EMS Active Threat Incidents SOP S 3272

• This is a Standard Operating Procedure for EMS Active Threat Incidents
• The SOP number is S 3272 NEW
• It was effective on 11/11/2016
• It replaces NONE
• Accountability lies with the City of Fort Worth Fire Department (FWFD)
• The review cycle is annual
• The authority lies with the City of Fort Worth Fire Department (FWFD)
• Its purpose is to establish baseline policies and procedures for the dispatch and use of a Rescue Task Force during an Active Threat Incident
• The intent of this SOP is to empower on-scene decision making, adaptability, and security in the furtherance of civilian and responder life safety, incident stabilization, and property conservation

Definitions

• Active Threat Incident: Incident involving one or more suspects who participate in an ongoing, random, or systematic shooting spree or other violent action, demonstrating intent to harm others with the objective of mass murder
  • An Active Threat Incident may or may not be a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI)
  • The objective of mass murder is assumed if it is believed the Active Threat suspect has used or intends to use deadly force on other persons and it is reasonably believed that the suspect has or is attempting to gain access to additional casualties
• Deadly Force: Force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death, or serious bodily injury
• Cleared: A rapid search of an area wherein no threats were observed or the threats were removed
  • An area may also be designated "cleared" through:
    • Credible information
    • Law enforcement moving through an area without encountering resistance
    • Law enforcement requesting fire/EMS resources to a certain location
    • The creation of a protected area by law enforcement personnel
• Secured: A systematic, methodical, and complete search of an area by law enforcement wherein there is a high level of certainty there are no remaining threats, and this same area's continued security is probable
• Contact Teams: Law Enforcement (LE) officers who arrive on the scene and immediately deploy with the goal of initiating contact to contain and/or eliminate the Active Threat suspect in order to prevent injury or loss of life
• Corridor Protection (or Protected Corridor): A safe area controlled by law enforcement wherein unarmed first responders can freely and safely operate
• Embedded Protection: Law Enforcement officers embedded into a Rescue Task Force to provide force protection
• Force Protection: The function of LE officers providing protection from hostile threats while assigned to unarmed emergency providers
  • Force protection is not the same as Rescue Task Force but is part of the Rescue Task Force concept
  • Force protection addresses safety and security of personnel and can include other facets of the incident
• Hot Zone: Area where there is a direct and immediate threat to emergency personnel or other persons
  • Rescue Task Force teams should not be operating in the Hot Zone and should immediately evacuate the area if the immediate area becomes a Hot Zone
• Warm Zone: Area where there is a potential hostile threat to emergency personnel or other persons, but it is neither direct nor immediate
  • The Warm Zone is the main zone of operations for the Rescue Task Force teams
  • An area that has been either cleared or secured qualifies as a warm zone
  • While the threat may exist elsewhere in the building or venue, LE has identified an area in which fire personnel may be brought in to render lifesaving interventions to injured casualties
• Cold Zone: Area where the Unified Command (UC) does not anticipate a danger or threat to emergency personnel or other persons
  • The Unified Command Post (UCP), Joint Information System/Center (JIS/JIC), Public Information Officer (PIO) and Staging are examples of functions located in the Cold Zone
• Concealment: Protection from observation
• Cover: Physical protection from bullets, shrapnel, or fragments of exploding rounds
  • When encountering a threat, cover is preferred to concealment alone
  • Sheetrock walls and vehicles provide concealment but generally do not provide cover
  • Engine blocks and apparatus water tanks may provide cover; cement block walls may not provide cover
• Command Post: The field location at which the primary tactical-level, on-scene incident command functions are performed
  • The command post will be referred to as the Unified Command Post (UCP), highlighting the need for fire, police, and EMS to be co-located in the same location to assist with effective interdepartmental communications and deconfliction of operational activities
• Rescue Task Force (RTF): A grouping of resources with the mission of entering the Warm Zone of an Active Threat, locating casualties, providing rapid life-saving interventions (focused on major hemorrhage control), and rapid evacuation of these casualties
• Extrication (or Rescue) Group: Resources assembled to perform a rescue function not necessarily within a single geographic division
  • For Active Threat Incidents, the Extrication Group will usually be comprised of multiple RTFs and any associated force protection elements
  • Casualty collection points may also be managed under the Extrication Group
• Extrication (or Rescue) Group Supervisor: The individual responsible for the Extrication Group
  • The Extrication Group Supervisor will usually maintain an interior position, with assigned force protection, in order to supervise assignment, movement, and accountability of RTFs, and to manage casualty collection point operations
• Triage, Treatment, Transport (T3): Refers to the 3 separate but related groups established in the Cold Zone at Mass Casualty Incidents
  • Casualties are assessed and categorized by medical priority (Triage), receive medical care (Treatment), and then put on transportation to definitive care (Transport)
  • The T3 is in the Cold Zone and is not the same as a Casualty Collection Point
• Casualty Collection Point (CCP): Optional, intermediate location(s) between the Hot Zone and the Triage, Treatment, Transportation Groups used for the collection of casualties
• Casualty or Patient: Term used for wounded civilians. "Victim” generally has a different meaning for law enforcement and may lead to conflicting situation reporting
• MCI bags: Backpacks or bags issued for Active Threat Incident and MCI response that include appropriate and approved Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) Emergency Medical Services (EMS) supplies
• Ballistic Protective Equipment (BPE): Includes ballistic vest (currently Level Illa), ballistic helmet (currently Level IIIa), and eye protection (currently ANSI Z87.1 rated)

