Fundamentals of Philosophy Exam 2 Study Guide PDF
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This document is a study guide for an exam in philosophy, covering topics such as knowledge, justified true belief, Gettier problems, foundationalism, skepticism, and the value of knowledge.
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Fundamentals of Philosophy Exam 2 Study Guide (Epistemology & Philosophy of Mind) **Knowledge (JTB & Gettier Cases)** Propositional vs. Ability Truth: Credit of having got things right Belief: Must be *your* success Knowledge vs. Mere True Belief (Lucky guess example) Skilled Archer Analogy J...
Fundamentals of Philosophy Exam 2 Study Guide (Epistemology & Philosophy of Mind) **Knowledge (JTB & Gettier Cases)** Propositional vs. Ability Truth: Credit of having got things right Belief: Must be *your* success Knowledge vs. Mere True Belief (Lucky guess example) Skilled Archer Analogy Justified True Belief (JTB) account of Knowledge Gettier Cases: Stopped Clock, Madonna, Hologram in Class No False Presuppositions? Too Strong vs. Too Weak Sally & the (supposedly) regularly maintained clock Perceptual beliefs don't have presuppositions: example of dog & sheep **Justification (Foundationalism)** Knowledge requires justification & Justification important in its own right Detective Example Justified Nonbasic Belief vs. Justified Basic Belief Two Theses of Foundationalism: 1) Some justified basic beliefs, 2) All others ultimately "founded" on them (get their justification from them) Regress Argument: Not justified, infinite chain, circular chain, or justified basic belief Classical Foundationalism: Infallible Justified Basic Beliefs (self-evident truths & mental states) & Deduction transmits justification Modest Foundationalism: Justified Basic Beliefs need not be infallible (CF + at least perception & memory) & Deduction not required (induction & abduction) Modest Foundationalism permits many more beliefs to be justified than does CF **The Value of Knowledge & Justification** Instrumental value of true belief 1. Some true beliefs trivial 2. Some true beliefs get in the way of our goals We also have the sense that knowledge is more valuable than true belief, so it can't be reduced to its value Knowledge as more instrumentally valuable than true belief because more stable Map example Non-instrumental value of knowledge: wisdom We would want wisdom even if it didn't help us achieve our goals Clifford's "The Ethics of Belief" The Ship example (and island example) No right to believe without sufficient evidence Believing without sufficient evidence (without good justification) has many negative consequences for the individual *and* society because beliefs motivate us to act and shape our minds holistically. 1. In some cases, people get hurt (ship & island). 2. The individual is made credulous over time (leading to irresponsible actions). 3. Society is made credulous over time (leading to irresponsible collective actions). 4. Truth is no longer valued. The pleasure that comes from a feeling of confidence in belief is stolen against society when not grounded in good justification. Everyone has a duty to be epistemically responsible. If one does not have the time to get good evidence, then they should have no time to believe. The lesson: it seems that justification has *moral* value. **Radical Skepticism** According to the radical sceptic, it is impossible for us to know very much. It is not explored as a position actually held by someone, but as a challenge for one's epistemological theory to overcome. Most skeptical arguments rely on a particular skeptical hypothesis --- a scenario that involves constant radical deception but is impossible for us to [distinguish] between it and our everyday scenarios. Examples: The Matrix & Descartes's evil demon 1\) We are unable to know the denials of the skeptical hypotheses. (P) 2\) If we are unable to know the denials of the skeptical hypotheses, then we are unable to know anything of substance about the world. (If P, then Q) 3\) Hence, we are unable to know anything of substance about the world. (Therefore, Q) Modus Ponens: If P, then Q. P. Therefore Q. This is a logically valid argument. The skeptical argument is a [paradox] because it involves a series of apparently intuitive premises which validly entail an absurd, and thus unacceptable, conclusion. The skeptical argument requires endorsement of [the closure principle] --- i.e. the claim that if one knows that p, and one knows that p entails q, then one also knows that q. Denying such a plausible principle seems like a move of desperation. [Contextualism] --- a view that suggests 'knows' is a context-sensitive term like 'empty' or 'flat.' So, the standards for knowing might vary depending on the context. This view allows the sceptic to be correct in claiming that we don't know very much relative to the sceptic's high standards, but also allows us to be correct in claiming