Firefighter Rapid Intervention and Mayday Awareness

Introduction to Rapid Intervention and Maydays

• It is possible for firefighters to become trapped and need to call a Mayday during any stage of a fire.
• Data from Project Mayday shows that downed firefighters is something that can happen anytime, anywhere, and to anyone.
• As Bobby Athanas of FDNY Rescue 3 put it, firefighting can become very real very quickly.
• Alan Brunacini said that the IC should be the biggest pessimist on the fireground.
• An IC cannot rest until all firefighters are home safely.
• Firefighters can be trapped or killed in the first few minutes of a fire, during overhaul, or at any point in between.
• Incident Commanders and tactical supervisors must never let their guard down.
• During a structure fire, the building is essentially undergoing demolition.
• A building becomes more unstable the longer it burns.
• Gravity and the weight of water continue to exert stress on the building, even after the fire is out.
• Structural components of buildings are not designed to withstand the impact of flames, forcible entry, and water.
• Lightweight construction can fail rapidly due to its inability to withstand direct flame impingement.
• Conditions at structure fires can change in mere seconds.

Prevention

• Preventing a Mayday is more important than curing it.
• Every firefighter, driver, and officer must ensure the following at the beginning of each shift:
• SCBA cylinder is full and straps are in working order
• Portable radio battery is full
• PPE is in good condition without rips, tears, or defects
• Have your portable radio on the correct tactical channel when headed to a fire or emergency.
• Be aware of the Incident Action Plan (IAP), priorities, strategies, and tactics to understand the risk/gain threshold.
• Take a moment to take a deep breath and size up the scene, considering the big picture.
• Always wear all PPE, including hood, gloves, and SCBA (including waist strap) when in an Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) atmosphere.
• Conduct a walk around of the building before entering if possible.
• Be aware of the location of the fire and building layout before entry.
• Know the Value Point (VP).
• Know who your boss is.
• Know your job.

Incident Command Responsibilities

• ICs need to reinforce expectations through personal example and by ensuring their rig, radio, and PPE are ready at the start of each shift.
• Astute ICs start each shift with a reminder that a Mayday, civilian rescue, or both could occur.
• Divisions or groups should be set up early to prevent Maydays, including strip mall fires.
• Tactical supervisors fill the tactical gap to identify risks that might be overlooked by crews and the IC.
• Division A supervisor prevented crews from going underneath an unsupported mansard potentially preventing a mayday, that collapsed seconds later.
• Radio traffic should be minimized, and face-to-face communication maximized, so critical traffic can be transmitted during a Mayday and safety transmissions can prevent it.
• Accountability should be maintained in real-time with eyes-on and hands-on supervision to ensure alignment with the overall strategy and prevent freelancing.
• Proactive, decentralized incident command is a key factor in preventing or managing Maydays.
• Division and group supervisors bridge the tactical gap and can identify unfolding dangers that could lead to severe fire events or collapses.
• Rapid intervention crews are completely reactive while tactical supervisors prevent incidents from occurring.
• Statistics show that rapid intervention crews only rescue downed firefighters 6% of the time.
• Most downed firefighters are rescued by nearby crews inside the structure.
• Tactical supervisors have the responsibility of forecasting problems and stopping task-focused firefighters from going into bad situations.
• The number one issue in the NIOSH 5 is inadequate risk assessment and that key factor should be avoided.
• Having a guardian angel (tactical supervisor) keeps personnel from taking unnecessary risks.
• It is important to be aggressive and smart.

