Hong Kong Poverty Situation Report 2019 PDF

70 Defining poverty- The Poverty Line (Hong Kong, 2019)  (ES.4) Commission on Poverty adopts:  ‘relative poverty’ - Poverty line set at 50% of the median monthly household income before policy intervention (before taxation and social welfare transfer). (CSSA Income: HKD2,455)...

70 Defining poverty- The Poverty Line (Hong Kong, 2019)  (ES.4) Commission on Poverty adopts:  ‘relative poverty’ - Poverty line set at 50% of the median monthly household income before policy intervention (before taxation and social welfare transfer). (CSSA Income: HKD2,455) Hong Kong Poverty Situation Report 2019. https://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B9XX0005E2019AN19E0100.pdf  2019 Poor Poor Poverty households population rate Post-intervention 0.287 million 0.642 9.2% (recurrent cash million measures, non- persons recurrent cash measures, means- tested in-kind benefits) Pre-intervention 0.649 million 1.491 21.4% (purely theoretical million assumption) persons Source: General Household Survey, Census and Statistics Department. Hong Kong Poverty Situation Report 2019. https://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B9XX0005E2019AN19E0100.pdf Hong Kong Poverty Situation Report 2019. p.21 https://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B9XX0005E2019AN19E0100.pdf  Welfare model of Hong Kong (recap)  Colonial past  Political domination + social stability  a paradoxical situation: strong state role as the financier and provider of services (public health; education; housing since 1950s) than just regulator vs. limited state capacity as adheres to ‘small government’ ideology.  Hong Kong – residual welfare state as highly institutionalized practices since 1970s:  (former) Colonial interest (crisis of legitimacy, stability)  Financial conservatism (running as a colony yet low tax rate)  Economic non-interventionism (Milton Friedman) Lee, W.Y. Eliza. 2005. “The Politics of Welfare Developmentalism in Hong Kong.” Social Policy and Development Programme Paper no.21, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Welfare model of Hong Kong (recap)  ‘Trickle down’ effect – welfare model requires high economic growth rate to boost government revenue.   Ideological rejection of welfare as a social right.   Emphasize on self-reliance.   Consider family as informal carer.  E.g. very rare government ads advocating ‘welfare’ as a citizen right. But lots of ads to emphasize ‘family’ as the social basis to solve social problems. (Lee 2005) Productivist Welfare Capitalism (Ian Holliday) (recap)  East Asian welfare model – Hong Kong, ‘facilitative’ subtype, features:  Social policy subordinate to economic policy  Social rights: minimal and extensions linked to productive activity (e.g. Manuel Castells’s PRH)  Stratification effect: limited, to reinforce productive elements (e.g. factory workers in the past)  State-market-family relationship: overriding growth objectives (growth oriented or ‘market prioritized’)  E.g. In 1999 government introduced the Lump Sum Grant System – a market oriented flexible funding model, a quasi-market has been developed by ‘contracting out’, social service with competitive bidding by NGOs and private sector. (Lee 2005) Holliday, I. (2000). Productivist welfare capitalism: Social policy in East Asia. Political studies, 48(4), 706-723.  Post-1997 poverty policy issues:  Overreliance on promotion of economic development and investment in human capital.  Hoping the ‘universal education’ (but still low university admission rate) could allow upward social mobility for the poor to escape from poverty.  Neglects the problem of working poor and social exclusion. Wong, Hung. 2007. “Misled Intervention by a Misplaced Diagnosis: The HKSAR Government’s Policies for Alleviating Poverty and Social Exclusion.” China Review 7(2): 123-147.  How welfare model impacts on poverty in Hong Kong Micro level discourse (government):  No poverty line has ever been set until 2013. Rather, government frequently incited the ‘culture of poverty’ to curb social expenses.  Culture of poverty - dependency culture (welfare - HK no.1 free economy and its cultural impact)  Gov. emphasizes itself as ‘last defense’ after ‘family’ and ‘individual’.  Result: 330,000 elders qualified for Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (綜援), only 57% are doing so. (Oxfam HK) Wong, Hung. 2015. The hope of poverty eradication: Examination of poverty problem in Hong Kong (Revised Edition) (「無窮」的盼望: 香港貧窮問題探析增訂版). Hong Kong: Chung Hwa Book Co. (in Chinese).  