The India Way by S. Jaishankar PDF

 For K. Subrahmanyam, father and Aravinda R. Deo, mentor  Contents Preface 1. The Lessons of Awadh The Dangers of Strategic Complacency 2. The Art of the Disruption The United States in a Flatter World 3. Krishna’s Choice The Strategic Cul...

 For K. Subrahmanyam, father and Aravinda R. Deo, mentor  Contents Preface 1. The Lessons of Awadh The Dangers of Strategic Complacency 2. The Art of the Disruption The United States in a Flatter World 3. Krishna’s Choice The Strategic Culture of a Rising Power 4. The Dogmas of Delhi Overcoming the Hesitations of History 5. Of Mandarins and Masses Public Opinion and the West 6. The Nimzo-Indian Defence Managing China’s Rise 7. A Delayed Destiny India, Japan and the Asian Balance 8. The Pacific Indian A Re-emerging Maritime Outlook Notes After the Virus An Epilogue Index About the Book About the Author Copyright  Preface ‘Wisdom is to live in tune with the mode of the changing world’ – THIRUVALLUVAR It was unsettling to discover after four decades as a professional diplomat that many of the assumptions on which we had operated were now being called into question. But it did not follow from there that our experiences were suddenly irrelevant. On the contrary, it seemed that those who could most objectively assess the last many decades were best placed to anticipate the coming times. Seeking truth from facts is, however, not easy. If the pressure of political correctness is one challenge, the weight of accumulated dogma is no less. An equally difficult reconciliation is that between an adequate awareness of the global context, and yet viewing it from a hard- headed national perspective. This has been a persistent dilemma since Independence and the era of nationalism has only sharpened it further. These are some issues of an endeavour that has occupied me for the last two years. In many ways, it was natural to put pen to paper on the subjects around which my life has revolved. An unpublished PhD thesis and an in-house history of the Indo-US nuclear deal provided some confidence to do so. Thus, it came about that after my tenure as Foreign Secretary ended in 2018, this initiative began through a fellowship with the Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore. If the project kept changing form and content thereafter, much of that reflected the rapid pace of events in the world we live in. At some stage, I put aside the temptation of bringing in any aspects of a memoir, believing that they are better written by those who are no longer operational. Instead, my effort was to develop an argumentation on contemporary politics through interactions in different forums, keeping them as analytical and dispassionate as possible. Looking at the world over these four decades from key vantage points was truly helpful in arriving at a detached view of its risks and possibilities. A professional initiation in Moscow taught me valuable lessons in great power politics, some perhaps unintended. Four stints dealing with the United States created a lasting interest in a polity whose confidence and resilience are quite unique. A long stay in Japan was an education in the nuances of East Asia, as indeed in the unrealized potential of our ties. And a shorter one in Singapore brought out the importance of adjusting to global happenings. Postings in Prague and Budapest heightened sensitivity to the currents of history. An absorbing but difficult tour in Sri Lanka was an invaluable politico-military experience. But, if there was one great learning, that was in a China that I caught at an inflection point in 2009. As Ambassador there, subsequently in the US, and then as Foreign Secretary, I have had a ringside view of recent global changes. Above all, interacting with our own leadership over many years at different levels of hierarchy had a value that is difficult to put in words. From that, the big takeaways were the importance of defining strategic goals, recognizing optimal outcomes and appreciating the interplay of politics and policy. This book was developed in the course of the last two years through a series of events. Lectures given at think tanks, conferences or business forums form its core. They remain relevant in large measure but have been updated where required. ‘The Lessons of Awadh’ is a fusion of comments on various such occasions. ‘The Art of the Disruption’ draws on addresses to the Oslo Energy Forum, the Raisina Dialogue, the Sir Bani Yas Forum and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. ‘Krishna’s Choice’ was articulated in its essence at the Sai Foundation, New Delhi. ‘The Dogmas of Delhi’ is an expanded version of the Fourth Ramnath Goenka Memorial Lecture. ‘Of Mandarins and Masses’ is a hybrid of talks at St Stephen’s College, the Heritage Foundation, the University of Birmingham and the Atlantic Council. ‘The Nimzo Indian Defence’ is based on a lecture delivered in Singapore. ‘A Delayed Destiny’ combines discussions at the Delhi Policy Group, India Foundation and the India International Centre. ‘The Pacific Indian’ owes its articulation to three Indian Ocean Conferences organized by the India Foundation and one by the National Maritime Foundation. And ‘After the Virus’ builds on recent speeches starting with the Fifth Raisina Dialogue 2020, taking into account the impact of the pandemic. To the organizations that provided a platform to formulate and express my thoughts, I am profoundly grateful. Audience responses were helpful in developing the argumentation. If propositions are sometimes deliberately sharpened, it is only with an intention to set minds at work. Global developments are clearly the overarching context for an exercise in which our national performance is assessed. The coronavirus epidemic is not only a reminder of this reality but also a harbinger of changes that the world will now experience. To appreciate its consequences, what we require at home is a dispassionate debate that rises above competitive politics. I am in debt to all those who have contributed to the making of this volume, especially an irreverent family, long suffering friends and argumentative colleagues. A special word of thanks to Radhika, Guru, Rajesh and Ramesh without whom these views would have never found expression. My publishers, especially Krishan Chopra, have been very patient as the fate of the book was linked to the twists and turns in my own life. I hope that their forbearance is rewarded.  1 The Lessons of Awadh  The Dangers of Strategic Complacency ‘The heaviest penalty for declining to rule is to be ruled by someone inferior’ – PLATO A famous Satyajit Ray film some decades ago captured the Indian self- absorption that shapes its larger awareness of the world. It depicted two Indian nawabs engrossed in a chess game while the British East India Company steadily took over their wealthy kingdom of Awadh. Today, as another global power rises – that too in India’s immediate proximity – this country cannot be oblivious once again to its consequences. Ideally, the emergence of China should serve as an inspiration to sharpen India’s competitive instincts. But at the very least, it should stir a serious debate about the direction of world politics and its implications for us. This is important because in parallel there are other momentous shifts underway. A larger rebalancing was already in evidence, now overlaid by greater regional volatility, higher risk-taking, stronger nationalism and a rejection of globalization. But the critical change is the recalibrated posture of an America that has long been the bedrock of the contemporary international system. Its response to China’s rise may well determine the direction of contemporary politics. Because global happenings are not always factored fully into its internal dynamics, such developments have often passed India by. How they impact its thinking is also not always made clear in the absence of definitive political narratives. So as India rises in the world order, it should not only visualize its interests with great clarity but also communicate them effectively. This is an effort to contribute to that endeavour, encouraging an honest conversation among Indians, without discouraging the world from eavesdropping. International relations may be mostly about other nations, but neither unfamiliarity nor indifference lessen its consequences. So, rather than allow events to come upon us, these are better anticipated and analysed. That has not been our history, as demonstrated in the Panipat syndrome that saw invading forces enter the Indian heartland for decisive battles. This default option of playing defence reflects a mindset that does not comprehend external events well, leave alone appreciate their implications. In contemporary times, Indian agnosticism about the outcome of the Second World War had major repercussions. In the next decade, India’s handling of the Cold War led Pakistan, a smaller neighbour, to close the power differential for decades. The consequences of its illegal occupation of part of Jammu and Kashmir was as underestimated as the strength of its revanchist sentiments after 1971. Understanding of China has been inadequate, whether it was the significance of the 1949 revolution, later the intensity of its Communist nationalism or, finally, the enormity of its post- 1978 rise. As India developed a greater familiarity with world politics, power equations were misjudged by political romanticism. Inevitable decisions, such as on nuclear weapons, were consequently delayed at great cost. The issue of pursuing earlier a United Nations Security Council seat is another example that has been debated widely. Missed opportunities in economic development by turning our back on global progress are, of course, a story told before. While the 1971 Bangladesh War, the 1991 economic reform, the 1998 nuclear tests and the 2005 nuclear deal were exercises in strategic retrieval, it nevertheless told on our overall standing. It is only more recently that a stronger realpolitik has overcome a complacency based on entrenched dogma. The rise of a potential superpower is naturally a disruptive occurrence for any global order. If we forget that, it is because the last time it happened, with the USSR, was in the midst of a World War that masked its emergence. Transitions between superpowers and their overlapping coexistence are difficult at best of times. The one between the UK and the US in the first half of the twentieth century is the exception, not the rule. But when societies are built on different principles, then it is very much harder to reconcile contestation with collaboration. Divergences may matter less when a nation’s influence is relatively small, and its actions mainly affect its own people. It was perhaps more acceptable in the immediate post- colonial world, when capabilities were of a lesser order. But once they reach a global scale, it became much harder to overlook. Conducting international relations, while being agnostic about the character of societies, has its limitations. This is strikingly evident today as attitudes across the political divide reinforce each other. Even as this started happening, globalization as a powerful compulsion for cohabitation initially mitigated emerging contradictions. At some stage, however, geopolitical stresses have found articulation as a vocal nationalism among states that feed off each other. Sharper competitiveness should be expected as the driving force of the world today. China’s full-blown arrival on the global stage has inevitably had its repercussions. Some of that arises from the natural displacement of other powers. But part of it is also because of China’s unique characteristics. Unlike other nations that rose earlier in Asia, it is much harder to fit into the Western-led global order. The reality now is that the two most powerful nations of our day who served each other’s purpose politically for many years now no longer do so. For India, such a scenario raises a host of strategic challenges. Handling that adroitly will be important, especially when approaching it from the perspective of our own interests. Developing the mindset to not only respond but actually leverage that is what could define the new India. The US currently is back to the strategic drawing board as it reinvents itself. Its interim approach is of greater