BRICS Coexistence: An Alternative Vision of World Order (2014) PDF

Introduction Cedric de Coning, Thomas Mandrup and Liselotte Odgaard Coexistence as an analytical concept and political practice The Soviet Union’s version of peaceful coexistence India’s version of peaceful coexistence Brazil’s version of peaceful coexistence China’s version of peaceful coexistence South Africa: diplomacy of ubuntu—another form of coexistence strategy Conclusion The grouping consisting of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) was initially meant to be nothing more than clever investment jargon referring to the largest and most attractive emerging economies. How ever, these countries identified with the BRIC concept, and started to meet annually as a group in 2008. At their fourth summit in 2011, they added South Africa to become the BRICS. By then the BRICS had fully morphed from investment jargon to a name for a new economic and political grouping that had the potential to challenge the unipolar hegemony of the United States and its Western allies, and to alter significantly the dynamics of global order. The characteristic that made the BRICS countries identify with the concept and resulted in common action as a political and economic grouping was not a shared identity as the most significant emerging economies. Instead, it was the realization that they share a common vision for a new global order, and that by combining forces in a small but strategic group that binds Asia, Africa and Latin America together, they had a better chance of realizing that vision. The BRICS countries shared a common experience in that they were all negatively affected by being on the periphery of a world order dominated by the United States and its allies. Since the end of the Cold War, and in economic terms since the end of World War II, the United 2 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard States and its satellites have been at the core of the global system, with everyone else situated on the periphery, closer or further away from the core, depending on the degree to which they have been integrated into what has been termed the neoliberal global order.1 This order is based on liberal democratic and human rights values, and on market-driven economic globalization. Whereas the market-driven economic globali zation and its principle of open markets and economic freedom are widely accepted international ordering principles, liberal democracy and human rights definitions are not. As the BRICS countries increasingly integrated their national economies into the global economic system, their economic wealth started to grow, due to cheap labor costs, and their relatively well-educated middle classes that thrived in the new information economy. For most of the BRICS, this resulted in rapid industrialization as market eco nomic dynamics shifted manufacturing to locations where goods were cheaper to produce. The BRICS thrived because of their natural resources, high education levels and their status as gateways into their regions. The countries attracted more foreign direct investment, and they started to transform their domestic economic structures to capitalize on export-led growth. It is thus somewhat ironic that whilst their rapid growth and growing economic influence is derived from the degree to which they became more integrated into the global free market economy, their political power is symbolized instead by the degree to which they are able to suggest an alternative to the current global order. Analyses of the BRICS grouping have tended to focus on their eco nomic identity. Their potential to become great powers in the twenty first century is generally associated with projections of the percentage of global gross domestic product (GDP) that their combined econo mies are likely to represent. By contrast, analyses that focus on the BRICS as a political grouping and examine their policies on global order are much less prominent in the debate.2 Theoretical approaches to world order in contemporary debates among scholars, analysts and decision makers mainly concern the issue of status quo versus revisionism in the current world order. This focus has emerged from the issue of China’s rise and whether it will use its growing power and influence to embrace or challenge the existing world order, which consists of liberal economic structures, a United Nations (UN) system for the management of global security issues, and a global US alignment system founded with liberal political values at its core. The seminal article on this issue by Alastair Iain Johnston from 2003 argues that China’s efforts to be richer and more powerful Introduction 3 have not translated into a concerted effort to supplant the United States as the predominant state, regionally or globally.3Johnston based his argument on a definition of the status quo entailing a power that does not challenge the existing distribution of power and the rights and rules that influence state interaction. Lately, however, China’s status quo policy has been questioned by research which argues that while China does not set out to challenge US dominance or the set of rules governing international conduct, it does have a proposal for how to interpret these rules of behavior which represents an alternative to the US concept of world order.4 Subsequently, this debate has been expanded to encompass a wider number of rising powers, such as India and Brazil, focusing on the characteristics and drivers of power tran sition in the international system. Most analyses reflect the argument that while many emerging powers may be dissatisfied with significant characteristics of the current world order, they do not offer a clear alternative to the existing global order. As a consequence, we are not witnessing the demise of US great power status, but the emergence of a chaotic world order with numerous rising powers and with unclear principles and drivers of world order.5 This edited volume addresses the political dimension of the emer gence and influence of the BRICS in the international system. We focus on how the BRICS as a grouping and as individual member states with foreign policy practices understand and influence global order, thereby potentially transforming its characteristics. We recognize the importance of international political economy dynamics and reform of the economic international order for the common identity of the BRICS members and in shaping the BRICS grouping. However, our focus is on the BRICS as a political project. To the degree that the BRICS grouping has already articulated a common vision, we can say that they share an idea of a global order where the rules prevent any one state, or an alliance of states, from dominating the international system. They claim that they are not competing for great power status, but are instead campaigning for a new global order in which it is impossible for any one state to become a great power. Or put differently, they are pursuing a global order where great power is contained so that it is impossible for any one state, or group of states, to impose their specific ideology on the rest of the system, or impossible to manipulate the international system to serve their national interests without regard for the common interests of states. We have chosen to refer to this approach to global governance as a strategy of coexistence. Coexistence can be defined as international 4 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard policy coordination for the purposes of conflict management, which then develops into a system of co-management or co-maintenance of global security issues. This type of global order is inherently pluralist in the sense that it allows for a world in which countries and regions with different world views, religions, political systems and approaches to national development can coexist. As will be discussed and analyzed in this volume, the BRICS coun tries do not have, as yet, a fully developed common approach to coex istence. However, we argue that this concept helps explain the behavior of the individual BRICS countries and the group as a whole. This helps to clarify the ambitions of the group concerning world order. Historically, the most well-known cases of coexistence as an approach to global order include the Soviet-style coexistence concept that emerged with Vladimir Lenin and survived as variations on a theme until Khrushchev’s leadership ended. The Indian concept of coexistence had its heyday during Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s reign in the 1950s. Finally, China’s concept of coexistence emerged in the days of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) under Zhou Enlai’s diplomacy in the 1950s and became a pillar of Chinese foreign policy with its inclusion in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1982. In Brazil, the concept has at times been used to describe its foreign policy and its place in the global order. In South Africa, the concept has not been used directly, but its foreign policy has been defined using similar concepts such as ubuntu and batho pele. This edited volume considers the extent to which the BRICS group ing has inherited this coexistence tradition and examines to what extent it has adapted it to a revised twenty-first century version. We consider the substance of a revised coexistence strategy, and the extent to which the strategies each BRICS country pursues are based on common objectives and instruments. In this edited volume, the core question is thus whether Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa subscribe to the same basic narrative of what ails global order and how it can be improved by means of coexistence. In addition, we address to what degree there are important differences in terms of the substantial objectives and instruments that each of the five countries pursues. We do not consider the BRICS countries as rivals to the Western-style liberal world order with an agenda to displace their position at the core of the global system. We argue instead that to realize their version of world order, the BRICS grouping merely needs to gain enough influence to constrain Western hegemony. If the West cannot unilaterally dictate the terms of global order, the core-periphery balance will be sufficiently redressed for a multi-polar coexistence model of global order to emerge. Introduction 5 Our hypothesis is thus that the BRICS are not aiming to replace existing great powers, but instead, through the coexistence strategy, their common program is to constrain all states from being able to become hegemons, so that none is able to dominate the others. Some analysts regard coexistence as propaganda that works as a smokescreen for the hegemonic ambitions of some, or all, of the BRICS countries. In order to address this criticism we critically seek examples where the BRICS act in ways which might imply that in their foreign policy practices they pursue national interests at the expense of acting in line with the basic principles of the coexistence framework. In this Introduction, we first outline the concept of coexistence. Second, we describe the historic variations of Soviet, Indian, Chinese, Brazilian and South African approaches to coexistence. Finally, we describe how the emergence of the BRICS and the grouping’s approach to world order is investigated in the remainder of the book. Coexistence as an analytical concept and political practice Coexistence rarely appears in Western literature on international rela tions. One reason is that the concept is seen as the brainchild of the communist Eastern bloc. The scarcity of references to coexistence in Western international relations literature is not only due to its com munist connotations, but also because coexistence is a misfit with Western political aspirations for international integration.6 US post war efforts at constructing an alliance system and the emergence of the European Union (EU) are cases in point. The US alliance system is one obvious example of the far-reaching consequences of these aspira tions for the structure of the international system. For