Overview & Assumptions

• Active Threat Incidents are law enforcement centric, coordinating fire department activities within an Active Threat Incident with law enforcement
• The Rescue Task Force (RTF) is a grouping of FWFD and LE personnel aggressively deployed to provide at or near the point-of-wound trauma management to casualties where there is an ongoing ballistic or explosive threat
  • FWFD personnel treat, stabilize, and remove the injured in a rapid manner under the protection of the dedicated LE officers
  • The RTF can be deployed to work in active shooter situations in schools, businesses, malls, conferences, special events, etc., and any other scene that is or has the possibility of an on-going ballistic or explosive threat
• The 4 essential elements to Active Threat Incident response are:
  • Locating and containing the Active Threat suspect(s) is critical to incident stabilization
  • Getting medical care to casualties as soon as possible, along with rapid extraction, is a prime objective
  • There must be a commitment by agency heads and incident representatives to integrated response
  • Agencies must commit to joint training and exercises
• The intent of RTF operations at an Active Threat Incident is to interject life-saving actions into a cleared area, eliminating the inherent delay and potential fatalities that would occur if RTFs waited for a secured operating area
• Active Threat Incidents are dynamic, unpredictable, rapidly progressing, and may not be contained
  • Rapid entry by law enforcement personnel to contain or eliminate the threat is the foundation for successful intervention in these incidents
  • After adequate resources are assigned to this task, LE officers should be made available for RTF force protection
• Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC), including Rapid hemorrhage control and casualty evacuation, is the key to saving as many lives as possible
  • Rescue Task Force teams need to make entry into the Warm Zone as quickly as possible, with appropriate ballistic and force protection, in order to accomplish casualty care and removal
• The cornerstones of Tactical Emergency Casualty Care include:
  • Rapid access
  • Hemorrhage control
  • Airway management and positioning
  • Prevention of hypothermia
• Emergency responders should establish a single, static, Unified Command Post as soon as possible
• The Unified Command should rapidly identify Warm Zone boundaries for Rescue Task Force operations

