AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 PDF

Administrative Changes to AFPAM 10-219, Volume 3, Civil Engineer Contingency Response and Recovery Procedures OPR: AFCEC/CXX References throughout to “AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operation,” are hereby changed to “AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program.” 3 June 2016 BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 10-219 VOLUME 3 OF THE AIR FORCE 7 MAY 2015 Incorporating Change 1, 15 DECEMBER 2015 Operations CIVIL ENGINEER CONTINGENCY RESPONSE AND RECOVERY PROCEDURES COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at www.e-Publishing.af.mil for downloading or ordering RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication OPR: AFCEC/CXX Certified by: AF/A4CX (Col James S. Griffin) Supersedes: AFPAM 10-219, Volume 3, Pages: 140 9 June 2008 This volume provides information and guidance for the execution of civil engineer (CE) contingency recovery activities. It describes procedures for a rapid transition from routine, day- to-day operations to an emergency response posture. Using the disaster and attack planning and preparation measures of Volumes 1 and 2 as its basis, this volume addresses how CE executes tasks to ensure recovery and continued operation of the installation during and after a crisis. This publication applies to all Air Force (AF) active, Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard CE units. This pamphlet implements Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-210, Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF) Program and AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operation. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF Form 847s from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command and Major Command (MAJCOM) publications/forms managers. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with (IAW) Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33- 363, Management of Records, and disposed of IAW the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) in the Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS). The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the AF. This publication is nondirective. However, suggested procedures, actions, or tasks may be presented in directive language to improve readability and understanding by simplifying sentence structure. Except when specified actions are mandated by AF or Department of Defense 2 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 (DOD) directive publications, units may modify the actions, directions, tasks, and worksheets to suit their needs. SUMMARY OF CHANGES This interim change revises AFPAM 10-219V3 by (1) changing Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (UXO) reporting procedures in paragraph 5.5.6.1, and (2) changing Table 5.3 to reflect Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 9-Line Report criteria per Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.12, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance. A margin bar (|) indicates newly revised material. Chapter 1—CE CONTINGENCY RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 7 1.1. Background............................................................................................................ 7 1.2. Scope...................................................................................................................... 7 Figure 1.1. Core Doctrine and CE Policies and Guidance....................................................... 8 1.3. Roles and Responsibilities..................................................................................... 8 Table 1.1. Potential CE Response Teams............................................................................... 11 Chapter 2—CE COMMAND AND CONTROL 12 2.1. Overview................................................................................................................ 12 2.2. UCC Activation..................................................................................................... 12 Table 2.1. Managing Radios................................................................................................... 14 2.3. UCC Operation and Management.......................................................................... 15 Table 2.2. Examples of Contingency Plans and Checklists.................................................... 15 Figure 2.1. Example Log of Events.......................................................................................... 16 Table 2.3. Potential UCC Status Charts.................................................................................. 17 Table 2.4. Potential Information Displayed on UCC Maps.................................................... 18 Table 2.5. Sample Personnel Strength Chart.......................................................................... 20 Figure 2.2. ADR Equipment Convoying from Dispersed Location to Crater Repair Sites..... 23 Chapter 3—DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS 25 3.1. General Information............................................................................................... 25 Figure 3.1. DARTs Assess Damage to Installation Facilities and Utilities.............................. 25 3.2. Overview................................................................................................................ 25 3.3. Assessment Methods.............................................................................................. 25 3.4. DART Organization, Leadership, and Equipment................................................. 26 Table 3.1. Example of Basic DART Composition.................................................................. 27 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 3 Table 3.2. Typical DART Equipment and Supplies............................................................... 28 3.5. Assessment Practices, Priorities and Reporting..................................................... 28 Table 3.3. DART Detailed Facility Assessments Progress (Notional)................................... 30 Table 3.4. Prospective Priority Facilities................................................................................ 33 Figure 3.2. Quickly Up-Channel Preliminary Damage Assessments to EOC......................... 36 Table 3.5. Civil Engineer OPREP-3 Information................................................................... 37 Chapter 4—AUXILIARY FIRE FIGHTING AND SEARCH AND RESCUE 38 4.1. Overview................................................................................................................ 38 4.2. Auxiliary Fire Fighting.......................................................................................... 38 Figure 4.1. Four Components of Fire Tetrahedron.................................................................. 39 Table 4.1. Portable Fire Extinguisher Symbols and Extinguishing Agents............................ 41 Table 4.2. Common Fire Extinguishers.................................................................................. 42 4.3. Basic Fire Fighting Concepts and Techniques....................................................... 42 Figure 4.2. Typical Gas Shutoff Valve..................................................................................... 45 Figure 4.3. Engineers Using Heavy Equipment to Cut a Fire Break....................................... 46 4.4. Search and Rescue (SAR) Concepts...................................................................... 48 Figure 4.4. SAR Team Removes Wounded Victim from Rubble............................................ 48 Figure 4.5. SAR Augmentees Should Possess Basic Lifesaving Skills................................... 49 Figure 4.6. SAR Sequence of Operations................................................................................. 51 4.5. Summary................................................................................................................ 51 Chapter 5—EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RECONNAISSANCE (EOR) 52 5.1. Introduction............................................................................................................ 52 5.2. Overview................................................................................................................ 52 Figure 5.1. Only EOD Personnel Render-Safe or Destroy UXOs........................................... 52 5.3. Types of Explosive Ordnance................................................................................ 53 5.4. Classes of Explosive Ordnance.............................................................................. 53 Figure 5.2. Class A (Bombs and Dispensers) and Class B (Rockets and Missiles) UXOs...... 54 Figure 5.3. Class C UXOs (Projectiles and Mortars)............................................................... 54 Figure 5.4. Class D UXOs (Land Mines)................................................................................. 55 Figure 5.5. Class E UXOs (Bomblets)..................................................................................... 55 Figure 5.6. Class F UXOs (Rocket-Propelled Grenades and Grenades).................................. 55 5.5. EOR....................................................................................................................... 55 Figure 5.7. MRAP Armored Vehicle....................................................................................... 56 4 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 Figure 5.8. Barricade Examples............................................................................................... 58 Table 5.1. Typical EOR Equipment........................................................................................ 58 Table 5.2. Recognition and Reporting Steps........................................................................... 59 Table 5.3. EOD 9-Line Report................................................................................................ 60 Figure 5.9. Deep Burst (Camouflet)......................................................................................... 61 Figure 5.10. Standard UXO Marker........................................................................................... 62 5.6. Support to EOD UXO Operations......................................................................... 62 5.7. Summary................................................................................................................ 62 Chapter 6—EXPEDIENT FACILITY AND UTILITY REPAIRS 63 6.1. General Information............................................................................................... 63 6.2. Overview................................................................................................................ 63 6.3. Expedient Repair Processes and Strategies............................................................ 