Case Study: Christmas Eve Mayday

• Sacramento Metro Fire and Sacramento City Fire share a border and respond on automatic aid to incidents in either jurisdiction.
• Common residential response levels include two BCs, four engines, two trucks, and one medic, while a second alarm brings the same resources.
• BC3 (City) and BC5 (Metro) responded to a house fire with three people trapped inside, BC3 was notified en route.
• This info was immediately passed to the units on their TAC channel.
• BC3 requested an additional medic, initiated a second alarm due to serious rescue anticipations and difficult access + heavy fire conditions.
• Radio traffic on the TAC channel became overwhelming but Division C was established and Division A objective began.
• Division A objective included completing a primary search, fire attack, and coordinated vent with the truck on the roof.
• One of the engines was finishing a bottle change when a muffled voice said, “I’m lost, I’m out of air, I NEED HELP!”
• Crews located the firefighter with the Mayday and quickly removed them from the IDLH zone.
• The Battalion Chief queued up a "then/what if" scenario due to limited awareness of first-day probie staffing the area.
• BCs must be able to hear multiple radio channels by having their radios on all day.
• An update from dispatch occurred while units were finishing an automatic TAC channel roll call, this allowed acknowledgement of dispatch.
• Requesting an immediate supplemental ambulance on the primary city channel enabled advising units en route, helping them better prepare for the next actions.
• Standing down the aggressive suppression efforts was decided upon through confirmed clear alls.
• To think of the then/what if, IC should establish a division/group supervisor to make tactical decisions based on information gathered from a forward position.
• Division/group supervisors help limit radio traffic by having face-to-face communications with task-level crews.
• Division supervisors helped so the Mayday was not walked on due to too much radio traffic.
• This Christmas Eve fire had 3 victims already pulled out and 2 under CPR so the scene was charged and needed coordination.
• This was able to be achieved as the BCs met nearly every rotation either in the form of training or coffee sit-down, developing confidence and trust.
• Gratitude to division supervisors being hostile, agile, and mobile filling the tactical gap was overwhelming.
• Filling the tactical gap enabled the IC to to have a focused, proactive perspective at the strategic level.
• Pacing decisions ahead of the incident power curve led to a safe and effective conclusion.

Two-Out Crews and Back-Up Lines

• Disparities exist in American firefighting due to the interpretation, terminology, procedures, and use of lines to fulfill the Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.134 (g)(3) and (g)(4) “two-in/two-out” regulation.
• Examples of line terminology include “two-out line", "back-up line,” “secondary line,” “initial rapid intervention team (IRIT) line."
• It is important to establish a RIC before two-out line is stretched.
• Some agencies treat every building as occupied in order to elude the regulation and enter immediately.
• Firefighters want to know the "why" behind any policy or SOG.
• Two-out policies that are in place just to stay out of trouble or prevent OSHA fines are likely to be ignored.
• Properly placed, staffed, and utilized two-out lines have saved lives and prevented catastrophic outcomes.
• Crews sometimes wait for too long outside of a fire or scene due to the two-out regulation.
• The two-out regulation exists and that is where the confusion lies.

OSHA Standard (1910.134(g)(3))

• For all IDLH atmospheres, employers must ensure that:
  • One employee, or more if needed, is located outside the IDLH atmosphere.
  • Visual, voice, or signal line communication is maintained between the employee(s) in the IDLH atmosphere and those outside.
  • Those outside the IDLH atmosphere are trained and equipped to provide effective emergency rescue, and if needed, are notified.
  • A designee authorized by the employer is notified and provides necessary assistance.
  • Employee(s) outside the IDLH atmospheres have pressure demand/other positive pressure SCBAs, or a prssure demand/other positive pressure supplied air respirator with auxiliary SCBA.
• Appropriate retrieval equipment is available, or equivalent rescue means are available without increasing overall risk.

OSHA Standard (1910.134(g)(4)) Procedures for Interior Structural Firefighting

• In addition to requirements under paragraph (g)(3), employers shall ensure:
• At least two employees enter the IDLH atmosphere and are in visual/voice contact at all times
• At least two employees are located outside the IDLH atmosphere
• All persons in interior structural firefighting use SCBAs.
• One of the two people outside the IDLH can take on other roles like incident commander/safety officer, as long as they can help, or preform rescue activities without jeopardizing the safety of anyone at risk.
• This doesn't mean firefighters shouldn't preform rescue activities before an entire team is assembled.
• A hoteline and a rapid intervention crew are not mentioned above.
• Each Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) has to follow fire safety.
• 1910.134 (g)(3) and (g)(4) are meant to balance the safety of firefighters with that of civilians needing rescue. IC has to balance this with Value Point analysis.
• As an IC or divison supervisor, you can preform two-out supervision.
• In house fire with 2 three-person engines, a minimum fire actack can operate, a second two-out line and a water supply can be secued and then one IC could command the scene.
• A RIC is three-person crew, ready to rescue firefighters.
• An RIC will have equipment cached in advance of a firefighter down to expedite the response during a Mayday, like spare SCBA and RIT pack with umbilical air.
• A powered circular and chain saws might be needed.
• Rescue rope bags and accessories should be read.
• EMS equipment should always be present.
• Size up the incident with divison supervisors and command to assess coordination skills and resource status.
• A rapid intervention plan and what extent is staffed will be indicated by Value Point annalysis..
• Civilian victims always take priority.
• Apartment fires should be addressed with rapid response teams and multiple resources.