General

• The Active Threat Incident should be managed through Unified Command, in accordance with a National Incident Management System (NIMS) compliant Incident Command System, with the lead agency determined by the strategic goals and immediate needs identified in the UCP
  • The lead agency will likely change throughout the incident
  • While the threat is still active, the lead agency will be the Fort Worth Police Department
• The Active Threat Incident command structure should be "built from the bottom up" - first arriving companies establishing a strong command and control presence and beginning appropriate actions necessary to address incident priorities, with later arriving supervisory personnel evaluating operational effectiveness and incident organization, making adjustments as needed
• Prior to deploying an RTF, Unified Command should identify threat zones (Hot, Warm, Cold)
  • Zone boundaries will likely move during the incident and should be monitored by UC through communication with LE contact teams
• Unified Command should rapidly deploy RTF teams into appropriate zones as soon as it is tactically feasible
• Agencies should establish and engage in timely and cooperative intelligence collection, sharing, and dissemination
  • Accurate intelligence is critical. Correcting misinformation is just as critical
• Agencies should maintain appropriate resource levels in staging and keep the UCP apprised of resource needs
• Agencies should disseminate information to the public using a Joint Information System/Joint Information Center (JIS/JIC)
  • Each agency should assign a Public Information Officer to the JIC
  • Do not co-locate the JIS/JIC with the UCP
• Additional FWFD responsibilities at an Active Threat Incident specifically include:
  • Identify, communicate, assess, coordinate access to, and mitigate hazardous device threats (e.g., IEDs)
  • Identify, communicate, assess, coordinate access to, and mitigate hazardous material (HAZMAT) threats
  • There may be a need to address these responsibilities in any ATI zone; these activities should be coordinated with LE
• The FWFD Incident Commander should consider utilizing fire apparatus and vehicles as shielding or transport vehicles for responders or victims, as needed
• All responders should be aware of the threat of secondary devices and IEDs
  • Be especially cognizant of vehicles parked in close and easily accessible parking areas, such as cars in handicap spaces and fire lanes
  • IEDs found in the interior of a structure should be marked and/or and avoided, then communicated to the UC; an appropriate geographical area around the found IED should become a Hot Zone
• Other SOPs may outline procedures not addressed in this SOP (e.g., Cold Zone operations procedures may be found by referencing the current FWFD MCI SOP)
  • In any instance where this SOP is in conflict with another, this SOP will take precedence regarding Active Threat Incident procedures

Dispatch

• Fire, Police, or MedStar communications centers may initiate an Active Threat Incident response based on call details or other available information
  • Fire fighters, police officers, or MedStar crewmembers may initiate an Active Threat Incident response by communicating this intent to their communications centers
• When the Fire Alarm Office (FAO) receives notice that a shooting has occurred, they should dispatch fire personnel according to their protocol for an "assault with a weapon” call-type
  • If there is an indication or it is determined, the call is an Active Threat Incident; the "Active Threat Incident" call-type should be activated
• In cooperation with Police Communications and MedStar, FAO personnel should be proactive in identifying an Active Threat Incident as early as possible
  • Many past active shooter/threat incidents have started off with a more "routine" violent call-type response by public safety
    • Anyone (such as FAO, responding units, etc.) with indication that the incident is something more demanding, whether by call notes, on-scene observations, or other information, should change the call-type to an Active Threat Incident; this will assist in the notification of additional resources that may be needed
• For an active threat call-type the FAO should dispatch: a one-alarm EMS assignment, Safety 1, EMS 99, and Marshal 99
• Upon confirmation that the incident is an Active Threat Incident, the FAO should notify the Active Threat paging group
  • Included in this notification should be:
    • Dispatching OPS 2 to the incident
    • Instructions for all available Arson/Bomb Investigations personnel to immediately respond to the incident
    • Notification of the Emergency Management Duty Officer
• Upon notification that a fire crew is on-scene staging, the FAO should contact PD Communications, and repeat as necessary, to determine whether fire crews are cleared-in to the command post and its location
  • FWPD is training patrol officers to designate their command post by putting a traffic cone on top of a patrol car
  • Emphasis should be on FD liaising with PD and coordinating on-scene activities

