Rapid Intervention And Maydays PDF

Rapid Intervention Fig. 12-0. Los Angeles City (CA) Firefighter\'s personal protective equipment after the Boyd Street Incident *Source.* Photo courtesy of Rick McClure Introduction Firefighters have been trapped and Maydays have been called during all phases of a fire (fig. 12-0). Many statis...

Rapid Intervention Fig. 12-0. Los Angeles City (CA) Firefighter\'s personal protective equipment after the Boyd Street Incident *Source.* Photo courtesy of Rick McClure Introduction Firefighters have been trapped and Maydays have been called during all phases of a fire (fig. 12-0). Many statistics have been captured by such enterprises as Project Mayday that give compelling data regarding downed firefighters. The bottom line is that it can happen anytime, anywhere, and to anyone. As a firefighter of 32 years, I (Anthony Kastros) have sustained burns to the face, had my SCBA mask come off during an interior attack and had to evacuate, fallen through a roof, been the primary caregiver of a downed firefighter who was a friend, and been the IC of a Mayday on a house fire. As my dear friend Bobby Athanas of FDNY Rescue 3 once said, "This job gets real, really quick." Alan Brunacini had a quote that fits: "The IC should be the biggest pessimist on the fire­ ground." You cannot and *must* not rest until all your firefighters are home safely back at their fire stations after a fire. Firefighters have been trapped or killed in the first few minutes of arriving on scene of a fire, during overhaul, and everywhere in between. As the IC or tactical supervisor, you must *never* let your guard down, nor let your firefighters do so. Consider the following facts: During a structure fire, a building is under demolition. The longer the building burns, the more unstable it becomes. Gravity and weight of water also put stress upon the building and continue to do so after the fire is extinguished. Buildings are not designed to remain intact when flames, forcible entry, and water impact their structural components. Lightweight construction may fail rapidly within a few minutes because it is not designed nor intended to withstand the impact of direct flame impingement. Conditions in structure fires can change in seconds. An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure  The old adage, "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" is never more appropriate than for preventing a Mayday. As we have described and reinforced in this text, the work done *before* the fire may prevent the Mayday in the first place. How so? Well, it all starts with you! Every firefighter, driver, and officer *must* ensure the fol­ lowing at the beginning of each and every shift. Remember, every company and chief officer sets the example: Your SCBA cylinder is full and all straps on your pack and mask are in working order. Your portable radio battery is full and not left on during your shift. Your PPE is in working order, free from rips, tears, defects, or hazardous materials that would cause it to not protect you. When responding to and arriving at a fire or other emergency scene, ensure you: Have your portable radio on the correct tactical channel when responding to a fire. Know the IAP, priority, strategy, and tactics on your incident. This will give you the risk/ gain threshold. Take a deep breath and size up the situation. Look at the big picture before you experi­ ence tunnel vision on the fire. Wear all your PPE, including hood, gloves and SCBA (including waist strap) when in the IDLH atmosphere, or over the IDLH (roof operations). Get a lap of the building before entering, when possible. Know where the fire is and the layout of the building before entering, when possible. Know the VP. Know who your boss is. Know what your j ob is. From the IC standpoint, you should do all of the above and have reinforced your expecta­ tions through your example. Chiefs, you are first a firefighter. Ensure your rig, radio, and PPE is ready at the beginning of each shift. The astute IC (any officer) begins each shift with a sober reminder that either a Mayday, a civilian rescue, or *both* could happen any day. Once on scene, setting up divisions or groups early can prevent a Mayday in the first place in the following ways: Tactical supervisors are in the tactical gap to see risk that could be missed by crews and the IC, thereby preventing a Mayday. This was the case on a strip mall fire. The Division A supervisor prevented crews from going underneath an unsupported mansard. Seconds later, it collapsed. Radio traffic is minimized, and face-to-face communication is maximized. This will also allow critical traffic to be transmitted during a Mayday and may prevent it with safety transmissions. Accountability is eyes-on and hands-on in real time. This maintains alignment with the overall strategy and risk management plan and keeps crews from freelancing or getting into untenable conditions. The philosophy of proactive and decentralized incident command is, in itself, a key component in either preventing a Mayday outright, or managing one much more calmly and effectively. When division and group supervisors are in place, they have bridged the tactical gap and can see bad things unfolding (ounce of prevention). They can stop crews from going into a space that is going to collapse or have a significant fire event. They can grab firefighters by the straps and say, "What are you doing? Don't go in there. The floor is going to give way!" Conversely, relying solely on the rapid intervention crews is completely reactive (pound of cure). According to Project Mayday by Don Abbott, the crew assigned to rapid intervention only rescues downed firefighters 6% of the time (fig. 12-1).