Law Definitions PDF

**INTRODUCTION** The meaning of law is one topic that has attracted significant jurisprudential and scholarly ink. With an understanding that the law has been from the beginning of time, it is only conventional that the different taints and ideas of persons through the ages would be affected by the time they were born and lived in as well as the different societies within which they grew and came into consciousness. According to Thurman Arnold 'obviously, law can never be defined with equal obviousness, however, it should be said that adherence of the legal institution must never give up the struggle to define law." E.J. Fitzgerald argued that defining law would not have been necessary if not for the need to clarify some legal concepts. For instance, according to Fitzgerald, if law is not defined, how would we determine whether international law is law or not. To Freeman "the requirements of a good definition of law should therefore \(a) include what is generally accepted as properly within this sphere; \(b) exclude which is universally regarded as not being law (e.g. the rules of a rubber band)..." Law as an abstract concept pervades all of the strata of the society, affecting these areas on different perspectives for one goal- development or otherwise of such a society. It is upon this background, that this work seeks to enumerate the definitions as given by different legal scholars and jurists and critically examine them, as well as give the role that law plays in the society. It must however be iterated here that this work considers all of the writings of these legal personae as mere deep reflections of their thoughts and the rendition of the same in their best possible descriptions, as none of these definitions have been universally accepted as the real and true definition of law even if they appear sound and valid. DEFINITIONS OF LAW To the philosophers of ancient times, Plato (Greek philosopher born 427 BC) and Aristotle (Greek philosopher born 304 BC), law was aptly described as '"An embodiment of Reason", whether in the individual or the community'. These philosophers began the natural law theory. They held the view that the law was about what the conscience tells you to do. St Thomas Acquinas another proponent of this school defined law as: "Nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, **1 T. Arnold, The Symbols of Government (1935) p.36** 2 and promulgated.\" 3 This definition was provided by, an **Italian philosopher** born in 1224. Indeed, this definition of law emerges from a solid stand point of human conscience and reasoning to result in valid judgment and is premised on a normative nature, seeing law as what it ought to be and not necessarily what it is. This results in uncertainty in the law as different persons have different morals based on societal influences and other character determinants. With a different opposite view to the naturalist, **John Austin (1790)** in his work "Province of Jurisprudence Determined," defines the law as \"A rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him.\" \"A body of rules fixed and enforced by a sovereign political authority.\" **Gurdip Singh** succinctly puts Austin's submissions on law as follows: "in the words of Austin, Law properly so called are species of commands. But being a command, every law properly so-called flows from a determinate source... whenever a command is expressed or intimated, one party signifies a wish that another shall do or forbear... every sanction properly so called is annexed to a command... briefly speaking, Austin views law as command of the sovereign... thus, there are three essential elements in the Austin's definition of law namely: command (of the sovereign); duty (of the inferiors) and sanctions (in case inferiors commit breach of the command)..." Hart defined law as a system of rules, a union of primary and secondary rules. 4 This Oxford Professor of Jurisprudence born in 1907 did great work in trying to simplify the status of understanding of law from the positivist perspective. Problematic with these definitions however, is the particular elevation of "sanctions" as a major element of the law. Reason being that some laws are obeyed not necessarily because of the sanctions they attract, but the general perception that it is right to obey them e.g. traffic laws might be obeyed because it is dangerous to life not to obey them and not necessarily for the fine- this doesn't make it any less of a law. As time went on, a group of thinkers emerged with a different view of what the law should mean. Their arguments and definitions were classified as legal realism. A major proponent, Oliver W. Holmes, an American judge in defining the law, opined: "The prophecies of what the courts would do... are what I mean by the law." 5 Just following similar line, the respected English judge Lord Browne-Wilkinson defined the law as \"The sum of the 3 \"Summa Theologiae (Summary of Theology)\", Question 90, Art. 4. 4 The Concept of Law, 1961 5 The Path of the Law in Collected Papers, 1920 3 influences that determine decisions in courts of justice.\" These realists maintained that the law can only be properly so called after that it has been interpreted and applied in the courts of justice- obviously putting the law at the mercy of a judge's interpretation as to its real nature. However, the same individualistic experience would recur and cause uncertainty as to law rather than a general standard. What this means is that one judge from a different background entirely would most likely not interpret a law in the same way another judge would and so the courts as a result of this inconsistency would not be able to give a precise meaning as to what law is in this context. **Coming from an economic perspective,** some writers also began to write under the **Marxist** **school of thought**. Marxist theories of law generally define law as a tool of oppression used by capitalists to control the proletariat. This view of the law posits that the rich use the Law as an instrument for oppressing the poor. These writers lived in such societies where the laws seemed like a means of wielding riches. However, it is faulted on the basis that the law is not a tool of negativity. The law represents an instrument for sanctity and shouldn't be attributed as a "**harassment apparatus**." Yet another definition holds that: \"Law...exists if it is externally guaranteed by the probability of coercion (physical or psychological) to bring about conformity or avenge violation, and is applied by a staff of people holding themselves especially ready for that purpose.\" **Max Weber** was born in 1864 in Germany and saw law from his sociological, economic and political views. But his definition seems to exempt laws made in the establishment of agencies. Would such Acts of Legislature seeking to establish an agency or institution thus not be regarded as laws, since there is no "violation" to be "avenged"? A little behind in history, **Hobbes** said \"Law is the formal glue that holds fundamentally disorganized societies together.\" 6 And one question to Hobbes would have been: what happens to seemingly organized societies? Don't such societies have laws? In fact what would be the safe definition of a disorganized society? One very astute writer **Glanville Williams** in his book 'Learning the Law,' defined law practically thus: \"Law is the cement of society and also an essential medium of change. Knowledge of law increases one's understanding of public affairs. Its study promotes accuracy of expression, facility in argument and skill in interpreting the written word, as well as some understanding of social values\". 6 **The Leviathan (1651)** 4 influences that determine decisions in courts of justice.\" These realists maintained that the law can only be properly so called after that it has been interpreted and applied in the courts of justice- obviously putting the law at the mercy of a judge's interpretation as to its real nature. However, the same individualistic experience would recur and cause uncertainty as to law rather than a general standard. What this means is that one judge from a different background entirely would most likely not interpret a law in the same way another judge would and so the courts as a result of this inconsistency would not be able to give a precise meaning as to what law is in this context. Coming from an economic perspective, some writers also began to write under the Marxist school of thought. Marxist theories of law generally define law as a tool of oppression used by capitalists to control the proletariat. This view of the law posits that the rich use the Law as an instrument for oppressing the poor. These writers lived in such societies where the laws seemed like a means of wielding riches. However, it is faulted on the basis that the law is not a tool of negativity. The law represents an instrument for sanctity and shouldn't be attributed as a "harassment apparatus." Yet another definition holds that: \"Law...exists if it is externally guaranteed by the probability of coercion (physical or psychological) to bring about conformity or avenge violation, and is applied by a staff of people holding themselves especially ready for that purpose.\" Max Weber was born in 1864 in Germany and saw law from his sociological, economic and political views. But his definition seems to exempt laws made in the establishment of agencies. Would such Acts of Legislature seeking to establish an agency or institution thus not be regarded as laws, since there is no "violation" to be "avenged"? A little behind in history, Hobbes said \"Law is the formal glue that holds fundamentally disorganized societies together.\" 6 And one question to Hobbes would have been: what happens to seemingly organized societies? Don't such societies have laws? In fact what would be the safe definition of a disorganized society? One very astute writer Glanville Williams in his book 'Learning the Law,' defined law practically thus: \"Law is the cement of society and also an essential medium of change. Knowledge of law increases one's understanding of public affairs. Its study promotes accuracy of expression, facility in argument and skill in interpreting the written word, as well as some understanding of social values\". 6 The Leviathan (1651) 4 Justice Aderemi a Nigerian jurist explains that "It is a form of discipline. It is a combination of justice and fair-play. It is a phenomenon that is ever present in every aspect of human life. It is certain and ascertainable..." 7 **Lon Fuller (born 1902)** avoided a 'full-blown' definition of law. To Fuller, for law to be properly accorded as law, it must possess the following characteristics inter alia: a\. It must have generality b\. It must be clear c\. It must not be contradictory d\. It must be properly promulgated (pass through appropriate legislative process) e\. It must not be retroactive 8 To Fuller, law is law when it fulfills the listed characteristics. **Joseph Raz** similarly puts his thoughts thus: The three most general and important features of the law are that it is normative, institutionalized and coercive. It is normative in that it serves, and is meant to serve, as a guide for human behavior. It is institutionalized in that its application and modification are to a large extent performed or regulated by institutions. And it is coercive in that obedience to it, and its application are internally guaranteed, ultimately by the use of force. 