PDF - Threats of Explosion Standard Operating Guideline

Standard Operating Guideline (SOG) TLEI – Threats of Explosion Effective Date: 01/01/2017 Procedure Number 04-17D Revised Date: Number of Pages...

Standard Operating Guideline (SOG) TLEI – Threats of Explosion Effective Date: 01/01/2017 Procedure Number 04-17D Revised Date: Number of Pages 8 1. Overview On occasion, violent subjects, terrorist, emotionally disturbed persons, or others may threaten to detonate an explosive device or set fire to themselves and/or an occupied structure. These incidents may occur as a standalone event (e.g. single suicide bomber) or in conjunction with a barricaded subject, hostage taking, active shooter, or as part of a Complex Coordinated Attack. The goal of this guideline is to outline some general operational procedures for Salt Lake City Fire Department (SLCFD) personnel when responding to these unique and challenging events. The safe mitigation of these events is a shared responsibility between the SLCFD and Law Enforcement (LE). The response to any incident where an individual threatens personal violence with explosion or fire is a continuum that requires close coordination between LE officers and SLCFD responders at all levels. Optimal outcomes depend on clear communication between both agencies before and during the event. NOTE: This SOG does NOT cover anonymous “bomb threats,” suspicious packages, or known CBRNE incidents (see SLCFD SOG 04-14A). It is geared specifically for incidents when the perpetrator is on scene and has direct access/control of an explosive device or incendiary methods and threatens to do harm to himself and/or others in the immediate area. 2. Definitions Casualty Collection Point (CCP): A specific designated location within the Cold Zone and outside of the Inner Perimeter where casualties are assembled to be triaged, treated, and transported to a medical treatment facility. This is a safe location where SLCFD personnel can interface with LE operations and receive casualties without the threat of injury or violence. CBRNE: Acronym for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (high order/yield). Typically used when referring to weapons of mass destruction employed by terrorists. Concealment: Objects, structural elements, and/or locations that hides an individual from view but does not provide protection from incoming hostile fire. Cover: Objects, structural elements, and/or locations that stops, turns, or impedes incoming hostile fire. Dynamic Risk Assessment: The continuous process of gathering and evaluating information throughout the entire incident in an effort to properly determine the presence of any or all potential hazards or dangerous conditions to public safety personnel and the public that may be 04-17D Threats of Explosion (SOG), Page 1 of 8 present or may occur during an operation to determine the appropriate risk level of that pending operation. Hazardous Devices Unit (HDU): AKA Bomb Squad is a group of LE specialists extensively trained in render safe procedures, explosive destruction, blast mitigation, and post blast investigation. Improvised Explosive Device (IED): A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. Incendiary Device: Any device designed or specially adapted to cause physical harm to persons or property by means of fire and consisting of an incendiary substance or agent and a means to ignite it. Inner Perimeter: A geographically defined area in which subjects are contained. Entrance and egress is controlled by law enforcement. Typically, this is the outer wall of the structure/building or the property boundaries in which the incident occurred. Operational Zones: Geographic locations or areas established based on the severity of the threat or hazard. Hot Zone: The geographic location within the Inner Perimeter in immediate proximity to a known threat (i.e. any uncontrolled area where an subject could directly engage others). Individuals within this zone are capable of taking effective incoming hostile fire or in other ways being injured. Warm Zone: The geographic location either inside or outside of the Inner Perimeter but may still be in the general proximity of a known or potential threat (i.e. an area where LE has either cleared or isolated the threat to a level of minimal or mitigated risk). Individuals within this zone are less likely of taking effective incoming hostile fire through the use of LE perimeter protection, hard cover, structure layout, and/or distance. This area can be considered “clear” but not “secure.” Cold Zone: The geographic location outside of the Inner Perimeter and well away from any known or potential threat. Individuals within this zone are no longer capable of taking any incoming hostile fire through the use of hard cover and distance. When determining Operational Zones, do not get fixated on concentric circles surrounding the scene; zones might be discontinues, asymmetrical, and dynamic depending on the threat’s locations. Outer Perimeter: A larger area encompassing the Inner Perimeter, which is controlled by law enforcement and from which the public is excluded. Typically the city block in which the incident occurred. Suicide Bomber: AKA Homicide Bomber, an individual/terrorist who carries out a bomb/explosive attack knowing that he or she will be killed in the explosion. Suicide Belt/Vest: AKA Explosive Vest/Belt, an improvised explosive device utilizing a belt, vest, backpack, etc. containing explosives and armed with a detonator, worn by suicide bombers. 