63 6.4. Expedient Repair Considerations........................................................................... 64 Figure 6.1. Arc Flash Warning Label....................................................................................... 65 Table 6.1. General Guidance for Repair Priority.................................................................... 66 6.5. CONUS versus OCONUS Theater Repairs........................................................... 67 6.6. Summary................................................................................................................ 68 Chapter 7—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE (O&M) AND FOLLOW-ON REPAIR 69 7.1. General Information............................................................................................... 69 7.2. Overview................................................................................................................ 69 7.3. O&M Safety Considerations.................................................................................. 69 7.4. The O&M Concept................................................................................................ 69 Table 7.1. O&M Concept........................................................................................................ 70 Table 7.2. Disaster Recovery Work Priorities........................................................................ 71 7.5. Airfield Ancillary Equipment O&M...................................................................... 73 7.6. Utility Repairs........................................................................................................ 74 Table 7.3. Typical Electrical Distribution Upgrade and Repairs............................................ 76 Table 7.4. Typical In-House Water Distribution Repairs....................................................... 78 7.7. Facilities and Services........................................................................................... 81 Table 7.5. Typical In-House Disaster Recovery O&M Tasks................................................ 81 7.8. Transportation Routes............................................................................................ 83 7.9. Resupply and Stockpiling...................................................................................... 83 Figure 7.1. Relocate Construction Resources Near Job Site to Increase Efficiency................ 85 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 5 Figure 7.2. Store Weather-Sensitive Materials Under Cover................................................... 85 7.10. Summary................................................................................................................ 85 Chapter 8—PROTECTION, SECURITY, AND DEFENSIVE PROCEDURES 86 8.1. Overview................................................................................................................ 86 Figure 8.1. Work Party Security Help Safeguard CE Work Crews......................................... 86 8.2. Basic Defensive Combat Skills for Self-Protection............................................... 86 Figure 8.2. Natural Cover Provides Hasty Protection From the Enemy.................................. 87 Figure 8.3. Effective Personal Camouflage Blends With Surrounding Terrain....................... 88 Figure 8.4. Low Crawl Provides the Lowest Silhouette........................................................... 90 Figure 8.5. High Crawl Permits Faster Movement and Low Silhouette.................................. 90 Table 8.1. Short Rush Procedures........................................................................................... 91 Figure 8.6. The Short Rush Method......................................................................................... 91 Table 8.2. The “Spider Crawl” Technique.............................................................................. 92 Figure 8.7. “Spider Crawl” Movement.................................................................................... 92 Figure 8.8. Right and Left Wedge Formations......................................................................... 93 Figure 8.9. File Formation........................................................................................................ 93 Figure 8.10. Two Fire Teams in Wedge and File Formations.................................................... 94 Figure 8.11. Two Fire Team Traveling Overwatch Formation.................................................. 94 Figure 8.12. Left Pivot Movement............................................................................................. 95 Figure 8.13. Right Pivot Movement........................................................................................... 95 8.3. Convoy Security.................................................................................................... 95 Figure 8.14. Air Force Engineers on a Convoy Mission in Iraq................................................ 96 8.4. Work Site Entry..................................................................................................... 96 Figure 8.15. Work Site Sweep................................................................................................... 97 Figure 8.16. Work Site Entry..................................................................................................... 97 8.5. Work Party Security............................................................................................... 97 Figure 8.17. Sectors, Fighting Positions, and Listening Posts................................................... 98 8.6. Augmentation of the Base Defense Force.............................................................. 102 8.7. Owner/User Security Procedures........................................................................... 102 Chapter 9—BASE DENIAL PROCEDURES 103 9.1. General Information............................................................................................... 103 9.2. General Responsibilities........................................................................................ 103 9.3. Base Denial Team.................................................................................................. 103 6 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 9.4. CE Activities for Base Denial................................................................................ 103 9.5. Withdrawal and Evacuation................................................................................... 106 Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 108 Attachment 2—ENGINEER REACHBACK AND OTHER USEFUL LINKS 118 Attachment 3—DAMAGE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS 119 Attachment 4—PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS PROS AND CONS 129 Attachment 5—CIVIL ENGINEER EQUIPMENT/TASK SAFETY CHECKLIST 131 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 7 Chapter 1 CE CONTINGENCY RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 1.1. Background. The unpredictable nature of war and disasters requires a great degree of flexibility by the CE force during emergency response and recovery operations. CE units must maintain contingency response and recovery capabilities to restore operations, save lives, mitigate human suffering, and minimize damage during and after a crisis incident on or near the installation. While the CE Contingency Response Plan (CE CRP) and other base plans should be followed to ensure a coordinated response, no plan can cover all possible scenarios. Therefore, all elements of the CE team must be able to adjust quickly to changing circumstances. Immediately after a disaster, attack or other crisis, civil engineers typically operate in the reactionary mode to eliminate life-threatening hazards rapidly. In later phases of the recovery, the engineer force begins a more deliberate effort. Even though the environment can still be chaotic and there may still be many immediate actions to take, the overwhelming dangers that prevailed during the onset of the emergency may have passed. The effort to identify and quantify the damage, assign repair priorities, and determine recovery strategy then begins. Engineering knowledge, experience, and common sense become crucial to base recovery efforts. 1.2. Scope. The information in this pamphlet supports implementation of Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-2, Readiness. It builds upon lessons learned and doctrinal precepts outlined in AF Doctrine Volume 5, Support, AF Doctrine Annex 3-34, Engineer Operations, current AF policy, and other related and relevant CE publications. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.1. See Attachment 1 for a complete list of references and supporting information. 1.2.1. Volumes 1 and 2 of this pamphlet series address CE planning and preparedness for natural or manmade disasters and installation attack. This volume, coupled with information in Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 10-219, Volume 4, Airfield Damage Repair Operations, address measures that support an effective CE contingency recovery capability. Specifically, this volume addresses base and unit level CE recovery actions associated with the following areas: 1.2.1.1. CE Unit Control Center (UCC) operations 1.2.1.2. Damage assessments 1.2.1.3. Auxiliary fire fighting and search and rescue 1.2.1.4. Explosive ordnance reconnaissance (EOR) 1.2.1.5. Expedient facility and utility repair processes and strategies 1.2.1.6. Operation and maintenance (O&M) and follow-on repairs 1.2.1.7. Self-protection and work party security 1.2.1.8. Base denial procedures 1.2.2. For comprehensive contingency response and recovery activities related to Emergency Management (EM), FES, and EOD, users should refer to AFI 10-2501; AFI 32-2001, Fire Emergency Services (FES) Program; AFI 32-3001, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Program; and relevant AFMAN 10-2500-series and AFPAM 32-2000-series publications. 8 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 See Attachment 2 for hyperlinks to AF and Joint publications, other references, and reach- back resources. Figure 1.1. Core Doctrine and CE Policies and Guidance 1.3. Roles and Responsibilities. Most CE unit functions are heavily involved with base response and recovery operations after a disaster, attack, or other major crisis. These CE operations include fire fighting and rescue, damage assessments, hazard mitigation, airfield and facility repair, critical infrastructure restoration (e.g., power, water and sewerage), CBRN monitoring, response and control, unit recovery management, and emergency contracting, to name a few. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of CE roles and responsibilities associated with emergency response and recovery operations. For additional information, consult the references in Attachment 1 and for reach-back support, contact the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) Reach-Back Center (RBC) at 1-888-232-3721 (toll free), 1-850-283-6995 (comm), Defense Switched Network (DSN) 312-523-6995, or via email at [email protected]. AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 9 1.3.1. The Base Civil Engineer (BCE)/CE Unit Commander. The BCE/CE Commander and engineer staff advises the installation commander and other installation officials on contingency response and recovery operations. They are also responsible for providing trained forces and available equipment and materials to return the installation quickly to a condition where the primary mission can be executed. When an incident or crisis occurs and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is activated, the BCE representative to the EOC is the command and control (C2) link between the EOC and the CE force. From the EOC, the BCE representative provides direction to airfield damage repair (ADR) crews and damage assessment and response teams through the CE UCC. At high-threat locations, the BCE and members of the minimum airfield operating surface (MAOS) selection team typically operate from the EOC during airfield recovery. Engineering and Operations Management specialists may also be attached to assist with CE response and recovery management activities. Other CE personnel operating from the EOC may include representatives from the Readiness and Emergency Management (R&EM) Flight, FES Flight, EOD and Operations Flights. 1.3.2. R&EM. The role of R&EM is to help ensure force survivability, expeditious installation recovery and mission continuation in all threat environments. The R&EM Flight provides support to the EOC, Incident Commander (IC), mobile communications capability, and specialized teams during incident response and recovery. Flight responsibilities also include CBRN detection, warning, and notification, advising commanders on operations in contaminated environments, and managing installation contamination control operations. R&EM roles and responsibilities are further defined in AFI 10-2501, AFMAN 32-1007, Readiness and Emergency Management (R&EM) Flight Operations, and AFMAN 10-2503, Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Environment. 1.3.3. FES. The primary role of FES during and just after an emergency is to rescue survivors, keep loss of life to a minimum, and extinguish or prevent the spread of fire. Emergency services include aircraft rescue fire fighting, structural fire fighting, technical rescue, emergency medical support, and hazardous materials (HAZMAT) response. Due to the limited numbers of firefighters, fire vehicles, and equipment, firefighter availability may be limited for ancillary tasks such as area contamination control processes. 1.3.4. EOD. EOD response and installation recovery capabilities after an attack or disaster include: responding to aircraft and explosive mishaps; identifying, evaluating, rendering safe, recovering, and disposing of any explosive threat to include abandoned munitions, unexploded ordnances (UXOs), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); performing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection, identification, sampling, warning, and reporting; recovering airfields denied by ordnance; and assisting mortuary services in remains processing. 1.3.5. CE UCC. Generally, UCCs are activated to support installation response and recovery operations after a crisis incident. The CE UCC controls and coordinates unit response activities, arranges support from other organizations, and serves as the commander’s communications conduit for assigned personnel. It is normally staffed with highly experienced and knowledgeable CE specialists from various elements of the operations flight. See Chapter 2 for additional CE UCC information. 10 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 1.3.6. Installation and Unit Specialized Teams. Civil engineer units along with other assigned units, provide specialized teams to the installation DRF. These specialized groups are key elements of the DRF and provide essential support during response and recovery operations. Teams include the Emergency Management Support Team (EMST) (formerly the Readiness Support Team), Shelter Management Teams (SMTs), Contamination Control Teams (CCTs), and Post Attack Reconnaissance (PAR) Teams. See AFI 10-2501 for their description and composition. In addition to presenting specialized teams to the DRF, CE units also organize other multi-shop, response teams to respond to major incidents. 1.3.7. CE Response Teams. While many peacetime emergencies can be handled without forming CE multi-shop response teams, a major natural disaster, major accident, or base attack will require special teams in addition to standard shop support. These response teams help keep the installation operational during the disaster or attack response period, reduce the loss of life, prevent property damage, and identify damage and initiate repairs following an emergency. Table 1.1 lists potential CE response teams not previously addressed in this chapter. See AFPAM 10-219, Volume 1, Contingency and Disaster Planning, for potential composition and organization of CE response teams. These teams are usually formed by assigning specific tasks or groups of tasks to various CE shops or flights. Individuals selected for positions on these teams should be highly skilled in their specialty and possess the maturity, level-headedness, and physical stamina to operate effectively in the chaotic and demanding environment that accompanies all catastrophes. The availability of qualified personnel at the time of a disaster or attack will be a prime determining factor in how these teams are structured. Furthermore, potential threats and manning differences at Continental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS (OCONUS) locations can affect how CE response teams are formed. 1.3.7.1. CONUS CE Response Teams. Due to the varying sizes and compositions of CONUS engineer organizations, the number of response teams, and number of team members for each installation can vary. It is incumbent on each BCE to evaluate assigned personnel strengths and build the needed response teams. The response teams may be filled by military, civilian, or a combination of these forces. 1.3.7.2. OCONUS Theater CE Response Teams. By nature of their location, response teams at overseas locations have a greater likelihood of facing an attack situation than their CONUS counterparts. However, natural disasters cannot be ruled out as a potential occurrence. At overseas installations having a peacetime United States Air Force (USAF) engineer presence, theater emergency crews for natural disaster response are likely based on standard manning document authorizations, at least for the initial stages of response. As with the CONUS response teams, military personnel, civilian employees, or a combined force may fill team positions. They could be augmented for disaster recovery activities if damages exceeded in-house capability to any great extent. For overseas locations with no in-place USAF engineer force, deployed Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF) units would form CE response teams. In an attack situation, Prime BEEF forces should be in-place prior to commencement of hostilities, thereby forming an integral part of the theater emergency response force by either augmenting in- place forces or performing as an independent unit. Teams are based on the anticipated availability of Prime BEEF forces addressed in the CE Force Module construct. AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 11 Table 1.1. Potential CE Response Teams Teams Description Locates, identifies, reports damage and UXO on the Airfield Damage Assessment airfield following an attack. If combined with UXO and UXO Team Team renders safe, disposes and removes UXO on airfields. Teams detect hazards and determine extent of CBRN Reconnaissance Team contamination on base Damage Assessment Response Conducts facility and utility damage assessment and Team (DART) isolates/safes damaged utility systems Provides on-scene control and guidance for the ADR ADR C2 Team efforts to minimize the total repair time to bring the airfield back to a mission ready status Repair craters located on the primary and secondary ADR Crater Repair Teams pavements of the operating airfield ADR Batch Plant Team Produces hot-mix asphalt for ADR Repair Crews Repair spalls and minor pavement damage to airfield and ADR Spall Repair Teams taxiways Tracks and delivers repair material to ADR Repair ADR Warehouse and Haul Team Crews Clears debris from the minimum operating strip (MOS) and taxiway access routes to permit resumption of ADR Debris Removal Team aircraft operations as soon as the crater repairs are complete Paints airfield markings for new MAOS and paints over Minimum Airfield Operating old markings that would conflict with the new markings; Surface (MAOS) Marking Team places edge and threshold markers Installs aircraft arresting systems (Mobile Aircraft Aircraft Arresting System Arresting System [MAAS] and Mobile Runway Edge Installation Team Sheaves [MRES]) for the MOS Emergency Airfield Lighting Installs approach, threshold, and edge lights; distance-to- System (EALS) Installation go, arresting system, and obstruction marker lights; and Team precision approach path indicator lights for the MOS Provide engineering design, oversight and management Engineering Team functions for assessments, evaluation, contingency construction solutions, and contract actions Accomplishes emergency and expedient repairs to Facility Repair/Utility Repair damaged facilities and utilities; performs other Teams emergency repairs as required Provide information and management in the event that Housing Management Team disaster victims require housing 12 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 Chapter 2 CE COMMAND AND CONTROL 2.1. Overview. The CE UCC is the BCE’s C2 conduit for unit personnel. It is an essential focal point within the CE organization during and after major accidents, attacks, or natural disasters. The UCC relays information to and from unit personnel, provides engineering expertise to the EOC or IC, and leverages unit resources to respond to and mitigate incidents. From the UCC, key supervisors coordinate, monitor, and direct CE recovery activities, including emergency notifications, personnel accountability, damage assessment, and repair, and other related activities. The following paragraphs address key factors related to CE UCC operations, including activation and management. For additional information on CE UCC staffing, organization and operation beyond what is addressed in this pamphlet, consult AFPAM 10-219, Volume 1. 