example, since the Cold War a US-led alliance has waged wars in Iraq and Afghani stan with state- and nation-building objectives based on the Western values of civil and political rights and a global economy based on a neoliberal free market economy. At the opposite end of the spectrum to integration in the Western international relations literature lie the autarchic dynamics of the dominant realist approach. This is the common interpretation of the Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, whereby US post-war efforts to create a liberal world order were countered by Soviet efforts to establish a communist alternative. Mobility between the West and East blocs occurred only at the fringes, such as in Indochina and on the African continent. In this context, coexistence is characterized neither by extensive cooperation between status quo powers in an international system 6 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard marked by integration, nor by widespread conflict between revisionist powers in an international system dominated by autarchy.7 Rather, coexistence promotes the emergence of a rule-based international system characterized by the co-management of global order by states that may subscribe to different world views, different political systems and different approaches to economic and development policies. The principal virtues of a strategy of coexistence are adaptability rather than rigidity, moderation rather than extremism, international political pluralism and persuasion rather than imposition.8 Coexistence is feasible as a foreign policy because the international realm is seen as a society of states, which differs from national or community politics only in scale. Thus, states’ aspirations for stability are not founded on contractual obligations but on the fact that the organization of the international realm into states makes the existence of social relations between them unavoidable. As a consequence, states will attempt to justify their foreign policy decisions by reference to common rules of state conduct, denying that their actions represent a breach of the principles of conduct. International anarchy implies that a relatively wide margin of interpretation prevails as to what con stitutes legitimate conduct, and claims of legitimate conduct are highly contestable as a result. However, the fact that states routinely look to the collective of states for approval indicates that they invariably attach importance to the acceptance of their foreign policy conduct by the diplomatic community.9 The fact that the international realm is social and that the freedom of action of one actor depends on, and is constrained by, its acceptance in this social system make a strategy of coexistence a feasible foreign policy strategy for pursuing national interests. The social character of the international system also means that great powers cannot afford to ignore the interests and ideas of small and medium-sized powers. Just as all individual legal personae in a state are equal before the law, so are all states equal in the global system. States are what they are in relation to other states. They have status according to their relations vis-à-vis other states and their role in and contribution to the society or ecology of states. A state’s goodwill vis-à-vis other states and its status as a worthy social partner form the basis for its successful interaction with others. Its reputation is an asset that a state cannot afford to take lightly.10 The theoretical literature defines coexistence as the antithesis of the politics of imposition or hegemony. Hegemony implies that one coun try or group of countries is powerful enough to impose its will on other international actors, i.e. they are influential enough to manipulate the Introduction 7 rules of the game in their favor. This may, for instance, mean insisting on enforcing the rules for everyone else, but ignoring it when it comes to their own actions. Coexistence, by contrast, involves preserving peace and stability through common habits and practices designed to regulate international conduct. Adhering to common rules of conduct implies accepting the constraints these put on you, even if you potentially have the power to ignore the rules. It is thus aimed at overcoming the security dilemma posed by an anarchic realist international world view where the security of one state tends to become the insecurity of another state because there are no political authorities above and beyond individual states, and those states with the most power have the capacity to make and break the rules.11 Coex istence defined as a state strategy requires a coherent program defining the constraints and possibilities of international conduct and diplomatic instruments for purposes of implementation. Coexistence implies that the skills of persuasion and attraction can confer influence on the strategic choices available to other states despite modest capabilities. The following section examines the BRICS countries’ historic rela tionship with coexistence, to identify historical variations of the con cept that may help identify differences and similarities between the contemporary coexistence strategies adopted. The five historical cases are the Soviet, Indian, Brazilian and Chinese coexistence strategies, and the South African ubuntu equivalent.12 The Soviet Union’s version of peaceful coexistence In the early years of the Soviet Union, world revolution took precedence over peaceful coexistence in the formulation of foreign policy.13 Lenin was convinced that the survival of the Soviet regime was contingent upon the outbreak of revolution and subsequent establishment of pro letarian regimes in Western Europe. However, political expediency, particularly when combined with the vulnerability of the fledgling Soviet state, dictated that the Soviet regime outwardly pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence with others. This led to the inherently contra dictory and duplicitous foreign policy whereby the Soviet regime preached and practiced coexistence with countries while at the same time actively supporting the overthrow of their governments. The first attempt at spreading world revolution by force came in 1920 with the outbreak of the Polish–Soviet War, in which the Soviet regime attempted to defeat the newly established Polish republic and install a Soviet government in Warsaw. However, Polish general Josef Pilsudski frustrated the attempt to defeat Poland and convert it into 8 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard the world’s second Soviet state. Lenin attributed the failure of the Red Army to impose a Soviet regime on Poland not to military defeat but to the fact that the Polish proletariat did not fight on the side of the Bolsheviks. The period of attempting to spread world revolution by force under Lenin came to an end. It instead became expedient to practice the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence was marketed so effectively that by 1925 every major country in the world, with the exception of the United States, had extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet regime. In addition, the Soviet Union estab lished extensive trade contracts with other countries, including Weimar Germany. At the same time, however, Communist International, an organization of communist parties of the world whose strategy was controlled by Lenin and his Politburo, continued to pursue an active policy of world revolution, supporting revolutionary coups in Ger many, Bulgaria and China. Although these were unsuccessful, they again called into question the commitment of the Soviet regime to peaceful coexistence. Joseph Stalin’s introduction of the doctrine of socialism in one country in 1924 constituted the second major step in establishing peaceful coexistence as the cornerstone of Soviet strategy. Socialism in one country significantly downgraded the importance of world revolu tion. It involved such a total commitment of Soviet resources to the home country that peaceful coexistence became not only feasible but also highly necessary. During the period of the first two five-year plans from 1928 to 1938, the Soviet Union did its utmost to create the impression that it had no ambitions beyond its borders, and was distressed lest anyone else have such ambitions. The threat posed by the emergence of the Nazi regime in Germany in 1933 led the Soviet Union to seek international respectability in the West. Moscow attempted to convince Western nations that peaceful coexistence was a strategy designed to enable states to develop their internal capacities and not a rhetorical device designed to mask the fact that world revolution remained the Soviet regime’s principal objective. Although the Soviet Union sup ported the revolutionary uprising during the Spanish Civil War, it also joined the League of Nations as a deliberate manifestation of support for peaceful coexistence, and it signed defense pacts with Western countries. Peaceful coexistence now took precedence over world revolution, which would be achieved by setting an example. Thus, once foreign workers had witnessed the triumph of socialism in one country, they would seek to emulate the Soviet political system. The outbreak of World War II brought a halt to peaceful coexistence as the dominant theme in Soviet foreign relations. Though the Soviet Introduction 9 Union was officially neutral from 1939 to 1941, in reality the period was marked by Soviet aggression against Poland, Romania and Fin land as well as the militant spread of Bolshevism to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The quest to spread communism was temporarily halted by Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. However, Germany’s subsequent defeat led to the Soviet liberation of Eastern Europe, which ultimately led to the Soviet imposition of puppet communist regimes. Then, having consolidated its control over the region, the Soviet Union again placed peaceful coexistence at the top of its agenda until Stalin’s death in 1953. Like his predecessors, Nikita Khrushchev championed the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. However, unlike Vladimir Lenin and Stalin, Khrushchev used the concept to argue that peaceful coexistence was a permanent phenomenon and that capitalist countries could peacefully evolve towards socialism and communism. In its simplest expression, Khrushchev’s interpretation of peaceful coexistence signified the repu diation of war as a means of solving controversial issues.14 It also pre supposed an obligation on the part of all states to desist from violating each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in any form and under any pretext, a renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of other countries with the objective of altering their system of govern ment or mode of life, and a commitment that political and economic relations between countries would be based upon the complete equality of the parties concerned, and on mutual benefit. According to Khrush chev, peaceful coexistence sprang from the nature of socialist society in which no class stood to profit from war or imperialism. Peaceful coexistence entailed not only living side by side without war but also the absence of the constant threat of it breaking out in future. Peaceful coexistence could and should develop into peaceful competition for the purpose of satisfying human needs in the best possible way. In this period, official Soviet textbooks on international law defined peaceful coexistence as mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality and mutual advantage.15 Khrushchev’s version of the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence can be understood in part as an adaptation, not a renunciation, of an ideological struggle in a nuclear world where the Soviet Union was the weaker party.16 The Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence was used in combination with world revolution, alternating as the primary and secondary themes in the Soviet Union’s quest to enhance its relative position in the international