^1^ *The vast majority of downed firefighters are rescued by other* *nearby crews inside the structure. This means less radio traffic* *is required through tactical supervision of companies.* Remember, as the safety officer of their respective division or group, the tactical supervisor is in place to forecast bad things and prevent task-focused firefighters from jumping into a bad situation. As a division supervisor, I have pulled firefighters out of buildings that were about to collapse, held them back from walls that were about to fall, and stopped them from going into areas they had no business going into. Most of the time, the IC never knew. Number one on the NIOSH 5 is inadequate risk assessment. This is a key factor in every Mayday and firefighter LODD that has ever happened. Having a guardian angel (tactical super­ visor) over your shoulder keeps you from unnecessary risk. Good firefighters are aggressive, great firefighters are aggressive *and* smart. Yet, we all miss the bigger picture when the fire is lulling us into its grasp. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Christmas Eve Mayday CHIEF KILEY KEELEY, SACRAMENTO (CA) METRO FIRE AND CHIEF RUSTY VAN VUREN, SACRAMENTO CITY (CA) FIRE DEPARTMENT Battalion Chief Kiley Keeley: Christmas Eve night was a cool evening with calm winds and light intermittent rain in Sacramento, CA. Late in the evening (2246 hours dis­ patch time), a fire would break out in a home in North Sacramento, within the City of Sacramento's borders. This is an older part of the city, with small homes. These large-lot property homes often have multiple non-permit-approved additions that have been constructed over the years. This house fire was one of these types of buildings. Sacramento City Fire and Metro Fire share a border, and throughout the years our agencies have developed a great relationship, where we respond on automatic aid with­ out respect to jurisdiction. We share common SOGs, and the battalion chiefs commonly train together for larger-scale incidents to be familiar with our expectations of other responding BC duties upon arrival, including full turnouts, SCBAs, and two handheld radios. Our common residential response levels include two BCs, four engines, two trucks, and one medic. A second alarm receives the same type and kind of resources. BC3 (City) and BC5 (Metro) were the responding BCs on the first alarm. Unknown to the crews upon dispatch, three people were trapped inside. However, BC3 was updated en route and it was immediately passed on to the responding units on their TAC (tactical) chan­ nel. An additional medic was also immediately requested by BC3. Given the serious rescue anticipations and difficult access, along with an initially incorrect street and heavy fire conditions faced by first arriving crews, BC3 (as the IC) quickly ordered a second alarm, including additional ambulances. I was on duty at Sacramento Metro Fire Battalion 7 and responded as part of the second-alarm assignment. As I got in the buggy and began driving to the scene, the TAC channel was overwhelmed with crews dragging victims out of the house, crews fighting the fire, coordinating vent, protecting exposures, and other pertinent radio traffic that the IC relies upon to maintain his/her plan for the incident. Upon my arrival, I checked in with the IC at his command post. He let me know that BC5 was Division C and he assigned me to run Division A. The objectives for Division A were to complete a primary search, fire attack, and coordinated vent with the truck on the roof. I made my way forward through the front yard strewn with cars and waist-high household debris to find the last of the victims being removed from the house and placed onto the gurney for transport to the hospital. Crews were outside and I was able to have face-to-face updates as to the status of the search and where the seat of the fire was. One of the engines in my division was finishing a bottle change when a muffled voice came over the radio Tm lost, I'm out of air, I NEED HELP!" I looked at the engine with fresh bottles and said, "That was a Mayday get inside and start searching. Listen to the radio for the name, unit, conditions, actions, needs (NUCAN)." Crews went to work to locate the firefighter with the Mayday. He was quickly located and removed from the IDLH zone with no injuries, thanks to the quick efforts of the men and women on scene. Battalion Chief Rusty Van Vuren: I responded from quarters with the units that would be first on scene with situational awareness of E20 having an acting captain as well as a first-day probie, along with multiple crews affected by the Christmas holiday. So, a "then/what if" mindset was queued up well before this particular dispatch. For BCs, the ability to hear multiple radio channels is incredibly important and can only be honed by having your radios on all day, regardless of whether one is on the inci­ dent or not. The update for confirmed victim profile from dispatch happened while units respond­ ing were finishing an automatic TAC channel roll call. This allowed me to acknowl­ edge dispatch and request an immediate supplemental ambulance on the primary city channel before immediately advising units en route. This gave them the chance to make that next mental prep within their rigs and avoid surprise. That same "then/what if" is what has one ready to make important decisions that ulti­ mately are validated when the "what if" occurs. In this case, additional ambulances and the second-alarm units were both quickly available for the additional victims. The incident power curve