9 It is very noticeable the difference that these different scholars have exhibited in their explanation of what the law is. Across different backgrounds, the perception of law changes with diverse writers representing their thoughts. Whatever definition or description is ascribed to law, I hold the view that the concept of law is obviously beyond doubt a complex or technical phenomenon. No matter how ubiquitous or nebulous the concept seems, it is evidently recognizable in every society with a constant manifestation of its functional effects and intricacies in institutions around the globe. **PLACE OF LAW IN THE SOCIETY** The purpose of law is to produce either of two things: (a) an idealistic society or (b) a practical society more tolerable than what has been labeled by some philosophers as the state of nature, in which there are no formal ties between mankind, and no civil or statutory law. 10 7 **Justice Aderemi, Pius Olayiwola**: Law as a Factor for Political Stability in the Third Republic; Paper delivered during the Law Week Programme organized by the Nigerian Bar Association, Ilorin Branch on February 1, 1989 8 **Lon Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (1940)** 9 J Raz: The Concept of a Legal System, 1970 Oxford University Press p. 3 10 D.R. Funk 'The Role of Law: How Law shapes and Alters the Foundaons of Sociees' being Undergraduate Honours Thesis at Utah State University Paper 75 -- htip://digitalcommons.usu.edu/honors/75 5 The importance of law is such that it is difficult or impossible for a society to exist without law. 11 The force of law is a major requirement for maintaining social order and preventing chaos in society. It is difficult to imagine the existence of a community without law. Lawmakers, courts and other officials of the law help to preserve a harmonious society. As **Freeman** wrote: **Fiction** provides us with numerous examples of utopian societies where congruence of norm and ideal is such that there is perfect social harmony and no need for law or lawyers to emerge. History teaches us the unhappy truth that no such society has ever existed. In all societies, socialization is an unequal process, there is always deviance and conflict, and law can be seen to emerge as a norm-asserting authority with the coercive power to sanction those guilty of violating the norm. It is difficult to escape the fact that law is necessary. If a society should ever come about where it is not, it may be predicted with certainty that it will be a society different from anything we have known. 12 Law functions as an integral part of the society and so occupies a core place in the society. It generally performs four functions. The first is that it plays the role of protecting us from evil 13 that is those people who wish to do us bad without any good intention. Secondly, law helps in regulating relationships amongst humans, and other institutions in the society in a bid to promote the common good. Another obvious role of the law in the society is the resolving of disputes over limited resources; this majorly being a part of the functions of the judiciary, to adjudicate upon disputes amongst persons and institutions. Finally, the law in the society encourages people to do the right things even though there have been arguments as to the stricken division between law and morality. Examining the several definitions at the first part of this work Law would appear not to be just a body of static rules to be obeyed by all citizens who are subject to its sanctions. It is a dynamic process by which rules are constantly being adopted and changed to fit the complex situations of a developing society. Divided into different categories: constitutional, case, statute laws; executive orders, regulations of administrative agencies and local ordinances: to 11 H.J. Grilliot, Introduction to Law and the Legal System 2 nd Edition 1979 Houghton Miﬄin Company 12 Freeman, The Legal Structure, 1974 (Longman) p1 13 This function of law underlies 20 th century developments in Internaonal Law such as the Nuremberg Trials and the creaon of the Internaonal Court of Jusce 6 Download Full PDF Package Translate Definitions of Law and the Place of Law in the Society **Meshack Okezi** Meshack Okezi 33215 Views 8 Pages 1 File ▾ Jurisprudence Download PDF Download Full PDF Package Translate Ask a question to find answers from the literature Get Answers arrow\_forward How do different cultural contexts influence the definitions of law and its perceived role in society? What are the implications of varying definitions of law on the effectiveness of legal systems in different countries? In what ways do social movements and public opinion shape the evolving definitions of law and its place in society? Original PDF Related Justice Aderemi a Nigerian jurist explains that "It is a form of discipline. It is a combination of justice and fair-play. It is a phenomenon that is ever present in every aspect of human life. It is certain and ascertainable..." 7 Lon Fuller (born 1902) avoided a 'full-blown' definition of law. To Fuller, for law to be properly accorded as law, it must possess the following characteristics inter alia: a\. It must have generality b\. It must be clear c\. It must not be contradictory d\. It must be properly promulgated (pass through appropriate legislative process) e\. It must not be retroactive 8 To Fuller, law is law when it fulfills the listed characteristics. Joseph Raz similarly puts his thoughts thus: The three most general and important features of the law are that it is normative, institutionalized and coercive. It is normative in that it serves, and is meant to serve, as a guide for human behavior. It is institutionalized in that its application and modification are to a large extent performed or regulated by institutions. And it is coercive in that obedience to it, and its application are internally guaranteed, ultimately by the use of force. 9 It is very noticeable the difference that these different scholars have exhibited in their explanation of what the law is. Across different backgrounds, the perception of law changes with diverse writers representing their thoughts. Whatever definition or description is ascribed to law, I hold the view that the concept of law is obviously beyond doubt a complex or technical phenomenon. No matter how ubiquitous or nebulous the concept seems, it is evidently recognizable in every society with a constant manifestation of its functional effects and intricacies in institutions around the globe. PLACE OF LAW IN THE SOCIETY The purpose of law is to produce either of two things: (a) an idealistic society or (b) a practical society more tolerable than what has been labeled by some philosophers as the state of nature, in which there are no formal ties between mankind, and no civil or statutory law. 10 7 Jusce Aderemi, Pius Olayiwola: Law as a Factor for Polical Stability in the Third Republic; Paper delivered during the Law Week Programme organized by the Nigerian Bar Associaon, Ilorin Branch on February 1, 1989 8 Lon Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (1940) 9 J Raz: The Concept of a Legal System, 1970 Oxford University Press p. 3 10 D.R. Funk 'The Role of Law: How Law shapes and Alters the Foundaons of Sociees' being Undergraduate Honours Thesis at Utah State University Paper 75 -- hp://digitalcommons.usu.edu/honors/75 5 The importance of law is such that it is difficult or impossible for a society to exist without law. 11 The force of law is a major requirement for maintaining social order and preventing chaos in society. It is difficult to imagine the existence of a community without law. Lawmakers, courts and other officials of the law help to preserve a harmonious society. As Freeman wrote: Fiction provides us with numerous examples of utopian societies where congruence of norm and ideal is such that there is perfect social harmony and no need for law or lawyers to emerge. History teaches us the unhappy truth that no such society has ever existed. In all societies, socialization is an unequal process, there is always deviance and conflict, and law can be seen to emerge as a norm-asserting authority with the coercive power to sanction those guilty of violating the norm. It is difficult to escape the fact that law is necessary. If a society should ever come about where it is not, it may be predicted with certainty that it will be a society different from anything we have known. 12 Law functions as an integral part of the society and so occupies a core place in the society. It generally performs four functions. The first is that it plays the role of protecting us from evil 13 that is those people who wish to do us bad without any good intention. Secondly, law helps in regulating relationships amongst humans, and other institutions in the society in a bid to promote the common good. Another obvious role of the law in the society is the resolving of disputes over limited resources; this majorly being a part of the functions of the judiciary, to adjudicate upon disputes amongst persons and institutions. Finally, the law in the society encourages people to do the right things even though there have been arguments as to the stricken division between law and morality. Examining the several definitions at the first part of this work Law would appear not to be just a body of static rules to be obeyed by all citizens who are subject to its sanctions. It is a dynamic process by which rules are constantly being adopted and changed to fit the complex situations of a developing society. Divided into different categories: constitutional, case, statute laws; executive orders, regulations of administrative agencies and local ordinances: to 11 H.J. Grilliot, Introducon to Law and the Legal System 2 nd Edion 1979 Houghton Miﬄin Company 12 Freeman, The Legal Structure, 1974 (Longman) p1 13 This funcon of law underlies 20 th century developments in Internaonal Law such as the Nuremberg Trials and the creaon of the Internaonal Court of Jusce 6 view the law only as a technical institution used for economic and political purposes would be to overlook an important aspect of its function. Having examined the various definitions of writers that formed several schools of thoughts as to the meaning of law and also a brief understanding of the role of law in the society, this work concludes on the notion that the law is living, organic, dynamic and remains a tool for social engineering. 7 **REFERENCES** Books and Articles - \"Summa Theologiae (Summary of Theology)\", Question 90, Art. 4. (Oxford 1977) - D.R. Funk 'The Role of Law: How Law shapes and Alters the Foundations of Societies' being Undergraduate Honours Thesis at Utah State University Paper 75 -- http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/honors/75 - H.J. Grilliot, Introduction to Law and the Legal System 2 nd Edition 1979 Houghton Mifflin Company - H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed, Oxford 1994). 292-4 - Hans Kelsen, 'The Function of a Constitution' in R. Tur and W. Twining (eds) Essays on - Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New York 1945), 58-64 and 123-136 or - Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, (2nd ed, trans M. Knight, Berkeley 1967), 114-119 and 221-236. - Hart, 'Bentham's Of Laws in General' in Hart, Essays on Bentham (Oxford 1982) - J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (Oxford 1970) Justice Aderemi, Pius Olayiwola: Law as a Factor for Political Stability in the Third Republic; Paper delivered during the Law Week Programme organized by the Nigerian Bar Association, Ilorin Branch on February 1, 1989 Kayode Eso Further Thoughts on Law and Jurisprudence, 2003, Spectrum Law Publishing, Ibadan Lon Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (1940) M.D.A Freeman, Lloyds Introduction to Jurisprudence 8th Edition 2008 London, Sweet & Maxwell M.D.A Freeman, The Legal Structure, 1974 (Longman) p1 P.M.S. Hacker, 'Hart's Philosophy of Law' in Hacker & Raz (eds.), Law, Morality and Society T. Arnold, The Symbols of Government (1935) p.36 T. Nagel, 'Justice and Nature' Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 17 (1997), 303 The Path of the Law in Collected Papers, 1920 Thomas Hobbes "The Leviathan" (1651) W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford 1990) Websites http://wps.pearsoned.co.uk/ema\_uk\_he\_mcbride\_letters\_2/142/36409/9320853.cw/content/ index.html http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad/OverDeHogeRaad/Pages/ Theroleoflawinsociety.aspx......................................................... **What is Law?