system. These dual themes were inherently uneasy bedfellows, and the attempt by Soviet leaders to define the country’s 10 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard external relations in terms of them both called into question the sin cerity of the Soviet commitment to peaceful coexistence, even when this principle appeared to take precedence over world revolution. India’s version of peaceful coexistence The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were first articulated in the so-called Panch Shila, or Agreement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India, on 29 April 1954.17 According to then-Indian Prime Minister Nehru, no individual fathered these ideals. Rather, they were said to originate from the five ancient precepts of Buddhism concerning personal behavior. For Nehru, peaceful coex istence constituted a standard of international ethics involving reciprocal affirmations between neighboring countries.18 It was the ethical alter native to war and to alliance formation that implies armed rival camps. Nehru was the driving force behind the NAM, which was launched at the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia with the announcement that a large group of nations in the developing world would not align with either the Western bloc or Eastern bloc.19 Zhou Enlai, then prime minister of China and second in command to Chairman Mao Zedong, was present, along with global statesmen such as Josip Tito of Yugo slavia, Gamal Nasser of Egypt and King Sihanouk of Cambodia. Nehru’s concept of peaceful coexistence was complementary to non alignment, which in the Indian view was a pragmatic policy centered on avoiding involvement in a struggle between the West and the East that did not concern India’s interests or values.20 Non-alignment was a positive and dynamic approach to world problems expressed through activities such as India’s leadership of the Afro-Asian movement toward independence and India’s participation in international forums that pursue the peaceful resolution of disputes, such as the UN. Nehru lauded the UN Charter as an expression of the principles of Panch Shila. He considered the mere fact of the UN’s existence as a forum representing the world community to be of the utmost significance. For a brief period, India was deeply involved in the pursuit of peace, seek ing to relax world tensions by attempting to mediate between the West and East. India’s policy of peaceful coexistence was combined with independent action focusing on the liberation of subject peoples, the maintenance of national and international freedoms, and the elimination of want, disease, and ignorance.21 Despite this, Nehru’s concept of peaceful coexistence was short-lived as a strategic practice. India’s attempt to forge Asian unity and Introduction 11 solidarity in the 1950s proved futile in the face of the US–Soviet rivalry that came to entangle India and the majority of India’s neighboring states in a global pattern of opposing alignments with one or the other of these two powers. Thus, India’s foreign policy activism degenerated into mere posturing against the United States and the Soviet Union, and India was rarely able to come to the aid of friendly countries in conflict with their neighbors. Where it did take bold positions, as in Indochina in support of Vietnam’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia to remove the Khmer Rouge from power, India came into conflict with all powers other than the Soviet Union, along with the neighboring Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).22 The Indian concept of peaceful coexistence entailed extensive foreign policy coordination with a view actively to pursue peace and dis courage alliance formation. It sat alongside non-alignment, and although it was applied for purposes of internal development, it involved solidarity with other developing countries. Brazil’s version of peaceful coexistence As was the case in the Soviet Union, the Brazilian concept of peaceful coexistence grew out of considerations in the late 1950s about obstacles of class differences to political development, resulting in the argument that in Brazil miscegenation had created the conditions for peaceful coexistence between social classes, and this inherent inter-class harmony paved the way for socialist-style planning in the political administra tion.23 In the heyday of Brazil’s focus on conducting a foreign policy independent from the United States in the early 1960s, peaceful coex istence became a buzzword for this attempt to create distance from the liberal world order propagated by Washington. In particular, San Tiago Dantas, who served as Brazil’s foreign minister from September 1961 to June 1962, espoused this doctrine of world order. San Tiago Dantas laid the foundations of what was later to become Brazil’s “independent foreign policy,” seeking to diversify Brazil’s international relations and refusing to align automatically with any country or bloc. Dantas advocated total involvement in the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), with the aim of protecting the price of commodities and participating in the growth of international trade, disarmament and more peaceful competitive coexistence, and interna tional economic cooperation so as to ensure growth in developing countries. In its foreign relations, Brazil should pursue a combination of universalism and pragmatism, retaining the right to negotiate with 12 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard all countries, in accordance with its own conventions and on the basis of respect for universally recognized principles of international con duct. The most well-known case where Brazil’s peaceful coexistence policy came to the fore was in 1961 and 1962, during Dantas’s mandate as foreign minister in the run-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Washington attempted to persuade Latin American countries to act in concert against Cuban leader Fidel Castro, implementing economic sanctions against Cuba that would prevent the island from trading with the Western hemisphere. Washington refused to apply the coexistence option to Cuba, stating that Latin America was not ready to forget and forgive soon, and that a testing period was not feasible insofar as Castro could not jettison Soviet aid until a sure replacement was at hand.24 Brazil opposed the US recommendation to use economic coercion against Cuba, recommending that Latin American countries refrain from signing the so-called Punta del Este resolutions. The resolutions were passed by 14 states in favor; one state, Cuba, against; and six states, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, abstaining. In the heyday of popular resistance towards the United States this was considered a foreign policy victory for Brazil. Together with Mexico, Brazil was the principal advocate of approaching Cas tro’s Cuba with more political tolerance. Such an attitude was thought to bring Cuba back into amity with other states in the Western hemi sphere, or at a minimum remove the acid from US–Cuban relations. Brazil was thus vocally critical of US refusal to accept peaceful coex istence with Cuba on the grounds of its connections with the Soviet bloc and with revolutionary movements in other parts of Latin America. At an informal meeting on 2–3 October 1962 in the Organization of American States (OAS) to review the Cuban situation and the military build-up, Brazil began retreating from its coexistence stance. The prin cipal reason was that Brazil’s proposal to approach Castro to see whether he could be enticed to sever political-military ties with Moscow was politely deflected by Castro.25 The final communiqué reiterated the member states’ adherence to the principle of non-intervention due to Mexico’s and Brazil’s insistence that the Castro problem be viewed in terms of coexistence. However, the communiqué also contained one of the strongest statements on Cuba, expressing the need to take action regarding the use of ships in Cuban trade in the light of the military build-up, declaring it desirable to intensify individual and collective surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items of strategic importance to Cuba, and calling for studies to be undertaken on the transfer of funds to other American republics for Introduction 13 subversive purposes and the use of Cuba as a base for training in sub versive techniques. The meeting can be said to represent a clear change of attitude in Latin America towards Cuba, realizing that support for the US opposition towards the Soviet-friendly revolutionary activism of Castro’s Cuba was a challenge rather than an opportunity for the efforts of Latin America to distance itself from the ideological East– West bloc rivalries of the Cold War.26 After the 1964 coup d’état and the establishment of a military regime in Brazil, the departure from peaceful coexistence associated with communism was complete, although the principles of universalism and pragmatism were invoked a decade later under Ernesto Geisel’s “Responsible Pragmatism” foreign policy, which sought to maximize economic and political opportunities through the diversification of ties. China’s version of peaceful coexistence China’s choice of a strategy of coexistence is not a phenomenon of the post-Cold War period. Indeed, coexistence has been central to under standing China’s national security strategy since 1953. In its first five years of governing, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had to combat internal subversive operations supported by the United States as well as China’s neighboring states, which were equally concerned about the spread of communism in the region. To counter these threats, China attempted to establish friendly relations with neutral neighboring states on the basis of what were to become known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The first state it approached was India, with which it held a conference in 1953 to promote trade and pilgrimage between India and the Tibet region of China. As a result of these negotiations, India waived its claim to extraterritorial rights in Tibet as the successor state to the British colonial empire in the region, and trade markets, routes, and procedures for traders and pilgrims were regulated. In the preamble to this bilateral agreement, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were inserted as binding rules governing the relationship between China and India.27 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are mutual respect for sove reignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.28 Although Chinese premier Zhou Enlai launched these principles in 1953 as specific guidelines for the Chinese-Indian bilateral relationship, they went on to become basic cornerstones of Chinese foreign policy. As foreign policy practice, these principles were a 14 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard product of China’s need to accommodate the realities of power politics that emerged after World War II. They also reflected China’s need to establish relations with neighboring states and its determination to introduce its particular brand of communism as a major force in international relations. Chairman Mao Zedong, who led the PRC from its establishment in 1949 until his death in 1976, based his concept of coexistence on Lenin’s belief that the capitalist and communist systems could exist side by side if the Soviet state could exploit the differences between them. Unlike Lenin, however, Mao was engaged in an intermittent civil war over a period of more than 20 years before seizing power. Conse quently, Mao’s doctrines and precepts combine prudence with revolu tionary enthusiasm, as a result of having been adapted to the conditions that confronted him on the ground. The fact that Mao led the CCP to victory in the most protracted civil war of the twentieth century meant that his principles remained sacrosanct for decades, until the advent of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform era commencing in 1978, and underlay most of China’s policies, strategies, and