Strategic Crisis Management in the European Union - PDF

Science Advice for Policy by European Academies STRATEGIC CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION Evidence Review Report No. 11 This Evidence Review Report has been produced under the auspices of the SAPEA consortium, which is funded by the European Union. The text of this work is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited. The licence is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0. Images reproduced from other publications are not covered by this licence and remain the property of their respective owners, whose licence terms may be different. Every effort has been made to secure permission for reproduction of copyright material. The usage of images reproduced from other publications has not been reviewed by the copyright owners prior to release, and therefore those owners are not responsible for any errors, omissions or inaccuracies, or for any consequences arising from the use or misuse of this document. The consortium identified all relevant interests of the experts requested to contribute to this Evidence Review Report, assessed whether an interest constituted a conflict of interests, and took — where relevant — measures to exclude that an interest could compromise or be reasonably perceived as compromising the impartiality or objectivity of the report. Further information about SAPEA’s quality guidelines and working processes is available at www.sapea.info. The information, facts and opinions set out in this report are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the European Union or the European Commission, which are not responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report by anyone. » ISBN 978-3-9823562-1-1 » DOI 10.26356/crisismanagement » Downloadable from https://www.sapea.info/crisis Publisher Contact SAPEA SAPEA Communications Office c/o acatech Rue d’Egmont 13 Pariser Platz 4a 1000 Brussels, Belgium 10117 Berlin, Germany [email protected] SAPEA, Science Advice for Policy by European Academies. (2022). Strategic crisis management in the European Union. Berlin: SAPEA. https://doi.org/10.26356/crisismanagement Version history Version Date Summary of changes 1.0 22 November 2022 First published version Strategic crisis management in the European Union Informs the Scientific Opinion of the European Commission Group of Chief Scientific Advisors Table of contents Foreword9 4. Risk management for the EU87 4.1. Summary and key messages 87 4.2. Introduction 90 Preface10 4.3. A new typology of risk and hazards 92 4.4. Risk perception 103 4.5. EU risk governance: the need for better Executive summary 13 management strategies to cope with Summary of chapters 14 systemic risks 105 Evidence-based policy options 18 4.6. Requirements for good governance of systemic risks 108 1. Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in 5. Science advice in times of Europe20 crisis111 5.1. Summary and key messages 111 1.1. Summary 20 5.2. Introduction 113 1.2. Ambitions and aims 21 5.3. Background: policy advice 114 1.3. Future trends and threats: Challenges for strategic crisis management in the EU 26 5.4. The role of scientific expertise and R&I in crises: lessons learned 119 1.4. Taxonomies of crises and focus of the report30 5.5. Implications for the EU science-policy nexus126 1.5. What is evidence in the context of crises?34 2. Concepts and frameworks for 6. Equality, trust and crisis management 38 participation in European crises 2.1. Summary and key messages 38 129 2.2. Strategic crisis management 40 6.1. Summary 129 2.3. Before the onset: From vulnerability and 6.2. Introduction 132 risk to emergency, crisis, disaster 42 6.3. Social inequalities and EU strategic crisis 2.4. After the onset: crisis response and management133 resilience47 6.4. The impact of trust on EU crisis 2.5. Integrated conceptual framework 52 management146 6.5. Participation in EU crisis management 153 3. The EU as crisis manager 65 3.1. Summary and key messages 65 3.2. For which types of crises does the EU have competence to act? 67 3.3. What capacity does the EU have in place?70 3.4. Where are the biggest gaps? 84 7. Information, 9. Conclusions and evidence- data & intelligence 172 based policy options 240 7.1. Summary and key messages 172 9.1. Conclusions 240 7.2. Introduction 175 9.2. Evidence-based policy options 242 7.3. The use of strategic foresight for prevention and preparedness 176 7.4. Decision support for crisis management181 References253 7.5. Training, reference scenarios and emergency exercises 198 7.6. Harmonised data standards for data Annex 1. List of working group sharing in the EU 201 members294 8. Case studies 207 Annex 2. Background and 8.1. Summary 207 8.2. Wildfire management in the EU 209 process295 8.3. The case of cybersecurity 215 8.4. The case of deliberate biothreats 223 Annex 3. Literature review on key 8.5. The case of displaced populations 234 terms and definitions 300 8.6. Conclusions 238 Annex 4. List of acronyms 308 Annex 5. Acknowledgements309 List of figures Figure 1. Natural disasters on the rise Figure 19. Types of information disorder189 around the globe 27 Figure 20. The framing of Russian military Figure 2. Welfare loss from considered presence in Crimea 190 climate impacts for the EU and the UK28 Figure 21. Example of a fact-checking Figure 3. People forced to flee worldwide, website for Ukraine crisis 192 2012–2022 28 Figure 22. The virtuous circle of Figure 4. The DIKW Pyramid 35 sensemaking and decision-making 194 Figure 5. Integrated risk & crisis Figure 23. Illustration of GDACS interface management cycles 41 and covered disaster categories 195 Figure 6. From vulnerability and risk to Figure 24. A taxonomy of decision-makers in emergency, crisis and disaster 43 humanitarian disaster response 196 Figure 7. Levels of uncertainty. 44 Figure 25. Joint Cyber Unit ecosystem204 Figure 8. Relation of resilience, absorption, Figure 26. Data Preparedness — Task to Tool adaptation, and recovery 48 framework 206 Figure 9. Relation between resilience, Figure 27. Global changes in wildfire events sustainability and transformation 50 210 Figure 10. Integrated framework 53 Figure 28. Changes in fire weather index under different climate change scenarios Figure 11. Global agricultural production of 211 four major global grain staples 58 Figure 29. Integrated fire and landscape Figure 12. EU crisis management capacities management to handle risks 214 71 Figure 30. ENISA Threat Landscape — 2021: Figure 13. Links between principles of most prominent threats 217 equality, trust and participation in crisis132 Figure 31. ENISA Threat Landscape Figure 14. The functional contributions of 2020–2021: affected sectors, numbers of the four major players to policymaking157 incidents 218 Figure 15. The six stages of the strategic Figure 32. Increase in numbers of foresight process and associated tools177 complaints and estimated losses due to Figure 16. INFORM Risk Index 2018-2020182 cyberattacks 219 Figure 17. Example of an analysis of the Figure 33. The functions vital for society231 online information network and its Figure 34. Crisis management model in polarisation 185 Finland 232 Figure 18. The challenges of early action — signposts in environment and performance 187 List of tables Table 2. Agents that can be used as Table 1. Interconnections between social biological warfare or bioterrorism- inequalities and crisis management in related incidents 225 the European Union 141 Table 3. Disease categorisation 227 List of boxes Box 1. The ship Ever Given and the Suez Box 8. Decision support and coordination Canal blockage 55 in conflicts vs. natural disasters 197 Box 2. Food systems, response diversity Box 9. Data preparedness — learning and EU policy initiatives 56 from the humanitarian domain 205 Box 3. Infrastructure resilience 59 Box 10. Governance and Risk Reduction in Portugal 212 Box 4. Examples of the EU’s growing competence as a crisis manager 69 Box 11. International Health Regulations 226 Box 5. Case example: how the EU assists member states in the fight against Box 12. The Finnish Security Strategy for wildfires 74 Society 230 Box 6. Social smart grids 95 Box 13. Global mechanisms against deliberate biothreats 233 Box 7. L’Aquila earthquake, 2009 124 About SAPEA SAPEA brings together outstanding expertise from natural, applied, and social sciences and humanities, from over a hundred academies, young academies and learned societies in more than 40 countries across Europe. SAPEA is part of the European Commission’s Scientific Advice Mechanism. Together with the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors, we provide independent scientific advice to European Commissioners to support their decision-making. We also work to strengthen connections between Europe’s academies and Academy Networks, and to stimulate debate in Europe about the role of evidence in policymaking. Europe’s academies draw on the best scientific expertise to provide independent, balanced and authoritative scientific advice. This approach makes SAPEA a critical source of evidence for policymakers and the wider public. Our Academy Networks collectively represent over a hundred academies, young academies and learned societies across Europe. SAPEA works to strengthen these academies and provides a means for close collaboration in a unique and interdisciplinary way. For further information about SAPEA, visit www.sapea.info. 8 Foreword In our increasingly interconnected, globalised and rapidly changing world, the type and nature of the crises we face are also evolving rapidly. There is therefore a pressing need for our theories, principles and practices linked to crisis management to keep up with these changes, in order to better prevent, prepare, respond and recover. The covid-19 pandemic has revealed the important role that the European Union can play as a crisis manager, as well as the many challenges this role represents. Against this backdrop, the College of Commissioners asked the Scientific Advice Mechanism of the European Commission to provide evidence-based advice that can inform the improvement of the EU’s strategic crisis management. This is the eleventh Evidence Review Report to be published by the SAPEA consortium. This Report informs a corresponding Scientific Opinion by the independent Group of Chief Scientific Advisors to the European Commission, and both the Report and the Scientific Opinion will inform policymakers. To address the highly complex nature of the topic and all its interlinkages, SAPEA assembled an outstanding working group of European experts from a wide range of disciplines, backgrounds and countries. This makes this report unique in the field of strategic crisis management. The project was coordinated by ALLEA, the European Federation of Academies of Sciences and Humanities, acting as the lead network on behalf of SAPEA. Academia Europaea acted as collaborating network. We warmly thank all contributing experts for their time and contributions, in addition to everyone else involved in assembling this report. We would also like to express our sincere gratitude to the science academies across Europe, thanks to whom SAPEA can bring together the best available science. A special thanks