2.2. UCC Activation. Unit commanders activate their UCCs and initiate unit personnel accountability; however, the EOC Director determines which UCCs remain activated. The CE UCC is one of several UCCs that may be activated to respond to emergencies. From a CE point of view, the responsibilities of the CE UCC are similar to those of the EOC. The difference lies in the level of responsibility. The CE UCC monitors and coordinates CE recovery actions related to installation damage assessment, decontamination, damage recovery and repairs, and other CE CRP tasks. Activation involves staffing, facilities, and communications. 2.2.1. Staffing. Although CE strategies and priorities are determined in the EOC, most of the actual engineer functions are controlled or coordinated by the CE UCC. The UCC is usually managed by the CE chief of operations and predominantly staffed by operations management personnel (Air Force Specialty [AFS] 3E6X1) and senior supervisors from select infrastructure support elements of the operations flight (e.g., electrical, water and fuels systems, pavements and construction, structural). While usually assigned in the EOC, FES and EOD representatives may also be on the staff. The typical CE UCC staff generally ranges between 7-11 personnel. 2.2.1.1. Operations managers are central to UCC operations and C2. They perform many tasks to standup and maintain the UCC; such as, keeping status of personnel, equipment, and vehicles; scheduling jobs; allocating resources; and coordinating information between the EOC and other unit UCCs. Other duties may include the following: 2.2.1.1.1. Personnel recall/accounting and identification of UCC team members/alternates 2.2.1.1.2. Gather and maintain required documents, directions, maps, equipment/asset listings, base plans, and checklists 2.2.1.1.3. Establish and maintain a permanent log of events 2.2.1.1.4. Post status boards and coordinate sharing of information between control centers 2.2.1.1.5. Monitor and report on the availability of specialized skills and required equipment 2.2.1.1.6. Site, manage, and operate an alternate UCC AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 13 2.2.1.2. Engineering specialists (AFS 3E5X1) are sometimes added to the staff to assist Prime BEEF supervisors in directing and controlling overall recovery operations in the CE UCC. The UCC staff may also include civilian personnel in a natural disaster response. If available during wartime, civilian personnel may also be used; however, workaround plans should exist that take into account the possibility these civilian employees may not be available. 2.2.2. Facilities. It may be advantageous to setup the CE UCC facility within walking distance of the CE shops. This makes communications easier if phones or radios are limited or not available. In addition, a backup power source should be provided to support operations during power outages. In case the primary facility is lost, an alternate or backup UCC facility should be ready for immediate occupancy. For wartime threats and disaster precautions, units should strive to establish their alternate UCC at a site that is unlikely to be included in the same hazard cordon affecting the primary location. Regardless where UCC facilities are located, the configuration, layout, equipment, and supplies are usually prearranged according to base and unit plans. 2.2.3. Communications. The UCC is essential for passing information up, down and across the chain of command in response to changing installation recovery situations or strategy. To be efficient, UCC communications should be reliable, simple, clear-cut, and understood by everyone involved. The CE UCC uses various methods to communicate recalls and process vital information, including land-line phones, cell phones, radios, pagers, facsimiles, computers, runners, and other means. Operations managers should perform operational checks (preferably monthly) on primary and alternate communications devices in the UCC. These operational checks must include verification of key contact numbers for both landline and cellular devices. Also, verify computer software is current and able to access the base network. The following paragraphs highlight basic practices for maintaining effective operational communications. 2.2.3.1. Operations and Communications Security. Personnel should always practice good operations security (OPSEC) and communications security (COMSEC) procedures, especially when classified or sensitive C2 information and resources are involved. Make sure to protect sensitive information using SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) and other specified security/encryption measures when required. Shred discarded paperwork, establish, and use designated call signs, duress codes, authentication codes, and passwords as necessary. 2.2.3.2. Telephones. Operations managers should specify which telephone connections are available in the UCC and list phone numbers for the various positions. Also, identify cellular phone numbers and assignment. When landline or hard-wired telephones must be used to relay classified information, use secure telephone equipment (STE) devices. When available, STE devices provide secure multimedia communications: digital telephone, secure voice, transfer of secure fax and data files, and other capabilities. The lead operations manager should consult with the unit security manager on clearance requirements for assigned operations management personnel. 2.2.3.3. Radio Assets. Maintain strict control over assigned tactical radios and/or land mobile radio (LMR) assets. Operations managers in the CE UCC should only be required to operate and manage communication devices under their direct control. FES, EOD, and 14 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 R&EM Flights typically manage their own systems and assets. Inventory, recall, and assign handheld radios to response teams as necessary. Radio assets should be kept fully serviceable and ready for immediate use; pay close attention to recharging batteries. Several dead batteries causing partial loss of communications when performing recovery actions can severely reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of repair and damage assessment crews. This immediately affects the speed at which the installation’s mission capabilities are reestablished. Quickly replacing lost or damaged radios during contingencies or wartime is virtually impossible. Some basic steps to managing radios are listed in Table 2.1. Table 2.1. Managing Radios Basic Steps for Managing Radios Maintain an accurate inventory of assigned radio assets Assign radios to CE response teams using an AF IMT 1297, Temporary Issue Receipt, or other approved method; electronic receipts are commonly authorized Recall assigned radios for redistribution according to operational requirements Setup and operate the UCC base station Keep radio batteries/spare batteries charged Collect and redistribute radios for normal use after the emergency has ended 2.2.3.4. Radio Discipline. The key to effective radio communications is to ensure all personnel use proper radio discipline, designated call signs, good enunciation, and brevity when communicating. Avoid clogging the networks with unnecessary chatter so transmissions can be devoted to communicating and coordinating mission critical activities. Refer to AFPAM 10-219, Volume 2, Civil Engineer Disaster and Attack Preparations, for more information on setting up emergency communications. 2.2.3.5. Radio “Dead Zones.” Ensure CE personnel using radios know the location of radio dead zones (if applicable) and understand how to minimize their effects. The installation communications officer and intrabase radio personnel can assist in identifying dead zones. Once identified, it is a good idea to annotate the information on the UCC’s installation layout map. Make it a practice to advise all new or infrequent radio users of these locations and ways to minimize their effects. To minimize the effects of radio “dead zones” or areas of high interference, use message-relaying techniques, change location, or move closer to the UCC. 2.2.3.6. Alternative Communications. During emergencies, viable alternatives to landline phones and radio communications should be available. Cell phones, computers, fax machines, mobile data devices, and runners may be good alternatives. However, it may be impractical to use runners if great distances are involved. When using cell phones or other non-secure communication methods, users should always be cognizant of COMSEC and OPSEC requirements. AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 15 2.3. UCC Operation and Management. Once activated, the CE UCC collects and reports damage inputs, directs recovery activities, and operates the CE communications network to coordinate around-the-clock recovery operations as directed by the BCE/CE unit commander and EOC. Additionally, as the CE communications pipeline, the UCC disseminates threat and emergency action information, incident cordon and evacuation instructions, protective measures, and other emergency information to all organizational elements. The following paragraphs address some specific CE UCC contingency response and recovery activities. 2.3.1. Maintain Essential Data and Documentation. The CE UCC should have on hand all essential data and documents to support recovery operations. Control center managers and supervisors should review and maintain current copies of contingency plans and checklists applicable to the crisis, maintain an events log, and establish or maintain other essential data and documentation as necessary. 2.3.1.1. Contingency Plans and Checklists. Operations managers should have available and review (preferably semiannually) copies of applicable unit checklists, operations plans, support plans, and base plans that CE supports (Table 2.2). Ensure the plans are complete and current so the CE UCC is operating on the same information as the other operations and communications centers (e.g., EOC, Base Defense Operations Center [BDOC], Emergency Communications Center [ECC]). Unit checklists are important tools for effective consequence management and should be comprehensive and current. These checklists provide CE personnel the means to respond quickly to a variety of events with little or no delay. Table 2.2. Examples of Contingency Plans and Checklists Plans: Major accidents, natural disasters, enemy attacks. Civil Engineer Contingency Response Plan (CE CRP). Medical Contingency Response Plan. Facility Response Plan. Mortuary/Services Search and Recovery Plan. Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan. Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP) 10-2. Integrated Defense Plan. Checklists: Major accidents, natural disasters, enemy attacks. Maps. Communications Equipment. Alternate UCCs. Recall Rosters. 