tactics in the international arena. Mao took the view that China must learn how to wage diplomatic covert struggles against the imperialists, eyeing the possibility of adding developed countries like France and Japan as a top tier to the “intermediate zone” of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and throwing them all into the balance against the encircling great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which were colluding and competing for hegemony over them. In so doing, China hoped to establish a third force in the international system that could challenge the dominance of the Eastern bloc and Western bloc. It was on this basis that Premier Zhou Enlai launched peaceful coexistence in his address to the developing world at the 1955 summit of the NAM.29 Although the 1966 Cultural Revolution—aimed at removing all liberal, bourgeois elements from the CCP and Chinese society—put a temporary halt to the peaceful coexistence effort, it was resumed in 1969. On 1 January 1970, China restored peaceful coex istence as the primary theme of its foreign policy by officially declaring its willingness to establish or improve diplomatic relations with all countries, regardless of their social systems, on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Convincing evidence that the mili tancy of the Cultural Revolution did not represent a permanent change in China’s international strategy was provided in 1970 when China received a large number of foreign delegations; expressed renewed interest in joining the UN; signed aid agreements with North Vietnam, Introduction 15 Albania, and North Korea; extended loans to Tanzania, Zambia, Ceylon and Romania; repaired relations with Yugoslavia, Burma, India, and the Soviet Union; and established diplomatic relations with Canada, Equatorial Guinea and Italy.30 China’s resurrection of peace ful coexistence improved its foreign relations so dramatically during 1970 that it could claim with justification that it had friends all over the world. In November 1970, the UN voted in favor of the PRC’s membership, and in 1971 the PRC replaced Taiwan as the fifth per manent, veto-wielding member state on the UN Security Council (UNSC), via UN General Assembly Resolution 2758.31 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were subsequently written into the Chinese Constitution in 1982. This act confirmed that the principles expressed the Chinese concept of right and wrong state conduct in the international realm.32 Peaceful coexistence has been a Chinese national security strategy designed to safeguard it against pressures from superior powers at odds with Chinese interests. Although, after US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Beijing in 1971, the Asia-Pacific region was often described as tripolar, the Chinese did not in any serious way challenge US and Soviet dominance during the Cold War.33 Consequently, it seems more appropriate to describe China during the later years of the Cold War as a secondary power. A secondary power is a state that is strong enough to avoid subservience to great power demands and is capable of alternating its alignment between different great powers without forming an alliance with any one of these.34 In China’s case, this meant carving out an independent position of influence between the United States and the Soviet Union. This involved subscribing to an alternative vision of international order to that of the United States and the Soviet Union. China presented itself as a developing state aiming for peaceful coexistence, a new economic world order, and the defiance of alliances. In contrast to the great powers, China did not occupy a position that enabled it to export its development model to other countries to any significant extent. China demanded respect from other powers and sought to play a significant role in international affairs, even when it had little money to spend. For example, Beijing undertook the prestige project of building the Tanzania–Zambia railway. However, in contrast to India, which intervened to exercise sovereignty over the Portuguese colony of Goa, China left the Portuguese colony of Macao alone. China displayed a strong streak of pragmatism at the time, which was largely determined by the failure of the 1960s development project known as the Great Leap Forward.35 For the most part, the alternative 16 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard political framework remained a rhetorical device designed to highlight China’s foreign policy independence, because Beijing was insufficiently influential to have an impact on the fundamental principles of inter national order. China’s principal gain was the considerable strategic, economic and political benefits it was able to extract through its for eign policy. However, it did not fundamentally contribute to, or alter, the political framework used by the United States and the Soviet Union for the management of international order.36 South Africa: diplomacy of ubuntu—another form of coexistence strategy South Africa does not explicitly use coexistence in foreign policy documents; however, it has in different forms and ways subscribed to the principles of the concept. Since the transition to majority rule in 1994, South Africa has undergone a foreign policy transformation, moving it away from the position of a self-declared member of the Western side of the Cold War and considered by the United States as a “tar-baby,”37 to being the bridge between the “rogue” developing states of the world and the US-dominated Western hegemonic system, Africa and the developing world in general. South Africa has been very active in organizations such as the NAM, the G20, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN. In its 2011 White Paper on Foreign Policy, Pretoria stresses that South Africa’s foreign policy is based on agreed international law and rules, including the absolute sovereignty principle and the right to non interference. South Africa rejects unilateralism and is a firm believer in multilateralism and multilateral solutions. It sees the UN as the pri mary global legitimate institution. South Africa has therefore since 1994 adhered to these principles in its foreign policy and promotes reform of international economic and political institutions in an attempt to create a more equitable international order, bringing the needs and wishes of the countries in the global South into a global cooperative framework. To this end, South Africa has tried to create cohesion amongst the states in the global South on some of these issues, for instance international trade and climate, to engender a uni fied grouping with more influence in dealings with the developed states of the North. South Africa is both a state that has based its foreign policy on the principles of human rights and democracy, and a state promoting these principles by active interaction and by being an example for others to follow. Based on its own post-conflict experience after apartheid it is a Introduction 17 firm believer in peaceful conflict resolution, including negotiated set tlement. Its foreign policy therefore includes all the elements men tioned above in China’s constitution, i.e. mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Since 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy has been structured according to these principles, and it has been vocal in its critique of unilateral military action in countries such as Iraq and Kosovo. Pretoria has also been active as a mediator in the attempts to broker peace agreements in places such as Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Focus in its foreign policy is therefore on “ubuntu,” meaning humanity, and “batho pele,” meaning putting people first, and not just South Africans, within the framework of rules and law that are considered universally legitimate. Conclusion The Soviet version of peaceful coexistence initially entailed minimal coordination aspirations. It can be seen as an attempt to ameliorate the competitive dynamics of the realist autarchic strategy that dominated US-Soviet relations by introducing some measure of great power coordination in high politics issue areas. In the early 1950s, the Soviet version of peaceful coexistence was translated into a proposition for global security management in a bipolar world order. The Indian version of peaceful coexistence entailed extensive coor dination aspirations. It can be seen as a proposal for ameliorating the integrationist dynamics of the liberal version of world order that dominated the Western hemisphere by establishing a separate system of policy coordination alongside this partial world order. The Brazilian concept of peaceful coexistence entailed policy coordination with a view to sustaining foreign policy freedom from the ideological great power rivalries of the United States and the Soviet Union. It was applied for purposes of internal political development, but involved solidarity with other developing countries that were under pressure to form alliances. In contrast to the Soviet Union, China’s historical dilemma has been between an inward-looking focus on the Chinese nation and a will ingness to engage externally in the interplay with other actors in the international realm. Because the principal choice has been between concentrating on internal development and pursuing external relations, peaceful coexistence has been the only real standard visibly defining China’s methods for promoting its national objectives at the global 18 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard level. Indian-style peaceful coexistence has entailed a much greater and more radical commitment to external activism than its Chinese coun terpart, which has aimed at giving states freedom to pursue their national interests. Instead, Nehru’s notion focused on the common interest of states in promoting the socioeconomic welfare of their citi zens to achieve peace. China’s understanding of peaceful coexistence entails that the pursuit of national interests should be a combination of individual foreign policy choices and extensive multilateral dialogue in order to prevent violent clashes between states with divergent national interests. Multilateralism is a means of allowing states to concentrate on fulfilling their individual goals, rather than an end in itself. The political project of the BRICS countries can be defined as coexistence in the sense that they all promote a world order that entails co-management of global security issues by peaceful diplomatic means. However, they differ in terms of the objectives that encourage them to pursue coexistence. Russia’s version of coexistence bears similarities to the Soviet version in the sense that its objective is to ameliorate the competitive dynamics of the realist autarchic elements of the interna tional system by introducing some measure of great power coordina tion in high politics issue areas while Russia works on restoring its dominance with the post-Soviet states. By contrast, Brazil, India and South Africa pursue an Indian/Brazilian-style coexistence model in the sense of aiming at ameliorating the liberal integrationist elements of the international system by introducing some measure of coordination of socioeconomic measures intended to create greater wealth and an international system based on international political pluralism. Finally, China pursues a post-Cold War version of its own coexistence model which entails international coordination to avoid the use of force by hegemonic powers with a view to promote states’ entitlement to pursue their national interests and a domestic inward-looking focus on the basis of the existing world order. Consequently, the book considers the coexistence strategy that ties the BRICS members together as consisting of these four basic principles: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; interference in the internal affairs of other states only within the framework of multilaterally agreed upon norms and rules; mutual non-aggression, the legal equality of states; and promotion of mutual benefits and national development paths. However, the interpretation and prioritization of these four principles differ among the five states. Introduction 19 In Chapter 1, Cedric de Coning analyzes the extent to which the BRICS grouping adopts a coexistence strategy in its pursuit of an alternative vision of world order. De Coning points out that the BRICS only have a short history. Nevertheless, a common concept of coexistence that invests the grouping with a common political purpose has already emerged. Despite significant differences regarding political intent and instruments, the BRICS have developed a set of principles designed to advance the interests of the developing world. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity emerges in the emphasis on a democratic world order, defined as the equal rights of states to co-manage the international system so as to ensure influence on the agenda and decisions for developing as well as developed countries. Interference only on the basis of common norms and values emerges in the effort to promote greater welfare and justice for all by means of mechanisms such as the BRICS development bank and the introduc tion of inter-BRICS trade in their own currencies, which are voluntary arrangements enhancing the economic and financial role of the member states. Mutual non-aggression and the legal equality of states emerges in the common positions on security issues on the UN agenda, which centers on governmental consent as a condition of interference and the use of peaceful instruments of conflict resolution. In addition, supporting principles such as the right of all countries to peaceful nuclear programs stresses the equal rights of states. The promotion of mutual benefits and national development paths is inherent in the emphasis on the right of all countries to determine their domestic political structures and to decide how to pursue development and justice. In Chapter 2, Adriana Abdenur demonstrates that Brazil’s foreign policy principles of respect for national sovereignty, non-intervention, self-determination, international cooperation, support for multi polarity, multilateralism and the peaceful settlement of conflicts and its strategy of focusing on peace and stability to ensure socioeconomic development, closely resemble the BRICS coexistence principles. For Brazil, the conflict between coexistence and its traditional focus on commitment to liberal democracy and human rights has been resolved by supporting democratization projects on condition of governmental consent. Brazil’s use of regional maritime disputes as a stepping stone for enhanced South-South cooperation, its focus on socioeconomic international forums such as the WTO and the World Bank to pro mote the interests of the developing world, and its focus on contribut ing to UN-endorsed peacekeeping and human security with governmental consent to promote international justice, demonstrate how the BRICS version of world order could be used to enhance 20 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard regional stability and promote national values such as democratization without compromising the BRICS framework. In Chapter 3, Flemming Splidsboel Hansen and Alexander Sergunin show that Russia’s foreign policy is conducive to the BRICS’ efforts to promote a version of world order that will enhance the role of the grouping in international political agenda setting and security man agement. Russia’s identity as a developed country is at odds with the BRICS’ identification with the interests of developing countries. This dilemma is resolved by Moscow’s focus on preservation of its great power status by using the BRICS principles of sovereignty and terri torial integrity in the UN Security Council context to promote global security management on the basis of governmental consent and con flict settlement on the basis of dialogue. In addition, Russia encourages a pluralistic approach to models of socioeconomic development in line with the rest of the BRICS, even if it does not define itself as a devel oping country and the security side of the BRICS is more important to Russia than the economic side. These aspects of the BRICS framework are in line with Russia’s foreign policy concept of soft power and its emphasis on enhancing Russia as an attractive role model, but at odds with its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow’s efforts include the use of special governmental agencies, mass media, compatriot communities and nongovernmental organizations. In Chapter 4, Surupa Gupta and Shibashis Chatterjee point out that Indian foreign policy conforms to the BRICS interpretation of coex istence. In particular, India’s support for a multipolar world order, multilateralism as a strategy for enhancing the influence on world order of developing countries, arms control and disarmament as a way of reducing international aggression, support for the primacy of sover eignty and territorial integrity in global security management, and a pluralistic international system that does not pass judgment on national political and economic development paths are all principles that reflect the BRICS version of world order. India’s principal chal lenge in accommodating BRICS principles is to reconcile its status as a leading development democracy with the political pluralism of the BRICS. This dilemma is resolved by India’s focus on aligning with multiple countries to cater to its security needs on the Indian sub continent coupled with its de facto emphasis on socioeconomic devel opment as the main issue for India’s future prosperity as well as for the development of a just global order. In Chapter 5, Liselotte Odgaard and Zha Daojiong argue that China’s foreign policy priorities of preserving international peace and stability by means of separating the economic and political sectors, by Introduction 21 insisting on regime consent as a requirement for intervening in the domestic politics of other states, the non-use of force for purposes of conflict management, and the role of regional and functional organi zations in international cooperation, entail a commitment to a world order of coexistence that is in line with the BRICS grouping’s defini tion of coexistence in its emphasis on constraints on international conduct and the prioritization of policy coordination as a platform for bilateral cooperation and the pursuit of national development paths. Focusing on the cases of China’s energy policy towards Iran and Myanmar, China’s UNSC policy on Libya and Syria, and China’s policies on maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, it is demonstrated that China’s principal challenge is to reconcile its national interest pursuit with the BRICS requirement of intervening in other states on the basis of common norms and values. China manages this dilemma by proposing to separate the economic and political spheres so that each country can pursue nationally distinct develop ment paths and by insisting on governmental consent as a requirement for intervention. This contrasts with Western preferences for promoting a universal development model or pronouncing other states pariahs which as a matter of principle should be excluded from international forums of cooperation and policy coordination. While the preference for rejecting universal values and insisting on the primacy of national historical development paths also allows for Chinese behavior that is often seen as a creeping threat to the authority of other states, for example in China’s behavior in the South and East China Seas, it also prevents China from coming into conflict with the principle of inter national political pluralism and the right of states to choose their own political and economic development path. In Chapter 6, Thomas Mandrup and Karen Smith analyze South Africa’s foreign policy practice, which is rooted in the ubuntu diplo macy emphasizing human security and is marked by respect for sover eignty, a cautious approach to interference in the domestic politics of other states, and multilateralism as a strategy for enhanced interna tional influence for developing countries. For South Africa, the BRICS grouping is a useful platform for promoting enhanced intra-African cooperation in the economic and security fields and for promoting the influence of regions outside the West on the global international poli tical agenda. However, South Africa faces a dilemma between its pre ference for human security which requires the promotion of democracy and human rights, and the international political pluralism of the BRICS grouping. So far this dilemma has been reconciled by South Africa’s prioritization of demonstrating respect for the common 22 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard version of world order pursued by the BRICS member states since it is seen as the most effective means of enhancing the influence of the developing world on global international politics. Democracy and human rights pursuits are therefore based on governmental consent. In Chapter 7, Cedric de Coning, Thomas Mandrup and Liselotte Odgaard summarize to what extent the BRICS grouping and its member states comply with the coexistence framework in their multi lateral and foreign policy practices. The main conclusion is that on the whole the BRICS demonstrate a high degree of commitment to their common concept of world order. Principal challenges to their unity include different outlooks regarding the desirability of interfering on the basis of democratic and human rights values, and territorial and maritime disputes and interventions that potentially call into question the commitment of member states to mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as mutual non-aggression. Despite these challenges, the main finding is that the BRICS grouping manages to adopt surprisingly unitary policies on world order. As a grouping and as a coordinating body for common principles of world order, BRICS represents a version of world order that combines absolute sovereignty and the independent decision-making power of states with a focus on socioeconomic development on the basis of national preferences which differs from Western world order concepts and their emphasis on political and civil society development on the basis of liberal values and, if necessary, use of force and imposition. The remainder of this book analyzes the BRICS grouping’s use of coexistence and each of the five BRICS countries’ coexistence strategies in detail. Notes 1 See Immanuel Wallerstein, World-systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham, Conn.: Duke University Press, 2007). 2 See for instance Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The BRICS Countries as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight,” Asian Perspectives 31, no. 4 (2007): 7–42; Michael A. Glosny, “China and the BRICs: A Real (but Limited) Partner ship in a Unipolar World,” Polity 42, no. 1 (January 2010): 100–29; Petar Kurecic and Goran Bandov, “The Contemporary Role and Perspectives of the BRIC States in the World-Order,” Electronic Journal of Political Sci ence Studies 2, no. 2 (June 2011); Leslie Elliott Armijo and Sean W. Burges, “Brazil, the Entrepreneurial and Democratic BRIC,” Polity 42, no. 1 (Jan uary 2010): 14–37; Ivan M. Ivanovic, “The BRIC Countries from Brazilian Perspective,” The Review of International Affairs LX, no. 1136 (November 2009): 19–32; Cynthia Roberts, “Russia’s BRICs Diplomacy: Rising Out sider with Dreams of an Insider,” Polity 42, no. 1 (January 2010): 38–73. Introduction 23 3 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 5–56. 4 Liselotte Odgaard, China and Coexistence: Beijing’s National Security Strategy for the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012). 5 See for example Vidya Nadkarni and Norma C. Noonan, ed., Emerging Powers in a Comparative Perspective: The Political and Economic Rise of the BRIC Countries (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013); Amrita Narlikar, “Introduction: Negotiating the Rise of New Powers,” International Affairs 89, no. 3 (2013): 561–76. 