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5.1 Identifying Global Inequalities Many of the topics introduced in this book are discussed in the context of an unequal world. Think back to the way we defined the study of human geography, in Chapter 1: the study of “What is where, why there, and why care?” This is a very useful framework that we use repeatedly through this book to study human geographic issues. In this chapter, we can begin studying uneven development and global inequalities by documenting the spatial distribution of wealth and poverty, or in other words, where on the globe we can identify inequalities in terms of development; this is the “what is where” component of the framework. Next, we will try to understand why the world is so unequal, through an exploration of development theory. Third, we will try to interpret why this matters, through a consideration of the various ways that inequalities impact people (i.e., issues of global hunger, the dimensions of refugee migration, the nature of infectious disease and natural disasters, and so on). Finally, we will offer some insights on what the future holds with respect to approaches like sustainable development, which aims to rectify some of the inequality we see in the world today. What (and Where) Are the More Developed and Less Developed Worlds? First, some comments on terminology. The term Third World was first used in the early 1950s, in the context of suggestions that former colonial territories might follow a different economic route from either the capitalist “First” or the socialist “Second” World. By 1960, the term was being used to designate a group of African, Asian, and Latin American countries generally described as poor, politically unstable, and unhealthy. Like all groupings based on broad generalizations, the Third World contained many more variations than similarities. Nevertheless, the classification had some value, and other terms have been used in much the same way. For example, the Independent Commission on International Development Issues produced what became known as the Brandt Report in 1980 (Brandt 1980), and it explicitly distinguished between North and South and rich and poor. Other commonly used terms were developed and underdeveloped, or developed and developing. All these terms are largely out of favour today. With the demise of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the geopolitical bipolarity of the Cold War era ended, and thus the distinction between the First and Second Worlds effectively ceased to exist. By default, the term Third World also became anachronistic. Further, North and South are geographically misleading; developed and underdeveloped seem to imply that nothing can change; and developing may be factually incorrect. As outlined in Chapter 4 (especially Box 4.1) the preferred terminology is more developed world and less developed world. These terms have the advantage of being relative rather than absolute and are used by organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the Population Reference Bureau. The more developed world comprises all of Europe and Northern America (Canada and the United States but not Mexico or the Caribbean), plus Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. All other countries in the world are classed as less developed. This classification is derived, according to the United Nations, by the sharp distinction of socio-economic conditions in more developed and less developed countries that existed as recently as the 1960s but has since diminished, as many countries of the less developed regions have undergone rapid development (for example, China). The terms continue to be used because the distinction remains meaningful for some purposes, despite its limitations. This simple twofold division is unsatisfactory in many respects, particularly because it disguises significant differences among the countries classified as less developed. Indeed, the UN and other organizations sometimes find it useful to exclude China from the less developed category and to identify a group of countries within the less developed world as comprising the least developed world: as of 2020, 46 countries were assessed as being in this group. Least developed countries have especially low incomes, high economic vulnerability, and poor human development indicators. Figure 5.1 maps the more, less, and least developed worlds. This book routinely employs the established distinction between more developed and less developed countries but also, when appropriate, makes reference to the least developed. But readers are asked to remember the diversity of experience that exists within any one country, not to mention the diversity between countries in such broad groups (see Box 4.1). FIGURE 5.1 More, less, and least developed countries As noted, most sources of information use the terminology of more developed and less developed countries as an explicit recognition of two unequal worlds. The term least developed has been used since 1971 to identify the least developed of the less developed countries. The list is reviewed every three years: Botswana (1994), Cape Verde (2007), Maldives (2011), Samoa (2014), Equatorial Guinea (2017), and Vanuatu (2020) have “graduated” (UN terminology) from this group, and Bhutan, Kiribati, São Tomé and Príncipe, and the Solomon Islands were candidates for graduation in 2021. As of 2020, the 46 least developed countries are as follows: Africa (33 countries): Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, DR of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia Asia and Pacific (12 countries): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos), Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Yemen Caribbean (1 country): Haiti Source: Author, using data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2020. The least developed countries report, 2020. Geneva: United Nations. View larger image In general, countries in the less developed world (and, more specifically, in the least developed parts) have relatively high levels of mortality and fertility and relatively low levels of literacy and industrialization. In addition, they often face political problems stemming from a colonial history that was replaced by authoritarian governments and is often exacerbated by ethnic or other rivalries. The basic demographic data are frequently unreliable; not only do the poorest countries have limited capital to conduct censuses, but low literacy levels may also affect the quality of the data collected. Box 5.1 provides capsule commentaries on three case studies of less developed countries, one each from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The African and Latin American cases belong to the least developed subgroup. AROUND THE GLOBE Box 5.1 | Three Less Developed World Case Studies: Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, and Haiti Ethiopia Ethiopia is one of several countries in the Horn of Africa suffering from a tragic combination of human and environmental factors. It is categorized as one of the 46 least developed countries. Ethiopia was settled by Hamitic peoples of North African origin. Following an in-movement of Semitic peoples from southern Arabia in the first millennium BCE, a Semitic empire was founded at Axsum (it became Christian in the fourth century CE). The rise of Islam displaced that empire southward and established Islam as the dominant religion of the larger area; the empire was overthrown in the twelfth century CE. Ethiopia escaped European colonial rule, but its borders were determined by Europeans occupying the surrounding areas, and the Eritrea region was colonized by Italy from the late nineteenth century until 1945. Attempts by the central government in Addis Ababa to gain control over both the Eritreans and the Somali group in the southeast generated much conflict. In 1974–5, a revolution displaced the long-serving ruler, Haile Selassie, and established a socialist state. Ethiopia is slightly larger than the province of Ontario—1.2 million square kilometres. Much of the country is tropical highlands, typically densely populated because such areas have good soils and are free of many tropical diseases. In 2020, the population was estimated at 115 million; the CBR was 33; the CDR, 6; and the RNI, 2.7. Although it is a leading coffee producer, Ethiopia is one of the poorest states in the world, with a 2019 GDP per capita of US$856, ranking it 165th out of approximately 185 countries and territories with sufficient data. Poverty is such a problem that many people rely on overseas food aid. Population growth is highly uneven, and the level of urbanization has only reached 20 per cent in the last few years, making Ethiopia one of the least urbanized countries in the world. Land reform policies, and the low quality of life in urban areas, contribute to the predominantly rural nature of the population. Women sell vegetables at the open-air street market at the Lideta district in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital. Located at the approximate geographical centre of the country, Addis Ababa is home to over 3.3 million of the nation’s inhabitants. mustafa6noz/iStockphoto View larger image Most Ethiopians have little or no formal education, especially those among the (predominant) rural population. The key social and economic unit is the family, in which women are subordinate, first to their fathers, then to their husbands and, if widowed, to their adult sons. Health care varies substantially between urban and rural areas. The country also has a particular regional problem. People in the Lower Omo River Valley live in difficult circumstances. The Omo tribes are agricultural peoples who depend on the annual cycle of river flooding. Each year, communities on the riverbanks move to higher ground prior to the flood, then return to plant their crops (mostly sorghum) in the replenished soil when the waters recede. But this resource and their cattle are often insufficient. Furthermore, disputes between groups about water rights are common. The situation may deteriorate further. The Ethiopian government recently opened the Gilgel Gibe series of dams and hydroelectric power–generating stations upstream from Omo communities; the Omo people claim these will mean the end of the annual flooding that forms the basis of their livelihood. The government argues otherwise, maintaining that flooding can be regulated as needed and that the Omo people will not be disadvantaged. Many scientists consider the Omo position legitimate, and an international coalition of governments has expressed concern. Notably, the Omo were not involved in any consultations about construction. Sri Lanka Sri Lanka is an island located in the Indian Ocean, south of India. Mostly low-lying, it has a tropical climate and a limited resource base. Minerals are in short supply, as are sources of power. The dominant economic activity is agriculture; about 36 per cent of the country is under cultivation. In 2020, Sri Lanka had a population of 22 million, a CBR of 15, a CDR of 6, and an RNI of 0.9. Although these figures are good by the standards of the less developed world, the country’s 2019 GDP per capita was US$3,853—well below that of countries such as Singapore (US$65,233) and Malaysia (US$11,414). Interestingly, Sri Lanka and Malaysia had comparable GNIs in the 1960s. Three factors account for Sri Lanka’s continuing problems. First, although it has effectively passed through the demographic transition (along with only a few other low-income countries such as China), its population increased rapidly in the past. Second, Sri Lanka has a long history of colonization—by the Portuguese from 1505 to 1655, the Dutch until 1796, and the British until independence was achieved in 1948. Problems of colonial dependency developed largely in the nineteenth century, when the ruling British established a system of plantation agriculture that largely benefited Britain rather than the local population. By 1945, tea plantations covered about 17 per cent of the cultivated area. Third, Sri Lanka includes two principal ethnic groups: the Sinhalese (74 per cent of the population), who moved down from north India and conquered the island in the sixth century BCE, and the Tamils (18 per cent of the population), who arrived from south India in the eleventh century. A long-running conflict between government soldiers and Tamil