** The question of, what is law? has been addressed by a plethora of legal and political theorists and philosophers over time. A diverse array of answers in the form of theories have been provided for us over t centuries. The aim of this chapter is not to engage with this question. **Costas Douzinas and Adam Geary** in their book Critical Jurisprudence (2005) oﬀer a convincing interpretation of the history of this queson. As they aptly point out, it has been proved over me, that the answer to this queson, provides us with a restricted jurisprudence or theory of law, one that is focused on '...\[interrogang\]...the essence or substance of law.' (Douzinas and Gearey 2005: 10) and '...assumes that there is a number of markers or characteriscs that map and delimit the terrain and deﬁne what is proper to law' (Douzinas and Geary 2005). As the authors point out such reﬂecons of law fail to relate to quesons of jusce, rights, subjecvity(gender, race, sexuality, class), ethics, polics, aesthec, colonialism and the economy. Indeed restricve jurisprudence ulises the queson of what is law? to create a pure uncontaminated understanding of what law is (e.g. Kelsen, Hart). Crical Jurisprudence instead encourages an engagement with law that is of a general kind, or as they point out it is a General Jurisprudence it returns legal theory to '...all those issues that classical philosophy examines under the tles of law and jusce' (Douzinas and Gearey 2005:10) that have been translated by the authors into contemporary concerns around of rights, subjecvity etc. By addressing the general aspect of law the authors aim to open up law to the 'ontology of social life' (Douzinas and Geary, 2005:11) and show how legality is proliﬁc and 'touches all aspects of existence and leads to the modern versions of the classical ars vivendi, the art of living, of which law and ethics was a central part.' 1 (Douzinas and Geary 2005: 11). Quesons of jusce and ethics for example, are proposed to be addressed through quesons around rights, subjecvity etc. Looking at law from the perspecve of the general, challenges the analysis that restricted jurisprudence has introduced (analysis of principles, rules, legislaon) and insisted upon as being either the main work of the instuon of law or, more generally should be the main preoccupaon of legal scholarship. As philosophers and polical theorists have noted law does have an operaonal funcon, that is, it does not merely work mechanically 'free' from the governmental instuons that surround it (legislave, execuve bodies) but rather at mes operates in a purely execuve fashion, to drive the polical agendas of polies (Agamben, Butler), with diﬀerenal consequences on populaons (refugees, women, precarious workers etc.,). Philosophically we may say that the restricve jurisprudence school of thought by preoccupying itself with the queson of what is law? has invested itself to retrieving the essence of law. Diﬀerently, the general jurisprudence school of thought has invested itself with the philosophical and dialeccal queson that asks us to consider who is law?; who is recognised within law, and who is excluded, who in other words becomes law. 1 By poinng to diﬀerenal treatments in law, and non-recognion instances, general jurisprudence we may say reacts to the restricve jurisprudenal understanding of law-which presents law as a machine operang justly, in the sense that any malfuncon in the machinery of delivering jusce, judicial mechanism, can be adjusted through alteraons of rules. On the contrary it general jurisprudence, points to the impossibility of such claiming by showing to us who is not law. 2 These two schools of legal thinking share nevertheless one thing in common, an aachment or investment in law 3. Restricve jurisprudence is concerned describing and preserving the law, while general jurisprudence desires every part of life, being captured within the ambits of law. In both 2 occasions life concerns are not seen to reside or could possibly reside outside a juridical order, nor could they imagined to be aended to outside the legal imaginaon. It is neither, with the what is law? nor, with the who is law? queson that I ﬁnd anarchists concerned with, but rather with the Nietzschean 4 queson, which I paraphrase here, of 'how shall law be overcome?'. This queson does not imply, that law will be usurped and turned into an apparatus that is in the image of anarchism-the queson does not a reacve engagement to law. This is a frequent misunderstanding and interpretaon of anarchist engagement with law. Most oﬅen, even in today, anarchist acons are interpreted as resistances or transgressions to law and order, see for example the reacons that the 'Black Bloc' had relang to their symbolic deformaon of buildings and police scuﬄes during the an-cuts campaigns in 2011. They were called by Kit Malthouse, London's deputy mayor as 'fascist agitators' 5 , a naming that presents direct acon anarchists as a polical grouping that wants to usurp (not just challenge the law) and frame it in a fascisc fashion. As Deleuze points out in relaon to Nietzsche's queson 'how shall man be overcome?', which I am paraphrasing here, it directs us to ' a new way of thinking', 'a new way of feeling' and 'a new way of evaluang' (Deleuze 2013:154). It directs us to the formaon of a subject and a way of life, other than the subject that is formed through law or a way of life that is predicated on law. It is important to note that such a subject or, a way of life is not going to come about in some future near -- by (not future oriented), but rather it is a subject and a way of life that arculates its existence in the present, albeit this it is not universal or all over present. In other words, the anarchist address of ' how shall law be overcome?' is indicave of the existence of this subject that thinks, feels and evaluates anew in the present. I called this elsewhere a parallel life 6. 3 (Douzinas and Geary 2005: 11). Quesons of jusce and ethics for example, are proposed to be addressed through quesons around rights, subjecvity etc. Looking at law from the perspecve of the general, challenges the analysis that restricted jurisprudence has introduced (analysis of principles, rules, legislaon) and insisted upon as being either the main work of the instuon of law or, more generally should be the main preoccupaon of legal scholarship. As philosophers and polical theorists have noted law does have an operaonal funcon, that is, it does not merely work mechanically 'free' from the governmental instuons that surround it (legislave, execuve bodies) but rather at mes operates in a purely execuve fashion, to drive the polical agendas of polies (Agamben, Butler), with diﬀerenal consequences on populaons (refugees, women, precarious workers etc.,). Philosophically we may say that the restricve jurisprudence school of thought by preoccupying itself with the queson of what is law? has invested itself to retrieving the essence of law. Diﬀerently, the general jurisprudence school of thought has invested itself with the philosophical and dialeccal queson that asks us to consider who is law?; who is recognised within law, and who is excluded, who in other words becomes law. 1 By poinng to diﬀerenal treatments in law, and non-recognion instances, general jurisprudence we may say reacts to the restricve jurisprudenal understanding of law-which presents law as a machine operang justly, in the sense that any malfuncon in the machinery of delivering jusce, judicial mechanism, can be adjusted through alteraons of rules. On the contrary it general jurisprudence, points to the impossibility of such claiming by showing to us who is not law. 2 These two schools of legal thinking share nevertheless one thing in common, an aachment or investment in law 3. Restricve jurisprudence is concerned describing and preserving the law, while general jurisprudence desires every part of life, being captured within the ambits of law. In both 2 occasions life concerns are not seen to reside or could possibly reside outside a juridical order, nor could they imagined to be aended to outside the legal imaginaon. It is neither, with the what is law? nor, with the who is law? queson that I ﬁnd anarchists concerned with, but rather with the Nietzschean 4 queson, which I paraphrase here, of 'how shall law be overcome?'. This queson does not imply, that law will be usurped and turned into an apparatus that is in the image of anarchism-the queson does not a reacve engagement to law. This is a frequent misunderstanding and interpretaon of anarchist engagement with law. Most oﬅen, even in today, anarchist acons are interpreted as resistances or transgressions to law and order, see for example the reacons that the 'Black Bloc' had relang to their symbolic deformaon of buildings and police scuﬄes during the an-cuts campaigns in 2011. They were called by Kit Malthouse, London's deputy mayor as 'fascist agitators' 5 , a naming that presents direct acon anarchists as a polical grouping that wants to usurp (not just challenge the law) and frame it in a fascisc fashion. As Deleuze points out in relaon to Nietzsche's queson 'how shall man be overcome?', which I am paraphrasing here, it directs us to ' a new way of thinking', 'a new way of feeling' and 'a new way of evaluang' (Deleuze 2013:154). It directs us to the formaon of a subject and a way of life, other than the subject that is formed through law or a way of life that is predicated on law. It is important to note that such a subject or, a way of life is not going to come about in some future near -- by (not future oriented), but rather it is a subject and a way of life that arculates its existence in the present, albeit this it is not universal or all over present. In other words, the anarchist address of ' how shall law be overcome?' is indicave of the existence of this subject that thinks, feels and evaluates anew in the present. I called this elsewhere a parallel life 6. 3 This chapter will posit anarchist arculaons that address the queson of 'how shall law be overcome?' In doing so I will be drawing from the archive of speeches of Emma Goldman and wrings from Kropotkin. The aim here is to show that the way that these anarchists account for law, demonstrate both, a subjecvity and a way of life that does not count upon law to either live and act, and a crique of law and legally consumed subjecvity that points to the limits of law that may have not otherwise been addressed by general jurisprudence. In the ﬁrst instance, what I will be re-arculang is an anarchist ethos, in the sense of an ethics of existence in the Foucauldian sense, and it the second a more nuanced crique of law. The secon that follows will oﬀer an anarchist crique of law and the one that immediately aﬅer will focus on the anarchist ethos. In some respects, both secons are interrelated and the separaon that is made here is somewhat arﬁcial, more speciﬁcally as crique here is not be taken to mean cricism with a transformave agenda for law, but rather a departure from law. Anarchist Crique of Law In 1917 Emma Goldman and her fellow anarchist Alexander Berkman where trailed for conspiracy against the Selecve Draﬅ Act 1917 which authorised the federal government to conscript young men between the age of 21 to 30 into the army in preparaon of the US entering into World War I 7. Goldman and Berkman along with other anarchists lawyers and academics have organised various events, including a debate at Harlem Casino on the eve (18 th May 1917) of the passing of the draﬅ Bill aended by around 10,000 people to inform cizens of the perils of war and of the devastaon that World War I was already spreading across Europe and why they stood against conscripon. They have also published on the 1 st of June and 2 nd of June 1917 in their respecve magazines, The 4 Blast and Mother Earth an essay against conscripon 8. As they insisted in their trial, the aim of their gathering at Harlem Casino and Goldman's essay 'No Conscripon League' (Goldman 2000:398-99) was not to discourage or, inﬂuence young men from