Mind-Body Problem: A Historical Overview PDF

Conceptual and Historical Issues in Psychology: The Mind-Body Problem Today. Dr. Alexander Coles B77 [email protected]  Learning opportunities: To explore the historical situatedness of the mind-body problem in psychology. To understand the contemporary relevance of this o...

Conceptual and Historical Issues in Psychology: The Mind-Body Problem Today. Dr. Alexander Coles B77 [email protected]  Learning opportunities: To explore the historical situatedness of the mind-body problem in psychology. To understand the contemporary relevance of this ongoing concern to psychology. To critically engage with contemporary issues concerning the mind- body problem in psychology. 2  The classical mind-body problem: What is ‘the mind’? What is ‘the body’? (How) do the mind and body interact with each other? No single experiment can be designed which would conclusively and unambiguously answer this question. Nor is the mind-body problem the provenance of any single academic discipline. Therefore, the mind-body problem is a philosophical problem. (Sellars, 1918) 3  The psychological Mind-body problem: APA Defines ‘psychology’ as: The study of the mind and behaviour BPS no longer defines psychology (!), but used to define it as: The scientific study of the mind and its influence on behaviour Therefore, psychology has placed itself in a quandary. What are we studying? 4  Traditional positions on the Mind-Body problem: Two broad positions: Dualism: The mind and body are separate entities, capable of exerting mutual influence over each other. Monism: The mind and body are the same entity. 5  Dualisms: Substance dualism: There are two types of ‘thing’, mental and physical. They exist independently of each other. Property dualism: There is only one type of thing, but it has two aspects: Mental and physical. Parallelism: Mental and physical events co-occur purely by chance. Any similarities between them are purely unintentional. (Descartes, 2016; Kim, 2000; Leibniz, 1989) 6  Substance dualism: Plato (425BC – 348BC ish): Tenuous and not in the strictest sense, Plato’s theories map onto dualistic arguments. Plato’s Apology: Argues that there is a corporeal body and an immortal soul. The soul is immortal and immutable, because it resembles the Forms. (Bos, 2002; Gerson, 1986; Plato, 2019) 7  Property dualism: Thomas Acquinas (1225 – 1274): Man is comprised of body and soul. The soul is separate from, yet bound to, the body: The Body is for existence in, and interaction with, the physical world. The soul is ‘the principle of life’, bound to the body and responsible for all intellectual, moral, and volitional activities. The complete human needs body and soul. (Acquinas, 1947; Macnamara, 2009) 8  Dualisms: Sāṃkhya (also Patañjali): 6th or 7th Century BC. Westerners equate the mind with the conscious self. Epitomised by Descartes quip “Cogito ergo sum”. But: It’s not mind vs matter. It’s consciousness vs matter. What we assume are the properties of the mind / body dualism are in fact the assumptions of the mind / body dualism. Choices we make about how to understand something. (Hubert, Awa & Zabelina, 2024; Marchetti, Di Dio, Cangelosi, Manzi & Massaro, 2023; Schweizer, 1993, 2019) 9  Dualisms: Sāṃkhya (also Patañjali): The universe is comprised of two fundamental principles: Purusha: Pure consciousness, spirit. Immutable and unchanging. Prakriti: The material world; matter and nature. Inherently unconscious. Cannot produce consciousness. Constantly evolving. (Hubert, Awa & Zabelina, 2024; Marchetti, Di Dio, Cangelosi, Manzi & Massaro, 2023; Schweizer, 1993, 2019) 10  Dualisms: Sāṃkhya (also Patañjali): The mind (Manas) is a sensory organ and part of Prakriti. The mind exists in the realm of matter, and thus has causal properties. Consciousness is pure awareness. (Hubert, Awa & Zabelina, 2024; Marchetti, Di Dio, Cangelosi, Manzi & Massaro, 2023; Schweizer, 1993, 2019) 11  Cartesian Dualism: René Descartes (1596 – 1650): Trope- namer (Cartesian dualism). Contemporary Psychology’s default position. Cogito, ergo sum. Substance dualism: The mind and brain are made up of separate things. Interaction via the Pineal Gland (NB: they do not). Mind influences the body through