individualism, more insularity and sharp retrenchment. This exercise of recalculation is a difficult one because the consequences of its past strategic bets cannot be easily undone. So we hear a potent narrative of unfair trade, excessive immigration and ungrateful allies. And market access, technology strengths, military dominance and the power of the dollar now seem to be the ingredients of an emerging solution. Whatever the politics that unfolds in America, much of the change is there to stay. The US-China dynamic that will impinge on the two States themselves and on the world is the global backdrop for Indian policymaking. The era of benign globalization that facilitated the dramatic rise of China has come to an end. How this came to pass is obviously important; what to make of it even more so. India’s rise has been slower and will now have to navigate difficult waters. We have entered a turbulent phase where a new kind of politics is being fashioned. The issue is not whether India will continue rising; that vector is reasonably assured. The question is how to do so optimally in an era of greater uncertainty. For the near term, India has little choice but to pursue a mix of multiple approaches, some orthodox and others more imaginative. But in all of them, partnerships with global interests could make a significant difference. Much of that would revolve around the West and Russia. But China, now the world’s second largest economy, can hardly be disregarded in any calculation. Leveraging them all may not be easy but still no less necessary for that. Mastering mind games and playing hardball are also musts in a more visceral world. To do all that, it is vital that we come to terms with its complex dynamics. Only then can India successfully execute strategic policies for a new era. Events in the last few years have been such a deviation from the norm that there is understandable confusion about the direction of world affairs. Both in the case of the US and China, developments have been outside the realm of earlier experiences. Pakistan has exceeded the most pessimistic projection of its policies. Other neighbours of India have sometimes acted at odds with their past. The influence of changing geopolitics is visible in our immediate vicinity, as in the extended neighbourhood. Refreshing India’s ties with Russia has required dedicated efforts. Japan has offered opportunities notwithstanding the complexity of its predicament. Comfort with Europe has grown, but needs more insights into its increasingly intricate politics. Much of our analyses of current happenings are also coloured by ideological battles. Whether we like the direction of events or not, it does not make them less real. They have both causes and effects that must be acknowledged. Whatever our views, it is better to analyse than just demonize the phenomenon that is Donald Trump. When the dominant power in the world revisits first principles, its consequences are profound. Assessing that accurately is part of gauging the permanence of the change underway. For India, the exercise holds particular importance because American calculations have been supportive of its recent rise. How much a shift in its thinking would transform world politics and affect India’s interests is today a paramount question. It is inextricably linked to the dynamics of its relationship with other powers. The new American approach to trade and security is no less relevant. It would be a mistake to approach the Trump Administration using the logic of previous experience with predecessors. There are new priorities in the making and the old playbook of dealing with that country needs rewriting. India’s rise will inevitably be compared to that of China, if only because that country has immediately preceded it. Its imprint on global consciousness, its civilizational contribution, geopolitical value and economic performance will all be factors in that exercise. Emulating the strategies and diplomatic tactics of another obviously cannot be a serious proposition for a society with a very different history and outlook. That said, there is much that India can learn from China. One important lesson is demonstrating global relevance as the surest way of earning the world’s respect. The Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew once paid India’s rise a back-handed compliment of being the more reassuring one. Today’s world may call for a greater willingness to make waves. There could also be an opportunity in a world looking for more sources of growth and stability. Being a democratic polity, a pluralistic society and a market economy, India will grow with others, not separately. Given these affinities, such an India can exploit effectively a search for new partnerships. Values that bring them together do matter, probably even more so in a technology-driven world. They shape intent that when paired with capabilities determines the nature of power. If one is less suspect, then there would be greater enthusiasm in welcoming the other. Geopolitics and balance of power are the underpinning of international relations. India itself has a tradition of Kautilyan politics that put a premium on them. If there are lessons from the near past, it is that these were not given the weightage that they deserved. The Bandung era of Afro-Asian solidarity in the 1950s serves as a reminder of the costs of neglecting hard power. But more than lack of focus on capabilities, they reflect an underlying thinking. We have since reached a league where the ability to protect our interests is an assumption, not just an option. That is best done through a mix of national strengths and external relationships. Clearly, in a more nationalistic world, diplomacy will use competition to extract as much gains from as many ties as possible. But there is, nevertheless, a strong case for India also supporting a greater sense of order. Our own growth model and political outlook intrinsically favour rules- based behaviour. India must make a virtue of reconciling global good with national interest. The challenge is to practise that successfully in a world of greater multipolarity and weaker multilateralism. India’s foreign policy carries three major burdens from its past. One is the 1947 Partition, which reduced the nation both demographically and politically. An unintended consequence was to give China more strategic space in Asia. Another is the delayed economic reforms that were undertaken a decade and a half after those of China. And far more ambivalently. The fifteen-year gap in capabilities continues to put India at a great disadvantage. The third is the prolonged exercise of the nuclear option. As a result, India has had to struggle mightily to gain influence in a domain that could have come so much more easily earlier. It is, of course, better that these issues are being addressed late than never. But greater self- reflection on our mistakes since 1947 would certainly serve the nation well. We could also extend that to the roads not taken. For a country that has long operated in a disadvantageous landscape, any change is to be welcomed with an open mind. While more distant developments cannot be disregarded, those in our immediate vicinity offer even greater promise. A Neighbourhood First approach that generously rebuilds economic and societal linkages of the Subcontinent can work to India’s favour. Extending the sense of neighbourhood to the East and the West is almost as important. Integrating the sea space to the South into our security calculus is the other key element of a broader vision. Together, the successful execution of such policies can reverse much of the strategic implications of the downsizing of India. The endeavours of the ASEAN to retain its cohesion and centrality also creates a demand for India. If the Asian balance of power was skewed by the Partition, this was further aggravated by the post-1945 restraints on Japan. The security posture of that polity therefore has some implications for India’s calculations. In fact, when it comes to Asia, the extent of change is still far from fully apparent. What can be safely asserted is that the openings for India are more, not less. However unsettling the current world picture may look, it should not mask the progress made in the last few decades. In a vast range of domains, they have transformed the quality of life for many. Certainly, Indians would be justified in expecting the future to be better. They cannot ignore global disruptions, but have no reason to buy into a pessimistic outlook. On the contrary, our domestic situation and international positioning opens up many possibilities. The options we create will help determine the choices we make. This is a time for us to engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood and expand traditional constituencies of support. The mix of opportunities and risks presented by a more uncertain and volatile world is not easy to evaluate. Structural changes are even harder to come to terms with, especially the diminution of regimes and disregard of rules. Goals, strategy and tactics are all today very different. The deficit in global goods may be troubling, but there are no ready substitutes. In such a dynamic situation, creating a stable balance in Asia is India’s foremost priority. It is only a multipolar Asia that can lead to a multipolar world. Equally important, it would put a premium on India’s value for the global system. Our approach should be to build comfort with the world, not opaqueness or distance. There will be a natural suspicion of all rising powers that we will have to allay. Taking on global responsibilities, acting as a constructive player and projecting our own distinct personality are elements of that solution. India is better off being liked than just being respected. So what will this really mean in terms of foreign policy and its practices? To begin with, it would require advancing national interests by identifying and exploiting opportunities created by global contradictions. Such an India would pay more attention to national security and national integrity. It would not be hesitant in adjusting its positions where required by its own interests. This mindset would also accord primacy to the nurturing of goodwill, beginning with India’s immediate neighbourhood. That would include a stronger sense of its bottom lines and a willingness to do what it takes to defend them. Making a visible impact on global consciousness would be taking this to the next level. It would encourage a greater contribution to global issues and regional challenges. Humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) is an obvious platform to demonstrate a more forthcoming posture. There would be conceptual aspects as well. Introducing our own diplomatic terms into the discourse is intrinsic to the process of international emergence. The Indo-Pacific, the Quad or the BRICS earlier are illustrative examples. Brand building that already plays on our IT and business strengths could be expanded further. The corona pandemic has allowed India to be now projected as the pharmacy of the world. Cultural practices can also be ‘mainstreamed’ to strengthen that process. Observing the International Day of Yoga or advocating traditional medicines are cases in point. Even the more prolific use of our own languages in interacting with the world is an indicator of the changing equilibrium. But more than the promotional elements, it is the underlying assumptions that can make a difference. We have been conditioned to think of the post- 1945 world as the norm and departures from it as deviations. In fact, our own pluralistic and complex history underlines that the natural state of the world is multipolarity. It also brings out the constraints in the application of power. A behaviour and a thought process which reflects that can facilitate the creation of a more favourable equilibrium with others. Indian policymakers may need to assess the merits of more realism in their approach to world affairs. To a great extent, this is a compulsion forced on them by global developments. Increasing nationalism across geographies is contributing to a more transactional view of international relations. The primacy being given to trade and connectivity to shape choices strengthens these trends. An unabashed America First and a