Chapter 1: An Overview of Ethics PDF

CHAPTER 1 An Overview of Ethics Chapter Outline Chapter Learning Objectives 2 Introduction 2 What Is Morality? 3 Descriptive and Normative Morality 4 Descriptive Deﬁnitions of Morality 5 Etiquette, Law, and Religion 5 Normative Deﬁnitions of Morality 6 What Is “Ethics?” 7 Metaethics 7 Metaphysical Issues 8 Psychological Issues 9 Egoism and Altruism 9 Emotion and Reason 9 Male Versus Female Morality 10 Normative Ethics 10 Teleological Ethics 10 Deontological Ethics 11 Virtue Ethics 12 Applied Ethics 12 Professional Ethics 14 Codes of Professional Ethics 15 The Importance of Professional Ethics 15 The Relationship Between Morality and Ethics 16 Morality, Ethics, and the Criminal Justice Practitioner 17 Case Study 1.1: Discovering Personal Values 18 The Nature and Source of Practitioner Values 18 The Occupational Career of the Practitioner 19 The Moral Career of the Practitioner 20 Values in Action: Two Models of the Criminal Justice Process 22 Crime Control Model 22 Due Process Model 23 Summary 24 Thought Exercise 1.1: Ethical Issues and the Exercise of Discretion in Criminal Justice 25 1 2 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS Key Terms 25 Discussion Questions 26 Resources 26 References 26 CHAPTER LEARNING OBJECTIVES: 1. Distinguish morality from ethics. 2. Contrast metaethics, normative ethics, applied ethics, and professional ethics. 3. Distinguish teleological systems of ethics from deontological systems of ethics. 4. Contrast terminal values with instrumental values. 5. Distinguish one’s occupational career from one’s moral career. 6. Describe the relationships among morality, ethics, and values. 7. Contrast the values-imported perspective from the values-learned perspective. 8. Identify and compare the values associated with the crime control and the due process models of criminal justice. INTRODUCTION Imagine you are a new police ofﬁcer with a major urban department in this country working your very ﬁrst shift. You and your ﬁeld training ofﬁcer (FTO), a 20-year veteran of the department, decide to stop for dinner at a local restaurant on your beat. As you ﬁnish your meal, you ask the server for the check. The server laughs and tells you that “meals for police ofﬁcers are on the house, in appreciation for all the hard work you do.” You are unsure how to react to this information since department policy expressly pro- hibits ofﬁcers from accepting gratuities such as free meals. What do you do? There are several ways you could respond. For example, you could just leave the full amount of the tab on the table and exit the restaurant. Or, you could give the server an oversized “tip” that covers both the meal and a gratuity. Finally, you could accept the gesture and return to your patrol duties. Which option would you choose? The more important question from the perspective of ethics, however, is this: How should you respond? For example, an observer might say you should have paid the tab because the possible consequences of not doing so could be signiﬁcant for both you and your partner. Accepting the gratuity would probably violate department policy and could subject the two of you to disciplinary action, including days off without pay—or worse. Thus, based on the severity of the potential negative consequences of accepting the gratu- ity, one might argue you should pay for the meal—it would be the “ethical” thing to do. Every day, police ofﬁcers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, probation ofﬁcers, and corrections ofﬁcers face situations where they must decide what is the ethical thing to do as What is Moralit y? 3 they go about their jobs: Should I use force against this suspect? Should I charge this defen- dant with every possible violation I can, in order to pressure her into accepting a plea bargain? Should I defend a client I know is guilty? As a judge running for reelection, should I accept campaign contributions from a political action committee (PAC) representing trial attorneys, some of whom may appear in my court? Should I overlook offenders’ minor violations of a probation order? Should I reward this inmate with special privileges in exchange for informa- tion about a planned escape? What’s the “right” choice, in moral or ethical terms, to make? Regardless of how you feel about the above situations, the point here is that our lives involve having to make choices about how we should behave. Sometimes those choices are trivial: Should we wear a white shirt or a blue shirt to work today, or should that new car we’re buying be red or black? At other times our choices can have potentially profound consequences for ourselves and others. For example, is it ever acceptable to lie to our spouse about an indiscretion in which we engaged, or treat another as the means to an end? It is those latter choices this book is most interested in, particularly as they relate to the behavior of criminal justice practitioners. In this chapter, I begin exploring morality and ethics as they relate to the criminal justice system and those working in it. The goal of the chapter is to give you a starting point for considering ethics and criminal justice and why ethics in criminal justice is important. Over my years of teaching courses on criminal justice ethics, I’ve found that many students do not know what ethics is; the difference between, or the relationship of, ethics and morality; what role personal values play in morality and ethics; or why ethical behavior by criminal justice practitioners is important. It’s not that students don’t care about these matters: they do, some very deeply. Most want to do the “moral” thing and act “ethically.” They’re just not sure what “doing the moral thing” or “acting ethically” entails. They need some guidance on how to tackle such matters so that they can “become more aware and open to moral and ethical issues” (Braswell, 2015, p. 7). So, to get started, let’s see what morality is, and what it entails. I’ll then examine ethics and the links between it and morality. I’ll conclude the chapter by examining how personal values relate to both morality and ethics, paying attention to the interaction among them in the context of the ﬁeld of criminal justice. WHAT IS MORALITY? In everyday parlance, people tend to think of morality as having something to do with “good” and “bad” or “right” and “wrong.” You might say, for example, that “everyone knows it’s ‘bad’ to lie, cheat, or steal.” Indeed, much of early childhood socialization cen- ters on learning about the difference between “good” and “bad” behavior: sharing toys with preschool classmates is “good” while grabbing a toy away from another child is “bad.” What children are learning is that society has rules, what sociologists call norms (Jackson, 1965). These rules, according to sociologists, make social order possible—we all can’t go around grabbing toys away from each other now, can we? Sociologists and anthropologists alike argue that some of these rules are formal, such as laws that are codiﬁed and involve formal social control mechanisms (the police) brought to bear against violators. Other norms are unwritten and are thus more informal and attend to matters ranging from rules about dress, etiquette, or marriage and procreation (Sumner, 1940). These culturally bound rules help members of the group learn what is “good” and “bad” behavior. 