Operations

• Best Practices:
• Coordinating FD operations with PD and their situational awareness is critical and is best accomplished through a Unified Command Post
  • FD cannot control the development of PD ICS, the focus should be on establishing contact with PD as soon as possible using tactics such as:
    • Making contact with an on-scene PD officer
    • Contacting FAO for them to ascertain through Police Communications an appropriate point to liaison with PD
• In addition to early Unified Command and rapid RTF deployment, priority should be given to RTF management-managing interior operating RTFs and ensuring RTFs entering a building have situational awareness
  • RTFs entering a building work most efficiently when effective interior command and control has been established
  • The end result should be a responsible party that quickly directs incoming RTFs to their assignment
    • This practice will eliminate duplication of efforts (e.g., re-clearing already cleared areas, re-triaging casualties, etc.) and will generally result in faster movement within the building and faster contact between an incoming RTF and remaining casualties
• Face-to-face communications between fire and LE resources should be sought in the early phases of the incident
  • PD's attempt to manage a dynamic tactical environment will not blend well with FD's attempt to simultaneously manage casualties and other incident responsibilities; early incident management should not be attempted on a joint radio channel
  • This face-to-face communication between FD and PD is preferred at all levels early in the incident
  • Information can then be communicated using language and identification that is clear and specific for each department
  • Monitoring LE radio is a prudent and beneficial tactic, EMS99 or M99 are resources that may be utilized to gain this advantageous information
• Incident commanders should be prepared to address rescue needs both inside and outside of the building
  • RTFs may need to use ambulances or vehicles to access and quickly extract casualties from outside the affected building; this movement will need to be coordinated with LE
• RTFs should move towards areas with known or suspected casualties rather than search areas not thought to be involved
  • A secondary search of these uninvolved areas should occur later in the incident

First arriving unit

• The first arriving unit will be initial FD command and should communicate their location to all responding units
• If a fire unit arrives at an Active Threat Incident call-type before police units, they should follow standard violent call-type staging protocols using their discretion regarding apparatus staging or crew involvement based on call details and/or observations made on-scene
• If first arriving companies begin RTF operations prior to a static unified command presence, communication and Situation Reports (SITREPS) to FAO are critical
  • RTF operations prior to a static UC presence should only be conducted after an appropriate risk-vs-benefit analysis
• The first objective of a first arriving unit should be to liaison with PD in order to establish a co-located, Unified Command Post
• If the first arriving unit is staged, they should ensure the FAO is aware of their status
  • The first arriving unit should make efforts to determine whether they are cleared-in to make contact (link-up) with a LE officer and the location where the link-up should occur accomplished through the FAO or on-scene contact with LE officers
• After liaising/coordinating with LE, the next objective is rapid RTF entry into warm zones to extract casualties
• The company officer should work with LE to establish incident zones-Hot, Warm, and Cold, where Rescue Task Forces are designed to operate within Warm Zones
• It is recommended that 3 core elements be established early in the incident to effectively manage RTF operations in an Active Threat environment:
  • Command (the FD unified command post representative)
  • Rescue Task Force
  • Rescue Group Supervisor (or similar assignment)
• Fire companies do not need to wait for all 3 elements to be in place before they begin coordinated RTF operations

First, second, and third RTFs

• Generally, the first suppression company on-scene will become the 1st RTF, the 2nd arriving company will be the 2nd RTF, etc
• The goal of the 1st RTF is to gain access to as many casualties as possible in order to address critical hemorrhagic and airway concerns, stabilizing the casualty before moves on to the next casualty as quickly as they are able
• The 2nd RTF can anticipate entering the warm zone to begin CCP operations and interior Extrication Group management
• The 3rd RTF can anticipate beginning the extraction of casualties from the warm zone, generally requiring 1 RTF for each casualty extraction

All companies

• Face-to-face communication between firefighters and law enforcement is preferred
• Apparatus placement on-scene should maintain a clear travel path for follow-on vehicles, such as ambulances
• Bring equipment necessary for RTF operations to a forward position in addition to Ballistic Protective Equipment and MCI bags (which may be needed to build or establish an equipment cache); this equipment should include:
  • Patient carrying devices, such as backboards or canvas tarps
  • Breaching tools such as Halligan bar, sledgehammer, Hydra Ram, and bolt cutters
    • FD personnel assigned to an RTF should assist LE with any breaching needs in the Cold and Warm Zones, but are not required to assist in Hot Zones
    • FD personnel may provide breaching equipment to LE needing to breach in Hot Zones
  • Flashlights