goes to the project chair, Professor Tina Comes, who has shown boundless dedication, energy and enthusiasm in this role. Professor Antonio Loprieno Chair of the SAPEA board 9 Preface The combined shocks of the covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the climate crisis have affected the lives and livelihoods of millions of people around the globe. Because of the transboundary nature of these crises, the EU has emerged as an important player in the field of strategic crisis management. Distinct from operational crisis management, the realm of emergency services or control room operations, strategic crisis management is concerned with the facilitation and orchestration of crisis management and covers the decisions and policies that are needed to better prepare for, respond to and recover from crises. In this Evidence Review Report, as a response to a request for advice from the Commissioner for Research and Innovation and the Commissioner for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, we set out to provide the evidence on how the EU can improve its strategic crisis management. This Evidence Review Report started out in 2021 as the final report in a series synthesising the lessons from the covid-19 crisis. But the ongoing climate crisis, and especially the war in Ukraine, brought about new questions. As this report is being finalised, at the beginning of June 2022, it is yet uncertain how the looming risks of food insecurity, inflation and economic instability, energy shortages, or even the risk of a nuclear escalation will evolve. In this Report, we have aimed to address the questions that arose, and added texts on food security and refugee crises, while maintaining the integrity of the review process and addressing the questions that were put forward in the original request, formulated in a scoping paper.1 But we realise that the world is likely to have changed by the time this report is published. Therefore, the Evidence Review Report focuses on the generic principles and frameworks for strategic crisis management that are relevant to the role of the EU. Since the type and nature of crises that the EU will be confronted with is changing, we especially focused on transboundary, compound, and protracted crises — which conventionally receive less attention. This turn towards complex and longer-term crises also required us to embed strategic crisis management in the context of risk and resilience. Crises are complex and have implications for virtually all areas of our societies: from governance to infrastructure, from economics to health, from environment to ethics. One of the unique features of this review report is that it brings together a broad range of disciplines. This review is grounded on evidence from the social and behavioural 1 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/research_and_innovation/groups/sam/scoping-paper_ crisis-management-in-the-eu_june_2021.pdf 10 sciences, engineering, resilience, (public) health, law, and environmental sciences. This interdisciplinary approach is crucial to develop effective policy options. I would like to thank the members of the working group. As we were writing about how to manage crises, we were collectively managing the repercussions of the covid-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine. Working group members were subject to lockdowns, had to juggle care responsibilities, made ad-hoc shifts to online education, and were welcoming family or refugees that had to flee Ukraine. Yet because of a shared sense of urgency, and despite the tight timeline of the report, the members of the group made an impressive contribution by dedicating their precious time to this effort. Even though, throughout the process, they never had a chance to meet in person, I was impressed by the constructive atmosphere, mutual respect despite diverging views, and their willingness to learn from each other. Professor Tina Comes Chair of the Working Group 11 12 Executive summary Crises like climate change, the recent pandemic and the war in Ukraine have a profound effect on all of us. Crises are growing in number, severity and complexity, and at an accelerating pace. The connectedness of European societies increases their vulnerability, and today’s crises have multiple cascading and rippling effects that can extend to all parts of society, the economy and environment. The need for effective strategic crisis management is evident and, given the increasingly transboundary nature of crises, the EU has emerged as an important player. Crisis management can be highly sectoral and not always geared to effective performance over the long term, especially when crises become protracted. The consequences of failed or ineffective crisis management can be severe, with rising inequalities and negative impacts such as political fragmentation, societal polarisation and economic disruption. Recent crises have illustrated starkly the need for preparation, improved capacity and resources. This Evidence Review Report is designed to address issues described in the scoping paper,1 which sets out the formal request for advice from the European College of Commissioners to the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors to the European Commission. This report synthesises the evidence in response to the main question from the scoping paper: Based on a broad and multidisciplinary understanding, how can the EU improve its strategic crisis management? This report focuses on the strategic level, involving those decision-makers and policymakers who are responsible and accountable for the outcome of a crisis. During the response phase in particular, strategic issues are often neglected because of the urgent need to act and react. For a response to be effective, it is essential to develop rapid decision-making capabilities and appropriate resources. Although crises are all different in terms of their type, duration and governance arrangements, there are underlying principles that are common to their management. This report identifies fundamental generic principles and frameworks that relate to the roles played by the EU in strategic crisis management. It provides concrete examples of past and ongoing crises, reflecting on trends and developments in the field. Importantly, it embeds strategic crisis management within the context of risk and resilience. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/research_and_innovation/groups/sam/scoping-paper_ crisis-management-in-the-eu_june_2021.pdf 13 Summary of chapters The main chapters of this report are as follows: 1, p.20, provides the introduction to this report, setting out both purpose and framing. It emphasises that the report is based on a synthesis of multidisciplinary evidence from academia and practice, rooted in the areas of crisis, risk and resilience. It sets out a taxonomy of crises, based on scale (magnitude and frequency), hazard (type of crisis), time (onset and duration) and governance level (local, national or transboundary). 2, p.38, sets out the concepts that are characteristic of strategic crisis management and provides an overarching framework to embed them within the context of risk and resilience. The chapter provides concise definitions for each of the main concepts, showing where and how they are linked. The framework integrates the crisis and risk management cycle into a consolidated overview that demonstrates how crisis and risk management capacities, practices and mechanisms can be organised. Finally, this chapter emphasises the importance of building response diversity and resilience across different sectors. 3, p.65, focuses on EU crisis governance and management. The chapter sets out the EU’s current competencies, capabilities and mechanisms for addressing crises of various types, both within and outside the EU. In recent years, the EU has continued to invest its crisis management capacities in different sectors, and the report identifies recent EU initiatives in areas like health, finance, climate change and data governance. Over the years, bridges have been built to connect capacities, and there is an emphasis on enhanced information management, risk detection and communication of early warnings. Given the rise of systemic, interconnected and transboundary crises, it makes sense for the EU to continue to invest in information- based tools and capacities. The rise of transboundary crises may increase public expectations that the EU will invest in building and strengthening transboundary crisis management capacities. 4, p.87, considers risk management for the EU, examining the evidence for the improved integration of risk management within crisis management practice. This approach is based on the rationale that effective, systemic and anticipatory risk management is key to crisis preparedness and resilience. Instead of traditional approaches to risk classification, the chapter puts forward a new taxonomy of risks, clustering them into four main groups: 1. system breakdown 2. globally pervasive risks 3. socially induced risks 4. amplifier risks 14 The chapter then looks at risk perception, closely linked to risk communication. Based on the evidence, the chapter provides an assessment of EU risk governance, acknowledging the long tradition of EU risk assessment, reduction and management. At the same time, it suggests that existing procedures and associated tools may be insufficient for handling systemic, complex risks. A systems approach to risk governance is required. 5, p.111, addresses ways to improve science advice during crises. It covers three main areas: » the function of science advice, especially during a crisis » the needs of policymakers » ways of improving science advice Three core functions of science advice are identified, each with its strengths and shortcomings, but collectively complementing one another. Five basic needs of policymakers are then described: enlightenment, orientation, strategic planning, integration and knowledge co-creation. The chapter highlights how science advice may be used in a crisis situation, identifying what the challenges are and how these might be addressed. It emphasises that preparation is key, with a number of ways forward for strengthening the policy-science nexus for crisis management. The emphasis should be bringing together different sources of expertise and knowledge into a network, creating shared spaces for discourse between EU and regional bodies and actors. Crises have a profound impact on societies, and 6, p.129, covers equality, trust and participation during crises in Europe. The chapter underlines that equality, trust and participation are closely interlinked. Inequalities are wide-ranging (for example, income, age, gender, ethnicity and more), and crises disproportionately impact people with low income and wealth. Policies and actions need to be adapted to the diverse realities encountered on the ground. Public trust is key in crisis response and beyond; building trust is a long-term investment that pays off during times of crisis, yet can be lost quickly if the public view crisis response as leading to increased inequality. One way to increase trust is by improving public participation and engagement. While there are many potential challenges to social media or information and communication technologies that are discussed in other chapters, here, we highlight that using these technologies for improving participation, such as via citizen-based forums, can be a potent means of strengthening crisis management. The model of analytic–deliberative participation is proposed as one of the most promising ways of developing an integrative approach, based on engagement with experts, stakeholders and the general public. 