CRJ 1010 Lecture Transcript PDF

SPEAKER 0 Greetings everyone. Today we're going to continue our discussion of police and the law. I'm going to talk about the Fourth Amendment and use of force. Terry stops and then cover some key concepts. So far, we've discussed cases that dealt with the Fourth Amendment and searches of defendant...

SPEAKER 0 Greetings everyone. Today we're going to continue our discussion of police and the law. I'm going to talk about the Fourth Amendment and use of force. Terry stops and then cover some key concepts. So far, we've discussed cases that dealt with the Fourth Amendment and searches of defendants homes or automobiles or electronic data. Today, we're going to discuss some Fourth Amendment cases that deal with the use of force. Often I hear people say that when an officer uses excessive force, it's a violation of the recipient's Eighth Amendment right. However, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to protect individuals who are being punished by the system, meaning those that have been convicted of a crime. According to the United States Supreme Court, when a police officer uses excessive force, the victim has suffered an unreasonable seizure. It was not until the 1980s that courts began reining in police power to use deadly force. Prior to 1985, police could essentially use whatever force was necessary to capture and arrest a fleeing felon, including deadly force. But in 1985, in Tennessee versus Garner, the United States Supreme Court began to place parameters on the use of deadly force. So during the chase, police officer Elton Hyman shot 15 year old Eugene Edward Eugene Garner with a hollow tip bullet to prevent Garner from escaping over a fence. Garner was suspected of burglarizing a nearby house. Hyman admitted that before he shot, he saw no evidence that Garner was armed and figured he was unarmed. The bullet hit Garner in the back of the head. Garner was taken to the hospital, where he died a short time later. Garner's father sued, seeking damages for violation of Garner's constitutional rights. The US District Court of the Western District of Tennessee entered judgment for the defendants because Tennessee's law authorized Hyman's actions. The court also felt that Garner had assumed the risk of being shot by recklessly attempting to escape. Garner's father appealed, and the US Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that killing a fleeing suspect is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and such a seizure would only be reasonable if the suspect posed a threat to the safety of police officers or the community at large. The state of Tennessee then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the court decided to hear the case. The question before the court was, does a statute authorizing the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of any fleeing suspect violate the Fourth Amendment? In A63 decision, just as Byron White wrote for the majority affirming the Court of Appeals decision. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of deadly force unless it is necessary to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon, and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of violence to the officer or the community. The Tennessee statute was unconstitutional as far as it allowed deadly force to prevent the escape of an unarmed fleeing felon. The notion of significant threat is somewhat ambiguous. What is threatening to you might not be threatening to me, and vice versa. As noted in the text, the standard set by Tennessee v Garner presents problems because it can be difficult to judge how dangerous a suspect may be. Officers must make quick decisions in stressful situations, and for this, the Supreme Court and other courts cannot create clear rules that will guide police in every context that arises. However, to clarify the rules for police, the Supreme Court. Justices also established the standard of objective reasonableness, saying that the officer's use of deadly force should be judged in terms of its reasonableness for the specific situation that confronts the officer. In 1989 and Graham v O'Connor, the Supreme Court dealt further with the use of force issue. On November 12th, 1984, the throne. Graham, a diabetic, had an insulin reaction while doing auto work at his home. He asked a friend to drive him to a convenience store in order to purchase some orange juice to counter his reaction when they arrived at the store. Graham rapidly left the car. He entered the store and saw a line of 4 or 5 persons at the counter. Not wanting to wait in line, he quickly left the store and returned to his friend's car. Officer Conner, a Charlotte police officer, observed Graham entering and exiting the store unusually quickly. He followed the car and pulled it over about a half mile away. Graham, still suffering from an insulin reaction, exited the car and ran around it twice. His friend Barry and the officer stopped Graham and sat him on the curb. He soon passed out. When he was revived, he was handcuffed, lying face down on the sidewalk. Several more police officers were present by this time. The officers picked up Graham, still handcuffed, and placed him over the hood of the car. Graham attempted to reach for his wallet to show his diabetic identification, and an officer shoved his head into the hood and told him to shut up. The police then struggled to place Graham in the squad car over Graham's vigorous resistance officer. Officer Connor soon determined, however, that Graham had not committed a crime at the convenience store and returned him to his home. Graham sustained multiple injuries, including a broken foot as a result of the incident. Grand filed charges against the police and the City of Charlotte, alleging violation of his rights by the excessive use of force by the police officers. Unlawful assault, unlawful resistance, um consulting and consisting in false imprisonment, and that the City of Charlotte improperly trained its officers in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The City of Charlotte filed a motion for a direct directed verdict. Here, the city was asking the judge to review whether they, there are legally sufficient evidence to substantiate his rights, were violated, the child read. The trial judge granted the city's request and determined that there were no there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to reach a different conclusion. Graham appealed the