Command

• Ensure accountability of all on-scene personnel
• Ensure a co-located, Unified Command Post is established with FWPD and MedStar
• Represent the FWFD in the Unified Command Post (UCP)
• Work with LE within the UCP to identify the RTF working zones, if not already established by the first arriving unit
• If FD/EMS resources are requested into the scene prior to an established UCP or liaison location, the FD IC can make the decision to accompany the requested resources to the requested location, making contact with the LE officers at that location to further progress the ICS structure, approach paths and link-up locations should be clearly communicated
• Create RTF teams from available units and deploy them, with consent from UC, ensuring each team is aware of their working limits and their mission; ensure adequate management of RTF operations and continue to create RTFs in anticipation of incident needs while keeping RTFs and other affected personnel updated on any changes to zone boundaries
• Ensure the incident call-type is changed to Active Threat; if specific resource needs are identified, such as Arson/Bomb or EOC, verify their activation
• Identify & communicate an appropriate level II staging area and/or approach information for remaining responding units
• A unified staging location will likely be beneficial, to include a LE staging officer co-located with the FD staging officer
• Ensure Personnel Accountability Reports (PARs) are obtained and SITREPS are provided at appropriate times
• Consider adding an additional MCI Alarm for patient treatment and transport; ensure a rapid sweep for IEDs is conducted of the UCP area, staging, CCPs, reunification locations, etc.
  • Rapid sweeps do not have to be done by EOD personnel, unless there is credible information regarding a related threat
  • Perpetrators of Active Threat Incidents will park in a location closest to their point-of-entry, such as handicapped parking spaces, fire lane, loading zones, etc
• Consider incorporating a relevant representative of the involved facility in the UCP
• Consider requesting the mobile command post respond and the physical workload of each RTF and assign additional resources, as needed
• Coordinate with on-scene LE resources to provide force protection for the UCP, T3, PIO and/or JIC, etc

Rescue Task Forces

• Each Rescue Task Force should include fire department personnel (generally 2 to 4) for EMS and evacuation combined with law enforcement for force protection
• An RTF may be assigned operations without embedded force protection if they will be working within a protected corridor and their movement has been coordinated with law enforcement, as the corridor will have been established by LE to create and maintain a safe area
• It is preferred that a rapid pre-entry briefing should be conducted with all elements of each RTF to ensure the team is aware of pertinent information before entering the Warm Zone
  • This briefing may be conducted by the fire officer on the RTF, the person making the assignment to the RTF, a law enforcement officer, or another designated individual
• The rapid pre-entry briefing should likely identify:
  • Zone boundaries
  • Entrance and egress routes or locations
  • Appropriate radio channels
  • The team's assignment, pertinent hazards and intelligence
  • The need for all persons, FD and LE, to stay together at all times
  • The need to maintain face-to-face communications between the fire and law enforcement members of each RTF
• RTF Teams should take on the radio designation of the assigned fire company
  • LE elements may continue to use their individual call signs, if needed
• FD members of the RTF should communicate to the UCP using their assigned FD radio channel
  • When the Extrication (Rescue) Group Leader has been established, RTFs should communicate with that position
  • RTF LE members should communicate using their assigned LE radio channel
• RTF communications to the UCP regarding casualty information, such as location, number, movement, etc., should be relayed to the UCP by FD rather than PD, so as to help prevent confusion or duplication of the information
• The LE officers in a RTF will be in charge of the unit during movement and in all matters related to force protection
  • LE officers assigned to force protection duties (including corridor protection) are not Contact Teams and are to stay with their assigned element, unless addressing an imminent threat to the RTF
• The fire officer in a RTF element will be in charge of all matters related to casualty care; RTF LE elements will not assist with casualty removal in order to eliminate distraction from their force protection mission
• After entering the Warm Zone, RTFs will find and stabilize as many casualties as possible, using Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) practices, until:
  • All available casualties are stabilized or accounted for
  • The RTF uses all appropriate EMS supplies, or
  • The RTF reaches the limits of the Warm Zone
• Casualty extraction by later arriving RTFs may be simultaneously performed while earlier RTFs are providing TECC stabilization and care
• Extended care inside the warm zone or CCPs is not the designed objective for RTFs; rapid hemorrhage control is priority, followed by rapid casualty extraction
• While the intent is to conduct RTF operations in the Warm Zone, RTF movement may traverse all zones if necessary for RTF safety or security
• If an RTF is abandoned by assigned LE force protection, the RTF should immediately notify the UCP, to include the RTF's location, and take appropriate actions, which may include evacuation or barricade in place
• If the RTF encounters an explosive device, the RTF should mark the location with a red chemlight and make a decision to bypass the device, avoid the device by finding an alternate route, or if necessary, evacuate the structure, communicating the chosen actions and the location and nature of the device to the UCP
• All casualties encountered by the RTF teams will be treated in the order they are encountered
• Direct ambulatory casualties to self-evacuate (or to move to CCPs if necessary) down a cleared egress route, following LE directions (civilians may need to be searched), ambulatory casualties will be categorized as "green/minor," but will not be marked while in the warm zone
• Non-ambulatory casualties in the warm zone will be categorized as “red/immediate,” and RTFs should affix red triage tape to that casualty; further classification and/or re-triage may be conducted by the T3 Group
• After TECC interventions, a non-ambulatory casualty should be placed in the recovery position before the RTF moves on to the next casualty.
• Deceased persons should be left in the location found and marked by either black triage tape or body positioning
• The intent of affixing triage tape and/or body positioning is to allow rapid identification by follow-on RTFs in order to avoid unnecessary repeated evaluations
• If necessary, RTFs should move casualties to CCPs and coordinate patient evacuation prior to moving casualties
• Extraction RTFs will move casualties to the T3 group and should coordinate patient evacuation prior to moving casualties
• The primary point of communication should be through the Extrication (Rescue) Group Supervisor (or CCP Supervisor, if no Extrication (Rescue) Group Supervisor is established)
• If weapons or dangerous devices are found or observed on a patient or casualty, alert LE immediately
• RTFs tasked with extracting casualties will need to know what location to bring the casualties, where this casualty hand-off will likely occur at the T3 if established, or at another Cold Zone location to load the casualty on an ambulance for rapid "load-and-go"