muscular China Dream are setting the tone. In any case, Russia’s focus has long been narrower than that of the Soviet Union. But even a Europe with a growing fortress mentality is struggling to find the right balance between its interests and values. As for Japan, its continued caution speaks for itself. India has little choice but to do in Rome as Romans do. Indeed, it can do that really well and perhaps even find new opportunities in the process. However, there is also a reason for brand differentiation that is especially important for a rising and aspirational power. In India’s case, this should build on the positive aspects of its nationalism. The world must be reminded that we provided economic assistance and training to others even when our resources were meagre. The expansion of India’s engagement with the world should be seen as something deeper than just ambition. The approach of ‘Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas’ is as relevant to foreign policy as to the domestic one. It should articulate a fundamental desire to engage the world more comprehensively. What India and the world mean to each other will change as they develop new equations. An economy that is transitioning to a higher level will hold a different relevance. That will mean striking the right balance between developing stronger national capabilities, making it easier to do business, ensuring a level playing field, and growing with the global economy. New equilibriums between the world and India will arise in different fields, some of them not without friction. But the international community has much more riding on India than just economic gains. Its performance will determine whether Sustainable Development Goals targets are achieved, climate change challenges are addressed, disruptive technologies are adopted, global growth is balanced and accelerated, and a larger pool of talent is made available. Not just that, it is also very much on India’s record that the global credibility of democratic practices will be strengthened. For that, India must successfully take forward its own model in the years ahead. While the progress of what will be among the larger economies in the next generation will be carefully monitored, its relevance to the priorities of the world will attract even more attention. Central to that exercise will be the ability to deliver a credible Make in India programme that can contribute to more resilient global supply chains. No less significant will be the deployment of emerging and greener technologies on a scale that make for a global difference. The socio-cultural changes that this India is undergoing are also an important factor in the overall matrix. Younger demographics and a broader awareness are contributing to stronger self-belief. An aspirational India will inevitably attach greater priority to pursuing national goals and establishing a global presence. Its greater sense of assurance will take India’s explorations in many directions. It is necessary that contemporary international affairs recognize and respect that development. As an Indian diplomat, I have watched the world change beyond imagination in the course of a long career. My generation and those before carried into our profession the heavy baggage of difficult experiences with the US, China and Pakistan. By the 1970s, these three accounts had mutated into a joint threat to Indian interests. The first half of my diplomatic life was dominated by two geopolitical realities: the Cold War and the rise of political Islam. They combined to precipitate the break-up of the Soviet Union, an event of great consequence for India. The second half saw our country come to terms with these changes and more. It fundamentally reshaped our ties with the US, even as a new power rose in the East with global repercussions. But it is not just the world that is changing; so too are Indian capabilities, aspirations and priorities. All of this is cumulatively reflected in an evolution from the centrality of the Soviet relationship to convergences with multiple powers. Economic reform, the nuclear tests, the 2005 nuclear deal and a tougher national security posture are among its diplomatic milestones. Together, they helped create a policy outlook that has not been easy to capture in terms of orthodox thinking. If India drove the revived Quad arrangement, it also took membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. A longstanding trilateral with Russia and China coexists now with one involving the US and Japan. These apparently contradictory developments only illustrate the world in which we now operate. Comprehending and messaging them is hard, especially to those not ready to come to terms with the intricacies of the new architecture. Positioning is of increasing value in a fluid world, explaining the importance of engaging competing powers like the US, China, the EU or Russia at the same time. But when Indian actions are viewed from the perspective of its own self- interest, a clearer pattern starts to emerge. It is one of constant advancement of goals and interests, using all pathways that the world has to offer. And since that often means plunging into the unknown, it requires both judgement and courage. Our past will always be an influence, but no longer a determinant of our future. Forging ahead will mean taking risks and refraining from passing off timidity as strategy or indecision as wisdom. In many ways, India’s progress of the last five years has confounded those who have been unable or unwilling to transcend the old framework of analysis. Expectations that its America policy would founder initially on the ideology of one Administration or then on the nationalism of another were proved wrong. That India could stand firm on key concerns and yet establish a stable relationship with China was not easily appreciated. The structural basis for ties with Russia is underestimated, as also the relevance of Europe and Japan to contemporary India. Perhaps the strongest preconceptions were in regard to the immediate neighbourhood. Every complication was depicted as a setback. And every correction was explained as an inevitable happening, presumably independent of India’s action. That being the case, it is hardly a surprise that the transformed landscape in our vicinity was not even recognized. Pakistan predictably has been the cause of the greatest debate. That India could offer a hand of friendship, but nevertheless respond strongly to acts of terror, is hardly a contradiction, except for those determined to see one. Clearly, different actions, players and times call for different responses. And setting the agenda to reflect contemporary challenges like terrorism is common sense, not wilfulness. Those with a historical sense of our national security threats will understandably worry about Afghanistan. Whether we blame it on imperial overstretch or just plain misjudgement, matters there have come to a difficult pass. But it is also true that the clock cannot be turned back two decades. India has a hand to play because of its contributions during this time. And it has consequently a standing of its own that is of no small value. Therefore, it is important not to be stampeded by the tactical manoeuvres of others. We will count, not because of the largesse of the world, but due to our strengths. And our role will not just reflect that, but also our convergences with other interested powers. Experience of governance always adds greater reality to any analysis. Simply put, many things are easy to advocate, much harder to do. In fact, this was precisely that argument with which my father tempted a student of international relations to sit for the Foreign Service examination in 1976. The learning since is that actual policy in a large country is a parallel pursuit of multiple priorities, some of whom could be contradictory. Neither abstention nor hedging are always answers to their pulls and pressures. Choices have to be made, not just debated. And they cannot be without costs. But before choices comes the issue of capabilities. It is our ability to rise to domestic challenges that will determine India’s place in the world. We are at least focused on the right issues now: digitization, industrialization, urbanization, rural growth, infrastructure, skills etc. The achievement of Sustainable Development Goals can be for India what the Millennium Development Goals did for China. There will be decisions on the economic front that will have a direct bearing on our comprehensive national power. We have a record of both over- protecting and under-protecting different sectors. The post-1991 strategy has clearly gone astray and both the current trade wars and post-corona recovery are powerful compulsions to formulate a more contemporary approach. Similar to how it approaches political multipolarity, India will have to undertake its economic variant, especially the big hubs around which its trade and investments revolve. Technology too has a special resonance for a society given to leapfrogging. Aggressive deployment may be tough but offers great rewards. Eventually, leading abroad will require delivering at home. Going up in the global power hierarchy, whether in terms of capability or influence, is only one element of India’s rise. Our nation has other journeys to make in parallel. In the last few decades, we have heard more authentic voices as democratization took deeper roots. These changes in our national culture have been affirmed, amongst others, through political and electoral outcomes. At the same time, India is also transitioning from a civilizational society to a nation state. It involves assuming attributes that introduce discipline and formalism in aspects of our daily life. There are also problems left over from history – especially the Partition – that require fresh thinking. So, quite apart from its growing prominence, the world is today required to come to terms with this changing India. The key questions pertaining to us reflect the global rebalancing underway. Will the world continue to define India, or will India now define itself? Awadh remains the symbol of the former to this day. But if it is now to be the latter, then it means not just new equilibriums with other powers but with the world order itself. India is today on a voyage of self-discovery and the lessons of Awadh are its surest compass in that quest.  2 The Art of the Disruption  The United States in a Flatter World ‘Sometimes by losing a battle, you find a new way to win a war.’ – DONALD TRUMP If you had believed the best minds of our times, this was not supposed to happen. But for two decades, China had been winning without fighting, while the US was fighting without winning. We speak here not just about outcomes in specific theatres or regions. It was even more about economic growth, political influence, and quality of life. As a result, along the way, America lost its famous optimism. Something had to give and it did, in the 2016 American presidential election. This obviously was not the only reason for that result. But through that one electoral event, the upholder of the international system turned revolutionary. And China, the rising power, finds itself defending the status quo – or at least the elements to its advantage. The world faces an extraordinary prospect of its two leading players doing what it takes to win, and then some more. Their behavioural impact on each other and the world is now visible. In other circumstances, the US could be practising the art of the deal. But in an unfavourable landscape, it seems more focused on changing the terms of engagement. The need of the day apparently is to discard what no longer works for it. Deals may or may not follow. In the ultimate analysis, the ability of major powers to reach accommodation will shape our times. When ‘black swans’ meet ‘grey rhinos’, the very nature of the habitat undergoes transformation. To the immediate beholder, these developments appear alarming. Especially so, if we focus on the events to the exclusion of trends. But international relations is an exercise of both forging convergences and managing divergences. Such dynamic processes will keep evolving while coexisting. At the extremes, they produce allies or create conflicts. But in an inter- dependent world, most relationships tend to settle down in the middle. Convergences even among competing powers is not unknown. The briefer examples include that of Germany and USSR after the First World War or the US and the USSR during the second one. In contrast, the trans-Atlantic bond between the UK and the US proved exceptionally durable. Somewhere in-between would be the UK-Japan partnership after the Meji Restoration that lasted half a century. China’s collaboration with the USSR/Russia in the 1950s and again today is also noteworthy. The US-China relationship that currently holds global attention has gone on for four decades, not a short span in modern times. Who benefited more in this period is a question to which we may get a different answer today than two decades ago. But because it was long enough to be taken as a given by two generations, we attribute to it a sense of being natural. We ask why it is under stress now, when we could wonder equally easily why it lasted that long. But beyond these two questions, what the world is arguing over is the continuing relevance of a system that the established powers devised but which was used so brilliantly by the rising one to advance its prospects. Typically, convergences dilute as the parties concerned move towards closer parity. Or believe they do. That is true with the US and China today as it was with the US and USSR in 1948, or the UK and Japan in 1922. The absence of a shared adversary who drove the coming together also changes the situation. The defeat of Germany and Japan removed the compulsions for the continuance of the US-USSR partnership. The lower salience of Russia has been a factor for the changes in the US-China one. And not least, as the UK-US special relationship suggests, while social similarities can be an extraordinary binding force, dissimilarities can be equally divisive. It is tempting to see current events as an outcome of choices, dissimulation or even of egos. All of that may be true, but there is also the unending process of international relations at work. The events of 2016 were more than exceptional in their nature. That the most powerful nation of our times should change course so sharply has a significance that is hard to overstate. While recognizing that, it should also be noted that these developments are not an entirely novel phenomenon. America First itself has a history, whose more controversial elements are sometimes evoked to criticize it. And its prioritizing of national interests at the cost of international responsibilities is something that spans the ideological divide. One might well ask what a Bernie Sanders foreign policy would have looked like. But in its earlier version, it was not yet an America of global magnitude and that is the real difference. Russia too followed such an approach immediately after the break-up of the USSR in 1992. To varying degrees, other nations big and small practise it, even if they do not admit doing so. All of this is only explainable by the reaction of key political demographics to their economic predicament that they linked to developments in the world. Simply put, global supply chains were perceived as an economic threat, and immigration and mobility as a cultural one. For many in Asia, it is difficult to comprehend the insecurities that globalization has created in the West. They have led to the left-right combination that helps the electoral success of nationalist candidates. Because the benefits of a more seamless global economy overshadowed the uneven distribution within societies and between them, there is today as much bewilderment at the turn of events as there is anger. When the deep state joins the loud state in the US, a structural shift is well underway. What began as an unexpected political phenomenon has mainstreamed to some extent over the last three years. Even before the corona crisis, the influence of global supply chains and domination of technologies had given a sharp edge to growing trade frictions. The high stakes of this competition are underlined by the fact that it is in many ways about disruption itself. The resulting capabilities and their deployment could without exaggeration determine the future direction of the world. Part of the contest revolves around the utilization of big data. Equally consequential is control over key emerging technologies. The new contestation is about artificial intelligence and advanced computing, quantum information and sensing, additive robotics and brain-computer interface, advanced materials, hypersonics and biotechnology. Whoever harnesses disruptive technologies better will influence the world more. Major powers recognize this increasingly starkly. As trade disputes now assume much deeper connotations, the US, in particular, may end up contemplating a radically different industrial policy to suit its national security needs. When new balances emerged, so did theories of the entrenched power resisting the rising ones. The Sparta-Athens example was cited, as indeed the UK-Germany conflict. But that is only one aspect of a phenomenon more complex than a clash foretold. For there is also evidence of the dominant helping the rise of the aspiring. China itself is a beneficiary, first of the assistance of the USSR in the 1950s, and then of the US since the 1970s. The truth is that these frictions are not fully structural nor always preordained. Every kind of example can be found in history. Dissimilar powers such as the US, European ones or Japan have both made common cause and gone to war. Related ones within Europe too have done the same. Culture has a role, as do interests and circumstances. But in the final analysis, it is all about calculations and aspirations. Both are derivatives of leadership choices and societal sentiments; nothing is really inevitable. And because it boils down to human factors, values and beliefs do play their part in shaping world affairs. Many of the discomforts today arise from differences on key issues like the relationship between the state, politics, society, business, faith and the markets. It is expressed in matters of personal freedoms and institutional firewalls. Sociology matters, especially once it assumes global proportions. This is at the heart of the predicament the world faces today. And creating common ground is, therefore, the hardest diplomatic challenge. Whether these contradictions could have been finessed a little longer is debatable. But political outcomes in key nations have made the question irrelevant anyway. The Sino-US competition in its new avatar will be a long and hard contest without clear outcomes. The likely scenario is of a twilight zone, where shifts in geopolitics are compounded by leaps of technology. The rise of a new global power was never going to be easy, and an order waiting to happen will look like chaos till it does. In an inter-dependent and constrained world, it can only unfold through tensions and negotiations, adjustments and transactions. In this process, much will depend on what is allowed to take root. An America that consciously chooses to be a higher cost but more insular economy, a nationalistic but innovative technology creator, and a self-sufficient but more powerful military, will mean a very different ball game. There will always be voices that would urge an accommodation. Perhaps even a return to the past. There is a third choice as well, one that retains the national security outlook of the present, but which appreciates the value of alliances. So, how much the culture of disruption will lead to the art of the deal still remains to be seen. What can India do to advance its goals in this disrupted world? Much of that would depend on its handling of the two principal actors – the US and China. This is not the first occasion when India faces such a predicament. We went through the Cold War, maintaining our independence in policymaking amidst all its complexities. Far from being a linear exercise, India made the adjustments required on stressful occasions. After the Chinese attack in 1962, it turned to the US to the extent of asking for air cover. In 1971, presented with the prospect of a US-China-Pakistan axis and a looming Bangladesh crisis, it concluded a virtual alliance with the USSR. Whenever crises receded, India went back to the middle path. As Russia weakened and China rose, a new binary prospect appeared in the making. There was a natural tendency to transpose the earlier syndrome on this emerging one. But the era after the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2005 showed how excessive caution lost the chance to make more than incremental gains. For the fact is that a return to the past only accentuates our limitations and undermines confidence. It encourages risk aversion and prevents exploitation of new opportunities. At this stage of its rise, it is vital that India make the most of convergences with others. These may vary by the region or the issue. Where intersections of interest are multiple, it is perhaps best to just distrust and verify. Because global fluidity is so pervasive, India must address this challenge of forging more contemporary ties on every major account. Achieving an overall equilibrium will depend on how it fares on the individual ones. In a world of more naked self-interest, nations will do what they have to do with less pretence. Hence, India must brace itself for what may be expected to come. It has to prepare for assertions of influence that will exploit power differentials, economic advantages and dependency of connectivity. And it can best respond with a logic that is understandable to the other party. We can, however, reasonably expect that even those more powerful have limited interest in an aggravation of ties. After all, they too operate in a world of multiple poles and greater choices. The future is, therefore, more one of management of differences and finding some stability in a changing dynamic. This will not be without problems and the key is to develop and sharpen strategic clarity. Even with neighbours with whom there are serious issues, there should be hope that the price of a pragmatic settlement will be less than the costs of a difficult relationship. At the same time, the temptation to pursue illusory gains based on past constructs should be resisted. No serious practitioner of politics will accept that foregoing opportunities to leverage will ever be rewarded. India cannot give any other nation a veto on its policy options. This is particularly so in a world when all significant players are trying to be as open-ended on their own choices. Nor is there a basis to suggest that a modest Indian global profile will somehow be rewarded by polities who are intrinsically enamoured of strength. On the contrary, it is when options are available to be exercised – and from time to time actually are – that realism prevails. This applies to all countries, as even partners will always strive to better terms of transaction. The tumultuous times we now live in are a far cry from the soothing mantras of globalization that we heard just a few years ago. Polarization permeates our world, whether in domestic politics or in inter-state relations. What the US and China are doing to each other is difficult enough. But what their behaviour will do to the rest of the world is even more impactful. It will change our thinking and in time create new habits and attitudes. Those will not be easily reversed, if ever. Some of us may imitate them; others may have no choice but to simply chafe. But all will react, one way or the other. When the smoke clears, a different global architecture will start to take form. New equations and interests would have come into being. Single-minded pursuit of national interest will make our world look like a bazaar, with more players, less rules and greater volatility. As a result, goals are more immediate and approaches more tactical. Structures have weakened as interest in finding common ground recedes. New York, Geneva and Brussels are now symbols to run against. Advantages are asserted in a more transactional ethos with negotiators learning that to their cost. Erosion in trust has been sharp, especially for nations that are part of alliance systems. Dependability is now a growing question mark and friends and allies are no longer immune to pressures. In fact, everybody is fair game when big affinities no longer overlook