continued to rise and fall throughout the incident due to the rescues, Mayday, multiple roofs, a gas meter that was hidden inside the fire building, and interior access issues. We BCs decided that we would stand down the aggressive suppression efforts after a confirmed all clear was announced after secondary searches. Takeaways from this incident: In order for command to live in the "then/what if," the IC should establish a division/ group supervisor to make tactical decisions based on information gathered from a forward position. Oftentimes, from the command post all you can see is a glow and some smoke rising above the apparatus. Division/group supervisors provide great intel and will help to limit radio traffic by having face-to-face communications with the task-level crews (this was a critical point accomplished by both BC5 and BC7). Without divisions on this fire, the Mayday could have been walked on, or not heard, due to the need for radio transmissions to command. With this being a Christmas Eve fire, three victims already pulled out and two under cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), the scene was highly charged and needed forward coordination. Communication between BCs that fill these roles begins well before the incident. The manner and reason this was achieved is/was because the BCs meet nearly every rotation either in the form of training or coffee sit-down, where we learn each oth­ er's preferences, personalities, strengths, and weaknesses. This creates a relation­ ship of confidence and trust that eliminates ego and territorialism. This naturally trickles through to the crews as well, who eventually were doing inter-departmental station drills on their own to create a borderless feeling of a team. Personal note from the incident commander: The sense of gratitude I had for my divi­ sion supervisors (BC7 and BC5) after an incident like this was overwhelming. Their work that day, being hostile, agile, and mobile, filling the tactical gap, so that I could multi-task as a focused, proactive IC at the strategic level was critical. The decision-making pace needed to stay ahead of the incident power curve and is really what made the incident come to a safe and effective conclusion. Two-Out Crews and Back-Up Lines versus Rapid Intervention Perhaps one of the greatest disparities in American firefighting is the interpretation, termi­ nology, procedures, and use of lines to fulfill the Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.134 (g)(3) and (g)(4) "two-in/two-out" regulation. Some terms used are "two-out line," "back-up line," "secondary line," "initial rapid intervention team (IRIT) line," and countless others. In addition, some agencies will wait until a RIC is established to stretch a two-out line. In many jurisdictions, the RIC company is a later-arriving crew, well after interior firefighting is underway. Some agencies treat every building as occupied to elude the regulation. Others go to the opposite extreme and will wait to establish a two-out crew with line before entering any structure, regardless of high or confirmed victim profile. Firefighters are smart and want to know the "why" behind any policy or SOG. Like any rule, firefighters will challenge, push the limits, find loopholes, and skirt policies and SOGs that they think make no sense, or that have not been given a proper "why" when implemented. If the only reason a fire department has a two-out policy is to stay out of trouble or prevent paying fines with OSHA, that is *not* good enough, and firefighters will likely blow it off. Properly placed, staffed, and utilized two-out lines (or whatever your FD calls it) have saved firefighter lives and prevented catastrophic outcomes. Simultaneously, crews have waited too long to enter fires because of fear of getting in trouble, potentially costing civilian lives. Therein lies the disparity. Another problem is misunderstanding the difference between two-out regulations and rapid intervention crews/teams. First came the two-out regulation. There is no mention of rapid intervention teams/crews or otherwise in CFR 1910.134. The fire service put its spin on it and created rapid intervention crews/teams after the fact. Two-out is the minimum under the law. Rapid intervention can be subjectively applied based upon conditions, perceived need, staffing, response levels, traditions, SOGs, state regulations, and a host of other factors, including the IC. Let's look at the *actual* OSHA standard:^2^ *1910.134(g)(3)* ***Procedures for IDLH atmospheres.** For all IDLH atmospheres, the employer shall* *ensure that:* *1910.134(g)(3)(f)* *One employee or, when needed, more than one employee is located outside the IDLH* *atmosphere;* *1910.134(g)(3)(H)* *Visual, voice, or signal line communication is maintained between the employee(s) in the* *IDLH atmosphere and the employee(s) located outside the IDLH atmosphere;* *1910.134(g)(3)(iii)* *The employee(s) located outside the IDLH atmosphere are trained and equipped to provide* *effective emergency rescue;* *1910.134(g)(3)(iv)* *The employer or designee is notified before the employee(s) located outside the IDLH* *atmosphere enter the IDLH atmosphere to provide emergency rescue;* *1910.134(g)(3)(v)* *The employer or designee authorized to do so by the employer, once notified, provides* *necessary assistance appropriate to the situation;* *1910.134(g)(3)(vi)* *Employee(s) located outside the IDLH atmospheres are equipped with:* *1910.134(g)(3)(vi)(A)* *Pressure demand or other positive pressure SCBAs, or a pressure demand or other* *positive pressure supplied-air respirator with auxiliary SCBA; and either* *1910.134(g)(3)(vi)(B)* *Appropriate retrieval equipment for removing the employee(s) who enter(s) these* *hazardous atmospheres where retrieval equipment would contribute to the rescue* *of the employee(s) and would not increase the overall risk resultingfrom entry; or* *1910.134(g)(3)(vi)(C)* *Equivalent means for rescue where retrieval equipment is not required under* *paragraph (g)(3)(vi)(B).