2.3.1.2. Log of Events and Support Activities. Establish and maintain a permanent log of events and unit support activities using methods prescribed by the owning MAJCOM or 16 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 unit, whichever is applicable. Either electronic/computer-generated logs or manual forms are usually permitted. Regardless of the means used, event logs typically have information fields similar to those shown in Figure 2.1. Maintaining an accurate log of events will not only improve continuity and information flow between shifts; it is also the basic information reference for after-action reporting. Regularly provide event logs to the alternate UCC (preferably no less than each shift change) for continuity in case the primary UCC becomes unavailable. When filled out, these logs are an official record of unit events and should be maintained IAW AFMAN 33-363. Figure 2.1. Example Log of Events 2.3.1.2.1. Include in the log all significant events and notifications along with other incident or contingency support activities. Be sure to note changes relating to unit posture and preparedness; response/repair team capabilities; mitigation activities; receipt of critical correspondence or information; significant facility, equipment, communications, vehicle, and personnel changes; and other events required by installation or unit plans and instructions. 2.3.1.2.2. In addition to the log of events, maintain any data or documents that may be pertinent to the unit’s response and recovery activities (e.g., correspondence, work orders, receipts, and photographs). These items may be an important part of the AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 17 record of events, especially if documenting damage or when contracting for equipment, supplies, or repair work. 2.3.1.3. Status Charts. Easily viewable status charts and boards are usually posted when certain information requires close monitoring by the UCC staff. Consider displaying the status of personnel, prepositioned equipment and materials, key facilities and shelters, vehicles, response and repair teams, damage assessment and repair, and/or other critical information (Table 2.3). The exact style and configuration of status charts or boards will likely vary between units and bases due to specific mission requirements. See AFPAM 10-219, Volume 2, for sample charts. Table 2.3. Potential UCC Status Charts CE STATUS CHARTS List unit strength numbers (military and civilian; casualty status) and status of key personnel, including: Personnel  Position, AFS, and contact method  Shift/Team assignment and availability List location of base priority facilities and other key areas, e.g.:  C2, aircraft maintenance, medical, fire fighting, etc. Facilities  Casualty collection points (CCP)  Shelters and contamination control areas (CCA) Vehicle status charts should indicate:  Type, registration number, and quantity Vehicles  Location/assignment  Serviceability and repair status Identify type, location, serviceability, run data, refueling schedule, Generators and repair status List location and serviceability of specialized equipment, e.g.:  Aircraft arresting system Specialized  Pumps and compressors Equipment  Chain saws  Floodlight sets, light carts, airfield lighting, etc List location, description and repair status (include damage report number and repair priority) of the base’s priority facilities and critical Critical infrastructure/ activities, e.g.: Infrastructure/  Airfields and roads Activities Damage  Facilities, including heating, ventilation, and air conditioning Assessment and (HVAC) Repair  Electrical generation and distribution  Fuels and natural gas storage and distribution  Water production, storage, and distribution 18 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 List type/location/quantity of critical materials and equipment, e.g.: Prepositioned  Class IV construction materials Supplies and  Electrical and plumbing equipment and parts Equipment  Aggregate stockpiles Staging Areas List staging areas used to support plan execution List installation/unit alert conditions:  Force protection condition (FPCON), mission-oriented Unit Posture/ protective posture (MOPP), defense condition, Alarm Preparedness condition, etc.  Natural disaster condition (hurricane, severe weather, etc.) List call signs and frequencies (include vehicle-installed radios) Radios List tactical/intrabase radio nets and the locations of the base stations and any relay sites. Identify any other unit(s) using the same net 2.3.1.4. Installation Maps and Drawings. Appropriate maps (e.g., base grid maps, airfield maps, GeoBase maps, and overlays) of the installation are necessary in the CE UCC for coordinating and plotting response activities, infrastructure damage, and the location of known hazards. Maps should depict information such as that shown in Table 2.4 and any other required or relevant data. GeoBase maps and overlays are critical to establishing and maintaining situational awareness and the Common Installation Picture (CIP) or Common Operational Picture (COP). As a backup, maintain hardcopies of all relevant drawings, base maps, and airfield maps. Operations managers should ensure maps are reviewed appropriate Superintendents and shop NCOICs (preferably monthly) and updated by GeoBase or other CIP/COP stewards when required. Table 2.4. Potential Information Displayed on UCC Maps Incident Information on Maps Unit areas of responsibility Location of UXOs and Contaminated areas Location of damage areas Structures (highlight key facilities and shelters) Utilities layout (electrical, gas, water, and sewer systems) Location of resources and recovery/repair teams Shelters and assigned occupants Routes (primary and alternate) for assessment and response teams 2.3.2. Gather and Disseminate Information. During a crisis, collecting and disseminating vital information for unit personnel, response teams and the EOC is a key function of the CE UCC. It helps facilitate the common operational picture and enhances contingency response and recovery operations. Even though the UCC is the CE communications conduit, all CE personnel have an essential role in information collection and dissemination. The ability to communicate important information quickly and efficiently is vital to successful installation AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 19 recovery. Information the CE UCC collects and reports up, down, or laterally across the chain of command may include personnel status and accounting; threat and protective measures; unit alert condition and emergency notifications; incident cordon and evacuation instructions; damage, casualties, and mission capability reports; response and recovery direction; mitigation efforts, activities and status; availability of specialized skills; required equipment/resources, and other emergency action and crisis response information. 2.3.3. Personnel Accountability. A fundamental task of all UCCs is accounting for assigned personnel. In the aftermath of a major disaster or an attack, it is doubtful the full complement of CE personnel will be available to respond. Individuals may be on leave, temporary duty (TDY), a casualty of the incident, or otherwise unable to respond or reach the installation. The recovery effort cannot wait until these personnel return or are backfilled; it will have to proceed with available manpower. For this reason, an accurate accounting of personnel present for duty is essential so CE management can make assignments to vital installation recovery functions. Personnel accountability procedures will vary from installation to installation. Therefore, adherence to locally established procedures is important to provide an accurate count of personnel to those responsible for making installation recovery decisions. The following paragraphs address typical methods used for personnel accounting. They include personnel recall, strength reporting, personnel rosters, including team/billeting assignments. For additional information on personnel accounting and reporting responsibilities during a crisis, refer to AFI 36-3803, Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Natural Disasters or National Emergencies. 2.3.3.1. Personnel Recall. An accurate unit recall roster with concise reporting instructions is essential for contacting and accounting for personnel during emergencies. Units should also maintain a communications-out (comm-out) recall rosters in case local communications become overloaded or inoperative. Notwithstanding how personnel are notified, reporting instructions should always be clear and thorough, including who reports where, when, to whom, and with what equipment. See the CE CRP for specific information on unit personnel recall methods and procedures. Note: The sign-in procedures may be accomplished in a number of ways such as sign-in sheets for each AFS or a vertical plotting board with sections for the various AFSs. 2.3.3.2. Personnel Strength Reporting. When designated by disaster plans or recall checklists, personnel strengths are reported from assembly locations to the UCC. The UCC compiles the information and compares it to the Alpha Roster, verifies information as necessary through the unit orderly room, and forwards the required data to the EOC. Some UCCs prefer to track/monitor this information using an easily viewable chart within the UCC (see Table 2.5). 20 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 Table 2.5. Sample Personnel Strength Chart Unit Personnel Strength Assigned 236 Leave/authorized absence 10 TDY 12 Casualties 0 Unaccounted for/status unknown 0 Present for duty 214 2.3.3.3. Key Personnel Rosters and Team Assignment. Personnel accounting also includes identifying people that fill key positions related to CE response and recovery activities. Personnel rosters with contact information (phone, billeting, etc.) enable rapid notification, response and improved unit coordination. Operations managers should provide a roster of key CE personnel to the EOC. Likewise, keep a roster of key EOC personnel inside the CE UCC. When CE response teams and crews are organized, establish team rosters to help expedite, track and manage team response and repair activities. Operations managers should regularly (preferably monthly) review and update Key Personnel Rosters and team assignments. See AFPAM 10-219, Volume 2 for examples of personnel and team rosters. 2.3.4. Direct, Coordinate, and Monitor. With BCE/CE unit commander direction, supervisors, and operations managers within the CE UCC coordinate, monitor, and direct unit resources to respond quickly and appropriately to a myriad of emergencies and tasks. The UCC staff should work closely with other internal elements such as EM, EOD, FES, and the ECC to avoid potential conflicts in tasking and activities. Once activated, the CE UCC may direct, coordinate, or monitor a number of activities including, fire fighting; UXO clearance; contamination control operations; damage assessments; repair of airfields, roads, facilities, and utilities; shelter management; moving unit personnel and equipment; dispersal, prepositioning and staging operations; spill response operations; base denial operations, and other response, mitigation and recovery activities. 