4 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS Importantly, the rules we learn are attached to various statuses we occupy during our lives. Sociologists have argued that a status is a position one occupies in a hierarchy of such positions, each of which has attached to it differing levels of power and prestige (Turner, 1988). For example, “college student” is a status in society that ranks relatively low on the hierarchy in terms of the amount of power and prestige associated with the position. However, compare the status of college student with that of “homeless person.” A signiﬁcant difference, yes? Sociologists also argue that a status can be either ascribed—you are born into the position and have little to no control over it—or achieved—you earn the position based on merit and/or your achievements (Crossman, 2016). In the United Kingdom, for example, Prince Charles occupies the ascribed status of “heir to the throne” due to the fact he was born into the royal family and is the eldest son of Queen Elizabeth II (to lose this status, he would have to abdicate the throne). By contrast, the prime minister of England (currently Theresa May) occupies an achieved status—she was elected to the position. Status also has a set of behavioral expectations associated with it that make interac- tion possible. For example, when you attend the ﬁrst meeting of a class at the beginning of a semester, you don’t expect the professor to come into the room, move into the corner, and stand on her head. Rather you expect the professor to introduce herself, review the course syllabus, answer questions, cover course policies, etc. Behavioral expectations that are associated with a status are known as “roles” (Giddens, 1993). What’s interesting is that while there are rules relating to a particular status that one occupies, such as a professor being discouraged (or even prohibited) from becoming romantically involved with a student, there are also rules that extend to all members of the group, regardless of an individual’s status. Returning to our example of “it is ‘bad’ to lie, cheat, or steal,” that rule covers everyone, regardless of status: mother, college stu- dent, professor, homeless person, or prime minister. Over the course of our lives, we learn not only the speciﬁcs of a larger “moral code” —the “don’t lie, cheat, or steal” business— but we also learn that particular rules of conduct are tied to the status we occupy at a given moment, for example the rules for a professor when meeting a class the ﬁrst day of a new semester. DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE MORALITY Norms thus provide us with a set of rules that govern our behavior. Morality, in turn, is tied to these rules. However, explicitly deﬁning morality isn’t that easy because philoso- phers have not adopted a consensus deﬁnition of the term. Rather, they tend to use the concept in either a descriptive or a normative manner (Gert & Gert, 2016). When using morality as a descriptive term, the philosopher is referring to codes of conduct developed and put forth by a group (e.g., Judaism) or codes accepted by an individual as binding on her behavior (e.g., a Hasidic Jew). When used normatively, philosophers are referring to morality as codes of conduct relevant only under speciﬁc conditions (e.g., a time of war) and would likely be agreed upon by most rational people (e.g., during war, the carpet bombing of civilian populations is morally wrong). Let me elaborate a bit on these notions. Descriptive and Normative Moralit y 5 Descriptive Definitions of Morality In the descriptive sense, morality involves group members identifying which rules of conduct that have been put forward count as moral codes. But you may be asking your- self, “What other rules are there? Aren’t all of the rules actually moral rules?” Sociologists and anthropologists alike agree that members of groups—even in small, homogeneous societies—distinguish rules along the following lines: morality, etiquette, law, and religion. Etiquette, Law, and Religion In many groups, etiquette may be considered part of the group’s moral code, although members generally view the rules of etiquette as less important than rules more central to the group’s overall moral code (Gert & Gert, 2016). In speaking of etiquette, the great English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) described it as “small morals” that involve “decency of behavior, as how one should salute another, or how a man [sic] should wash his mouth or pick his teeth before company,” which he distinguished from “the qualities of mankind [sic] that concern their living together in peace and unity” (Hobbes, 1994 , p. 56). However, note that etiquette is relative—its rules vary greatly across time, place, and group. Additionally, note that “there are no plausible con- ditions under which we could pick out the ‘correct’ rules of etiquette... that would be accepted by all rational beings” (Gert & Gert, 2016, p. 1). Thus, the rules of etiquette are not rules of morality. Unlike etiquette, law involves explicit written rules, relatively signiﬁcant penal- ties associated with violating them, and ofﬁcials responsible for interpreting the rules and administering the penalties (Vago, 2012). Law is also tied—either explicitly or implicitly—to morality, which is then used to evaluate the law and, potentially, change it. Thus, just because some behavior is lawful does not make it moral. Finally, while the morality of a group may be based on a speciﬁc