Tiger separatists, whose primary goal was the creation of an independent state (Tamil-Eelam), ended in 2009. This conflict is discussed in a broader South Asian context in Chapter 8. Contemporary Sri Lanka is a far cry from the tropical Indian Ocean island called Serendip by the first Arab visitors and Paradise by many later Europeans. Haiti Termed the “nightmare republic” by some commentators, Haiti is a third example of a politically troubled country in the less developed world. Like Ethiopia, it is categorized as least developed—the only such country in the Latin American region. The basic demographic data for 2020 show a population of 11.5 million, a very high CBR (24), a moderate CDR (8), and a high RNI (1.6). The use of modern contraceptive techniques is low, although there are good reasons to believe that demand for them is high. As a relatively small island nation, population density is high, at 398 people per square kilometre. Mostly mountainous with a tropical climate, Haiti has a long history of political turmoil since gaining independence (the first Caribbean state to do so) from France in 1804, following a 12-year rebellion. More recently, the first free election was held in 1990, after 30 years under the brutal rule of the Duvalier family. The victor was overthrown in 1992, and the country was again ruled by a military despot until democracy was re-established in 1994. However, the country has continued to be politically unstable and is often identified as one of the world’s most politically volatile states. Haiti is one of the most impoverished countries in the world; its 2019 GDP per capita (US$1,273) ranks it among the poorest 10 per cent of all countries. By contrast, the independent (and tourist haven) Dominican Republic, which shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti, has a GDP per capita almost five times that of Haiti. Economic disparities within Haiti itself are also extreme, not only between the poor Creole-speaking Black majority (95 per cent of the population) and the rich French-speaking minority (5 per cent) but also between the capital city of Port-au-Prince and the rural areas. It is estimated that the wealthiest 1 per cent of the population holds 44 per cent of the wealth. The rural population practise subsistence agriculture on soils that are generally poor, leading to erosion and declining soil fertility. Access to clean drinking water is difficult; hunger is widespread; and rates of infant mortality, tuberculosis, and HIV are all high. A collapsed infrastructure and drug trafficking and related corruption prevail. Finally, bad government and lax building standards mean that the country is tragically unable to cope with natural disasters, such as tropical storms or the January 2010 earthquake that killed thousands and virtually destroyed Port-au-Prince. Development : Problems of Definition and Measurement Defining Development Traditionally , economic and social development have been measured by reference to the absolute size and power of a country's economy. This can be measured in several different ways, including gross domestic product (GDP), gross national product (GNP), and gross national income (GNI), to name just a few. While each of these indicators measures slightly different aspects of a country's economy, for our purposes, they are effectively the same. The most commonly used measure of economic development is the GDP per capita, which is an aggregate of a country's economic production divided by its population size (per capita means per person) This macroeconomic indicator is most commonly used because not only does it provide reliable data for comparing various countrieseconomic performance (and is comparatively easy to calculate), but it is also believed to serve as a reliable surrogate measure of social development in health, education, and overall quality of life. Some critics, however, believe that such measures are inappropriate because they do not take into account either the spatial distribution of economic benefits or the real-life conditions that less developed countries face, such as population displacement, inadequate food supplies, and vulnerability to environmental extremes. It can be argued that, for the less developed countries, such aggregate macroeconomic indicators reveal how the minority wealthy population is progressing but tell us nothing about the poor majority; the same logic applies to the poor populations living in wealthier countries. The different opinions on the appropriateness of economic measures of development reflect a general disagreement about what development actually means. One problem is that definitions of development frequently are ethnocentric. Thus, the standard definition of development is based on wealth and modernization. But many observers argue that the entire concept of development is nothing more than Eurocentric nonsense invented by the more developed world and imposed on other places and cultures. For most people, however, the fundamental error in this alternative way of thinking is that it appears to deny the need to address issues of poverty. Measuring Economic Development The World Development Report, an annual publication of the World Bank, measures development on the basis of selected economic criteria, grouping countries into four categories—low income, lower-middle income, upper-middle income, and high income—according to GNI per capita. Figure 5.2 illustrates this classification of national economies. One problem with this way of ranking countries is that it reflects a developmentalist bias, suggesting that, as countries become more technologically advanced, they can—and should—increase their GNI. Moreover, as the World Bank admits, while this measure does not completely summarize a country’s level of development or measure welfare, it has proved to be a useful and easily available indicator that is closely correlated with other, non-monetary measures of the quality of life, such as life expectancy at birth, mortality rates of children, and school enrolment rates. Notwithstanding some of its limitations, the mapped data provide a useful description of global differences in levels of development; countries such as Canada, the United States, and those in Western Europe, along with a few others, are at the top of the income scale, while many of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, along with a few Asian and Latin American countries, are in the lowest tier. Box 5.2 comments on the problematic idea of growth following a series of developmental stages. EXAMINING THE ISSUES Box 5.2 | The Idea of Growth through Developmental Stages Societies have frequently been seen as travelling along a sequential path of development. Several anthropologists have proposed sequences of cultural change, sometimes referring to developmental stages using terms such as savagery, barbarism, and civilization. Others have envisaged society passing from primitive culture to feudalism, capitalism, and communism. Still others have seen society as experiencing shifts in the dominant occupational category, from primary to secondary to tertiary. Geographers have considered and contributed to these various generalizations. In general, the sequence is as follows: In the early stages of development, the economy and society are fragmented, trade is limited, and primary economic activities (such as subsistence farming or, more likely, hunting and gathering) dominate. Subsequently, as transportation improves and regions become more specialized and less subsistence oriented, manufacturing develops and trading becomes important. Finally, the service sector comes to dominate the economy, and regions become highly specialized. The classic example of generalization about the economic development of capitalist states was proposed by Rostow (1960), and is based on the European experience. There are five stages: Traditional society: Subsistence agriculture, domestic industry, and a hierarchical social system; a stable balance between population and resources Preconditions for take-off: Localized resource development because of colonialism or activities of a transnational corporation; an export-based economy; often a dual economy where different areas of the same country are engaged in different levels (for example, the Canadian Shield and the Canadian North today might be considered to be in this stage) Take-off to sustained growth: Exploitation of major resources; possibly radical and rapid political change (the newly industrialized countries may be in this stage) Drive to maturity: Creation of a diverse industrial base and increased trade Age of high mass consumption: Advanced development of an industrial economy; evident in the more developed world This model is useful, because it links easily to the demographic transition model (see Chapter 4). The simplifications in the Rostow model can be risky: what happened in Europe and North America may not happen elsewhere. More crucially, this logic can be criticized as an example of developmentalism, which, as noted earlier, implies that all countries necessarily proceed through the same sequence. It is also worth reiterating that economic growth and development are not necessarily the same thing, as our discussion of the HDI emphasizes. While comparisons between one country and another can be made using aggregate macroeconomic measures like GDP per capita (or GNI per capita), one of the biggest challenges is that standards of living (the local costs of goods and services) vary between countries, especially between more and less developed areas. For example, the cost to purchase a litre of milk or a new car or to pay monthly rent on an apartment will vary between Canada and just about every other country; sometimes the costs will be higher and sometimes lower. The implications of this are that a GDP per capita figure for Canada, which is used as a proxy measure for the average income of Canadians, cannot easily be compared with the GDP for Ecuador or Burundi, or anywhere else for that matter, because of variations in the quantities of goods and services that can be purchased with that average income. The solution to this problem is called purchasing power parity (PPP), and it involves calculating the local cost of a common market basket of goods and services (including thousands of common products) and using this to create an exchange rate for each country (Figure 5.3). This exchange rate then becomes a factor in interpreting the actual buying power of a country’s average income (Figure 5.4). FIGURE 5.3 A representative market basket of goods used to calculate purchasing power parity Low-income countries have an average GNI per capita of US$821; lower-middle-income countries, US$2,360; upper-middle-income countries, US$8,150; and high-income countries, US$46,052. Source: Author, using data from World Bank. 2021. World development indicators 2020. Washington, DC: World Bank. View larger image FIGURE 5.4 Gross national income per person, adjusted for purchasing power parity, 2019–2020 Low-income countries have an average GNI per capita (PPP) of US$2,449; lower-middle-income countries, US$7,007; upper-middle-income countries, US$17,884; and high-income countries, US$52,629. Source: Author, using data from World Bank. 2021. World development indicators 2020. Washington, DC: World Bank. View larger image The following numbers illustrate the impact of the purchasing power parity adjustment. In 2017, Canada’s GDP per capita was US$45,032, and its PPP equivalent was US$46,378—only marginally different. For Ecuador, the GDP per capita was US$6,198, but its PPP equivalent was nearly two times higher at US$11,617. And one final example is Burundi, a country among the least economically developed: its GDP per capita was US$320, and its PPP equivalent was two and a half times higher at US$771. What does this mean? On the one hand, it does not mean that the fundamental economic development differences between the more developed and less developed worlds are invalid. In fact, it confirms that these differences do indeed exist. When factoring in the cost of living for various places, we still see that Canada is more economically developed (wealthier) than Ecuador, and Ecuador is more developed than Burundi. On the other hand, what the PPP adjustment does tell us is that when we account for differences in cost of living and exchange rates, the relative variation between countries