2.3.5. Team Dispatch and Control. Damage and destruction is an unfortunate byproduct of major accidents, natural disasters, and enemy attacks; consequently, when these situations occur, CE teams are dispatched to help mitigate the circumstances. CE response teams are usually organized based on the specific mission needs and threat condition. Besides first and emergency responders, CE response teams perform a number of tasks including, PAR, damage assessment, hazard and spill response, contamination control, ADR, engineering, MAAS and EALS installation, facility, and utility repair, and other emergency recovery activities. Once activated; and with EOC direction, the CE UCC staff dispatches emergency engineer teams when situations warrant their specialized skills and equipment. Engineer officers, superintendents, and operations managers in the CE UCC direct the repair efforts of the teams and provide functional expertise where needed. The staff also tracks progress and status of engineer teams so accurate information is relayed to the BCE, EOC, and/or IC, as appropriate. AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 21 2.3.6. Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Mission Support. Helping to ensure COOP and mission support requirements during emergencies is a vital CE function. In addition to performing primary functions such as FES, EOD, and EM; repairing airfields, roads, and facilities; maintaining alternate command centers (e.g., alternate EOC, mobile communications vehicle and alternate CE UCC), CE forces also perform other actions that help ensure COOP and mission support during a crisis. Some of these actions are highlighted in the following paragraphs, including pre-designating alternate engineer leadership for EOC and UCCs; conducting thorough change-over briefings during shift changes; dispersing and recalling personnel and equipment, and prepositioning or staging assets for rapid response. While certain activities are performed during the planning and preparation phase before an emergency, others may need to be accomplished after the onset of the emergency or incident. 2.3.6.1. Pre-designated Personnel. Provision should be made for the continuity of engineer leadership in both the EOC and the UCC. Although, the establishment of alternate command centers aids in solving part of the problem, the possibility exists that key personnel assigned to serve in either the primary or alternate command centers may become casualties or unable to perform their primary duties. Other engineer personnel should be pre-designated to fill in for these key individuals. This pre-designation should be done in advance of any hostilities, and sufficient training and C2 familiarization should be provided so that a smooth transition can occur, if required. 2.3.6.2. Change-Over Briefings. Because of “round-the-clock” operations, the quality of shift changeover briefings can influence COOP and mission support. In effect, continuity is affected every time there is a shift change. The amount of professionalism and effort put into changeover briefings is directly proportional to the degree of operational and mission continuity maintained. These briefings should be in sufficient depth and scope to make individuals on the next shift conversant on all major recovery activities underway and those programmed to start during the shift. Fancy eyewash slides are not necessary nor worth the time to produce; however, just passing the logbook will not cut it either. Brief oncoming shift personnel as you would wish to be briefed. 2.3.6.3. Disperse and Recall Equipment/Personnel. Equipment and personnel are dispersed to protect them from damage or destruction so they are available for restoring operations after the crisis. Usually, when the disaster or attack is imminent, commanders will review dispersal plans and determine how they apply to the current situation. One of the most crucial factors in conducting an effective dispersal operation is time. The greater the warning before an emergency, the more attractive dispersal becomes as a resource protection option. Therefore, installation leadership will evaluate carefully all warnings regarding potential disasters or enemy actions and whenever possible, make early decisions regarding the feasibility of dispersal. The decision as to whether assets should be dispersed depends upon the perceived impact of the threat and estimates regarding the time available for dispersal. A prudent and judicious process of weighing one risk against the other is necessary to determine if the benefits of dispersal outweigh the costs. For example, dispersing resources may increase protection, but the manpower required to transport those assets may seriously undermine personnel strengths. To illustrate further, dispersing personnel and equipment to high ground across a river may protect these assets from the effects of a flood; but if the flood washes out the connecting bridge, these assets may not be immediately available to support the recovery effort. If commanders 22 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 anticipates regrouping at another location following the emergency, this could be a strong motivating factor for dispersing some of those assets during the pre-disaster or attack phase. The best dispersal plan is only effective if it is tempered by the conditions existing at the time of an emergency. If dispersal is necessary, the following actions should be taken: 2.3.6.3.1. Assemble and organize dispersal forces and provide them with a comprehensive briefing of actions to be taken. Any changes to preplanned dispersal activities should be emphasized. Especially important are changes in dispersal locations, dispersal assets, and dispersal methods. If dispersing off-base, be sure personnel have current maps with alternate routes back to the base marked in case primary routes are blocked. 2.3.6.3.2. Organize dispersal assets and arrange the necessary transportation. This step includes all activities necessary for mobilization of dispersal assets; loading trucks with equipment and materials; fueling equipment that will be driven to the dispersal location; organizing convoys for land movements to dispersal sites off base, arranging airlift support for long-range dispersal; and changing dispersal routes as needed to reflect the current situation. 2.3.6.3.3. Move resources to dispersal sites. Transport assembled assets to the dispersal location as expeditiously as possible. This is especially important to ensure that valuable resources are not exposed, or concentrated in a single location, when the catastrophe strikes. 2.3.6.3.4. Establish and maintain communications with appropriate command center. Dispersed forces must maintain contact with the command center. The command center must be advised of any factors that affect the capability of the dispersed forces to accomplish their post-disaster or post-attack mission. Remember to provide mobile generator support to dispersal sites for powering base station radios, battery chargers, and lighting. Also, include a means of refueling the generators nothing elaborate; portable fuel containers should be sufficient. 2.3.6.3.5. Protect dispersed assets. It is vital that dispersed resources be secured and protected from the effects of a disaster or enemy actions. Otherwise, the purpose of the original dispersal will be defeated and the force could be ineffective in responding when recalled. Depending upon the type of emergency, protective measures could range from boarding up windows and sandbagging to construction of standoff revetments. Plan accordingly; if time will not permit accomplishment of protective measures once arriving at a dispersal location, complete the hardening tasks as one of your preparation actions for disasters or attacks. 2.3.6.3.6. Recall dispersed equipment and personnel. Commanders assess the possibility of a threat recurrence before recalling dispersed assets for recovery actions. He or she may decide to recall only those assets needed for sustained operation of critical functions. 2.3.6.4. Prepositioning Assets. Maintaining COOP after a disaster or attack relies heavily on the availability of assets that support installation response and recovery operations. When there is adequate time to anticipate actions for emergency operations, unit AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 23 leadership considers prepositioning needed assets (e.g., supplies, equipment, vehicles, and support materials) in primary/alternate locations for immediate use in emergencies. These assets provide the CE force with a rapid response capability during consequence management and are needed to protect or sustain personnel, repair damaged infrastructure, and restore operations. Assets may also be prepositioned to support commander-directed base denial operations. The type of prepositioned assets can sometimes affect where they are located. The following paragraphs highlight some examples of prepositioned assets. 2.3.6.4.1. Shelter Assets and Supplies. Whether planned for assigned personnel or an incoming augmenting force, eventually shelter assets and supplies will be prepositioned inside shelter areas. Items could include water, food, bedding, first aid supplies, and hygiene kits for potential occupants. Although water and power for shelters may be readily available through the normal infrastructure, if those utilities are damaged during the event, then bottled water and generator power may be needed. Both of these items should be prepositioned before the need arises. Also, consider having storage containers (e.g., lockers, cabinets, shelving) in the shelters for occupants’ clothing and personal gear. 2.3.6.4.2. ADR Assets. ADR equipment and materials are sometimes prepositioned at main operating bases to increase the crater repair capability at that location. These ADR assets are typically located at theater installations vulnerable to attack but may be staged at less vulnerable bases for potential deployment to other sites, if needed. Prepositioned ADR assets should be dispersed around the installation to help ensure availability after an attack (Figure 2.2). The number of dispersed locations selected depends on the quantity of ADR assets and resources, airfield location/orientation, enemy threat to the airfield, and the anticipated repairs. Figure 2.2. ADR Equipment Convoying from Dispersed Location to Crater Repair Sites 2.3.6.4.3. CBRN Warning and Detection Assets. CBRN warning and detection assets provide units with the ability to detect and protect against a number of CBRN agents. When CBRN threats are present, prepositioning available detectors and alarms in key locations around an installation, (threat detection grid) may permit accurate and early 24 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 detection of CBRN agents and provide commanders more time to implement protective measures. Commanders may also employ warning and detection assets in the aftermath of an attack involving CBRN materials to relay or determine the location of contaminated or uncontaminated areas. Review AFMAN 10-2503 for additional information on CBRN warning and reporting, and detection assets. 