The making of the Modern Gulf states - Chapter two .pdf

2 The Emergence of the Gulf States Two major external factors have played a determining role in the their strategic establishment and evolution of the Gulf location on the route to India, which led directly to the relationship with Britain, and the existence there of vast oil resources, which has...

2 The Emergence of the Gulf States Two major external factors have played a determining role in the their strategic establishment and evolution of the Gulf location on the route to India, which led directly to the relationship with Britain, and the existence there of vast oil resources, which has had far-reaching and inevitable economic and political repercussions. The interaction of these two has in turn had a significant effect on another important factor, the central authority of the ruler, whose position became institutionalized. This chapter will analyse the emergence of the modern Gulf states in the light of these three factors- strategy, oil and the position of the ruler- which can be said to have had the greatest bearing on their formation. Strategy: relationship with Britain British ships first went to the Gulf because of its position on the route to India; this led ultimately to the establishment of British dominance in the region. Throughout the nineteenth century. Britain had been concerned with promoting the access of its vessels sailing to and from India. To this end, it spun an intricate web of treaties around the Arab rulers of the Gulf states. By the end of World War I, the Gulf had become, to all intents and purposes, a British lake. The strategic assets of the Gulf region increased even further during the twentieth century. In Iran oil was discovered and produced by a British company (the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the predecessor of British Petroleum); in Iraq Britain had assumed a mandate; and important landing and refuelling stops were established for the British air route linking Egypt, Iraq and India (Kuwait, Bahrain, Sharjah, Oman). Throughout the period of British hegemony, many of the The Emergence of the Gulf States 13 features which were to constitute important characteristics of the Gulf states were established. They owe much of their existence as separate political units to Britain. Their rulers were personally responsible for fulfilling their treaty conditions, and they alone had dealings with British officials and representatives. The fact of their treaty obligations gave the rulers continuity and political status, for they bound both them and their heirs and successors. By and large, the treaties with Britain sealed the Gulf states off from the rest of the world. Britain guarded them with a jealous eye: in the nineteenth century, to prevent other powers from entering the region; and in the present century. to ensure the maintenance of the Gulf as a British lake. On the one hand, therefore, the British connection added an important element to the sovereignty of the states and their rulers; and on the other, that connection isolated the states, thus impeding their sociopolitical development. This isolation caused the states over the years to become very parochial and inward-looking; until the discovery of cil, they appeared to be places where time had stood still. The merchants and sailors confined their activities to the shores of the Gulf, and ventured out only as far as Bombay. Until the recent past the Indian connection remained very strong. The Indian rupee was the currency in circulation, particularly in the coastal towns and villages, and until the 1940s, Indian stamps were overmarked 'Kuwait' and 'Bahrain'. The Arabic dialect ofthe coastal areas contained many Urdu words, and the political officers stationed there - a mere handful of Englishmen - were members of the British government of India who had been trained for service in India. They applied British Indian regulations throughout the Gulf states. Most of the Gulf states had no recognized legal status within the British Empire. They were not colonies, mandates or protectorates; they were described simply as being 'in treaty relations with Britain'. The fact that they were a backwater, however, afforded them a certain protection, acting as a cocoon which preserved their social traditions and political systems, permitting the continued use of Arab tribal customs. It also contributed to the survival of their institutions despite the dramatic impact of the great oil wealth of the past forty years. No Gulf state was allowed to deal directly with another country, large or small; all foreign relations were conducted on their behalf by Britain until independence. Moreover, all movement in and out 14 The Making of the Modern Gulf States of the Gulf states was subject to British permission. An amazing anecdote will illustrate this point. In 1934, the Political Agent in Bahrain received a telegram from the British consul in Basra informing him that he had granted an entry visa to Bahrain to a Mr Harding of American Express. The Agent panicked when he read the telegram; he did not want any Americans in Bahrain. He therefore decided to prevent Mr Harding's entry. He went to the airport and prepared to send him back immediately after his plane landed, but to his surprise and relief, Mr Harding turned out to be an Englishman; he was allowed in. The net result of this tight control was that the people of the Gulf were cut off from the rest of the world except India. They had little to do with their fellow Arabs until the advent of oil, with the exception of a tiny group of Egyptian, Lebanese and Palestinian schoolteachers in Kuwait and Bahrain. By the same token, the British relationship also acted to protect the political and territorial integrity of the different states. This was particularly the case during the 1920s and 1930s when the three regional powers - Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq - entered the political arena. The first two were dominated by charismatic personalities: King Abdel Aziz ibn Abdel Rahman Al Faisal Al Saud (known in the West as King Ibn Saud) and Reza Shah. After having consolidated their own power at home, both men gradually led their respective countries to become important components in the political structure of the region. After attaining independence from Britain in 1930, Iraq joined Saudi Arabia and Iran to become the third regional power. All three laid claim to different parts of the Gulf states, and all three were engaged in a forward policy there during the inter-war years. The King of Saudi Arabia considered parts of the inland territories of Oman, Qatar and the Trucial states as belonging to his kingdom. Likewise, Reza Shah revived the old Iranian claim to Bahrain, and Iraq regarded Kuwait as part of the Ottoman province of Basra from which it had been separated by the AngloKuwaiti treaty of 1899. Britain resisted these claims with great firmness, and expended considerable diplomatic and political effort to maintain the status quo. As a result, the regional powers confined manifestations of these claims to non-military means. The forward policies of the regional powers were thereby contained and frozen into the requirements of the pax Britannica. These requirements were so firmly The Emergence of the Gulf States 15 established that they have been maintained up to the present, albeit in a different form, long after Britain has left the region. An interesting feature of the British connection before the discovery of oil was the smallness of the contingent of British officals residing there; until World War II, they were never more than four or five. They alone maintained British rule and made sure the treaty conditions were observed. They issued manumission certificates for slaves wishing to be released from their bondage. They had meetings with the rulers, and kept detailed records of all events of importance. They had jurisdiction over most foreigners in the Gulf states. On the commercial side, their functions included the issuing of certificates of origin for shipping, approving lists of passengers and granting export licences. Their authority was, of course, upheld at all times by the sloops of the British Indian navy, which were never far off; their stated objective was to secure and maintain the maritime peace of the Gulf. British policy was officially against interference in the internal affairs of the states so long as British interests were not affected. The British officials living there were so few that their duties were very time-consuming. None of the modern amenities - such as electricity, air-conditioning, refrigerators - were then available, and daily life was fairly difficult for these Europeans who were not accustomed to the heat and humidity. The policy of non-interference meant that British officials were not involved in the introduction of any of the much-needed socioeconomic reforms. No schools or hospitals, no public services of any kind were introduced by the representatives of the British government: this perpetuated the isolation of the region. It also contributed to the strengthening of the respective positions of the different rulers. Government was left entirely to them so long as they fulfilled their treaty obligations; these were largely concerned with the absence both of foreign relations and of any kind of hostilities at sea. The rulers received moral and political support from Britain, and were allowed a free hand in the conduct of local affairs. They therefore gained much in stature during the British period. The fact that Britain had separate relations with all the states, large or small, encouraged feelings of separation between them. A clause in the treaties stipulated, for example, that every ship had to fly the flag of the state to which it belonged. In time, each state became identified with a flag. The daily identification with 16 The Making of the Modern Gulf States its own flag by each seafaring population increased the separateness, and played a part in establishing the difference between, say, Dubai and Sharjah, and between Qatar and Abu Dhabi. Travel documents were issued by British officials. Although a flag and a passport are only symbols of a state, their repeated use inevitably brings about a form of national identity. The natural corollary to a flag and a passport is a national anthem. Although it is unlikely that any of the Gulf states had anthems in the modern sense during the nineteenth century, Bahrain and Oman had such a song by the 1930s, and today all Gulf states have them. Flags, passports and anthems are only very minor manifestations of separateness, but in the Gulf they contributed, over the many years of the British presence, to the process by which each state became politically and socially self-contained. In the same way, the parcelling off of small groups of tribal configurations to become separate political units led to other, perhaps more lasting, results, the most outstanding of which concerns oil. Since the British government of India oversaw all the original oil concessions, it was only natural for it to introduce the oil companies to the same political units. Thus, the signing of the oil concessions perpetuated the political system created in the nineteenth century: separate concessions were granted to the oil companies by the rulers of Qatar and Umm al-Qaiwain, Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Since oil was not discovered in all the Gulf states, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar are today particularly rich, while Fujairah, Bahrain and Umm al-Qaiwain are not. Oil: the advent of the companies The entry of the oil companies in search of concessions soon after World War I was to become a major milestone in the sociopolitical and economic evolution of the region. Their influence was felt in two different areas simultaneously. On