Case Study: Lullwater Incident

• Operations were transitioned to defensive mode and exterior liness and a ladder pipe were activated.
• An assessment was made where crews were sent back in for overhaul.
• While cutting the casement window, a cornace fell across the ladder.
• It was decided that interior crews would exit the structure. Crew began to exit the process.
• A low rumble was head and a burst of dust occured. Four members were working 2nd floor.
• A large section of roof came down pilling firefighters.
• Notify command of collapse and declared mayday, and advised will no longer be C divison supervisor.
• Chief responded to the rear and new C divison asssumed.
• A firefigher pinned against the wall was quickly removed.
• It was decided that heavy equipment would be requested.
• Air bags were requested back in case.
• Sixteen minutes into to mayday, the firefighters were freed who was on full PPE. He was able to reach his regulator disconnect to the roof collapse.
• First house crewed had metal castments, and other department abraisive blade cut that metal.

Takeaways from Lullwater Incident

• The roof had a lot of weight.
• Too much manpower was being used instead of waiting for special equipment.
• Always trust intuition.

ICS and Communications for Maydays

• First step is to calm down, and then the alarm will follow.
• The IC does these tasks, it's equal to all transmissions to equal the IC.
• Southwest Supermarket Fire in Phoenix showed if takes 12 firefighters to get 1 out.
• Medical should ALWAYS be on all working fires.
• Coordinate support and bridge gaps, and maintain alignment effectiveness is what an IC does.
• Tactical bosses and the IC always need to preform "then what if" scenarios.
• Stop radio transmissions.
• Conduct LUNAR report.
• Verify to all members the contents of the LUNAR report.
• Division of supervisor of the firefighters/company should meet up with RIC, confirm LUNAR and develop action plans.
• Make sure the IC approves all tactics and plans.
• Call addition alarms if needed.
• Objectives should be firefighters rescued.

House Fire Incident

• There was a 1 story house on E101.
• As E101 began a attack, a two-out line was made byE 20 to protect E101.
• More water was asked for becaus ethe fire required more water.
• Division A was assigned to E103 and TR20, whose line was staffed with help and pulled over.
• The roof on TR 106 had a roof divsion of captain.
• RIC was created with E105.
• Med group was placed at M19.
• 3 min in, a rear patio came down.
• E20 said mayday and stated E101 was in fine position.
• Because of all this prep that day the day was dealt with successful.
• Medical came to ICU.
• TR106 was ready to call on the further augment by other alarms.

Case Study: Carr Incident

• Dressed as first responders you show up to the scene.
• After 25 minutes you and one of the firefighters fall in the basement basment.
• There was 6 of 7 people living inside a one bedroom flat.
• The incident started with rescuers of some cilvillans from the floors above.
• The rapid response then fell through.
• Discuss all siturations wit h other firefighters and officers.
• Expext the unexpected and figuire it our.

Acronym EDWARD

• Emergency delcarartion clearnings all messages and LUNAR reports.
• Deploy the RIC and may timer begins.
• Warn dispatch and what frequencys will be used.
• Aditional alarms sound and extra staging of fire.
• Rolling PAR accountability.
• Doubling resources and also helping the already estabablished RIC.

Carr Incident Complications

• Standard roitiene was messed up and interfed with proper 360 degree report.
• Minute Delay interfeered.
• 1st in capitan officer made it difficult to tell what and were the proper source of the blaze was.
• Comopanys are to brifed on the radio transmission to be able to be properly listened in.
• Groups need to be held accountible by managers, and they need the prooper tranning.
• After what happened there was reminder that if fire below the fire it neeceds to checked.
• There has to be high quality rapid action and supervisors must not fail.

Sumarry

• Get back home all the troops after any call.
• Value points let the officers see were gain and risk lie on scene.
• Then and What if so something commanders must think forward to.

Chapter Review

• Make divions to cut down maydays happening.
• Two in Two outs and proper training.
• LUNAR report for safety.
• RIT must be able to conduct tactical considerations.
• There the FESHE and the other things that help rapid responders.
• This can be utialized to prep you for any training that needs to happen.