FCTM NN.pdf

Non-Normal 8 Table...

Non-Normal 8 Table Non-Normal Of Contents Operations Operations (tab) 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Non-Normal Operations Chapter 8 Table of Contents Section TOC Preface................................................. 8.1 Non-Normal Situation Guidelines........................... 8.2 Troubleshooting........................................ 8.2 Approach and Landing.................................. 8.3 Landing at the Nearest Suitable Airport..................... 8.4 Ditching................................................ 8.5 Send Distress Signals................................... 8.5 Advise Crew and Passengers.............................. 8.5 Fuel Burn-Off......................................... 8.5 Passenger Cabin Preparation.............................. 8.5 Ditching Final......................................... 8.5 Initiate Evacuation...................................... 8.5 Engines, APU........................................... 8.6 Engine Oil System Indications............................ 8.6 Engine Failure versus Engine Fire After Takeoff.............. 8.6 Fire Engine Tailpipe.................................... 8.6 Loss of Engine Thrust Control............................ 8.7 Dual Engine Failure/Stall................................ 8.7 Airframe Vibration Due to Engine Severe Damage or Separation. 8.8 Recommended Technique for an In-Flight Engine Shutdown.... 8.8 Bird Strikes........................................... 8.9 Evacuation............................................. 8.10 Method of Evacuation.................................. 8.11 Discharging Fire Bottles during an Evacuation.............. 8.11 Flight Controls......................................... 8.12 Leading Edge or Trailing Edge Device Malfunctions.......... 8.12 Flap Extension using the Secondary or Alternate System...... 8.13 Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 4 FCT 777 (TM) 8.TOC.1 Non-Normal Operations - Table of Contents 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Jammed Flight Controls................................. 8.13 Inoperative Stabilizer................................... 8.15 Stabilizer............................................ 8.16 Flight Instruments, Displays.............................. 8.16 Air Data Systems Unreliable.............................. 8.16 Airspeed Unreliable.................................... 8.16 Altitude Unreliable.................................... 8.20 Fuel................................................... 8.20 Fuel Balance......................................... 8.20 Fuel Leak............................................ 8.21 Low Fuel............................................ 8.23 Fuel Jettison.......................................... 8.23 Hydraulics............................................. 8.23 Hydraulic System(s) Inoperative - Landing.................. 8.24 Landing Gear........................................... 8.24 Tire Failure during or after Takeoff........................ 8.24 Landing on a Flat Tire.................................. 8.25 Gear Disagree........................................ 8.25 Overspeed............................................. 8.28 Tail Strike............................................. 8.29 Takeoff Risk Factors................................... 8.29 Landing Risk Factors................................... 8.30 Warning Systems........................................ 8.32 Fire................................................... 8.32 Wheel Well Fire....................................... 8.32 Windows............................................... 8.33 Window Damage...................................... 8.33 Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.TOC.2 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations - Table of Contents 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Flight with the Side Window(s) Open.......................8.33 Situations Beyond the Scope of Non-Normal Checklists........8.33 Basic Aerodynamics and Systems Knowledge................8.34 Flight Path Control.....................................8.35 Directional Control During Landing Ground Roll.............8.35 Checklists with Memory Steps............................8.36 Communications.......................................8.36 Damage Assessment and Airplane Handling Evaluation........8.36 Landing Airport........................................8.37 Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.TOC.3 Non-Normal Operations - Table of Contents 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Intentionally Blank Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.TOC.4 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  777 Flight Crew Training Manual Non-Normal Operations Chapter 8 Non-Normal Operations Preface This chapter describes pilot techniques associated with accomplishing selected Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs) and provides guidance for situations beyond the scope of NNCs. Aircrews are expected to accomplish NNCs listed in the QRH. These checklists ensure maximum safety until appropriate actions are completed and a safe landing is accomplished. Techniques discussed in this chapter minimize workload, improve crew coordination, enhance safety, and provide a basis for standardization. A thorough review of the QRH section CI.2, (Checklist Instructions, Non-Normal Checklists), is an important prerequisite to understanding this chapter. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.1 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Non-Normal Situation Guidelines Non-Normal Situation Guidelines When a non-normal situation occurs, the following guidelines apply: NON-NORMAL RECOGNITION: The crewmember recognizing the malfunction calls it out clearly and precisely MAINTAIN AIRPLANE CONTROL: It is mandatory that the Pilot Flying (PF) fly the airplane while the Pilot Monitoring (PM) accomplishes the NNC. Maximum use of the autoflight system is recommended to reduce crew workload ANALYZE THE SITUATION: NNCs should be accomplished only after the malfunctioning system has been positively identified. Review all EICAS messages to positively identify the malfunctioning system(s) Note: Pilots should don oxygen masks and establish crew communications anytime oxygen deprivation or air contamination is suspected, even though an associated warning has not occurred. TAKE THE PROPER ACTION: Although some in-flight non-normal situations require immediate corrective action, difficulties can be compounded by the rate the PF issues commands and the speed of execution by the PM. Commands must be clear and concise, allowing time for acknowledgment of each command prior to issuing further commands. The PF must exercise positive control by allowing time for acknowledgment and execution. The other crewmembers must be certain their reports to the PF are clear and concise, neither exaggerating nor understating the nature of the non-normal situation. This eliminates confusion and ensures efficient, effective, and expeditious handling of the non-normal situation EVALUATE THE NEED TO LAND: If the NNC directs the crew to plan to land at the nearest suitable airport, or if the situation is so identified in the QRH section CI.2, (Checklist Instructions, Non-Normal Checklists), diversion to the nearest airport where a safe landing can be accomplished is required. If the NNC or the Checklist Instructions do not direct landing at the nearest suitable airport, the pilot must determine if continued flight to destination may compromise safety. Troubleshooting Troubleshooting Troubleshooting can be defined as: taking steps beyond a published NNC in an effort to improve or correct a non-normal condition initiating an annunciated checklist without an EICAS alert message to improve or correct a perceived non-normal condition initiating diagnostic actions. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.2 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Examples of troubleshooting are: attempting to reset a system by cycling a system control or circuit breaker when not directed by the NNC using maintenance-level information to diagnose or take action using switches or controls intended only for maintenance. Troubleshooting beyond checklist directed actions is rarely helpful and has caused further loss of system function or failure. In some cases, accidents and incidents have resulted. The crew should consider additional actions beyond the checklist only when completion of the published checklist steps clearly results in an unacceptable situation. In the case of airplane controllability problems when a safe landing is considered unlikely, airplane handling evaluations with gear, flaps or speedbrakes extended may be appropriate. In the case of jammed flight controls, do not attempt troubleshooting beyond the actions directed in the NNC unless the airplane cannot be safely landed with the existing condition. Always comply with NNC actions to the extent possible. Note: Flight crew entry into an electronics compartment in flight is not recommended. Crew distraction, caused by preoccupation with troubleshooting, has been a key factor in several fuel starvation and CFIT accidents. Boeing recommends completion of the NNC as published whenever possible, in particular for flight control malfunctions that are addressed by a NNC. Guidance for situations beyond the scope of the non-normal checklist is provided later in this chapter. Approach and Landing When a non-normal situation occurs, a rushed approach can often complicate the situation. Unless circumstances require an immediate landing, complete all corrective actions before beginning the final approach. For some non-normal situations, the possibility of higher airspeed on approach, longer landing distance, a different flare profile or a different landing technique should be considered. Plan an extended straight-in approach with time allocated for the completion of any lengthy NNC steps such as the use of alternate flap or landing gear extension systems. Arm autobrakes and speedbrakes unless precluded by the NNC. Note: The use of autobrakes is recommended because maximum autobraking may be more effective than maximum manual braking due to timely application upon touchdown and symmetrical braking. However, the Advisory Information in the PI chapter of the QRH includes Non-Normal Configuration Landing Distance data specific to the use of maximum manual braking. When used properly, maximum manual braking provides the shortest stopping distance. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.3 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Fly a normal glide path and attempt to land in the normal touchdown zone. After landing, use available deceleration measures to bring the airplane to a complete stop on the runway. The captain must determine if an immediate evacuation should be accomplished or if the airplane can be safely taxied off the runway. Landing at the Nearest Suitable Airport Appendix A.2.11 Landing at the Nearest Suitable Airport “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport” is a phrase used in the QRH. This section explains the basis for that statement and how it is applied. In a non-normal situation, the pilot-in-command, having the authority and responsibility for operation and safety of the flight, must make the decision to continue the flight as planned or divert. In an emergency situation, this authority may include necessary deviations from any regulation to meet the emergency. In all cases, the pilot-in-command is expected to take a safe course of action. The QRH assists flight crews in the decision making process by indicating those situations where “landing at the nearest suitable airport” is required. These situations are described in the Checklist Instructions or the individual NNC. The regulations regarding an engine failure are specific. Most regulatory agencies specify that the pilot-in-command of a twin engine airplane that has an engine failure or engine shutdown should land at the nearest suitable airport at which a safe landing can be made. A suitable airport is defined by the operating authority for the operator based on guidance material but, in general, must have adequate facilities and meet certain minimum weather and field conditions. If required to divert to the nearest suitable airport, the guidance material typically specifies that the pilot should select the nearest suitable airport “in point of time” or “in terms of time.” In selecting the nearest suitable airport, the pilot-in-command should consider the suitability of nearby airports in terms of facilities and weather and their proximity to the airplane position. The pilot-in-command may determine, based on the nature of the situation and an examination of the relevant factors, that the safest course of action is to divert to a more distant airport than the nearest airport. For example, there is not necessarily a requirement to spiral down to the airport nearest the airplane's present position if, in the judgment of the pilot-in-command, it would require equal or less time to continue to another nearby airport. For persistent smoke or a fire which cannot positively be confirmed to be completely extinguished, the safest course of action typically requires the earliest possible descent, landing and evacuation. This may dictate landing at the nearest airport appropriate for the airplane type, rather than at the nearest suitable airport normally used for the route segment where the incident occurs. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.4 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Ditching Ditching Send Distress Signals Transmit Mayday, current position, course, speed, altitude, situation, intention, time and position of intended touchdown, and type of airplane using existing air-to-ground frequency. Set transponder code 7700 and, if practical, determine the course to the nearest ship or landfall. Advise Crew and Passengers Alert the crew and the passengers to prepare for ditching. Assign life raft positions (as installed) and order all loose equipment in the airplane secured. Put on life vests, shoulder harnesses, and seat belts. Do not inflate life vests until after exiting the airplane. Fuel Burn-Off Consider burning off fuel prior to ditching, if the situation permits. This provides greater buoyancy and a lower approach speed. However, do not reduce fuel to a critical amount, as ditching with engine thrust available improves ability to properly control touchdown. Note: Fuel jettisoning may also be considered prior to ditching. Passenger Cabin Preparation Confer with cabin personnel either by interphone or by having them report to the flight deck in person to ensure passenger cabin preparations for ditching are complete. Ditching Final Transmit final position. Select flaps 30 or landing flaps appropriate for the existing conditions. Advise the cabin crew of imminent touchdown. On final approach announce ditching is imminent and advise crew and passengers to brace for impact. Maintain airspeed at VREF. Maintain 200 to 300 fpm rate of descent. Plan to touchdown on the windward side and parallel to the waves or swells, if possible. To accomplish the flare and touchdown, rotate smoothly to touchdown attitude of 10° to 12°. Maintain airspeed and rate of descent with thrust. Initiate Evacuation After the airplane has come to rest, proceed to assigned ditching stations and deploy slides/rafts. Evacuate as soon as possible, ensuring all passengers are out of the airplane. Note: Be careful not to rip or puncture the slides/rafts. Avoid drifting into or under parts of the airplane. Remain clear of fuel-saturated water. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.5 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Engines, APU Engine Oil System Indications Engine Oil System Indications Oil pressure is considered as the most significant of several oil system indicators. Oil temperature, oil quantity and oil pressure indications enable the flight crew to recognize a deteriorating oil system. While engine operation is governed by both oil pressure and oil temperature limits, there is no minimum oil quantity limit. Therefore, there is no low oil quantity NNC in the QRH. If abnormal oil quantity indications are observed, check oil pressure and oil temperature. If oil pressure and oil temperature indications are normal, operate the engine normally. Accomplish the appropriate NNC for any non-normal oil pressure or oil temperature EICAS messages. Engine Failure versus Engine Fire After Takeoff Engine Failure versus Engine Fire After Takeoff The NNC for an engine failure is normally accomplished after the flaps have been retracted and conditions permit. In case of an engine fire, when the airplane is under control, the gear has been retracted, and a safe altitude has been attained (minimum 400 feet AGL) accomplish the NNC memory items. Due to asymmetric thrust considerations, Boeing recommends that the PF retard the affected thrust lever after the PM confirms that the PF has identified the correct engine. Reference items should be accomplished on a non-interfering basis with other normal duties after the flaps have been retracted and conditions permit. Fire Engine Tailpipe Fire Engine Tailpipe Engine tailpipe fires are typically caused by engine control malfunctions that result in the ignition of pooled fuel. These fires can be damaging to the engine and have caused unplanned evacuations. If a tailpipe fire is reported, the crew should accomplish the NNC without delay. Flight crews should consider the following when dealing with this situation: motoring the engine is the primary means of extinguishing the fire to prevent an inappropriate evacuation, flight attendants should be notified without significant delay communications with ramp personnel and the tower are important to determine the status of the tailpipe fire and to request fire extinguishing assistance the engine fire checklist is inappropriate because the engine fire extinguishing agent is not effective against a fire inside the tailpipe. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.6 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Loss of Engine Thrust Control Loss of Engine Thrust Control All turbo fan engines are susceptible to this malfunction whether engine control is hydro-mechanical, hydro-mechanical with supervisory electronics (e.g. PMC) or Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC). Engine response to a loss of control varies from engine to engine. Malfunctions have occurred in-flight and on the ground. The major challenge the flight crew faces when responding to this malfunction is recognizing the condition and determining which engine has malfunctioned. The Engine Limit or Surge or Stall NNC is written to include this malfunction.This condition can occur during any phase of flight. Failure of engine or fuel control system components or loss of thrust lever position feedback has caused loss of engine thrust control. Control loss may not be immediately evident since many engines fail to some fixed RPM or thrust lever condition. This fixed RPM or thrust lever condition may be very near the commanded thrust level and therefore difficult to recognize until the flight crew attempts to change thrust with the thrust lever. Other engine responses include: shutdown, operation at low RPM, or thrust at the last valid thrust lever setting (in the case of a thrust lever feedback fault) depending on altitude or air/ground logic. In all cases, the affected engine does not respond to thrust lever movement or the response is abnormal. Since recognition may be difficult, if a loss of engine control is suspected, the flight crew should continue the takeoff or remain airborne until the NNC can be accomplished. This helps with directional control and may preclude an inadvertent shutdown of the wrong engine. In some conditions, such as during low speed ground operations, immediate engine shutdown may be necessary to maintain directional control. Dual Engine Failure/Stall Dual Engine Failure Dual engine failure is a situation that demands prompt action regardless of altitude or airspeed. Accomplish memory items and establish the appropriate airspeed to immediately attempt a windmill restart. There is a higher probability that a windmill start will succeed if the restart attempt is made as soon as possible (or immediately after recognizing an engine failure) to take advantage of high engine RPM. Establishing airspeeds above the crossbleed start envelope and altitudes below 30,000 feet improves the probability of a restart. Loss of thrust at higher altitudes may require descent to a lower altitude to improve windmill starting capability. The in-flight start envelope defines the region where windmill starts were demonstrated during certification. It should be noted that this envelope does not define the only areas where a windmill start may be successful. The DUAL ENGINE FAIL/STALL NNC is written to ensure that flight crews take advantage of the high RPM at engine failure regardless of altitude or airspeed. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.7 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual A hung or stalled in-flight start is normally indicated by stagnant RPM and/or increasing EGT. During start, engines may accelerate to idle slowly but action should not be taken if RPM is increasing and EGT is not near or rapidly approaching the limit. Note: Cycling both fuel control switches is used during a dual engine failure to reset both EECs. Any further cycling of the fuel control switches during a dual engine start, or any cycling of a fuel control switch during a single engine start, will not aid or speed up the start attempt. Fuel should be cut off during the start only if engine damage becomes apparent or the engine does not start. Note: When electrical power is restored, do not confuse the establishment of APU generator power with the establishment of engine generator power at idle RPM and advance the thrust lever prematurely. Airframe Vibration Due to Engine Severe Damage or Separation Airframe Vibration Certain engine failures, such as fan blade separation can cause high levels of airframe vibration. Although the airframe vibration may seem severe to the flight crew, it is extremely unlikely that the vibration will damage the airplane structure or critical systems. However, the vibration should be reduced as soon as possible by reducing airspeed and descending. In general, as airspeed decreases vibration levels decrease. As airspeed or altitude change the airplane can transition through various levels of vibration. It should be noted that the vibration may not completely stop. If vibration remains unacceptable, descending to a lower altitude (terrain permitting) allows a lower airspeed and normally lower vibration levels. Vibration will likely become imperceptible as airspeed is further reduced during approach. The impact of a vibrating environment on human performance is dependent on a number of factors, including the orientation of the vibration relative to the body. People working in a vibrating environment may find relief by leaning forward or backward, standing, or otherwise changing their body position. Once airframe vibration has been reduced to acceptable levels, the crew must evaluate the situation and determine a new course of action based on weather, fuel remaining, and available airports. Recommended Technique for an In-Flight Engine Shutdown Appendix A.2.11 Recommended Technique for an In-Flight Engine Shutdown Any time an engine shutdown is needed in flight, good crew coordination is essential. Airplane incidents have turned into airplane accidents as a result of the flight crew shutting down the incorrect engine. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.8 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual When the flight path is under complete control, the crew should proceed with a deliberate, systematic process that identifies the affected engine and ensures that the operating engine is not shut down. Do not rush through the shutdown checklist, even for a fire indication. The following technique is an example that could be used: When an engine shutdown is needed, the PF verbally coordinates confirmation of the affected engine with the PM and then turns off or directs the PM to turn off the affected A/T. The PF verbally confirms the affected engine with the PM and then slowly retards the thrust lever of the engine that will be shutdown. Coordinate activation of the fuel control switch as follows: PM places a hand on and verbally identifies the fuel control switch for the engine that will be shutdown PF verbally confirms that the PM has identified the correct fuel control switch PM moves the fuel control switch to cutoff. If the NNC requires activation of the engine fire switch, coordinate as follows: PM places a hand on and verbally identifies the engine fire switch for the engine that is shutdown PF verbally confirms that the PM has identified the correct engine fire switch PM pulls the engine fire switch. Bird Strikes Bird Strikes Experience shows that bird strikes are common in aviation. Most bird strikes occur at very low altitudes, below 500 feet AGL. This section deals with bird strikes that affect the engines. Recent studies of engine bird strikes reveal that approximately 50% of engine bird strikes damage the engine(s). The risk of engine damage increases proportionally with the size of the bird and with increased engine thrust settings. When an engine bird strike damages the engine, the most common indications are significant vibrations due to fan blade damage and an EGT increase. Note: After any bird strike, the engines should be inspected by maintenance. Preventative Strategies Airports are responsible for bird control and should provide adequate wildlife control measures. If large birds or flocks of birds are reported or observed near the runway, the crew should consider: delaying the takeoff or landing when fuel permits. Advise the tower and wait for airport action before continuing takeoff or land on another runway that is free of bird activity, if available. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.9 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual To prevent or reduce the consequences of a bird strike, the crew should: discuss bird strikes during takeoff and approach briefings when operating at airports with known or suspected bird activity. be extremely vigilant if birds are reported on final approach if birds are expected on final approach, plan additional landing distance to account for the possibility of no thrust reverser use if a bird strike occurs. Note: The use of weather radar to scare the birds has not been proven effective. Crew Actions for a Bird Strike During Takeoff If a bird strike occurs during takeoff, the decision to continue or reject the takeoff is made using the criteria found in the Rejected Takeoff maneuver of the QRH. If a bird strike occurs above 80 knots and prior to V1, and there is no immediate evidence of engine failure (e.g. failure, fire, power loss, or surge/stall), the preferred option is to continue with the take off followed by an immediate return, if required. Crew Actions for a Bird Strike During Approach or Landing If the landing is assured, continuing the approach to landing is the preferred option. If more birds are encountered, fly through the bird flock and land. Maintain as low a thrust setting as possible. If engine ingestion is suspected, limit reverse thrust on landing to the amount needed to stop on the runway. Reverse thrust may increase engine damage, especially when engine vibration or high EGT is indicated. Evacuation Evacuation If an evacuation is planned and time permits, a thorough briefing and preparation of the crew and passengers improves the chances of a successful evacuation. Flight deck preparations should include a review of pertinent checklists and any other actions to be accomplished. Appropriate use of autobrakes should be discussed. If evacuating due to fire in windy conditions, consider positioning the airplane so the fire is on the downwind side. Notify cabin crew of possible adverse conditions at the affected exits. The availability of various exits may differ for each situation. Crewmembers must make the decision as to which exits are usable for the circumstances. For unplanned evacuations, the captain needs to analyze the situation carefully before initiating an evacuation order. Quick actions in a calm and methodical manner improve the chances of a successful evacuation. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.10 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Method of Evacuation When there is a need to evacuate passengers and crew, the captain has to choose between commanding an emergency evacuation using the emergency escape slides or less urgent means such as deplaning using stairs, jetways, or other means. All available sources of information should be used to determine the safest course of action including reports from the cabin crew, other airplanes, and air traffic control. The captain must then determine the best means of evacuation by carefully considering all factors. These include, but are not limited to: the urgency of the situation, including the possibility of significant injury or loss of life if a significant delay occurs the type of threat to the airplane, including structural damage, fire, reported bomb on board, etc. the possibility of fire spreading rapidly from spilled fuel or other flammable materials the extent of damage to the airplane the possibility of passenger injury during an emergency evacuation using the escape slides. If in doubt, the crew should consider an emergency evacuation using the escape slides. If there is a need to deplane passengers, but circumstances are not urgent and the captain determines that the Evacuation NNC is not needed, the normal shutdown procedure should be completed before deplaning the passengers. Discharging Fire Bottles during an Evacuation The evacuation NNC specifies discharge of the engine or APU fire bottles if an engine or APU fire warning light is illuminated. However, evacuation situations can present possibilities regarding the potential for fire that are beyond the scope of the NNC and may not activate an engine or APU fire warning. The crew should consider the following when deciding whether to discharge one or more fire bottles into the engines and/or APU: if an engine fire warning light is not illuminated, but a fire indication exists or a fire is reported in or near an engine, discharge both available fire bottles into the affected engine if the APU fire warning light is not illuminated, but a fire indication exists or a fire is reported in or near the APU, discharge the APU bottle the discharged halon agent is designed to extinguish a fire and has very little or no fire prevention capability in the engine nacelles. Halon dissipates quickly into the atmosphere there is no reason to discharge the engine or APU fire bottles for evacuations not involving fire indications existing or reported in or near an engine or APU, e.g., cargo fire, security or bomb threat, etc. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.11 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Flight Controls Leading Edge or Trailing Edge Device Malfunctions Leading edge or trailing edge device malfunctions can occur during extension or retraction. This section discusses all flaps up and partial or asymmetrical leading/trailing edge device malfunctions for landings. Note: When leading edge devices or trailing edge flaps are not in the proper position for flaps 20 or 30, autolands are not certified. All Flaps and Slats Up Landing Flaps and Slats Up Landing The probability of both leading and trailing edge devices failing to extend is extremely remote. System reliability and design have reduced the need for some traditional non-normal landing procedures. As a result, an all flaps up landing NNC was not required for airplane certification and does not appear in the AFM or in the QRH. Slats Drive Failure (Leading Edge) - Landing Slats Drive Failure (Leading Edge) - Landing Failure of the primary hydraulic drive for the leading edge slats causes the slats to automatically revert to the secondary mode (electric drive). The EICAS message SLATS PRIMARY FAIL is displayed. If the slats fail to respond in the electric drive mode or an asymmetry exists, the EICAS message SLATS DRIVE is displayed. The SLATS DRIVE NNC accommodates the most severe malfunction of no leading edge slats on one wing. Flaps 1 position on the flap indicator is for leading edge devices. When flaps are extended to 1 and the leading edge devices fail to extend, the flap display expands. The flap indicator shows no trailing edge flap movement. Flap extension is limited to flaps 20 if slats are not fully extended. The VREF specified in the QRH permits the approach to be flown wings level with the control wheel approximately level. Airplane pitch attitude at touchdown is less than normal. Do not allow the airplane to “float”. Fly the airplane onto the runway at the desired touchdown point. Expeditiously accomplish the landing roll procedure after touchdown. Flap Drive Failure (Trailing Edge) - Landing Flap Drive Failure (Trailing Edge) - Landing Failure of the primary hydraulic drive for the trailing edge flaps causes the flaps to automatically revert to the secondary mode (electric drive). The EICAS message FLAPS PRIMARY FAIL is displayed. If the flaps fail to respond in the electric drive mode or an asymmetry exists, the EICAS message FLAPS DRIVE is displayed. Accomplish the FLAPS DRIVE NNC. The inboard and outboard TE Flaps move as a single group. Flap load relief is not available in secondary mode of operation. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.12 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual The VREF listed in the FLAPS DRIVE NNC allows normal maneuvering throughout the initial phases of the approach. On final, maintain VREF plus wind additive. If speed is allowed to decrease to VREF, 40° bank capability is not available. The pitch attitude on final is several degrees higher than for normal configuration. Do not allow the airspeed to go below VREF during the flare or the tail of the airplane may contact the runway. Do not allow the airplane to “float” just above the runway surface. Fly the airplane onto the runway at the recommended touchdown point. Expeditiously accomplish the landing roll procedure after touchdown. Flap Extension using the Secondary or Alternate System Flap Extension using the Secondary or Alternate System When extending the flaps using the secondary or alternate system, the recommended method for setting command speed differs from the method used during normal flap extension. Since the flaps extend more slowly when using the secondary or alternate system, it is recommended that the crew delay setting the new command speed until the flaps reach the selected position. This method may prevent the crew from inadvertently getting into a low airspeed condition if attention to airspeed is diverted while accomplishing other duties. Jammed Flight Controls Jammed or Restricted Flight Controls The flight control system consists of control surfaces electrically linked to flight deck controls with the exception of a mechanical link to the stabilizer and one spoiler pair. Although rare, jamming of the flight control system has occurred on commercial airplanes. A jammed flight control can result from ice accumulation due to water leaks onto cables or components, dirt accumulation, component failure such as cable break or worn parts, improper lubrication, or foreign objects. A flight control jam may be difficult to recognize, especially in a properly trimmed airplane. A flight control jam in the pitch axis may be difficult to recognize. In the case of the elevator, the jammed control can be masked by trim. Some indications of an elevator jam are: unexplained autopilot disengagement autopilot that cannot be engaged undershoot or overshoot of an altitude during autopilot level-off higher than normal control forces required during speed or configuration changes. If any jammed flight control condition exists, refer to the Jammed Flight Controls NNC. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.13 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Both pilots should apply force to try to either clear the jam or activate the override feature. There should be no concern about damaging the flight control mechanism by applying too much force to either clear a jammed flight control or activate an override feature. Maximum force may result in some flight control surface movement with a jammed flight control. If the jam clears, both pilot’s flight controls are available. Note: There are override features for the control wheel and the control column. If the jam does not clear, activation of an override feature allows a flight control surface to be moved independent of the jammed control. Applying force to the non-jammed flight control activates the override feature. When enough force is applied, the jammed control is overridden allowing the non-jammed control to operate. To identify the non-jammed flight control, apply force to each flight control individually. The flight control that results in the greatest airplane control is the non-jammed control. Note: The pilot of the non-jammed control should be the pilot flying for the remainder of the flight. The non-jammed control requires a normal force, plus an additional override force to move the flight control surface. For example, if a force of 10 lbs (4 kgs) is normally needed to move the surface, and 50 lbs (23 kgs) of force is needed to activate the override, a total force of 60 lbs (27 kgs) is needed to move the control surface while in override. Response is slower than normal with a jammed flight control; however, sufficient response is available for airplane control and landing. Individual flight control surfaces that do not respond correctly to pilot or autopilot inputs may cause either a FLIGHT CONTROLS or SPOILERS EICAS message to display. Because the flight control surfaces are electronically controlled, an individual flight control surface jam will not result in restricted movement of the control wheel, column, or pedals except to a limited extent in the case of spoilers 4 and 11. Trim Inputs If a jammed flight control condition exists, use manual inputs from other control surfaces to counter pressures and maintain a neutral flight control condition. The following table provides trim inputs that may be used to counter jammed flight control conditions. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.14 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Jammed Control Manual Trim Inputs Stabilizer (select Direct mode to Elevator gain more stabilizer authority, if needed) Aileron Rudder* Rudder Aileron Spoiler Rudder*, Aileron *See Recommended Rudder Trim Technique, Chapter. 1 Note: Asymmetric engine thrust may aid roll and directional control if TAC is inoperative. Approach and Landing Attempt to select a runway with minimum crosswind. Complete approach preparations early. Recheck flight control surface operation prior to landing to determine if the malfunction still exists. Do not make abrupt thrust, speedbrake, or configuration changes. Make small bank angle changes. Establish landing configuration, correct airspeed and in-trim condition early on final approach. Establish touchdown attitude no later than crossing the threshold and do not reduce thrust to idle until after touchdown. Asymmetrical braking and asymmetrical thrust reverser deployment may aid directional control on the runway. Note: In the event of an elevator jam, control forces will be significantly greater than normal and control response will be slower than normal to flare the airplane. Maintain flight path with thrust and main electric trim as needed. Go Around Procedure If the elevator is known or suspected to be jammed, a go-around should be avoided if at all possible. To execute a go-around with a jammed elevator, slowly and smoothly advance thrust levers while maintaining pitch control with stabilizer and any available elevator. If a go-around is required, the go-around procedure is handled in the same manner as a normal go-around. Inoperative Stabilizer Jammed Stabilizer An inoperative stabilizer is indicated by the STABILIZER EICAS message. In contrast to airplanes with conventional flight control systems, normal pitch trim is still available in the normal flight control mode, however elevator authority is limited. The QRH specifies a maximum in-flight speed, adjusted approach speed and landing configuration that ensures adequate elevator control is available for the remainder of the flight. Use normal piloting techniques for landing. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.15 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Stabilizer Unscheduled Stabilizer Trim Hold the control column firmly to maintain the desired pitch attitude. If uncommanded trim motion continues, the stabilizer trim commands are interrupted when the control column is displaced in the opposite direction. Flight Instruments, Displays Air Data Systems Unreliable AiAir Data Systems Unreliable Airspeed Unreliable Airspeed Unreliable Unreliable airspeed indications can result from blocking or freezing of the pitot/static system or a severely damaged or missing radome. When the ram air inlet to the pitot head is blocked, pressure in the probe is released through the drain holes and the airspeed slowly drops to zero. If the ram air inlet and the probe drain holes are both blocked, pressure trapped within the system reacts unpredictably. The pressure may increase through expansion, decrease through contraction, or remain constant. In all cases, the airspeed indications would be abnormal. This could mean increasing indicated airspeed in climb, decreasing indicated airspeed in descent, or unpredictable indicated airspeed in cruise. Increased reliance on automation has de-emphasized the practice of setting known pitch attitudes and thrust settings. However, should an airspeed unreliable incident occur, the flight crew should be familiar with the approximate pitch attitude and thrust setting for each phase of flight. This familiarity can be gained by noting the pitch attitude and thrust setting occasionally during normal flight. Any significant change in body attitude from the attitude normally required to maintain a particular airspeed or Mach number should alert the flight crew to a potential airspeed problem. If abnormal airspeed is recognized, immediately set the target pitch attitude and thrust setting for the aircraft configuration from the Airspeed Unreliable memory items. When airplane control is established, accomplish the Airspeed Unreliable NNC. The crew should alert ATC if unable to maintain assigned altitude or if altitude indications are unreliable. (See Altitude Unreliable discussion later in this chapter.) Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.16 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Memory items for target pitch and thrust must be accomplished as soon as it is suspected that airspeed indications are incorrect. The intent of having memorized pitch and thrust settings is to quickly put the airplane in a safe regime until the Airspeed Unreliable checklist can be referenced. The following assumptions and requirements were used in developing these memory items: The memorized settings are calculated to work for all model/engine combinations, at all weights and at all altitudes. The flaps up settings will be sufficient such that the actual airspeed remains above stick shaker and below overspeed. The flaps extended settings will be sufficient such that the actual airspeed remains above stick shaker and below the flap placard limit. The settings are biased toward a higher airspeed as it is better to be at a high energy state than a low energy state. These memorized settings are to allow time to stabilize the airplane, remain within the flight envelope without overspeed or stall, and then continue with reference to the checklist. Settings are provided for flight with and without flaps extended. The crew should use the setting for the condition they are in to keep the airplane safe while accessing the checklist. The memorized pitch and thrust setting for the current configuration (flaps extended/flaps up) should be applied immediately with the following considerations: The flaps extended pitch and thrust settings will result in a climb. The flaps up pitch and thrust settings will result in a slight climb at light weights and low altitudes, and a slight descent at heavy weights and high altitudes. At light weight and low altitude, the true airspeed will be higher than normal, but within the flight envelope. At heavy weight and high altitude, the same settings will result in airspeed lower than normal cruise but within the flight envelope. The goal of these pitch and thrust settings is to maintain the airplane safely within the flight envelope, not to maintain a specific climb or level flight. The current flap position should be maintained until the memory pitch and thrust settings have been set and the airplane stabilized. If further flap extension/flap retraction is required refer to PI-QRH Airspeed Unreliable table. In order to determine if a reliable source of indicated airspeed is available, the Airspeed Unreliable checklist says "When in trim and stabilized, cross check the captain, first officer and standby airspeed indicators." The intent of this statement is for the pilot flying to set the pitch attitude and thrust setting from the PI-QRH Flight With Unreliable Airspeed table and allow the airplane to stabilize before comparing the airspeed indications to those shown in the table. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.17 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual The airplane is considered stabilized when the thrust and pitch have been set, and the pitch is trimmed with no further trim movement needed to maintain the pitch setting. This is not an instantaneous process, and must be complete before comparing indicated and expected airspeeds for accurate results. If it is determined that none of the airspeed indicators are reliable, the PI-QRH tables should be used for the remainder of the flight. Flight crews need to ensure they are using the table and values appropriate for phase of flight and airplane configuration. When changing phase of flight or airplane configuration, make initial thrust change, set pitch attitude, configure the airplane as needed, then recheck thrust and pitch, and trim as needed. Do not change configuration until the airplane is trimmed and stabilized at the current configuration. Flap load relief can prevent the flaps from extending or remaining at the desired flap setting for landing. The flap load relief function uses indicated airspeed, which may be unreliable. The Airspeed Unreliable checklist procedures configure the airplane as necessary by using alternate flaps if needed to prevent unwanted flap load relief. Unreliable airspeed may cause noticeable effects in the normal speed stability of the airplane since the normal pitch control law uses indicated airspeed. If the indicated airspeed falls below 50 knots, the flight control system changes to the secondary mode, which does not depend on airspeed. If the flight crew is aware of the problem, flight without the benefit of valid airspeed information can be safely conducted and should present little difficulty. Early recognition of erroneous airspeed indications requires familiarity with the interrelationship of attitude, thrust setting, and airspeed. A delay in recognition could result in loss of airplane control. Ground speed information is available from the FMC and on the instrument displays. These indications can be used as a crosscheck. Many air traffic control radars can also measure ground speed. For airplanes equipped with an Angle of Attack (AOA) indicator, maintain the analog needle at approximately the three o’clock position. This approximates a safe maneuver speed or approach speed for the existing airplane configuration. Descent Idle thrust descents to 10,000 feet can be made by flying body attitude and checking rate of descent in the QRH/PI tables. At 2,000 feet above the selected level off altitude, reduce rate of descent to 1,000 FPM. On reaching the selected altitude, establish pitch and thrust for the airplane configuration. If possible, allow the airplane to stabilize before changing configuration and altitude. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.18 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Approach If available, accomplish an ILS approach. Establish landing configuration early on final approach. At glide slope intercept or beginning of descent, set thrust and attitude per the QRH tables and control the rate of descent with thrust. Landing Control the final approach so as to touch down approximately 1,000 feet to 1,500 feet beyond the threshold. Fly the airplane on to the runway, do not hold it off or let it “float” to touchdown. Use autobraking if available. If manual braking is used, maintain adequate brake pedal pressure until a safe stop is assured. Immediately after touchdown, expeditiously accomplish the landing roll procedure. Go-Around or Missed Approach - Airspeed Unreliable Prior to Approach If an airspeed unreliable event occurs prior to the approach and a valid airspeed indicator is not available, ensure completion of the Airspeed Unreliable NNC and refer to the QRH-PI tables for appropriate pitch and thrust settings for all phases of flight. If a go-around or missed approach is necessary, do not push TO/GA. Execute a go-around using go-around thrust and pitch values from the QRH-PI tables. Upon reaching a safe altitude set the target pitch attitude and thrust settings from the QRH-PI table for the current airplane configuration and phase of flight. On Approach If an airspeed unreliable event occurs during approach, and a go-around or missed approach is necessary, do not push TO/GA. Disengage the autopilot and disconnect autothrottle, execute a go-around using go-around thrust and 15° pitch attitude. Upon reaching a safe altitude set the target pitch attitude and thrust settings from the Airspeed Unreliable NNC and accomplish the checklist. Pitch and Thrust Reference for Airspeed Unreliable The following table provides pitch and thrust settings calculated to work for all model/engine combinations, at all weights and at all altitudes. Flaps Extended Flaps Up Pitch Attitude Thrust Pitch Attitude Thrust Model (degrees) (N1) (degrees) (N1) 777 10 85 4 70 Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.19 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Altitude Unreliable Altitude Unreliable Altitude information transmitted to ATC by the airplane’s transponder may be unreliable. ATC is not an independent source of barometric altitude information. In situations where altitude indications are unreliable or altimeters disagree, transponder altitude received by ATC may be unreliable and cannot be used to verify barometric altitude. Accomplish the AIR DATA SYS/NAV AIR DATA SYS NNC if the EICAS message is shown. Fuel Fuel Balance Fuel Balance The primary purpose of fuel balance limitations on Boeing airplanes is for the structural life of the airframe and landing gear and not for controllability. A reduction in structural life of the airframe or landing gear can be caused by frequently operating with out-of-limit fuel balance conditions. Lateral control is not significantly affected when operating with fuel beyond normal balance limits. The primary purpose for fuel balance alerts is to inform the crew that imbalances beyond the current state may result in increased trim drag and higher fuel consumption. The FUEL IMBALANCE NNC should be accomplished when a fuel balance alert is received. There is a common misconception among flight crews that the fuel crossfeed valve should be opened immediately after an in-flight engine shutdown to prevent fuel imbalance. This practice is contrary to Boeing recommended procedures and could aggravate a fuel imbalance. This practice is especially significant if an engine failure occurs and a fuel leak is present. Arbitrarily opening the crossfeed valve and starting fuel balancing procedures, without following the checklist, can result in pumping usable fuel overboard. The misconception may be further reinforced during simulator training. The fuel pumps in simulators are modeled with equal output pressure on all pumps so opening the crossfeed valve appears to maintain a fuel balance. However, the fuel pumps in the airplane have allowable variations in output pressure. If there is a sufficient difference in pump output pressures and the crossfeed valve is opened, fuel feeds to the operating engine from the fuel tank with the highest pump output pressure. This may result in fuel unexpectedly coming from the tank with the lowest quantity. Fuel Balancing Considerations The crew should consider the following when performing fuel balancing procedures: use of the FUEL IMBALANCE NNC in conjunction with good crew coordination reduces the possibility of crew errors Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.20 