Casualty Collections Points

• CCPs might be established to provide a collection point for casualties when it is necessary to manage a group of casualties, when there is a significant geographical distance between the warm zone and the T3, or when interior conditions change and CCPs are needed for casualty safety
• Often, CCPs will create themselves, however, moving casualties to a CCP may require twice the movement, resources, and coordination
• Actions in the CCP are generally limited to TECC interventions, as triage should be accomplished at the T3 groups
• The CCP is not intended to be a long-term holding area; casualties should be evacuated out of the warm zone as swiftly as possible, even if they are brought to a CCP
• CCPs may be interior or exterior is be secured by LE and communicated to the UCP and will be managed by the FWFD if located in the Warm Zone
• Each CCP should have a Group Supervisor designated to stabilize and manage the casualties
  • In the absence of a dedicated Extrication (Rescue) Group Supervisor, a CCP supervisor may act as the interior "traffic cop" that meets and directs incoming RTFs and directs them to their area of operations
• Radio designation for the CCP Group Supervisor may be "CCP 1, CCP 2, etc." and should provide regular SITREPS to the UCP, to include the number and location of casualties in the absence of a dedicated Extrication (Rescue) Group Supervisor
• There is no set-in-stone prescription for establishing CCPs, deciding whether to create a CCP or move on to other casualties, or for how to manage interior operating RTFs.
  • The CCP operations can be adjusted to the tactical situation and resource availability based on number of suspected casualties, geography of the involved structure, nature of the threat, etc

Extrication (Rescue) Group Supervisor

• A dedicated Extrication (Rescue) Group Supervisor will usually consist of 1 chief or fire officer, with LE force protection, positioned in a forward Warm Zone location
• Use of force Protection will be optional if the Extrication (Rescue) Group Supervisor is operating within a protected corridor
• A dedicated Extrication (Rescue) Group Supervisor should coordinate RTF operations inside the Warm Zone, aintain accountability of the RTFs inside the Warm Zone, ensure adequate communications are established with the UCP and appropriate SITREPS are provided, including changes in interior conditions, number of casualties, etc., direct RTFs to their assigned operating area to minimize duplication of coverage and will ensure the RTFs do not inadvertently enter a Hot Zone, assign RTFs their assigned tasks, ensure all accessible casualties are treated, stabilized, and/or removed, and request additional resources, as necessary
• It is not necessary to establish an Extrication (Rescue) Branch Supervisor prior to RTF teams entering the Warm Zone, but an early and strong presence capable of visual direction to interior RTFs cannot be overemphasized
• Depending on the threat situation, number and location of casualties, and the geography of the interior structure, interior CCPs and/or a logistical resupply points in the Warm Zone may be necessary
  • If internal CCPs are established, the Extrication (Rescue) Branch Supervisor should coordinate their operations and integration