7, p.172, covers information, data and intelligence for crisis management. It suggests that a potential role for the EU would be to support local and regional 15 capacities in using scenarios for prevention and preparedness, employing strategic foresight across different regions and administrative levels. The chapter considers approaches to decision support that are especially useful during the crisis preparedness phase, such as safety and security risk assessments, expert judgement and statistical early-warning signals. Emphasis is given to collaborative resilience — that is, the ability of a community to prepare for, respond to and recover from a crisis. The chapter underlines that sensemaking and situational awareness can provide an accurate overview of a crisis situation. It suggests that existing EU platforms should be able to integrate feedback loops and should also focus on information quality — timeliness, accuracy, relevance, completeness, and consistency. The chapter outlines the broad range of training tools available, pointing out a lack of comparable standards, curricula and evaluation criteria. On data harmonisation, it proposes that EU data strategies be extended to meet the special quality requirements for data- driven, cross-border crisis management, facilitating access while also safeguarding data privacy. The chapter acknowledges the initiatives currently being prepared at European level, including the establishment of a Joint Cyber Unit by 2023. 8, p.207, translates the report’s findings into concrete case studies, following the methodology suggested in the scoping paper: » Wildfire management is of increasing global concern, and the EU has developed strategies to respond to these new threats. Evidence suggests that greater efforts should be made for risk reduction and recovery, and that the EU Civil Protection Mechanism should become a more integrated system, interoperable with other existing mechanisms. » Deliberate biothreats pose a significant and growing threat to global security. The EU in becoming better prepared to respond to cross-border health emergencies, as well dealing with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents and attacks. The case study highlights the importance of alignment with international information, regulations and guidelines from, for example, the WHO, member states, organisations at different levels, and EU actors. Raising awareness and increasing legislative oversight on dual-use research is crucial. » Enhanced and increasingly ubiquitous information and communication technologies (ICT) offer unprecedented capabilities but also create new risks, with smart environments introducing new cyber vulnerabilities. Cyberthreats have become a real concern and ransomware a prime threat. Cyberwarfare has also become a serious concern. Fast and effective data exchange is paramount, with trustworthy ICT a cornerstone of successful crisis preparedness and response. Stepping up cyber-defence requires a multi-dimensional effort, and the EU has built up cooperation among several services. A renewed and multidisciplinary approach, with a broader, more proactive view and an increased emphasis 16 on preventive measures and an effective response, can contribute to better- protected networked systems. » The case of displaced populations is ongoing and of particular concern. This case study reviews past refugee crises to identify important lessons. The EU has activated a temporary protection directive to deal with the war in Ukraine, and this instrument provides a great basis for dealing with a sudden influx of displaced populations, even if long-term social integration remains a challenge. Principles of solidarity among member states are important so as to avoid overwhelming some states, yet this is difficult to achieve. In the longer run, no robust mechanism is in place to avoid a state of ‘permanent temporariness’ for displaced populations. Evidence suggests that well-developed contingency planning, with the application of the precautionary principle, is key. Good information systems need to be in place that allow authorities to plan for adequate capacities and resources, although data ownership, privacy and data protection raise serious concerns. Here, the EU — which has been spearheading data protection and privacy initiatives — could have a strong role to play. While each crisis comes with its own sectoral specificities, many of these crises overlap. Each case also illustrates the proportions that each sectoral crisis can take, which inevitably calls for a broader and more integrated approach to risk and crisis management. The EU needs to have mechanisms in place to coordinate and manage these and other ongoing risks and crises at the same time. These case studies call for: » increasing coordination and alignment with other levels of governance, which is especially relevant for transboundary crises » increasing capacity in prevention and preparedness » improving information and data These conclusions are in line with the conclusions reached in previous chapters of the report. In the concluding 9, p.240, the report warns that Europe is likely to face crises of increasing frequency, magnitude and duration. This also implies that crises and risks are increasingly co-occurring, as crises are becoming more protracted and transboundary in nature with serious cascading effects on society, the economy and the environment, that likely hit the most vulnerable people hardest. Although the EU was never intended or designed as a crisis manager, it has been growing into this role in recent decades. The EU has developed a range of instruments and mechanisms that have been continuously adapted over successive crises. Yet the increasingly transboundary nature of crises may raise expectations and provide opportunities for the EU to fulfil the role of facilitating coordination between member states, providing a flexible and cross-sectoral response, in concert with strong local capacities that can safeguard the functioning of society and the economy. A further role for the EU 17 in strategic crisis management could be in training and setting standards that guide risk management, decision-making and information-sharing. This explicitly targets not only the typical training of civil protection services, but those decision-makers and policymakers that need to rapidly make strategic decisions when responding to crises. New forms of ICT may increase risk of misinformation or cybersecurity, but also offer ways by which to engage citizens and empower them in preparation for and management of crises. Protracted (long-term) crises can blur the lines between risk and crisis management. They require an integrated vision and the effective coordination of activities and organisations across all phases of the risk and crisis management cycle. Crisis management techniques and decision support tools are most useful when tailored to the complexity and context of a given situation, providing flexibility and supporting (rapid) adaptation. At the same time, there is a need and unique opportunity given the progress in technology development to develop data preparedness protocols, harmonised data standards and clear information management guidelines. Evidence-based policy options This report puts forward a range of policy options, drawn from the evidence. They cover three main areas. In the area of governance and institutions: Consideration could be given to establishing a European risk and crisis governance board or body. This could help to monitor and analyse risks and crises, develop common approaches for transboundary impacts, offer training and capacity building, and oversee the science-policy interface. It could provide guidance to more flexible, decentralised units that are closer to the locations or sectors in which crisis management is needed. Cross-disciplinary risk management taskforces, situated within existing European institutions, could assess, monitor and regulate the physical, financial, and governance links between different risk domains. An EU-wide information and communication taskforce could respond and engage the public as soon as a potential crisis arises and counter the impact of mis- or disinformation. The science-policy nexus for crisis and risk management could be strengthened. This could include a reform of the EU science advisory system for crisis and risk management. 18 In the area of resilience, preparedness and capacity-building: The development of new cross-sectoral risk assessment protocols and standards could take into account hitherto unconsidered impacts of crises, such as their duration, indirect and long-term effects, the distribution of impacts, welfare and wellbeing. Learning and training are vital for crisis preparedness, and there is an opportunity to improve decision-support capabilities of all decision-makers. European standards could be developed that evaluate the impact of crisis management training. To strengthen public participation, training could be provided to crisis management authorities and emergency responders on how to coordinate and manage their interaction with volunteers. Standards could be set on data sharing and guidance to (digital) volunteers to help them understand the context in which they are operating. The EU can also spearhead privacy efforts by developing and setting standards to ensure compliance with GDPR and address the question of data ownership. Monitoring and engagement with social media can be used to understand public sentiment, trust, and risk perception. There is an opportunity to establish formal or informal consultation mechanisms as a means of fostering participation in the preparedness and recovery phases of transboundary crises — promoting trust, equality and empowerment. In the area of intelligence, technology and data: An EU-wide dynamic risk radar methodology and monitoring protocol could provide early indicators of crisis and improve overall preparedness for transboundary systemic risks. Strategic foresight and improved intelligence could be connected to concrete scenario and contingency planning for enhanced decision-support. Harmonised standards for data preparedness and data sharing could be developed. 19 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe 1. Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe 1.1. Summary This chapter provides the introduction to this Evidence Review Report, and sets out the frame and purpose. The report’s aim is to inform the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors to the European Commission by providing evidence to answer the questions put forward in the scoping paper:2 Based on a broad and multidisciplinary understanding, how can the EU improve its strategic crisis management? The Scoping Paper formulates the formal joint request for advice from the Commissioner for Research and Innovation and the Commissioner for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid to the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors (see Annex 2 for information about the background on this report). The focus on European strategic crisis management implies that the Evidence Review targets the policymakers and decision-makers who are responsible for facilitating and coordinating crisis management across the member states, rather than providing operational guidelines. This report warns that crises are becoming increasingly frequent, complex, protracted and compound in nature. As such, they can cascade into other sectors, regions, and nations, making them transboundary. For policymakers, overlapping ‘polycrises’ will be characteristic of the future. This trend also implies that the conventional lines between crises, risk and resilience is becoming blurred. Therefore, this report is based on multidisciplinary evidence from academia and practice rooted in the areas of crisis, risk and resilience. Although there are many different types of crises, there are underlying principles that are common to managing them. This chapter sets out a taxonomy of crises, based on scale (magnitude and frequency), hazard (type of crisis), time (onset and duration) and governance level (local, national or transboundary). The report identifies generic principles based on the crisis taxonomy, while reflecting on the most pressing trends and 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/research_and_innovation/groups/sam/scoping-paper_ crisis-management-in-the-eu_june_2021.pdf 20 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe developments in strategic crisis management as far as possible, given that this report was finalised in June 2022. 1.2. Ambitions and aims The war in Ukraine and the resulting human suffering has shaken our societies to the core. The possible threat of nuclear warfare, the sanctions with their widespread economic consequences, the implications for energy autonomy and food safety, millions of refugees fleeing the war, and looming inflation highlight once more the need for effective crisis management. And the Ukraine war is not the only crisis that confronts policymakers. The covid-19 pandemic was still raging when this report was written, and monkeypox is a reminder that the threat of other pandemics remains present. The latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022), on the impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability to climate change, paints a dire picture of future climate crises. The cascading effects associated with these three parallel crises range from political fragmentation and societal polarisation, driven by misinformation and cyberwar, economic disruptions and geopolitical shifts. They underline the need to urgently replace ageing infrastructure systems, accelerate the transition to a sustainable economy, reduce dependence and increase autonomy. As a result, this report is written with a sense of urgency, as we witness the enormous suffering associated with the unfolding conflict and war; the arrival of refugees from Ukraine; the challenges of coordinating covid-19 response strategies and lockdowns across different countries, even though the benefits and the costs were known (Goniewicz et al, 2020); the deep effects of the covid-19 pandemic that ripple through health, economic, social, educational, and environmental systems; and the looming threats of increasing climate and environmental crises. Any crisis has several levels. At the operational level, emergency responders and volunteers set up emergency shelters, dispatch ambulances, organise call centres, and transport goods to where they are needed. However, the focus of this report is on the strategic level. Strategic crisis management is designed to facilitate and orchestrate crisis management across all phases of the crisis management cycle, including preparedness, response, and recovery. As such, it concerns the decision-makers and policymakers who are ultimately responsible and accountable for strategic direction, and the outcomes of a crisis. Therefore, this report does not present checklists, guidelines or a ‘cookbook’ on how to better organise the operational crisis response. Rather, it focuses on the broader strategic and policy issues in the context of crises, risk and resilience. 21 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe Because there is such a vast range of crises and member states, it is impossible to list each possible crisis and its consequences, or to discuss and compare how the response may unfold in each member state. At the time of finalising this report (early June 2022), the war in Ukraine is still ongoing, yet the full implications of the war, such as inflation and economic recession, energy shortages, and the massive risk of food insecurity, go beyond the scope of the present report and are not yet covered by (scientific) evidence. We have chosen to ensure the integrity of the evidence review process and retain the initial mandate of the scoping paper, while providing additions and adjustment to reflect the most urgent developments wherever possible. Although the types of crises are different, and we cannot predict what the most pressing questions will be once this report is published, there are underlying principles that are common to managing crises. These principles pertain to: crisis governance, coordination, and management resilience, risk management and preparedness science-policy advice equality, trust, and participation data, foresight and intelligence Therefore, in this report, we analyse how to prepare for and respond to different types of risks and crises. We focus on the European level and how the EU helps facilitate and orchestrate crisis management, given the heterogeneity of crisis response mechanisms and respect for the subsidiarity principle. While we identify generic fundamental principles, we also provide concrete examples and applications of both past and ongoing crises wherever possible, and reflect on the most pressing trends and developments in strategic crisis management. Importantly, crisis management must contend with increasingly complex and compound crises. While traditional crisis management has been largely concerned with local or sectoral crises, decision-makers and governments must increasingly ready themselves for threats that emerge in faraway domains and manifest themselves in unsuspected ways. Hitherto smaller events or crises can cascade into other sectors, regions, and national countries. In other words, crises are becoming transboundary in nature (Boin, 2019). Moreover, they are harder to manage as they evolve within complex and deeply interconnected systems (Perrow, 1984; Renn & Lucas, 2021). A series of cascading effects occurring at different timescales has the potential to lead systems towards amplifying feedback loops that eventually result in large-scale disasters (Helbing, 2009). As the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates, crises that happen outside of the European Union can also have severe implications for and within the EU, calling for humanitarian interventions and external assistance, as well as managing the cascading effects within and for the EU. 22 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe While we are confronted with increasingly complex crises, modern societies are heavily dependent on the continuous smooth functioning of complex socioeconomic, technical, and environmental systems (Aarestrup, Bonten, & Koopmans, 2021; Comes & Van de Walle, 2014; Helbing, Ammoser, & Kühnert, 2006; Helbing & Kühnert, 2003). Yet crisis management arrangements still tend to be sectoral, giving rise to a fragmented governance system (Den Uyl & Russel, 2018; Morsut & Kruke, 2018) that is prone to the so-called Robinson Crusoe syndrome (‘we are alone on an island’). There is a vast body of literature that describes the shortcomings of brittle or unclear coordination structures (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Comes, Van de Walle, & Van Wassenhove, 2020a; Comfort, 2004), the difficulty of making decisions under tremendous uncertainty in very volatile conditions and under time pressure (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 2010; Mendonça, Jefferson, & Harrald, 2007; Turoff, Chumer, Van de Walle, & Yao, 2004; Van de Walle, Brugghemans, & Comes, 2016), and the challenges of communicating risk (Renn, 2008). The covid-19 pandemic has laid bare the many barriers and shortcomings that prohibit a timely, effective and legitimate response to a transboundary crisis. The response has revealed a lack of preparedness, especially in the most vulnerable communities. Moreover, it has illustrated the difficulties of working across borders and coordinating response efforts to jointly manage a protracted crisis that now is well into its third year. Crisis management arrangements do not seem to be geared towards long-term performance, even though the boundary between crises and complex policy problems begins to blur over time. Now, with the war in Ukraine, we are potentially confronted with another long-term protracted crisis with dire consequences, even though these consequences are hard to foresee. As the pandemic inevitably collides with other crises, leading to an increasing risk of compound crises (Kruczkiewicz et al, 2021), new challenges continue to emerge. For instance, how can refugees who are fleeing a war be protected from (spreading) a pandemic? How can European healthcare systems be prepared to deal with the potential double-shock of a combined epidemic and a climate disaster such as a flood — as witnessed in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany in July 2021? Meanwhile, the 2020 State & Trends report by the Global Center for Adaptation3 (2020, p.2) states that “the pandemic is eroding recent progress in building climate resilience, leaving countries and communities more vulnerable to future shocks”. The response to one crisis can also amplify the impact of future crises and lead to polycrises, in which decision-makers are confronted with multiple, mutually reinforcing challenges (Zeitlin et al, 2019). Because of the increasing protracted, compound and polycrises, the traditional lines of division between risk management and crisis management blur. Rather, recognising, 3 https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GCA-State-and-Trends-Report-2020-Online.pdf 23 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe preventing and managing the risks that one crisis may bring for another sector or region over time becomes of paramount importance for strategic crisis management. Therefore, this report goes beyond the traditional crisis management literature and discusses the interplay of crises, risk management and resilience. Our overarching framework on how to tie together crisis, risk and resilience is presented in 2, p.38. At a societal level, the consequences of failed or ineffective crisis management can be severe. Crises invariably amplify existing inequalities, leading to disaster injustice (Parthasarathy, 2018; Patel et al, 2020). If leaders do not explicitly address social inequalities, then trust in public institutions and political leaders arguably erode (Everett et al, 2021) and societal fragmentation may further increase (Zeemering, 2021; see also 6 of the present report). Lack of trust, fragmentation and polarisation in turn decrease social resilience and therefore leave us less prepared for future crises and disasters (see 6.4, p.146). There has been hope that new information and communication technologies (ICT) can help us improve crisis and disaster management, by providing better information in real- time to those who need it (Comes, Meesters, & Torjesen, 2019; Crowley & Chan, 2010; Mahajan et al, 2022). Accordingly, a range of information and data analytics tools have been developed to support European policymakers in dealing with crises, ranging from the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System to the new Risk Data hub launched in 2022 by the European Commission’s Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre. Yet the proverbial ‘infodemic’, the increasing threats of cyberwarfare and the use of technology as a weapon to destabilise countries have also highlighted the downsides of information technology. ICT has accelerated the spread of lies and rumours, which now spread quicker than facts (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018), thereby eroding trust and hampering an efficient response. The war in Ukraine and the covid-19 crisis have starkly illustrated the need for better preparation, improved capacity, and resources to respond at an EU level. In response to the Ukraine war, the challenge has been to mobilise humanitarian support, organise joint sanctions and the supply of weapons, and wean Europe off its dependence on Russian oil and gas. In response to covid-19, Europe faced critical shortages of resources, capacities and supplies, from hospital beds and critical supplies to procurement, logistics and planning capacity; from the capacity to rapidly mobilise financial resources to the flexibility to reorganise life as we know it. In this report, we review research findings to provide an overview of the evidence on the status quo and suggest potential policy options to improve strategic crisis management in Europe. This report focuses on evidence that demonstrates the effectiveness (or lack of) and the impact of different concrete policies or actions in the different areas outlined by the 24 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe scoping paper. We present an integrated perspective that consolidates and combines knowledge and evidence across a broad range of domains and disciplines. This chapter has outlined the scope of this Evidence Review Report, its purpose within the European Commission’s Scientific Advice Mechanism, and its focus on strategic crisis management of the EU. It has also emphasised the urgency of the questions that we seek to address. This report offers a scientific perspective on the state of the art with regards to strategic crisis management, to inform the Group of Chief Science Advisors in their formulation of a Scientific Opinion for policymakers. Yet at the time of writing this report — between October 2021 and May 2022 — the policy focus and thereby also the requests to the Working Group shifted from an ERR that provided deeper lessons to the covid-19 response to the currently still ongoing war in Ukraine and the many cascading effects that are yet expected. As outlined above, we decided to ensure the integrity of the review process and answer the questions that were set out in the scoping paper with the best available evidence to date. Furthermore, we provided additions on specific challenges such as refugees and food security wherever possible. In order to provide a robust review of the available evidence, we brought together a broad range of experts from different backgrounds, drawing from multiple sources of evidence. Reflecting the complexity of the field and the breadth of questions provided in the scoping papers, we included a total of more than 800 references in this report. But fields such as crisis management, risk or resilience have led to vast bodies of literature that go beyond our mandate. Therefore, our report represents a rapid synthesis of the most urgent questions that were posed, rather than a full and systematic literature review of crisis management. This required us to make choices and select specific areas that we deemed best suited to address the requests brought forward. In addition, this report also highlights ambiguities, uncertainties, and knowledge gaps that we identified to inform future actions. Our first reference point for this review report was the academic peer-reviewed literature, as published in journal articles and book chapters. But, as we are also invited to reflect on the current practices of crisis management, and as our goal is to inform policymaking, we reviewed past, current and upcoming EU policies and guidelines, with support from the Cardiff European Documentation Centre and most recent updates provided by the Secretariat of the Scientific Advice Mechanism in the European Commission. Furthermore, we reflect on best practices and recommendations from various international organisations such as the UN (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction), the World Bank, the OECD and the IPCC. Especially for the definition of core concepts (2) and the reflection on risk management and crisis governance (1 and 4), this approach has been instrumental. This pragmatic stance on what constitutes evidence also allowed us to 25 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe include evidence about emerging crises or trends that are not yet published in peer- reviewed sources. 1.3. Future trends and threats: Challenges for strategic crisis management in the EU Humanity has been confronted with risk, emergencies, and crises big and small throughout history. But there are several environmental, social, technological trends and developments that have changed fundamentally the type and nature of the risks and crises that we will confront in the future. The World Economic Forum (2022) Global Risks Report anticipates that the likely high-impact risks over the next decade include climate action failure and extreme weather events, the erosion of social cohesion, infectious diseases and livelihood crises, as well as geo-economic confrontations and debt crises. Interestingly, scientists rank both the likelihood and the impact of these crises significantly higher than the WEF respondents, painting an even more dire picture of the situation (Future Earth, 2021). The following images present evidence of the impacts of disasters. First, Figure 1 provides an overview of the registered natural disasters globally between 1980 and 2019. Important spikes are noticeable in the most recent decades, with a growing trend in meteorological and hydrological events. 26 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe Figure 1. Natural disasters on the rise around the globe Source: https://www.statista.com/chart/22686/number-of-natural-disasters-globally/ Looking ahead, the G20 Risk Atlas for Europe (Spano et al, 2021) provides an overview of assessed economic impact for the EU under different climate scenarios. For instance, the duration of urban heatwaves is expected to increase by 1247% (i.e., more than 12-fold) by 2050, and significant GDP losses which range from 1.5% of the EU’s GDP by 2050 and up to a 4.7% GDP loss under a high emission scenario. The Joint Research Centre’s PESETA IV report (Feyen et al, 2020) further specifies the expected economic losses in different macro-regions and for different types of climate- related events (Figure 2). 27 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe Figure 2. Welfare loss from considered climate impacts for the EU and the UK Source: PESETA IV Report, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c707e646- 99b7-11ea-aac4-01aa75ed71a1/language-en As stated previously, the overall increase in crises and risks that European policymakers will be confronted with goes beyond the climate sector. Overlapping polycrises will be characteristic for the future of crisis management, and there will be a stress on crisis management capacity. For instance, as shown in Figure 3 (which covers the period up to 2020 and so does not include the impact of the Ukraine war), Europe will be confronted with a growing number of refugees and displaced people. Figure 3. People forced to flee worldwide, 2012–2022 Source: UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/ 28 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe In this report, we focus on three overarching trends that pose significant challenges and require a fundamental change in the way the EU prepare for and manage risks and crises: Increasing frequency and severity of hazardous events. The climate is changing, and we are beginning to see the consequences in terms of more extreme events. The IPCC (2021) report confirms that every region on the planet is seeing increasing changes, with far-reaching implications for flooding, changing rainfall patterns, coastal water and heatwaves. The latest IPCC (2022) report stresses that cumulative stressors and extreme events are projected to increase in magnitude and frequency, and will accelerate the loss of livelihoods, flooding, drought risk and food insecurity. At the same time, the changing climate also threatens our biodiversity, affecting especially marine ecosystems — and the people who rely on them. Given the pace and magnitude of these changes, we are also in uncharted territory in terms of the scope and severity of the disasters that will confront us. Increasing vulnerability. A variety of drivers increase our vulnerability, ranging from increasing urbanisation and ever more dense cities — especially in low-lying areas — to increasing pressure and physical stress on ageing infrastructure systems, and the dependence on globalised supply chains. To manage and address these challenges, decision-makers and infrastructure providers alike have turned to a plethora of ‘smart’ systems. They now influence virtually every aspect of modern living — from smart energy systems to smart health systems, intelligent houses, mobility and intelligent traffic control. Paradoxically, the increasing ubiquity of ICT can exacerbate the problems that it promises to address, by adding new vulnerabilities. At the same time, paradigms of efficiency, lean management and reliance on global markets have led to a reduction in system redundancies, buffer capacities and response diversity (see 2.5, p.52). Increasing complexity. Overall, the increased vulnerability of systems, and the increased frequency and severity of crises and disasters, is related to their increased complexity and often global interconnectedness. In tightly coupled systems that are highly complex, local disruptions can cause unprecedented cascading or rippling effects, making it increasingly hard to contain crises geographically and sectorally (Perrow, 1984). Most systems are now networks, or even networks of networks, which promotes cascading effects (Helbing, 2013). Combined with delayed responses to perturbations (i.e. deviation from the normal state) and amplifying feedback effects, it implies that the nature of systemic problems is so ‘wicked’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973) that there are limitations to our ability to predict and control the crises that arise. These systemic considerations are not accommodated by existing risk management and planning methods. Whereas in the past we were able to contain crises to a specific critical infrastructure or region, nowadays more systems across a larger area are likely to be affected. Furthermore, the systemic crises of the future are likely to have long-term effects 29 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe on society, public health, the economy and the environment. For instance, there is ample research to show that the covid-19 pandemic is affecting progress on all UN Sustainable Development Goals (e.g. Ahmed et al, 2020). The pandemic also amplifies existing inequalities, both within EU member states as well as across member states, and globally. 