Explaining Poverty in HK:  Globalization   Foreign direct investment (FDI) + deindustrialization   global city + polarized service sector   working poor (flexible employment, part-time, informal), not enough for even food support? Wong, Hung. 2015. The hope of poverty eradication: Examination of poverty problem in Hong Kong (Revised Edition) (「無窮」的盼望: 香港貧窮問題探析增訂版). Hong Kong: Chung Hwa Book Co. (in Chinese).  10mins http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20060428/5872199 break Wong, Hung. 2007. “Misled Intervention by a Misplaced Diagnosis: The HKSAR Government’s Policies for Alleviating Poverty and Social Exclusion.” China Review 7(2): 123-147. Class activity: surviving Hong Kong - Part I and Part II https://padlet.com/kentlkw1/remake-of-surviving-hong-kong-i2xo2jylhp3ysp6u  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 60k+50k 55k+40k 25k+20k 20k+14k 15k+0 8k+10.5k Household 110k 95k 45k 34k 15k 18.5k income Total % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) expenses % income Food % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) expenses% Housing % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) expenses% Traffic % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) expenses% Other % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) % (k) expenses% Possible Impacts of Living in Poverty in HK?  Deprivation  Social exclusion  (the lack of) social capital  Subjective poverty (identity, efficacy)  Intersect with gender, ethnicity/race, age 84 85 86  S.D. - Inequality  strain/frustration  social movement (displacement)?  Social frustration = input far greater resulting outcome  Social fairness = a sense of social fairness refers to perceptions of the existence of procedural justice, a fair distribution of wealth, social equality, and equality of opportunity for upward social mobility.  “Do you think that there are sufficient opportunities for young people to move upward?  Individual fairness = an individual’s feelings about the effort or input that he/she makes in relation to the result or outcome.  “Do you think that your living standard is fair compared with the efforts that you put into your job?” Zheng, V., Hsiao, H. H. M., Wan, P. S., & Wong, K. (2020). Young people’s sense of fairness and social action: A survey analysis of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 5(3), 270-287. 87 Zheng, V., Hsiao, H. H. M., Wan, P. S., & Wong, K. (2020). Young people’s sense of fairness and social action: A survey analysis of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 5(3), 270-287. 88  Frustrated youth are the majority Zheng, V., Hsiao, H. H. M., Wan, P. S., & Wong, K. (2020). Young people’s sense of fairness and social action: A survey analysis of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 5(3), 270-287. 89 S.D. - Inequality  strain/frustration  social movement (displacement)?  Research suggests ‘young people in Taiwan and Hong Kong have higher levels of frustration and show greater tolerance and acceptance towards radical confrontational approaches than those in Macao.’  ‘young people with a higher level of both social and individual unfairness display more interest in local politics, are more likely to take part in social movements, and are more inclined to agree to a radical confrontational approach.’ Zheng, V., Hsiao, H. H. M., Wan, P. S., & Wong, K. (2020). Young people’s sense of fairness and social action: A survey analysis of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 5(3), 270-287. 90 H.D.1: Does Inequality Matters?: HK-Taiwan society Comparisons  Note: Gini coeff. in 2006 HK=.533 TW=.339 3.8 HK TW 3.7 P 3.6 I I 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Year PII: Perceived Income Inequality Wong, Kevin T. W. and Jackson K. H. Yeh. 2013. “Perceived income inequality and its political consequences in Hong Kong and Taiwan from 2003 to 2009,” in Facing Challenges: A Comparison of Taiwan and Hong Kong (eds. W. S. Yang & P. S. Wan). Taipei: Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, pp. 237–266. (In Chinese) 91 H.D. 1: Does Inequality Matters?: HK-Taiwan society Comparisons  Perceived income inequality in Taiwan is higher than in Hong Kong. Why?  Influenced by the trend of income inequality more then the level of rise in income inequality.  