volition. Body influences the mind through sensation. (Blum, 2019; Descartes, 2016; Mohammed, 2012) 12  Cartesian Dualism: Pain: The defining feature of existence. Pain is not a property of the mind, but rather a property of the body. Generated by nerve impulses in response to harmful stimuli. Experienced subjectively as ‘pain’. The mind need not get involved. Masochists and Phantom limbs. Bodily sensations (thirst, hunger, pain) demonstrate that the self is inextricably intertwined with the body, even as it is a separate thing. Emotion too is influenced by the mind. We can enter a physiological state &ofCrump, (Birch, Burn, Schnell, Browning excitation, but 2021; Descartes, it 2016; 1972, is up to 2000; Duncan theMacDonald mind to & Leary, 2005) differentiate excitement from fear. 13  Leibniz Parallelism: Mental and physical states cause each other, but are separate processes on separate paths. The mind and brain do not interact directly. They instead live parallel lives. And are caused by God. (Liebniz, 1989; Loptson, 2006; McDonough, 2008) 14  Leibniz Parallelism: Monads: The foundations of reality! Distinct. Apperceptive. Non-interactive. Sufficient Reason. Simple and indivisible. Pre-established harmony. There is no mind-body problem! (Liebniz, 1989; Loptson, 2006; McDonough, 2008) 15  Pause to take stock: Dualisms: There are two types of thing – mind and body. Cartesian Dualism is the default Western philosophical position. The mind and body are separate, and we can only know ourselves. Existence is pain! () 16  Monisms: Paramenides (late 6th Century BC). Reality is a single, monolithic substance. Plurality is a lie! Aristotle (384BC – 322BC): Mental functions are located in the heart. Galen (129AD – 216AD): Mental functions are located in the Brain. The point being, they are primarily and irreducibly bodily sensations. Benedict de Spinoza (1632AD – 1677AD): There is only one substance in the world: Nature / God. An infinite, self-causing substance which encompasses everything. (Bos, 2002; Charlton, 1981; Curd, 1991; Stent, 1998) 17  Substance monism: Spinoza. God is the Universe. And is eternal, enduring, and necessary. There cannot be two substances which are composed of identical stuff. Each thing must be unique (crabs excepted). (Delgado, 2008; Spinoza, 2017) 18  Monisms: Advaita Vedanta The non-dual nature of reality. Hindu Philosophy. “Brahma satyam, jaganmithya, jivobrahmaivanaparah”: “Brahman alone is real; the world is non-real; and the individual Self is essentially not different from Brahman”. (Francis, 2023; Sankaracharya & Madhavananda, 1925; Shankara, 2014) 19  Monisms: Advaita Vedanta Reality is not dual – there is only one underlying form (often known as Brahman: The infinite, unchanging, underlying reality of the universe). Everything else is illusion. The self (Atman) is ultimately identical to the reality (Brahman). Diversity, duality, self-and-other distinctions are illusions based on ignorance of the true nature of the world. Liberation comes from realising this, and breaking the cycle of individual fixation. (Francis, 2023; Sankaracharya & Madhavananda, 1925; Shankara, 2014) 20  Monisms: Advaita Vedanta We intuitively make sense of the world by imposing false understandings on it. This can be stripped away by negation: removing what is not real. e.g. the shapes we see in the dark. We think a pile of clothes is a person, and so we impute personhood on it, an understand it as a living being. This is wrong! As we investigate it, we strip away falsehoods and come to a true understanding of the thing we are looking at. NB: Method of negation is akin to falsification. Popper would be proud! (Francis, 2023; Sankaracharya & Madhavananda, 1925; Shankara, 2014) 21  Monisms: Advaita Vedanta We are conscious essence, not physical matter. > See again, Cogito, ergo sum For Descartes, this was the ultimate in being. For Advaita, Vendata, this superimposition of the ego must also be transcended, in order to reach the ‘true’ reality. “my body” and “my mind” implies that these are things which belong to us, but are not us. (cf “I body” and “I mind”). Your ‘self’ unequivocally exists. And is separate from all it perceives. (Francis, 2023; Sankaracharya & Madhavananda, 1925; Shankara, 