2.3.6.4.4. Class IV Construction Materials. Construction materials and supplies for recovery operations may be prepositioned at installations or locations either as minimum stock levels or as separately stored stockpiled items. Adequate security and protection of these materials is essential to ensure they are available when needed. This is especially true for materials placed in open storage or dispersed locations. See Chapter 7 for more information on storing and stockpiling recovery materials. 2.3.6.5. Staging Assets. Generally, staging is the process of assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining materiel in preparation for onward movement. Understandably, the size and scope of staging operations vary and will likely be governed by a number of wide-ranging factors. Staging large forces and equipment for war or response to major disasters is different from staging CE resources for a much smaller, installation or unit emergency response. Furthermore, plans for staging assets may be developed well in advance of a potential crisis or accomplished immediately prior to or after an incident occurs. Regardless, when and how staging is planned or accomplished, engineers are usually heavily involved in the endeavor. 2.3.6.5.1. For major operations, expect the staging process to require a significant amount of preplanning, coordination, and effort, especially if large areas are needed to support huge groups of people and materiel. Large-scale staging operations usually involve all units on an installation and can include activities such as marshaling and lay-down areas, Security Forces (SF), personnel and equipment reception/staging areas and facilities, personnel support, billeting, transportation, material handling equipment, maintenance, general supply and subsistence support, contracting support, communications support, and medical services. 2.3.6.5.2. In contrast to large-scale staging operations, unit commanders can stage CE teams and resources in response to a heightened potential for attack or for an actual event on or near the installation. Furthermore, commanders may consider staging CE assets at dispersed or protected locations before a disaster strikes or an attack to increase their survivability and readiness during recovery operations. In any case, staging assets can enhance recovery capabilities and help ensure COOP after a crisis. 2.3.6.5.3. In emergencies, sometimes hastily developed staging areas are used to accommodate responding forces during the initial incident response phase. These staging areas should be checked for potential hazards prior to or immediately after the arrival of initial response forces to help ensure the staging area and entry control points are free of hazards. CE forces, including FES, EOD, and EM play a significant role in establishing hazard- and contamination-free staging areas. Refer to AFMAN 10-2502, Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) Standards and Procedures, and your installation’s IEMP 10-2 and CE CRP for specific staging guidance. AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 25 Chapter 3 DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS 3.1. General Information. Performing damage assessments is the first step toward restoring critical installation facilities, utilities, and infrastructure to service after an attack or disaster. Specialized damage assessment response teams (DART) and airfield damage assessment teams (ADAT) perform assessments. DARTs help determine the location, type, and extent of damage to most installation facilities and utilities (Figure 3.1), and have a responsibility to isolate damaged utility systems whenever it is possible and practical to do so. During wartime, DARTs report the location, type, and quantity of UXOs discovered following an attack. They also make a quick inspection of ADR equipment and stockpiles; reporting the results of their findings to the ADR Officer-In-Charge (OIC). DART damage assessment reports are forwarded to the CE UCC where they are analyzed and prioritized IAW the installation recovery strategy developed by the EOC. Similar to DARTs, ADATs check and report the condition of the installation’s airfield (i.e., runways, taxiways, ramps, and supporting infrastructure). Since the condition of the airfield has a fundamental and immediate impact on the flying mission, ADATs report their findings directly to the EOC (not CE UCC), to ensure senior leaders and those responsible for Minimum Operating Strip (MOS) selection have instant visibility on airfield condition. Whether DARTs or ADATs; speed and accuracy is essential during damage assessments to help ensure timely base recovery and restoration of installation operations; including flying operations. Figure 3.1. DARTs Assess Damage to Installation Facilities and Utilities 3.2. Overview. This chapter addresses general damage assessment methods and processes; DART organization, leadership, and equipment requirements; and damage assessment recording and reporting. Airfield damage assessments and ADATs receive only cursory mention in this chapter, and readers should refer to AFPAM 10-219, Volume 4, for specific ADAT and airfield damage assessment information. 3.3. Assessment Methods. In the aftermath of a peacetime disaster, major accident, wartime and terrorist attack, or other crisis incident, the approach or method of damage assessment is vital to meeting the goals of the recovery effort. For example, wartime damage assessments are usually conducted and analyzed with an eye on prioritizing expedient repairs of critical facilities 26 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 to restore installation operations quickly. Also during periods of war, repair times may be considered more critical than repair costs, and non-mission critical facilities will likely be completely bypassed during the repair/restoration process. Conversely, when conducting peacetime damage assessments, the focus may be on developing priorities and determining costs of permanent repairs to all facilities damaged during the disaster or accident. Both types of assessments are addressed throughout this chapter. 3.3.1. Installations with active flying operations differentiate airfield damage assessments from facility/infrastructure damage assessments. Airfield damage assessments involve a rapid appraisal of the airfield for damage, including checks of runway surfaces, taxiway surfaces, and other facilities that directly support aircraft operations. On the other hand, facility and infrastructure damage assessments evaluate damage to all other installation infrastructure, including facilities and utilities. Resources permitting, both assessments should be conducted simultaneously and depending on the situation, may be of equal importance. 3.3.2. Damage assessment methods are usually categorized as Preliminary (Phase I) and Detailed (Phase II) assessments. For preliminary assessments, an initial evaluation of the installation is made to quickly locate areas of UXO and major facility and utility damage. The results of this preliminary survey are used to obtain a general idea of overall installation damage and update the preplanned damage assessment routes. A detailed damage assessment requires a more accurate location and description of problems than the preliminary or rapid assessment since these reports will form the basis of repair crew sizing, material and vehicle allocation, damage repair cost estimates, and, to some degree, prioritization of efforts. During detailed assessments, DARTs follow UCC-directed travel routes from their shelter locations to various critical facilities and utilities throughout the installation. The DART reports the severity of damage along these routes and, in particular, at the predetermined critical facilities. DARTs also note and report all hazards; such as, dangerous breaks in gas, electrical, water and sewer lines; road perils; UXOs; etc. All affected areas should be recorded on a base map maintained in the CE UCC. See paragraph 3.5 for a closer look at preliminary and detailed damage assessment practices, priorities and reporting procedures. 3.3.3. In addition to the damage assessment procedures addressed in this section, UFC 1- 201-02, Assessment of Existing Facilities for Use In Military Operations, is a good source of information for performing preliminary and detailed facility assessments. It provides contingency personnel with procedures to assess facilities to determine if buildings meet the minimum life safety and habitability requirements to permit occupancy in support of military operations. It also provides options for mitigating risks when deficiencies exists. 3.4. DART Organization, Leadership, and Equipment. The number of DARTs established depends, for the most part, on the size of the installation to be surveyed. Three teams should be sufficient for an average size installation. While manpower assets from Prime BEEF teams configured in a warfighting force posture can support a three-team requirement, the number of teams required for damage assessment should be based upon factors such as:  Facility type/size  Type/size of utility systems  Number of facilities  Geographical separation of facilities AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 27 3.4.1. Organization. Reflected in Table 3.1 is an example of basic DART composition. Do not hesitate to tailor the skill mix and number to the installation’s facility and utility situation. For example, if the installation has a large petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) complex and tank farm, consider adding or substituting a Water and Fuels System Maintenance (WFSM) person for another craftsman on one of the teams. If a civilian work force is available, use to fill needed positions on teams or to field additional teams. For safety reasons, DARTs should never have less than two qualified individuals at all times. See AFPAM 10-219, Volume 1 for more information on the composition of DARTs and other CE response teams. Table 3.1. Example of Basic DART Composition DART Composition AFSC Title # Personnel 3E371 Structural Craftsman 1 3E071 Electrical System Craftsman 1 3E471 WFSM Craftsman 1 3.4.2. Leadership. The senior military member or civilian assigned to the DART is responsible for organizing and directing the team’s assessment operation. Ideally, individuals chosen to head DARTs should be knowledgeable of the type damage to be assessed (e.g., electrical, mechanical, and structural). Team leaders ensure DARTs: 3.4.2.1. Maintain communication with the UCC. 3.4.2.2. Survey incident/accident sites and compile preliminary and detailed damage assessment survey data. When incidents involve multiple locations/facilities, establish survey sequence using the installation’s facility priority list. 3.4.2.3. Report immediately to the UCC all situations posing an immediate threat to public safety (e.g., downed power lines, gas leaks, collapsing structures, fires). 