religion (e.g., Islam), the two are not the same. If morality is a guide to conduct, then religion is about much more: stories and parables; supernatural beings and events; and exemplary humans (some- times called saints). Believers then use these components to explain or justify behav- ior required (or prohibited) by their religion. While there may be an overlap in the conduct prohibited or required by both religion and morality, in many cases religion requires or prohibits more than morality while also allowing some behavior that may be prohibited by morality (Gert & Gert, 2016). Even when morality is not regarded as the code of conduct that is put forward by a formal religion, it is often thought to re- quire at least some religious explanation and justiﬁcation. However, just as with law, some religious practices and precepts are criticized on moral grounds (e.g., a group’s practice or precept that involves discrimination based on race, gender, or sexual ori- entation). Thus, when “morality” is used in the sense that it is referring to a general code of conduct put forward by a group or society that is distinguished from etiquette, law, and religion, morality is being used in a descriptive sense. It is also being used in the descriptive sense when it refers to widely held attitudes of individuals. Just as one can refer to the morality of “the Americans,” so, too, can one refer to the morality of an American. 6 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS Normative Definitions of Morality When used in the normative sense, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional conditions, especially the condition of being rational (Gert, 2005). That a person meets these conditions is typically expressed by saying that the person is a moral agent (Gert & Gert, 2016). Thus, for many philosophers, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that applies to all who can understand it and adapt their behavior to it, even if it is designed to protect the larger group rather than individual members. These same philosophers also argue that in a normative sense, morality would never be overridden. A key point to make here is that philosophers differ on what is “rationality” and on the conditions whereby “rational” actors ultimately endorse the code of conduct that counts as “morality.” Normative deﬁnitions may also diverge on what it means to “en- dorse” a code. Finally, philosophers differ considerably regarding to whom morality applies—that is, exactly whose behavior is subject to moral judgment— and evaluations of the “rightness” or “wrongness” of others’ (and our own) behavior (see Willer & Simpson, 2017; I go into much greater detail on this point in Ch. 4). Thus, for some phi- losophers, “morality” applies only to those beings who have certain features of humans (e.g., fallibility and vulnerability) that make it rational for them to endorse morality. Others present morality as a guide to all rational beings, including God, even if they do not have human characteristics (Gert & Gert, 2016). For our purposes, then, let’s say that morality, in the normative sense, relates to a code of conduct that applies to all who un- derstand it and conform their behavior to it. Morality, then, refers to an all-encompassing code of conduct that applies to all ra- tional actors—what philosophers refer to as “moral agents”—who understand it and are willing to conform their behavior to it. The rules are taken as absolute and should not be overridden. The rules may be tied either implicitly or explicitly to etiquette, law, and religion although none of these, by itself, constitutes morality. To illustrate, Box 1.1 pres- ents examples of moral values—deep-seated and enduring beliefs that speciﬁc kinds of conduct or end-states of existence are personally and/or socially preferable—common to people living in the United States (Rokeach, 1973). If morality refers to an overarching code of conduct, then that code must specify how one should (or should not) behave. If, for example, a certain code of morality says that “lying, cheating, and stealing are wrong,” there must be justiﬁcation(s) for why those behaviors are wrong. Those justiﬁcations are found in the ﬁeld known as ethics, to which I now turn my discussion. BOX 1.1 Examples of Moral Values in the U.S. Do not gossip Tell the truth Do not vandalize property Have courage Do not have sex before marriage Keep your promises Do not cheat Treat others as you want to be treated Be trustworthy Do not judge Be dependable Respect others Be forgiving Keep your self-control Have integrity Source: Yourdictionary.com (2017) Metaethic s 7 WHAT IS “ETHICS?” Ethics, also known as moral philosophy, is one of several major branches of philosophy devoted to the systematic study of what is right and wrong, and is divided into three major areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics (Fieser, n.d.). To that, I am adding an additional subarea within applied ethics, what is called “professional ethics” (Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, n.d.). Figure 1.1 provides a schematic representa- tion of the ﬁeld. Metaethics involves the study of the origin, meaning, and logic behind the principles that shape ethics. Metaethicists examine abstract notions, such as whether there are universal truths; what is the will of God; what role is played by reason in making ethical judgments; and what is the meaning for self and others (Fieser, n.d.). Normative ethics tries to develop standards for morally acceptable conduct (e.g., “The Golden Rule”) and uses logic and reason to justify the standards (Kagan, 1997). Applied ethics examines speciﬁc controversial issues such as abortion, euthanasia, eating meat, or capital punish- ment (Fieser, n.d.). What’s crucial here is that applied ethics addresses questions about the right and wrong of speciﬁc behaviors, such as the state executing criminal offenders or the National Security Agency (NSA) “eavesdropping” on American citizens’ international phone calls. Using the guiding principles and tools of both metaethics and normative ethics, applied ethics seeks to resolve such controversial issues as abortion, capital punish- ment, and euthanasia, among others. I add professional ethics as a subﬁeld of applied ethics, as it is involved with developing rules or standards concerning the behavior of people who are professionals, such as doctors and lawyers (Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, n.d.). Let’s explore these areas in greater depth. METAETHICS “Meta” means above or beyond, so metaethics concerns itself with issues that are “beyond ethics.” What this translates to in practice is that metaethics concerns itself with the study of the meanings of the concepts or principles that are found in ethics. Ethics Applied ethics Metaethics Normative ethics (What’s the proper moral (Does morality exist?) (How should one behave?) action in this context?) Professional ethics (What’s the proper moral action by this practitioner under these specific circumstances?) F I G U R E 1.1 The Field of Ethics 8 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS Rather than attempting to show that a speciﬁc ethical orientation is “correct,” metaethics seeks to understand from where important concepts originated and what they mean (Fieser, n.d.). Put another way, metaethics “steps back” from substantive debates over questions such as “Can police use of deadly force against suspects ever be justiﬁed?” to ask about the views, assumptions, and commitments shared by those engaging in the debate (Sayre-McCord, 2014). Metaethics thus involves “reﬂecting on the presuppositions and commitments of those engaging in moral thought, talk, and practice and so abstracting away from... moral judgments” (Sayre-McCord, 2014, p. 1). Some philosophers suggest that at its most basic level, metaethics focuses on two principal issues: (1) determining if morality exists independent of human beings, (known as metaphysical issues), and (2) identifying the underlying psychological basis of moral judgments and the behavior in which we engage (identiﬁed as psychological issues) (Fieser, n.d.). Metaphysical Issues While there is no consensus among philosophers about what metaphysics means, for our purposes, let’s say that metaphysics seeks to understand why things exist at all—in this case, morality, the principles that guide it, and what it means for morality to exist in the ﬁrst place (Cline, 2016; van Inwagen & Sullivan, 2014). In metaethics, the issue is discov- ering “whether moral values are eternal truths that exist in a spirit-like realm, or [are] simply human conventions” (Fieser, n.d., p. 1). Some metaethicists argue that moral values are objective; that is, they exist beyond human conventions. They are absolute, eternal, and apply to all humans regardless of considerations like culture or time. For example, take the following equation: 2 + 2 = 4. The objectivist would argue that this mathematical relationship is timeless (as are others like it), it never changes, and applies everywhere. The objectivist would say the same of moral values. Like mathematical re- lationships, moral values are unchanging, universal, and eternal. Plato, for example, argued that mathematics and moral values were absolute truths that existed as abstract entities and originated in a spirit-like realm. Other objectivists argue that morality is a divine command that originates in God’s will, an orientation sometimes referred to as Divine Command theory (Fieser, n.d.). This theory argues that there is an all-powerful deity (“God”) in control of everything. It is the deity’s will that determines human moral- ity, revealed to humans as commands (e.g., “Thou shall not commit adultery”) or as found in sacred texts like the Christian Bible or the Jewish Torah (I explore Divine Com- mand theory in greater detail in Ch. 2). A different view held by some metaethicists denies the objective status of moral values (Mackie, 1977). While not rejecting moral values outright, these skeptics argue that all moral values are human creations. Known as moral relativism, this argument holds that people either create their own moral values and standards (“individual rela- tivism”) or that morality is grounded in the norms and values of the larger group or society of which individuals are a part (“cultural relativism”). Proponents of this orien- tation cite variability in moral values across cultures relating to such behavior as mar- riage, women’s rights, or cannibalism as evidence of these values being culture-bound (Harrison & Huntington, 2000). Metaethic s 9 Psychological Issues A second area of metaethics involves the psychology of moral judgments and behavior, particularly the question of why people are (or should be) moral. Psychologists suggest that people are moral for several reasons, including fear of punishment, desire for praise, to achieve happiness, to appear digniﬁed, or simply to “ﬁt in” with the group (Weir, 2012). Egoism and Altruism Researchers in moral psychology differ on what motivates people to be moral. Some scholars have argued that we are moral because doing so serves our own selﬁsh interests and desires (Asher, 2012). This orientation is best illustrated by the 17th-century philoso- pher Thomas Hobbes in his classic work Leviathan (Hobbes, 1994 ). In the book, Hobbes argued that selﬁshness motivates most human action. Even so-called charitable acts, like helping a homeless person or organizing a food bank, involve a reward, namely, exerting power over others. This view is known as psychological egoism. Scholars work- ing in this tradition have argued that all humans have an instinctual self-interest that motivates behavior (May, 2011). Others, while agreeing that selﬁshness drives much human conduct, have also argued that we have an inherent capacity to show benevolence toward others. This view is called psychological altruism; its proponents argue that in- stinctual benevolence motivates at least some of our actions (Farside, 2007). Emotion and Reason Suppose I was to make the following statement: “Police use of deception during interro- gation of suspects is morally wrong.” Is that statement rational or is it an expression of an emotional feeling? The role played by emotion and reason when making moral judg- ments is the basis of a second area of interest in moral psychology. On one side are schol- ars who agree with the great 18th-century thinker David Hume that moral judgments are based solely on emotion. In the above example, I can tick off any number of reasons why police use of deception is morally wrong, but such a list—by itself—is not a true moral assessment. Rather, my emotional reaction to police using deception is the actual basis of my pronouncement, not my list of reasons. On the surface, my statement about police deception appears to be a factual description of a