-compliance is generally not intentional -- it’s due to: Ambiguity: Rules aren’t clear. Incapacity: States lack financial or administrative capacity to comply. Policy implication: To increase compliance, make rules clearer  The incentives approach George W. Downs et al. (1996). Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization 50:3, 379- 406 Assumption: Compliance can be costly, so it depends on states’ deliberate calculation of incentives: The likelihood that non-compliance will be observed. The likely costs and benefits (both material & reputational) of compliance vs. non-compliance. Arguments: If rules require little departure from states’ preferences, then compliance may be high even if monitoring and punishment of violators are weak. As rules require greater departure from states’ preferences, compliance becomes more dependent on the monitoring and punishment of violators. Policy implication: To increase compliance, strengthen positive  Domestic politics Xinyuan Dai (2005). Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. International Organization 59:2 (Spring), 363-398 The two-level game of compliance with int’l rules: International partners prefer the state to comply. Domestic constituencies have various preferences. The domestic compliance game: Governments face domestic constituencies with different preferences on int’l rule compliance and different degrees of influence. The larger & better-informed a constituency is, the more influence it has on government’s  International socialization Jeffrey T. Checkel (2005). International Institutions and Socialization in Europe. International Organization 59:4, 801-826 Individual states adopt the rules of groups of states (international society) to which they belong or hope to belong. Processes of socialization: Role playing: States adjust their behaviour to fit the rules connected to their role, even if the rules don’t fit their beliefs or preferences. Persuasion: States’ leaders or citizens are persuaded by the moral or causal logic underlying an int’l rule. Bureaucratic normalization: A state’s bureaucracy incorporates int’l rules into its standard routines. Over time, these routines become taken-for-granted.  Rule evasion Zoltán I. Búzás (2017). Evading international law: How agents comply with the letter of the law but violate its purpose. European Journal of Int’l Relations 23:4, 857-883 What is evasion? “intentional compliance with the letter of the law but not its purpose in order to minimize inconvenient obligations in an arguably legal fashion.” Why do states evade int’l rules? It looks like compliance so avoids accountability and punishment, but it allows them to avoid more costly changes to their behaviour. When do states evade int’l rules? Evasion is most likely when: (1) legal obligations are costly, (2) there’s a significant gap between the rule’s letter and purpose. Questions? Comments?  Next class: Creation and design of international organisations