is somewhat less. You might say that the PPP adjustment compresses the variation between the economically more developed and less developed, but it does not alter the fundamental pattern. Measuring Human Development The UN’s Human Development Report, published annually since 1990, is intended to complement the economic measures of development such as GDP, GNP, or GNI. This alternative conceptualization of development primarily focuses on countries’ ability to meet basic human needs. It uses a wide variety of data to construct a Human Development Index (HDI) related to three primary elements of development: health (as measured by life expectancy), education (as measured by the mean number of years schooling children receive), and income (as measured by GNI per capita). Further, beginning in 2010, the HDI has been modified to incorporate inequalities within countries by considering national disparities in gender, income, health, and education. The HDI does not measure absolute levels of human development in the way that economic measures do but rather ranks countries in relation to one another. The value of thinking in terms of the HDI rather than solely in economic terms was reinforced by some research by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); data from several countries showed that economic growth does not necessarily translate into improvements in health or education or into redressing issues of poverty. Figure 5.5 maps the HDI in four general categories, indicating the countries in each category. Table 5.1 presents data on 20 countries (out of the 189 countries for which data are available): the 10 with the highest HDI values and the 10 with the lowest, using data from the 2019 Human Development Report. Again, as with economic measures of development (i.e., GNI per capita), African countries are generally the least developed. The HDI has a maximum value of 1.000 and a minimum value of 0.000; hence, Norway, with a score of 0.957, has a shortfall in maximum human development of only 4.3 per cent, whereas Niger, with a score of 0.394, has a shortfall of 60.6 per cent. It is also important to note that, although a general relationship between economic prosperity and human development is evident, there is no direct link—some countries are more successful than others in translating economic success into better lives for their people. INTERACTIVE MAP 5.1 Global Patterns of Migration, 2019 The UNDP divides the data set as follows: 66 countries with a very high level of human development, 53 with a high level, 37 with a medium level, and 33 with a low level. Data are not available for six countries, most notably North Korea and Somalia. Source: Author using data from United Nations Development Program. 2020. Human development report, 2020: Human Development for everyone. New York, NY: United Nations. Online: http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI. [Please note: You must be using an online, browser-based eReader in order to view this content.] The HDI data in Table 5.1 paint a distressing picture of global inequalities. A positive finding, however, is that most countries have managed to reduce their human development shortfall (the difference between their score and a perfect score of 1.000). The world’s average HDI has increased over time, with most countries showing at least a moderate increase. 5.2 Explaining Global Inequalities We begin this section by addressing an unfortunately common answer to the question of why different levels of development and related inequalities exist: the idea that differences in ingenuity and ability (i.e., human potential) between groups of people, called “races,” explain global differences in development. While grossly incorrect, this idea has been routinely employed since it came to the fore in the nineteenth century. As Chapter 7’s discussion about ethnicity and the so-called myth of race conclusively demonstrates, this assumption of the existence of “races” and their inherent inequality is scientifically incorrect. Having set aside this argument that some are poor (or wealthy) because they are lazy (or industrious), because they are less intelligent (or more intelligent), or because of the colour of their skin, we are left to find alternative explanations for the global inequalities that we documented earlier in this chapter. There is no one easy answer as to why the world is characterized by inequalities from place to place, such that it is routinely divided into two different and unequal parts. As we might expect, answers sometimes tend to be ideologically driven, reflecting a specific world view and related discourse. They are not necessarily wrong, but we must appreciate the larger intellectual context of the response. In this section, we consider two categories of answer that, importantly, can be thought of as sequential and complementary, and we place these answers in the needed larger contexts. Our first answer—that agricultural civilizations influenced development—requires that we think about why certain areas of the world experienced cultural development and the technology of agricultural domestication and, critically, why the practice of agriculture diffused away from some core areas of domestication. This explanation requires an understanding of physical geography and, for many critics, has overtones of environmental determinism (rather than possibilism). This first response can be seen as a prelude to the second—that differences in development can be explained by world systems and dependency theories. These latter theories consider the relations between different parts of the world from the onset of European overseas expansion to the present. Agricultural Civilizations Agricultural civilizations developed in some areas and not others and were a result of a transition from hunting and gathering societies to agricultural societies (Figure 5.6 maps the most significant of these). But why did some civilizations, notably those in Eurasia, involve agricultural diffusion across great distances, while others remained relatively limited in spatial extent, notably those in the Americas and Africa? FIGURE 5.6 Civilizations of the ancient world Source: Stearns, P.N., M. Adas, S.B. Schwartz, and M.J. Gilbert. 2007. World civilizations: The global experience. New York, NY: Pearson, 3. © 2008. Printed and electronically reproduced by permission of Pearson Education, Inc., New York, NY. View larger image Jared Diamond (1997) contends that basic world geography is critical to understanding not only the rise but also the subsequent spread of agriculture and thus the rise and spread of civilizations. He contends that the major axis of Eurasia is east–west, while the major axes of the Americas and of Africa are north–south. Diamond proposes that these different continental shapes were crucial because latitudinal (east–west) extent allows agricultural technologies to spread great distances over areas of similar climate, whereas cultural diffusion of agriculture on continents that lack this latitudinal extent is more limited. Because agricultural technologies are the precursor to the rise of civilizations, this basic geographic circumstance is a factor in beginning a chain of causation that eventually leads to some societies’ ability to spread globally and dominate other societies. Diamond’s ideas may aid our understanding of why European culture was able to move overseas. The latitudinal extent of Eurasia is the first link in the chain because it permitted agricultural technologies to spread and, combined with suitable plant and animal species, led to a sophisticated agricultural region that became the hearth of several key civilizations. The eventual outcome was a series of proximate factors that enabled one culture (Europeans) to move around the world and colonize other peoples and territories. This shape of continents argument is not fully proven, but if correct, it helps explain why European culture was able to move overseas earlier than some others. World Systems and Dependency Theories Our second explanation to understand the spatial distribution of inequality builds on the shape of continents idea but has a quite different conceptual logic. It relies on an understanding of the colonial period and of relations between countries since about 1500. For many human geographers, the single most important factor in explaining the plight of countries in the less developed world is their history of colonialism and their subsequent ongoing relationship with more developed countries. Most less developed countries have a colonial history; even those that do not (such as China, Thailand, Liberia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan) have been affected by Europe’s world dominance between about 1500 and 1945. Why is this colonial relationship so important? On the world scale, it can be argued that colonialism has led to dependence. In the past, many former colonies became economically dependent on their colonizers (the more developed countries); more recently, aid intended to promote development has served to encourage increased dependence. The Indigenous cultures and social structures of former colonies have been largely relegated to secondary status, their place taken by European structures. Thus, in the broadest sense, the less developed countries lack power, including being able to control and direct their own affairs. An important contribution to human geography that addresses these issues of colonialism and the related subordination of less developed countries is the world systems theory, proposed first by Immanuel Wallerstein (1979) and related to ideas of dependency theory. Describing the dynamic capitalist world economy from 1500 onward, world systems logic examines the roles that specific states play in the larger set of state interrelationships. The contemporary outcome of the colonial process, according to Wallerstein, is a world divided into three principal zones: core, semi-periphery, and periphery (Figure 5.7). The core states benefit from this situation, as they receive the surpluses produced elsewhere. The principal core states are Britain, France, the Netherlands, the US, Germany, and Japan—the countries where world business and financial matters are centred. The semi-periphery consists of countries that are partially dependent on the core, for example, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. The periphery consists of those countries that are dependent on the core, and while technically no longer colonies, they in effect remain colonized. All the countries that we regard as least developed belong in this latter group, as well as several others regarded as less developed. Questions to consider are, How does this theory accommodate the rapid political and economic changes in, for example, China? How quickly or easily does China pass from periphery to core? FIGURE 5.7 The world system: Core, semi-periphery, and periphery The line marks the 1980 Brandt Report division of North and South. Source: Adapted from Knox, P., J. Agnew, and L. McCarthy. 2014. The geography of the world economy. 6th edn. New York, NY: Routledge. View larger image Although this world system is conceptually dynamic, it is extremely difficult for a state to move out of peripheral status because the core countries have a vested interest in maintaining this dependency relationship. Consider the relationship between the United States (or Canada for that matter) and countries like Vietnam or Cambodia; the consumer culture of the more developed world depends on a supply of inexpensive labour to produce the goods available at Walmart or Canadian Tire. But the dependency relationship goes the other way as well; less developed economies are dependent on transnational corporations from the more developed world to provide employment. As a result, we can think of the world systems theory as being rigidly dynamic. The closely related logic of dependency theory stresses that some areas must remain underdeveloped for others to become more developed. This is because economic value is transferred in one direction only: from periphery to core. For example, in simple terms, most European countries benefited from extracting resources from their colonies but provided no substantial benefits in return. Hence, the European colonizing countries grew economically while the colonies lost potential. 