the one hand, they upheld and perpetuated the political units which had evolved and developed under British aegis; on the other, they acted as agents of major change. The two effects were mutually reinforcing. The impact of the oil companies was so strong that it has allowed the Gulf states to maintain their old political systems long after the end of the colonial era. Since the oil companies worked very closely with British officials, it was inevitable that they too would regard each state The Emergence of the Gulf States 17 as separate. A concession with specific terms and conditions for Bahrain was signed with the ruler in 1930; another one with Kuwait was signed in 1934; the ruler of Qatar signed his in 1935; and so on. The concessions ultimately determined the course of the financial fortunes of each state: Kuwait became and has remained enormously wealthy since 1949-50; Bahrain only moderately so in the 1930s; and Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah have started only recently to reap the financial rewards of the discovery of oil. By placing the concessions in the names of the different rulers, the oil companies helped to maintain the political system. They also raised a new question when dealing with the political units. This was one with which the British authorities had not been hitherto concerned - the precise delineation of each state's boundaries. The companies understandably wanted to know the exact extent of their concessionary areas and turned to the British officials for information. Every inch of land had suddenly become very valuable. The Gulf states had never before attempted to define their borders. The desert law that governed society was not concerned with such a foreign concept. Qatar, the Trucial states and Oman all had large inland territories; their boundaries fluctuated according to pastoral and political conditions, and were never expected to achieve any degree of permanence. Rupert Hay, who was Political Resident during the 1950s, described the situation as follows: 'The Arabian desert has sometimes been compared to the high seas. Caravans come and go like ships and nomads roam at will in search of grazing . . . ' 1 The very acceptance of the principle of boundaries at this time served to underline the separateness of each state and thus to ·cause each to identify itself as a separate political unit. It was inevitable that tension - and, in some cases, hostilities- between neighbouring states resulted: each extended its territorial claim to the largest possible area. Kuwait's borders had already been delineated in 1922 at a conference held under British auspices in U jair (Saudi Arabia) to limit the expansion of Saudi Arabia into Iraq; two-thirds of the land claimed by Kuwait at that time was 'awarded' to Saudi Arabia by the British authorities. In addition, those areas whose sovereignty could not be accurately defined were designated 'neutral zones': they were to be shared equally by the two states. The difficult task of defining borders and determining the exact 18 The Making of the Modern Gulf States extent of a ruler's authority began in earnest after the preliminary concessions were signed during the 1930s. Hitherto, a ruler's sovereignty had been firmly established only in the coastal towns, and occasionally in the inland oases such as al-Ain and Liwa (Abu Dhabi). This was because Britain, primarily interested in the sea route to India, recognized the authority only of those rulers who had jurisdiction over coastal areas. Bahrain's island status presented no problems and Kuwait's borders had been established in 1922. The inland portions of the remainder of the states included large tracts of desert. The seeds of the first major dispute over territory were sown when Saudi Arabia granted an oil concession in 1933 to an American oil company. The Foreign Office in London, acting on behalf of Oman, Qatar and Abu Dhabi- whose borders were contiguous with Saudi Arabia- defined their exact extent shortly afterwards. This was rejected by Saudi Arabia, and thus began a major territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and the three Gulf states on the other which was to affect relations between them for the next four decades. Territorial disputes between most of the Gulf states ensued within a few years of the signing of the preliminary oil concessions: between Qatar and Bahrain over Zubarah (on the west coast of Qatar) and the Hawar islands lying between them; between Abu Dhabi and Dubai; between Abu Dhabi and Qatar; between Sharjah and Dubai; and so on. Many of these have lingered on to the present day. The conflict which erupted in April 1986 between Qatar and Bahrain over the islet of Fasht al-Dibal (belonging to the Hawar islands) is the continuation of a problem which started when the oil concessions were signed in the 1930s. One of the most striking changes brought about by the oil companies was the opening up of the region to the outside world. Until then, the British authorities had granted very few entry visas there, and allowed only minimal reference to the Gulf states to be made internationally. Once the oil concessions had been signed, control of foreigners could no longer be tightly restricted; geologists, refinery workers, managers, etc. all began to arrive in increasing numbers. The parochial days of the Gulf states were over. As the barriers of isolation were lifted, an awareness of the political and economic realities of the Gulf region began to grow. From hesitant beginnings, Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi newspapers, The Emergence of the Gulf States 19 which began to arrive there on a regular basis, turned their attention to the eastern flank of the Arab world. Relationships with Arab countries were gradually established. At first, they were confined mostly to the cultural level as Gulf students began to go abroad: Bahrainis to Lebanon, Kuwaitis to Egypt and