* *1910.134(g)(4)* ***Procedures for interior structuralfirefighting.** In addition to the requirements setforth* *under paragraph (g)(3), in interior structuralfires, the employer shall ensure that:* *1910.134(g)(4)(f)* *At least two employees enter the IDLH atmosphere and remain in visual or voice* *contact with one another at all times;* *1910.134(g)(4)(H)* *At least two employees are located outside the IDLH atmosphere; and* *1910.134(g)(4)(iii)* *All employees engaged in interior structural firefighting use SCBAs.* ***Note 1 to paragraph** (g): One of the two individuals located outside the IDLH atmosphere* *may be assigned to an additional role, such as incident commander in charge of the* *emergency or safety officer, so long as this individual is able to perform assistance or rescue* *activities withoutjeopardizing the safety or health of any firefighter working at the incident.* ***Note** 2 **to paragraph (g):** Nothing in this section is meant to preclude firefighters from* *performing emergency rescue activities before an entire team has assembled.* Note that a hoseline and the term "rapid intervention crew" are not mentioned above. Nei­ ther is a list of required rescue/extrication equipment. The AHJ is the local fire department and each one determines how they will adhere to the above. In reality, what is done in practice may differ from what is written in policy or SOG. Fire departments all over America have inter­ preted this regulation in countless ways. The key is that you know *your* policy, how to interpret it, and train your officers to properly engage each fire as thinking leaders who understand the intent of 1910.134 (g)(3) and (g)(4). *The intent is to balance the protection of firefighters' lives with* *rescue of civilian lives.* This will be a judgement call, and the VP is a very effective means of gathering information to make an informed decision when seconds count and lives hang in the balance. Note that *One of the two individuals located outside the IDLH atmosphere* may be assigned to an additional role, such as incident commander *in charge of the emergency or safety officer,* *so long as this individual is able to perform assistance or rescue activities without* *jeopardizing the safety or health of anyfirefighter working at the incident.* This means that as an IC or division/group supervisor, you may perform either of those roles and still be part of the two individuals located outside the IDLH atmosphere (two-out). This should be liberating and allow you many options on an incident. In the early stages of a working house fire with low or moderate VP, for example, two three-person engines should be able to initiate interior fire attack, stretch a second two-out line for protection, secure a water supply, and have one officer in command. A RIC, also known as a (RIT is composed of at least a three-person crew, placed to be ready for immediate rescue of firefighters inside a structure. An RIC will have equipment cached in advance of a firefighter down to expedite the response during a Mayday. Minimum equipment should include: Spare SCBA or RIC pack with umbilical air Spare SCBA cylinders Forcible entry tools such as a flathead axe, Halligan tool, pry bar, officer tool, and so on Powered circular and chain saws Rescue rope bag and accessories EMS equipment or a medical group nearby Ladder appropriate to size of structure Portable radios for all members Portable lighting In addition, a separate size-up of the incident, including situation status and resource status and location of crews working inside and around the building, should be assessed. This should be done in coordination with division supervisors and command. This will help verify that active accountability is accurate and will reduce reflex time if a Mayday were to occur. As the IC, you must weigh risk versus gain, as we have illustrated throughout the text. Based upon the VP, your staffing and response levels, and your SOGs, you will determine when to establish a rapid intervention plan and to what extent it will be staffed and supported. For example, you may have confirmed victims trapped and not enough firefighters on scene to perform fire attack, rescue, vent, medical, and have enough personnel left over to adequately staff a RIC Group. The priority is the civilian victim. As the IC of a three-alarm apartment fire, I did not have rapid intervention crews in place until the third alarm, as we had several trapped occupants upon arrival. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Lullwater Incident CHIEF DAVID RHODES, ATLANTA (GA) FIRE RESCUE AND EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, *FIRE ENGINEERING* MAGAZINE Hearing the rumble and feeling the ground shake from a structural collapse is not something you want to experience as a chief officer managing crews that are interior. As the dust settles and the reality hits you square in the face, it is a nauseating feeling. There is, however, no time to waste in gathering your thoughts and moving forward with first making sense and orienting yourself to what has occurred. Then, requesting and assigning the appropriate resources to a strategy to mitigate the hazard, all while thinking of contingency plans if that strategy doesn't work. I was assigned to Battalion 3 operating as the C (Charlie) side division supervisor on a very large mansion fire in Atlanta, Georgia. I was part of a three-chief command team that was managing this fire that also included Battalion 5 as IC, and the shift com­ mander assistant chief who was the A (Alpha) side division supervisor. The alarm came in at 22:10. The structure was an early-1920s-era, 6000-square-foot, two-story, L-shaped residence (fig. 12-2). The initial alarm included three engines, three trucks, two battalion chiefs, and the heavy rescue. There was heavy fire upon arrival and we operated in the offensive mode, rescue phase for the initial strategy. A second alarm was requested due to the size of the structure and the amount of fire involvement. This brought another three engines and three trucks and the addition of the shift commander. Interior crews made progress and had the majority of the first-floor fire under control within the first 10 minutes. The heavy rescue was able to get an all-clear on the second-floor primary search. At the 20-minute mark, some early signs of roof collapse began to present on the A (Alpha) side and the decision was made to switch to a defen­ sive mode, since the primary search was completed. Exterior lines and a ladder pipe operated for approximately 45 minutes before the fire was under control. The roof on the main part of the house burned through on both the A and C (Charlie) sides. Now we were faced with a large overhaul operation and numerous pockets of fire. An assessment of the structure was completed and a decision was made to send crews back interior for overhaul. I was managing an engine and truck company working to get into the attic of the second floor in the smaller part of the L directly over the garage. The house had metal casement windows and the windows on the C side extension had not been removed. The crew squeezed their way in the window frame in place (fig. 12-3). I did not like this and called for an additional truck company to come and cut the window frames out. Crews remained inside and line was also advanced through the window frame. The interior crews started working to access the attic by pulling ceil­ ing in the wire-and-lathe ceiling covering. I went inside the first floor directly under where crews were working to double check the structure and make sure there was no additional fire that had rekindled. Upon exiting the first floor, I returned to check the status of the window removal. A piece of the cor­ nice fell across the ground ladder that was used to enter the second floor. The truck com­ pany assigned to remove the window had still not arrived. I had a worse feeling about the window still being in place and decided to pull the crews out until we could get the window removed. All crews acknowledged the order to exit and began the process. Then, I heard a low-decibel rumble and felt vibration from the ground, and a burst of dust occurred. I knew I had four members working on the second floor. A large section  of the roof had collapsed, pinning one firefighter against the wall and one other under the debris. Two others were able to escape the area and immediately started working to rescue the trapped members. I notified command that we had a collapse and fire­ fighters trapped, declared a Mayday, and advised I would no longer be the C (Charlie) division supervisor and would be managing the Mayday. The assistant chief responded to the rear of the structure and assumed the C (Charlie) division supervisor role and requested two additional engines, one truck, and a med­ ical supervisor. An RIT was deployed consisting of an engine and a truck company. The firefighter pinned against the wall was removed quickly and continued assisting the rescue of the other firefighter. Crews continued attempting to cut the metal casement window, but the standard department abrasive blades were just disintegrating with little impact. Additional saws were requested and the captain of Truck 15 was placed in charge of the rescue. The heavy rescue had left the scene for another fire once we were under control. They were requested back in case the airbags and other lifting equipment was needed. Chain­ saws and pry bars were used interior to cut away rafters, ceiling joist, and decking. Handlines were deployed on either side of the rescue, as fire was now flaring up in the debris with the influx of oxygen and dislodged building materials. Sixteen minutes into the Mayday, the firefighter was freed. He was pinned in a supine position and was unable to move any part of his body. He was in full PPE and on air when the collapse happened. As the rescue crews removed a critical piece of the roof, he was able to reach his regulator and disconnect. He had just run out of air the instant before the pressure and weight on his arm was lifted. The rescued firefighter was able to get out of the structure and down the ladder on his own. He appeared to be okay and looked at me and requested another assignment. Of course, he was done for the day and we insisted he be transported to the hospital and evaluated. He and the firefighter that was pinned against the wall were both sent for evaluation. The firefighter pinned against the wall suffered torn tendons and ligaments in his foot that required surgery to repair. His recovery was nearly six months. The trapped firefighter under the collapse sustained second and third degree burns on his legs, back, and buttocks. This occurred from the compression of his body on embers that were smoldering on the floor. He was out for nearly a year and received several skin grafts before returning to full duty. Lessons Learned This