smaller differences. As nationalism sharpens across regions, so does the characterization of diverging interests. Black and white are redefined even as ‘Green on Blue’ attacks enter the political domain. But the fact is that there are stabilizing forces at work too, many from the earlier era. The caution of markets and the unpredictability of conflicts are constraining factors on extreme competition. Economic inter-dependence also limits the extent of political risk-taking. They will continuously contest the changes underway, generating heated arguments at home and abroad. So, even as nations play more roughly for narrower objectives, there would also be those who are prepared to settle for less. In the liberal world, this could mean limiting aspirations to pluralism, or just the defence of openness. When it comes to relationships and expectations, both believers and sceptics may converge where outcomes are uncertain. Given all these pulls and pressures, clarity and objectivity are the two attributes that will remain in short supply. The trend till recently was firmly in the opposite direction. The world was not only more interlinked in its activities, but also confident in that thinking. We all spoke of a global village and saw globalization realized in a variety of practical ways. Technology was the great promise that we could see made us more connected with each passing day. The default solution to any significant challenge – whether promoting trade, addressing climate change or responding to terrorism – was through shared endeavours. However, all that has started to change. It is not that the ‘me’ did not exist before. But national and global interests were usually reconciled through a network of agreements, mechanisms and practices. Between nation states and the international community stood intermediaries, alliances, regional structures or like-minded partners. But this world, evolving steadily since 1945, stands eroded by disenchantment with globalization and anger at mercantilism. Its three key principles that we had taken for granted – access to global markets, value of global supply chains and reliance on global talent mobility – are all under stress. Players are moreover multiplying even as rules are weakening. The old order is visibly changing but the new one is not yet in sight. While equations between nations may be disturbed, the churning within societies is no less relevant. If the world is not what it used to be, it is because the shelf life of old normals has expired. The story in the Western world is of sharp income inequality, pressures on jobs, stagnant quality of life and blame on ‘outsiders’. Growing resentment that was left untended was finally given voice by black swan events. Brexit was the warning bell and Trump’s election the real thing. Whether it was targeting plumbers from Poland, caricaturing immigrants from Mexico or castigating refugees from Africa, politics mobilized around cultural threats and economic grievances. Doing so, it revealed that the thinking of established elites had become outdated. Small wonder that their foreign policy outlook should also be questioned, be it advocacy of collective interests or arguments of common good. Once departures from the norm were set in motion, justifications were not difficult to find. The unfairness of globalization emerged as a lightning rod, especially the parts that could be directed at others. Big Tech underwent a rapid transformation from being the great hope to the new threat. The emergence of new agendas obviously tested old players, whose confidence that power would socialize proved misplaced. Across the world, it is being given form by political nationalism that challenges the status quo. The developing world, especially Asia, may present a contrasting picture with stronger growth rates and higher aspirations. But it is still in the middle of rebalancing and its declaration of success are very premature. Because globalization served much of Asia well, we wrongly assumed that its optimism was shared universally. When global convergence weakens, its advocates everywhere find their positions undermined. As alliances erode and the US steps back from major international commitments, the resulting anxiety may be wider than we think. Once globalization comes under attack, all its facets are subject to pressures. Opposition to globalized business will naturally undermine its governing rules and criticize the institutions that oversee it. Such a world view will also resent those commitments that do not serve its immediate goals. It is no accident that the political counter to globalization should focus on immigration and job security. These are issues that resonate most effectively with Western electorates, despite their economic logic being questionable. But the foreigner is a convenient whipping boy, in person as much as an economic competitor. And if their trading practices make it easier to do so, then apparently so be it. The Trump outlook depicts global supply chains as taking jobs away from America, calling into question the logic on which global business has relied on for years. Muscular use of tariffs constricts the hitherto generous access to the US economy. Financial policies and social pressures are seeking to bring manufacturing back to America. There are moves afoot to also ‘decouple’ the Western world from China in the sphere of sensitive technologies. How much they will succeed remains to be seen. The other driver of the current volatility is opposition to global mobility. The phenomenon itself is a consequence of the spread of skills and more efficient economic practices. However, difficult times are increasing hostility to its social aspects. After all, cultural insularity goes hand in hand with economic protectionism. But these pressures must contend with business realities that have developed deep roots. All said and done, talent will remain the prerequisite for technology leads. And this is what can make India’s position very different. It is the only viable reservoir that prepares skills before they flow into the world economy. The economic merits of such adjustable sources trump their social and political aspects. Making itself more relevant to the global knowledge economy clearly holds the key to India’s future relationships. The impact on the global order of these developments is likely to be visible over the next generation. That would have many dimensions, each of them in itself a source of potential instability. The most obvious one is that the world will be increasingly multipolar as distribution of power broadens and alliance discipline dilutes. An India or a Brazil will demand a greater voice with a growing economy. Germany and Japan cannot be impervious to change in American thinking on, say, Russia or Korea. As consistency starts to be questioned, many more nations will start to do their own thinking and planning. A more nationalistic approach to international relations will undeniably weaken multilateral rules in many domains. This will be particularly sharp in respect of economic interests and sovereignty concerns. Undermining the working of the World Trade Organization or disregarding the Law of the Seas are not good signs. This prospect of multipolarity with less multilateralism suggests a more difficult future even for the near term. This does not mean giving up on the latter. On the contrary, it requires a new energy to be poured into reformed multilateralism. The current anachronistic order must be pushed to change, along with its outdated agenda. It is also important to appreciate that the issue is not a binary choice between defending the order or inviting disorder. Unless we recognize that key elements of the order are no longer working for many stakeholders, confusion will continue to prevail over change. This will necessarily bring to the fore uncomfortable questions about current observance of rules, in both letter and spirit. And as major powers selectively advance arguments, much of the basic consensus that underpins the current reality will start to fray. The emerging world is also likely to fall back on balance of power as its operating principle, rather than collective security or a broader consensus. History has demonstrated that this approach usually produces unstable equilibriums. World affairs will also see a proliferation of frenemies. They will emerge from allies who criticize each other or competitors compelled to make common cause. A more transactional ethos will promote ad hoc groupings of disparate nations who have a shared interest on a particular issue. This would be supported by requirements of working together and reaching out beyond alliance structures. The combination of these developments will encourage more regional and local balances with less global influence on their working. The really uncharted territory that US-China frictions will take us into is that of coping with parallel universes. They may have existed before, most recently during the Cold War. But not with the inter-dependence and the inter-penetration of the globalized era. As a result, divergent choices and competing alternatives in many spheres will rest on partially shared foundations. This dilemma will be evident in a growing number of domains, from technology, commerce and finance to connectivity, institutions and activities. The key players will themselves struggle with the dichotomy of such parallel existence. Those who have to manage both, as most of us will, may then find themselves really tested. Even if ties between China and the West take on a more adversarial character, it is difficult to return to a strongly bipolar world. The primary reason for that is the landscape has now changed irreversibly. Other nations are independently on the move, including India. Half of the twenty largest economies of the world are non-Western now. Diffusion of technology and demographic differentials will also contribute to the broader spread of influence. We see forces at play that reflect the relative primacy of local equations when the global construct is less overbearing. The reality is that the US may have weakened, but China’s rise is still far from maturing. And together, the two processes have freed up room for others. Both have a use for third parties as they contest each other. In fact, their mutual dynamic may well drive multipolarity faster. The beneficiaries could well be middle powers. Those who already have prior advantages like Russia, France and UK will get a new lease of life. Some like India can aspire to an improved position. Others, like Germany, would increase their weight through collective endeavours. But this will also be a world of a Brazil and Japan, of Turkey and Iran, a Saudi Arabia, Indonesia or an Australia, with a greater say in their vicinity and even beyond. The dilution of alliance discipline will only further facilitate this process. What will emerge is a more complex architecture, characterized by different degrees of competition, convergence and coordination. It will be like playing expanded Chinese Checkers including with some who are still arguing over the rules. A multipolar world that is driven by balance of power is not without its risks. Europe, with its World War experiences, is especially chary. Even dominant powers – the US, Russia earlier or China now – favour such balancing only for specific contingencies and not as a general approach. Past experience does suggest that unchecked competition can often spiral downwards, both regionally and at the global level. For that reason, international relations envisage collective security as a safety net. Even if that did not always work, broader consensus through wider consultations functioned as a Plan B. Those most unsettled at the prospect of multipolarity with weaker rules are nations that have long functioned in an alliance construct. Unlike independent players, it is understandably difficult for them to accept that the compulsions of inter-dependence are a good enough substitute. Others may contemplate this prospect with greater nervousness; but an India perhaps with a more open mind. An individualistic world means that the entrenched order is more open to newer players. Longstanding collective positions may become less rigid. That the format of play is also more bilateral strengthens the inclination to make