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual routine fuel balancing when not near the imbalance limit increases the possibility of crew errors and does not significantly improve fuel consumption during critical phases of flight, fuel balancing should be delayed until workload permits. This reduces the possibility of crew errors and allows crew attention to be focused on flight path control fuel imbalances that occur during approach need not be addressed if the reason for the imbalance is obvious (e.g. engine failure or thrust asymmetry, etc.). Fuel Leak Fuel Leak Any time an unexpected fuel quantity indication, FMC or EICAS fuel message, or imbalance condition is experienced, a fuel leak should be considered as a possible cause. Maintaining a fuel log and comparing actual fuel burn to the flight plan fuel burn can help the pilot recognize a fuel leak. Significant fuel leaks, although fairly rare, are difficult to detect. The Fuel Leak NNC includes steps for a leak that is between the front spar and the engine (an “engine fuel leak”) or a leak from the tank to the outside (a “tank leak”). The NNC for the 777-200 non-ER airplane includes steps for a leak into the center wing dry bay area. An engine fuel leak is the most common type of fuel leak since fuel lines are exposed in the strut. Most other fuel lines, such as a crossfeed manifold, are contained within the tanks. A significant fuel leak directly from a tank to the outside is very rare due to the substantial wing structure that forms the tanks. There is no specific fuel leak annunciation on the flight deck. A fuel leak must be detected by changes or discrepancies in expected fuel consumption, or by some annunciation that occurs because of a fuel leak. Any unexpected and sustained change in fuel quantity or fuel balance should alert the crew to the possibility of a fuel leak. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.21 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Some fuel-related checklists (for example, FUEL IMBALANCE) list reasons that a fuel leak should be suspected. This list is not exhaustive and, in all cases the flight crew should use their knowledge of the fuel system and current operating conditions to determine whether a fuel leak should be suspected. Some reasons are: The total fuel remaining on EICAS is less than the planned fuel remaining. The total fuel can be less than planned fuel for a number of reasons, such as a fuel leak, unforecast headwinds, fuel sloshing (such as from high angles of pitch). Sloshing fuel would be a temporary effect. Flight crews should consider these when deciding whether or not to suspect a fuel leak. An engine has excessive fuel flow. A faulty fuel flow meter or an engine fuel leak downstream of the fuel flow meter will cause an excessive fuel flow indication. Total fuel remaining compared to planned fuel remaining should be considered when deciding whether or not to suspect a fuel leak. One main tank is abnormally low compared to the other main tanks and the expected fuel remaining in the tanks. One tank indicating abnormally low can be caused by a fuel leak, engine out or a crossfeed problem. With an engine out, if the totalizer and calculated values are tracking as expected, a fuel leak would not be suspected. A fuel pump with higher pressure and a faulty crossfeed valve can cause one tank to provide fuel to more than one engine, causing one tank to indicate low. In this case, the fact that total fuel should still match planned fuel, a fuel leak would not be suspected. On PROGRESS page 2 the totalizer is less than the calculated fuel. The TOTALIZER fuel is the sum of the individual tank quantities. The CALCULATED fuel is the totalizer value at engine start minus fuel used. Fuel used is calculated using the engine fuel flow sensors. This can be caused by a fuel leak or a tank fuel quantity indicator failure. If a tank fuel quantity indicator has failed, the crew would not suspect a fuel leak. If a fuel leak is suspected, it is imperative to follow the NNC. The NNC leads the crew through steps to determine if the fuel leak is from the strut or the engine area. If an engine fuel leak is confirmed, the NNC directs the crew to shutdown the affected engine. There are two reasons for the shutdown. The first is to close the spar valve, which stops the leak. This prevents the loss of fuel which could result in a low fuel state. The second reason is that the fire potential is increased when fuel is leaking around the engine. The risk of fire increases further when the thrust reverser is used during landing. The thrust reverser significantly changes the flow of air around the engine which can disperse fuel over a wider area. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.22 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Low Fuel Low Fuel Operations In-flight A low fuel condition exists when the EICAS message FUEL QTY LOW is displayed. Approach and Landing In a low fuel condition, the clean configuration should be maintained as long as possible during the descent and approach to conserve fuel. However, initiate configuration changes early enough to provide a smooth, slow deceleration to final approach speed to prevent fuel from running forward in the tanks. The FUEL QTY LOW NNC specifically calls for a flaps 20 approach and landing rather than a normal landing configuration as in other models. Testing and analysis shows that elevator authority at flaps 30 approach speeds is not adequate to enable the crew to successfully flare the airplane for landing in the unlikely event both engines failed in the landing configuration. Runway conditions permitting, heavy braking and high levels of reverse thrust should be avoided to prevent uncovering all fuel pumps and possible engine flameout during landing roll. Go-Around If a go-around is necessary, slowly and smoothly advance thrust levers and maintain the minimum nose-up body attitude required for a safe climb gradient. Avoid rapid acceleration of the airplane. If any main tank fuel pump low pressure light illuminates, do not turn the fuel pump switches off. Fuel Jettison Fuel Jettison Fuel jettison should be considered when situations dictate landing at high gross weights and adequate time is available to perform the jettison. When fuel jettison is to be accomplished, consider the following: ensure adequate weather minimums exist at airport of intended landing fuel jettison above 4,000 feet AGL ensures complete fuel evaporation downwind drift of fuel may exceed one NM per 1,000 feet of drop avoid jettisoning fuel in a holding pattern with other airplanes below. Hydraulics Proper planning of the approach is important. Consideration should be given to the effect the inoperative system(s) has on crosswind capabilities, autoflight, stabilizer trim, control response, control feel, reverse thrust, stopping distance, go-around configuration and performance required to reach an alternate airfield. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.23 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Hydraulic System(s) Inoperative - Landing Hydraulic System(s) Inoperative - Landing If the landing gear is extended using alternate gear extension, the gear cannot be raised. Flaps can be extended or retracted using the secondary drive system. However, the rate of flap travel is significantly reduced. Flaps 20 and the VREF specified in the QRH are used for landing with multiple hydraulic systems inoperative to improve flare authority, control response and go-around capability. The airplane may tend to float during the flare. Do not allow the airplane to float. Fly the airplane onto the runway at the recommended point. If nose wheel steering is inoperative and any crosswind exists, consideration should be given to landing on a runway where braking action is reported as good or better. Braking action becomes the primary means of directional control below approximately 60 knots where the rudder becomes less effective. If controllability is satisfactory, taxi clear of the runway using differential thrust and brakes. Continued taxi with nose wheel steering inoperative is not recommended due to airplane control difficulties and heat buildup in the brakes. Landing Gear Tire Failure during or after Takeoff Tire Failure during or after Takeoff If the crew suspects a tire failure during takeoff, the Air Traffic Service facility serving the departing airport should be advised of the potential for tire pieces remaining on the runway. The crew should consider continuing to the destination unless there is an indication that other damage has occurred (non-normal engine indications, engine vibrations, hydraulic system failures or leaks, etc.). Continuing to the destination will allow the airplane weight to be reduced normally, and provide the crew an opportunity to plan and coordinate their arrival and landing when the workload is low. Considerations in selecting a landing airport include, but are not limited to: sufficient runway length and acceptable surface conditions to account for the possible loss of braking effectiveness sufficient runway width to account for possible directional control difficulties altitude and temperature conditions that could result in high ground speeds on touchdown and adverse taxi conditions runway selection options regarding “taxi-in” distance after landing availability of operator maintenance personnel to meet the airplane after landing to inspect the wheels, tires, and brakes before continued taxi availability of support facilities should the airplane need repair. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.24 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Landing on a Flat Tire Landing on a Flat Tire Boeing airplanes are designed so that the landing gear and remaining tire(s) have adequate strength to accommodate a flat nose gear tire or main gear tire. When the pilot is aware of a flat tire prior to landing, use normal approach and flare techniques, avoid landing overweight and use the center of the runway. Use differential braking as needed for directional control. With a single tire failure, towing is not necessary unless unusual vibration is noticed or other failures have occurred. In the case of a flat nose wheel tire, slowly and gently lower the nose wheels to the runway while braking lightly. Runway length permitting, use idle reverse thrust. Autobrakes may be used at the lower settings. Once the nose gear is down, vibration levels may be affected by increasing or decreasing control column back pressure. Maintain nose gear contact with the runway. Flat main gear tire(s) cause a general loss of braking effectiveness and a yawing moment toward the flat tire with light or no braking and a yawing moment away from the flat tire if the brakes are applied harder. Maximum use of reverse thrust is recommended. Do not use autobrakes. If uncertain whether a nose tire or a main tire has failed, slowly and gently lower the nose wheels to the runway and do not use autobrakes. Differential braking may be required to steer the airplane. Use idle or higher reverse thrust as needed to stop the airplane. Note: Extended taxi distances or fast taxi speeds can cause significant increases in temperatures on the remaining tires. Gear Disagree Gear Disagree Land on all available gear. The landing gear absorbs the initial shock and delays touchdown of airplane body parts. Cycling the landing gear or maneuvering the airplane in an attempt to extend the remaining gear is not recommended. A gear up or partial gear landing is preferable to running out of fuel while attempting to solve a gear problem. Landing Runway Consideration should be given to landing at the most suitable airport with adequate runway and fire fighting capability. Foaming the runway is not necessary. Tests have shown that foaming provides minimal benefit and it takes approximately 30 minutes to replenish the fire truck’s foam supply. Prior to Approach If time and conditions permit, reduce weight as much as possible by burning off or jettisoning fuel to attain the slowest possible touchdown speed. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.25 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual At the captain’s command, advise the crew and the passengers of the situation, as needed. Coordinate with all ground emergency facilities. For example, fire trucks normally operate on a common VHF frequency with the airplane and can advise the crew of the airplane condition during the landing. Advise the cabin crew to perform emergency landing procedures and to brief passengers on evacuation procedures. The NNC instructs the crew to inhibit the ground proximity system as needed to prevent nuisance warnings when close to the ground with the gear retracted. For landing in any gear configuration, establish approach speed early and maintain a normal rate of descent. Landing Techniques Attempt to keep the airplane on the runway to minimize airplane damage and aid in evacuation. After touchdown lower the nose gently before losing elevator effectiveness. Use all aerodynamic capability to maintain directional control on the runway. At touchdown speed, the rudder has sufficient authority to provide directional control in most configurations. At speeds below 60 knots, use nose wheel/rudder pedal steering, if available, and differential braking as needed. Use of Speedbrakes During a partial gear or gear up landing, speedbrakes should be extended only when stopping distance is critical. Extending the speedbrakes before all gear, or the nose or the engine nacelle in the case of a gear that does not extend, have contacted the runway may compromise controllability of the airplane. When landing with any gear that indicates up or partially extended, attempt to fly the area with the unsafe indication smoothly to the runway at the lowest speed possible, but before losing flight control effectiveness. A smooth touchdown at a low speed helps to reduce airplane damage and offers a better chance of keeping the airplane on the runway. Since the airplane is easier to control before body parts make ground contact, delay extending the speedbrakes until after the nose and both sides of the airplane have completed touchdown. If the speedbrakes are deployed before all areas have made contact with the runway, the airplane will complete touchdown sooner and at a higher speed. Some crews or operators may elect to avoid the use of speedbrakes during any gear disagree event. However, most gear disagree events are the result of an indicator malfunction rather than an actual gear up condition. If the crew elects not to use speedbrakes during landing, be aware that stopping distance may rapidly become critical if all gear remain extended throughout touchdown and rollout. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.26 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Use of Reverse Thrust During a partial gear or gear up landing, an engine making ground contact could suffer sufficient damage such that the thrust reverser mechanism may not operate. Selecting reverse thrust with any gear not extended may produce an additional asymmetric condition that makes directional control more difficult. Reverse thrust should be used only when stopping distance is critical. If reverse thrust is needed, keep in mind that the airplane is easier to control before body parts make ground contact. If the thrust reversers are deployed before all gear, or the nose or the engine nacelle in the case of a gear that does not extend, have made contact with the runway, the airplane will complete touchdown sooner and at a higher speed. After Stop Accomplish an evacuation, if needed. Gear Disagree Combinations Both Main Gear Extended with Nose Gear Up Land in the center of the runway. After touchdown lower the nose gently before losing elevator effectiveness. Do not attempt to hold the nose of the airplane off the runway. Nose Gear Only Extended Land in the center of the runway. Use normal approach and flare attitudes maintaining back pressure on the control column until ground contact. The engines contact the ground prior to the nose gear. One Main Gear Extended and Nose Gear Extended Land the airplane on the side of the runway that corresponds to the extended main gear down. At touchdown, maintain wings level as long as possible. Use rudder and nose wheel steering for directional control. After all gear, or the engine nacelle where the gear is not extended, have made contact with the runway, braking on the side opposite the unsupported wing should be used as needed to keep the airplane rolling straight. One Main Gear Only Extended Land the airplane on the side of the runway that corresponds to the extended main gear down. At touchdown, maintain wings level as long as possible. Use rudder for directional control. After all gear, or the nose or the engine nacelle in the case of gear that do not extend, have made contact with the runway, braking on the side opposite the unsupported wing should be used as needed to keep the airplane rolling straight. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.27 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual All Gear Up or Partially Extended Land in the center of the runway. The engines contact the ground first. There is adequate rudder available to maintain directional control during the initial portion of the ground slide. Attempt to maintain the centerline while rudder control is available. Overspeed Overspeed VMO/MMO is the airplane maximum certified operating speed and should not be exceeded intentionally. However, crews can occasionally experience an inadvertent overspeed. Airplanes have been flight tested beyond VMO/MMO to ensure smooth pilot inputs will return the airplane safely to the normal flight envelope. At high altitude, wind speed or direction changes may lead to overspeed events. Although autothrottle logic provides for more aggressive control of speed as the airplane approaches VMO or MMO, there are some conditions that are beyond the capability of the autothrottle system to prevent short term overspeeds. When correcting an overspeed during cruise at high altitude, avoid reducing thrust to idle which results in slow engine acceleration back to cruise thrust and may result in over-controlling the airspeed or a loss of altitude. If autothrottle corrections are not satisfactory, leave the autopilot engaged, deploy partial speedbrakes slowly until a noticeable reduction in airspeed is achieved. When the airspeed is below VMO/MMO, retract the speedbrakes at the same rate as they were deployed. The thrust levers can be expected to advance slowly to achieve cruise airspeed; if not, they should be pushed up more rapidly. During descents at or near VMO/MMO, most overspeeds are encountered after the autopilot initiates capture of the VNAV path from above or during a level-off when the speedbrakes were required to maintain the path. In these cases, if the speedbrakes are retracted during the level-off, the airplane can momentarily overspeed. During descents using speedbrakes near VMO/MMO, delay retraction of the speedbrakes until after VNAV path or altitude capture is complete. Crews routinely climbing or descending in windshear conditions may wish to consider a 5 to 10 knot reduction in climb or descent speeds to reduce overspeed occurrences. This will have a minimal effect on fuel consumption and total trip time. When encountering an inadvertent overspeed condition, crews should leave the autopilot engaged and use the speedbrakes as needed unless it is apparent that the autopilot is not correcting the overspeed. However, if manual inputs are required, disengage the autopilot. Be aware that disengaging the autopilot to avoid or reduce the severity of an inadvertent overspeed may result in an abrupt pitch change. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.28 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual During climb or descent, if VNAV or FLCH pitch control is not correcting the overspeed satisfactorily, switching to the V/S mode temporarily may be helpful in controlling speed. In the V/S mode, the selected vertical speed can be adjusted slightly to increase the pitch attitude to help correct the overspeed. As soon as the speed is below VMO/MMO, VNAV or FLCH may be re-selected. Note: Anytime VMO/MMO is exceeded, the maximum airspeed should be noted in the flight log. Tail Strike Tail Strike Tail strike occurs when the lower aft fuselage or tail skid (as installed) contacts the runway during takeoff or landing. A significant factor that appears to be common is the lack of flight crew experience in the model being flown. A tail strike can be identified by the flight crew or cabin crew. Any one of the following conditions can be an indication of a tail strike during rotation or flare: a noticeable bump or jolt a scraping noise from the tail of the airplane the TAILSKID or TAIL STRIKE EICAS message or light may be displayed. Note: Anytime fuselage contact is suspected or confirmed, accomplish the appropriate NNC without delay. Takeoff Risk Factors Understanding the factors that contribute to a tail strike can reduce the possibility of a tail strike occurrence. Any one of the following takeoff risk factors may precede a tail strike: Mistrimmed Stabilizer This usually results from using erroneous takeoff data, e.g., the wrong weights, or an incorrect center of gravity (CG). In addition, sometimes information is entered incorrectly either in the flight management system (FMS) or set incorrectly on the stabilizer. The flight crew can prevent this type of error and correct the condition by challenging the reasonableness of the load sheet numbers. Comparing the load sheet numbers against past experience in the airplane can assist in approximating numbers that are reasonable. Rotation at Improper Speed This situation can result in a tail strike and is usually caused by early rotation due to some unusual situation, or rotation at too low an airspeed for the weight and/or flap setting. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.29 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Trimming during Rotation Trimming the stabilizer during rotation may contribute to a tail strike. The pilot flying may easily lose the feel of the elevator while the trim is running which may result in an excessive rotation rate. Excessive Rotation Rate Flight crews operating an airplane model new to them, especially when transitioning from an airplane with unpowered flight controls to one with hydraulic assistance, are most vulnerable to using excessive rotation rate. The amount of control input required to achieve the proper rotation rate varies from one model to another. When transitioning to a new model, flight crews may not realize that it does not respond to pitch input in exactly the same way as their previous model. Improper Use of the Flight Director The flight director provides accurate pitch guidance only after the airplane is airborne. With the proper rotation rate, the airplane reaches 35 feet with the desired pitch attitude of about 15°. However, an aggressive rotation into the pitch bar at takeoff is not appropriate and can cause a tail strike. Landing Risk Factors A tail strike on landing tends to cause more serious damage than the same event during takeoff and is usually more expensive and time consuming to repair. In the worst case, the tail can strike the runway before the landing gear, thus absorbing large amounts of energy for which it is not designed. The aft pressure bulkhead is often damaged as a result. Any one of the following landing risk factors may precede a tail strike: Unstabilized Approach An unstabilized approach is the biggest single cause of tail strike. Flight crews should stabilize all approach variables - on centerline, on approach path, on speed, and in the final landing configuration - by the time the airplane descends through 1,000 feet AFE. This is not always possible. Under normal conditions, if the airplane descends through 1,000 feet AFE (IMC), or 500 feet AFE (VMC), with these approach variables not stabilized, a go-around should be considered. See the section titled “Stabilized Approach Recommendations” in chapter 5 of this manual for more detailed information on the stabilized approach. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.30 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Flight recorder data shows that flight crews who continue with an unstabilized condition below 500 feet seldom stabilize the approach. When the airplane arrives in the flare, it often has either excessive or insufficient airspeed. The result is a tendency toward large thrust and pitch corrections in the flare, often culminating in a vigorous pitch change at touchdown resulting in tail strike shortly thereafter. If the pitch is increased rapidly when touchdown occurs as ground spoilers deploy, the spoilers add additional nose up pitch force, reducing pitch authority, which increases the possibility of a tail strike. Conversely, if the airplane is slow, increasing the pitch attitude in the flare does not effectively reduce the sink rate; and in some cases, may increase it. A firm touchdown on the main gear is often preferable to a soft touchdown with the nose rising rapidly. In this case, the momentary addition of thrust may aid in preventing the tail strike. In addition, unstabilized approaches can result in landing long or a runway over run. Holding Off in the Flare The second most common cause of a landing tail strike is an extended flare, with a loss in airspeed that results in a rapid loss of altitude, (a dropped-in touchdown). This condition is often precipitated by a desire to achieve an extremely smooth/soft landing. A very smooth/soft touchdown is not essential, nor even desired, particularly if the runway is wet. Trimming in the Flare Trimming the stabilizer in the flare may contribute to a tail strike. The pilot flying may easily lose the feel of the elevator while the trim is running. Too much trim can raise the nose, even when this reaction is not desired. The pitch up can cause a balloon, followed either by dropping in or pitching over and landing in a three-point attitude. Flight crews should trim the airplane during the approach, but not in the flare. Mishandling of Crosswinds When the airplane is placed in a sideslip attitude to compensate for the wind effects, this cross-control maneuver reduces lift, increases drag, and may increase the rate of descent. If the airplane then descends into a turbulent surface layer, particularly if the wind is shifting toward the tail, the stage is set for a tail strike. The combined effects of high closure rate, shifting winds with the potential for a quartering tail wind, can result in a sudden drop in wind velocity commonly found below 100 feet. Combining this with turbulence can make the timing of the flare very difficult. The pilot flying can best handle the situation by using additional thrust, if needed, and by using an appropriate pitch change to keep the descent rate stable until initiation of the flare. Flight crews should clearly understand the criteria for initiating a go-around and plan to use this time-honored avoidance maneuver when needed. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. June 30, 2019 FCT 777 (TM) 8.31 Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual Over-Rotation during Go-Around Go-arounds initiated very late in the approach, such as during the landing flare or after touching down, are a common cause of tail strikes. When the go-around mode is initiated, the flight director immediately commands a go-around pitch attitude. If the pilot flying abruptly rotates up to the pitch command bar, a tail strike can occur before the airplane responds and begins climbing. During a go-around, an increase in thrust as well as a positive pitch attitude is needed. If the thrust increase is not adequate for the increased pitch attitude, the resulting speed decay will likely result in a tail strike. Another contributing factor in tail strikes may be a strong desire by the flight crew to avoid landing gear contact after initiating a late go-around when the airplane is still over the runway. In general, this concern is not warranted because a brief landing gear touchdown during a late go-around is acceptable. This had been demonstrated during autoland and go-around certification programs. Warning Systems Fire If an unexpected landing gear configuration or GPWS alert occurs, the flight crew must ensure the proper configuration for the phase of flight. Time may be required in order to assess the situation, take corrective action and resolve the discrepancy. Flight path control and monitoring of instruments must never be compromised. Note: If the warning occurs during the approach phase, a go-around may be necessary, followed by holding or additional maneuvering. Fire Wheel Well Fire Wheel Well Fir Prompt execution of the FIRE WHEEL WELL NNC following a wheel well fire warning is important for timely gear extension. Landing gear speed limitations should be observed during this checklist. Note: To avoid unintended deceleration below the new target airspeed, the autothrottle should remain engaged. If airspeed is above 270 knots/.82 Mach, the airspeed must be reduced before extending the landing gear. Either of the following techniques results in the autothrottle reverting to the SPD mode and provides a more rapid speed reduction than using VNAV speed intervention or FLCH. select altitude hold and set approximately 250 knots set the MCP altitude to a desired level off altitude and use speed intervention to reduce airspeed. Note: Additionally, the thrust levers may be reduced to idle and/or the speedbrakes may be used to expedite deceleration. Boeing Proprietary. Copyright © Boeing. May be subject to export restrictions under EAR. See title page for details. 8.32 FCT 777 (TM) June 30, 2019  Non-Normal Operations 777 Flight Crew Training Manual If the pitch mode is VNAV and the crew wishes to remain in that mode, select speed intervention to open the MCP command speed window and then set approximately 250 knots. If the pitch mode is FLCH and the crew wishes to remain in that mode, simply set approximately 250 knots. These techniques do not result in as rapid a speed reduction as reverting to the SPD mode, but allows the crew to remain in the pitch mode in use. Windows Window Damage Window Damage If both forward windows delaminate or forward vision is unsatisfactory, accomplish an ILS autoland, if available. Flight with the Side Window(s) Open Window(s) Open The inadvertent opening of an unlatched flight deck window by air loads during the takeoff roll is not considered an event that warrants a high speed RTO. Although the resulting noise levels may interfere with crew communications, it is safer to continue the takeoff and close the window after becoming airborne and the flight path is under control. The flight may be continued once the window is closed and locked and pressurization is normal. If the window is damaged and will not close, return to the departure airport. If needed, the windows may be opened in-flight after depressurizing the airplane. It is recommended that the airplane be slowed since the noise levels increase at higher airspeed. Maneuver speed for the current flap setting is a good target speed. Intentions should be briefed and ATC notified prior to opening the window as the noise level can be high and make communications difficult, even at slow speeds. However, there is very little turbulence on the flight deck. Because of airplane design, there is an area of relatively calm air over the open window. Forward visibility can be maintained by looking out of the open window using care to stay clear of the airstream. Situations Beyond the Scope of Non-Normal Checklists Situations Beyond the Scope of Non-Normal Checklists It is rare to encounter in-flight events which are beyond the scope of the Boeing recommended NNCs. These events can arise as a result of unusual occurrences such as a midair collision, bomb explosion or other major malfunction. In these situatio