Acquisition MI PDF
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Military Institute of Science and Technology
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Summary
This document discusses the methods used by intelligence agencies for the recruitment of agents and couriers. It covers different types of agents, including motivated, penetration, and exploited agents, and details the recruitment process, from talent spotting to verification and enrollment. The document also describes various means of interaction with target populations and considerations for agent recruitment in target areas.
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RESTRICTED CONTENTS Chapter Subject Page No Numbe r 1. Recruitment of Agents and Couriers 2 2. Training of Agents 16 3. Operation of Intelligenc...
RESTRICTED CONTENTS Chapter Subject Page No Numbe r 1. Recruitment of Agents and Couriers 2 2. Training of Agents 16 3. Operation of Intelligence Network 21 4. Illegal Traders and their Potential for Espionage 29 5. Cover Planning 34 6. Safe House 41 7. Briefing and Debriefing of Agents 45 8. Launching and Deinduction 58 9. Communication with Agents 64 10. Agent / Courier Records 72 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED CHAPTER 1 RECRUITMENT OF AGENTS AND COURIERS Introduction 1. Intelligence agencies adopt various methods to acquire information of the terrorist group / enemy. The methods adopted by intelligence agency to acquire information include electronic means, signal, imagery and human agents. These means lead to subsets of intelligence which are Electronic Intelligence, Signal Intelligence, Imagery intelligence and Human intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT is the oldest and the most important subset of information acquisition. HUMINT is restricted to acquisition of information by persons through interaction with other individuals. It supports the other forms of acquisition of information to build upon a intelligence picture. HUMINT accomplishes the task by operating a human intelligence network. This network comprises of agents and couriers, who acquire and pass the desired information from the target area. The intelligence agencies in their effort to run the effective human intelligence network go very deliberately in selecting the desired agents and couriers. 2. The most appropriate individuals for recruitment are those who have accessibility to the desired information in target area. Deliberate and careful selection of such persons assumes utmost importance. Therefore it warrants a thorough knowledge of theoretical and practical issues involved in the various stages of recruitment. Efforts are likely to fructify only if the right persons are identified and recruited. Apart from the above it is important to ensure the safety and security of the agents / couriers. At the same time faulty selection and casual approach would be a retrograde step resulting in wasteful effort, loss of finances and above all the non-fulfilment of the allotted tasks. Agent 3. An individual, who is specifically employed, trained and tasked to gain information which will be of intelligence, security and counter intelligence value. Courier 4. An individual or object used for transmission of messages, documents and material between various components of intelligence net. Types of Agents 5. Motivated Agent. A motivated agent is one who works for an intelligence agency based on his convictions, ideologies, patriotism and at times due to religious fervour. 2 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 6. Penetration Agent. The agent who has been penetrated into a hostile organisation is called as penetration agent. He collects information of interest during his normal functioning and passes it on to his true employers. He is termed as mole if he as a member of an intelligence organisation and passes information to hostile intelligence agency. 7. Mass Penetration Agent. An agent inducted into a target group using cover of a mass movement such as movement of refugees due to backlash by terrorists. 8. Exploited Agent. He is an agent whose moral weakness is exploited, generally by blackmail to involve him in espionage, sabotage or subversion. 9. Double Agent. One who works for two opposing intelligence services at the same time but is loyal to only one. Knowledge of this fact is known only to the agency to which he is loyal. 10. Dual / Multiple Agent. The agent who works concurrently, for two or more agencies of the same side is termed as dual / multiple agent. They are usually loyal to both the agencies and do not pit them against each other. This is different from a double agent who works for two opposing sides with the knowledge of only one side. 11. Sleeper Agent. One who is inducted to lie low, build up a cover and become active only on order or pre-determined situations. He is the backup or assured individual for an intelligence agency for employment in special contingencies. 12. Voluntary Agent. These are the persons who on their own accord, for whatever reasons, offer their services to an intelligence agency. 13. Support Agent. An agent whose sole occupation is to provide support measures to intelligence net in a target area. 14. Walk-in-Agent. He is a voluntary type of agent who initiates contact and offers his services to an intelligence agency. Recruitment 15. This is the process of influencing an individual to perform information gathering activities. The objectives of recruitment are as follows:- a. To enrol agents who are receptive, qualified and motivated to perform the desired activities. 3 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED b. To enrol agents in such a manner that neither the act of recruiting them nor any of the subsequent acts of the agents will compromise the unit or any of its activities. 16. Agent recruiting is a very systematic process and should be carried out deliberately. It involves the stages of talent spotting, verification, selection, evaluation, re-verification and enrolment. Each step of agent recruitment is distinct phase. This allows for immediate disengagement, should the individual fail to meet the desired level at any stage. 17. Talent Spotting. Talent spotting is a process of identifying, locating and collecting the background information of persons who have the potential to acquire information. The basic considerations to identify such an individual are the placement in the target area and accessibility to the information. Talent spotting warrants the employment of highly trained intelligence agency personnel. It assumes importance as spotting has to be done amongst the large unorganised population spread over an area. The intelligence agency must carry out talent spotting preferably by employing own personnel. It is primarily the responsibility of intelligence field operator to discreetly identify such individuals. However in areas where intelligence field operator cannot operate due to operational constraints, the most reliable agents must be tasked for the same. In such a case an agent being asked to carry out talent spotting, has to be guided by experienced intelligence personnel. The intelligence agency at this stage endeavours to identify individuals and simultaneously collect the desired information for further verification. The desired background information includes mainly the individual’s character, whereabouts, education, physical condition and contacts. However, the information available may be sketchy at times. Based on the available information, intelligence agency proceeds to the next stage of verification and simultaneously gathers the left over details. Talent spotting will involve interaction with cross section of population and by adopting various means depending upon the situation. These are brought as under:- a. Target Population for Talent Spotting. (1) Locals. The intelligence agency should maintain data base of individuals who frequently visit or have contacts in target area. Details of persons known to be indulging in illegal activities / trading across the forward defended line would also assist in identifying desired individuals. This information can be obtained by liaison with the local population and civil administration. (2) Internally Displaced Persons in Government Controlled areas. Internally displaced persons located in camps / welfare centres controlled by government authorities or those settled in government controlled areas may have potential individuals. Such a section of population by virtue of their status is likely to cooperate with intelligence 4 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED agencies. The control officer should liaise with civil administration for background details of internally displaced persons in a camp / welfare centres or in a locality. (3) Internally Displaced Persons in Uncleared Areas. In the war like situation many civilians are left without proper shelter and are displaced before they are guided to camps. However, some displaced persons at times may stay in make shift arrangements, in uncleared areas under the control of terrorists. In such a situation there would be individuals who are likely to cooperate with intelligence agency. Such persons are susceptible and gullible to cooperate with the intelligence agency owing to the frustration and helplessness. (4) Contacts of Agents. The control officer should go through the agent’s records and identify individuals who in the past have helped the agent and appear to have potential to acquire the information. These contacts can then be exploited to work for the agency. (5) Terrorists. The terrorist who have left the organisation and are willing to work for the government are most likely to cooperate with the intelligence agency. The intelligence agency should be on look out for such cadres. b. Means of Interaction. (1) Meetings / Interaction. (a) Local Population. Once the data is available about the local population, own personnel should carry out the identification initially by observation and subsequently by informal interaction. (b) Internally Displaced Persons in Government Controlled Areas. The individuals showing keenness / interest or appear to have the desired potential amongst them should be identified for further stages. This is carried out by visiting the camps / welfare centres or localities to observe these individuals. It may be noted that presence of intelligence agency personnel should be adequately covered to ensure that suspicion is not aroused. It should be carried out to identify the individuals who are likely to cooperate. The intelligence person should informally interact with such individuals to gauge their response and knowledge about the target area. It should be carried out without isolating these individuals. The interaction should be on generic subjects so as to ensure that purpose is not given away. 5 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED (c) Internally Displaced Persons in Uncleared Areas. The location of such areas will not permit movement of