04-17D Threats of Explosion (SOG), Page 2 of 8  These devices are usually packed with ball bearings, nails, screws, bolts, and other objects that serve as shrapnel to maximize the number of casualties in the explosion. SWAT Team: An acronym for Special Weapons And Tactics. A group specially trained and equipped LE officers whose mission is the safe resolution of high-risk law enforcement tactical operations. Tactical Command: Commands and coordinates the tactical law enforcement response within the inner perimeter of an incident. Tactical Operations Center (TOC): The location where law enforcement tactical operations are coordinated through the incident’s LE Tactical Commander. The TOC may or may not be co- located with the Unified Command Post. Tactical Medics (TMs): Specially trained and equipped SLCFD personnel currently assigned to the SLCPD SWAT Team. They are sworn SFOs/LEOs and trained in the principles of TECC/TCCC and LE tactical operations. Unified Command: Incident management performed by representatives of several agencies to assure that a consistent response plan is developed and deployed and that all actions are performed in a safe, well-coordinated manner. 3. Guideline Active threats of explosives and fire as a weapon require close coordination with law enforcement at all levels utilizing the Incident Command System. These events shall initially be under the command of law enforcement; most likely the Salt Lake City Police Department (SLCPD). As SLCFD units arrive in staging or on scene, a Fire Command for the responding SLCFD and EMS units shall be established as well. Every effort shall be made to create a Unified Command with law enforcement at a common Command Post as soon as is practically possible. Communication with law enforcement is crucial. Based on the dynamics of the incident, SLCFD assets shall either work under a Unified Command organization or as an EMS, Rescue, or Fire Branch, Division, or Group. A. The first arriving SLCFD unit on scene shall: 1. Confirm the nature of the incident (e.g. suicide bomber, incendiary threat, etc.). 2. Respond to an initial staging area in close proximity to the incident but at a safe location. The decision to stage is based on pre-arrival information from the Dispatch Center and the direction of the on scene law enforcement officers (see SLCFD SOG 06-12). SLCFD units should not respond directly to the scene until instructed to do so by the Dispatch Center and/or the on scene law enforcement officers. 3. Upon arrival, provide a scene size-up to the Dispatch Center and other responding units. Consider designating a specific approach route for other responding units. 4. Establish initial Fire Command for SLCFD resources and amend the response as needed. 5. Designate a staging area for other responding units. Consider an area that is not in direct line of sight or in immediate proximity to the scene. This may be a predetermined area developed from preplanning for a specific event or location. 04-17D Threats of Explosion (SOG), Page 3 of 8  Parking both at the beginning and throughout the event is critical to the response. Traffic corridors shall be established early providing for both access to the scene and egress. NOTE: If casualties are encountered immediately upon arrival, first arriving SLCFD units may have to designate a temporary Triage Unit Leader who will have the responsibility of coordinating the immediate triage and movement of casualties to impromptu treatment areas. B. Upon establishing Command, the IC shall: 1. Assume command of the SLCFD resources. When possible, co-locate with the on scene, in-charge law enforcement agency IC and establish a Unified Command. Establish a Command Post if not otherwise established. 2. Work with the law enforcement IC to identify the Operational Zones, possibly by making use of a map or drawing, and ensure that SLCFD or other non-law enforcement personnel do not enter the area. 3. Conduct and continue a Dynamic Risk Assessment 4. Provide a quick briefing to all resources on scene. 5. Request additional resources for an MCI and fire suppression as needed. 6. If the possibility for numerous casualties exists, determine the location of the Casualty Collection Point and reroute responding EMS resources to that area. 7. If it is discovered that the IED has CBRNE potential, activate a HazMat response. 8. Make any Working Incident or other notifications as per SOP. 9. Make a special call for the SLCFD Tactical Medics on duty and have them respond to the scene. 10. Consider utilizing a Tac channels and/or common radio channel for communications. Standard IED guidelines against the use of cell phones and radios may not be applicable in some situations as there may be an overriding need for a rapid, coordinated response. C. A pre-detonation response takes place before there is an explosion or a fire is ignited. If there is a report of a possible suicide bomber, little time will be available for law enforcement intervention if the suspect is indeed a suicide bomber, especially when he is possibly moving toward his intended target. Recommended tactics may include: Command should be prepared to establish flexible evacuation and containment areas. Rapid communications will be vital. If there is an explosion immediately upon arrival, there must be a controlled response into the hazard area. SLCFD personnel shall not touch or handle any type of IED or other suspicious device. SLCFD personnel should use cover and distance when possible. If the suspect is neutralized and there is no explosion, SLCFD personnel shall not render aid to the suspect until directed to do so by Command and only after a thorough search has been completed by the HDU. The suspect may only be injured, and a “handler” could still detonate the device remotely. All devices should be considered live. HDU members or robots must first approach and clear a bomber or suspected bomber. 