registering. Rather, the wanted to create the space whereby they could disseminate through informaon about the perils of World War I and conscripon, as well as to enable young men to make an informed decision regarding the draﬅ 9. Both Berkman and Goldman insisted on this point. In his closing speech to the jury Berkman explained why he would not advice anybody not to register: I would never advice anyone to do a thing which does not endanger me. I am willing to resist tyranny. If I were willing and ready to resist tyranny, I might advise other to do so, because myself would do it. I would be with them and the responsibility. But I was excepted from that registraon business. I did not have to register. I was beyond the age. I was not in danger. And would I advice anyone to do the thing which does not put me in danger? I would advise people once in a while, if I thought it necessary to do things, dangerous things; but I would be with them. Never would I advise anybody to do a thing that is dangerous and I not be there or not be in danger. That is why I did not advise people no to register. (Berkman and Goldman 2005: 54) And earlier, in his introductory speech to the jury, he argues that the decision to register or not to register was leﬅ up to conscience of each young man (Berkam and Goldman 2005: 28). Emma Goldman in a leer, that Goldman send to Mary E. Fitzerald her secretary and anarchists associate and was presented by Fitzerald in ﬁrst non- conscripon meeng that took place on the 23 rd of March 1917, and was also presented in court, eloquently explains why she will not urge young men not to register: '...I do not advice or urge young men to refuse to register; As an anarchist, I could not do that, because that would be taking the same posion as the Government, by telling someone to do this or that. I refuse to advise young men to register, it must be leﬅ to the 5 individual.' (Goldman \[&\] Berkman v United States: Transcript of Record 1917 Sept. 25 Supreme Court of the United States: 241). As it is well known both Goldman and Berkman were found guilty of conspiring against the draﬅ and were exiled to Russia in 1919. This was not the ﬁrst me that Emma Goldman found herself in a court of law. She had been previously been arrested and trailed, in 1893 she was incarcerated for a year at Blackwell Island Penitenary for 'incing a riot' (aﬅer a speech she gave in Union Square in response to the unemployment that plagued the US at the me) and in 1916 she was convicted for breaching the Comstock Law of 1873 10 which criminalised the circulaon of informaon around Birth Control, for her lectures on the topic. For the laer convicon she had the opon to pay a ﬁne of \$100 dollars or spend two weeks in prison. She chose to spend two weeks in the Queens County Penitenary 11. Goldman never feared the law or its instuons and turned her appearances in court into propagaons for anarchist principles. Shulman writes with respects to her trial where she stood accused of breaking the Comostock Law: On April 20 Emma's case went to trial. Emma defended herself. Three staid judges presided over an overﬂowing courtroom. Emma, as always, was expected to put on the best show in town. Aﬅer some wiy exchanges with the prosecuon, Emma turned her trial into an eloquent defence of birth control. Her closing speech to the court lasted for one rapturous hour. "If it is a crime," she concluded with passion, "to work for healthy motherhood and happy child-life, I am proud to be considered a criminal". (Shulman 1971: 170) Similarly when arrested for the conspiracy against the draﬅ Emma Goldman turned the court room and the trial into a space where anarchism would be propagated (Goldman 1970: 614). As Goldman informs us in her biography Living My Life (1970) they, herself 6 Blast and Mother Earth an essay against conscripon 8. As they insisted in their trial, the aim of their gathering at Harlem Casino and Goldman's essay 'No Conscripon League' (Goldman 2000:398-99) was not to discourage or, inﬂuence young men from registering. Rather, the wanted to create the space whereby they could disseminate through informaon about the perils of World War I and conscripon, as well as to enable young men to make an informed decision regarding the draﬅ 9. Both Berkman and Goldman insisted on this point. In his closing speech to the jury Berkman explained why he would not advice anybody not to register: I would never advice anyone to do a thing which does not endanger me. I am willing to resist tyranny. If I were willing and ready to resist tyranny, I might advise other to do so, because myself would do it. I would be with them and the responsibility. But I was excepted from that registraon business. I did not have to register. I was beyond the age. I was not in danger. And would I advice anyone to do the thing which does not put me in danger? I would advise people once in a while, if I thought it necessary to do things, dangerous things; but I would be with them. Never would I advise anybody to do a thing that is dangerous and I not be there or not be in danger. That is why I did not advise people no to register. (Berkman and Goldman 2005: 54) And earlier, in his introductory speech to the jury, he argues that the decision to register or not to register was leﬅ up to conscience of each young man (Berkam and Goldman 2005: 28). Emma Goldman in a leer, that Goldman send to Mary E. Fitzerald her secretary and anarchists associate and was presented by Fitzerald in ﬁrst non- conscripon meeng that took place on the 23 rd of March 1917, and was also presented in court, eloquently explains why she will not urge young men not to register: '...I do not advice or urge young men to refuse to register; As an anarchist, I could not do that, because that would be taking the same posion as the Government, by telling someone to do this or that. I refuse to advise young men to register, it must be leﬅ to the 5 individual.' (Goldman \[&\] Berkman v United States: Transcript of Record 1917 Sept. 25 Supreme Court of the United States: 241). As it is well known both Goldman and Berkman were found guilty of conspiring against the draﬅ and were exiled to Russia in 1919. This was not the ﬁrst me that Emma Goldman found herself in a court of law. She had been previously been arrested and trailed, in 1893 she was incarcerated for a year at Blackwell Island Penitenary for 'incing a riot' (aﬅer a speech she gave in Union Square in response to the unemployment that plagued the US at the me) and in 1916 she was convicted for breaching the Comstock Law of 1873 10 which criminalised the circulaon of informaon around Birth Control, for her lectures on the topic. For the laer convicon she had the opon to pay a ﬁne of \$100 dollars or spend two weeks in prison. She chose to spend two weeks in the Queens County Penitenary 11. Goldman never feared the law or its instuons and turned her appearances in court into propagaons for anarchist principles. Shulman writes with respects to her trial where she stood accused of breaking the Comostock Law: On April 20 Emma's case went to trial. Emma defended herself. Three staid judges presided over an overﬂowing courtroom. Emma, as always, was expected to put on the best show in town. Aﬅer some wiy exchanges with the prosecuon, Emma turned her trial into an eloquent defence of birth control. Her closing speech to the court lasted for one rapturous hour. "If it is a crime," she concluded with passion, "to work for healthy motherhood and happy child-life, I am proud to be considered a criminal". (Shulman 1971: 170) Similarly when arrested for the conspiracy against the draﬅ Emma Goldman turned the court room and the trial into a space where anarchism would be propagated (Goldman 1970: 614). As Goldman informs us in her biography Living My Life (1970) they, herself 6 and Berkman, '...did not believe in the law and its machinery, and \[they\] knew that we could expect not jusce.' (Goldman 1970: 613). Indeed in this trial Goldman gave a remarkable speech 12 to the jury where she propagated not only what anarchism stands for but also her understanding and limitaons of law. She points out at ﬁrst that the charge that was made against them is hypocrical, a 'trumped- up charge' in Goldman words (Berkman and Goldman 2005: 61). And then, she goes on to describe the law as an instuon that curbs change and can't no maer how much it aempts to regulate the ﬂow of life which is ever changing (Berkman and Goldman 2005: 62-3). In describing the charge of conspiracy against herself and Berkman as fraudulent, Goldman desires to expose us to the hypocrisy of the law, and its inability to operate as an apparatus without polics 13. How can Goldman accuse the law of being hypocrical? Let's see how she accounts for law's hypocrisy, or how she 'adorns' law with the characterisc of hypocrisy: To charge people with having conspired to do something which they have been engaged in doing most of their lives, namely their campaign against war, militarism and conscripon as contrary to the best interest of humanity, is an insult to human intelligence. (Berkman and Goldman 2005: 57) For somebody to be charged with conspiracy it is required to be proved that there is an agreement between two or more pares to commit an oﬀence and at least one of the pares does an act towards the achievement of an oﬀence. Berkman and Goldman were charged as I have already noted with conspiracy against the draﬅ, and more precisely for conspiring to encourage men of conscripon age not to register for military service. They were charged with secon 37 of the Criminal Code. For them to be found guilty of the 7 charge, it required ﬁrstly to be proved that they agreed amongst themselves to encourage men of conscripon age not to register. This would have fulﬁlled one part of the actus reus or conduct of the charge that required evidence of an agreement to do as such. Furthermore, the charge required the proof of a breach of US law. Init would have they would be breaching US laws as, on the 18 th of May 1917 the Congress had passed The Selecve Service Act 1917. The prosecuon would have needed to prove at least one overt act, or that one of them would have done something (i.e., circulang pamphlets that said so) that would have demonstrated that they were encouraging young men not to register. The prosecutor Mr Content addressed the charge the charge to the jury as such: The general conspiracy secon of the United States law, Sec. 37 of the Criminal Code, in plain English is this: When two or more conspire to commit an oﬀence against the United States and one or more of such persons does any act toward the accomplishment of the conspiracy-what we call an overt or outward act-then the act is complete and that is a conspiracy. Conspiracy simply means two or more persons acng in an unlawful agreement; that is to say, a conspiracy is two or more persons acng in concert in an unlawful plan, either to accomplish something lawful by lawful or unlawful means. If any one does any act looking toward the accomplishment of the conspiracy, whether he ﬁnally succeeds or not, the crime is complete by the commission of the so-called "overt act". (Berkman and Goldman 2005: 23) The prosecuon presented as evidence of their "overt acts" for conspiring against the draﬅ, the gathering at the Harlem Casino of the 18 th of May, and the publicaon of the essay, 'No Conscripon League' in Mother Earth on the 1 st of June and The Blast on the 2 nd of June of 1917\. Goldman considers the charge hypocrical as we have seen in our earlier quotaon. There are two main reasons that provoke her to characterise the law as such. Firstly, it was was a well-known fact that as anarchists both she and Berkman were against militarism, naonalism and war. In other words their polical beliefs and previous acvism demonstrated that they were opposed to such endeavours. This well-known fact to her eyes on its own did prove that they did not had to come to an agreement as to the disseminaon 8 of informaon against militarism. Secondly, they were accused for comming and oﬀence, i.e. encouraging