Secondary Searches

• After all known, probable, and suspected casualty locations have been accessed by RTFs, a secondary search of the entire incident area should be accomplished for any remaining casualties
• Secondary searches conducted by LE only with an accompanying report that the area searched was casualty-free will be sufficient to categorize that area as having a "secondary all clear"

Arson & Bomb Investigators

• Upon confirmation of an Active Threat Incident, FAO office should notify all Arson & Bomb Investigators to respond to the incident
• Upon arrival at the incident, Marshal 99 should report to the IC to assist the Incident Commander, as needed
• Arson & Bomb Investigator roles at an Active Threat Incident may include Explosive Ordnance Disposal and other related operations, Investigative and/or Intelligence functions, Liaison with LE or other agencies, and RTF force protection

Force Protection

• Law Enforcement may provide force protection by embedding officers within an RTF, by establishing protective corridors, by securing the area in question, or by another, agreed upon manner
• Force protection may or may not be FWPD (it may be another agency)

MedStar

• Establish, staff, and operate Triage, Treatment, and Transport groups as appropriate (CCPs are a FWFD responsibility)
• The T3 is established in the Cold Zone only
• Active Threat Incidents that have few casualties may not have a formal T3 established whereas the casualties may be loaded onto first available ambulances and immediately transported
• If a formal T3 is established, the RTFs will bring the casualties to the T3
• Primary focus should be maintaining availability of ambulances for casualty transport from the incident in coordination with receiving hospitals on patient destination and tracking, while tracking patients being transported by ambulance to hospitals and establishing staging in the Cold Zone

Active Threat Committee

• The FWFD will appoint an Active Threat Program Coordinator and a supporting committee to oversee the FWFD Active Threat program and related preparedness, development, maintenance, and training.
• The committee should: Coordinate and conduct, at a minimum, two (2) annual full-scale exercise utilizing FWPD, FWFD, and MedStar representatives, Present to Fire Administration the information needed to purchase and maintain ballistic protection, Present to Fire Administration the information needed to replace ballistic protection, Prepare and coordinate training, Coordinate with other agencies regarding matters related to Active Threat preparedness, Coordinate with the Emergency Management Office, After any Active Threat Incident convene with representatives to conduct a Post Incident Analysis and disseminate any lessons learned
• Representatives from EMS-99, Arson & Bomb Investigations, Training, Operations, Emergency Management Office, and the Fort Worth Professional Fire Fighters Association should be included on the committee

PPE and Equipment

• Ballistic Protective Equipment (ballistic vest, ballistic helmet, and eye protection) should be worn if fire fighters are aware they are responding to an Active Threat Incident, but it is not mandatory to delay life-saving actions in order to don BPE or to delay donning BPE in order to engage in life-saving actions
• For eye protection fire fighters should wear ANSI Z87.1 rated eyewear bearing clear lenses
• It is not necessary to wear structural bunker coats over a ballistic vest
• Currently, 2 MCI bags are assigned to each operations apparatus having 4 assigned personnel
• Each MCI bag should contain, at a minimum: EMS gloves, Black, Red, Yellow, and Green Triage Tape, Red chemlights, 6 x Combat Application Tourniquets, 6 x 4" Israeli Bandages, 2 x trauma shears, 6 x multi-trauma dressings, 12 x Kerlix gauze bandage, 4 x Vaseline occlusive dressing, 2 x Nasopharyngeal Airways, Foil blankets (when fielded), Hyphen Chest Seals (when fielded), 40 mm canisters (when fielded)
• BPE may be worn on other incidents where an individual feels ballistic protection is prudent or necessary
• BPE should be kept in their designated locked storage areas on each apparatus and lost or stolen ballistic helmets or ballistic vests should be immediately reported to FWPD and documented on a FD 703 outlining the circumstances along with the police report number and should also be submitted up the chain-of-command through to the appropriate Assistant Chief, with a copy to the Active Threat Incident Committee to facilitate equipment replacement
• BPE should not be transferred to reserve apparatus unless there is a designated locked storage area on the apparatus