6 The understanding of Western aspirations for integration used in this edited volume is based on G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 3–79. 7 For an assessment of the literature on China’s rise that focuses on the dis tinction between patterns of conflict and cooperation between China and the United States, see Avery Goldstein, “Power Transitions, Institutions, and China’s Rise in East Asia: Theoretical Expectations and Evidence,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, nos. 4–5 (August–October 2007): 639–82. 8 The explanation is based on Herbert Butterfield, “Morality and an Inter national Order,” in The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919– 1969, ed. Brian Porter (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 341. 9 C.A.W. Manning, The Nature of International Society (London: MacMil lan, 1975), 160–61, 176–77. 10 F.S. Northedge, The International Political System (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), 112–13, 150–51. 11 Northedge, The International Political System, 92–94. 12 The four coexistence case studies are based on Odgaard, China and Coex istence, 35–40, 75–86. 13 For an account of the origins of the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence, see Warren Lerner, “The Historical Origins of the Soviet Doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence,” Law and Contemporary Problems 29, no. 4 (Autumn 1964): 865–70. 14 Nikita S. Khrushchev, “On Peaceful Coexistence,” Foreign Affairs 38, no. 1 (October 1959): 1–18. 15 Edward McWhinney, “‘Peaceful Coexistence’ and Soviet-Western Interna tional Law,” American Journal of International Law 56, no. 4 (October 1962): 951–70. 16 Nigel Gould-Davis, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Pol itics during the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 1 (1999): 90–109. 17 McWhinney, “‘Peaceful Coexistence’ and Soviet-Western International Law,” 952. 18 E. Malcolm Hause, “Noncommitted and Nonaligned,” Western Political Quarterly 13, no. 1 (March 1960): 70–82. 19 Edward Luce, In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 261. 20 Robert L. Hardgrave Jr and Stanley A. Kochanek, India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation, 4th edn (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 337–38. 24 C. de Coning, T. Mandrup and L. Odgaard 21 Hause, “Noncommitted and Nonaligned,” 72, 80. 22 C. Raja Mohan, “India’s Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Security,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2008): 43–60. 23 Jawdat Abu-el-Haj and Ronald H. Chilcote, “Intellectuals, Social Theory, and Political Practice in Brazil,” Latin American Perspectives 38, no. 3 (May 2011): 15, 20. 24 James G. Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 2),” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 8–9. 25 On Brazil’s initiative, see James G. Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 3–20. 26 R. St. J. MacDonald, “The Organization of American States in Action,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 15, no. 2 (1964): 395–401. 27 India, MEA, “Notes: Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China, 1954–59,” White Paper, 1959; Byron N. Tzou, China and International Law: The Boundary Disputes (New York: Praeger, 1990), 30. 28 People’s Daily, “Preamble,” Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 4 December 1982, english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html. 29 W.A.C. Adie, “‘One World’ Restored? Sino-American Relations on a New Footing,” Asian Survey 12, no. 5 (May 1972): 365–85. 30 Harry Harding, “China: Toward Revolutionary Pragmatism,” Asian Survey 11, no. 1 (“A Survey of Asia in 1970: Part I”, January 1971): 51–67. 31 UN General Assembly, Restoration of the Law Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations, Twenty-Sixth Session (A/RES/ 2758), 1976th Plenary Meeting, 25 October 1971, daccess-dds-ny.un.org/ doc/resolution/gen/nr0/327/74/img/nr032774.pdf ?OpenElement. 32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, China’s Initia tion of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, 17 November 2000, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm. 33 See for example Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific (London: Routledge, 2004 ), 72–97. 34 Liselotte Odgaard, The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security: US China Policies on Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2007), 56–58. 35 Lindsey Grant, quoted in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945–1996 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 165. 36 For an analysis of the main elements in the US-Soviet international order, see Odgaard, The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security, 30–34. 37 Cedric de Coning and Chris Landsberg, “From ‘Tar Baby’ to Transition: Four Decades of US Foreign Policy towards South Africa,” Issues and Actors 8, no. 6 (March 1995). 1 BRICS and coexistence Cedric de Coning The evolving global environment: the context for the BRICS project Global threats and challenges: the political project of the BRICS Financial crisis and economic governance: the economic project of the BRICS Conclusion In the introductory chapter it was said that what made Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa identify with the BRICS concept was the realization that they share a common vision for a new global order, and that by combining forces together in a small but strategic grouping that binds together key countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America, they had a better chance of realizing that vision. In the remaining chapters we look at this vision for a new global order from the perspective of each of the individual BRICS countries, but in this chapter we will take a look at how these countries have articulated their common vision collectively. We do so by analyzing the two BRIC and three BRICS summits that have taken place annually since 2009. The editors claim that the BRICS share a common vision of a future global order where the rules prevent any one state, or an alliance of states, from dominating the international system, and they have chosen to refer to this approach to global governance as a strategy of coexistence. They have defined coexistence as international policy coordination for the purposes of conflict management, which then develops into a system of co-management or co-maintenance of global security issues. The editors have identified four principles that, taken together, help to outline further the coexistence strategy, namely: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; interference in the internal affairs of other states only within the framework of multilaterally agreed upon norms and rules; mutual non-aggression, the legal equality of states; and promotion of mutual benefits and national development paths. 26 Cedric de Coning In this chapter we look at what it is these five countries agree on when it comes to their shared vision for a new global order. Our aim is first to track the emerging narrative of a common vision and to ana lyze whether this narrative can be said to reflect a strategy of coex istence. To do so we look at the five summits chronologically to analyze the development of the narrative over time. Second, our aim is to analyze the common vision described in the collective statements of the BRICS with a view to improving our understanding of the various elements of the collective vision, including the theory of change embedded in the vision, i.e. how the BRICS themselves perceive that their vision will be realized. This we will do by looking at the political and economic projects of the BRICS in greater detail. Lastly, we will analyze what progress has been made towards implementing the vision. Five years is a very short period of time in the overall development of global trends in international relations, and we recog nize that it will take several decades of sustained effort for the BRICS grouping to have a meaningful influence on the international system. However, it may still be possible to track what, if any, practical steps have been taken—as reflected in the annual communiqués of the BRICS summits—over this period to start to implement this vision. The annual BRICS summits have grown in import and great effort has been invested in preparing each summit. One can thus justifiably assume that the official communiqués released at each summit have been negotiated with great attention and care, and that they reflect what the BRICS countries want to share with the world about their agreed common vision for the future as well as their position on cur rent affairs. A careful analysis of the communiqués should thus be able to generate an understanding of how this vision has developed over the first five years of the establishment of the BRICS. The evolving global environment: the context for the BRICS project The first meeting of the BRIC grouping took place between the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China, in Ekaterinburg, Russia on 16 June 2009. At this first meeting the BRIC countries dis cussed the situation of the global economy and other pressing issues of global development, and also prospects for further strengthening collaboration within the BRIC group. This first meeting took place in the context of an emerging global financial crisis, and in the communiqué released after the summit the BRICS and coexistence 27 BRIC leaders stressed the central role played by the G20 summits in dealing with the financial crisis. In so doing they emphasized that the financial crisis had brought about a recognition that the global econ omy could no longer be managed by the G81 alone, but that a wider grouping of states, including the BRIC countries was now critical to co-managing the global economy, and especially the global financial system. The second meeting of the BRIC leaders was held in Brasília on 15 April 2010. The communiqué released after this summit said that the leaders had met to discuss major issues on the international agenda as well as to take concrete steps to improve cooperation and coordination within the BRIC group. In the second communiqué the BRIC coun tries went to even greater lengths to explain their alternative vision for a new global order. The communiqué said that the BRIC countries shared the perception that the world was undergoing major and swift changes and these changes highlighted the need for corresponding transformations in global governance in all relevant areas. In the communiqué the BRIC countries underlined their support for a “mul tipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States.”2 The third summit took place in Sanya, Hainan, China on 14 April 2011, and at this meeting the Republic of South Africa joined the grouping and it was re-named the BRICS group. The communiqué released after the summit explained that the reason why these coun tries, with a total population of nearly 3 billion, had come together was because they shared an overarching objective to contribute significantly to the development of humanity and to establishing a more equitable and fair world. The communiqué said the BRICS countries shared the view that: … the world is undergoing far-reaching, complex and profound changes, marked by the strengthening of multipolarity, economic globalization and increasing interdependence. While facing the evolving global environment and a multitude of global threats and challenges, the international community should join hands to strengthen cooperation for common development. Based on uni versally recognized norms of international law and in a spirit of mutual respect and collective decision making, global economic governance should be strengthened, democracy in international relations should be promoted, and the voice of emerging and developing countries in international affairs should be enhanced.3 28 Cedric de Coning The fourth summit of the BRICS countries took place in the capital of India, New Delhi, on 29 March 2012. The communiqué released after the summit stated that the BRICS grouping was a platform for dialo gue and cooperation that represented 