intelligence persons. In such cases the persons sympathetic to the nations cause may be tasked to identify such individuals. Movement of such individuals to government controlled areas must be arranged on some pretext at the behest of reliable contacts in uncleared areas. This would facilitate further interaction with intelligence agency. The intelligence agency would there after follow the same process as in case of camps in government controlled areas. (d) Terrorist. The agency should carry out screening to ensure that the terrorist who show their willingness are not the one who are planted by terrorist groups. The intelligence persons should interact with such cadres who have shown willingness to work for the agency. The interaction should be aimed at assessing the motive of such an individual. (2) Agents. Talent spotting in areas, where movement of intelligence personnel is restricted due to operational environment, is carried out by agents. The agents are asked to introduce those individuals who assisted them in acquisition, other contacts and internally displaced persons. Available information on some other individuals may also be shared to assist the agent. The agent is further guided by intelligence field operators by giving out the method of locating and identifying such individuals. (3) Check Points. Check points are established to screen the local population and internally displaced persons transiting on either side. Individuals showing interest or cooperating with security force can be identified. In order to identify the suitable individuals, trained intelligence personnel should be co-located with security force personnel manning the check points. Suitable arrangements should be made either to carefully segregate such individuals or organise a meeting subsequently. (4) Interrogation. It refers to interrogation of internally displaced persons, prisoner of war, surrendered and apprehended terrorists. During the course of interrogation the interrogator should identify desired individuals. The identification can be based upon the cooperation and response of the individual, IQ, knowledge of the target area and other qualities desired of an agent. (5) During Operations. Intelligence personnel are co-opted with security forces for cordon and search operations. The intelligence persons during the operation would be involved in screening of civilians. During this process individuals likely to cooperate with the agency are 6 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED identified and asked to interact with agency subsequently. In order to ensure security of these persons, they should be grouped along with other civilians and asked to report at security forces camps for further interaction. This should be carried out discreetly so as to ensure that suspicion is not aroused amongst the locals. 18. Verification. The individual identified to be a potential agent / courier should be kept under observation. The intelligence agency should discreetly verify background information, contacts, activities and linkages with terrorists groups. During the course of verification any additional information acquired should be dovetailed with the existing information. The method adopted to verify the credentials will depend on the place of residence of the individual as under:- a. Resident of Uncleared Area. In the case of individuals from the uncleared area verification should be carried out discreetly by other agents / couriers. The agent tasked for verification of a potential agent / courier must be from the same area and should be explained the details to be ascertained and the methodology. The motive of such tasking should not be communicated to the individual. The feedback obtained from the agent should be analysed and assessed by intelligence agency. b. Resident of Government Controlled Areas. In case of individuals from government controlled areas, verification will have to be carried out covertly by own personnel. However in areas where intelligence agency personnel cannot reach out, the task of verification can be entrusted to agents / couriers already working for the intelligence agency. The feedback obtained from the agent should be analysed and assessed keeping in mind the willingness and contacts in the target area. Individuals identified from government controlled area who visit uncleared area should be kept under observation to ascertain the facts. 19. Selection. Selection forms the next stage for individuals found suitable after verification. It is the process in which a person is considered for further cultivation based on the motive of the individual and the requirements of the intelligence agency. It is at this stage, based on the individual traits, the person is considered for selection as an agent or as courier. The principles of capability, suitability, multiplicity and timeliness should be adhered to at the time of selection. The factors to be considered while carrying out the selection an agent or a courier are as follows:- a. Resident of Uncleared Area. A resident of the uncleared area by virtue of his location achieves desired placement in the area. Individual would be familiar with the area, local customs and traditions which will assist in acquisition of information. In addition, such persons can exploit existing contacts and also move unchecked in the target area to gather information. The knowledge of the customs and traditions would assist in carrying out the activities without suspicion. 7 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED b. Resident of Government Controlled Area. Agents belonging to government controlled area should have the qualities as under:- (1) Physical Characteristics. While selecting an individual from government controlled area, it should be ensured that his physical characteristics are similar to those in the uncleared area. Individual should be able to easily merge amongst the population without fear of being spotted. (2) Religion. An individual must preferably be one of those believing and practicing the same religion as in the uncleared area. This provides a suitable ground to interact with terrorist groups without suspicion at the outset. (3) Contacts in the Uncleared Area. Persons having meaningful contacts in target area should be given preference for employing as agents / couriers. It is basically through these contacts that couriers and agents are provided shelter and given the necessary assistance in the uncleared area. This assists in convincingly justifying presence, move freely in the area and assume suitable cover story to acquire the information (4) Customs and Traditions. An individual must be familiar with the customs and traditions of the uncleared area. It assists in merging with the local population and to operate without arising any suspicion. It also aids in establishing suitable contacts and widen the network subsequently. c. Motive. There are number of factors to motivate an individual to work for the intelligence agency either as an agent or a courier. It will be effective as long as the interest of an individual is being met. Some of the factors / motives are as under:- (1) Monetary. Monetary requirements remain the most important lure for an agent to work for an agency. Some persons being poor want to make extra money, while others may like to make easy and fast money. In such cases it assumes great importance as they are likely to work only in return for monitory rewards. This can be judged by the individuals financial condition and reaction to the monetary rewards offered initially. (2) To Evade Law. Certain persons who are involved in illegal activities desire to work for the intelligence agency to establish an association. This is intended to get official cover for their nefarious operations in return for the information provided. Such people by virtue 8 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED of their activities have adequate knowledge of the target area or linkages with terrorist groups. Moreover their bold outlook and agreement to work provides adequate base for the intelligence agencies. In this manner, they not only surreptitiously continue their smuggling / crime but side by side provide information. Thereby they try to seek assistance from intelligence agency to cover their nefarious activities. (3) Patriotism. Some persons owing to their patriotic feelings are willingly to work for intelligence agency. The motive remains primarily to earn satisfaction of being of some use to the country. (4) Personal Security. The main concern of the people living very close to the forward line of defences is to protect their life and property. The reason to associate with intelligence agency / work for them is to earn the good will of law enforcing agencies. In such cases due care be exercised to ascertain the motive and integrity shown towards the intelligence agency. (5) Revenge. This is one of the most important factors which motivate the person to work for an intelligence agency. Individuals who are affected due to the violent acts, long to take revenge against the terrorist group. These individuals help an intelligence agency to achieve their motive. d. Willingness. It is desirable that no individual should be compelled to work as an agent / courier. Only those individuals who volunteer / show interest should be selected. e. IQ. Agents / Couriers should be of minimum average intelligence. They should be able to recognise information of intelligence value, have good memory and should be able to report information without exaggeration or distortion. f. Sex. There is no restriction over selection of women as courier / agents. However, their scope and employability is limited and the same should be kept in mind at all times. g. Physical Fitness and Mental Alertness. The prevalent security situation and distances would entail sources to cover large distances over rugged terrain. Hence it is imperative on part of the intelligence operator to select agents with a high level of physical fitness as well as adequate mental robustness. 