2014) 22  Monisms: What kind of substance is it anyway? Idealists: Mental (Berkley, 1881). Materialists: Physical (Churchland, 1988). Neutral Monists: Mental and physical combined (Russel, 1921). (Berkley, 1881; Bos, 2002; Charlton, 1981; Curd, 1991; Spinoza, 2017; Stent, 1998) 23  Material monists: Cartesian dualism impossible, because: It’s not supported by chemistry, physics, or evolutionary biology. Mental phenomena are dependent on neurobiological phenomena (hormones, chemical reactions, myelin sheath, sulci etc). Computer modelling shows complex results can be gleaned from simple unity appropriately organised. There’s no evidence for the existence of a non-physical substance, nor how such a substance would interact with the physical. (Churchland, 1988) 24  So: If the mind and body are different substances which cannot interact, then: Either mind and body do not interact, or: The mind and body are not separate substances (Monism), or: You must hand-wave the problem away... () 25 Dualisms and monisms: () 26  Pause to take stock: Monisms: There is only one type of stuff. Mind and matter. Classic psychological approach: Material monism. It’s all neurobiology. So: Is there even a mind-body problem? () 27  Type-Identity theory A form of Monism. Reduces consciousness to brain states. Mind and Brian are the same. Therefore, physical and mental states are the same too. ‘Pain’ is a mental sate, correlated with the activation of c-fibres and the insula. “I am in pain” just means “The unmylenated c-fibres of my brain are being stimulated”. (Elgin, 2020; Hemmo, & Shenker, 2022; Nagel, 1965) 28  Type-Identity theory Key distinction: Meaning vs Reference. When discussing Mental states, we’re not discussing brain states. The weight of our brain (~3kg) is not the weight of our conscience. Different meanings have the same referent point. Scientific progress with remove the mystique. Just like ‘lightening’ is no longer the magical wrath of the gods! (Elgin, 2020; Hemmo, & Shenker, 2022; Nagel, 1965) 29  Type-Identity theory E.g. emotion: Direct 1-2-1 relationship between emotional states and brain states. Every emotion has an associated pattern of brain activity. Emotions are physical processes. But, what comes first? Neuroanatomy, or feeling? Consider James-Lange theory of emotions. Bundle theory: We can combine different chemical processes in different quantities to make the full gamut of emotional experiences. (Dewey, 1894; Elgin, 2020; Hemmo, & Shenker, 2022; Nagel, 1965; Northoff, 2008) 30  Type-Identity theory Arguments for: Developments in Neuroscience. Show that physical and mental states overlap. Many substances affect both physical and mental states (alcohol, caffine, nicotine). Brain damage can affect both physical and mental states. ‘Resolves’ mind-body problem (by ignoring it). (Dewey, 1894; Elgin, 2020; Hemmo, & Shenker, 2022; Nagel, 1965) 31  Type-Identity theory Arguments against: Equating brain and mind implies different brains should not produce different states. What of AI? What of Qualia? What of Brain plasticity? What of multiple realisability? Ignores mind-body problem (rather than resolving it) Do mental states generalise from individuals to groups? Neuronal chauvinism: Can only neurons support mental states? (Crane, 2012; Dewey, 1894; Elgin, 2020; Hemmo, & Shenker, 2022; Hill, 2012; Horgan, 1996; Nagel, 1965) 32  Epiphenomenalism: Further reduces consciousness to mere neuroanatomy. The brain causes mental states (M1, M2). Mental states have no effect on physical states (P1, P2). The mind is like a ‘bell on a clock’. It has no role in keeping the time. Humans and animals are automata, reflexively responding to stimuli. (Campbell, 2001; Greenwood, 2010; McGilvary, 1910) 33  Epiphenomenalism: E.g emotion: Caused by neurochemical reactions in the brain. No causal efficacy: Cannot influence behaviour, emotion, or thought. So, what purpose do emotions serve? How are people able to act ‘emotionally’? (Campbell, 2001; Greenwood, 2010; McGilvary, 1910) 34  Epiphenomenalism: Arguments for: Neuropsychology: Many reactions and functions do not require conscious functioning. Neurophysiology: Conscious awareness follows the brain state that ‘causes’ it. Behaviourism: Predicated on