common tactic used by the police. In reality it is not. When considered carefully, my statement contains two elements: (1) my personal disapproval about police deception (an emotive element) and (2) my trying to get the police to stop engaging in the behavior (a prescriptive element) (Fieser, n.d.). Other scholars, however, have rejected the notion that moral pronouncements and choices are based on emotion and have argued instead that moral assessments are (or at least can be) based on reason and are free from emotions and desires. Inspired by the great 18th-century Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant, these scholars have argued that morality is based on reason. If I make a statement that it is “wrong to steal someone else’s car,” I should be able to justify my claim with an argument. For example, I might say that stealing causes pain to the owner of the property; that it violates the owner’s property rights; or the thief risks being caught and punished (Fieser, n.d.). For these philosophers, moral decision-making involves offering the best reasons for one’s position rather than providing one’s emotional reaction to the behavior in question (I discuss the debate about emotion versus reason in moral thinking in greater depth in Ch. 4). 10 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS Male Versus Female Morality A third area of interest in moral psychology extending beyond debates about egoism vs. altruism or emotions vs. reason in moral decision-making is whether morality is grounded in a distinctly male-centered (patriarchal) view of the world (Held, 1993, 2006). Scholars interested in this area suggest that men and women have different moral compasses, shaped by their lived experiences. For men, morality is grounded in and shaped by their involvement with traditionally male-dominated activities, such as ac- quiring wealth, entering business-related contracts, and governing societies (Fieser, n.d.). Systems of rules needed for trade and governance then became the model for creating relatively rigid, rules-based systems of morality that stress rights and duties (Held, 1993). Women, on the other hand, develop their moral compass from experiences that involve them in childcare and nurturing of others, both of which are far less rule- oriented actions. Because these activities involve greater spontaneity and creativity, systems of morality arising from these experiences stress caring and nurturance over rules, rights, and duties. As a result, in the “male model,” the moral person performs the duties required of him and follows universalistic rules unaffected by circumstances. By contrast, in the “female model,” the moral person responds to circumstances in a caring and nurturing manner. Rather than being distant, the moral person allows cir- cumstances to touch them and uses creativity to respond in an appropriately nurturing fashion. Feminists (e.g., Held, 1993) have argued that a care-based system of ethics— concerned more with context and less with abstract rules—can either supplement “male-models” of morality or replace them entirely (I examine potential gender-based differences in morality in greater depth in Ch. 4). NORMATIVE ETHICS Normative ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to develop standards for morally ac- ceptable conduct (e.g., “The Golden Rule”) and justify those standards using logic and reason (Kagan, 1997). A key assumption guiding normative ethics is either: (1) there is a single criterion that determines moral conduct or (2) there are sets of criteria that deter- mine the morality of conduct (Kagan, 1997). Take the Golden Rule as an example. It consists of a single guiding principle against which the morality of behavior is compared: “Do unto others as you would have others do unto you.” By using this single standard, I am able— at least in theory— to decide whether any possible action is right or wrong, ranging from lying, to cheating, to stealing, to physically harming others. In other in- stances, sets of guiding principles, such as those involving good character traits or pos- sible consequences, become the standard for assessing morality. These lines of thinking are illustrated by three major systems of normative ethics, known as teleological ethics, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics. Teleological Ethics Have you ever been tempted to cheat on an examination in one of your classes? What helped you decide (either way)? If you focused on the possible costs (e.g., getting caught) and beneﬁts (e.g., achieving a high grade) of cheating, you focused on the potential consequences of cheating (or not). In doing so, you relied upon a teleological Normative Ethic s 11 system of ethics to decide what to do. Teleological ethics focuses on the potential outcomes of behavior, be they good or bad, to determine the ethics of the behavior (in Greek, the word telos means “end” or outcome of behavior). These theories ﬁrst became popular in the 18th and 19th centuries, when philosophers sought a quick and (rela- tively) straightforward way of creating standards for judging the ethics of any behavior. Consequentialist theories are attractive since one can readily “envision” potential out- comes of behavior. In the case of cheating on the test, you can easily envision earning either an “A” or an “F” on the test—each is possible. There are competing teleological theories of ethics; my focus here is on two of them, known as ethical egoism and Utilitarianism. One example of teleological ethics is known as ethical egoism. When determining whether behavior is ethical, this system focuses on the potential consequences of the behavior—good and bad—for the actor alone. If the potential negative consequences exceed the potential positive consequences, then the behavior is judged as unethical; if the opposite is true, the behavior is ethical. A second popular consequentialist theory is Utilitarianism, which holds that an action is moral if the possible positive consequences for everyone outweigh the possible negative consequences. As you will learn, the differ- ence between the two theories is one of emphasis. Ethical egoism stresses the conse- quences for the person engaging in the behavior as important to the acceptability of the behavior. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, stresses the potential consequences for all involved as the key to whether the behavior is judged acceptable (I examine teleological ethics in greater detail in Ch. 2). Deontological Ethics Humans are social animals. That is, we seek the company of other humans and organize entire social systems around the relationships that develop. Depending on the speciﬁc nature of the relationship you have with other humans—friend, sibling, son or daughter, colleague, stranger—you incur certain obligations or responsibilities to those people (in other words, when you occupy a status, certain obligations to others arise). In deonto- logical ethics (from the Greek deon, or duty), ethical behavior is not determined by the possible consequences of one’s behavior. Rather, ethical behavior is determined by ful- ﬁlling the obligations people incur to others because of their relationship with them (Fieser, n.d.). Deontological ethics is sometimes referred to as nonconsequentialist be- cause duties are obligatory, regardless of the consequences that might follow from an action. For example, from a deontological standpoint, it would be unethical for me to not care for my elderly, inﬁrm parents, even if doing so resulted in great ﬁnancial savings for my spouse and me. Two examples of deontological theories of ethics include those based on the writings of the 18th-century Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant and those relating to religious principles, referred to as Divine Command theory. Kant argued that that we have moral duties to self and others, but that there is one fundamental duty that is above all others, which he called the categorical imperative. This imperative—a command—says (1) treat others as ends, not as the means to an end, and (2) act in a way that you would want everyone to always act. Kant also distinguishes the categorical imperative from what he called hypothetical imperatives that relate to our desires, which he articulated as “if- then” statements, such as “If you want to earn an ‘A’ in this course, then you must work 12 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS very hard,” or “If you want a solid marriage, then remain faithful to your spouse.” Religious ethics proponents argue that morality is (1) dependent upon the character of one or more supreme deities (“God”) and (2) a function of obedience to God’s commands revealed to us through parables or stories, along with sacred texts like the Christian Bible, the Jewish Torah, or the Islamic Koran. Divine Command theory views the morally right action as one that God commands of us—and that we are thus compelled (have a duty) to follow. The speciﬁc content of these divine commands varies based on the speciﬁc religion and views of the divine command theorist, but all versions of the theory hold in common the claim that morality and moral obligations are based on God (I discuss deontological ethics in greater detail in Ch. 2). Virtue Ethics The above systems of ethics focus on behavior and using rules to determine whether some- thing is ethically permitted or not. While espousing different rules, each system’s rules are based on reason. Therefore, people can learn them because people can reason. A third major system of ethics, called virtue ethics, suggests that that developing good habits or character is the key to living a proper life (Timpe & Boyd, 2014). Among the proponents of virtue ethics are some of the greatest philosophers of all time, including Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas, all of whom argued that ethics is fundamentally related to character. Plato, for example, identiﬁed four core (or cardinal) virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Other important virtues include fortitude, generosity, self-respect, good temper, and sincerity. In addition to advocating good habits of character, virtue theorists hold that we should avoid acquiring bad character traits, or vices (e.g., cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity). Virtue theory also stresses that virtu- ous character traits develop through moral education, especially during childhood. Virtue ethics is among the oldest systems of ethics in the entirety of Western civilization, tracing its origins to ancient Greece (I discuss virtue ethics in greater detail in Ch. 2). Figure 1.2 summarizes the systems of normative ethics I’ve mentioned to this point. APPLIED ETHICS Under what circumstances is abortion morally permissible? What about physician-assisted suicide? Is human cloning morally acceptable? Is one morally obligated to help the homeless person begging for money on the street corner? Is eating meat morally permissible? These are just a few of the many thousands of questions that applied ethicists consider. Applied ethics is the third major branch of ethics and is devoted to analyzing moral problems and the moral permissibility of speciﬁc actions or practices in speciﬁc areas of life, including economics and business, medicine, and law and policy (Collste, 2012). The ﬁeld is distinct from other branches of ethics but is related to them in that it seeks answers to similar kinds of questions. The ﬁeld is also varied— there are many kinds of research projects in applied ethics, including in the following substantive areas (Mastin, 2008): Medical ethics: moral values and ethical judgments as they apply to medicine; Bioethics: ethical controversies brought about by advances in biology and medicine; Legal ethics: ethical controversies relating to the practice of law; Applied Ethic s 13 Normative ethics Systems of ethics Systems of ethics whose focus is whose focus is behavior character Teleological systems Deontological systems Virtue ethics (Consequentialist) (Duty-based) Ethical egoism Kantian ethics Religious ethics Utilitarianism (Divine command theory) F I G U R E 1. 