20. Cultivation. Cultivation can be defined as process of persuading an individual to acquire information from the target area. Influencing, persuading or motivating can be based on motive of the individual. This involves high level of 9 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED expertise by the intelligence operator and puts his ability to an acid test. Cultivation commences once the intelligence agency has been able to select the individuals as potential agent / courier. Cultivation stage can be further divided into following sub- stages:- a. Approaching the Individual. The cultivation commences once the individual is approached. The individual can be approached by two methods as given below:- (1) Introduction by Third Party. The meeting with the individual is initially arranged through a third party. The third party here may be an agent who is already working for the agency or any other confidant of intelligence agency. However while adopting this approach the aspect of security assumes added importance as the identity of the individual is known to the third party. Security of move and meeting should be ensured to cater for any unforeseen eventuality. Such an approach is very likely in case of a resident from uncleared area. During the introductory meeting in presence of third person discussions may revolve around generic topics. The aim of discussion should be to gauge the individual’s attitude, knowledge about the area and to create a positive impression. Intelligence field operator should make an endeavour to show case the friendly attitude. The conduct of the intelligence operator should not be business like. Discussion should be channelised in a manner that it makes a ground for another meeting in near future. Simultaneously invitation for subsequent interaction should be extended at any other place other than the location of intelligence agency. After the interaction is over the analysis should be done keeping in mind the circumstances, location, duration and the environment during the meeting. The first meeting may not reveal all the aspects required by the intelligence operator. However the aspects which merit consideration are as follows:- (a) Attitude and willingness of the individual. (b) Response and reaction of the individual towards the questions posed by the intelligence person. (c) Knowledge of the target area. (d) Nature of an individual whether one is extrovert or introvert. (e) Individuals financial condition and weakness if any. (f) Likings and disliking of the individual with regards to the type of discussions, topics and issues. 10 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED (g) Individuals views about ideology propagated by terrorists. (h) Individuals opinion about the counter terrorist operation undertaken by government. (i) Ability to take risk. (j) Manner in which meeting was concluded. (k) Reasons cited for interaction in near future. (2) Direct Approach. In this method a direct meeting is held between the intelligence operator and the individual, without highlighting the purpose of the meeting. This approach / meeting should appear as coincidental. Such a meeting requires adequate preparation on behalf of intelligence field operator. It would require adequate study of individual’s habits, work place, general routine and matters of interest. The location for the meeting should not be either isolated nor to busy area. The environment should be conducive in all the respects. The discussions should revolve round matters of interest to the individual. It must be ensured that discussions should not make a mention / reference of third person else it may give away the purpose of interaction at the outset. The other considerations would remain the same as in indirect approach. b. Establishing Rapport. This will involve instilling confidence in the individual and ward off his apprehensions and fear about the intended nature of work. In this stage the individual is being gradually prepared to operate for the agency. Numbers of meetings are must to establish rapport. This process will depend upon the type of individual. The intelligence agency should preferably continue with the same intelligence operator who established the initial contact. This ensures better understanding of the behaviour of an individual, builds personal rapport and ensures continuity. The process of establishing rapport will differ for resident of uncleared area and that of government controlled areas. The process of establishing rapport for different types of individuals is as follows:- (1) Resident of Uncleared Area. In such cases the number of opportunities to interact will be very few owing to their place of residence and security problems in movement. The intelligence operator has to make maximum of the limited interactions, instill confidence and persuade the individual to work for the agency. The intelligence operator should latch on to the motive, weaknesses, discuss issues of interest to individual and touch upon the likely help the agency can render. Intelligence operator should always endeavour to associate themselves with the agent. In subsequent interactions once the confidence has been 11 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED gained the ice should be broken by outlining the requirements of intelligence agency in a subtle manner. All such meetings should be organised in friendly environment. The location selected should be innocuous looking other than the office area. Suitable entertainment should be catered for to act as catalyst in establishing rapport. The type of entertainment should be based on the agents liking. During the interactions and meetings it should be ensured that no unrealistic assurances are made which may embarrass the agency / government in future. The success of the establishing rapport can be gauged by individual’s positive response towards the intelligence operator. (2) Resident of Government Controlled Area. In case of such individuals, the number of opportunities to interact will be more. However, the time taken to establish the rapport may be more due reluctance to operate in target area. Maximum time should be given to build personal rapport and confidence. Family and peer pressure on the agent may act as hindrance in motivating an individual. To ensure such a situation does not arise interactions should be carried out away from area where the individual resides. Intelligence agency personnel should never attempt to visit the house of the individual else it may negate the efforts. During the interactions and meetings it should be ensured that realistic assurances are made. The process of instilling confidence and gauging the success remains same as that of resident from uncleared area. c. Cultivation can be considered to have been accomplished once the individual expresses willingness to work and take on the task. 21. Testing. An individual having been successfully cultivated to operate for intelligence agency needs to be tested for his capability and suitability. This needs to be carried out before tasking further. Initially individual is assigned certain innocuous tasks, the information of which already exists with the agency. Information acquired thereafter should be compared with available information. Thorough de-briefing should be carried out to analyse the methodology used to acquire, means of communication used, problems encountered and risk taken to judge the potential of the individual. At this stage it is also must to ascertain the competence, initiative, intelligence and level of training. This will assist in assessing the type of training to be imparted and subsequent tasking. Intelligence agency should take a decision at this stage to enrol / test further / discard for want of desired qualities. 22. Re-verification. This is a very important stage which runs concurrently after the individual has been cleared for enrolment. The primary aim is to ensure that the individual is not a dual / multiple or a double agent. It involves discreet surveillance of the activities of the agent. It would include the meetings of the agent with contacts not known to intelligence agency, movements and other activities. 12 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED Based on the outcome of re-verification the agent may be either retained or laid off. Re-verification should also be carried out by intelligence agency when it is suspected that agent is likely to become double agent or compromise the security of intelligence operations here after. 23. Evaluation. This follows the testing phase and runs concurrently with re- verification. It is undertaken to analyse the performance of the individual. Although no yard stick can be laid it may be done after completion of two to three tasks or after six months to one year. This allows the intelligence agency to plan further tasking, assess the reliability and usefulness to the organisation. At this stage it aids the intelligence agency in taking a decision either to put the potential agent through subsequent stages or break the contact. Evaluation is an ongoing process to judge the performance of the agent after every tasking. It is carried out by comparing the information provided with available information, corroboration or negation by other sources over the period of time. Quality and not the quantity should form the basis of evaluation. The intelligence field operator must keep intangible aspects in mind and evaluate the individual’s performance without being too rigid. The grading will depend upon type of information provided. 24. Enrolment. Enrolment will normally be the culmination of a relatively lengthy and gradual process of recruitment of the individual concerned. Intelligence agency must assess the likelihood of the potential agent being receptive to enrolment before stepping on to enrolment. An exception to this may be a walk-in agent. By this stage the relationship should be brought to a degree of credibility that even if the potential agent declines to be enrolled, individual should not use the offer in order to embarrass the intelligence field operator. The person is then enrolled having been explained the job requirements and terms of intelligence agency. These may include frequency of visit to intelligence agency, monetary rewards if any, dos and don’ts etc. The intelligence field operator should simultaneously allot the code number and a codename to the agent. Thereafter, only the codename must be used to refer to an agent, in order to provide maximum security coverage to operations. Enrolment is considered to be completed once the record cards are prepared by the control officer. The record cards are prepared and forwarded to higher HQ for better control over the agents. The preparation of record card is as mentioned below:- a. Whenever a new agent / courier is enrolled, it must be ensured that all pertinent particulars of the individual are obtained and filled in the agent / courier record card including the photograph. However some individuals from the target area may occasionally be hesitant in giving their photographs for obvious reasons. It should never be obtained under compulsion for fear of losing rapport with them. A photograph can either be taken discreetly without the individual’s knowledge or by tactful persuasion. This could be done by telling him that his photograph is necessary so as to assist the military / para military forces in recognising him at security forces posts. 13 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED b. This record card will subsequently help in conducting the necessary verifications pertaining to the individual. It will also help in follow up relating to assessment of the agent / courier for decision of retention / termination. It gives a complete data of the agent and the same assists the handler to take over the agent from the previous incumbent. 