stimulus and response without reference to mental states. (Campbell, 2001; Greenwood, 2010; McGilvary, 1910) 35  Epiphenomenalism: Arguments against: Evolutionary: If the mind serves no function, why did it evolve? Interactional: How do the mind and body interact? Empirical: The mind can indeed ‘veto’ behaviour! Logical: If the mind cannot affect the brain. How do we know about the mind? (Campbell, 2001; Greenwood, 2010; McGilvary, 1910) 36  Eliminative Materialism: Eliminative: It aims to remove ‘mentalist’ terms. ‘Folk psychology’ terms are prescientific. Therefore… We’re using the wrong concepts to discuss ‘mind’ and ‘body’. No such thing as ‘belief’. Developing science and understanding will surpass these terms and render them obsolete. Like there being only 4 elements. Akin to the Vital Force (élan vital) argument for living and not-living things. (Ramsey, 2021; Slagle, 2020; Stollberg, 2015) 37  Eliminative Materialism: Emotions: Folk-psychological categories which are neither meaningful nor useful. Everything is caused by biological / physiological processes which we do not understand yet. Speak instead of neuroscientific concepts (brain activation, neurotransmitters). Sadness: Psychology moves from behavioural descriptions (raised inner eyebrows, reduced walking speed, reduced motivation) to physiological descriptions (left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation). (Arias, et al., 2020) 38  Eliminative Materialism: Arguments for: History of science riddled with examples of this: Heat → Mean kinetic energy, Phlogiston → Oxidisation (burning), Elan Vital → Organic biochemistry, Witches → hysteria → Mental illness. Folk-psychology akin to folk-physics. Just because we cannot explaining it now... (Ramsey, 2021; Slagle, 2020; Stollberg, 2015) 39  Eliminative Materialism: Arguments against: Counter-intuitive. Logic: Eliminative materialism is a belief. Beliefs are mental states. Either mental states therefore exist, or eliminative materialism does not exist. Eliminative materialism is evidence against itself! Qualia: Can we really dismiss all subjectivity? (Ramsey, 2021; Slagle, 2020; Stollberg, 2015) 40  Eliminative Materialism: Arguments against: Folk-psychological theories easily refutable. Causality: Assumes psychology is grounded in neuroscience. Can we really solve the mind-body problem by just ignoring the mind? We cannot get rid of ‘mental’ talk, and still speak of the same phenomenon just because we kept the hardware. (Block, 1980; Popper, 1979) 41  Neuropsychological approaches: Starting position: How does the mind influence autonomic and endocrine systems (and via that, internal organs)? How, for example, can stress cause ulcers? Insert rabies strains into rats and monkeys and watch how it moves around the brain and body. Researchers therefore can look at what brain areas activate first, under what conditions, and how they cascade through the rest of the anatomy. Stress, for example, starts in cortical areas associated with affect, cognition, and movement and then to the adrenal medulla (Dum, Levinthal & Strick, 2024) 42  Neuropsychological approaches: Anticipating exercise can lead to an increased heart-rate, in preparation of exercise. This research shows (in primates) 11 distinct cortical areas involved in the performance of demanding cognitive tasks and behavioural routines (such as exercising). (Dum, Levinthal & Strick, 2024) 43  Pause to take stock: Psychology loves monist approaches! Type identity theory: Mind and brain are the same. Statements of mind are statements of neuroanatomy. Advances in neuroscience add credence. Advances in AI add doubts. Epiphenomenalism: The brain causes mental states. Mental states have no function. So, what;s the evolutionary point of them? Eliminative materialism: Remove all superstitious ‘mentalist’ terms. Science will out! Illogical argument against its ()own existence. 