men of the age of conscripon to break the law or disobey. On the 18 th of May when they were talking at the Harlem Casino the legislaon had not passed. It passed while they were in 'conference'. So on the 18 th of May at least they could have not have commied an oﬀence when The Selecve Draﬅ had not been passed. Even if we suppose that they did found out while in 'conference' that the draﬅ had been passed, they never suggested to eligible draﬅers to object, but rather as they repeatedly stated they merely presented them with their views against conscripon in order to enable them to make their own decisions as to whether they would register or not. In her essay 'The No-Conscripon League' (2000) for example, presented in court as we have seen as evidence to the conspiracy charge, she explains what was the role of the No Conscripon League; the league was a plaorm of support for those who have already or were about to make the decision not to register and a space where opposion to militarism, the killing of fellow human beings could be debated (Goldman 2000: 398). Furthermore this plaorm was necessary as it was a maer of democrac necessity to have the conscienous objector recognised. Such democrac recognion, was granted in European countries such as England (Goldman 2000:398). Crical Legal theorists 14 , that promote a general jurisprudence as a crique of law and an account of the law, tend to show the contradicons and inconsistencies in law. Costas Douzinas and Ronnie Warrington in an early essay 15 for example point out to the paradoxical and contradictory ways in which law delivers jusce. They focus on cases where refugees apply for asylum in the UK. As they explain in such occasions law demands that refugees need to prove that their fear of prosecuon has to be 'well founded'. In turn this 'well- founded' fear would need to be '...sasﬁed by showing (a) actual fear and (b) good reason 9 for this fear...'(Douzinas and Warrington 1991: 121).Douzinas and Warrington (1991) argue that it is paradoxical that law is demanding 'fear' an irraonal feeling to be proved through reason. Their crique shows clearly that law operates this paradox and they suggest following the thought of Jacques Derrida that jusce based on standards that do not take account the subject before the law, the refugee in this case and how they experienced fear of prosecuon, leads to injusce. What Douzinas and Warrington perform in this essay, is precisely what general jurisprudence aspires to do, for example for law to include the subject and its singularity within its ambits. Simultaneously because the exclusion of the subject and its experience of a situaon for example in this case its experience of persecuon) law fails to deliver what is sets out to do via its legal documents (statutes, case law), namely jusce. Goldman's crique of law and the trial nevertheless can be disnguished from crical legal studies, and consequently from the brand of general jurisprudence that Douzinas and Gearey are pung forward. How can this disncon be drawn? Goldman shows us that law has been hypocrical in charging them conspiring against the draﬅ as through-out her life she has wrien about and run acons that demonstrated that she did not believe or supported militarism. Moreover in challenging the evidence presented against her and her fellow accused Berkman she exposed us not only that the law does not account for the subject but also that law builds its accusaons on inaccurate facts. That law reaches its conclusions, from charging, to trialing, to judgment, based on inaccurate or un-true facts. Goldman exposes us to the methods in which it reaches its jusce, which are not based on truth. While general jurisprudence points to the exclusive pracces of law, Goldman and anarchist in general, point to the illegalies that law engages with. There is a fundamental diﬀerence between these two criques. The ﬁrst, general 10 jurisprudence accuses law for being exclusionary and aspires to 'correct' the law through poinng to its exclusions. The second, the anarchist crique, does not aspire to correct the law, as it has observed and demonstrated that laws' pracces are based on non-truth. Goldman and her fellow anarchists I would suggest expose to us that law itself is criminal. It is not coincidental that Goldman closing speech to the jury, begins by telling the jury that their arrest, bail and trial is 'a three act comedy' (Berkman and Goldman 2005: 57). From the start she alerts the jury, the press (as you recall from the moment of their arrest Berkman and Goldman as they had no faith in the criminal jusce system, they had decided to use the court room as a theatre where they would propagate anarchist principles) that the trial was ﬁcous. Anarchists like Goldman did not aspire to rehabilitate the law also for other reasons. As Goldman points out in her closing speech to the jury 'Progress is ever renewing, ever becoming, ever changing\--never is it within the law.'(my emphasis)(Berkman and Goldman 2005:63). Law is not imagined as the space where radical ideas and pracces can accommodated within, but rather a space where the status quo is preserved. Why? Goldman eloquently suggests that,'\[t\]he law is staonary, ﬁxed, mechanical, \"a chariot wheel\" which grinds all alike without regard to me, place and condion, without ever taking into account cause and eﬀect, without ever going into the complexity of the human soul.' (Berkman and Goldman 2005: 62-63). The law, as Peter Goodrich has shown in Languages of Law (1990) is tradion or rather it preserves tradion. Goldman points out that if the jury looks into all the signiﬁcant social, scienﬁc and cultural transformaons that have taken place over me they will note that all of them took place against the law. On the contrary, the law always considered new ideas and ﬁgures propagang them, as criminals, as it does to anarchists, 'we are criminals even like Jesus, Socrates, Galileo, Bruno, John 11 Brown and scores of others. We are in good company, among those whom Havelock Ellis, the greatest living psychologist, describes as the polical criminals..., as men and women who out of deep love for humanity, out of a passionate reverence for liberty and an all- absorbing devoon to an ideal are ready to pay for their faith even with their blood. (Berkman and Goldman 2005: 63). It is not only Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman that point to the hypocricy, untruthfulness, woody qualies and un-inovave character of law. It is not only Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman that suggest that for a radical transformaon of society we don't need criques of the type generated by general jurisprudence. On the contrary such criques sustain the operaon of law, they provide both the crical cizen and the less crical one, with hope for transformaons within the law, for a hope for example that a beer ethical atude towards excluded or disavowed subjects will happen within law. It is not only these two great anarchists acvists of the early 20 th century that do not see law as the accommodator of the force of life and through their vision and acons oﬀer us a crique of law that desires the 'destrucon' of law. Kropotkin also in his reﬂecons of the relaon between nature and anarchism oﬀers us similar conclusions. Let us follow his thought brieﬂy here. In his essay 'Law and Authority' (2002) Kropotkin in presenng us with why law is both useless and hurul in society (Kropotkin 2002: 212). His characterisaons oﬀ law as hurul and useless arrived aﬅer a quick history of modern law. Kropotkin suggests that pre-modernity humans did not need law. Everyday aﬀairs were arranged through 'customs, habits and usages' (Kropotkin 2002: 201). And Kropotkin elaborates that, humans who like the animal kingdom were social by nature, managed to arrange their everyday aﬀairs through the customs, habits and usages because such 12 pracces were see as being useful to the preservaon of humanity (Kropotkin 2002: 202). Such pracces Krotopkin insists '...are anterior to all law' and religion (Kropotkin 2002: 202). Instead, '\[t\]hey are found amongst all animals living in society. They are spontaneously developed by the very nature of things, like those habits in animals which men call insnct'. (Kropotkin 2002: 202). The debate as to the scienﬁc validity of Kropotkin's understanding of the state of nature does not interest me. We may though imagine some readers objecng to the emphasis that Kropotkin puts on nature, or the natural way in which 'things are done'. Indeed we can imagine a crique emanang from post-structuralist feminist philosophy, more precisely such crique may emanate from work that derives from the philosophy of Judith Butler. As it is well known Judith Butler as early as in Gender Trouble \(1990) and in Bodies that Maer (1993) has put into queson philosophical and feminist accounts that present gender as the cultural construcon of sex, creang in this way two genders men and women and leaving un-problemazed that sex may not be a 'natural' category. Moreover, Butler, through the theory of performavity, has shown that claims to natural categories, do not pre-exist the very uerance that makes such claims (Butler 1993; Loizidou 2007:35-42). Following Butler thus we may say that Kropotkin's reference to a natural state of life is a performave speech act that by its very enunciaon creates or brings to being a 'natural' state of life. Such a cricism though would be short-sighted. It does not take into account the fact that Kropotkin's nature or rather state of nature is not 'natural', it is rather presented as an amalgamaon of techne and nature (physis). It is not dissimilar to Heraclitus 16 aphorism about nature. Heraclitus aphorism, "Nature loves to hide", has been interpreted to mean that nature is not bereﬅ of technology, and more precisely nature holds within itself a technology of appearance (growth) and disappearance (decay or destrucon) (Hadot 2006). Kropotkin, similarly thinks of nature as technology. It is 13 noceable that when Kropotkin talks of 'customs, habits and usages', which for him are pracces that both cement and preserve the social, are presented as pracces that develop over me, they grow (appear) and decay (disappear) depending on the role they play in social preservaon. They are not therefore stac pracces but rather ever-altering working towards accommodang the social. Indeed, when Kropotkin refers to humans developing these pracces (customs, habits, usages) out of insnct, as animals out of habit (Kropotkin 2002:202), he brings to our aenon ﬁrstly that human insncts are not a given but rather they are 'culvated' over me to '...keep society together in the struggle it is forced to maintain for existence.' (Kropotkin, 2002:202). Secondly, human insnct is unlike animal habit. While, animal's preserve themselves through habitual or automac pracces, we know for example that bears hibernate over the winter period in order to preserve heat, human insncts which develop spontaneously and contribute to human preservaon requires a struggle, thinking or a mastery over how we to live together. It is not coincidental I propose that Kropotkin puts the word of insnct in proximity to the problemac of co- existence and in relaon to animal habits. I want to suggest that we may interpret through this proximity and interrelaon of words that his understanding of the state of nature is one that requires diﬀerent techniques, in animals a technique of automac preservaon and in human animals requires contemplaon or reasoning. Let's not forget that that the word spontaneous, the aribute that Kropotkin gives to human insncts, comes from the lan sponte. As Sara Ahmed is reminding us in her forthcoming monograph Wilful Subjects (2014), the etymology of the word sponte refers us to 'willing' or 'of one's free will' which in turn direct us to the process of thinking, of reﬂecng and understanding, aributes that since Kant we designate to the will. 14 Even if we do not engage in this debate, on whether Kropotkin's 'state of nature' is an amalgamaon of both nature