Theories of Politics and Communication PDF

Theories of Politics and Communication © Eerik Lagerspetz University of Helsinki Fall 2024 A tentai:ve list of our topics: 1. What is democracy? Concepts and values. The basic philosophical challenges. 2. Justifications of democra...

Theories of Politics and Communication © Eerik Lagerspetz University of Helsinki Fall 2024 A tentai:ve list of our topics: 1. What is democracy? Concepts and values. The basic philosophical challenges. 2. Justifications of democracy I: the epistemic and consequentialist views. 3. Justifications of democracy II: the proceduralist views; the roles of voting and of representation. 4. Justifications of democracy III: Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality; the deliberative views. 5. Technological developments and the transformations of the public sphere. 6. The crises of democracy. The parallel problems of technocracy and populism. 7. Democracy and future. How democracy is able to cope with the long-term prespective (climate change etc.)? We all are ”democrats” now!  Since the 2nd World War, democracy has officially been the only game in the town. Virtually no country (except few traditional autocracies) dares to call itself ”non-democratic”. Instead,  those countries that are considered as non-democratic by the rest of the world want to call themselves “democracies” in some special sense: e.g. “people’s democracy” (the former Soviet satellites), “sovereign democracy” (Russia), “guided democracy” (Indonesia 1959-65), “organic democracy” (Franco’s Spain), “illiberal democracy” (Victor Orban’s Hungary) and so on. Example: The Economist Democracy Index, 2023 Fulldemocracies 24 Flawed democracies 50 Hybrid regimes 34 Authoritarian regimes59 Aristotle, The Politics (ca 340-330?): ”A basic principle of the democratic constitutions is liberty. (…) ’Ruling and being ruled in turn’ is one element in liberty, and the democratical idea of justice is in fact numerical equality, not equality based on merit; and when this idea of what is just prevails, the multitude must be sovereign, and whatever the majority decides is final and constitutes justice.” (1317a40) Democratic values  Political equality. In democratic decision-making, all members participating in decision-making are equal.  Equal and effective liberty. All decision-makers are equally entitled to express their opinions, disseminate information, discuss on issues, and to form groups, organizations and coalitions.  Self-government. In democratic decision-making, the citizens have means to participate in an authoritative way so that their acts of participation have an effective, predictable impact in the decisions. Institutional principles related to the realization of democratic values 1. wide rights of participation 2. equal rights of all (adult) citizens 3. liberty of speech and of organization 4. public decision-making 5. important decisions preceded by public discussion 6. the use of majority principle at some level(s) 7. free, fair and general election of the central decision-makers 8. accountability and replaceability of those in political authority 9. general and equal laws (the rule of law) 10. principles (1)-(9) protected by a constitution Institutional principles related to the realization of democratic values The principles – and the values behind them - are realized in existing democracies at various degrees. They are partly interrelated. For example public discussion (5) presupposes liberty of speech (3) as well as publicity (4). I argue that the use of majority principle (6) follows from equal rights (2), at least in the modern conditions. Nevertheless, the institutional requirements (1) – (10) can be kept separate. They have been developed in different contexts. For example, in many medieval and early modern societies there were rights of participation, but they were very unequal. In some societies there has been wide rights of discussion but no participation. Aristotle, The Politics. What is democracy?  ”…(a) Elections to office by all from among all. (b) Rule of all over each and of each by turns over all. (c) Offices filled by lot, either all or at any rate those not calling for experience or skill. (d) No tenure of office dependent on the possession of a property qualification, or only on the lowest possible. (e) The same man not to hold the same office twice, or only rarely, or only a few apart those connected with warfare. (f) Short terms for all offices or for as many as possible. (g) All to sit on juries, chosen from all and adjudicating on all or most important matters (…). (h) The assembly as the sovereign authority in everything, or at least the important matters, officials having no sovereign power over any, or over as few as possible.