house had a full slate roof, which added a considerable amount of weight that was not initially considered in the risk assessment. Our department had a culture of using manpower for overhaul instead of waiting on resources from other department with heavy equipment. Always, always trust your intuition! I didn't like the fact that firefighters had to squeeze through that metal casement window, but instead of stopping them, I let them go with a plan to remove the window behind them. Had I not ordered them out when I did, the trapped firefighter would have been in an area that would have been even more diffi­ culty to remove. Since he was moving towards the window, he was only a few feet inside, which made access a little bit easier. ICS and Communications for Maydays  The first thing to do if a Mayday occurs is to remain absolutely calm. As with all transmissions, whatever the IC does, the rest of the alarm will do. Not all Maydays are equal. You may have a quick Mayday that is minor and resolved before you even have a chance to respond on the radio. Or, you may have several members trapped, with an extensive rescue operation requiring addi­ tional alarms and support. Do not overreact and make the response more complicated. Wait a few seconds and see what you have. For example, dispatch may suggest adding more radio channels, additional chiefs may arrive, and companies may assign themselves to the incident. You must control this chaos and ensure you know what the extent of the problem is. Everyone will want to help, but not everyone can. A Mayday can also be extremely labor-intensive. The Southwest Supermarket Fire in Phoe­ nix, AZ showed that it takes 12 firefighters to get 1 out. This 12:1 ratio may tax your system immediately. Or, you may have adequate resources. Additional Maydays could occur and you may find multiple firefighters in cardiac arrest. This is why a medical group should *always* be standing by on all working fires. When a Mayday occurs, there are several steps that should occur by the IC and division/ group supervisors, in unison and often simultaneously, to maximize efficiency and minimize time-to-task completion. *Remember, the majority of downedfirefighters are rescued by nearby* *crews operating close by.* Allow them to do so. This will congeal the task-level response as crews muster around their fallen comrade(s). As soon as the Mayday occurs, firefighters will do whatever they can at their levels and in their locations to rescue their brothers and sisters. Your job, as the IC, is to coordinate, sup­ port, bridge the tactical gap, and maintain alignment of response to maximize effectiveness. Remember, remain in the "then/what if" and let your tactical- and task-level bosses get the work done. Remember, the majority of downed firefighters are rescued by nearby crews operating close by. Consider the following: The IC should stop all radio traffic upon a Mayday and acknowledge the Mayday directly by conducting a *LUNAR* report with the downed firefighter, if possible. The LUNAR should be repeated clearly by the IC to verify accuracy and ensure that all members on scene have heard the LUNAR. Simultaneously, the division supervisor of the firefighter/company down and the RIC group supervisor should meet face-to-face, confirm the LUNAR, and develop a tactical plan. This may require the division supervisor giving crews to the RIC group supervisor to augment the Mayday response. The IC and tactical supervisors should confirm the tactical plan so the IC can support it. This includes notifying the IC of any movement of crews from division to RIC group. As needed, the IC will call additional alarm(s) and ambulances for the Mayday, based upon the LUNAR report. Plan ahead accordingly. The RIC group supervisors objective is to rescue the downed firefighter(s). The division supervisor's objective is to continue the firefight to ensure that conditions are tenable. This may include additional attack lines and/or ventilation. Based upon the VP and fire conditions at the time of the Mayday, companies on scene can be reassigned to the RIC Group. In addition to the above example, you may have a company on the roof performing vertical ventilation that is no longer needed. They can be reassigned to the RIC Group. If you have a Mayday *and* a confirmed rescue of civilians simultaneously, the IC must support both. ICS will help you organize and decentralize both operations at once. You may have the respective division supervisor lead the civilian rescue, or establish a separate rescue group, depending upon the nature and needs for the civilian rescue(s). The medical group should be augmented and the medical group supervisor should be working face-to-face with the RIC group supervisor to receive downed firefighters. We responded to a house fire with explosion and gas leak at 10:30 on a weekday. Upon arrival, E101 reported a one-story house with heavy fire from the rear and heavy black smoke from the front. This was a low VP, as the sole occupant was out and he stated that the fire started at his propane barbecue in the back of the house. E101 initiated fire attack. E20 arrived shortly after and assumed command from E101. E20 secured a water supply and stretched a two-out line, per the SOG, to protect E101. I arrived and assumed command from E20. It was clear that this fire required more water and E20 requested to take their two-out line inside as a secondary attack line. I agreed. E103 then arrived with TR20. E103 was assigned to assume Division A with the objectives of fire attack and search inside the house. Division A had E101, E20, TR20, and his crew (E103) work­ ing for him. The E103 crew