and the culture it suﬃces to note that his understanding of the state of nature is very diﬀerent from those painted by contractarian polical theorists such as Hobbes. As Saul Newman (2012) points out Kropotkin's understanding of the state of nature is diametrically opposite to the one oﬀered by Hobbes. The state of nature was not seen as a threat to humanity. On the contrary, Kropotkin and '...anarchists see as the basis of ethical community...' (Newman,2012: 313). Indeed, Kropotkin in this parcular essay suggests the 'state of nature' operates as to sustain and maintain sociality. On the contrary, the introducon of law is seen as a disturbance to social cohesions. Law's become useless and and hurul, because they do not serve the society but rather 'the ruling class' (Kropotkin 2002: 203). These law's which Kropotkin divides 'into three principal categories: protecon of property, protecon of persons, protecon of government' (Kropotkin 2002: 212\) stabilise and petrify (inscribe) customs that accommodate the ruling class at the expense of society (Kropotkin 2000: 205-6) or those they oppress. The law is injurious or hurul therefore because they serve the interests of few and not society at large. If we take for example, one of the categories of laws that Kropotkin refers us to, the category of law that protects the government, we noce as he suggests that all administrave laws, from tax laws the 'organisaon of ministerial departments and their oﬃces' (Kropotkin 2002: 214) serve to create and sustain agencies of the state which in turn will be invested in protecng the 'privileges of the possessing classes' (Kropotkin 2002:212). For Kropotkin laws protecng the person, primarily criminal laws that appeal to the whole social body or cater for the security of the whole social are being breached because of the unequal distribuon of wealth vested in private property (Kropotkin 2002: 215). They are as he suggests mainly property related crimes. Indeed even if we look at as something as crude the Brish Crime 15 Survey 2013 we can note that '\[t\]heﬅ oﬀences accounted for 50% of all police recorded crime (1.9 million oﬀences) in 2012/13 and 60% of all incidents measured by the CSEW (an esmated 5.2 million incidents) for the year ending March 2013' (Crime Survey for England and Wales 2013:42) 17. For Kropotkin the answer to the disappearance of crimes against persons does not lay in beer laws nor in more severe forms of punishment, but rather in the abolion of, private property (which he considers as the root to most crimes against the person) and punishment (Kropotkin 2002: 215-6). Punishment, for example capital punishment, has been stascally proven as he argues that does not decrease homicides. Consequently then, if law can't protect the whole of social body, but instead sustains and expands upon the power of the ruling class, for Kropotkin it becomes injurious law. Why? It subtracts from the social body the equal distribuon achieved in the state of nature and moreover it denigrates the posions and welfare of those the ruled. Secondly, Kropotkin describes law as being useless or without value precisely because it fails to deliver jusce and equality to society. And as law can't deliver what it promises, Kropotkin proposes, 'No more law! No more judges!' (Kropotkin 2002: 315) Unlike the crique of general jurisprudence oﬀered by Crical Legal theorists, a crique that as Newman (2012) aptly observes 'aim\[s\] at the anarchic deconstrucon of law and propose a contestaon of legal authority and violence' (Newman 2012: 310) anarchists, or at least the examples of early 20 th anarchists that I have recalled above, call for the vanishing of law. Anarchists call for the complete destrucon of law because they understand law's very constuon is stepped in its inability to capture the ﬂow of life and changes in life. Why? Because ,'\[t\]he law is staonary, ﬁxed, mechanical' (Berkman and Goldman 2005: ) Goldman tells us, and it is as such in order to provide the power holders '...permanence to customs imposed by themselves for their own advantage' (Kropotkin 2002: 205). Moreover law is 16 decepve (Goldman), law is useless and injurious (Kropotkin). A legal form of life in other words does not correspond with the pracces or ethos of law itself. While crical legal scholars such as Douzinas and Gearey may point as we have seen to this non- correspondence between legal forma and legal operaon, their resoluon to this violence is to include, bring within the boundaries of law, those aspects that have been excluded, ethics, jusce etc., Their response is not necessarily paradoxical. Crical legal studies (UK) has vested itself in a rehabilitaon of law and not its destrucon, or more precisely crical legal studies have invested themselves in making central the margins of law. Let's not forget that Derrida's philosophical wrings have been extremely inﬂuenal to this movement 18. Derrida himself never saw himself as an anarchist though he put to task the very idea of arche. In an interview given to Lorenzo Fabri in the journal of Crical inquiry 19 , Jean-Luc Nancy points out that Derrida was not vested in rehabilitang a certain type of polics, nor in proposing a new polics but rather in undoing the foundaons of polics, in search for another way of thinking the quesons of authority, freedom, sovereignty: Not one more polics, but another thought of polics, or else another thought than polics, if polics is inextricably linked to the arche in general (or else one must rein- terrogate from top to boom the theme of the arche in general---the an-archy of the arche... (Jean Luc Nancy 2007: 435) As such pre-packed polical theories would have undermined his very search. And moreover, '\[h\]e tried to be truly philosophical in polics, rather than applying or reconstrucng a "polical philosophy." It could be said that, for him, not only communist polics, anarchist polics, and so on were outdated' (Jean Luc Nancy 2007: 433). Nevertheless while Derrida may have not been aracted to anarchism as ideology, we can't suggest that the Crical Legal Studies movement, by rehabilitang whatever falls outside 17 the law within the law, where challenging the very an-arche of arche. On the contrary such rehabilitaon merely adapts the outside of law within the form of law. At its best it reconstutes law otherwise, without averng the cricisms as to its injurious, stac and useless character, aributes that the aforemenoned anarchists thinkers have shown to us to be operaonal within law. Goldman, Berkman, Kropotkin on the contrary I want to argue show to us that in order to undo arche (authority, law, beginning) one has to begin from a diﬀerent set of values. Ethics of Existence or Parallel Lives I have suggested at the start of this chapter that Anarchists do not oﬀer a crique of law, but moreover show to us of a way of life that is it not lived in accordance to law. I have also suggested that this way of life, formulates an ethics of existence or an art of living akin to the pracces that Foucault idenﬁed being present in Greek and Roman life, such as parrhesia 20 or 'freely speaking' one of many such arts of living that included dietecs 21. These pracces revealed to Foucault that Greek life was mostly concerned with the care of the self, and moreover that their ethical existence was primarily concerned with the here and now and not some 'aﬅerlife'. The ethical self was concerned with mastering oneself and not subjugang oneself to a juridical order 22. In doing so, one's aenon was turned away from tradional morality (concerned with the analysis and producon of an authenc self) and towards the queson of how the self emerges in 'relaon that one has to the creave acvity.' 23 So parrhesia, like dietecs, is concerned with turning ones life into art by a self-mastering subject, an anarchic subject. It is impossible in this piece to demonstrate the aray of pracces that lead us to an anarchist art of existence. Instead I will focus on two 18 vignees, that are indicave of self-mastery and parrhesia. Foucault suggests that an art of existence is constuted by pracces that are distant from the juridical order. The ﬁrst vignee draws on Kropotkin's understanding of how this self-mastery can be achieved. The second is drawn from Emma Goldman's life. The second vignee aims at showing the pracce of parrhesia in an anarchist ethics of existence. Kropotkin proposes that, '\[l\]iberty, equality and praccal human sympathy are the only eﬀectual barriers we can oppose to the an-social insncts...' (Kropotkin 2002: 218) that law perpetuates. At the start of his essay 'Law and Authority' (2002) Kropotkin writes: In exisng States a fresh law is looked upon as a remedy for evil. Instead of themselves altering what is bad, people begin by demanding a law to alter it. If the road between two villages is impassable, the peasant says: -"There should be a law about parish roads." If a park-keeper takes advantage of the want of spirit in those who follow him with servile observance and insults one of them, the insulted man says, "There should be a law to enjoin more politeness upon park-keepers."...In short, a law everywhere and for everything! A law about fashions, a law about mad dogs, a law about virtue, a law to put a stop to all the vices and all the evils which result from human indolence and cowardice. (Krotopkin 2002: 196-7) As we have seen Foucault idenﬁes that an ethics of existence require certain pracces, pracces that both enact and pursue one's desire of self-mastery and a beer life. As I have already explained above such life, such beer life is ancipated to be fulﬁlled without the guidance of the juridical order. Such pracces, like parrhesia that I will talk about in relaon to Emma Goldman more importantly demonstrate also that there is a possibility to live life without law. An ethics of existence is present in anarchism, an ethics of existence that opens 19 us to parallel possibilies that avoid both the injuries of law that Kropotkin idenﬁes and the hypocrisy of law that Goldman so passionately alert us in her court speech to the jury that I earlier traced in this chapter. Kropotkin also, in the above quotaon, provides us with an insight into an anarchist ethics of existence. An anarchist ethics of existence, Kropotkin requires humans to solve everyday problems by themselves, without rounely and habitually turning to law. We can understand Kropotkin's references to 'liberty, social praccal sympthathy and equality' as the busters of law, through his call for self-mastery. 