Iraq. Moreover, Egyptian, Palestinian and Lebanese teachers arrived in Kuwait and Bahrain. Gulf citizens, particularly those of the privileged elite, felt stronger bonds with their fellow Arabs than they had had with Indians. The earlier links with India soon assumed second place. Another new link was also being forged: that with the USA, whose interests in the Gulf and the entire Arab world had hitherto been confined largely to the activities of a few missionaries. It was in Bahrain that an American oil company, the Standard Oil Company of California (SoCal), first obtained a concession. Although the British government had initially objected strongly to the entry of a US company, it finally accepted it on condition that the company holding the Bahrain concession would be a British company. So a subsidiary of SoCal, the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) was formed as a British company which was registered in Canada; one of its five directors was British and his appointment was always made in consultation with the British government. BAPCO struck oil in Bahrain in 1931, and production began the following year. In 1933, SoCal obtained a concession for Saudi Arabia. American oil companies were now firmly established in the region, their interests ultimately providing the basis for a forward US policy in the Arab world. A new power was set to overtake Britain. The position of ruler The combined effect of the relationship with Britain and the opening of the region by the oil companies had a powerful local impact on the role of central authority. The one important and constant element in the political evolution of the Gulf states was the position of the ruler. He signed the treaties, and he was personally responsible for the application of all their clauses. The British authorities - whether the Political Resident, the Political Agent or the Senior Naval Officer of the Persian Gulf Divisiondealt with him alone. The treaty system strengthened his position and assured the continuity of his influence. With time, it became 20 The Making of the Modern Gulf States a guarantee. Most important, it contributed to the institutionalization of his position. British support for a ruler was conveyed in many different ways, even in the number of gun salutes he was accorded. In 1929, for example, the rulers of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar were the recipients of seven-gun salutes; the ruler of Abu Dhabi received a five-gun salute; and the ruler of Dubai, only a humble three. That year, an attempt was made by the family of Shaikh Said of Dubai to depose him. The Political Resident stepped in to uphold the ruler: he warned that any move to depose Shaikh Said would incur the strong disapproval of the British government. To reconfirm this support, a public and audible gesture to Shaikh Said followed: he was granted a five-gun salute. This was a clear recognition of his independence and one that reflected his increased stature. By the same token, the salute for Abu Dhabi was reduced because of fratricide in the ruling family: between 1912 and 1928, three rulers were murdered by their brothers who then succeeded them. The gun salute was reduced from five to three as a symbol of British displeasure. Likewise, the salutes of Kuwait and Bahrain were raised (to eleven) as a mark of approbation after they signed oil concessions a few years later. Before the arrival of the oil companies. the rulers had assumed a generally passive role in their respective relationships with Britain. As long as they adhered to their treaty conditions, they had little contact with British officials, aside from formalities. But once negotiations for oil concessions had started, the situation changed perceptibly. The ruler now became more active and dynamic; his signature was essential to the business in hand, and he was allowed to participate in the discussions, which had become tri-lateral: those taking part were the Political Agent, a representative of the oil company and the ruler. The ruler was quick to perceive that he had new advantages, and acted on this with positive results. He was aware of the economic benefits - though not perhaps of their extent - that could be derived from the discovery of oil. He therefore held out for the best financial terms possible. Shaikh Ahmad al-J abir of Kuwait went one step further. He encouraged two different companies, the Gulf Oil Corporation (USA) and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Britain) to outbid each other while competing for the same concession. He therefore obtained The Emergence of the Gulf States 21 better terms; he astutely waited for the opportune moment, and awarded it to both companies on a fifty-fifty basis. A ruler could also opt for political rather than commercial gains during the tri-lateral discussions for an oil concession. Such was the case of Shaikh Abdallah of Qatar in 1935. Since the early days of his rule, he had been plagued by the hostility of his brothers, over whom he had little control. He required a firm British commitment both to safeguard his position and to recognize his son as his heir and successor. He therefore struck a bargain with the Political Resident: he would sign the oil concession if Britain provided him with such a commitment. His position as ruler was thereby strengthened considerably. A ruler was personally responsible to Britain for the actions of his people. Any infringement of the treaty regulations could bring British admonition down on him. His successor would emerge from his immediate family. The law of primogeniture did not apply in the Gulf: the main principle governing the succession was the strength and abilities of the candidate. He had to display a combination of fearlessness, integrity, intelligence, wisdom and generosity; he also had to make sure that none of his close relatives became disaffected - not to do so could bring about his downfall. The most important factor in his