pulled a second two-out line. TR106 arrived and was assigned to roof division with the objective of vertical ventilation. The TR106 captain was roof division supervisor. E105 arrived and was assigned to RIC. M19 arrived and was assigned to medical and to stand by at the TCP. Within three-and-a-half minutes of my arrival, the rear patio cover collapsed on E101 cap­ tain and firefighter. Per the SOG, E20 immediately called a Mayday on their behalf. As I asked for a LUNAR report, E20 confirmed that E101 was not entrapped and was fine. This was obvi­ ously a huge relief! Had this been an extended Mayday with entrapment of two firefighters, we were set up for success. At the time of the Mayday, the radio was dead silent because tactical supervisors were in place to communicate with their crews and eliminate unnecessary radio traffic. As the Mayday was being called, the Division A Supervisor immediately responded to the front door and made face-to-face contact with his crew who were staffing the two-out line. They were in an excellent position to continue firefighting and protecting the area around E101 if needed. This would have been critical, as E101 was down and E20 was assisting them, leav­ ing both of their hoselines unstaffed. Simultaneously, RIC (E105) was ready to proceed with augmenting any firefighter rescue that E20 was obviously conducting with TR20. Medical was at the ICP, ready to receive the firefighters. If needed, TR106 could have been called off the roof to further augment RIC operations until the arrival of subsequent alarms, had they been called. *As the IC, you must be thinking in the \"then/what if" all the time.* CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Carr Fire CHIEF CHRIS STAVROS, GLENDALE (CA) FIRE DEPARTMENT Your engine is driving back from your maintenance facility and you see a bit of smoke coming from a residential area on the border of your city. You notify your dispatch center, and as your engine proceeds with a smoke investigation, you arrive on scene, in station attire, to a working apartment house fire, with immediate rescue needs on the second floor. Twenty-five minutes later, you and one of your firefighters fall into a burning basement. The Carr Incident was a structure fire, intentionally started with a propellant, in the basement of a two story pre-33 center-hall apartment building in Glendale, California. Pre-33 refers to the construction date and construction standards prior to the Long Beach, California earthquake of 1933. Pre-33 apartment buildings are typically URM and can house many people from lower income levels, sometimes with six or seven people living in a one-bedroom apartment, so there is a large loss-of-life possibility at all hours. The incident began with rescue of several civilians from upper floors and ended in a double Mayday of two firefighters who fell through the first floor into the burning base­ ment. There were rescued by the assigned rapid intervention group, which consisted of a Glendale (CA) truck company and a Burbank (CA) engine company. Some incident commanders can struggle with when to assign an RIC. If there is a con­ firmed rescue or a high victim profile, the RIC assignment can be delayed, but what is your *personal* risk tolerance for making that decision? How will you, or your compa­ nies, feel if RIC is assigned early, and that possibly results in a missed rescue and a civilian fatality? How will you, or your crews, feel if RIC is delayed, and a firefighter is killed who may have been rescued had a dedicated RIC been assigned? These are sit­ uations that should be discussed with your firefighters and officers. Regardless of what trigger you have for making the RIC assignment, you need to plan for many different scenarios, and you need to practice simulations to prepare yourself and your crews for the actual event. You should expect the unexpected (fig. 12-4). From a command perspective, I use the acronym EDWARD-D if I have a Mayday. E Emergency declaration, clear all radio traffic on the incident, and announce a Mayday in progress. Attempt to get a LUNAR. D Deploy RIC. Begin a Mayday timer. W Get a warble tone from the dispatch center to announce a Mayday in progress, the tactical objectives, and tactical frequencies. A Add an alarm (additional companies to the staging area). R Roll a PAR (conduct a personal accountability report). D Double the resources to and from (if not already formed) the RIC. D Deal with the incident. On the Carr Incident, several factors came into alignment that may have contributed to the double Mayday. The first was that the first-in engine company was out in dis­ trict and responded to a "smoke in the area,\" and were dressed in their work uniforms. The standard routine that a company officer would have of being properly dressed, giving a solid initial report on conditions, getting a 360°, or at least a three-side view, was disrupted. Upon arrival, they were faced with immediate rescue. The second factor was that the BC had a delayed response because he did not get paged that there was an assignment. That one-minute delay prevented them from possibly getting a drive-by of the building, something that is very useful. The third factor was that the first-in engine captain was a well-respected officer, so subsequent arriving officers did not reverify the origin of the fire, which was in the basement, but reported as being on the first floor (fig. 12-5).  