accommodations. This has been particularly in evidence in the security domain. Whether it is the nuclear deal and the NSG waiver, the partnerships in Afghanistan or the Malabar Exercise, they reflect a departure from the old group think to more contemporary pragmatism. It could also now extend to other domains. Friends who differ or competitors who cooperate are a notable trait of this emerging scenario. Both express different aspects of constraints that limit freedom of choices in an interdependent world. The rise of nationalism is largely responsible for the former group while global threats bring the latter together. Thus, we have seen the US differ with much of the Western world, especially Europe, on issues like climate change. The politics of the Trans- Pacific Partnership and the NAFTA were examples of the divisive role of trade. Energy policy has been an equally potent area, reflected in American criticism of Europe’s dependence on Russia. But more than specific issues, frenemies have grown as mindsets have changed. The belief that alliances are burdensome is by itself a cause for frictions. In the final analysis, the utility of the current dispensation to America’s global posture has come into question. The momentum of the past, however, can still keep combinations alive of nations who may disagree about the present. Despite differences of views, traditions do continue a basis for working together, even if unhappily. A very different motivation is provided, however, by the compulsions of common concerns. We have seen coalitions of convenience on global issues like counterterrorism, maritime security, non-proliferation or climate change. These are issue-based and can again be effective even when grudging. If division within alliances was one evolution, reaching beyond them was another. As the world moved in the direction of greater plurilateralism, result-oriented cooperation started to look more attractive. They were better focused and could be reconciled with contrary commitments. The growing imperative of sharing responsibilities was combined with an appreciation of influences beyond formal structures. Asia has been a particular focus for such initiatives, as regional architecture is the least developed there. India today has emerged as an industry leader of such plurilateral groups, because it occupies both the hedging and the emerging space at the same time. Working with different powers on security, political and developmental issues has shown that making common cause can be extended by pragmatism and imagination. The twilight world is one full of partial agreement and limited agenda. Its ambiguous nature requires flexible arrangements that are customized to the challenge. These practices will not only become more widespread in coming times but occupy a prominent place in the foreign policy of states beyond India. A world of multiple choices is increasingly opening up at different levels. We surely see that at the big table, where larger powers are dealing more opportunistically with each other. Through their behaviour, they encourage the rest of the world to also do so. In the light of the global balance being so fluid, the shaping of the local one has become a subject on its own. In the Gulf, there is a multi-cornered contest underway with faith, governance models, political principles and balance of power all providing variables. Less complex examples litter other parts of the world. As they throw up issues, it is more effective for India to respond with engagement than by distancing. The skill that current diplomacy values most is dealing with contesting parties at the same time with optimal results. The pressure on players is definitely more in a higher intensity and less structured game. But there is a reason why going up the global power hierarchy is judged by the ability to successfully manage conflicting priorities. Dominating the global stage today is very different from earlier days. When the world was much simpler, so too was the rise of powers. Fortunes were made and unmade by a combination of national strength, international opportunities and the quality of leadership. Superior technologies and practices produced decisive outcomes, often on the battlefield. Today, the variables that drive power and affect calculations are many more. Their interplay is also complex and less predictable. Equally important, their application takes place in a constrained, globalized and interdependent world. As a result, accumulation of influence substitutes for much rawer exercises of strength. Strategy has become more an effective deployment of resources than the use of force. Technology has opened up options like weaponization of finance or cyber interventions. At the same time, persuasion and incentives are also more common than coercion. Consequently, nations now rise in a different way, without necessarily a signature moment of transformation. The global financial crisis of 2009 is a telling example where neither China, the rising power, nor the US, the one yielding ground, fully appreciated at that time the enormity of the tipping point. An increase in the influence of nations may be more diffused and perhaps less tangible. But nevertheless, it is equally real. No one doubts China’s influence on the world stage, even if they don’t ponder that it was achieved by running trade surpluses rather than by shedding blood. Financial instruments, displays of strength and connectivity projects have provided opportunities to assert power without physically clashing with competitors. That said, the latent threat of growing capabilities continues to underpin hard power. It explains why some, for example, embellish their past conflicts so much. In the case of India too, maintaining a more robust military posture and carrying out the 1998 nuclear tests were essential milestones in its evolution. But its global image is equally the result of its response to the Y2K challenge, its higher rate of growth and global acquisitions by its business. Power itself has now come to have different attributes and not all of them reside in the same nation. The US, for example, remains the world’s technological leader by a long stretch. But while behind on this score, China has used its financial and trading muscle to carve out for itself the number two slot. Europe is highly regarded for its industrial strength and quality of products. Even though it has pursued interventionist policies beyond the continent, it is still seen as punching below its weight. In contrast, Russia has summoned up its longstanding capabilities and by sheer willpower reinvented itself as a key player. So, what is the global hierarchy of power is no longer an easy question to answer. Because it has so many facets and is played out more locally, we are back to the matrix of many sides, many players, many games. The domain most affected by all these disruptions is the provision of global goods. American parsimony and Chinese nationalism have renewed a debate on this subject. The vision and activities of Europe have also shrunk. Few other powers have moved to pick up the slack, India being a part exception. An unwillingness to commit resources to a larger global cause is very much in consonance with a narrower approach to international relations. That debate is framed, for example, around continuing troop commitments to Afghanistan and the Middle East. Or responding to the corona pandemic more lately. But it is much more complicated than that, encompassing respect for international law or responding to serious misbehaviour. Indifference to the most egregious actions of terrorism, for example, allowed it to become the norm in a large geography. India, of course, has a particular complaint in that context. The discipline of the global order was given credit in the past for a range of preventive measures. Non-proliferation experts would confirm that many more nations would have gone nuclear but for alliance pressures. Much has depended on the credibility of key powers in underwriting their commitments. If that erodes, it could have a profound impact on the calculations of many. It will also make it difficult to reach understandings on new dimensions of threat, such as in cyber or space. The next decade will unfortunately be less generous and so more unsafe. Keeping that in mind, India has to carefully navigate the near future whose contours are starting to define themselves. Leading nations, not just the US and China, will be surely more nationalistic and create space for others. Power distribution will continue to spread and multipolarity will accelerate. But greater players will not mean better rules; probably quite the opposite. As new capabilities and domains rise, global rules will struggle to keep pace. These developments will pose challenges to a rising power like India that would definitely prefer greater predictability. But if it can handle the uncertainty, its rise can also be faster. At various levels of global politics, balances of power will be sought and often achieved. Loose and practical arrangements of cooperation will proliferate across geographies. Some will be composed of the like-minded, others more opportunistic, and still more, a mix of the two. Regional politics and local balances will gain importance. Clearly, India will have to engage a broader set of partners more creatively. The transactional bazaar will bring together frenemies, grappling with the compulsions of globalization. Many will use the newer techniques of finance, connectivity or technology. India will need to find adequate responses, nationally where possible or in partnership, where required. Each of these issues is a challenge in itself and their matrix will determine India’s future in a volatile world. India could rise in an incremental way, as it was hitherto wont to do, hoping to play a balancing role as new equations came into play. Or, it could be bolder and seek to determine agendas and outcomes. To some extent, Indian hesitations of playing a leading role derive from its recollection of formidable powers like the US and USSR. But China has shown that a developing society, albeit of a large size and dynamic economy, can start to assume that responsibility. India could well follow in its footsteps, obviously at its own pace. That is, in fact, the calculation or perhaps even hope in many quarters. A flatter world has been beneficial to India as its rise has been welcomed by many entrenched powers. The American interest in working with India has been evident for two decades and has now further accelerated. Russia remains a privileged partner with whom geopolitical convergence is a key consideration even in shifting circumstances. That has given the relationship a unique ballast. After Brexit, a more uncertain Europe has also developed a growing interest in India as a force of stability and growth in Asia. China, for its part, sees India as inherent to the rise of Asia and the larger rebalancing of the power distribution. The expansion of Japan’s concerns and interests has created the basis for a completely different quality of ties. Countries of Asia, especially in the ASEAN and the Indo- Pacific, visualize merits in India’s ability to shape a more multipolar Asia. The other extended neighbourhood in the Gulf has also welcomed the return of India to its region. While doing all this, India has retained its traditional constituencies of support in Africa and the rest of the political South. As the power differential vis-à-vis the world narrows, collaboration possibilities have expanded. If the world has developed stakes in India’s prominence, the latter, in turn, can utilize that sentiment to the fullest. Improving economic and political prospects is the necessary condition to contemplate India’s rise in the world order. But sufficiency requires a favourable environment as well as the leadership and judgement to take advantage of it. And it is changes in regard to these two factors that today make a strong case to take India’s aspirations more seriously. The right strategic calculations require a proper comprehension of the transformation in the international landscape. Assessing its contradictions accurately at the global and regional level opens up opportunities for progress. At its heart right now is the dynamic between the US and China. But also relevant