that we know plenty of things relative to our everyday, more relaxed standards. However, does the skeptical argument rely on high epistemic standards? If the argument works in all epistemic standards, contextualism doesn't provide a plausible avenue of defense against skepticism. Pritchard Interview Zebra Example: Being unable to distinguish between cases based on appearance doesn't mean we can't have background information that justifies belief that we are not in a skeptical case. Good Case vs. Bad Case If we are not in a skeptical case, then it seems our reasons connect us with reality. **Consciousness** Phenomenal consciousness as being 'what it is like' to undergo the mental occurrences associated with our subjective inner lives The 'hard problem' of consciousness is finding an answer to the question 'What is the nature of consciousness?' Reductionist Physicalism: If we knew all the microphysical facts and had perfect logical skills, then we would know everything about consciousness. Functionalism: we should take a behaviorist approach, defining consciousness in terms of the behaviors of conscious creatures. Ex: pain as "any state which produces the belief that something is wrong with the body and a desire for the state to disappear." (Pritchard, 164) Non-Reductionist Physicalists: truths about consciousness supervene on microphysical truths, they don't logically follow from microphysical truths. Example of [Strong Emergence] Dualism: There are two types of fundamental properties in the universe --- physical and phenomenal --- and both are necessary. Panpsychism: Typically claims that phenomenal properties are present in everything (even everyday objects), and that these properties are the only fundamental ones in our universe. However, a panpsychist could in principle take the line that mental and physical properties are equally fundamental. One prominent argument against physicalism is the [Mary argument], which tries to show that seeing a color for the first time involves learning a new fact about conscious color perception. 1\) If it is simply asserted that she gains new knowledge, then the physicalist will object that the argument begs the question. Possible Reply: But what if it is simply an intuitive appeal? Doesn't it seem like new knowledge is gained? 2\) If Mary knew prior to her release only lower-level microphysical truths, instead of all truths about color, then the argument may work against reductionist physicalism but not non-reductionist versions. 3\) Reductionist physicalists try to attack the claim that new facts are learned. Rather, Mary gains a new ability or concept instead of learning a new fact. **Perception** Veridical Experience: No misperception Illusory Experiences: Fail to be properly causally related to some of the properties of objects in the external world Hallucinatory Experiences: are not properly causally related to the external world at all Epistemic Sense Comparative Sense [Direct realism] about perception holds that veridical perceptual experience involves a direct perceptual relation to an object and some of its perceptible property instances. [Indirect realism] about perception holds that we perceive the world through some intermediaries. 1\) Indirect realism fits well with our experiences of illusions and hallucinations. 2\) Another thing in favor of indirect realism is that it seems supported by the perspectival looks of objects (e.g. the way in which a tilted coin looks elliptical). Argument from Illusions 1\) Illusions and veridical perceptions can be introspectively indistinguishable. 2\) Yet in the case of illusions, the perceiver is not related to property instances of the external object. 3\) As illusions and veridical experiences are of the same basic kind, the perceiver is not related to property instances of the external object in the case of veridical perceptions either. Argument from Hallucinations 1\) Hallucinations and veridical perceptions can be introspectively indistinguishable. 2\) Yet in the case of hallucinations, the perceiver is not directly related to an external object. 3\) As Hallucinations and veridical experiences are of the same basic kind, the perceiver is not directly related to an external object in the case of veridical perceptions either. Disjunctivism A standard way of replying to these arguments is to deny that veridical and non-veridical experiences are of the same basic kind. Illusion: A mixed mental state that involves both a perceptual relation to an external object and an (mere) appearance of properties it doesn't have. Hallucination: A different type of mental state that perceivers can't distinguish from veridical perceptions. Introspective appearance does not itself divide conscious mental states into basic kinds. The Transparency of Experience One problem with this direct realist line is that not all visual, auditory, olfactory, or gustatory experiences are this transparent. John Locke as an indirect realist