ruling on the use of excessive force, arguing for a standard of objective projective reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the directed verdict. He then applied to the United States United States Supreme Court, who agreed to hear his case, and so the question before the court was, Must Graham show that the police acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing him harm, to establish his claim that Charlotte police used excessive force, and secondarily, must Graham's claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force be examined under the Fourth Amendment. Objective reasonableness standard. In a unanimous ruling written by Justice William Rehnquist, the court held that claims of excessive force used by government officials are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard. The court vacated the directed verdict and remanded the case to the district court to be decided by that standard. The court noted the Fourth Amendment stands as one of the two primary sources of protection against physically abusive government conduct, along with the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the validity of Graham's claim must be judged by reference to the specific rights conferred by the Fourth Amendment, not by a generalized excessive force standard. Further, the court explained that the objective reasonableness of a use of force should be judged by the perspective of an officer on the scene, and should take into account factors such as the severity of the crime, threat posed by the suspect, and any attempts by the suspect to resist or evade arrest, regardless of officer intent, meaning officers do not need to act maliciously for force to be Unreasonable. When it comes to seizures, the Supreme Court focuses on the nature and extent of officers interference with people's liberties and freedom of movement. If people voluntarily stop in order to speak with an officer, they have not been seized because they are free to move along their way whenever they choose. However, if officers assert their authority to halt that individual's movement, then a seizure has occurred and the Fourth Amendment requirements requires that the seizure be reasonable. One form of seizure is an arrest which involves taking a suspect into custody. Property can also be subject to seizure, especially if it's evidence in, um, a criminal case. A stop, on the other hand, is different. If you get pulled over for speeding, that is considered to be a stop. But excessively long traffic stops might violate the motorist's Fourth Amendment rights. According to the United States Supreme Court. For example, in Rodriguez Versus the United States, which was heard in 2015, the court ruled that police violate the Fourth Amendment if they prolong a driver's stay at a traffic stop for the purpose of waiting for a drug sniffing dog to arrive on scene. So a stop is defined as a brief interference with a person's freedom of movement for a duration that can be measured in minutes, usually under an hour. So in 2015, when, um, the court heard Rodriguez versus the United States, they were dealing with a K-9 officer who stopped Rodriguez for driving on a highway shoulder, which is a violation of Nebraska law. The officer attended to everything relating to the stop, including checking the driver's license of Rodriguez and his passenger and issuing a warning. He then sought permission to walk his dog around the vehicle. Rodriguez refused. The officer detained him until another officer arrived, then retrieved his dog, who alerted to the presence of drugs. The ensuing search revealed methamphetamine. At this point, 7 or 8 minutes had elapsed from the time the officer issued the warning until the dog alerted. Rodriguez was indicted. Rodriguez defense moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the officer had prolonged the stop without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, characterizing the delay as a de minimis intrusion on personal liberty, meaning a very limited intrusion. His defense appealed to the United States Supreme Court, who agreed to hear the case and the question before the court was, is the use of a K-9 unit after the conclusion of a traffic stop and without reasonable suspicion for criminal activity, a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures in A63 majority, the court held that the use of a K-9 unit after the completion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop exceeded the time reasonably required to handle the matter, and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Because the mission of the stop determines its allowable duration, the authority for the stop ends when the mission has been accomplished. The court held that a seizure unrelated to the reason for the stop is lawful only so long as it does not measurably extend the stops duration. Although the use of a K-9 unit may cause only a small extension of the stop, it is not fairly characterized as connected to the mission of an ordinary traffic stop and is therefore unlawful. This ruling clearly indicates the court at that time was really focused on protecting citizens rights. The K9 search only added 7 to 8 minutes, and the court said that it was excessive because the stop had technically already concluded before the canine was brought in. And I think this was a clear message that fishing, you know, fishing expeditions will not be tolerated, that police need to have articulable information, um, to provide a basis for a search. If the officer had probable cause, a reasonable suspicion, that is a different story. But it sounds like he was just looking for something because he thought he could and the court said otherwise. So when we talk about reasonable suspicion, I'm talking about an officer's belief based on articulable facts that would be recognized by others in a similar situation, that criminality is afoot and necessitates further investigation that will intrude on an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. So officers cannot legally make stops based on hunches. They must be able to describe specific aspects of the person's appearance, behavior, and circumstances that led them to conclude that the person should be stopped in order to investigate the occurrence of a potential crime, but courts permit police officers to make many kinds of stops without reasonable suspicion, for example, at border crossings where it is especially important to prevent illegal activities such as smuggling and drug trafficking, officers make stops without reasonable suspicion. Thus, everyone can be stopped in certain situations, even if there is no specific basis to suspect them of wrongdoing. One case we can review that dealt with reasonable suspicion is Terry v Ohio from 1968. And here in this case, Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden was patrolling and plain clothed in downtown Cleveland. At approximately 230 in the afternoon on October 31st, 1963. He observed Terry and two other men and what he believed to be casing a job for a stickup. McFadden stopped and frisked the three men and found weapons on two of them. The men were arrested at trial. The defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on a Fourth Amendment violation. The court denied their motion to suppress and they were found guilty. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial Judicial District in Cuyahoga and Cuyahoga County affirmed the district court's decision. The defendants appealed to the Ohio State Supreme Court, and the court dismissed their claim on the ground that no substantial constitutional question was involved. Finally, the defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the question before the court was was the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In an eight one decision, the court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seize could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the court found that the officer acted on more than a hunch and that a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing Terry was armed, and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior. The court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety. Incident to the investigation. So again, the court is saying if an officer believes based on articulable facts that would be recognized by others in a similar situation, that criminality is afoot and necessitates further investigation that will intrude on the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. It is lawful, however, um, if they cannot articulate those facts, then the search or the um stop would be, um, unlawful. And there's something important, also important about this case. We see that Thurgood Marshall, the first African American Supreme Court justice, was on the court and help decide this landmark case. So Thurgood Marshall graduated from Lincoln University in Oxford, Pennsylvania, in 1930 before attending law school. He wanted to go to the University of Maryland for law school, but was denied because the color of his skin. As a result, he attended Harvard. Howard. Pardon me. Howard University. Marshall graduated as valedictorian of his class in 1933 and moved back to Baltimore, Maryland. He turned down a post-graduate scholarship to Harvard in order to start his own practice, and opened an office in East Baltimore. A few people did come to him for help, though unable to pay. Marshall turned none of them away. He began to develop his style as he took cases dealing with police brutality, evictions, and harsh landlords. As his name began to gain notice, he earned big clients such as labor organizations, building associations, and corporations. Marshall started to volunteer with the NAACP and eventually became one of their attorneys. He won his first case, arguing that the University of Maryland Law School should allow an African American admissions. Remember, he was turned down from that law school because he was African African-American. He continued to fight for civil rights, and in 1952 he finally got the case he had been hoping for and argued Brown b Brown v the Board of Education before the United States Supreme Court. The case was reviewed in 1953, and after five months of waiting, the Supreme Court delivered its opinion that invalidated the separate but equal doctrine. In 1961, President Kennedy appointed Marshall as a federal judge to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York City, where he spent four years. In 1965, President Johnson called upon Marshall to be the country's next Solicitor General, and he was in that role for two years. In 1967, the president appointed him as the first African American to be an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court. As a lawyer, and while on the bench, he staunchly supported upholding individuals rights, expanding civil rights, and limiting the scope of criminal punishment. He spent 24 years on the United States Supreme Court, retiring in 1991. So it wasn't until 1967 that we saw the first African American appointed to the United States Supreme Court in the United States, and Thurgood Marshall was obviously a staunch, um, opponent, uh, a proponent, pardon me, of individual rights in fighting for individuals to receive fair and equal treatment. When talking about probable cause, we're talking about reliable information indicating that it is more likely than not that evidence will be found in a specific location, or that a specific person is guilty of a crime. To obtain arrest warrant and arrest warrant, the police must provide a judicial officer with sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause. Obviously, officers on the street do not have time to ask a judge to sign an arrest warrant in the moment. So when police make an unplanned arrest, a judge subsequently examines the arrest for probable cause and a hearing that must occur shortly after the arrest, typically within 48 hours. If the judge determines that probable cause existed, the suspect's arrest is upheld. If it is determined that probable cause did not exist, the suspect is released from custody. This slide and the next two slides deal with, um, warrantless searches instances in which officers can, um, search something without a warrant. I'm not going to cover any of these cases in detail, but I have provided the, um, the case or the court case title as well as the decision for you to review. I think it goes without saying that if I'm presenting this in a, in a lecture, you should definitely, um, Take note and be familiar with with these cases. And they deal with a variety of different contexts. So again, I'm not going to cover them in detail. You can pause and write down the information as you see fit. As I scroll through the next two slides. That concludes our discussion of police and law. As always, if you have any questions, drop them in the discussion board on canvas or send me an email. Have a great week!