3.4.2.4. Survey assigned areas, record damage on damage assessment worksheet(s) and transmit survey data information to the UCC. 3.4.2.5. Complete initial isolation or shutdown of utilities to prevent further damage or injury if within the capabilities of the DART. 3.4.2.6. Return to the UCC when directed and provide detailed damage assessment data. Also, maintain all worksheets/photos for the detailed damage assessment and for historical purposes. 3.4.2.7. Request any non-CE support through the UCC. 3.4.3. Equipment. Equipment for DART support should be assembled during the attack preparedness phase. The specific types and quantities of support equipment depend on installation requirements and how the assessment will be conducted. Dedicated vehicle support for assessment team operations is virtually mandatory; however, the possibility exists that assessment may have to be accomplished on foot if many vehicles are destroyed or roads are seriously blocked. In such cases, teams will be severely limited in what they can perform in the way of utility isolation, and their assessment time will be greatly lengthened. Although 28 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 not all-inclusive or mandatory, Table 3.2 lists typical equipment and supplies for personnel performing DART tasks. Note: Items in this list do not constitute new purchase requirements. Consult with unit POCs for specific DART requirements, funding and logistics authority. Table 3.2. Typical DART Equipment and Supplies DART Support Equipment Personal protective equipment (PPE) and/or individual protective equipment (IPE): (e.g., hard hats, gloves, safety glasses, rubber boots (flooded areas), reflective vests, chemical warfare ensemble, helmet, body armor) Data recording/reporting equipment (mobile device/computer w/GIS data loaded, small digital camera, if provided), priority facility list, base map/installation grid maps, utility drawings, damage assessment worksheets/forms, clipboards, writing implements, radios w/spare batteries Binoculars and night vision devices Utilities isolation tools and gear such as electrical hot sticks, fuse pullers, and valve keys Global positioning system equipment/directional compass Miscellaneous equipment such as explosion-proof, plastic-cased flashlights, hand tools, nonmetallic measuring tapes, surveyors tape (multiple colors), flags, UXO markers, utility shutoff markers, and first aid kit 3.5. Assessment Practices, Priorities and Reporting. DARTs begin attack or disaster recovery assessments when directed by the commander (usually through the EOC or UCC after declaration of “Alarm Black” condition or “All Clear”). Upon notification, DART members should report to their designated assembly area or an alternate location as directed by the UCC. Conduct preliminary and detailed damage assessments as indicated below. For additional, comprehensive facility assessment procedures and checklists, see UFC 1-201-02. 3.5.1. Preliminary Assessment (Phase I). The purpose of the preliminary damage assessment is to assess the recovery environment quickly and identify areas of major utility and facility disruption. The preliminary assessment should also identify any readily apparent life safety hazards. Note: If possible, preliminary damage assessments during peacetime should be completed within the first few hours of daylight that it is safe to have personnel out following the disaster. 3.5.1.1. When making preliminary reports, exact damage descriptions and measurements are not expected, so information should be of a general nature (e.g., roof damage, broken windows). Preselected observation posts can provide information on visible facility and utility damages using expedient modes of communication (e.g., radio/telephone contact with UCCs and the EOC). The preliminary damage assessment will set the pace for the recovery effort. During preliminary assessments, DARTs should: 3.5.1.1.1. Perform a rapid and safe base assessment 3.5.1.1.2. Identify damage by building category and general description AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 29 3.5.1.1.3. Use locally approved DART worksheets to document assessments (See Attachment 3 for examples of preliminary damage assessment worksheets) 3.5.1.1.4. Report limiting factors for emergency response vehicles (e.g., blocked road, bridge) 3.5.1.1.5. Provide inputs to the UCC 3.5.1.2. In addition to DART preliminary reporting, the CE UCC should expect installation-wide reports and inputs from personnel who are not trained or familiar with damage assessment reporting requirements. Much of the information received will be inaccurate; therefore, UCC personnel will have to be prepared to ask the right questions and clarify any contradictory inputs. Expect to receive damage inputs from all types of communications modes—runners, the installation telephone system, other C2 centers, and the EOC. 3.5.1.3. During wartime assessments after an installation attack, the UCC should be prepared for plenty of confusing UXO reports. Many personnel do not have an EOR background or experience. Most inputs will probably be in terms of generalities, so close questioning will have to be done to ascertain the type of munitions that will be encountered. The CE UCC will use the UXO information and other data obtained during the Phase I initial reconnaissance to adjust DART routes as appropriate. Afterwards, Phase II assessments begin. 3.5.2. Detailed Assessment (Phase II). Once preliminary damage assessment is complete and the UCC has a rough estimate of overall base damage, the next step is to perform a detailed assessment of damaged facilities. The Phase II damage assessment can be highly dangerous and perhaps time-consuming, depending upon the extent of the damage and size of the installation. In both attack and disaster recovery environments, DARTs serve as the eyes and ears of the UCC. The interface between these two functions should be close since the entire installation recovery effort; from a facility and utility aspect, hinges on their efficiency and effectiveness. The following paragraphs address both peacetime disasters and installation attacks, unless otherwise noted. 3.5.2.1. DARTs should physically inspect and record the damage to each facility using locally developed, pre-formatted DART worksheets. Worksheets serve as source documents for what the DART has observed (See Attachment 3 for examples of damage assessment worksheets). 3.5.2.2. If safety permits, DARTs should inspect accessible areas of facilities. Damage to built-up roofs, remote storage facilities and other locations not readily visible could go undetected for days unless inspection criteria are clearly defined. Comprehensive worksheets and checklists can help ensure DARTs inspect all required areas within the facility. Any damage detected should be reported in units (e.g., windows, doors), square footage (e.g., roofs, exterior/interior walls), or linear footage (e.g., piping, ductwork, fencing), as applicable. 3.5.2.3. To ensure required facilities are inspected by DARTs, the UCC should set goals and chart completion of inspections. Records from previous incidents or lessons learned may help provide realistic timelines and goals. Since it is important to know how well the detailed damage assessment process is proceeding, it may be helpful to post a chart in the 30 AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 UCC indicating progress or status of assessments. Table 3.3 is a notional chart indicating daily progress or achievement. Table 3.3. DART Detailed Facility Assessments Progress (Notional) 3.5.2.4. During peacetime, damage assessment goals are to develop repair priorities and determine the cost of repairing all facilities damaged in the disaster. While an installation’s immediate priority following any natural disaster will rightfully be centered on rescuing personnel and stabilizing facilities to protect against further damage; typically, the debris will have barely settled before the first requests for a damage estimate arrives. The sooner an installation can provide a substantiated damage estimate, the sooner it can expect emergency funding for disaster repairs. Data provided by DARTs is vital to estimating repair costs and authenticating overall damage estimates. 3.5.2.5. Sometimes, due to DART inexperience or lack of practice, initial damage assessment reports may not contain all the information needed to prepare a complete cost estimate. As a result, DARTs may need to return to some facilities to collect additional information for cost estimators. However, repair costs are not the immediate concern during wartime; the unit’s main objective is to restore installation operations quickly. On the other hand, during peacetime, a complete cost estimate after a disaster is vital to gaining the necessary funds to repair or replace damaged infrastructure. For this reason, consider having DARTs submit assessment data to cost estimators in the UCC after initially performing only one or two assessments. Once the information supports accurate repair cost estimates, set the number of facilities DARTs should assess before submitting them to the UCC. For example, consider having DARTs submit damage assessment data after completing 5 to 7 facility assessments at a time. This may help minimize lost time revisiting damaged facilities to collect additional information. 3.5.2.6. Using the data from the DART worksheets, trained estimators compute the dollar estimates for each facility damaged. For peacetime disasters, repair costs should present a realistic appraisal of the damage done by the disaster. All damage caused by the disaster should be included, but the cost should not include any problems caused by age, AFPAM10-219V3 7 MAY 2015 31 change of use, or other outside factors. Repair costs are provided to the MAJCOM and HQ USAF and should be complete, accurate, timely, and justifiable. 3.5.3. Typical DART Attack Recovery Actions. Damage assessments performed after an installation attack have a different focus than peacetime, they can also be more challenging due to a multitude of wartime effects and threats; e.g., CBRN hazards, UXOs, major fires, bomb-damaged infrastructure, additional attacks, and personnel/equipment attrition. These types of wartime challenges must be considered when executing DART activities. The typical sequence of DART actions following an attack is as follows: 3.5.3.1. The UCC gathers initial damage reports and annotates appropriate inf

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