'Liberty', one of the andotes to the perils of law, is not only required to break the law, but it can be achieved precisely through the pracce of self-mastering our everyday disputes, can be achieved through thinking together (praccal social sympathy) what is at stake in a dispute. Kropotkin puts at the core of an anarchist art of living, self-mastery. This self- mastery will undo the habitual ways of solving our social disputes by turning to law (his repeve tone of our calls oﬀ law hint to the habitual and bereﬅ of thinking reliance on law). It is important to note that the reference to 'liberty, social praccal sympathy and equality' as the busters of law are not ideals for Kropotkin but rather they are embedded in pracces, in the way in which he observed anarchists pracced their lives. By poinng that we can 'alter ' what is bad , by suggesng that such an alteraon requires the pracce of habit busng (Kropotkin 2002: 197-201), I would like to suggest, Kropotkin grounds what may appear ideals in pracce, and in turn provides us a with what an anarchist art of living or ethics of existence entails. Kropotkin anarchist art of living ﬁnds its more paradigmac arst in Emma Goldman. Her atude towards the law, that her jury speech in the 1917 trial that I trace above is an emblemac of the way she lived her life away from law, in disobedience to law and in non- fear of law. Her jury speech in its totality is an example of parrhesiac speech or 'speaking 20 ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; **Understanding the Role of Legal Assistants in Modern Law** **Editorial Editorial July 13, 2024, Professionalism in Law** The role of legal assistants is pivotal in enhancing professionalism within the legal sector. These professionals provide essential support that streamlines operations and contributes to effective legal practices, ultimately ensuring that justice is administered efficiently. As the legal landscape evolves, understanding the responsibilities and significance of legal assistants becomes increasingly vital. Their contributions not only facilitate the daily functioning of law firms but also uphold the standards of integrity and professionalism expected in the legal field. Table of Contents Significance of Legal Assistants in Professionalism Core Responsibilities of Legal Assistants Enhancing Legal Efficiency through Legal Assistants Skills Required for Successful Legal Assistants Ethical Considerations for Legal Assistants Role of Legal Assistants in Different Legal Settings Corporate Law Criminal Law Family Law Impact of Technology on the Role of Legal Assistants Legal Research Tools Document Management Systems Training and Certification for Legal Assistants Educational Pathways Certification Programs Growth Opportunities for Legal Assistants Future of Legal Assistants in the Legal Profession Significance of Legal Assistants in Professionalism Legal assistants play a significant role in the landscape of professionalism within the legal sector. Their contributions are instrumental in ensuring that legal practices operate smoothly and efficiently, thereby enhancing the overall professionalism of the field. By managing essential tasks, legal assistants allow attorneys to focus on complex legal matters, ensuring that clients receive the attention and expertise they require. Effective communication and organization are critical components of professionalism in law. Legal assistants facilitate this by maintaining meticulous records, scheduling appointments, and preparing necessary documentation, which underscores the importance of their role. This level of support enables attorneys to uphold a standard of excellence in their services, thereby fostering trust and integrity within the client-attorney relationship. Additionally, legal assistants uphold ethical standards and confidentiality, which are paramount in the legal profession. Their ability to navigate sensitive information responsibly reinforces the ethical framework of law firms and other legal entities. In doing so, legal assistants not only support attorneys but also contribute to a culture of professionalism that prioritizes both efficiency and ethical behavior in legal practices. Core Responsibilities of Legal Assistants Legal assistants play a vital role within law firms and legal departments, performing various tasks that support attorneys in delivering high-quality legal services. Their core responsibilities encompass legal research, drafting documents, maintaining case files, and preparing for trials. This extensive involvement allows legal assistants to facilitate a smoother workflow and contribute significantly to the professionalism in the legal field. In addition to managing documents and case files, legal assistants are tasked with conducting thorough legal research. They analyze statutes, regulations, and case law to assist attorneys in formulating legal strategies. This research not only enhances the quality of legal arguments but also supports the efficiency of the overall legal process. Another important responsibility includes client communication. Legal assistants often interact with clients, gathering necessary information and providing updates on case progress. This direct engagement helps in managing client expectations and fosters a positive relationship between clients and the legal team. In summary, the core responsibilities of legal assistants are integral to the functioning of legal practices. Their multifaceted roles enable attorneys to focus on complex legal issues while ensuring that administrative and preparatory tasks are handled efficiently and professionally. Enhancing Legal Efficiency through Legal Assistants Legal assistants are integral to enhancing legal efficiency within law firms and legal departments. They provide critical support that allows attorneys to focus on more complex legal matters. By managing routine tasks, legal assistants streamline workflow, reducing time spent on administrative duties. One significant way legal assistants contribute to efficiency is through meticulous document preparation and management. They prepare legal documents, ensuring adherence to required formats and deadlines. This attention to detail significantly minimizes the risk of errors, which can lead to costly delays in legal proceedings. Legal assistants also play a vital role in conducting research and organizing case files. Their ability to gather relevant information swiftly enables attorneys to make informed decisions and strategize effectively. This rapid access to essential data not only accelerates case preparation but also enhances the overall quality of legal services provided. In addition, their role in communication and scheduling fosters an organized environment. Legal assistants liaise between clients, attorneys, and courts, ensuring seamless information flow. This proactive approach not only enhances client relations but also optimizes the use of legal resources, reinforcing the importance of the role of legal assistants in the legal profession. Skills Required for Successful Legal Assistants Successful legal assistants possess a diverse set of skills that are vital in maintaining the professionalism within the legal field. Strong organizational abilities are crucial, enabling them to manage multiple tasks efficiently while keeping track of deadlines and case files. This skill ensures that legal professionals can focus on substantive legal matters without distraction. See also Understanding Malpractice in Criminal Defense Cases Excellent communication skills, both written and verbal, are fundamental for legal assistants. They often draft legal documents, correspond with clients, and interact with other legal professionals. Clear and concise communication fosters better collaboration within legal teams and enhances client relationships. Research skills are equally important, as legal assistants must navigate various databases and resources to obtain relevant information. This ability to conduct thorough legal research not only supports lawyers in building strong cases but also contributes to informed decision-making within legal practices. Proficiency with technology is increasingly indispensable. Familiarity with legal software, document management systems, and e-filing procedures equips legal assistants to manage their responsibilities effectively and contributes to the overall efficiency and professionalism in law. Ethical Considerations for Legal Assistants Ethics play a pivotal role in the profession of legal assistants, guiding their conduct and interactions within the legal framework. These professionals are expected to adhere to a code of ethics that emphasizes integrity, confidentiality, and professionalism. Understanding the ethical considerations helps to maintain trust in the legal system. Legal assistants must prioritize client confidentiality, ensuring that all sensitive information remains protected. Any breach could result in severe consequences, including legal action against both the assistant and the supervising attorney. Ethical behavior fosters strong relationships between clients and legal professionals. In addition to confidentiality, legal assistants must exercise discretion and avoid conflicts of interest. They should not engage in any activities that might compromise their impartiality or the integrity of the legal process. Specific ethical responsibilities include: Upholding the honor of the legal profession. Being honest and forthright in all communications. Adhering to relevant laws and regulations governing legal practice. By embracing these ethical considerations, legal assistants significantly enhance the professionalism in law and contribute to the overall efficacy of legal operations. Role of Legal Assistants in Different Legal Settings Legal assistants perform varied roles across different legal settings, tailoring their skills and responsibilities to meet the unique demands of each area. In corporate law, for instance, they may support attorneys with mergers and acquisitions by conducting due diligence and preparing corporate documents. Their expertise ensures that transactions are efficiently managed and compliant with regulations. In the realm of criminal law, legal assistants often assist in case preparation, which includes gathering evidence, organizing discovery materials, and preparing trial exhibits. This role is vital in ensuring that attorneys have the necessary information for a robust defense or prosecution, facilitating a smoother legal process. In family law, legal assistants play a pivotal role in managing sensitive cases such as custody disputes or divorce proceedings. They may prepare legal documents, maintain client communications, and schedule appointments, ensuring that all aspects are handled with professionalism and attention to detail. Through these varied roles in different legal settings, legal assistants contribute significantly to the professionalism inherent in the law, enhancing the overall effectiveness of legal services. Their abilities in each environment underscore the diverse requirements of the profession. Corporate Law Legal assistants in corporate law provide critical support to attorneys and legal departments, ensuring that various transactions and compliance matters proceed smoothly. Their involvement ranges from assisting in document preparation to conducting necessary legal research and maintaining corporate records. Their responsibilities include: Drafting contracts and agreements. Performing due diligence for mergers and acquisitions. Supporting compliance with regulations and corporate governance requirements. In this setting, legal assistants serve as important facilitators, enabling lawyers to focus on strategic legal issues rather than administrative tasks. This role fosters professionalism in legal practice, enhancing overall efficiency within corporate law. Moreover, they must stay updated with legal precedents and industry regulations, which requires strong analytical skills and attention to detail. The combination of technical and soft skills equips legal assistants to excel in corporate environments. Criminal Law In the realm of criminal law, legal assistants serve a vital function that supports the operations of legal practitioners. Their involvement is critical in various activities, such as organizing case files, drafting legal documents, and assisting in trial preparation. These tasks require a keen attention to detail, given the high stakes typically involved in criminal cases. Legal assistants conduct preliminary investigations, which can include gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses. They play a crucial role in the discovery process, ensuring that all relevant information is thoroughly documented and made available to the attorneys. This level of support helps in building a compelling case for defense or prosecution. Moreover, facilitating communication between clients and attorneys is another essential duty of legal assistants within criminal law. They often explain legal procedures to clients, helping them understand their rights and options. This interaction enhances the professionalism of legal services and fosters trust between all parties involved. By streamlining administrative tasks, legal assistants significantly contribute to the overall efficiency of criminal law practices. Their expertise allows attorneys to focus on strategic legal analysis and representation, thereby strengthening the integrity of the legal system. See also Understanding Legal Standards: A Comprehensive Overview Family Law Legal assistants in family