04-17D Threats of Explosion (SOG), Page 4 of 8 D. A trans-incident response occurs when the bomber attempts to detonate the device and it malfunctions or partially detonates, or when the suicide bomber wishes to surrender. Tactical considerations may include: SLCFD personnel shall not approach the subject and shall retreat if subject approaches them. Suicide bombers appearing to surrender may do so as a ruse to draw in and kill law enforcement personnel and other responders. Even if a suicide bomber sincerely wants to surrender, a second party (handler) may initiate the detonation remotely. Should a suicide bomber wish to surrender, minimum standoff distances must be maintained. LE officers will instruct the suicide bomber to remove all clothing and explosive devices. Once completed, HDU personnel will handle the bomber, clothing items, and explosive devices remotely using special equipment. SLCFD personnel will only approach the suspect to render medical aid once he or she has been cleared by the HDU. E. A post-detonation response takes place after an explosion. A suicide bombing has the overwhelming potential for a large number of casualties and fatalities. SLCFD personnel should expect a chaotic situation. Tactical considerations may include: SLCFD personnel may be requested to assist LE officers in immediately dispersing any crowds. Prior to responding farther into the scene, Command should ensure that HDU technicians have searched for secondary explosive devices on loitering individuals and the general area. Based on intelligence from the HDU, casualties may need to be quickly removed from the area to the CCP in a secure location. Biohazard issues will need to be addressed rapidly, as these scenes can have multiple traumatic injuries in one small location. Decontamination may be required. Immediately monitor for other hazards such as chemical agents, gases, and radioactive materials. If there are any signs of structural collapse or potential collapse, call for the Heavy rescue Team to respond. SLCFD personnel shall not touch or handle any type of IED or suspicious device. SLCFD personnel shall not approach the suspect or suspect’s remains regardless of their condition. Undetonated or partially detonated explosives or secondary devices may be present. HDU personnel or robots must be the first to approach a bomber or suspected bomber no matter how long the wait. SLCFD personnel must be aware of the possibility of secondary devices and snipers/shooters in the area. Position resources accordingly using cover and distance. These types of events have targeted responders in the past. Emergency vehicles that are/were inside the blast/crime scene should be left in place until the HDU can determine they are safe to move and that moving them will not destroy key evidence. Plan on an intensive media response. This will be a very fluid, dynamic situation. Remember: responders have been killed at these types of incidents. 04-17D Threats of Explosion (SOG), Page 5 of 8 F. If active fire starts or exists, Command shall establish a Fire Group. The Fire Group is configured to suppress fires and coordinate any other SLCFD non-EMS operational needs of the incident. Additional groups (e.g. HRT, HazMat, etc.) may need to be created or developed as well, based upon the dynamics of the incident. The Fire Group Supervisor shall: 1. Determine the type and number of SLCFD resources needed and request that they respond to a designated safe staging area. 2. Request/secure Force Protection as needed. Designate and operate on a separate radio channel from the rest of the event. 3. Confirm that open travel routes exist for responding fire apparatus and establish a safe staging area. 4. Communicate the boundaries of the incident’s Operational Zones to all companies and ensure that SLCFD personnel stay out of those areas that hold a threat of violence. 5. Under no circumstances should SLCFD personnel enter or move through the Hot Zone areas to deploy ladders, hose lines, or other equipment. 6. Be aware that fire could be used as a weapon. 7. Consider allowing active fire to burn until the security and safety of fire suppression personnel can be confirmed by law enforcement. G. If there is a possibility for or presence of multiple casualties, Command should request an SLCFD Active Shooter Event Assignment (SLCFD SOG 04-17A) and/or an MCI Assignment (SLCFD SOG 06-5B) to standby at the scene. A suicide bombing has the potential for large numbers of casualties with very traumatic injuries. Some seriously injured casualties may have no visible wounds, and many casualties may be beyond help. Expect numerous types of traumatic injuries resulting from blast pressure, burns, and shrapnel. Command should establish a Medical Group and SLCFD resources should prepare for RTF and MCI operations as per SOG. The Medical Group is configured to receive the casualties and manage the triage, treatment, transfer and transportation of casualties from the Casualty Collection Point to the local hospitals. The Medical Group Supervisor shall: 1. Before or as part of the initial triage, ensure that a body search for weapons is performed on all persons entering the Casualty Collection Point from the incident sight. 