14 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 25. Training. The type of training to be imparted is generally gauged by the intelligence agency during testing and evaluation stage. The training of the agent is very important as it would facilitate the individual to acquire the desired information. The basic training is conducted initially and focuses on sharpening the agent’s sense of security, communication, passage of information and use of electronic gadgets. The training has been further classified as unit level training and specialised training. The unit level training is imparted by intelligence unit in existing resources and special training by establishment created for the purpose. Training of agents / couriers is discussed in detail in chapter 2. 26. Handling of an Agent. The intelligence agency carries out tasking of agents once individual is recruited. Based on the intelligence requirements the control officer would prepare the tasking for an agent. This would also involve briefing, task oriented training and induction into the target area for acquisition. The agent would then set on the mission of acquiring information. It is desirable that same intelligence operator handles the agent who has cultivated him in initial stages. It also ensures that the intelligence agency is able to exploit maximum potential of agent. This will go longer in keeping the agent working for the agency. The level of motivation can be judged by continuously monitoring the behaviour, information obtained, rewards extended and other de-motivating factors like risk, monetary hardships and pressure from family members. On completion of the tasks agents are de-briefed and rewarded for the information obtained. The agents, depending upon the type of information provided are evaluated and graded from time to time. Desired motivational level can be ensured by enhancing monetary rewards, resting the individual for some time etc. Handling of an agent remains one of the most important facet of intelligence as all the hard work put in cultivating an individual would be lost if the agent is not handled properly. 27. Termination. The agent is discarded by the agency after the individual proves unproductive or is likely to jeopardise the agency and its operations. This option is exercised by the intelligence agency / control officer after detailed analysis and evaluation of the performance of the agent. The decision of termination should not be communicated to the agent / courier directly. The agency should gradually cut down the rewards and distance itself from the individual. Agents / couriers who are residents of target areas should not be terminated owing to their location. The reasons for retaining these agents is their potential in terms of providing actionable information from the target area and also act as support agents subsequently. The termination may be carried out with / without prejudice depending upon the reason for termination. In event of termination with prejudice, care must be taken that individual does not compromise the other agents. It is suggested that following types of agents may be terminated:- a. Agents who have proved to be unproductive over a period of time. b. Double agents. c. Dual / Multiple agents. 15 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED d. Individuals who provide misleading information. Security 28. Security of agents / couriers working for intelligence agencies entails that their activities, movements and whereabouts are kept secret. All couriers / agents should be allotted codename and they should always be referred to by the same. Under no circumstances should their identity be revealed. Even the identity of those handling the couriers / agents should be concealed by adopting pseudo names etc. Communication with the agents should be preferably be carried out by secured means. Interactions with couriers / agents should also be so arranged that venue is changed every time without following any pattern. As soon as an agent / courier arriving from the target area should preferably be received by intelligence personnel. The individual should thereafter during the stay, should always be accompanied by own staff and never let out of sight. Conclusion 29. Agents / couriers are required to carry out missions of sensitive nature, hence it is important that their selection and recruitment is carried out deliberately. As cultivation of an agent is time consuming and laborious, it is imperative that the utility and loyalty of an agent be judged by evaluating their work at frequent intervals. Unproductive, double, dual / multiple agents should be discarded. To ensure that the agents are not compromised it is imperative that their identity and of those handling them is concealed. 30. Process of recruitment facilitates immediate disengagement, if individual is found to be unsuitable at any stage. The process of recruiting agents allows a periodic review of the overall effect of its progress. The success of efforts will largely, depend upon the selection, handling, training and incentives offered. The evaluation and dismissal also forms an important facet of handling agents / couriers. The security of agents / couriers is vital in utilising their services and hence needs to be accorded utmost priority. 16 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED CHAPTER 2 TRAINING OF AGENTS Introduction 1. Training is one of the most important phases in the making of an individual into an effective agent. After enrolment, agents are trained to enhance their capability to acquire information and to increase probability of success. Training should include various aspects of intelligence tradecraft to facilitate the agent in acquisition of information without compromising security. It should cover clandestine communications, surveillance, counter-surveillance, photography, recording, assumption of cover etc. 2. Based on frequency of interaction of an agent and intelligence agency, training must be imparted systematically and continuously. Training should be gradual and progressive in nature and should meet the operational requirements. At unit level, basic form of training should be imparted and specialised training can be subsequently given at training cells / establishments at higher levels. Planning and Preparation 3. Planning. The aspects which need to be considered while planning are as under:- a. Aptitude. Based on the interactions and earlier tasking, the aptitude of the agent must be factored in planning. Aptitude here would mean knack to carry out a task in particular manner. It will depend upon individuals IQ, education, personality and motivation. For example flair to assume cover story instantaneously to deal with unknown situation. b. Strengths and Weaknesses. Analysing strengths and weaknesses of an individual would help the agency in structuring the training. The training must focus $to minimise the weaknesses of the individual and strengths should form the basis for conducting higher / specialised of training. c. Operational Environment. The operational environment in the target area would be one of the most important aspects which would dictate the type of training to be imparted. This will ensure that the agent can operate effectively in the assigned area to acquire the desired information. d. Futuristic Employment. Based on the evaluation and the impending tasks the agent should be trained gradually keeping in mind the futuristic employment. 17 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 4. Preparations. A broad training schedule is worked out based on the training to be imparted. It will involve allocation of time, resources and trainers. The preparatory actions would also involve selecting the venue, preparation of training mock-ups and security. Administrative back up must be catered for the training. It must be ensured that no two agents are clubbed together for training at a time. Levels of Training 5. The intelligence agency after the enrolment of an individual conducts training to enhance the capability and to hone the skills to acquire information. Some intelligence acquisition operations may require agents with basic skills to acquire information whilst other operations may require special expertise. There will be some agents who have desired accessibility but no expertise to acquire information whilst others may have limited expertise to do so. To acquire information an agent has to be trained and brought up to the desired level. Depending upon the task and intelligence requirement the training required would differ. The various levels of training are as brought in succeeding paragraphs. Basic Training 6. Basic training is imparted by the field intelligence operator. All agents should be trained in modus operandi of acquiring, assimilating, recording, passage and security of information. The training schedule should be structured based on the availability of an agent and the time required. It may even be confined to spot training during routine visits. The aspects that should be covered during the basic training are as follows:- a. Information on Terrorists Groups. An individual being trained should be updated on the background information of the terrorists groups in the target area. This will depend upon the individual’s knowledge and the requirement. It would assist the individual in enhancing operability in that area. The details that should be included in background information are history, organisation and strength of terrorists group. Special emphasis should be laid on modus operandi of terrorist group to detect the informers / agents of security forces. b. Topography. The knowledge of topography of an area would assist the agent in carrying out the acquisition operations. This would facilitate infiltration, movement and ex-filtration. The individual should be given an overview of topographical details to include existing road network, tracks, canals and bridges. Likely routes of infiltration and ex-filtration to include rivers, mountain ranges etc, should be highlighted. c. Customs and Traditions. Training should be conducted to aid the agent's understanding of customs and traditions of target area. It would assist in better understanding of the situation. The individual should be made to practice certain customs and traditions unique to the target area. This will assist him in assuming cover in covert operations. 