5.3 Interpreting the Significance of Global Inequalities So far, we have described the uneven development in the world and have made several attempts to explain why this inequality is as it is. The next few sections of this chapter will illustrate why these inequalities matter and perhaps offer some insights into what we can do about them. The primary illustrations of this significance of inequality are food insecurity and hunger, population migration and the refugee crises, and the differential effects of natural disasters and disease on people in the more developed and less developed worlds. 5.4 Feeding the World Famine is a highly emotive word that the UN uses only when three circumstances are met: At least 20 per cent of the population has access to fewer than 2,100 kilocalories of food a day. Acute malnutrition exists in more than 30 per cent of children. Two deaths due to malnutrition per 10,000 people, or four deaths per 10,000 children, occur every day. We all know that parts of the world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, seem to be especially vulnerable to hunger and famine. But it was not always like this. In fact, until the nineteenth century, famine, hunger, and malnutrition were common almost everywhere. A few regionally diverse and historically varied examples include the 1229 famine in Japan, probably caused by volcanic activity and damp weather, that killed about one-fifth of the population in some areas; the 1315–22 famine in Northern Europe, most likely caused by flooding and cold weather, which killed between one-fifth and one-third of the population; and the 1454 famine in Mexico. A common denominator in these and other early famines is that they probably resulted directly from physical geographic circumstances. As we will see, the situation has changed, with physical geography playing a secondary role, since most famines today are caused by political circumstances such as war, policy failures, and bad government. The bottom line is that, perhaps contrary to apparent common sense, famines do not result directly from food shortages and too many people (as Malthus contended) but from problems with access to food. The World Bank estimates that about one billion people receive insufficient nourishment to support normal activity and work. The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports the number is closer to 700 million. In either case, it is important to recognize that, without proper nutrition, the body, including the brain, cannot develop fully and therefore that food shortages are both caused by and contribute to poverty. Hunger is most evident in many of the world’s poorest, and conflict-prone, countries in the world, such as Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Pakistan, and India. The current food problem exists despite evidence that nobody would go hungry if the world’s food production were equally divided among the world’s eight billion people. Thus, the problem is not global production but rather distribution. Further, while predictions of this type are necessarily tentative, it appears that enough food will be produced by 2050 to feed all expected 9.6 billion people. But producing sufficient food, whether today or in 2050, does not mean that everybody has the needed access to food. A diet may be deficient in quantity, quality, or both. Specific requirements vary according to age, sex, weight, average daily activity, and climate, but an insufficient quantity of food (or calories) results in undernutrition. The best-known cases of acute undernutrition are the famines that attract media attention. An adequate diet includes protein to facilitate growth and replace body tissue, as well as various vitamins. A diet deficient in quality results in malnutrition, usually a chronic condition. The most extreme consequence of undernutrition and malnutrition is death. Global Hunger Documenting the global hunger problem requires that we consider the issue from a few different perspectives. First, the extent of the current global hunger problem needs to be put into a larger historical context. Earlier, we talked about famines in various parts of the world in the past, but what do we know about the numbers of undernourished people worldwide, over a period of time? The number of undernourished people worldwide has declined from about 800–50 million people in the early days of this century to about 650 million today; as a share of the population, this means a decline from about 13.5 per cent of the population in 2001 to 8.7 per cent today. In this relatively short time frame, this is a remarkable achievement. But, of course, not everyone would suggest that much progress is being made, especially those many millions of people who do not have access to enough food to feed themselves or their families. Second, based on our discussion earlier in this chapter, it is not surprising that areas of sub-Saharan Africa, South-Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America are the worst off with respect to hunger. In most of these areas, with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa, the situation is showing improvement (Figure 5.8). South-Central Asia, including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, represents the largest share of the global hunger problem, with nearly 40 per cent of the world’s undernourished population. Sub-Saharan Africa has seen an increase of approximately 40 million undernourished people since 2001, and today, the region represents one-third of the global hunger problem. n 2018, Jack Ma, co-founder of the Alibaba Group, was among the first Chinese people to become one of the 20 richest people in the world. The same year, China saw the creation of the most new billionaires worldwide. How do these developments reflect economic changes in China in the twenty-first century? Frederic Legrand—COMEO/Shutterstock View larger image Zhong Shanshan, founder of a major water bottling company, among other Chinese businesses, is now regarded as the wealthiest Chinese citizen, with a net worth of over $60 billion. Photo by VCG/VCG via Getty Images View larger image Third, India presently has 190 million undernourished people, representing approximately 13.5 per cent of its population. These 190 million undernourished Indians represent nearly 30 per cent of the global hunger problem. In comparison, the world’s largest country, China, has many fewer undernourished people today. The most recent data for China shows 40 million undernourished people in 2010, after several decades of fairly steady decline. Even in 2001, China had 140 million undernourished people, or about 11 per cent of its total population; the equivalent figure is likely closer to 2 per cent of its current population. Two decades ago, these two countries represented the bulk of the global hunger problem, but today, the situation has improved substantially in China and much less so in India. Explaining Food Shortages As we have previously stated, most explanations of the world food problem have, until recently, focused on three factors: Overpopulation: The root cause of the food problem is often said to be the sheer number of people in the world. Yet evidence suggests that there are not too many people. Overpopulation is a relative term, and densely populated areas are not necessarily overpopulated. Table 5.2 confirms that countries with dense populations, such as the Netherlands and South Korea, are not overpopulated, while less densely settled countries, such as Ethiopia and Mexico, may be. A compelling example is China, which experienced regular famines when it had a population of 0.5 billion but is now, with a population of almost 1.4 billion, essentially free of famine. Inadequate distribution of available supplies: Most countries have the transportation infrastructure to guarantee the appropriate movement of food, but other factors prevent satisfactory distribution. Physical or human circumstances: A 1984 drought in central and eastern Kenya is estimated to have caused food shortages for 80 per cent of the population. Other causes in specific cases include flooding and war. Circumstances such as these obviously aggravate existing problems, but they cannot be considered root causes. Political and Economic Explanations Most recent explanations of the food problem have tended to focus on the political and economic aspects. For example, the world systems perspective suggests that global political arrangements are making it increasingly difficult for many in the less developed world to grow their own food. Not only is the percentage of the population involved in agriculture in the less developed world declining (from more than 80 per cent in 1950 to less than 60 per cent today), but the vast majority of those remaining in agriculture cannot compete with the handful of commercial farms that can benefit from technological advances. Indeed, the vast majority have lost control over their own production because of larger global causes. For example, farmers in Kenya are actively encouraged to grow export crops such as tea, coffee, and cut flowers instead of staple crops such as maize; peasant farmers in many countries are losing their freedom of choice because credit is increasingly controlled by large corporations; and many governments make it their policy to provide cheap food for urban populations at the expense of peasant farmers. The essential argument here is that the capitalist mode of production is affecting peasant production in the less developed world in such a way as to limit the production of staple foods, thus causing a food problem. In the same way, global economic considerations make it increasingly difficult for people in the less developed world to purchase food. Throughout the world, food is a commodity; hence, production is related to profits. In other words, food is produced only for those who can afford to buy it. In 1972, a year when famine was widespread in the Sahel region of Africa, farmers in the US were actually paid to take land out of production to increase world grain prices. These arguments suggest that the cause of the world food problem is the peripheral areas’ dependence on the core area. Yet any attempt to correct that problem is likely doomed to failure, because the more developed world is not about to initiate changes that would lessen its power and profits. If this argument is followed to its logical conclusion, the world food crisis can only get worse, regardless of technological change, because the cause of the problem lies in global political and economic patterns. Further support for the connection between famine and politics can be found in the historical record. Between 1875 and 1914, some 30–50 million people died in a series of famines in India, China, Brazil, and Ethiopia. Descriptions of these famines point to the role played by meteorological conditions but also to the complex politics of colonialism and capitalism as essential causes. The fact is that feast and famine live side by side in our global village. There are rich and poor countries, and in the poor countries, both rich people and people living in poverty. Increasingly, agriculture is a business, and it is in the nature of business that not all participants compete equally well. Food problems are not typically caused by overpopulation, and population density is a poor indicator of pressure on resources. We will not solve food problems merely by decreasing human fertility. A concerted and co-operative international effort is needed to improve the quality of peasant farming and to reorient it toward the production of staple foods. Meanwhile, undernutrition and malnutrition are not disappearing, and famines will continue to occur unless there is meaningful political change. What makes the world systems perspective particularly valuable is its emphasis on structural causes—not just the fairly obvious immediate causes, such as drought and crop failure, that tend to receive media attention. But the basic world systems logic can be usefully applied at various spatial scales below that of the world as a whole. The Role of Bad Government Governments, particularly bad ones, are a cause of food problems and lack of economic and social development more generally. Many argue that widespread hunger has nothing to do with food production and everything to do with poverty—which in turn is closely related to political governance. The argument is that famine does not occur in democratic countries