Change of Gini coefficient between 1996 and 2006  Hong Kong: 2.81%  severe, but less felt.  Taiwan: 6.94% (increasing) Wong, Kevin T. W. and Jackson K. H. Yeh. 2013. “Perceived income inequality and its political consequences in Hong Kong and Taiwan from 2003 to 2009,” in Facing Challenges: A Comparison of Taiwan and Hong Kong (eds. W. S. Yang & P. S. Wan). Taipei: Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, pp. 237–266. (In Chinese) 92  H.D. 2: Social movements and political opportunity structure  1. social movements are structured by the institutional environment wherein they are embedded;  2. their development is both constrained and enabled by the existing political opportunity structures, and  3. they interact with the broader political environment and in their turn, are able to impact on the institutional setting and create opportunities for collective action. Lui, Tai-lok and Stephen Wing-kai Chiu. 2000. “Introduction – changing political opportunities and the shaping of collective action: Social movements in Hong Kong.” P.1-20 in Wing-kai Chiu and Tai-lok Lui (edited) The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press 93 H.D. “Political Opportunity Structure”  “Political opportunity (structure, POS) denotes the consistent dimensions of the political environment, or, of changes in the environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting expectations for success or failure” (Chiu and Li 2014) (e.g. football match)  Static view: Open POS/ Closed POS  Dynamic view: opening/constraining Chiu, Stephen Wing-kai and Li Hang. 2014. Contentious Politics in Two Villages. Anti- High-Speed-Rail Campaigns in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Occasional Paper 230.Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. 94 Changes of Political Opportunity Structure: 1970s – opening  “Political climate” after 1966 and 1967 riots  “Consultative democracy” political arrangement  Establishment of the City District Officer (CDO) Scheme  Changing labor legislation  Provision of Youth Services  ‘Grass Roots’ politics in formation.  See: King, Ambrose Yeo-chi. 1975. “Administrative absorption of politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots level.” Asian Survey 15(5):422-439. 95 https://theinitium.com/article/20150919-opinion-residence-movement-council/ 96 Changes of Political Opportunity Structure: 1980s-1997: further opening  Decolonization  Initiation of political reforms.  Constitutional matters appeared on the agenda of local social movements.  Political parties were formed.  Increasingly focused on the electoral politics.  “Hallowing out” of political organizations at the grass-roots level. 97 The Last Governor of HK  1982 Hong Kong District Board Elections – 18 districts  1985 Hong Kong LegCo Election – indirect;1st representative democracy in HK  Chris Patten’s electoral reform (1994) (新九組): broadened electorate base: include ‘all’ eligible voters, and direct vote (occupation listed in 1991 HK Census)  Broadened to 2.7 millions new voters in 1995 LegCo. 98 Changing Political Opportunity 1997-2009 1970s-1980s 1980s-1997 Chiu, Stephen Wing-kai and Li Hang. 2014. Contentious Politics in Two Villages. Anti- High-Speed-Rail Campaigns in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Occasional Paper 230.Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. 99 Changes of Political Opportunity Structure: 1997–2009: constraining?  Democratization remain stagnant after handover.  Political parties found they can only play a minor role in structuring political terrain (no through train amid 1997).  Unbridgeable gaps between grassroots and political parties (mostly professionals)  Head of Government (Tung) Vs. Head of Civil Servants (Chan) – political stagnant at higher level?  Government’s less favorable responses: The effectiveness of consultative channels declined.  H.D. 2 for extra-institutional social and political mobilization? 100 101  Changing Political Opportunity + Social Inequality Hong Kong (1970s-2009) 1970s-1997 1997-2009 1. Institutionalized Increasingly Less, or more, political system accessible accessible? 2. Stability of elite Unstable (mixed Stable (largely pro alignments loyalty before 1997) establishment)? 3. State’s response Increasingly Less, or more, to social movements favorable favorable? Political opportunity Expanding (1970s- Constraining (path structure 1980s paths A and B) or expanding 1980s-1997 paths (path D)? D) 102