18 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED d. Local Laws. The agent should be made aware of the local rules and regulations administered by terrorist groups in uncleared areas. It would add on to the agent's general awareness. This will assist in utilising the knowledge to his advantage. e. Weapons and Equipments. The agents must be trained to identify the weaponry of the terrorist groups. Understanding of this is important so that the agent can easily differentiate between various types of weapons. f. Modus Operandi. Knowledge of modus operandi of terrorist group aids the agents in understanding their tactics. This will assist in movement and acquisition of information. g. Proficiency in Language. Training should be carried out in local languages and dialects of the uncleared areas. This aids in disguise and better integration with the locals. Efforts should be made to achieve desired proficiency over the period of time. h. First Aid. The individual should be trained in basic treatment to overcome minor ailments. Small kits should be usually issued for this purpose. Even smaller injuries such as non fatal knife wounds if not treated in time can be lethal in the long term. i. Art of Disguise. An agent should be trained in the art of disguise. It is crucial for an agent to understand as to how it helps in maintaining covert status and to remain unknown in a hostile environment. The physical preparation of an agent must be concentrated on making his appearance unobtrusive and inconspicuous in the environment. This is done by teaching the method of changing appearance so that the individual is not easily recognised. Although quite simple to learn, it requires adequate practice to become an expert in disguise. This would involve training on changing appearance by modifying haircut style, moustache and beard. Dressing style as per the traditions of the target area must also be incorporated in the training. It must be emphasized that the individual’s dressing style and nature of activity should not stand out of place in the target area. The physical characteristics and general appearance of the agent must not attract undue attention. j. Assuming Fake Identity / Cover. An agent should be trained to take up convincing cover stories and fake identity which would stand the best of investigations. An agent must be trained adequately to acquire such documents. Training in a specific civil trade will assist in assuming a cover in the target area. The intelligence agency must correctly identify the trade that would give the requisite cover. This would entail the agent to observe the routine activities of the persons involved in the trade, so as to understand the details involved in a particular cover. The cover story must be practiced and rehearsed prior to its assumption. 19 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED k. Infiltration and Ex-filtration Techniques. The agents should be trained to carry out infiltration and ex-filtration in various situations. It should also include the modus operandi of contacting other agents after infiltration in target area. l. Photography. Training should be imparted to surreptitiously carry out video, audio recording and still photography. This would assist the agent to take photos of the target without arousing suspicion. m. Surveillance. An agent should be trained in the techniques of surveillance as it is the most important means of acquiring information. Use of modern technology should also be covered to amalgamate with human surveillance. Depending upon the need and situation an agent can be trained in using electro optic devices, sound detecting scopes and bugging of an area to carry out surveillance. n. Counter Surveillance. The agent should be trained to detect and negate the surveillance of terrorists groups. This would include imparting knowledge of various techniques to counter surveillance. o. Memory Training. Memory training should be imparted to assist an agent to retain maximum information without recording it on paper and the ability to reproduce it later. This is carried out by asking agents to co-relate / associate the information in form of objects and issues easy to recollect. It can be carried out by making acronyms of voluminous data. The ability can be developed by regularly practicing the individual. p. Communication and Security. The training should be conducted in manner that a procedure is evolved, where in, timely exchange of information takes place without physical meetings. This would enhance the security of the agent and reduce the risk of compromise. Therefore the agent has to be trained to ensure timely and secure passage of information to the agency. The agent must be trained in various methods of communicating as under:- (1) Live and dead drops. (2) Transmitting information in short hand, secret ink writing, postal channels etc. (3) Training in information technology to include fax, e-mail and SMS. (4) Training to ensure security of information related to mission and other agents. (5) Use of codes in transfer of information. 20 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED q. Escape and Evasion. The agent should be taught the methods to evade apprehension and escape when caught by the terrorist group. Specialised Training 7. Specialised training forms part of progressive training of an agent after having undergone the basic training. It is imparted to only those agents who are recommended for specialised training by handlers. It is also imparted to an agent if the accomplishment of task requires specialised training. Such training may be provided at an establishment / training cell with adequate infrastructure. The aspects that should be covered during the specialised training are as follows:- a. Computers. Computers are predominantly used to store information. Breaking into personal computers for the purpose of retrieving confidential information is a very commonly used skill in acquiring information. The agent should be suitably trained to retrieve information from the computer network of terrorists outfit. b. Modes of Communication. In specialised training an agent must be trained in using radio sets, microphotography and steganography. c. Explosives Specialist. An agent should be trained in manufacturing explosives out of local resources. They could be used for many purposes such as distractions and destruction to assist the operations by the security forces. d. Unarmed Combat. This type of training should be imparted as it is crucial in self defence. The agent should be able to dispose of hostile personnel using his hands or knives. e. Incendiary Targets. Fire is one of the most economical and equally destructive means to neutralise the target. The agent should be trained to identify targets which are susceptible to fire. This will also include methods to be used to ignite fire based on type and composition of the target. f. Psychology. The agent should be imparted knowledge of human psychology as it would assist them in interaction with other people. It helps them to acquire information by establishing rapport, friendship and empathy. g. Entertainment Drugs. The agent should be trained in usage of entertainment drugs. These drugs put an individual in an inebriated state where one is likely to drop his guard. This situation is then exploited to elicit information while the individual is under the influence. Conclusion 21 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 8. Training facilitates an agent in operating covertly, effectively, safely and with minimal support. Realistic and progressive training of an agent will result in successful intelligence operations in the long run. It should be made realistic by using mock-ups / models of the target area. The successful accomplishment of the mission largely depends on the type of training imparted to the agent by the intelligence agency. A well trained agent would not only achieve desired results but ensure that the network runs effectively. 22 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED CHAPTER 3 OPERATION OF INTELLIGENCE NETWORK Introduction 1. Every nation directs its intelligence efforts based on its intelligence requirements to find out the capabilities, limitations and intentions of enemy / terrorists organisations posing threat to its national security. Acquisition and analysis of the information assists in drawing up the complete intelligence picture. Information regarding capabilities and limitations obtained by overt and technological means leave certain intelligence voids. Intelligence agencies operate intelligence net to conduct espionage operations to meet these voids. Intelligence Net 2. It is the network of various sources, agents and couriers spread out in target area to acquire the information as per the intelligence requirements. Intelligence field operator controls all the components and the operations of the intelligence net. Organisation 3. Organisation of any intelligence net depends on the intelligence requirement, size of the target, demography, resources available, security measures and means of communication. It is organised by suitably meshing various components of the network to achieve desired success. Various components are as brought in succeeding paragraphs. 4. Components of the Intelligence Net. The intelligence net may comprise of the following personnel:- a. Control Officer. He is a person who is responsible to control and operate the net. Controlling of the intelligence net involves maintaining the records of all components, laying down specific tasks and time by which it should be completed. It further includes evaluating information provided by the field agent and suitably rewarding them. The desirable traits in a control officer are as mentioned below:- (1) Above average intelligence and intellectual curiosity. (2) Extrovert personality. (3) Good communication skills. (4) Proficiency in local language of the target area. 23 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED (5) Ability to convince others to achieve legitimate goals (6) Sound judgement, common-sense and self discipline b. Principal Agent. He is an agent who interacts either openly or clandestinely with the number of field agents operating for him. His main role is to act as main link between the control officer and the field agents and may be located in the target area. In the initial stages his requirement may be for cultivation and subsequently for maintaining morale and discipline of the agents. c. Resident Agent. The resident agent acts as a link between the control officer and other agents. He is located in the target area and a secured member of the community. d. Field Agent. He is a member of the intelligence net who actually acquires the information from the target area. e. Cut-Out. The cut-out is a person who is not a permanent feature of the net. The individual is employed for passage of information between the various components of the net. He merely acts as link and is not aware of contribution of his actions and identity of other elements of the net. Their employment enhances security of the net as their apprehension would not compromise of the net. The security is further enhanced by employing different cut-outs thereby avoiding set pattern. f. Courier. The individual who is tasked to carry documents, information and material between various personnel of the net is called as courier. g. Source. A source is a person or an object which provides information. Types of Net 5. Intelligence nets can be classified on the basis of type of contact and interaction between the control officer and the field agent. These are as follows:- a. Direct Net. b. Indirect Net. 6. Direct Net. In this type of the net the control officer personally operates all field agents functioning under him. Direct net is established, if the distance to the target and security situation favours direct contact between the agent and the control officer. It is characterised by direct briefing and interaction between the control officer and an agent. It also facilitates timely and first hand information reaching the control officer. 