because, even in the poorest democracy, famine would threaten the survival of the ruling government. A cursory review of current global famine areas confirms that famine seems to have six principal causes, with bad government front and centre. Of the other causes, four are closely related to bad government: a prolonged period of underinvestment in rural areas, refugee problems stemming from political instability related to conflict, HIV/AIDS and other diseases depriving families of productive members and damaging family structures, and continued population growth because of high birth rates. The sixth cause is bad weather. Links between quality of governance and food production are repeatedly emphasized in the World Bank’s annual World Development Report. Arguing that agriculture can play a key role in development, the reports often note the need for sound agricultural policies and investment. Unfortunately, many of the less developed countries perform poorly on a range of governance measures. For example, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) provide a comprehensive annual snapshot of the quality of governance in 200 countries across six key dimensions. While all the dimensions contribute to our understanding of poor governance, perhaps the most illustrative of issues impacting food security are the measures related to government corruption. In this context, corruption is taken to mean the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. As Figure 5.9 shows, the countries with the worst scores on corruption are also those places that are currently facing or have recently faced famine. In 2019, the most corrupt governments were found in South Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Venezuela, and North Korea. FIGURE 5.9 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): Control of corruption, 2019 The Worldwide Governance Indicators measure the quality of governance across six dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Here, showing the control of corruption dimension, countries are ranked from very high (the top 10 per cent of countries with respect to controlling corruption) to very low (the poorest 10 per cent of countries). Source: Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2020. World governance indicators. Online: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi. View larger image The larger question of the global spread of democracy is considered in Chapter 8. Figure 5.10, employing a fourfold division of countries and six measures of quality of governance, shows a clear relationship between a poor governance score and emphasis on agriculture. FIGURE 5.10 Quality of governance among different types of countries The four country groupings are not mutually exclusive: agriculture-based countries are mostly in sub-Saharan Africa; transforming countries are mostly in South and East Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa; urbanized countries include most of Latin America and much of Europe and Central Asia; and the developed countries (a grouping that includes many of the urbanized countries) are those in the more developed world. The six dimensions of governance—voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption—used to calculate the governance score are taken from a substantial World Bank research project (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006). For the purposes of this figure, scores below zero indicate poor governance, and above zero, better governance. Source: World Bank. 2008. World development report: Agriculture for development. Washington DC: World Bank, 23, Figure 12. View larger image Providing Food Aid Food aid provided by the more developed world helps the less developed world enormously, but it has not proven to be a solution to famine. This is not surprising, given our observation that the ultimate cause is political (which no amount of aid is likely to change) and that factors such as drought are proximate causes. Aid is often directed to urban areas, even though the greatest need is usually in rural areas; indeed, much donated food goes to governments, which then sell it for profit. Aid tends to depress food prices in the receiving country, reducing the incentive for people to grow crops and increasing their dependence. In many cases, it is not effectively distributed, whether because of inadequate transport or because undemocratic governments in the receiving countries control the food supply and feed their armies before anyone else. There are other concerns. In 2006, when suffering from a severe drought and food shortages, Eritrea expelled three charities working in the country in an apparent attempt to attract international attention to the long-running border disagreement with Ethiopia. Even more disturbing, a 2006 report from a children’s charity stated that humanitarian workers and peacekeeping soldiers in Liberia were providing food aid in return for sex with young girls. Again, during the 2011 famine in Somalia, militias that controlled parts of the country prevented food aid from reaching some of those in need. These comments about food aid may also apply more generally to attempts to help countries emerge from poverty. It has been said, only half-jokingly, that foreign aid merely moves money from people living in poverty in rich countries to rich people in poor countries. There is, for example, much debate about the merits of the Make Poverty History campaign, initiated in 2003 and strongly supported by the Irish rock singer Bob Geldof, other popular entertainers, and many politicians. A major focus of this campaign was collecting money from individuals and pressuring governments to provide more aid. Although such attempts to help poor countries are laudable and well motivated, their effectiveness is another matter. A country such as Malawi has received huge amounts of aid in recent decades but without any indication of meaningful improvement in quality of life for the vast majority of the population. Raising this critical point is not to suggest that many countries do not require humanitarian aid, disaster relief, or medicine. The criticism is that merely pouring in money does not achieve the desired end to poverty. A 2005 report by two major humanitarian agencies, Oxfam and Action-Aid, accused Western governments of using aid to reward strategic allies and to support favoured economic development projects. The document also suggested that only about one-fifth of aid money went to the countries that were most in need, with only half of that one-fifth being invested in health and education. Perhaps more important, aid funds are commonly sent to countries known to be governed by potentially corrupt politicians. Botswana is an example of a country that has been governed well and has steadily improved in terms of quality of life; Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia are contrary examples, mired in poverty and not always well governed. In other countries, wealth achieved from oil or other natural resource revenues is used to benefit not the population but a select few. Indeed, some argue that more natural resources lead to more corrupt government. A recent notorious example involved the son of the president of Equatorial Guinea spending more than CA$2 million on luxury cars and expensive homes in several countries around the world, all while the vast majority of the country’s population is poverty stricken. More generally, about 40 per cent of Africa’s private wealth is held overseas, much in Swiss bank accounts. Further, foreign companies are typically quite content to exploit local ignorance in order to maximize their profits. The main shopping area in Port Louis, Mauritius. Situated about 800 kilometres east of Madagascar, the island is Africa’s only full democracy. Severe poverty is rare in the country; however, the country is vulnerable to rising global food prices because it relies on imports for 70 per cent of its food need. For example, the main fruit crops (banana, pineapple, lychee, and mango) yield only half the requirements. Constantin Iosif/Shutterstock View larger image Food shortage and related problems are complex. There are many undernourished and malnourished people in the world, yet enough food is being produced to feed everyone. As we have noted, there seem to be good reasons to believe that current food shortages are not caused by inadequate supplies and that supplies will be adequate in the future. On the basis of a scientifically detailed analysis of the complete food cycle, Smil (2000, 315) arrived at a conclusion he described as “encouragingly Malthusian.” In other words, the future may not be as bright as we might hope, but neither is it totally bleak. Thus, with reference to the competing pessimistic and optimistic positions, we might suggest that neither extreme is a realistic portrayal of our future. Rather, like several other problems (for instance, the issue of refugees), the food problem appears to be associated with specific areas and a multitude of complex interrelated causes—physical, economic, and cultural but primarily political (Box 5.3). IN THE NEWS Box 5.3 Feeding 9 Billion In 2020, the number of people suffering from daily hunger remained at about 850 million people, a figure it has hovered around for nearly a decade. Think about that for a moment. First, picture being hungry every single day. For most of us—the lucky ones—this is hard to imagine. Being in a situation where, every day, you know you will not get enough food to eat is tragic. Second, think about 850 million people being in that same situation. That is 24 times the population of Canada, 2.5 times the population of the United States, or a little more than the entire population of Europe. This is a staggering problem. Digging deeper, we can see two possible ways of looking at this issue. In 2016, there were about 40 million fewer hungry people, and so, on the one hand, this problem got markedly worse between 2016 and 2020. On the other hand, leading up to 2016, there was a full decade of slowly declining hunger. So, in the bigger scheme of things, the 2016–20 period could be a blip on an otherwise downward trajectory. We can certainly hope this is the case. However, it is worth looking a little further into the situation to see, first, what contributed to this increase in the hunger problem and, second, what the root cause is of so many being hungry in the first place. According to the United Nations, the hunger crisis has worsened across major parts of sub-Saharan Africa, as well as southwestern and southeastern Asia, with South Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and Zimbabwe being in the direst situations (Figure 5.11). Perhaps not surprisingly, in those countries with the worst food security problems, there is a clear connection to conflict. South Sudan, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and Nigeria are all mired in civil strife. Furthermore, deteriorating environmental conditions, such as floods and droughts, exacerbated the already bad situations, such as in Madagascar in early 2021. In fact, some have argued that in many countries, both today and in the past, civil conflict often begins as a result of deteriorating environmental circumstances that reduce the availability of food. The single best contemporary example is Syria; the civil war began not long after a series of horrible harvests. FIGURE 5.11 Food assistance needs and famine risk, 2020 East Africa (including South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Sudan) and Southwest Asia (Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan) plus Nigeria, DR of Congo, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar were in need of the most food assistance in 2020, and several distinct areas across the Sahel in sub-Saharan Africa are at particular risk of famine. Source: Author, using data from Famine Early Warning Systems Network, 2020. Alert: Drought, economic shocks, and continued conflict maintain high assistance needs in 2020. Online: https://fews.net/sites/default/files/Food_assistance_needs_Peak_Needs_2020_Final.pdf. View larger image A Turkish aid organization (Kizilay) distributes supplies and aid in Afrin, Syria. How can food insecurity exacerbate conflict in regions like Syria? answer5/Shutterstock View larger image Our second issue to address here is that even if we ignore the increase between 2016 and 2020, there