(…)”  The oratory of Pericles (in Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, ca government “Our 431-404) is called a democracy, because its administration is in the hands, not of the few, but of the many; yet while as regards the law all men are on an equality for the settlement of their private disputes, as regards the value set on them it is as each man is in any way distinguished that he is preferred to public honours, not because he belongs to a particular class, but because of personal merits; nor, again, on the ground of poverty is a man barred from a public career by obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the state a service. “ The oratory of Pericles (in Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War) “And you will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and in public affairs, and in others of us who give attention chiefly to business, you will find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in public affairs, not as one who minds his own business, but as good for nothing; and we Athenians decide public questions for ourselves or at least endeavour to arrive at a sound understanding of them, in the belief that it is not debate that is a hindrance to action, but rather not to be instructed by debate before the time comes for action.” The justification problem(s) 1. Why democracy is a better system than any of its (feasible) alternatives? 2. Why it is justified to use coercion in implementing democratic decisions? 3. Why should I obey democratic decisions? Possible justifications of democratic decision-making  Good consequences:  Democratic decision-making produces better decisions (than its feasible alternatives).  Democracy has good indirect consequences. E.g. it promotes general welfare or protects liberty  People have a right to democratic participation because  Democracy is required by equality  Democracy is required by liberty  Democracy is required by self-government NB. The justifications are not mutually exclusive! Possible problems in justifications  Does democracy actually produce better decisions than its alternatives? [an empirical question]  Does it actually promote welfare or protect liberty? [empirical questions]  Itsit compatible with citizens’ liberty and self-determination? [a conceptual question?] What is authority?  If someone is a practical authority, their decisions should be taken into account because they are their decisions.  Someone is an epistemic authority if their statements (about the subject in which he or she is an authority) should be believed because they are made by them. Shirley Letwin (1989), ”The Morality of Democracy and the Rule of Law”. “Would we want democracy if we had an access to indisputable knowledge of what ought to be done? The answer is, of course, no. Whether such knowledge were derived from God, history, science or nature, it would be folly if not sacrilege to let the ignorant decide. Any reasonable person would want to hand over public decisions to the sages or technicians who knew the truth.” The epistemic argument against democracy 1. Politically important decisions should realise the common good. 2. There is knowledge about the common good. 3. Some people have more knowledge of the common good than others do. 4. Those who have more knowledge about the common good than others are more likely to make decisions that realise the common good than those who have less knowledge about it. 5. Those who have more knowledge about the common good should make the politically important decisions. 6. Democracy is a system in which all are equally entitled to participate in decision- making. Hence, 7. politically important decisions should not be made in a democratic way. The epistemic argument against democracy Premise (1) seems to be an analytical truth: if the common good exists, it is what politically important decisions should aim at. Premise (6) follows from our notion of democracy. Premise (4) says that knowledge about the common good is of a practical nature: if someone knows the content of the public good, she is also better equipped to make decisions that realise it. So, prima facie, the controversial premises are (2) and (3). Hans Kelsen (1955),”The Foundations of Democracy”, Ethics 66: “To legislate, and that means to determine the contents of a social order, not according to what objectively is the best for the individuals subject to this order, but according to what these individuals, or their majority, rightly or wrongly believe to be the best – this consequence of the democratic principles of freedom and equality is justifiable only if there is no such thing as an absolute answer to the question as to what is the best, if there is no such thing as absolute good.” Premises (1) and (2) of the Anti- Democratic Argument denied:  There are no objective moral truths. All moral judgements are subjective. Political convictions are at least partly moral in nature; therefore, they should be analysed as subjective opinions or expressions of personal preferences. Because none of them is unconditionally true or false, there is no rational reason to give a privileged status to any conviction.  At the same time, concrete decisions has to be made. Democracy is the only method of making decisions that treats all political convictions equally. A relativist justification of democracy is self-refuting! (1) Ifthere are no “absolute” or “objective” or “true” answers to evaluative questions, there is no absolute, objective or true answer to the question of whether democracy is better than some alternative arrangement. (2) If the judgement “democracy is better than its alternatives” somehow followed from the premise that there are no objectively true answers to evaluative questions, the premise itself would be undermined by this result. For then there would be an objectively true answer at least to one evaluative question. Aristotle, The Politics: An epistemic argument for democracy. “For the many, of whom each individual is not a good man, when they meet together may be better than the few good, if not regarded individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of excellence and practical wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and sense, so too with their character and thought. Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and some another, and among them they understand the whole.” (Aristotle, 1281b)  Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), The Social Contract: “When a law is proposed in the People’s assembly, what they are being asked is not exactly whether they approve the proposal or reject it, but whether it does or does not conform to the general will, which is theirs; everyone states his opinion about this by casting a ballot, and the tally of the votes yields the declaration of the general will. Therefore, when the opinion contrary to my own prevails, it proves nothing more than that I have made a mistake, and that what I took to be the general will was not.”(Bk. IV.2.) What is the relation between truth/correctness/best alternative and democratic processes?  Constitutive interpretation: the truth or correctness is either something which emerges only in the democratic process itself. Problem: circularity?  Indicative interpretation: the truth or correctness is independent of the democratic process; the democratic process provides good evidence about the truth or correctness of a statement or a decision. Problem: how we know that the democratic process produces good evidence? If we can assess its reliability by some other method, why no use that rather than the democratic process? The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) proved by Marqis de Condorcet (1743- 1794) If there are only two possible kinds of answers to a question – correct and incorrect ones – and if the average probability of an individual voter answering a question correctly is greater than 0.5, the probability of getting the correct answer from an absolute (simple) majority of a group of voters is higher than the average, and it increases rapidly as the size of the group increases. For example, when the average competence is 0.505 and the number of people participating in decision making is 10 000, the probability that the majority of them will reach the right solution is 0.8413. If their average competence is The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT); the conditions (i) There exists a correct (right, best) alternative. (ii) Voters have to choose between two alternatives only. (iii)The voters vote sincerely, not strategically. They are striving for truth, not trying produce the most preferred outcome. (iv)Votes are independent of each other. (v) The average competence of the voters – that is, their probability to vote for the correct alternative – is over 0.5. The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) continued The argument seems to solve the twin problems of democratic authority and of epistemic elitism. The authority of democratic procedures becomes a species of epistemic authority. There is genuine knowledge about the common good; but the best source of this knowledge is people as a whole. Thus, the result challenges the old wisdom, expressed by the economist F. A. Hayek (1960, 110), that the majority decisions “are bound (…) to be inferior to the decisions that the most intelligent members of the group make after listening to all opinions”. The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) – possible problems  Are peole competent in the relevant sense?  Are votes independent? (What about parties and opinion leaders?)  Is CJT actually an argument for democracy – or only for the rule of the many, instead of one or of few?  The problem shared by all epistemic justifications of democracy: persisting opposition is unreasonable. If a majority decision is the best source of information, it is irrational to disagree with the majority, when the decision has been made. (cf. the Rousseau-quote above!)  NB. These problems are there even if we grant for the epistemic democrat the basic premise: in politics, there are correct (and incorrect) solutions. An indirect epistemic argument for democratic processes (my proposal) Democratic processes may be better than communities of experts to spot relevant problems, although they may not be as good to find right solutions. Example:  A, the community of experts, makes the correct decision on 90 % of the issues it deals with, while the democratic community B makes the correct decision in 55 % of cases.  Suppose, that B is twice as effective in recognizing the important issues. For example, there are 100 potentially relevant issues in both communities. A makes the correct decision on 45 issues, the wrong decision in 5 issues, and leaves 50 issues unconsidered. B deals with all the issues, making 55 right and 45 wrong decisions.  The total number of correct decisions is, then, greater in B than in A. A community of experts may produce better decisions but worse “non- decisions”.