1.4. Taxonomies of crises and focus of the report As outlined above, the focus of this report is on strategic crisis management, and the role of the EU in facilitating and coordinating it. To further distinguish the different types of crises and help focus the report, given the plethora of crises that the EU and its member states may or might be confronted with, crisis typologies can be of help. Crisis scholars and practitioners have a long tradition of developing typologies of crises to understand the underlying mechanisms and provide advice on how to prepare and respond adequately. Here, we discuss four such typologies, based on scale, hazard, time and governance level. These definitions provide the basis on which to scope the types of crises where the EU, as an overarching organisation, can bring the most added value with respect to its member states — and this is the focus of this report. Magnitude and frequency of a crisis Crises can be of different magnitudes and frequencies, ranging from frequently recurring smaller emergencies (Tennakoon, Serrao-Neumann, & Hanna, 2021; Vargas-Florez, Lauras, & Comes, 2021) to rare large-scale disasters or catastrophes (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, Van Wassenhove, Pérez, & Wachtendorf, 2012). Hazard Traditional reviews on crisis management (Kuipers & Welsh, 2017) tend to distinguish between different types of hazards/threats, such as extreme weather, terrorism, pandemics, cybersecurity and so on. Sometimes, a simpler and more direct distinction is made between humanmade and natural hazards. This hazard-based perspective has, over time, made room for the idea that the precise nature of the hazard matters less than the vulnerabilities it can exploit and the impact it generates. Academics and practitioners tend to advocate for a so-called all-hazards approach, meaning that governments should address risk and crisis management problems with approaches that allow for dealing with the wide range of hazards and threats in an integrated manner (Dynes, 1983). 4, p.87, proposes an alternative classification of risks. 30 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe A typical example of such a classification is shown below, adapted from IRGC (2005): Physical agents Social-communicative hazards » ionising radiation » terrorism and sabotage » non-ionising radiation » humiliation, mobbing, stigmatisation » noise (industrial, leisure, etc.) » experimentation with humans (such » kinetic energy (explosion, collapse, as innovative medical applications) etc.) » mass hysteria » temperature (fire, overheating, » psychosomatic syndromes overcooling) Complex and hybrid hazards Chemical agents (combinations) » toxic substances (threshold) » food (chemical and biological) » genotoxic/carcinogenic substances » consumer products (chemical, » environmental pollutants physical, etc.) » compound mixtures » technologies (physical, chemical, etc.) Biological agents » large constructions (buildings, » fungi and algae dams, highways, bridges, etc.) » bacteria » critical infrastructures (physical, » viruses economic, social-organisational, » genetically modified organisms communicative) » other pathogens » natural hazards triggering Natural forces technological accidents (‘natech’) » wind » earthquakes » volcanic activities » drought » flood » tsunamis » (wild)fire » avalanche In this report, we follow an approach — wherever possible — that covers both manmade and natural hazards, and threats of diverse types at onset.4 Where needed, we provide clear distinctions and considerations for the different types of crises that emerge. 4 Also see https://www.ifrc.org/what-disaster 31 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe Time Another element that is conventionally considered to characterise crises and disasters is time. Crises and disasters are characterised according to their onset (slow versus sudden) and their duration. This allows us to distinguish three types: The sudden onset crisis. This is a crisis that that manifests itself from one moment to the other, like an earthquake or explosion. When a crisis of this type is studied, it is usually discovered that there was an incubation period (Turner, 1978), during which the crisis was latent or ignored. Therefore, to decision-makers, this type of crisis typically comes as a surprise. The most prominent examples of sudden onset crises are earthquakes; while we know which regions are prone to earthquakes, it remains extremely hard to predict when and where an earthquake will occur and on which magnitude (Asim et al, 2018). As such, earthquakes often surprise decision-makers, emergency services and affected communities alike — with potentially devastating consequences — especially if emergency services are understaffed or not readily deployed, as shown in the L’Aquila Earthquake in Italy (Alexander, 2010; see also Box 7, p.124). The creeping crisis. This is a crisis that flows from a threat that has been slowly building up over time, accumulating damage potential, in full view of the authorities. The risk of escalation is not understood, not appreciated, or simply ignored (Boin, Ekengren, & Rhinard, 2020). Examples include climate change, anti-microbial resistance and organised crime (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2021). The protracted crisis. This is a crisis that lasts a long time. In the humanitarian domain, protracted crises are defined as situations in which sections of the population face threats over an extended period, with institutions failing to provide adequate support (Russo, Hemrich, Alinovi, & Melvin, 2008). At some point, it may not be clear whether the crisis should still be addressed in terms of crisis but perhaps rather as a wicked policy problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973). While there are many examples of humanitarian emergencies outside of the EU, examples within the EU include covid-19 (Mojifur et al, 2021; Ruktanonchai et al, 2020) and the financial plight of countries struck hard by the 2008 global financial crisis (Brada et al, 2021). Governance level With respect to governance and geographical scale, we distinguish the following types of crises (Tasic & Comes, forthcoming): Local crises play out within the boundaries at a low administrative level, such as a village, city, or region. A local crisis can be geographically located and does not ‘move’ beyond the administrative boundaries. 32 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe Crises within the state unfold within the borders of the nation state. They conventionally prompt a response from local or national emergency services or civil protection units. Examples range from extreme weather events to cyberattacks against individual organisations. If a crisis exceeds the coping capacity of a member state, it may ask help from other member states, which can be coordinated through EU mechanisms. In reality, this rarely happens, but recent cases such as immigration crises, financial crises, and covid-19 have shown that a member state can suddenly become overwhelmed by events and need the collective support of other member states. Transboundary crises affect multiple sectors in multiple states. These crises are not static and go across geographical and sectoral boundaries. We may distinguish: » EU-wide or global large-scale events such as epidemics and pandemics, financial crises, migration crises or large-scale extreme weather events (heatwaves) » transboundary events that occur in border regions, such as radioactive clouds, riverine pollution, or flooding. Both types of events require coordination across countries and between services. While transboundary crises that affect few member states are not likely to overwhelm the response capacity of the EU as a whole and therefore do not threaten to exhaust the EU’s capacities and resources, large-scale (EU-wide or global) crises may strain the capacity to respond and thereby hamper solidarity between countries. Additionally: » External crises occurring outside the EU, but demanding the EU’s involvement. External crises may directly or indirectly affect EU citizens, or may cause cascading effects for the EU. Prominent examples range from the current war in Ukraine, to the Boxing Day 2004 tsunami in Aceh where thousands of tourists from the EU were directly affected. Some crises outside the EU bring about the migration of the fleeing population, such as the ongoing Syrian refugee crises and the war in Ukraine. These crises may also have implications for the disruptions on globalised supply chains and a general shortage of critical resources and supplies (e.g. Thailand floods, 2011; Suez Canal blockage, 2021; Russia-Ukraine war, 2022). In these cases, the EU can, for instance, operate via its External Action Service to protect EU citizens, or provide humanitarian assistance via the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, while it can internally prepare for and respond to the repercussions of the crisis. Importantly, whereas a hazard (such as a flood or an earthquake) often has a clear origin, it is increasingly difficult to confine the impact of a crisis to a specific region or sector. This is often referred to as a cascading effect (Zuccaro et al, 2018) or as trans-sectoral effects (Renn et al, 2020). A crisis may originate in the environmental sector but its impacts might 33 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe extend into the health, financial and political sectors, depending on the interactive links between the original target of the crisis and the interconnected domains. This report is aimed at the EU level. We are especially interested in crises in which the EU has a critical role to play in the preparedness, management and coordination of the crisis. These are: crises that exceed the coping capacity of a single member state crises that directly or indirectly affect more than one member state via cascading and rippling effects (e.g. migration, supply chain disruptions, or disruptions in the mobility of the workforce) crises that occur outside the EU but demand involvement from EU member states 1.5. What is evidence in the context of crises? It is widely recognised that, to be rational, decision-making must be well-informed (Poot et al, 2018). This usually means that it must take account of the evidence of past events and the experience of managing them. As a fully-fledged concept, evidence-based practice originated in medicine (Trinder and Reynolds, 2008). Clinical decisions need to be made in awareness of previous histories of whether procedures worked, what caused particular pathologies and syndromes, and so on. Medicine needed to learn from both its triumphs and its mistakes. Other fields of human endeavour soon adopted the same approach and began systematically marshalling evidence, synthesising and analysing it, and feeding the results into the decision-making process. Evidence-based practice is not simple. The first question to answer is what constitutes evidence (Rycroft-Malone et al, 2004). By definition, it is factual information that can contribute to the solution of a problem. The information must be obtained by objective methods and not introduce any form of deliberate bias into the picture of the problem that it creates. For the better part of a century the compilers of evidence have used the ‘DIKW pyramid’, invented (it is said) by the poet T.S. Eliot. Data and facts constitute the lowest layer. When these are combined, they produce information, a form of low-level, or preliminary, interpretation. Ability to interpret information gives knowledge, in which conclusions are made about the significance of the information. At the top of the pyramid, wisdom constitutes the ability to act — rationally and with justification, of course — on the basis of knowledge (Frické, 2019). 