are the determination of Russia, the choices of Japan and the durability of Europe. The loose coalition of developing states will play some part, although it increasingly differentiates on issues of concern. And as multipolarity grows and discipline erodes, it is really sharper regionalism that can produce outcomes beyond the control of major powers. Multilateralism may well take a backseat as rules and norms come under greater scrutiny and the consensus among the Permanent Five (US, Russia, China, UK and France) weakens. All in all, this points to more fluidity and unpredictability. In theory, this new reality should be welcomed by the beneficiaries. After all, the demand for a more multipolar world has been pressed for many years by them. Now that multipolarity is upon us, its compulsions and responsibilities will make themselves felt. Nations will have to forge issue- based relationships that can often be pulling them in different directions. Keeping many balls up in the air and reconciling commitments to multiple partners takes great skill. There will be convergence with many but congruence with none. Finding common points to engage with as many power centres will characterize diplomacy. The country that fares the best is the one which has least problems with its peer group. India must reach out in as many directions as possible and maximize its gains. This is not just about greater ambition; it is also about not living in yesterday. In this world of all against all, India’s goal should be to move closer towards the strategic sweet spot. The shifting sands of global politics have always been the determining context for national choices. The post-colonial era that followed the Second World War saw India’s return to the international arena as a sovereign power. Gaining independence ahead of many other colonies, it enjoyed first-mover advantages in world affairs for a considerable period. The next shift came when India had to respond to the Sino-US rapprochement, one facilitated by Pakistan. It did so by aligning to a great degree with the USSR. While that too took it through the next few decades, economic compulsions and the onset of unipolarity compelled further adjustment. The Indo-US nuclear deal of 2005 was symbolic of this repositioning which helped accelerate India’s rise in the global order. Today, this country finds itself at another crossroads, this time one where choices are less clear and risks more complicated. To forge ahead, it is imperative that there is an adequate appreciation of the enormity of the disruption to which the international system is now being subjected. As Indians weigh their prospects, they must consider themselves in the overall flow of modern history. Placing national prospects in a context of global events does not come easily to self-absorbed societies. Yet, divorced from the larger picture, they could misread their position or ignore their destiny. India’s current modernization is one of a series that goes back to the Meiji Restoration in Japan. Even then, Indian nationalists perceived it as the beginning of the revival of Asia, hailing Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905. But it was that country’s socio-economic transformation that was the really lasting story. The creation of the Soviet Union, emergence of the ‘tiger’ economies in East Asia and the ASEAN, and, finally, the rise of China – all saw the rest of Eurasia playing catch-up. Each one of these developments have had their influence on India, sometimes unconsciously so. Admittedly, India is the only one to have undertaken this journey more arduously on a democratic vehicle. But politics and sociology aside, its efforts in the last quarter century reflect broadly similar goals and objectives as those of Asia. If it differed, it was more in the depth and intensity of change, where an evolutionary approach produced less sweeping outcomes. Some of the consequential constraints are therefore only now being addressed. Foreign policy is now an exercise to assess the disruptions underway and the trends that accelerate, mitigate or counter new directions. The coronavirus pandemic may well be a further complicating factor. But as the global architecture opens up and India’s own capabilities strengthen, it has greater freedom than in the past to organize its rise. This process will naturally have its risks that will need careful assessment. Much of the strategy would revolve around creating a more favourable landscape. Changing the global discourse in its favour is also essential at this time. But the end goal even, perhaps especially, in a volatile world is clear. Many friends, few foes, great goodwill, more influence. That must be achieved through the India Way.  3 Krishna’s Choice  The Strategic Culture of a Rising Power ‘A nation that doesn’t honour its past has no future’ – GOETHE A multipolar world with frenemies, balance of power and a clash of values may today present a challenge for global politics. Yet, these were the very characteristics of a period in India that is captured by a particularly powerful epic. As India rises, questions will naturally be asked as to what kind of power it will be. If nothing else, the world’s experience with China’s rise will surely prompt such queries. It is also something that Indians should be asking of themselves. Part of the answer may well lie in India’s own history and traditions. Until recently, a Western paradigm has dictated global norms and values. China, as the first non-Western power to seriously rise in the post-1945 era, has drawn on its cultural heritage to project its personality and shape the narrative. It is but logical that India too should follow suit. Indeed, if there are today hurdles to understanding India’s viewpoint, much of that arises from an ignorance of its thought processes. That is hardly surprising when much of the West was historically so dismissive of our society. It is revealing that the standard American introduction to Indian strategic thought does not even refer to the Mahabharata, though that epic so deeply influences the average Indian mind. Imagine commenting similarly on Western strategic tradition ignoring Homer’s Iliad or Machiavelli’s The Prince! Or on China, disregarding their equivalent, Three Kingdoms. If this happens to India, it is less due to our oral tradition than our limited global salience till now. This needs to be rectified precisely because a more multi- cultural appreciation is one sign of a multipolar world. But also because many of the predicaments that India and the world face currently have their analogy in what is really the greatest story ever told. Putting out explanations is integral to the process of ascending the global hierarchy. Often, India’s rise is an issue framed in terms of whether it would be an Eastern or a Western power. Underlying this is a Eurocentric assumption that pluralism is a purely Western attribute. India, with a longer history of diversity and coexistence, defies that preconception. A second debate revolves around the themes of nationalism and globalism. Here too, India occupies a singular position in reconciling what others see as antithetical concepts. A nationalistic India is willing to do more with the world, not less. But what perhaps distinguishes us from other traditions of statecraft is our approach to governance and diplomacy. India’s history shows that it does not follow a ‘winner takes all’ approach to contestation. Nor is there a confident belief that the end justifies the means. On the contrary, the Indian narrative is interlaced with moderation and nuance that highlight the fairness of the outcomes. That reality may not have always lived up to such a standard does not invalidate these concepts. There is continuous reflection on both the goals and the processes, sometimes to the point of self-doubt. But what it boils down to is the importance of making the right choices in difficult situations. The Mahabharata is indisputably the most vivid distillation of Indian thoughts on statecraft. Unlike the Arthashastra, it is not a compendium of clinical principles of governance. Instead, it is a graphic account of real-life situations and their inherent choices. As an epic, it dwarfs its counterparts in other civilizations, not just in length but in its richness and complexity. Focusing on the importance of the sense of duty and the sanctity of obligations, it is also a description of human frailties. The dilemmas of statecraft permeate the story, among them taking risks, placing trust, and making sacrifices. The courage required to implement policy is, perhaps, its most famous section – the Bhagavad Gita. But there are other elements of perennial politics as well, including tactical compromises, utilizing obsessive players, undertaking regime change and ensuring balance of power. Our current concerns have an ancient reflection in that tale, especially leveraging the external environment to address bilateral imbalances. The orthodoxies of strategic competition and gaming the system coexist with more contemporary concepts of controlling the narrative and valuing knowledge as power. This is an account of debates and decisions made against the background of a competition that becomes a conflict. The global political situation now is nowhere that catastrophic. But it nevertheless has elements of similarity that hold lessons for decision-making now. The India of the Mahabharata era was also multipolar, with its leading powers balancing each other. But once the competition between its two major poles could not be contained, others perforce had to take sides. While there is no reason to suggest a literal repetition today, the manner in which costs and benefits were weighed by interested parties is instructive for all students of strategy. Like the landscape, the choices made then have some resemblance to our contemporary world. The more momentous of them is that of Sri Krishna, who provides strategic guidance, diplomatic energy and tactical wisdom in navigating challenges. The best known of the dilemmas in the Mahabharata relates to a determination to implement key policies without being discouraged by the collateral consequences of the action. The example, of course, is that of the most accomplished Pandava warrior, Arjuna, as he enters the battlefield. Undergoing a crisis of confidence, he is unable to summon up the determination to take on kinfolk ranged against his interests. While he is eventually persuaded by Lord Krishna to do his duty, there are underlying aspects of Arjuna’s behaviour that apply to state players in international relations. This is not to suggest disregard of cost-benefit analysis. But sometimes, even when there is a pathway, it may not be taken due to lack of resolve or a fear of costs. Unlike Arjuna, we in India are less intimidated by comfort with the known, as by the fear of the unknown. In contemporary parlance, the expression ‘soft state’ describes a nation’s inability or unwillingness to do what is necessary. In Arjuna’s case, it was certainly not a situation of inability. And that, sometimes, is the predicament of the Indian state as well. In the longstanding fight against terrorism, for example, we are often constrained by our lack of imagination and fear of risks. That may have started to change, but it is important to match the level of resolve shown by others. Arjuna eventually takes the field as a righteous warrior and that sense of self-justification is important to recognize. It is only when a national elite has a strong and validated sense of its bottom lines that it will take a firm stand when these are challenged. So, whether it is an issue of violation of sovereignty or infringement of borders, an ability to respond categorically can come from this inherent self-belief. Asserting national interests and securing strategic goals through various means is the dharma of a state, as indeed it was of an individual warrior. This needs underlining in a climate where judgements are sometimes made with the yardstick of popularity, rather than strategy. Also relevant in this context is summoning the willpower to address concerns that are upon us, rather than rationalize inaction by highlighting its costs. We have heard, all too often, arguments that a competitor is too big to challenge and would anyway prevail in the end. Or, sometimes, that