selection was his qualities of leadership. He could be the son of the ruler, the brother, the nephew or the uncle. This fact inevitably led to great rivalries and tensions within the ruling families, as the members vied with each other for control. With the exception of the AI Khalifah, who had come to power in Bahrain as a result of conquest, the ruling families had emerged over the years through the efforts of individuals with outstanding leadership abilities. A close rapport with their citizens evolved by the twentieth century with the institutionalization of their respective positions. The British policy of non-interference allowed the rulers a relatively free hand in governing. Although in principle they had absolute power, they generally consulted a small, informal council (majlis) according to the Islamic principle of shura (consultation). The concept of shura was essential to the administration of authority. Most decisions of importance were obtained in that manner: they were referred to the majlis, which usually contained one or two members of the ruling family, together with social and religious notables. 22 The Making of the Modern Gulf States This system of shared responsibility prompted Bertram Thomas, who was Financial Adviser to the Sultan of Muscat, to remark that it had 'its own kind of democracy, namely, a social democracy side by side with traditional authoritarianism in government (largely this is the converse of British democracy)'. 2 If a ruler failed to consult his majlis, he could expect the notables to band together to oblige him to do so. The administrative infrastructure was very limited, and the functions of government varied from place to place. But the rulers remained accessible to their people: they gave daily audiences of several hours; they heard petitions and acted on them; they also gave judgments on personal and commercial disputes. The economic activities of the states provided the rulers and their dependents with their main sources of income: in Oman, this was agriculture; in the other places, it was trade and the pearling industry. Other sources of income included customs dues and taxes on seafaring vessels. The extent of a ruler's income was directly related to his power and standing in the community; this affected the rhythm of economic activity and determined whether taxes could be imposed and collected. A state of economic interdependence existed between the ruler and his people. The pearling industry was vital to the pre-oil economies. The work of pearling was extremely arduous, and sophisticated methods for its development had emerged over the centuries of exploiting the oyster-rich waters of the Gulf. The employment provided by the pearling industry gives a strong indication of its central role in society. In Kuwait, for example, 20 per cent of the entire population were engaged in it; in the Trucial states the figure was 31 per cent; and in Qatar 48 per cent. The pearling industry suffered an almost total collapse after the Wall Street crash of 1929. The world economic depression which followed drastically lowered the demand for costly luxury items, such as pearls. The industry received another blow when the Japanese introduced cultured pearls into the international market shortly afterwards. During the 1930s, therefore, the economy of the Gulf was shattered. It would have been almost impossible to overcome this crisis had the strange hand of fate not intervened: the oil companies arrived in search of concessions. The oil concessions not only offered the possibility of relief from the poverty which had set in after 1929. They also brought about a subtle and important change in the relationship between The Emergence of the Gulf States 23 a ruler and his people. The agreements provided the rulers with monthly retainer fees. Infinitesimal though these payments were, they allowed the rulers for the first time to be financially independent of their people. On the one hand, therefore, this drove a new and unexpected wedge between ruler and ruled; on the other, it allowed the rulers to become generous to their people without taxation. When oil was discovered, the tiny trickle of money became a giant waterfall. Once again, the same situation prevailed. The ruler became the major recipient of the income; at the same time, he disbursed large sums of it towards socio-economic development projects. Before long, the Gulf states had become welfare states. But the old system was considerably weakened. Once the oil revenues started to pour in, the former rudimentary methods of ruling were inevitably out of date. Complex government machinery was brought in: departments were set up, councils of ministers were appointed, secretaries and under-secretaries were employed, salary scales were drawn up. This machinery contributed even more to widening the gap between the ruler and his people. The direct nature of the ruler's daily audiences became diffused, and access to him much more difficult. Previously, his citizens could approach him about any outstanding problems, no matter how personal. Now their requests and petitions had to be channelled through an everburgeoning bureaucracy. Although the old forum had not been dispensed with, a new system was superimposed upon it. The interdependence between ruler and ruled was broken. The search for a new form of participation began, and it was most marked in Kuwait and Bahrain. The following two chapters will survey their attempts. Notes 1 Sir Rupert Hay, 'The Persian Gulf States and their Boundary Disputes', Geographical Journal, vol. 120, 1954, p. 435. 2 India Office Records, London. L/P&S/12/4584: Ext. 6051/42: Bertram Thomas (Public Relations Officer in the Persian Gulf) to S. F. Newcombe (Ministry of Information), 16 October 1942. Unpublished Crown Copyright material in the India Office Records and Public Record Office transcribed here appear by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office.