34 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe Figure 4. The DIKW Pyramid Beyond the DIKW pyramid, things start to become complex. Clearly, evidence is the base of the pyramid, and with modern methods such as data mining and supercomputing it has broadened considerably since the pyramid was first conceived in the 1930s. What significance should we attribute to evidence? Evidence of what? Even the most neutral facts require interpretation in order to endow them with meaning. Perhaps the interpretation is subjective or questionable in some way. Not all evidence can be verified and most of it has the character of a sample of reality, not a survey of an entire population of immutable facts. Is the sample a legitimate representation of the wider reality and is the evidence therefore sufficient to form a basis for supporting rational decision-making? This also largely depends on the sample itself. Much political decision-making has a strong ideological basis. In this sense, evidence may be welcomed where it supports the ideology and it may be roundly ignored where it does not. Selective use of evidence is widespread in the process of finding a justification for decisions that are not based on a clear assessment of what is actually happening but instead on a desire to impose a particular ideology or agenda. Hence, evidence may be collected and analysed, but the analysis may not be directed towards making an objective determination on the basis of all the evidence, by comparing and weighing up the relative significance of each factor. Among those who seek to improve disaster risk reduction, ‘evidence-based practice’ has become a rallying call and something of a mantra (Alexander, 2021). Despite the reservations expressed above, it is still an extremely important part of good decision- making in the face of the risk of disasters. Moreover, as research on emergencies, crises and disasters has grown enormously in recent years, there is more and more opportunity to make use of evidence as it is collected and also to base expert judgement upon it. ‘Good practice’ and ‘best practice’ require that experience be gathered, collated and 35 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe interpreted as inspiration for new developments, probably in a different part of the world to that from which the evidence is derived (Aitsi-Selmi et al, 2016). In dealing with evidence for disaster risk reduction, two particular caveats need to be borne in mind. The first is that most disaster data constitute an exceedingly uneven time series. Impacts tend to show extreme ‘spikes’ over time, often combining massively destroyed infrastructure with a surge in need for assistance (Holguín-Veras et al, 2013). This extreme shift in needs, demand, capacity, and human response to the crises, interferes with many conventional and linear planning processes such as moving averages. Many extreme geophysical phenomena, and some anthropogenic ones, have the potential to unleash exceptionally large events, perhaps without sufficient forewarning. The second caveat partly follows from this. Past data and historical time series may not be a reliable guide to what the future holds in store. Vulnerability to extreme events is conditioned by the evolution of human society as well as by the nature of each threat or hazard (Hewitt, 1983). This is highly complex and currently rather unstable. Nevertheless, we know that meteorological extremes are likely to become larger and more frequent. In a world composed of unequal and fragmented human societies, emergent risks such as disease pandemics may cause impacts that are profound and difficult to predict. Modern society is highly dependent on networks and, when these fail, the cascading consequences may be profound (Pescaroli & Alexander, 2016). All of this adds up to a challenge to collect evidence with care and discrimination, analyse it objectively, and advocate for it to be used rationally and honestly. In this process, it is important not to read too much into evidence. Occam’s razor (by William of Occam, 1987/1347) quite rightly states that the explanation of a phenomenon should be the simplest one that is upheld by the evidence. We may treat this as a plea not to ‘overload’ evidence with imagined significance, but to give it its right place in the process of interpreting reality in order to make rational decisions about disaster risk. The use of evidence needs to be transparent, fair and impartial. In the European Union, as elsewhere in the world, there is a pressing need to improve the use of evidence as a support for policymaking and strategic decisions. As Albris et al (2020) noted, there is an abundance of research, experience and therefore evidence. The challenge is to make good use of these things. To begin with, it would help to clarify what constitutes ‘evidence’ in the context of disaster response, preparedness, emergency intervention and recovery. Perhaps standards for the collection, verification and marshalling of evidence could be proposed. Secondly, there is a need to share evidence and, within the constraints of national sovereignty, ensure that decisions are made that effectively tackle international hazards and threats (Migliorini et al, 2019). Thirdly, there is a need to ensure that the decision-making process takes full account of evidence and that the latter is subject to fair, transparent and authoritative evaluation before it is used. 36 Introduction: The need to rethink crisis management in Europe Applied science is ready to serve the process of ensuring public safety (Carabine, 2015). It needs to be utilised. Approach to this Evidence Review Report Even though we cast our net as wide as possible, for some questions brought up in the scoping paper, only limited evidence is available. This especially concerns the question of the impact of regional research at the EU level. Nevertheless, we aim to provide pointers to the existing evidence and present suggestions for the additional research required to answer the questions adequately. This report acts on the premise that there is an urgent and chronic need “to apply the existing fruits of research and development” in crises and disasters (Alexander, 2013, p.847). It is the ambition of this evidence review to synthesise the state-of-the- art in crisis and disaster management and make accessible the insights and crucial findings from disaster and crisis research. Indeed, there is no shortage of analyses and recommendations. Since the 1980s, the professional risk and crisis community has studied the crucial role of social and organisational networks in disasters (Dynes, 1983), and the importance of risk and crisis communication, information flows, decision-making and the development of adaptive coordination structures (Quarantelli, 1988; Turoff et al, 2004). While there is a widespread consensus about the need to improve strategic crisis management, there are of course many questions about how to achieve this. Importantly, there is an ongoing debate around the need for centralisation versus decentralisation that we will highlight throughout the report. In this report, we aim to focus on general principles of risk management, crisis governance and management, intelligence, equality, trust, participation and policy advice, while providing examples to illustrate our findings. Our report concludes with case studies that demonstrate the implications of our results in specific areas, and turn the evidence from the preceding chapters of the report into concrete and actionable findings. We followed the guidance from the scoping paper and explored three major areas: climate change-related crises; cybersecurity crises and digital risks; and health crises. 37 Concepts and frameworks for crisis management 2. Concepts and frameworks for crisis management 2.1. Summary and key messages The scoping paper asks for clear definitions of key terms and their integration into a comprehensive framework. Chapter 2 therefore sets out the concepts that are characteristic of strategic crisis management, and provides an overarching framework that embeds strategic crisis management (focusing on the decision-makers and policymakers who provide strategic leadership) in the context of risk and resilience. To develop the definitions of core concepts, a review team analysed definitions of terms within major policy documents and academic literature. The definitions covered in the Report are: vulnerability; risk; emergency; crisis; disaster; response; resilience; adaptation; absorption; recovery. Chapter 2 provides a brief definition and, where needed, explains the roots of the concept, along with underlying paradigms. It also gives an overview of the dependencies between the different concepts, including overlaps and conflicts With crises that are complex, compound and protracted, the boundaries between the phases can blur, the challenge being to coordinate activities within and across the different phases of the crisis and risk management cycles. Therefore, the Report’s overarching framework integrates the Crisis and risk Management Cycle to an integrative overview that shows how crisis and risk management capacities, practices and mechanisms can be organised. The report’s consolidated framework highlights the interplay between risk, crisis and resilience. Finally, this chapter emphasises the importance of building response diversity and resilience across different sectors. The key messages for Chapter 2 can be summarised as follows: There is a plethora of available scientific knowledge on risk and crisis management that can be further integrated into European policy and practice. European crisis management has to adjust to the increasing importance of transboundary and compound crises. Such crises cannot be contained within specific sectors, geographical regions, or set periods of time. Cascading and rippling effects can affect all parts of society, the economy and environment. More frequent global crises could strain principles of solidarity. The prevalence of compound risks and polycrises blur the lines between risk and crisis management. 