is still a large number of people who are hungry every day. At the very least, 800 million or so people are undernourished. This problem persists despite the fact that there is more than enough food to feed the current global population. The problems lie not in food production per se but in the distribution of food, food waste, the feeding of livestock to produce meat and dairy products (which, nutritionally speaking, we do not need), and so on. What are the solutions to these problems? In short, they include utilizing science and technology (such as drought-resistant crops), creating better food distribution systems (e.g., avoid waste, stop using corn to make ethanol fuel, etc.), enacting stronger government regulations and proactive government policies, and supporting local food systems. These solutions are controversial and not easily implemented. But we need solutions, for if the current food problem cannot be addressed, feeding a population of 9 or 10 billion is going to be even more challenging. Evan Fraser, a geographer at the University of Guelph, has developed a research and education program, Feeding 9 Billion, which explores these very issues. We encourage you to check out his work (online: www.feeding9billion.com). EXAMINING THE ISSUES Box 5.4 | Emerging Africa: The Hopeful Continent The two phrases used in this box’s title are taken from a special report published in The Economist in 2013. Although the report regularly stresses uncertainties, the overall tone is mostly positive. The argument is that, while Africa faces numerous problems related to poverty, nutrition, health, and civil strife, the recent past shows substantial improvement. Indeed, it might be said that the perception of the continent from outside is both partial and warped, as the media tend to cover only wars, disasters, and famines and continually stress the need for aid and intervention. The good news is that several developments over the past decade or so are beginning to have a significant impact. Large amounts of targeted aid, including large sums from philanthropists like Bill and Melinda Gates, are showing results. There is much new infrastructure, notably schools that are improving education standards and roads and railways that are making it easier to move goods and people. The World Bank predicts that most African countries will be classed as middle income by 2030, whereas only about half are today. Also, the number of major conflicts has declined, with the end of wars in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, and Chad. Reasons include the end of the Cold War, which meant the United States and the former Soviet Union began to reduce their involvement in propping up regimes or supporting anti-government groups, and intervention by Western countries to facilitate peace. Significant conflict is evident still in South Sudan, DR of Congo, Somalia, Libya, Nigeria, Mali, and Niger. Political violence undermines state stability, limits the ability of governments to function effectively, weakens state institutions, forces school and hospital closures, and deters foreign investment. When conflicts end, the potential for growth and for a better quality of life is greatly enhanced. Significantly, democratic ideas and institutions become more evident. In recent years, a few African countries—including Botswana, Ghana, South Africa, and Tunisia—have shown enthusiasm for democratic institutions and increasing personal freedoms. Unfortunately, only 11 African countries, overwhelmingly in the southern portions of the continent, can be classified as even partly democratic, and these account for less than 10 per cent of the continents’ population. However, recent surveys have shown greater-than-ever demand for democracy over other forms of government; the question is whether some of the long-standing authoritarian leaders will give it to their people. In 2008 Festus Mogae, a former president of Botswana, won the US$5 million Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, which recognizes good governance in Africa. Botswana has been one of the most politically stable countries in Africa since independence in 1966, never having had a coup and holding regular multi-party elections. In 2017, the nearly 40-year-long repressive regime of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, which had contributed to a food crisis affecting millions, ended with an internal power struggle and his being ousted from office. Mugabe’s time in office, fortunately, is more the exception than the norm in sub-Saharan Africa. Less dramatic, but no less important, are some changes in the approach to combatting poverty. Since about 2000, some African countries, including Uganda and Kenya, have adopted a strategy that sees poor households given a small stipend to spend as they choose. Initiated in Latin America, this program clearly helps pull people out of poverty. Recipients typically do not waste the money but use it to, for example, build a new roof or buy seed. There are good reasons to be increasingly confident about the future of Africa, with the ongoing development, decreased conflict, enhanced democratic institutions, and grassroots initiatives all having a positive effect on people’s everyday lives. Refugees Since the end of World War II, distressingly large numbers of people have been forced to move from their homes. Specific reasons vary but include political changes following a period of conflict, political repression, food shortages, drought, or often a combination of these circumstances. Some people move within their country, while others cross international borders. In the immediate postwar period, some of these major population movements were in the more developed world, but today, the less developed, and especially least developed, countries are now the primary source. Globally, the first major movements of refugees took place after World War II in response to changing political circumstances. For example, immediately after 1945, about 15 million Germans relocated. Shortly after the partition of India in 1947, following the end of colonial rule, the British created the Hindu state of India and two Muslim states—West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). This partitioning process resulted in the movement of about 16 million people—about 8 million Muslims fled India for the new state of Pakistan, while about 8 million Hindus and Sikhs fled Pakistan for India. From about 1960 to the mid-1970s, the annual number of refugees in the world was relatively low at between two and three million (Figure 5.12). However, in 1973, the end of the Vietnam War gave rise to one of the first large transcontinental movements of refugees; some two million people fled Vietnam, necessitating a major international relief effort. Because of its involvement in the war, the US received about half of these refugees. The flow of Vietnamese refugees continued until the early 1990s. More generally, the 1980s saw a large increase in numbers of refugees for various political, economic, and environmental reasons. Total refugee numbers began to fall in the first decade of the twenty-first century, standing at 10.5 million in 2010, but have increased since then, largely because of the civil war in Syria and the subsequent emergence of the Islamic State; the major countries of origin of today’s refugees are listed in Table 5.3. The Nature of the Refugee Problem Refugees are individuals forced to flee their home country when faced with persecution or other threats to personal safety, such as those resulting from war, famine, or natural disaster. In most cases, when significant refugee crises emerge, the source country is mired in such chaos that it is difficult both to provide information to individuals about places of safe refuge and to track the movements of the individuals. Accordingly, estimates of total numbers of refugees vary. The most reliable source of information on refugee numbers is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Although most countries offer protection to their citizens, others choose not to or are unable to do so as a result of war or natural disaster, and these prompt refugee crises. Most current refugee movements are prompted by civil wars and forms of ethnic conflict, as was the case, beginning in 2012, of Syrians fleeing the civil war in their country. By 2020, more than 6.5 million refugees had left Syria for camps in neighbouring Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, while others had crossed borders but were not in camps, and still others remained internally displaced within Syria. While this crisis has dominated the news, it is not the only ongoing refugee crisis; at the time of writing, there are dozens of emergencies. For example, beginning in 2017, and continuing into 2021, more than one million Rohingya minorities have fled from Myanmar into neighbouring Bangladesh (see Box 5.5). Unrest in DR of Congo since early 2017 has forced nearly a million refugees into Angola, Zambia, and other neighbouring countries. Economic collapse and political uncertainty has resulted in a massive refugee crisis in Venezuela, and civil strife in Yemen has forced many people to flee to neighbouring countries. Those countries that receive refugees, either for a short period of time or for the longer term, are known as countries of asylum. Refugees arrive on the shores of Lesbos, Greece. In 2015, over half a million people fled Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan for Europe. Eastern European countries such as Slovenia, Croatia, Türkiye, and Hungary have struggled to handle the influx of people, with some closing their borders. The EU and the German government have sought more co-operation from central and southeast European states in processing and accepting refugees. Photo by SOEREN BIDSTRUP/SCANPIX DENMARK/AFP via Getty Images View larger image IN THE NEWS Box 5.5 Rohingya Refugee Crisis Official estimates suggest that about 1.1 million Rohingya, a majority-Muslim ethnic group, live in the majority-Buddhist Southeast Asian country Myanmar (formerly known as Burma). Nearly all the Rohingya live in the western coastal state of Rakhine, on the Bangladesh border. Rakhine is the poorest state in the country and is ethnically and religiously split between Rohingya Muslims and predominantly Buddhist ethnic Rakhine. As a minority group, the Rohingya have been persecuted in many ways for a very long time. Shortly after Myanmar’s independence from the British in 1948, the Union Citizenship Act was passed, defining which ethnicities could gain citizenship in the new republic. It recognized people of 135 Indigenous ethnicities as citizens, but the Rohingya were not included. The situation worsened for the Rohingya after a military coup in 1962. The new military-led revolutionary council severely restricted the Rohingya’s rights to study, work, travel, marry, practise their religion, and access health services. The 1982 Citizenship Act again denied citizenship to the Rohingya; they are effectively stateless. Since the 1970s, a number of crackdowns on the Rohingya in Rakhine State have forced hundreds of thousands to flee, mostly to neighbouring Bangladesh. The government blamed an armed Rohingya group for the deaths of nine border police in October 2016 and sent military troops into the mostly rural villages of Rakhine State as part of a security crackdown in retaliation for this alleged involvement in the deaths. UN officials and non-governmental organization (NGO) workers accused government troops of a variety of human rights abuses, including what appeared to be a form of ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya. Hundreds of villages appear to have been burned to the ground, thousands of men are missing, and hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have become internally displaced or refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries by either land or boat. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that over 700,000 refugees fled to Bangladesh between August 2017 and July 2018. The vast majority of the refugees in this case are women and children, and over half have sought shelter in and around the existing refugee camps of Nayapara and Kutupalong in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. As in many other refugee crises, the solutions seem out of reach. Repatriation to Myanmar seems unlikely without a political regime change and a lessening of cultural tensions. Local long-term settlement in Bangladesh is hard to fathom, given that Bangladesh often has trouble feeding and housing its own poor, never mind a million or more from neighbouring Myanmar. Other nearby Muslim states such as Malaysia or Indonesia are possible destinations, but so far neither has made much of a humanitarian effort to assist. A combination of two satellite images of the Kutupalong refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, taken a year apart. The images show how the geography and topography of the area have changed, as trees and vegetation have vanished while the camp expands. The image on the left was taken on 8 February 2017 and the image on the right on 28 February 2018. The images contain modified Copernicus Sentinel-2 data, 2017 & 2018. Source: Toronto Star MELANIE MACDONALD/ GEOSPATIAL ANALYST View larger image In addition to refugees, the UNHCR describes three other classes of “persons of concern”: Asylum seekers are people who have left their home country and have applied for refugee status in some other country. Returnees are refugees who are in the process of returning home (the desired goal for most refugees); in recent years, the UNHCR has been involved in major repatriations in many places, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, and several African countries. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are people who flee their homes but remain within their home country; unlike refugees, they do not cross an international boundary. The UNHCR estimates nearly seven million Syrians are internally displaced within Syria, another five million Congolese in DR of Congo are living away from their home but within the country, four million more IDPs are in the zones of ethnic conflict in Yemen, and an unknown number of Venezuelans are similarly displaced (although many of them are trying to find a way into neighbouring Colombia). The Refugee Problem Today Today, the total number of persons of concern is 82.4 million, including refugees, asylum seekers, and those who are internally displaced. But even these figures likely underestimate the full extent of the problem. Official figures attempt to measure the effect of distressing situations for which reasonably detailed data are simply not available, as well as a variety of situations that are more difficult to categorize. For example, about 258,000 Urdu-speaking Muslims, known as Bihari, have been stranded in Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) since the 1947 partition. The Biharis are in a difficult situation because of their past support for the former West Pakistan (now Pakistan). Similarly, about 800,000 Iranians in Türkiye are not recognized as refugees. Figure 5.13, which maps major source countries of refugees in 2020, highlights some of the key problem areas (Southwest Asia, East and Central Africa, and South-Central Asia). It is sometimes suggested that the vast majority of refugees and other persons of concern are women and children, but this is not usually the case. Globally, about 49 per cent are female and in Syria, for example, 9 per cent are under the age of 5 and 41 per cent under the age of 18. These percentages do not differ radically from standard gender and age distributions. It seems that, when a population is displaced en masse, its demographic structure remains relatively balanced. Most refugees move to an adjacent country, which can result in some very complicated regional patterns when the same nation is both a country of asylum for some refugees and the home from which others have fled. Such situations often arise in the context of ethnic conflict and civil war, and those affected are usually in serious need of aid and support. Current examples include the East African countries of Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti; the Central African countries of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and DR of Congo; the West Asian countries of Yemen, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria; and the Southeast Asian country of Myanmar (Box 5.5). Some refugees are able to move to countries in the more developed world. Table 5.4 lists the principal countries of asylum. This table confirms that, although most refugees are in countries adjoining their homelands, some obtain legal status in the more developed world. Without question, refugee and related problems are greatest in the less developed world. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that few asylum countries have the infrastructure to cope with the additional pressures that refugees bring. As evidenced by the figures in Table 5.4, most of the top-ranked countries receiving refugees are in the less developed world. Some, like Uganda and Sudan, are even among the least developed countries. It is extremely challenging to provide emergency shelter, food, and medicine for hundreds of thousands of people, especially for countries struggling to meet these same demands for their own population. Syria The Syrian crisis, by far the biggest refugee emergency of our time, is a useful case study for the conditions that give rise to and result from refugee crises. Estimates suggest that there are between six and seven million internally displaced Syrians and a similar number of Syrian refugees living outside Syria. The majority of Syrian refugees outside Syria are living in neighbouring countries in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and others. Most of these refugees are living in countries close to Syria with the hope that they will be able to return to their home country when things return to normal, but the conflict there has lasted more than a decade already (Figure 5.14). Many of these people have been living in refugee camps, temporary shelters, and various other arrangements for a decade, often with young children, elderly family members, or both. They have lost homes, businesses, and loved ones. For them, going back to Syria, while certainly desirable, will not be simple. Between one and two million Syrian refugees have fled further from the conflict, with more than a million of them in Europe and many more in North America, Latin America, or elsewhere. For this group, Germany has been the most welcoming destination, taking in fully half of these refugees. Sweden, Austria, and Canada have also made significant efforts to resettle newcomers. However, the Syrian crisis has arisen at a particularly sensitive time in the history of countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, a time when long-standing policies of tolerance and welcoming those in need have seemingly evaporated in a wave of populism. In these countries, immigration and related issues have become an important political touchstone. European Refugee Crisis and Populism In Europe, and elsewhere in the more developed world, the issue of refugees and migrants has taken a new political turn since about 2012. Among more developed countries, those in Europe have taken in the bulk of migrants arriving from Southwest Asia and the Middle East (Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.), East Africa (Somalia, South Sudan, Eritrea), and West Africa (Nigeria, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, etc.), largely as a result of geographical proximity to these areas (Figure 5.15). For many of these migrants, the journey to Europe is a perilous one fraught with serious risks, including dehydration, heat stroke, or starvation while crossing the North African deserts; capsizing and drowning while crossing the Mediterranean Sea; and theft, rape, or murder when seeking assistance from criminal migrant smugglers. In 2015, more than a million refugees and migrants risked their lives crossing the Mediterranean Sea. In 2016, an estimated 350,000 attempted this same crossing, and more than 5,000 drowned. In 2020, the volume of refugees and migrants making this perilous journey had dropped markedly, but it has not stopped entirely. Once migrants have safely arrived in Europe, the journey is not over. Part of the problem stems from the fact that there are relatively few pathways for migrants to get to Europe, and those pathways lead to only a small number of entry points: Spain, Italy, Greece, and the Balkan states. In 2016, 180,000 refugees and migrants arrived on Italian shores, and 170,000 more arrived in Greece. These countries must process refugee claims and determine who will be permitted into Europe. Those whose claims are rejected must then be returned to safe havens in Africa (if any exist for them). Attendees at an April 2016 rally for Donald Trump’s presidential campaign take pictures of a supporter with Trump’s “Build the Wall” slogan written across his arms. The social media activity generated by events like this helped Trump’s populist ideas gain traction. AP Photo/Elise Amendola, File View larger image Further problems arise for those admitted to Europe. Most refugees want to go where they can find jobs and immigrant settlement services (such as Germany, which has been the most welcoming to refugees). As a result, the challenge of accommodating these refugees has fallen disproportionately on a few countries. Add to this a rising tide of populism in Europe, which has swung many European countries, including Italy, Hungary, Poland, and many others, to an overtly nationalist and anti-migrant position. Populists blame migrants for rising crime rates and unemployment, despite a lack of evidence that either of these problems actually exist, let alone can be tied to incoming refugees. Much the same arguments were used in the United States under the American populist fervour, which resulted in President Donald Trump’s “travel ban” on people from predominantly Islamic countries and his campaign promises to “build the wall” along the southern border with Mexico. Different refugees have different reasons for moving, and there are no simple ways to resolve their many different cases. The UNHCR has traditionally proposed three solutions: voluntary repatriation, local settlement, and resettlement. More recently, the focus has turned to attacking the underlying causes of refugee problems. But all attempts at solutions are problematic. The UNHCR tends to favour voluntary repatriation, which occurs when refugees decide to return home on their own. But this approach is not feasible for most refugees because, in most cases, the circumstances that caused them to leave have not changed. However, some success was achieved in the Horn of Africa region prior to the 2011 famine, as noted in Box 5.6. Local settlement in a neighbouring host country is difficult in areas that are poor and lack resources to support refugees over the long term. Whatever the reason behind a refugee movement, nearby areas regularly face similar problems and hence are rarely able to offer solutions. People in areas that are already poor and subject to environmental problems, such as drought in parts of eastern and southern Africa, will be hard-pressed to provide refugees with the food, water, and shelter they need. Resettlement in some other country is an option for only a select few. EXAMINING THE ISSUES Box 5.6 | War, Famine, and Refugees in the Horn of Africa Tragically, the four countries that comprise the Horn of Africa—Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti (Figure 5.16)—are rarely out of the news. Along with neighbouring Sudan, South Sudan, and Kenya, the Horn is a land of refugees, with areas that are war-torn and often lacking food. This region is home to several protracted refugee problems resulting from a tragic mix of human and physical geographic factors. Eritrea was a province of Ethiopia from 1962 to 1993, but there were ongoing tensions between the two. For example, when Eritrea and the neighbouring Ethiopian province of Tigray experienced severe droughts for several years in the 1980s, the Ethiopian government refused to allow international aid efforts access to these areas. Following a nearly unanimous vote to secede in 1993, Eritrea became a separate state—and Ethiopia became a landlocked nation. Border disputes simmered after 1993, and about 80,000 people died during a 1998–2000 war that was the largest conventional conflict in Africa since World War II. UN peacekeeping forces withdrew from the border zone in 2008, but the dispute continued. In a surprise move, in 2018, Ethiopia finally agreed to the