24 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 7. Diagrammatic illustration of direct net is as shown below:- Field Agent Control Officer Field Agent Field Agent 8. The advantages and disadvantages of such net are as under:- a. Advantages. (1) Control and supervision of the field agent is direct. (2) Accurate and timely information is received by the control officer. (3) Little or no distortion in information. (4) Tasking, briefing and de-briefing is more effective. (5) Morale of the agent remains high as the rewards are certain and safe. (6) Compromise of one field agent does not compromise the entire net. (7) Better rapport between control officer and the agent. b. Disadvantages. (1) Coverage of the target area is limited due to the constraints of human resources and limited number of agent. (2) Frequent contacts between the agent and the control officer may jeopardise the mission if the agent is exposed. 25 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED 9. Indirect Net. In this type of the net control officer operates through a principal agent who in turn organises coverage of target area with more than one field agent. Indirect net is established, if, the distance to the target and security situation does not favour establishment of direct net. Language barrier between the control officer and the agents may also be the reason for establishing such a net. 10. Diagrammatic illustration of indirect net is as shown below:- Field Agent Indirect Net-1 Field Agent Principal Agent Field Agent Control Officer Field Agent Principal Agent Field Agent Field Agent Indirect Net-2 11. The advantages and disadvantages of this type of net are:- a. Advantages. (1) Better coverage of the target as more agents cover the area. (2) Inherent security is ensured due to limited contact between control officer and agents. b. Disadvantages. (1) Control and supervision of field agents by control officer may be inadequate. (2) The information received by control officer may be distorted. 26 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED (3) Morale of the agent may suffer due to the delayed / inappropriate and uncertain rewards. (4) Defection or compromise of principal agent generally results in loss of the entire net. (5) Likelihood of lateral networking with other nets operated by same or different intelligence agency. This may compromise more than one net at a time. (6) More time is required to acquire the information due to number of briefings and de- briefings involved in the net. 12. The analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of both the types of the net, it inadvertently suggests that the direct net should be established. The ground realities may seldom permit the ideal situations to aid establishment of direct net. It may even happen that a portion of indirect net may function as direct net where in control officer would interact with the field agent. Thus it is evident that indirect net may have to be established very often to acquire information. Characteristics of Intelligence Net 13. The characteristics of an effective intelligence network are as under:- a. Centralised Control. Intelligence net must preferably be controlled centrally, to ensure that there is no dissipation of effort. It also limits false corroboration and affords flexibility. It also ensures that man power and resources can be diverted to meet any unforeseen situation. b. Multiplicity. Based on the intelligence requirement, number of nets should be operated. This ensures that in case a net is detected / neutralised, the mission is not jeopardised. It also affords redundancy in the system to cater for an organisation that duplicates and provides alternatives in case one net fails. c. Continuity. The coverage of target area should be continuous to monitor the activities and detect changes. This will assist in filling the existing intelligence voids. This can be ensured by number of agents operating in the area. d. Communication. The field agent should only be familiar with the identity of other members of the net on one-up and one-down basis. The communication should be confined to these members only, except probably in the case of an emergency. Simple and intelligently prepared codes must be used in communication on telephones, internet or through couriers. 27 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED e. Security. All members of the net should be security conscious and must take adequate precautions so that no suspicion is aroused while acquiring or passing of information. If multiple nets are operating in the area, linearity should be maintained to ensure security. Lateral networking between two nets may endanger various nets and would increase risk to personal security of agents. A security lapse at any stage might jeopardise the existence of the nets. Establishment of the Intelligence Net 14. The knowledge of characteristics will assist intelligence operator to establish an effective intelligence net. The control officer may have to establish a new net or operate an existing net with suitable modifications. Recruitment of agents forms the beginning of establishment of network. The process of recruitment from spotting to enrolment has been covered in detail in preceding chapters. The aspects required to be kept in mind in establishing intelligence net are as follows:- a. Operational Environment. Control officer should firstly factor in the operational environment while establishing the net. The existing threat, security situation and the modus operandi of the terrorist groups in the area of intelligence responsibility forms the basis for organising the setup of the net. b. Area of Intelligence Responsibility. The geographical area of responsibility and the sensitivity of certain areas will dictate the allocation of responsibility to the agents. The area should be adequately covered keeping in mind the principles of multiplicity and continuity of intelligence acquisition operations. The allocation should not be mathematical in nature and must be based on activities of terrorists and existing intelligence voids. Every component of the net should be so placed that maximum efficiency is achieved in acquiring and passing information. c. Agents. The agents are the most important components of an intelligence network. The human factor of intelligence net determines the success or failure of acquisition operations. The control officer while setting up the net has to consider availability, capability and suitability of the agents. d. Netting. Based on the intelligence requirement the control officer should plan the type of net and modus operandi to be adopted by agents. This entails nominating principle agent, resident agent, field agents and couriers. The control officer lays down broad guide lines for the functioning of the net, methodology for acquisition, passage of information and security measures to be adopted. He has to streamline and coordinate the functional aspects between various components of the net. The control officer should maintain flexibility in netting and make necessary changes based on the intelligence requirement. 28 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED e. Time Planning. Adequate time should be catered for the establishing of net to achieve the desired results. This will include time taken for planning, preparations, placement of agent and netting. Operation of the Intelligence Network 15. The control officer plays a pivotal role in operation of the intelligence network. The success / efficacy of the network depend largely on the method adopted by the control officer / principal agent (agent handler) in operating the net. Salient aspects that merit consideration are as follows:- a. Preparation for Briefing. The control officer needs to carry out certain preparatory actions prior to the briefing. It involves getting latest updates on the operational situation, liaison with formations / units and staff. The control officer, then re-assess the situation and incorporates these inputs to modify the tasking / briefing. It would also include making suitable administrative arrangements like necessary aids for briefing namely charts sketches etc. b. Tasking. Tasking of an agent is the most important phase of intelligence network operation. The success of acquisition operation depends upon the way task is worded or explained to the agent. The task must be worded in such a manner that it should be unambiguous and singular. It should not live anything to the imagination of an agent. The task must be in question form, spelling out the information required and the time by which it is desired. Leading questions should not form the task. It must be cross checked to ensure that agent has understood the task correctly. A clear understanding of the task will facilitate acquisition of the correct information. c. Briefing. It is giving out detailed and final instructions prior to departure on the specified tasks. It includes the likely routes of infiltration, modus operandi of collection, passage of information, ex-filtration, security aspects and time plan. The suggested procedure and points to be kept in mind while carrying out briefing are covered in Chapter 7. d. Induction. It involves physical launching of the agent into the target area by the control officer. Induction should be through areas which ensures secrecy, affords security and protection to the agent. It could be possibly through difficult terrain and places where enemy presence is less. Successful induction requires preliminary preparation by control officer. It involves liaison with field units, security of the movement to induction point and final briefing before the induction. The detailed procedure of induction is covered in Chapter 8. 