law play a pivotal role in supporting attorneys while managing sensitive cases that often involve emotional upheaval. They assist with various tasks, such as gathering relevant documentation, coordinating schedules, and maintaining client communication, thereby facilitating a smoother legal process. In family law, legal assistants conduct initial client interviews to collect vital information, which aids attorneys in understanding each case's unique nuances. They also assist in the preparation of legal documents, including divorce petitions, child custody agreements, and prenuptial contracts, ensuring accuracy and compliance with regulations. Moreover, they help in case research and analysis, identifying precedents and relevant statutes that may impact proceedings. Legal assistants in family law contribute significantly to the effectiveness of the legal team, enabling attorneys to focus on strategic decision-making rather than administrative tasks. With their knowledge of legal procedures and emotional intelligence, legal assistants are instrumental in navigating the complexities of family law, demonstrating how the role of legal assistants is essential in promoting professionalism within the legal field. Impact of Technology on the Role of Legal Assistants Technology has fundamentally transformed the role of legal assistants, enhancing their efficiency and effectiveness in the workplace. Legal research tools, such as online databases and comprehensive search engines, enable legal assistants to conduct thorough investigations, streamlining the information retrieval process that contributes to case preparation. Document management systems have also revolutionized the organization and accessibility of legal files. These digital solutions facilitate efficient storage, retrieval, and sharing of documents, allowing legal assistants to manage large volumes of information with ease. The ability to collaborate in real-time with attorneys and clients further enhances overall productivity. Moreover, automation in various processes, such as case management and billing, reduces the manual workload on legal assistants. This enables them to focus on more substantive work, thereby improving the quality of service provided to clients. As technology continues to evolve, the expectations and responsibilities of legal assistants will undoubtedly expand, ensuring their integral role in the fabric of the legal profession. Legal Research Tools Legal research tools comprise various software and online platforms designed to assist legal assistants in the effective and efficient gathering and analysis of case law, statutes, regulations, and other legal information. These tools enhance the ability of legal professionals to access pertinent legal knowledge rapidly. Popular legal research tools include Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Fastcase. These platforms offer comprehensive databases, allowing legal assistants to conduct detailed searches for relevant cases and legal precedents, significantly reducing research time. Features such as advanced search capabilities and case citations streamline the research process. Additionally, legal research tools often provide users with access to secondary sources, such as law reviews and legal encyclopedias, which can provide context and insights. The integration of these resources helps legal assistants to present well-informed arguments and recommendations. The proliferation of legal research tools has transformed the role of legal assistants in maintaining professionalism within the legal field. By utilizing these tools effectively, legal assistants can enhance their contributions to legal teams, ensuring that cases are thoroughly researched and effectively supported. Document Management Systems Document management systems are software solutions designed to organize, store, and manage electronic documents throughout their lifecycle. These systems play a pivotal role in enhancing the operational efficiency of legal professionals, particularly in the context of managing large volumes of sensitive information. The integration of document management systems streamlines document retrieval, sharing, and archiving processes. Legal assistants use these systems to maintain comprehensive records and ensure compliance with regulatory requirements, which is paramount in maintaining professionalism within the legal field. Additionally, modern document management systems feature advanced search capabilities and metadata tagging, allowing legal assistants to quickly locate necessary documents. This efficiency not only saves time but also contributes to the overall productivity of legal teams, enabling them to focus on more strategic aspects of their work. Incorporating document management systems also enhances security protocols by controlling access to sensitive information and maintaining audit trails. Such measures are integral to preserving client confidentiality and fostering trust, further underscoring the significance of legal assistants in upholding professionalism in law. Training and Certification for Legal Assistants Training for legal assistants typically involves a combination of formal education and practical experience. Many legal assistants hold associate degrees in paralegal studies, offering a foundational understanding of legal principles, terminology, and procedures. Furthermore, institutions may provide specialized courses tailored to specific areas of law, enhancing their expertise. Certification programs also contribute significantly to the professional development of legal assistants. Various organizations, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants (NALA) and the National Federation of Paralegal Associations (NFPA), offer certification that validates skills and knowledge in the field. Achieving certification often requires passing a rigorous exam, ensuring that legal assistants meet industry standards. See also Understanding the Importance of Community Engagement in Law Ongoing education is vital for legal assistants to stay current with evolving laws and practices. Workshops, webinars, and legal seminars provide opportunities for professional growth. Engaging in continued education not only bolsters a legal assistant's resume but also enhances their contributions to law firms and other legal settings. In summary, proficiency in the legal field necessitates a structured approach to training and certification for legal assistants. By pursuing relevant educational pathways and obtaining certifications, these professionals can significantly improve their skills and adapt to changing legal landscapes. Educational Pathways Legal assistants typically pursue various educational pathways to equip themselves with the necessary skills and knowledge for their roles. A common route is obtaining an associate degree in paralegal studies, which serves as a foundational program covering legal terminology, research, and ethics in the legal field. Some aspiring legal assistants may choose to further their education by earning a bachelor's degree in paralegal studies or a related field. These programs often delve deeper into specialized areas of law, enhancing understanding and expertise. Additionally, some universities offer certificate programs for those who hold degrees in other fields, allowing for a seamless transition into the legal arena. Continuing education is also vital for legal assistants to stay updated on evolving laws and practices. Many institutions provide specialized training in areas such as intellectual property law, contracts, or litigation, supporting the development of focused expertise within the profession. This structured educational approach underpins the unwavering professionalism and competence of legal assistants, reinforcing their essential role in the legal field. Certification Programs Certification programs for legal assistants serve to formalize the education and training required for professionals in this field. These programs provide crucial credentials that affirm an individual's capability and knowledge in the role of legal assistants, enhancing their credibility in various legal settings. Several organizations offer established certification programs, including the National Association of Legal Assistants (NALA) and the National Federation of Paralegal Associations (NFPA). NALA's Certified Paralegal (CP) examination and NFPA's Paralegal Advanced Competency Exam (PACE) are well-recognized certifications that demonstrate a high standard of professional competence. Participating in these certification programs often requires candidates to have a certain level of education, practical experience, and continuing education, all of which are vital for maintaining professionalism in law. Obtaining certification can lead to better job prospects and increased salary potential, making it a valuable investment for aspiring legal assistants. Growth Opportunities for Legal Assistants Legal assistants are presented with various growth opportunities in their career paths, reflecting their importance in the legal profession. As the demand for legal services increases, so does the need for trained professionals who can effectively contribute to various legal settings. This expansion creates avenues for legal assistants to advance into specialized roles and higher-level positions. Within the legal field, legal assistants can transition into roles such as paralegals, legal analysts, or office managers. These positions often require further skills and knowledge, allowing individuals to take on more complex cases and leadership responsibilities. In larger firms, the prospect of becoming a senior legal assistant or supervisor is also attainable, enhancing their professional development. Moreover, legal assistants can pursue specialization in niche areas of law, such as intellectual property, immigration, or contract management. This focus not only enriches their expertise but also makes them more valuable to their employers. Continuous education and certification courses can further facilitate this growth, ensuring that legal assistants stay competitive in an evolving legal landscape. Future of Legal Assistants in the Legal Profession The role of legal assistants is evolving significantly as the legal profession adapts to technological advancements and changing client expectations. Legal assistants are increasingly becoming integral members of legal teams, enhancing office communication and collaboration. Their involvement allows lawyers to focus on more complex legal issues, thereby elevating the overall professionalism in law practices. As automation and artificial intelligence continue to shape the legal field, the future of legal assistants will likely involve an increased emphasis on technology-based skills. Legal assistants must become proficient in utilizing advanced legal research tools and document management systems. Such technological integration will streamline workflows and improve efficiency within law firms. Additionally, the demand for specialized legal assistants in various fields, including corporate and family law, is on the rise. This specialization will provide legal assistants with opportunities for career growth and development. Such trajectories may lead to enhanced responsibilities, positioning them as vital contributors to legal strategies and client relations. Overall, the future of legal assistants in the legal profession appears promising. Their evolving role underscores the importance of professionalism in law while adapting to the demands of a dynamic legal landscape. As legal practices continue to grow in complexity, the contributions of legal assistants will remain crucial for achieving efficient and effective legal services. The role of legal assistants is pivotal in promoting professionalism within the legal field. Their diverse responsibilities not only enhance operational efficiency but also ensure that ethical standards are maintained across various legal settings. A

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