UN-brokered peace treaty, and meetings between the leaders of the two countries suggest that there is hope that the dispute may finally be over and that both countries can begin a process toward greater economic and social development. Politics is also a factor in conflict in Somalia. Even though it is one of Africa’s poorest countries, it has placed economic and social development second to the political ideal of integrating all Somali people into one nation, irrespective of what country they reside in. Since independence in 1960, this has involved conflict with Ethiopia (in the Ogaden) and, particularly, with Kenya. A full-scale war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977–8 coincided with a major drought. Between 1991 and 2012, however, Somalia had no effective central government and instead was plagued by clan warfare and lawlessness. It has been, without a doubt, a country in crisis. The absence of an effective national government led to the rise of Somali piracy, which has become a major threat to international shipping off the nation’s coast. The continuing political instability in Somalia between 2010 and 2012 prevented any effective response to several severe food shortages, which exacerbated an already tragic scenario. The situation in Somalia became much worse in 2011, when the UN declared a famine in some areas of the country, the first such declaration in Africa since the 1980s. Since 2000, the Horn, and East Africa more generally, has experienced several major drought conditions, the worst period of the last one hundred years, but Somalia was least able to cope. The reason parts of Somalia suffered more than neighbouring countries is that, as noted, it had no effective government and was a state in civil conflict. Drought added onto more than 20 years of conflict and ongoing lack of effective central authority resulted in famine. In the end, nearly 250,000 people died in Somalia, nearly half of them children under the age of five. There is a simple but useful way to understand this situation: if drought conditions occur when a conflict situation is already prevailing, famine results for the most vulnerable members of the population. It is important to stress that only parts of Somalia were in a state of famine between 2010 and 2012. Those who suffered were members of weak or minority clans. In 2012, the UN declared the famine over but cautioned that over two million people in the country continued to need emergency aid to survive. It is also significant that the political conflicts in the Horn of Africa are not merely regional but are closely related to European colonial policies. France, Britain, and (especially) Italy had a presence in the region during the colonial era; subsequently, the United States and the USSR (more recently Russia), and now China have been involved in the region. As of 2020, however, there are about one million Somali refugees in neighbouring countries, with almost half of these in Kenya and a quarter in Ethiopia. In the end, though, like Ethiopia, Somalia might finally be on a positive path. It remains to be seen, however, whether the new government will succeed and prioritize political reform and development ahead of ethnic nationalism. In addition to managing refugee flows, attacking the root causes of the refugee problem is also a mammoth challenge. Not only are the causes often a complex mixture of political, economic, and environmental issues for which no simple solutions are available, but refugee problems are also greatest in parts of the less developed world that already face huge challenges. A key first step in solving the many refugee and related problems is working toward national political stability and, of course, greater levels of development. 5.6 Natural Disasters and Diseases The world can be a risky place, rife with dangerous natural phenomena like earthquakes, tropical storms, volcanic eruptions, and disease-carrying vectors like malaria-transmitting mosquitoes. While these phenomena may occur indiscriminately, they often have a disproportionate impact on different parts of the world. Almost invariably, people in less developed countries are more likely the victims of these natural disasters and communicable diseases. Why is that? By now, you probably have a good sense of the answer. Let us look at a few examples of natural disasters and diseases and explore how some of the consequences of uneven development can create a greater risk of tragic death when catastrophes occur. Natural Disasters Human geographers have long used the term natural disasters to refer to physical phenomena such as floods, storms, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions and their human consequences. Such events are natural, in the sense that they are part of larger physical processes, but not all become disasters. To understand why a natural event becomes a human disaster, we need to understand the larger cultural, political, and economic framework. In short, some parts of the world and some people are more vulnerable than others to natural events. Just as, on average, the rich live longer than the poor because they are better able to afford good nutrition and medical care, so some parts of the world are better able to protect themselves against natural events. The UN has specifically targeted the goal of reducing the human consequences that accompany natural events, especially in the less developed world. This objective arose from the fact that beginning in the 1980s, the number of major human disasters increased substantially, fatalities rose considerably, and regional disparities between the more developed and less developed worlds grew. As with fluctuating food supplies, the less developed world suffers the most. Adverse cultural, political, and economic conditions combine to place increasing numbers of people at serious risk in the event of any environmental extreme. In many cases, surging population growth in many less developed countries is manifest in poor construction standards, poor planning and infrastructure, and inadequate medical facilities, all of which make these countries especially vulnerable to natural hazards. Box 5.7 provides details on Bangladesh, which is regularly subject to devastating floods. AROUND THE GLOBE Box 5.7 | Flooding in Bangladesh Bangladesh is a low-lying country at the confluence of three large rivers: the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Meghna. Floods are normal in this region; indeed, they are an essential part of everyday economic life, as they spread fertile soils over large areas. During the monsoon season, however, floods often have catastrophic consequences, especially if they coincide with tidal waves caused by cyclones in the Bay of Bengal. Three factors contribute to flooding: Deforestation in the inner catchment areas results in more runoff. Dike and dam construction in the upstream areas reduces the storage capacity of the basin. Coincidental high rainfall is a common occurrence in the catchment areas of all three rivers. Regardless of specific causes, floods are difficult to control because of their magnitude and because the rivers frequently change channels. The most extreme consequence of flooding, of course, is death; in a 1988 flood, over 2,000 died. Impelled migration is another serious consequence: in 1988, over 45 million people were uprooted. Disasters occur regularly. In a normal year, over 18 per cent of Bangladesh is flooded, and even normal floods result in shifting of river courses and erosion of banks that cause population displacement. In an already poor country, such displacement aggravates landlessness and food availability. Most displaced persons move as short a distance as possible for cultural and family reasons. During these impelled migrations, the poorest suffer the most, and women-headed households are particularly vulnerable. Some migrants move to towns, hoping to become more economically prosperous. Typically, however, such rural-to-urban migrants become further disadvantaged, clustering together in squatter settlements generally regarded as unwelcome additions to the established urban setting. Earthquakes, Volcanic Eruptions, and Tsunamis If we were able to peel away the thin shell of air, water, and solid ground that is the outer layer of the earth, we would find that our planet is a furnace. Many of our major cities are a mere 35 kilometres above this furnace, and in the deep ocean trenches the solid crust above it is as little as 5 kilometres thick. Not surprisingly, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are regular occurrences. Between 200 and 300 earthquakes occur each year in Canada alone, although most of us never notice them. In other parts of the world, such as California, Central America, areas around the so-called Pacific Ring of Fire (including Japan, Indonesia, and countries along the western side of South America), and many other areas, major volcanic eruptions and earthquakes are a real risk. You might recall some of the following volcanic events: Mount Merapi in Indonesia (2010), Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland (2010), Volcán de Fuego in Guatemala (2018), and Mount Kilauea in Hawaii (2018). While they were disruptive (the ash cloud from Eyjafjallajökull resulted in the cancellation of thousands of transatlantic flights) and newsworthy, most of these pale in comparison to the more deadly eruptions of the past, such as the Indonesian eruptions of Tambora (1815) and Krakatoa (1883), which resulted in over 100,000 fatalities combined. Volcanic eruptions today are often less harmful than earthquakes because of our improved ability to predict them (although this is still far from an exact science). Some of the recent and deadly earthquakes around the world include Banda Aceh in Indonesia (2004), which caused a tsunami responsible for approximately 283,000 deaths; Kashmir in the Himalayan region of Pakistan and India (2005), which killed 100,000 people; Sichuan in China (2008), with 90,000 fatalities; and Haiti (2010), with more than 160,000 deaths. Much less deadly, but certainly damaging, was the central Mexico earthquake of 2017, which was one of the most powerful ever in the region and toppled thousands of buildings in Mexico City. The December 2004 earthquake beneath the Indian Ocean seabed near Banda Aceh Island in Indonesia resulted in a devastating tsunami that hit parts of Asia and Africa. The tsunami moved across the ocean with little loss of energy, resulting in much destruction when it reached land. Figure 5.17 shows the origin and movement of the tsunami and the areas affected. In addition to the 283,000 deaths, a further 1.1 million people were displaced—many of them in Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. Aid agencies moved in quickly to provide clean water in order to combat disease, avoiding an even greater tragedy. The unpredictability of earthquakes contributes to the devastation of these events, as does the fact that we so often live or build cities on fault lines. Hurricanes and Tropical Cyclones Hurricanes and tropical cyclones are regular natural phenomena, but when they make landfall near populated areas, they can be fatal. How many people die depends on the political and economic circumstances. Hurricanes, typhoons, and tropical cyclones are all regional names applying to the same natural event: a tropical storm that begins over the ocean and can lead to a natural disaster if and when it makes landfall. In February 2023, a major earthquake struck southern and central Türkiye and northern and western Syria, resulting in approximately 60,000 deaths and leaving 1.5 million people without homes. The earthquake resulted in a humanitarian crisis, where the UN and various international aid agencies rushed to provide temporary housing, food, water, and medicine. Mohammad Bash/Shutterstock View larger image The effect of political and economic circumstances on the overall impact of a tropical storm is starkly highlighted by the September 2017 Hurricane Maria that struck the northern Caribbean, including the islands of Dominica and Puerto Rico. One of the most powerful storms on record, Hurricane Maria came just days after two previous storms had already devastated the region by saturating soil and overwhelming local infrastructure. When Maria hit the islands, it knocked out power and communication l

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