38 Concepts and frameworks for crisis management The changing nature of crises requires the EU to re-think conventional — often sectoral — approaches to risk and crisis management. There is a need to capture the dynamics and interdependencies between risks and crises, at different levels and scales. Developing flexible responses to various types of disruptions, many of which can never be exactly determined in advance, means that society can increase its response diversity. Society needs to recognise, value and enable the opportunities a diversity of response options provides. In the presence of cascading effects, crises cannot be controlled within a single sector. Management requires coordination between different sectors and governance levels. To achieve resilience, key principles such as flexibility, redundancy, adaptiveness, diversity, multi-scalarity and self-organisation need to be implemented. Under the pressure of increasing uncertainty, volatility and complexity of modern societies, policy and science have developed key concepts and methods by which to study and support the management of the many crises and emergencies, large and small. We here proceed with a review of the concepts that characterise the crisis event (emergency — crisis — disaster, Chapter 2.2). Herein, we distinguish the phase prior to the event, which focuses on identifying, managing and monitoring risks and reducing vulnerabilities (Chapter 2.3.), from the crisis management which evolves around the capacity to prepare, respond and cope. We relate crisis management to other relevant concepts: resilience — adaptation — absorption — recovery. Yet a closer look into the use of all these terms reveals that their exact meaning is far from clear. In practice, different EU sectoral strategies and policy instruments may use different concepts and terms. This is especially true in the areas of vulnerability and risk (Cardona, 2004; Heckmann, Comes, & Nickel, 2015), and resilience (Elmqvist et al, 2019; Meerow, Newell, & Stults, 2016; Saja, Goonetilleke, Teo, & Ziyath, 2019; Woods, 2015). To provide an overview of the definitions of core concepts mentioned above, a review team was set up by professional staff members of Cardiff University’s Library Services/ Specialist Unit for Evidence Review (SURE) under the guidance of the Working Group Chair to analyse the use of the concepts and terms in key policy documents and the academic literature. The methodology and review process are detailed in Annex 6. In chapters 2.2 and 2.3, we provide a brief definition that is guiding the use of the term throughout this ERR. In addition, where needed, we outline the roots of the concept, along with underlying paradigms and provide an overview of the dependencies between the different concepts, including overlaps and conflicts. From there, we develop an overarching framework that captures the interplay of risk and crisis management in Chapter 2.5, and highlight the need for response diversity and resilience. 39 Concepts and frameworks for crisis management 2.2. Strategic crisis management The various capacities, practices, and mechanisms to respond to crises can be organised according to the crisis management cycle (Figure 5, p.41, right hand side in orange). This cycle tells us what the activities in question focus on. A conventional distinction is made between prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Altay & Green, 2006; French & Geldermann, 2005, Mitroff et al, 1987). Each phase in the crisis management cycle has specific characteristics, in terms of urgency of the decisions, the type and nature of uncertainty, the number of actors involved, and the capacity and resources that can be mobilised, for instance. Conventionally, crisis management focuses on the response phase and is reactive in nature, especially in fast-burning crises, whereas preparedness focuses on the knowledge and capacities to anticipate, respond to, and recover from the impacts of crises via planning, organisation and training (Djalali et al, 2014). In this report, we focus on strategic crisis management of the EU. The strategic management of crises focuses primarily on strategic issues in preparedness, rapid decision-making capability and resources in the response. It also focuses on the extent to which crisis management considerations are integrated into the strategic vision and management of an organisation, and conversely, the integration of strategic issues in the response to and recovery from a crisis (Taneja et al, 2014). This is different from operational crisis management decisions, typically done by emergency services such as firefighters or police. Operational crisis management is concerned with everyday dispatching, scheduling, or maintaining situational oversight. In contrast, strategic crisis management focuses on the decision-makers and policymakers who are responsible and accountable for the outcome of the crisis (Ansell & Boin, 2019). As such, strategic crisis management of the EU aims to facilitate and orchestrate crisis management across member states, sectors and regions. The OECD further stresses the need for strong strategic leadership, as well as a common set of principles and values that ensures that capacities and resources can be mobilised efficiently in crises (Baubion, 2013). As the EU and its member states will be increasingly confronted with complex and transboundary crises, we see here a key role for the EU. Importantly, as we are confronted with complex, compound and protracted crises, the boundaries become blurred between the different phases of crisis management, and between risk management and crisis management. At the time of writing, as the war in Ukraine is entering its fourth month and a heatwave in India has led to an export ban on wheat, we see an increasing risk of food insecurity, energy shortages, inflation and economic recessions. Even though these risks are linked to one or several acute crises, it is important to assess, evaluate, prevent, control and monitor them. 40 Concepts and frameworks for crisis management Figure 5. Integrated risk & crisis management cycles Author: Tina Comes Figure 5 shows our overarching framework for strategic crisis management that highlights the interplay of risk and crisis management: in risk management (left hand side, in blue), the aims are to identify, assess, evaluate and then monitor, control or (ideally) prevent a risk from occurring. We argue that this control and monitoring should be matched by preparedness in the crisis management cycle. For instance, as we see the risks of food insecurity or shortages of oil and gas growing, what can be done to prepare (crisis management cycle, right hand side, orange)? This approach is designed to ensure a faster and more efficient response. As crises are becoming protracted and their longer-term implications are becoming visible, new risks may arise during the response and recovery phases. For instance, the response and recovery from covid-19 has led to an increase in mental health risk,5 which in turn needs to be evaluated, controlled, and monitored. A key challenge across all phases therefore remains overseeing and coordinating activities that are organised in the various phases of the risk and crisis management cycles, for the different and interdependent crises and risks with which the EU is confronted. Yet conventionally, crisis and risk management, as well as the activities pertaining to different types of crises, are often delegated to different organisations. Because of the interdependencies outlined in Figure 5, this report is not structured into the different phases of the crisis management cycle. Instead, in the subsequent chapters, we highlight the implications across and within the different phases of the 5 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2022/697217/EPRS_STU(2022)697217_ EN.pdf 41 Concepts and frameworks for crisis management crisis management cycle and we will also argue for a further integration of risk and crisis management in Europe. 2.3. Before the onset: From vulnerability and risk to emergency, crisis, disaster While ‘emergency’, ‘crisis’ and ‘disaster’ may often be used interchangeably in everyday language, or even in academic articles, they have distinct meanings and differentiate between scope, scale and nature. To understand crises, it is also important to understand how they arise. Conventionally, vulnerabilities create risks that — when unaddressed — can develop into crises, often initiated by a triggering event or series of events (see Figure 6, p.43). In the following, we first provide the core definitions along with some prototypical examples of such events, and then discuss the major differences and similarities between them from the point of view of policymakers and decision-makers. Importantly, within some member states, all or some of these concepts might legally enable the use of particular emergency powers, enabling emergency management organisations or giving access to particular financial instruments. Particularly in the context of federal member states, the relationship in crisis between state and federal competences are often tied to such threshold concepts as ‘disaster’, ‘major crisis’, ‘state of emergency’ or ‘calamity’. The use of such concepts will often be dependent on definitions within particular domains of regulation (e.g. nuclear, pollution or cyber), and thus not something defined across regulations even within the same jurisdiction (Lauta, 2015; Guttry et al, 2012; Lyster, 2015). While this is important to bear in mind, it does not make it less relevant to create a coherent use of such concepts in an EU context. Furthermore, even where definitions seem similar, the actual application might vary substantially (Orru et al, 2021). 42 Concepts and frameworks for crisis management Figure 6. From vulnerability and risk to emergency, crisis and disaster Author: Tina Comes Risk: a central concept A central concept in this section is the notion of ‘risk’, which then leads to crises, emergencies or disasters. Since the term ‘risk’ has been used in different sectors, there is a multitude of definitions and applications. Because of its central role, we give here an overview of the different strands of the risk literature before then providing a concise definition. As decision-makers have been confronted with risk in many different contexts and sectors, there is a plethora of approaches to measuring and managing risk, for instance also put forward by the Society for Risk Analysis:6 In finance, ‘risk’ is conventionally defined as the fluctuation around the expected value of return, or — more broadly — a

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