the very nature of a neighbour is to indulge in terrorism and we simply have to live with it. This is fatalism disguised as deliberation. If there is a message in Arjuna’s choice, it is that we have to face up to responsibilities, however difficult their consequences. India’s national security would have been significantly better if that had been more widely appreciated and practised. One aspect where the strategic landscape at the time of the Mahabharata bears resemblance to our current world is in regard to the constraints that operate on competitors. In that era, these emanated from a range of human emotions, obviously very different from those that apply today. They were partly driven by a belief that conflict, by its very nature, is destructive to the interests of all the involved parties. There was therefore a visible reluctance to initiate it, among the Kaurava elders and even more, with King Yudhishtira. His brother Arjuna carries that feeling even into the battlefield. But this is also sharpened as sentiments from past relationships clash with the requirements of future interest. Both the patriarch Bheeshma and the teacher Drona display enormous reluctance to bring their full capability into play against their previous wards. Today’s constraints are less behavioural and more structural. Nuclear deterrence creates one threshold. Economic interdependence is probably a more compelling factor as markets react to tension, leave alone actual conflict. A more technological world is also more vulnerable, even if it has created greater capabilities. The range of options that were open earlier have steadily shrunk with the passage of time. In our own case, the scale of conflicts that took place earlier can no longer be realistically contemplated. While all polities will naturally plan for worst-case scenarios, the reality is increasingly of sharp responses, narrow windows and limited application. It does not do away with the need for building up strong overall capabilities. But it does shift the focus on the need to develop the mind games which are more relevant to the likely scenarios. If there is one quality that a rising power must cultivate, it is that of displaying responsibility. The manner in which Arjuna finally took up arms at Kurukshetra not only highlighted devotion to duty; it also brought out his forbearance. He was, in that sense, a reluctant warrior. In a different way, so too was Sri Krishna. His willingness to forgive his cousin and rival Shishupala a hundred provocations before finally responding decisively is instructive. This too is a lesson for a nation with growing capabilities in the global arena. Power, especially as it grows, must be debated, projected and applied judiciously. Till now, India has rarely faced this dilemma. Most of the conflicts of our modern era have been defensive wars where their justification is largely self-evident. As events have shown in recent times, we need to cultivate the strategic patience required for modern day Shishupalas. India does not need irresponsible talk at this stage of its rise. Use of force must always be the considered option, never the first one. Even superpowers like the US discovered through their experience in Iraq the damage caused by the contrary approach. Major nations have multiple weapons in their armoury and blunt instruments are usually the least productive. But efficacy aside, the imagery is no less significant. Those who casually advocate application of force abroad do damage. Such actions, as the instructive epic tells us, are an option reserved for imminent danger or serial offenders. Most strategists fight the last war, not the next. In that context, Arjuna made a consequential choice some time before the battle began. Both he and his rival-cousin Duryodhana went to Krishna’s capital Dwarka to seek his support as an ally. Arjuna arrived later but was seen first by the awakening host as he sat at the foot of the bed. Asked to choose between Krishna’s army or his personal participation without weapons, Arjuna surprised Duryodhana by opting for the latter. His understanding of the game- changing potential of Sri Krishna was clearly the basis for his decision. There is a moral in this as we consider enhancing competitiveness in national security. Like most warriors, Duryodhana thought in an orthodox manner, while Arjuna also understood what was outside the box. Without neglecting the established areas of capability, it is vital that this nation prepare itself better for what awaits the world. That may be in areas like artificial intelligence, robotics and data analytics or sensing, advanced materials and surveillance. Particularly if leveraging others is central to success, it is imperative that a contemporary and informed assessment of capabilities is made. Arjuna understood what Sri Krishna was about; Duryodhana did not. This was not just about getting the big picture wrong but actually not appreciating what is at hand. Duryodhana was oblivious to the significance of Sri Krishna; or else he would not have underestimated him for lack of weapons. Understanding the full value of capabilities is as important as building them. The Pandavas clearly scored better in both departments. Today, India not only needs to pay attention to the quality of cards that it has but also focus on how to play them well. Relations between states, like policies within it, are based on rules and norms. Even if they are breached from time to time, there is always a larger societal expectation that exceptions will remain just that. All players use practices and traditions to advantage and the Mahabharata is no different. The archery teacher Drona takes the thumb of a talented student, Eklavya, as the ritual offering to the master since he could otherwise overshadow his favourite, Arjuna. The god Indra, disguised as a Brahmin, seeks the invulnerable armour and earrings of the Kaurava general Karna after prayers as it is the one time of the day when he cannot refuse him a favour. Arjuna uses a reincarnated woman as a cover in battle, knowing full well that Bheeshma will not fire back because of gender sensitivity. In a world that is now riven with trade disputes, technology fights and connectivity differences, it may be of some consolation to recall that not playing by the rules has a long history. If some have gamed the system or seek unintended benefits, this is a path that others have trodden before. The Mahabharata also holds numerous examples of violations of codes of conduct, some more flagrant than others. The main protagonist Duryodhana is killed literally with a blow below the belt. Of the successive Kaurava commanders, one is brought down using a woman warrior as a shield, the second attacked after laying down weapons and the third decapitated when digging his chariot wheel out of the ground. Well-laid rules of individual combat fall by the wayside as stakes mount. Arjuna’s son Abhimanyu is attacked by multiple adversaries simultaneously, including from the rear. His own father, Arjuna, also breaches the code in assaulting Bhoorisvaras when engaged in a fight with his longstanding rival Satyaki. Such deviations provided the justification for the most terrible act of the conflict, the night-time slaughter of the sleeping victors by Drona’s son Ashwathama at the end of the war in revenge against the manner of his father’s killing. These examples frame a debate on the merits of observing rules and the costs of violating them. Their more contemporary versions can be found in every geography across all eras. For all the constraints and limitations that rules impose, compliance and its appearance are very valuable in international relations. Serial violators are given little credit even when they comply, while an occasional disrupter can always justify a deviation. In many ways, that was the difference between the Kauravas and the Pandavas. The importance of adhering to international law, agreements and understandings is not a theoretical debate. Powerful nations are understandably reluctant to put their options and interests at the judgement of others. That could be the case with India too as it gains in power and stature. Nevertheless, the advantage of being perceived as a rule-abiding and responsible player cannot be underestimated. We saw that when it came to accommodate nuclear aspirations, the world was far more trusting of India than Pakistan. This continues even further as they seek membership of key technology export control regimes. On a matter like maritime claims, India’s acceptance of an arbitral award regarding Bangladesh in 2014 contrasted with what happened to the South China Sea one in 2016. Playing by the rules is at the heart of games that nations indulge in with each other. To understand the mindset of others is often key to assessing how far they will go and from what they will shrink. The strength of an unorthodox player is to make an accurate judgement about the likely responses of the more orthodox and rule-bound one. While themselves indulging in unrestrained actions, their tactics would be to hold the other side to higher standards. Arbitraging that gap, of course, gives them a great edge. The final exchange between the rival brothers Karna and Arjuna is illustrative of this predicament, as indeed are the last moments of the Kaurava prince Duryodhana. Both Karna and Duryodhana expect competitors to live up to values that they have themselves flouted. Much of Sri Krishna’s relevance to the Pandavas is his contribution to resolving these dilemmas and addressing the situations when rules stop being a rule. In the modern world, open societies confront such challenges when going up against less scrupulous competitors. Fighting the uneven fight is their karma. The most extreme situations arise when confronting terrorism, especially that backed by state powers. As others have discovered before, there are no easy answers. Consider the diplomatic engagement between India and Pakistan in the last two decades. Pakistan indulges in nuclear scare-mongering to create a moral equivalence between a terrorist and a victim. We then make the mistake at Havana and Sharm-El-Sheikh of playing along. In this logic, ‘strategic restraint’ apparently applies only to the victim, not to the perpetrator. In fact, a narrative was even created that suggests there are no escalatory dangers when Pakistan commits terrorism, but only when India responds to such acts. What is amazing is how many have bought this self-serving logic, expecting that India must naturally conform to it. Making it a game for two has, therefore, been a real challenge. The value of the Uri and Balakot responses was that, finally, Indian policy could think for itself rather than let Pakistan condition its answers. And that, in many ways, was the role of Sri Krishna as well on the Pandava side. While deviations from the norm are less rare, a more complex issue is the role of deception. It clearly cannot be that activities in the domains of foreign policy and national security should be transparent in all respects. After all, incentives, fear and manipulation are part of human nature. Indian strategic thought, most notably Kautilya’s writings, underline the importance of ‘Sama, Dana, Danda and Bheda’ (alliance, compensation, force and trickery) as the ways of approaching political challenges. The complexity of tactics grows in direct proportion to the gravity of the situation. We see that in two of the ethically disputable situations in the Mahabharata. At a moment of battlefield desperation, the King Yudhishtira is persuaded to make a false public declaration to destroy the morale of Dronacharya, a critical opponent. Earlier, when Arjuna’s oath to kill an enemy by a deadline was being tested, Sri Krishna created an illusion of safety that encouraged Jayadratha, a hunted warrior, to expose himself with fatal consequences. In both cases, the letter of the action violated its spirit. Far more flagrant situations have happened in real life. Many of the most fateful battles in the modern world – Bosworth Field in England, Sekigahara in Japan or Plassey in India – have after all been decided by treachery. Sometimes, deception has even been justified as a call of honour, a case in point being the Japanese saga of the 47 Ronin. Yet, the world does seek conformity with rules and promotes observanc