29 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED e. Acquisition of the Information. This is the most critical phase on which the success of the mission is dependent. It is executed in target area by the field agent / agents. Control officer may control this phase directly or indirectly. The method adopted by the agent depends on the situation and method advocated by control officer. Depending upon the security situation and available means of communication the control officer may direct the agent from time to time. f. Transmission of Information. Information once acquired has to be passed on to the next link in the network. This is done either physically through a courier or by electronic means. This phase involves handling of information by various components of the network. The time lag between the acquisition and transmission of information should be minimised as far as possible. It not only reduces time but also ensures security of the net. However speedy transmission should not compromise security. Hence every component of the net must ensure security in passage of information. g. Reception / De-induction. This is receiving the agent on returning back with information from the target area. It further involves movement of agent from the point of entry to safe house for rest and recoup. h. De-briefing. It is interviewing the agent on returning from the target area after completion of the specified tasks. It includes information acquired, route of exfiltration, security related issues etc. De-briefing may be carried out in form of narrations, questions and answers. The control officer needs to simultaneously check the veracity and credibility of the information acquired and evaluate reliability of the agent. It should be aided by audio recording, sketches, charts etc. Suggested procedure for de-briefing has been covered in Chapter 7. i. Rewards. This is the incentive extended to the agent by the control officer for the information acquired. These rewards should commensurate with the type of information acquired. It helps in maintaining the morale and relationship between the control officer and the agent. Conclusion 16. It is essential to organise and establish a net for acquisition of intelligence. The type of net established would depend upon intelligence and operational environment. Successful operation of intelligence net depends on the competence and experience of the control officer. He also needs to regularly monitor the activities of other components of the net to ensure morale and discipline of the net. The acquisition of information is a long drawn process involving more than one individual hence coordination, communication and security assumes greater importance in operation of the net. 30 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED CHAPTER 4 ILLEGAL TRADERS AND THEIR POTENTIAL FOR ESPIONAGE Introduction 1. Illegal trading / smuggling is defined as an unlawful transactions of articles / goods such as narcotics, medicines, oil, gold, precious stones, wood, etc from one area to another. In many ways, it is just another business which is illegal and risky but fetches high returns. The persons who deal in such illegal transaction of goods come in contact with many anti national elements. The nature of their dealings forces them to maintain contact with the terrorist groups in the target area thereby getting to know their modus operandi and security setup. These illegal traders in order to prevent any interference from the terrorist and to create conducive environment for their illegal trade, may fund the terrorist groups. Such traders are known to chalk out the smuggling plans and execute them on ground through their operatives in target area. 2. Illegal traders some times become extremely well organised, operate as powerful groups based on the support from conflicting areas. Such individuals by virtue of their dubious dealings in target area and contacts with terrorists groups have desired potential to be agents / couriers. This can be exploited by the intelligence agency to enrol them as agents / couriers. Types of Illegal Traders 3. There are two types of illegal traders / smugglers who operate from one area / province to another, and can be termed as under:- a. High Level Illegal Traders / Smugglers. High level illegal traders are those persons resorting to illegal transactions of valuable goods from one area to another. The trading is generally carried out through a net of high profile traders by using land, air and sea as means of communication. b. Low Level Illegal Traders / Smugglers. Low level illegal traders are those who resort to illegal transaction of goods on small scale, personally or through couriers. Such traders generally use land means of communication. Unique Characteristics 4. The illegal traders have some unique characteristics which are of value to the intelligence agency. These qualities are as under:- a. Bold, dare devil and ability to face hardships. 31 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED b. Maintain number of contacts in the target area to ensure lodging, security and safety during visits. c. Multi linguistic, possess the knowledge of traditions and customs of target area. d. Capable of taking a cover story in event of crisis. e. Posses adequate knowledge of topography including infiltration / ex- filtration routes. f. Fair amount of knowledge about modus operandi, hierarchy and locations of terrorist outfit. g. Physical appearance and dialect spoken may at times be akin to the target area. h. May have relatives residing in uncleared area. Espionage Potential 5. The unique characteristics mentioned above qualify an illegal trader as a potential agent / courier as it meets some of the basic qualities by an individual to carry out espionage. The other important criteria met by an illegal trader to be an effective agent are as follows:- a. Placement in the target area. b. Accessibility to information of terrorist groups. c. Contacts in the terrorists groups. d. Frequent visits to the target area. e. Can provide assistance to intelligence agency in spotting and handling of other agents. f. Only task specific training is required to be imparted. Motives 6. The illegal trader possesses certain qualities of a potential courier / agent. However, the illegal trader also has ulterior motives to work for an intelligence agency. The likely motives are as follows:- a. To gain immunity against the punitive actions. 32 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED b. To gain prominence / respectability in area by showing association with the government agency. c. Easy access to the security posts while crossing over to the target area. d. Better administrative support in target area by other supporting agents. Recruitment 7. To recruit an illegal trader as an agent, intelligence agency needs to follow some explicit guidelines in spotting, verification, selection and cultivation. The process of recruitment otherwise generally remains similar to that of any other individual. The guidelines to be followed in various stages are as follows:- a. Spotting. Only those illegal traders / smugglers should be spotted who have suitably established their own network and visit target area very frequently. The contacts of such traders both in target area and government controlled areas must be identified at this stage. Traders who are inexperienced in their dealings must be avoided. The techniques for carrying out spotting of illegal traders are as follows:- (1) Agent. Agent already operating for an intelligence agency can be tasked to identify such traders. The intelligence agency may share available inputs of such individuals with the agent. (2) Intelligence Agency Personnel. Intelligence agency personnel may approach an illegal trader indirectly by assuming the cover of business personnel wanting their services. This requires detailed study to identify the type of trade flourishing in the target area. b. Verification. It should critically focus on the contacts in the terrorists groups. It should also ascertain the pending cases of frauds, arms smuggling, human trafficking and other crimes in the courts against such traders. The persons involved in such cases should be discarded. This would assist the agency in identifying the desired agent based on the common interests of intelligence agency and trader. c. Selection. At this stage the correct motive of an illegal trader should be identified. Motives and willingness to work for the intelligence agency should be gauged. Some of the motives may put the handler and intelligence agency in embarrassing situation like seeking reprieve in criminal cases, arms smuggling and human trafficking. Such individuals should not be selected for cultivation as agents. 33 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED d. Cultivation. In this stage the motive identified should be suitably used to motivate an individual, however limited assurances should be made to the individual to avoid any legal complications. e. Testing, Re-verification and Enrolment. The method adopted in testing, re-verification and enrolment will be the same as covered in Chapter 1. 9. Training. Illegal traders must be trained to apply their basic knowledge of the area to acquire information of terrorist groups. It would involve planning based on individual’s aptitude, strengths, weaknesses, operational environment and futuristic employment. Such traders by virtue of their dealings would have basic knowledge about the terrorists groups, topography, customs, traditions, language, rules and regulations of the target area. Keeping this aspect in mind, basic training should be imparted to include knowledge of weapons and equipment, modus operandi of terrorists, memory training, photography, communication and security. The method of training would be similar to that of any other agent as covered in chapter 2. 10. Handling. It is one of the important aspects in employing illegal traders to acquire information. Such traders by virtue of their dealings may work for intelligence agency with dubious motive. The traders must be asked to always inform the agency of their move plans. This will assist the agency in exploiting such trader’s movement across the forward defended locality. The control officer should carryout tasking of such individuals based on their capability and suitability. The agents should be trained for specific tasks and briefed prior to the movement. After acquiring the information and on de-induction the individuals should be debriefed at the earliest before he gets on to the business. At times such traders continue to stay in target area even after acquiring information. In such contingencies they should be asked to pass the information through other couriers or electronic means based on the operational situation. These traders would generally seek favour in terms of assistance for moving unchecked in the government controlled areas. The handler in such eventualities should take the appropriate decision keeping in mind the individuals motive. Handler should not grant any favour which will put the agency in an embarrassing situation. Monitoring 11. Illegal traders with the passage of time may start working for intelligence agency and terrorist group simultaneously as a double agent. It is therefore, essential to guard against illegal traders. The intelligence agency should continuously monitor the activities of such traders to ascertain dubious motives. The dubious motives could be those mentioned below:- a. Possibility of individual turning into double / dual / multiple agent. b. Escorting other illegal traders. c. Providing misleading information at the behest of terrorist groups. 