43 percent of the world’s popu lation, and was committed to the promotion of peace, security and development in a multipolar, interdependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world. The communiqué also argued that what it called the transcontinental (Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America) dimension of the BRICS interaction further added to its value and significance. The fourth communiqué further articulated the BRICS vision: … of a future marked by global peace, economic and social pro gress and enlightened scientific temper. We stand ready to work with others, developed and developing countries together, on the basis of universally recognized norms of international law and multilateral decision making, to deal with the challenges and the opportunities before the world today. Strengthened representation of emerging and developing countries in the institutions of global governance will enhance their effectiveness in achieving this objective.4 Whilst the fourth summit reaffirmed the core norms of the BRICS, it also seemed to introduce a functional argument, namely that the equality of states in the international system is not only a right, but that the more all countries are represented in the institutions that make up the global system, and thus participate in and take co-ownership of them, the more effective these institutions will become. This reflected a gradual shift in the focus of the BRICS, away from its origin as an aspirational group that had in common an alternative vision for the future, to a group that was more present in current international affairs, and that actively cooperated to pursue common interests in a broad range of international forums. The fifth summit of BRICS leaders was held in Durban, South Africa, on 27 March 2013. South Africa is the smallest member coun try of the BRICS grouping in terms of the relative size of its economy and population, and some commentators have questioned why it has been included in the group.5 One way to make sense of South Africa’s role in the BRICS is to understand it in the context of South Africa representing Africa, and Africa’s current and potential future con tribution to the global economy. The BRIC grouping needed to include an African representative, and South Africa had the largest and most sophisticated economy at the time. South Africa was also widely BRICS and coexistence 29 recognized politically as having a regional influence and international footprint, and as one of the most likely countries to represent Africa in a reformed UN Security Council. From this perspective it makes sense that the overarching theme of the fifth BRICS summit was “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Develop ment, Integration and Industrialization.” The summit was also followed by a retreat with African leaders, under the theme, “Unlocking Africa’s Potential: BRICS and Africa Cooperation on Infrastructure.” The summit in South Africa concluded the first cycle of BRICS summits as each member had then hosted one meeting of the new grouping. The communiqué released after the fifth summit reaffirmed the commitment of the BRICS to the promotion of international law, multilateralism and the central role of the UN. The communiqué stated that the discussion at the fifth summit reflected the growing intra BRICS solidarity as well as its shared goal to contribute positively to global peace, stability, development and cooperation. The communiqué also stated the BRICS’ aim to develop itself progres sively into a full-fledged mechanism of current and long-term coordination on a wide range of key issues of the world economy and politics. The communiqués released after the first five summits of the BRICS countries articulate an alternative vision for a new global order that is more democratic, just, fair, rule-based, and which requires the collective decision making and co-management of all states, both when it comes to the specifics of the international financial system and its institutions, but also more broadly as it pertains to international trade and the political system, including global institutions like the UN. With con cepts like democracy, fairness and rule-governed behaviour, the BRICS countries are signaling that they perceive the current global order to be undemocratic, unjust, unfair and arbitrarily manipulated by a domi nant superpower supported by an alliance of developed countries in the North. The BRICS hold that the existing global governance archi tecture is regulated by institutions that were developed to deal with a very different set of challenges and opportunities. As the global economy is being reshaped, the BRICS are committed to exploring new models and approaches to global governance which strive for more equitable development and inclusive global growth. Global threats and challenges: the political project of the BRICS The BRICS are widely understood to be a grouping that has a shared macroeconomic interest as so-called emerging markets in the global 30 Cedric de Coning economic system. The communiqués released after each of the five BRICS summits do reflect the prominence the grouping gives to global finance and economics in that these are the first issues dealt with at each summit. However, it would be wrong to take this to mean that the BRICS do not have a political project. First, it should be recognized that the global economic and financial project of the BRICS has a political aim, namely to redress global inequality at the level of the international political economy. We will look into this aspect of the BRICS project in the next section. Second, the BRICS also have a direct political project aimed at transforming the way the international system is governed. In this section we will focus on what the first five summits have dealt with when it comes to this more direct or overt aspect of the political project of the BRICS. In a statement that reflects the BRIC vision for a new global order, the communiqué released after the first summit states that the BRIC countries: … underline our support for a more democratic and just multi polar world order based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all states. We reiterate our support for political and diplomatic efforts to peacefully resolve disputes in international relations.6 The BRIC leaders go on to express their strong commitment to multi lateral diplomacy and they recognize the central role played by the UN in dealing with global challenges and threats. At the same time, they also affirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN with a view to making it more efficient. Two of the BRIC countries, China and Russia, are permanent members of the Security Council, and the other two, Brazil and India have been strong advocates for the reform of the Security Council, and have at times expressed an interest in serving on such a revised Security Council. China and Russia, although in favor of Security Council reform, also have a vested interest in maintaining their current privileged position. This first communiqué reflects this tension within the BRIC countries when it avoids explicitly mentioning the Security Council, and limits its comments on UN reform to saying: “We reiterate the importance we attach to the status of India and Brazil in international affairs, and understand and support their aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations.”7 The communiqué released after the second summit expresses the strong commitment of the BRIC countries to multilateral diplomacy, with the UN playing the central role in dealing with global challenges BRICS and coexistence 31 and threats. The BRIC countries again reaffirm their support for com prehensive reform of the UN, with a view to making it more effective, efficient and representative. The communiqué again stops short of saying anything specific about Security Council reform other than to reiterate the importance that China and Russia attach to the status of Brazil and India in international affairs. The references to multilateral diplomacy and the central role the BRIC countries assign to the UN for managing conflict reflect a deep unease with what these countries view as unilateral action by the West to resolve conflicts by either imposing its norms and values via a manipulation of the UN, or by bypassing the UN altogether. The first two communiqués indicate that the BRIC countries are especially cri tical of actions by the West that involve support for specific movements or political parties in non-Western countries. They interpret these acts as interference in the internal politics of the countries in question, and in breach of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states, as enshrined in international law. In the communiqué released after the third summit, the BRICS again express their strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy with the UN playing the central role in dealing with global challenges and threats. The third communiqué again reaffirms the need for a compre hensive reform of the UN, but on this occasion, for the first time, it mentions the Security Council. However, it does not mention anything specific on Security Council reform other than the now standard sen tence where the existing permanent members of the Security Council, China and Russia, acknowledge the important role of Brazil, India and South Africa, and their aspirations to play a greater role in international affairs. However, what was special in 2011 was that all five BRICS countries served together on the Security Council, as Brazil, India and South Africa were elected as non-permanent members. The communiqué acknowledges that this coincidence provides the BRICS countries with a valuable opportunity to work closely together on issues of interna tional peace and security, to strengthen multilateral approaches and to facilitate future coordination on issues under UN Security Council consideration. In an attempt to articulate what these countries have in common when it comes to their positions on UN peace and security matters, the communiqué states: We maintain that the independence, sovereignty, unity and terri torial integrity of each nation should be respected. We wish to continue our cooperation in the UN Security Council on Libya. 32 Cedric de Coning We are of the view that all the parties should resolve their differ ences through peaceful means and dialogue in which the UN and regional organizations should as appropriate play their role. We also express support for the African Union High-Level Panel Initiative on Libya.8 Despite the fact that all the BRICS countries were on the Security Council together, and shared a common approach to Libya, South Africa was the only BRICS country that voted in favor of UNSC resolution 1973, which authorized an intervention in Libya on 17 March 2011. Brazil, China, India and Russia abstained. However, the BRICS countries adopted a common position on Libya a few months later, when they agreed that the way the UN resolution was implemented amounted to an abuse of the mandate, and that the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza tion (NATO) and the countries which formed the coalition that inter vened in Libya manipulated the UN protection mandate to use force to bring about regime change. These events further strengthened their resolve and common position on interventions aimed at forcefully changing a government, and con tributed to the fact that all the BRICS countries subsequently joined forces to resist a similar intervention in Syria. As reflected in the statement quoted above, the BRICS position is that the independence, sover eignty, unity and territorial integrity of each nation should be respected and upheld, and that all the parties to a conflict or dispute should resolve their differences through peaceful means and dialogue. The BRICS countries reject the imposition of solutions with force from the outside. For them self-determination means that each society has the right to make its own decisions regarding how it is ruled. In the case of Libya and Syria, the BRICS position was that the international community should support and facilitate negotiations and dialogue among all the factions in these countries, but stop short of taking actions that amount to taking decisions on behalf of the societies. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang explained this position at the close of the G20 summit in Saint Petersburgh in 2013, when China commented on the Chinese position on Syria. The spokesperson explained that the countries in favour of a military solution should “be serious about the possible consequences of the use of military means without the mandate of the UN Security Council.”8 The concept of democracy at the international level, i.e. where states in the international system, like citizens at the national level, are equal before the law and have equal say in the co-management of the inter national system, has been a common theme in the first three summit BRICS and coexistence 33 communiqués. It stands in contrast to the traditional Western realist interpretation of the international system as being in a state of anarchy with no authorities beyond the state, thus requiring those states with the greatest power to manage the international system on behalf of the others, including protecting the weak and acting as a global policeman. By articulating this alternative vision of a democratic international order the BRICS are using the democratic norm to articulate its vision of an international system where states are treated as sovereign equals that co-manage the international system. The first three summit communiqués included broad statements on the peace and security situation in the Middle East and North Africa, but the fourth communiqué contains comprehensive statements on, amongst other things, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Syria, Iran and Afghanistan. These statements reflect the growing trust among BRICS countries to cooperate on sensitive international political questions. It also reflects that the BRICS have, over the course of the first three years, developed the diplomatic processes necessary to generate sophisticated common positions, and subsequently to cooperate to support these common positions in various international forums. The communiqué recognizes the vital importance that the stability, peace and security of the Middle East and North Africa hold for the inter national system, and above all for the countries and their citizens, whose lives have been affected by the turbulence that has erupted in the region. The communiqué states that the BRICS agree that the period of transformation taking place in the Middle East and North Africa should not be used as a pretext to delay resolution of lasting conflicts, but rather should serve as an incentive to settle them, in particular the Arab–Israeli conflict. The communiqué expresses deep concern at the situation in Syria and calls for an immediate end to all violence and violations of human rights in that country. The BRICS countries argue that global interests would best be served by dealing with the crisis through peaceful means which encourage broad national dialogues that reflect the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Syrian society and respect Syrian inde pendence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. The communiqué states that the BRICS’ objective is to facilitate a Syrian-led inclusive political process. On Iran, the BRICS communiqué states that the situation cannot be allowed to escalate into conflict. The BRICS argue that Iran has a crucial role to play for the peaceful development and prosperity of a region of high political and economic relevance, and calls on Iran to play its part as a responsible member of the global community. The 34 Cedric de Coning BRICS state that they recognize Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with its international obligations, and support reso lution of the issues involved through political and diplomatic means and dialogue between the parties concerned, including between the Interna tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran, and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The communiqué released after the fifth summit reiterates the strong commitment of the BRICS to the UN as the foremost multilateral forum entrusted with bringing about peace, order and sustainable development to the world. In this regard, the BRICS reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective and efficient, so that it can be more responsive to global challenges. On Syria, the communiqué again expresses the deep concern of the BRICS with the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situa tion in Syria and it condemns the increasing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law as a result of continued vio lence. The BRICS believe that the Joint Communiqué of the Geneva Action Group provides a basis for resolution of the Syrian crisis and they reaffirm their opposition to any further militarization of the con flict. The communiqué argues that a Syrian-led political process lead ing to a transition can be achieved only through broad national dialogue that meets the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Syrian society and respect for Syrian independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty as expressed by the Geneva Joint Communiqué and appropriate UNSC resolutions. In view of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria, the BRICS call upon all parties to allow and facilitate immediate, safe, full and unimpeded access of humanitarian organizations to all in need of assistance. The BRICS urge all parties to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers. The Syrian conflict represents the first example of the BRICS effec tively blocking the preferred policy of the West to a major interna tional political crisis, with the result that their preferred course of action, namely a negotiated rather than a military solution to the crisis, was accepted as the only viable solution. In the aftermath of the intervention in Libya, the BRICS developed a common position on the rejection of what they termed regime change by force, i.e. Western interventions aimed at putting governments in place in countries that are favorable to the West. From a BRICS perspective this type of intervention amounted to a violation of the principles of sovereignty and self-determination enshrined in international law, as they deny the people in these countries the opportunity to choose their own leaders. BRICS and coexistence 35 In the Syrian case they were for the first time able to go beyond state ments actually to block the preferred course of action of the West. In the Syrian case the West insisted that the government of President Assad step down. The BRICS countries insisted that the political future of the country needs to come about through negotiations among the different Syrian political factions and rejected foreign-enforced regime change. By effectively blocking the Western policy on Syria, the BRICS have signaled that a shift has occurred in the existing global order, namely that the West could no longer act unilaterally and implement solutions to a global crisis of this scale on their own. In the future, they would have to take into account the views of other powers, including the BRICS countries, both individually and as a group. Their actions have also shown that in order for the BRICS to start changing the existing global order, they do not have to become stronger than the West, only strong enough to block the West. In other words, they do not have to become economically and militarily as strong or stronger than the West in order to check their hegemony, they only have to develop the diplomatic clout—the ability to generate common posi tions and to cooperate on maintaining and explaining those positions to the global polity under pressure—to block the West from manip ulating the UNSC and other forums where these decisions are made. The actions of the BRICS countries on Syria are an example of the BRICS acting in accordance with the principles of coexistence as for mulated in the opening chapter, by enforcing mutual respect for sover eignty and territorial integrity, and by rejecting foreign interference in the internal affairs of Syria. These actions have reinforced the principles already enshrined in the UN Charter that intervention can only occur within the framework of multilaterally agreed upon norms and rules. It has also reinforced the principle of the legal equality of states. On the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the communiqué welcomes the admission of Palestine as an Observer State to the United Nations, but expresses concern at the lack of progress in the Middle East Peace Process and calls on the international community to assist both Israel and Palestine to work towards a two-state solution. The BRICS sup port a contiguous and economically viable Palestinian state, existing side by side in peace with Israel, within internationally recognized borders, based on those existing on 4 June 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital. The BRICS leaders expressed concern about the con struction of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which they note are in violation of international law and harmful to the peace process. 36 Cedric de Coning On Iran, the BRICS leaders state that they believe there is no alter native to a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. They recognize Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with its international obligations, and they support resolution of the issues involved through political and diplomatic means and dialogue, including between the IAEA and Iran, and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant UNSC resolutions and consistent with Iran’s obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The BRICS leaders express concern about threats of military action as well as unilateral sanctions, and the hope that all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear program will be resolved through discussions and diplomatic means. On Afghanistan, the BRICS leaders state that the country needs time, development assistance and cooperation, preferential access to world markets, foreign investment and a clear end-state strategy to attain last ing peace and stability. The communiqué reaffirms the commitment of the BRICS to support Afghanistan’s emergence as a peaceful, stable and democratic state, free of terrorism and extremism, and underscores the need for more effective regional and international cooperation for the stabilization of the country, including by combating terrorism. The fifth summit also gave attention to a number of conflicts in Africa. On Mali the summit communiqué commends the efforts of the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mali aimed at restoring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mali. The BRICS leaders support the civilian efforts of the Mali government and its international community partners in realizing the transitional program leading up to the presidential and legislative elections. The BRICS leaders emphasize the importance of political inclusiveness and economic and social development in order for Mali to achieve sustainable peace and stability. The communiqué reflects grave concern with the deterioration in the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), and deplores the loss of life. The BRICS strongly condemn the abuses and acts of violence against the civilian population and urge all parties to the conflict immediately to cease hostilities and return to negotiations. The BRICS leaders call upon all parties to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access, and they say that they are ready to work with the international community towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The communiqué also expresses grave concern about the ongoing instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The BRICS welcome the signing in Addis Ababa on 24 Februa

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