Lessons Learned 1. Company officers and divisions/groups need to be brief on the radio. Long, 2. Divisions/groups are responsible and accountable for the operations in their 3. When a company officer's routine is disrupted, it is important for the officer to 4. In a complex incident, the IC, in addition to stating objectives, should remind 5. Always assign an engaged, quality officer and crew as the rapid intervention +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | | | Apartme | | Fig. | | | | | | nt | | 12-6. | | | | | | Fire | | Carr | | | | | | -138 | | | | | | | | Carr | | | | | | | | Dr. | | | | | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | Staging | | | Carr IC | | Safety | Inciden | | | | | | | | t | | | | | | | | Command | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | BC3 | | | Battali | | TRN 21 | Board^3 | | | | | on | | | ^ | | | | | 2 | | | | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | AU81 | Sub 1 | Divisio | Divisio | Ventila | RIG Grp | *Source | | | | n | n | tion | Med Grp |.* | | RA36 | | 1 | 2 | | | Photo | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | BC1 | EMS2 | E23 | E2? | T2G | 721 | courtes | | | | | | | EMS21 | y | | | E23 | PR2 | | | | of | | | | | | | T29 E27 | Glendal | | | | | | | | e | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | | E22 | E25 | 729 | | E11 BLS | (CA) | | | | | | | 25 | Fire | | | | | | | | Departm | | | | | | | | ent | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | | T21 | E21 | TRN 2 | | | | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | | E39 | | T32 | | | | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | | | | E29 | | | | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | Resourc | | | | | | | | es | | | | | | | | Enroute | | | | | | | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | CH? | | | Rehab | | | | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ | | | | E23 | | | | +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ Summary A Mayday can happen to anyone, anytime, in any place. As the IC, your first priority is to get all your troops back to the station after every call, and home, safe to their families after each shift. The safety of our troops must be balanced with the need to save civilian lives. Each incident starts with a VP. From there, you will determine the level of gain versus risk. What do you have to gain (civilians) and how much risk are you willing to take with your firefighters? You may have multiple confirmed victims and delay RIC implementation until much later in the fire or until enough resources are on scene. Conversely, you may have a low VP and have a two-out and an RIC group established. The timing and level of rapid intervention is largely subjective, based upon the FD SOGs, staffing, response levels, conditions on scene, VP, and even the IC. You must plan ahead and always be in the "then/what if" as the IC and remain the pessimist until you clear the scene. Tactical supervisors are a tremendous help in preventing the Mayday in the first place. They may see risks such as worsening fire conditions and deteriorating building conditions, thereby preventing firefighters from going unnecessarily into high risk/no gain situations. Set up your incident for success by creating divisions and groups to keep the span of con­ trol manageable, radio traffic minimal, and risk assessment exponentially more effective and decentralized. Once a Mayday does occur, you will have tactical supervisors in place to handle the immediate rescue of the firefighters, while you remain ahead and able to support the oper­ ation, whether you have heavy fire, civilian victims, or otherwise. Chapter Review Review Questions 1. Explain how setting up division/groups early can help prevent a Mayday. 2. What is the number one NIOSH 5 contributing factor? 3. Describe the foundation of two-in-two-out. 4. What does LUNAR stand for? 5. Explain the functions of a RIT/RIC crew and some of the tactical considerations. FESHE Strategy and Tactics (C0279) Related Content The content contained in chapter 12 provides detailed information specific to rapid interven­ tion and Mayday incidents. While the FESHE CO279 course does not specifically reference rapid intervention of Mayday incidents, they will occur within a structure fire incident and require adjustment to tactics and ICS/NIMS. The chapter format supports the CO279 course outline by detailing information on fireground communications associated with these events and ICS/NIMS roles and responsibilities to support and manage them. Access the Tactical Review Guide Appendix C\#4: Mayday---Walmart. Fire in B Loading Dock for an objectives-based scenario exercise. NFPA1021 Job Performance Requirements The information in this chapter can be utilized to support training and educational programs associated with the Emergency Services Delivery Fire Officer IJPR 4.6, 4.6.1, 4.6.2, Fire Officer IIJPR 5.6,5.6.1, and Fire Officer III 6.6 and 6.6.1. For active rapid intervention or Mayday incidents and pre-planning responses, the content in this chapter also supports training and education for Fire Officer III 6.6.3 "Develop a plan for the organization given an unmet need for resources that exceed what is available in the organization." Access the Tactical Review Guide Appendix TRG \#4: Mayday-Walmart. Fire in B Loading Dock for a 1021 Job Performance Requirement-based scenario exercise for Fire Officer I, II, and III. Endnotes 1. Don Abbott, Project Mayday Download!, December 25, 2018, https://www.firefighterclose- calls.com/project-mayday-download/. 2. Occupational Health and Safety Administration, "Standard 1910.134: Respiratory Protec­ tion," OSHA, last modified September 26, 2019, regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.134. 3. Glendale Fire Training Videos, "Carr Incident After Action Review," YouTube, May 23,2020, video, 26:57,.