34 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED d. Impostor as intelligence agency personnel in any other government offices. Conclusion 12. Illegal traders have potential of becoming an agent / courier owing to the knowledge and contacts in target area. The intention to work for the intelligence agency should be well understood prior to recruiting any such individual. Intelligence agency should make an endeavour to exploit the potential of such traders as and when one volunteers or is cultivated to work. The information provided should be analysed as their likelihood of operating as a double agent cannot be ruled out. An illegal trader when properly handled can prove to be an effective to the intelligence agency. 35 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED CHAPTER 5 COVER PLANNING Introduction 1. Acquisition of information by employing Human Intelligence (HUMINT) requires detailed planning and preparation. Acquisition of information from a target area may have to be done over the period of time. To sustain such prolonged intelligence operations in a hostile environment an agent is generally placed in the target area. The agent who is placed in hostile area needs to assume fake identity to justify his existence and to ensure security of intelligence operations. Fake identity is assumed by the agent based on the cover story provided by the intelligence agency. 2. Assuming a cover by an agent warrants detailed planning and coordination to ensure its success. In present scenario under cover operations play a major role in achieving the aim of intelligence operations. However the same depends on extremely high level of training and execution of such operations. Sir Winston Churchill once called it a ‘Battle of Conjurers’--the under-cover war between the experts in deceit and deception on which the fate of operations may depend. Cover 3. Cover is the means by which an individual, group or organisation conceals the true nature of its acts and its existence from the observer. The cover is assumed by building up the desired cover story before embarking on the mission. The cover story is selected deliberately after acquiring desired information of nature of activities, way of life and security setup of intelligence agency in the target area. This will provide information about various options available for placement of the agent. Intelligence operations in which cover is used are called as under cover operations and the individual part of such operation is called as under cover agent. They are defined as under:- a. Under Cover Operations. These are the intelligence operations in which information is acquired by an agent by concealing ones true identity in order to accomplish the mission. b. Under Cover Agent. He is a member of an intelligence organisation or an agent who conceals his actual identity and obtains information. 4. Necessity. The necessity of cover planning in under cover operations is as under:- a. To maintain secrecy of operations from terrorists groups. b. Helps in justifying presence in the target area. 36 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED c. Provides security to the agent. d. Helps in successful accomplishment of the mission. Types of Under-Cover Assignments 5. Jurisdictional Assignments. In such assignments, a number of agents are assigned to obtain information about different aspects of a particular target / target area. In such assignment the location of target, routine of the target and habits of the target are considered. This type of assignment will be used for a primary mission as well as supporting missions. Based on the various aspects of the target the type of assignment is selected. The various types of jurisdictional assignments are dwelling, work and social assignments which are performed by different agents are as under:-. a. Dwelling Assignment. In such assignment, agent starts residing in the vicinity of residence / work of the hostile individual. The same would also hold true in case of information is required about an installation. b. Work Assignment. In this type of assignment an agent joins the organisation with the intention of obtaining information from the target. An agent gets recruited in the terrorist group, establishes himself, earns confidence and thereafter starts providing the desired information. In other words agent penetrates the terrorist organisation. c. Social Assignments. This assignment can be defined as an assignment in which the undercover agent assumes the cover story to assist him visiting the clubs and other places of amusement and entertainment known to be habitually visited by persons of intelligence interest or their associates. 6. Combination Assignment. When an agent covers all phases of a target, the agent is said to be of combination assignment. Such assignment is capable of producing the best results, but the possibility of compromise increases. Selection of Cover Story 7. Cover story is an account of biographical data, true or fictional, which will portray the identity the agent wants to assume. The cover story to be assumed by an agent is carefully chalked out based on the operational requirement. It also depends upon on other factors like the personal details of the subject, work place, area and details of hostile intelligence set up. Cover stories will depend upon the nature of assignment. 8. Types of Cover Stories. Depending upon the operational environment and the nature of assignment the types of cover stories which can be assumed are as under:- a. Natural. It involves using actual or true background data of an agent with minor changes to suit the situation. In this type of cover story the fictitious 37 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED identity is chosen in such a manner that very little changes can help in building the cover story. b. Artificial. In this type of cover story the biographical data is suitably prepared or adopted for the required purpose. It involves preparation of fictitious story to suit the situation. The story thus prepared is supported by complimentary actions so that it is made to appear as a true one. c. Combination. In this type of cover story, the biographical and background story consists of actual and fictitious data. This kind of story is assumed so as to strike the correct balance between facts and fiction. 9. Details of Cover Story. The intelligence agency will need to collect detailed information about number of aspects associated with the cover story. This will be necessary so as to provide the agent with the necessary wherewithal to operate in the target area. The details that will be required are as follows:- a. Mutual Point of Interest. It must provide a mutual point of interest between the mission requirement and agent. The basis of the cover should be such that the agent and the intelligence agency are equally interested and willing to use it. b. Justification for Presence. It should assist in justification for agent’s presence in a particular place without compromising identity. The justification should be such that hostile investigation should not to be able to uncover it. It should also help an agent to take a different cover if required. c. Contact. The cover story must afford opportunity to the agent to carry out surveillance of the subject and target area. d. Biographical Data. It must provide enough details to permit the agent to stick to it under prolonged questioning. It should cover all the details from date and place of birth to names of parents and other blood relations. Details of education along with the certificates as proof should be made available. It should also provide the agent with previous and permanent addresses about which he is qualified to speak intelligently. The proof of address must be prepared and made available to assist the agent in proving his identity so as to get the desired standing in the target area. e. Financial or Special Status. The agent should be given the requisite resources to maintain the status befitting the assumed identity. Desired financial status would also ensure that the agent concentrates on the mission and does not involve himself in earning a livelihood. This will also ensure that the cover is not used for activities other than those desired. 38 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED f. Freedom of Movement. It must allow an agent enough freedom of movement within the target area. The cover story must facilitate movement at all the times without arousing suspicion in hostile environment. g. Communication. The story must provide an agent with opportunity to communicate with the control officer. The cover assumed by the agent should allow him to contact control officer without taking unnecessary risk, thereby decreasing the chance of detection. However, when such opportunities are not forthcoming the secret means should be used to communicate. These measures ensure security of the operations. h. Alternate Cover Story. The plan should cater for alternate cover to be used by an agent if security is likely to be compromised. This ensures that the mission is not called off as the agent can assume alternate cover story. i. Extrication. The operational plan should cater for valid reasons which can be cited by an agent to move out from the target area without arousing any suspicion. This will also depend upon the situation at the time of extrication. Selection of Personnel 10. Agents for under cover assignment should be selected on basis of certain qualifications as under:- a. General qualifications. b. Special qualifications. 11. General Qualifications. Some of the general qualifications required in an under cover agent are as under :- a. Intelligence / IQ. Agent should have above average intelligence and be capable of comprehending the details of the cover story. He should also be able to make quick decisions based on sound judgement and logical thinking during execution of under cover operations. b. Senses. Agent should have keen senses to ensure that security is maintained by keeping eyes and ears open at all the times. Individual should also have sound perception in order to ensure accuracy and reliability of his observations. Poor eye-sight or bad hearing will lead to the submission of false or inaccurate information. c. Self-Confidence. Self-confidence will enable the agent to present the cover story in a natural and convincing manner. However, over-confidence must be avoided. 39 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED d. Good Memory. An agent must have good long term and short term memory so that need to take notes does not arise. e. Temper. The individual should have patience to overcome various situations to avoid confrontation in the target area. f. Endurance. An agent must have adequate mental and physical endurance to withstand long hours of duty. g. Personality. An agent must be able to display an average personality which blends with the group. h. Physical Appearance. An agent should possess similar physical characteristics that of the local population where one is likely to operate. i. Natural or Acquired Aptitude. An under-cover agent must have natural or acquired aptitude for under cover work. Lack of aptitude would jeopardise the mission and the entire net. 12. Special Qualificatio