2. Implement the SLCFD Mass Casualty policy, as well as the District 2B Protocol (Mass Casualty Incident Plan) and the Triage and Treatment Protocol. 3. Assign Triage, Treatment, Transfer, and Transport officers. 4. Confirm that open travel routes exist for responding EMS vehicles to access the Casualty Collection Point and that the path away from the incident area is clear for ambulances when transporting to the hospital. 5. Direct the Dispatch Center to advise local hospitals to prepare to receive casualties of an IED attack MCI. 6. Ensure documentation for all casualties is complete. H. Secondary device recognition and management. While the safe management and disarming of IEDs is primarily a law enforcement responsibility, all responders must be aware of the potential for a secondary device and be able to recognize a potential IED if they encounter one. Primary and secondary devices come in all different shapes, sizes, and configurations 04-17D Threats of Explosion (SOG), Page 6 of 8  from obvious pipe bombs to backpacks and boxes to suicide vests/belts on bystanders to vehicles. If a secondary device or potential device is discovered: 1. Immediately stop and verbally alert others around of the potential IED. 2. Rapidly determine the best course of action (i.e. retreat and isolate the area, mark and bypass the device, halt and shelter in place, etc.). If in doubt, retreat. 3. Restrict the use of wireless devices and radios in the immediate area. 4. Communicate with Command from a safe location (consider using a “runner”) describing what was found, it’s location, and the team’s course of action. SLCFD members shall not investigate or attempt in any way to disarm any IED or potential IED. That is a specific law enforcement function (i.e. SLCPD Hazardous Devices Unit) and coordinated directly through Unified Command. I. Operational Withdrawal. Due to the dynamic nature of these incidents, certain conditions, situations, or events may occur which could endanger SLCFD personnel beyond a reasonable risk. If any of the following occur during the deployment of SLCFD resources, Command should consider activating an operational withdrawal or abandonment of the structure/area as per SLCFD SOG 04-33A. 1. Discovery of additional IEDs. 2. Active gunfire directed at SLCFD personnel or in close proximity. 3. Additional explosions or the sudden ignition of fire. 4. Significant injury to an SLCFD member or LE officer. Note that in this situation, immediate and aggressive rescue may be the best course of action. 5. Release or discovery of a hazardous material or CBRNE/WMD device. 6. Any other Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) condition. J. Other general SLCFD considerations: 1. Do NOT Self-Dispatch. Safety and accountability issues are only some of the problems caused by this. If not formally requested by the Dispatch Center, SLCFD apparatus and personnel shall not respond to the scene. 2. Use extreme caution when approaching the scene and minimize personnel exposed to unnecessary risk throughout the operation. Utilize cover and distance. 3. Consider turning off emergency lights and warning devices before arrival. 4. If bystanders become hostile, extricate yourself and advise Command. 5. For larger geographic incidents or incidents with travel barriers, consider the use of multiple staging areas and Casualty Collection Points. 6. Work as teams or in pairs as a minimum. Never go anywhere alone. 7. When deploying SLCFD personnel on special assignments, if possible assign a team spotter. Their role is to observe, identify, and avoid threats while the balance of the team executes their tactical assignment. 8. Consider the possibility of secondary devices designed to injure responders. If this is a real possibility, designate a second level of staging for the balance of responding resources until they are needed and can be advanced in safely. 9. While the saving of life is the primary role of SLCFD responders, all personnel on scene should remain cognizant of the need for crime scene preservation. Do not touch or move items unnecessarily or in other ways alter the scene. Report any suspicious object, activity, or persons to LE immediately. 04-17D Threats of Explosion (SOG), Page 7 of 8  10. Any and all clothing or items transported with the casualties should be kept and collected at the hospital using best practices in preserving any items of evidentiary value. The hospital(s) must be informed of the importance of keeping clothing and/or items that are or could be of use for LE investigative purposes. 11. Keys shall be left in all response vehicles as the need to shift or move vehicles is critical, should the need arise. K. Tactical Law Enforcement Incidents can take many hours to completely resolve. Although the scene may appear to be static, until the suspect(s) is in custody and all potential threats neutralized, these incidents present the potential to turn deadly without notice. It is essential that SLCFD personnel remain alert to their surroundings and situations at all times and closely monitor all developments. 04-17D Threats of Explosion (SOG), Page 8 of 8