44  Critiques: Functionalism Mental states are functional relationships between sensory inputs, other states, behavioural outputs. Mental states should be defined by what they do, not where they are found. What of ‘multiple realisability’? In short, it ignores the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness. (Hauser, 1997; Jacquette, 1990; Putnam, 2018; Schweizer, 1993; Searle, 1980) 45  The ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness: Easy problem: How do neurons work? Hard problem: How do experiences work? There is an irrefutably qualitative aspect to consciousness and existence which varies from person to person. Consider your favourite song. If all was a product of physical matter, and we all had the same physical matter, then we should all have the same musical preferences. We must therefore either deny conscious experiences exist, or accept dualistic separations of mind and matter. (Chalmers, 2017; 2020; Silberstein & Chemero, 2011) 46  Critique: The Chinese room. Imagine sitting in a room, where people pass you cards written in a language you do not understand. Input → Syntactical processing rules → Output. (Searle, 1980) 47  Critique: The Chinese room. Processing for input and output forgets about meaning. You’re just following a sequence of rules. The ‘right’ inputs and outputs does not necessarily guarantee a certain mental state response. Computational inputs / outputs does not, cognition, make. But: Are ‘mental representations of phenomenon’ an essential part of cognition? Or does this overemphasise the importance of consciousness? (Searle, 1980) 48  AI: ToM ChatGPT easily passes the Sally-Anne test. Also the Faux Pa task (where ambiguous implicit cues must be identified, interpreted, and acted upon). Careful phrasing of the question needed in order to prompt ChatGPT to give the appropriate response. ToM, an exclusively human trait, may have spontaneously arisen in LLMs? (Brunet-Gouet, Vidal & Roux, 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Marchetti, Di Dio, Cangelosi, Manzi & Massaro, 2023) 49  AI: Creativity More creative than humans at problem solving. 151 Humans vs ChatGPT-4. Alternative uses task, consequences task, divergent associations task. AI more robust at these tasks. Controlling for fluency, AI was more original and elaborate. (Hubert, Awa & Zabelina, 2024) 50  AI: Creativity Rope: As an alternative plant trellis: knotting it at regular intervals for climbing plants to latch onto and create an unusual, vertical garden. Unravel the one solid piece of rope to the point where its strands of rope and make a wig out of it. (Hubert, Awa & Zabelina, 2024) 51  Pause to take stock: Easy problem of consciousness: How does the brain anatomy work? Hard problem of consciousness: How do thoughts and experiences work? Material monist approaches do not answer this. “The Chinese Room”: Inputs and outputs explain nothing. And AI is starting to perform startlingly well in ToM and Creativity tasks. () 52  Panpsychism: Whither consciousness? Perhaps everything is conscious? Everything has mental properties. The Mind is a non-physical property of all things. Physical: Space, time, energy, mass. Mental: Ephemeral, yet fundamental. (Goff, 2017; Matthews, 2011; Mørch, 2014; Seth, 2021; Strawson, 2016; Van Cleve, 1990) 53  Panpsychism: E.g. Emotion: Consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe. Emotions are a fundamental property of consciousness. All things have emotions (to some extent). Thought is not separate form experience. (Goff, 2017; Matthews, 2011; Mørch, 2014; Seth, 2021; Van Cleve, 1990) 54  Panpsychism: Arguments for: Nagel: Four premises. The mind is real. Everything is matter. The mind cannot be reduced to physical states. The mind does not emerge from physical states. (Goff, 2017; Matthews, 2011; Mørch, 2014, 2019; Montemayor, 2019; Seth, 2021; Van Cleve, 1990) 55  Panpsychism: Arguments against: It’s unfalsifiable. It cannot be tested empirically. It’s not even a real theory! Panpsychists claim there’s no evidence against it! (Goff, 2017; Matthews, 2011; Mørch, 2014, 2019; Montemayor, 2019; Seth, 2021; Van Cleve, 1990) 56  Philosophical vs practical problem? Mind-Body problem is not philosophical (re: Seele – not limited to one domain, not conclusively testable). Rather, for psychology it is a pragmatic problem. Mind unequivocally influences body, and vice-versa. Counterfactual reasoning; decision making; induced emotions; meditation; mindfulness; motivation; placebo effects; self- concept; stress; volitional behaviour. (Popper, 1952; Von Bertalanffy, 1964) 57