2 Systems of Normative Ethics Business ethics: ethical principles and problems arising in business; Environmental ethics: ethical issues relating to the relationship between humans and the natural environment; Information ethics: ethical issues arising from computers and information technologies; Media ethics: ethical principles and standards for journalism, advertisement, and entertainment. One issue in applied ethics is which method or formula should be used to ﬁgure out the morality of a given practice, action, or policy (e.g., police use of deception to appre- hend drug dealers). One approach is “top/down,” where one starts with a normative theory, say, Utilitarianism, and moral actions are decided by the guiding principle(s) of that theory. One then assesses the action or practice using the principle(s) (Dittmer, n.d.). Another way is to use a pluralist approach, in which various moral principles are drawn from to decide the morality of the action or practice. A ﬁnal choice is to use moral particu- larism, which deﬁnes the moral status of an action not on the basis of moral principles, but rather on the basis of morally relevant factors as they occur in a speciﬁc context, for example, in medicine or in law (Dancy, 1993). In criminal justice, applied ethics might deal with the ethics of such practices as plea bargaining; with police tactics like proﬁling 14 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS and use of deception; or with judges running for election who accept campaign contribu- tions from attorneys likely to appear in their courts. Professional Ethics How often have you used the word “professional” to describe how someone acted while occupying a speciﬁc status, such as plumber, nurse, police ofﬁcer or architect? Meant to describe how well the individual performed his or her duties, in common parlance anyone can be a “professional.” The reality, however, is much different. As explained by Michael Losavio, Kathryn Siegfried-Spellar, and John Sloan (2016), sociologists distinguish among “jobs,” “occupations,” and “professions.” A job is simply a way of earning money to cover one’s basic needs, such as housing and food. In a job, the one doing the work may have little to no substantive interest in what he or she is doing, possesses minimal competency, and may be uncommitted to the position. An occupation, by contrast, involves much greater commitment to the work and the posses- sion of minimum competencies and skills. “Police ofﬁcer,” for example, is an occupation that (at minimum) requires one to possess a high school diploma (or GED) and success- fully complete a series of psychological and physical tests, graduate from a certiﬁed training academy, and endure a probationary period of on-the-job training. Finally, a profession involves entrance into an elite realm of work where the individual acquires specialized knowledge, training, and skills. Professionals engage in relatively autono- mous, client-centered work, and follow a code of ethics that governs their work-related behavior. Table 1.1 presents the distinguishing characteristics of the professions. TABLE 1.1 Distinguishing Characteristics of the Professions Characteristic Description Knowledge Specialized knowledge grounded in well-established theories and conceptual schemes that give intellectual coherence to specific facts and procedures; deeper and more sophisticated than that of an ordinary worker Training Specialized university-based training prepares individuals to be competent practitioners; university or professional school admissions policies and processes serve gatekeeping function Value of the Work Professional work is deemed of great economic and social value Relations with Clients Credat emptor (“let the buyer trust”), where the professional controls at least some aspects of the client’s behavior (e.g., “doctor’s orders”) Guidance of Professional Presence of a code of ethics that defines the key values of the profession and Behavior provides general guidance for its practitioners; provides a process for investigating alleged unprofessional behavior, and provides sanctions, including expulsion from the profession for violating the code Relations with Other Cooperative—professionals are participating in a common endeavor; Members of the Profession competition for clients is frowned upon; public criticism of a fellow professional is avoided unless it serves some higher good; competitive relations (e.g., lawyers involved in litigation) are governed by accepted standards of professional practice Level of Autonomy Very high Regulation Self-regulation based on established standards and practices and licensing by the state Source: Adapted from Volti (2012, pp. 153–156). Applied Ethic s 15 Professional ethics can be described as codiﬁed (written) sets of principles, stan- dards, or rules that apply to professionals. The principles that guide the behavior of speciﬁc professionals, say, lawyers (including defense attorneys and prosecutors), can be developed in two separate ways (Dittmer, n.d.). One way is to ﬁnd the key features of the profession and then, given these features, identify the major ethical issues associ- ated with them. A second way would be to develop the principles by starting with important historical (as opposed to hypothetical) cases and then drawing out moral lessons and principles from them. Once members of the profession have adopted the principles, standards, or rules they are typically incorporated into a written code of ethics. Codes of Professional Ethics Andrew Abbott (1983) has noted that professionals such as lawyers, doctors, or engineers have two obligations: those to society and those to clients. In the former case, the profes- sions have various service obligations to the larger society. Medicine, for example, has an obligation to help prevent and treat disease. Lawyers have an obligation to ensure justice is done. In case of clients, the professions have created rules— called “codes of ethics”— that outline members’ societal obligations and articulate proper behavior when interacting with clients and others. In effect, these codes create rules for those in the profession to follow as they go about their everyday work. In a classic study of professional codes of ethics, Abbott (1983) observed that they had several commonalities: (1) they are formally written and national in scope; (2) they are related to intraprofessional status (how members view other members and those outside the profession); (3) they stipulate an enforcement mechanism that includes dis- ciplinary proceedings and sanctions for violations; (4) they are applicable to individual professionals and to individual occasions of professional behavior, rather than regulating aggregate professional performance or conduct (e.g., costs of service, quality of results, etc.); and (5) they identify obligations toward fellow professionals, clients, and others, with obligations toward fellow professionals predominating. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIC S. Why are professional ethics important? One reason they matter is because most professionals have an informational advantage over their clients (Fisher, 2014). Because power imbalances between client and professional can be exploited to the professional’s advantage, a corresponding obligation—articulated in the code of ethics—is needed to ensure that the professional does not exploit the cli- ent’s trust. Such an obligation demands that the professional act in the client’s best, long-term interests and take all necessary steps to ensure transparency in the relationship by revealing actual or potential conﬂicts of interest that could harm the client. Thus, professional ethics function to identify moral hazards for professionals, and either pro- vide them appropriate strategies for avoiding them, or if they can’t be avoided, provide ways to work around them (Fisher, 2014). Second, professional ethics matter because most professionals are, at some point, new and inexperienced. Professional ethics for these individuals “represent a kind of collective, time-tested wisdom that is passed on to new professionals” (Fisher, 2014, p.1). Professional ethics warn those new to the profession what to watch out for and tell them what to do. In addition, as change occurs in law, technology, and professional norms, 16 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS evolving standards “will help keep professionals informed of new ethical challenges, emerging responsibilities, and best practices” (Fisher, 2014, p. 1). A third reason professional ethics are important is because they help serve as a “countervailing [balance] to organizational inﬂuence or the power of authority (say, from a supervisor or boss)” (Fisher, 2014, p.1). To illustrate, imagine an accountant for a successful company is calculating its quarterly earnings. Although accounting has a standard for calculating and reporting corporate earnings, there are also bosses who tell their accountants to “make the numbers work” to meet the earnings expecta- tions of Wall Street. Professional ethics remind the individual accountant of his or obligations beyond those of helping ensure the ﬁnancial success of the company (Fisher, 2014). Finally, professional ethics play a role in disciplining those who engage in unethical conduct. Professional associations, like the American Bar Association (ABA), that create codes of professional ethics typically include a formalized process for pursuing sanctions against practitioners who do not follow the rules and enforce a sliding scale of penalties, ranging from censure to expulsion, for those found in violation of the rules. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORALITY AND ETHICS Given what I’ve said to this point about morality and ethics, you may wonder how the two are related. Recall that, for our purposes, morality is an overarching code of conduct—a set of rules—that applies to all who understand the code and are willing to conform to it. Ethics, on the other hand, is the systematic study of what is right and wrong. An easier way to think about the two is this: morality refers to the customs, the special “dos and don’ts,” that most people in a group or society share and accept as the standard for behavior, whereas ethics refers to reﬂections on these rules, includ- ing justiﬁcations for them (Gammel, n.d.). For example, a speciﬁc group or society may have rules against lying, and stress that “honesty is the best policy.” Lying would thus be immoral. However, ethics might have a different take on lying, depending on which system of ethics and the guiding principle(s) consulted. For example, while a Kantian would agree that “lying is always wrong,” the Utilitarian would assess the possible positive and negative consequences of lying before reaching a conclusion about whether the behavior was wrong. Additionally, morality has been shown to change over time and place—it is culturally relative (Prinz, 2011). To illustrate, prior to the 20 th century in the United States, women were considered the property of their fathers and husbands; had limited legal rights; were limited in, or outright prohibited from, enrolling in certain professional schools, etc. Anyone who rejected these rules was considered “immoral.” Today, however, discriminating against women would not only be considered immoral by most Americans, but such discrimination would also be patently illegal (Amnesty International, 2017). From the perspective of ethics, discrimination against women would be wrong—regardless of time or place. What this means is that there is not always concordance between morality and ethics. While morality tends to be ﬂuid and variable over time and across place, ethics tends to be stable. Table 1.2 distinguishes some of the key features of morality and ethics. Moralit y, Ethic s, and the Criminal Justice Prac titioner 17 TABLE 1.2 Distinguishing Morality From Ethics Key Feature Morality Ethics Meaning Beliefs shared and rules followed by Guiding principles that help individuals members of a society or group as to what is or groups decide what is good or bad right or wrong behavior Root Word From the Greek word mos, which means From the Greek word ethikos, which “custom” means “character” Governed By Social and cultural norms Various systems/guiding principles Deals With Principles of right and wrong What constitutes right and wrong conduct Consistency Morality may differ from society to society or Ethics are generally uniform. group to group Expression Morality is expressed in the form of general Ethics are expressed as abstract rules and statements. principles Source: Adapted from Burhi (2015, p. 1). MORALITY, ETHICS, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTITIONER Many of you want to pursue a career in the ﬁeld of criminal justice, be it in law enforce- ment, as a defense attorney or prosecutor; in the ﬁeld of institutional or community- based corrections; in forensics, whether natural (e.g., drug chemistry) or digital (the identiﬁcation, recovery, preservation, and analysis of evidence stored on electronic equipment); or in research. Because many entry-level positions in the ﬁeld of criminal justice require a bachelor’s degree—at minimum—you’re pursuing an undergraduate degree in criminal justice or a related discipline like sociology or psychology to qualify for those positions. Assuming you’re successful in ﬁnding a position, you’ll end up work- ing in an agency setting, such as a municipal police department, county sheriff ’s depart- ment; or district attorney’s ofﬁce; in a regional crime laboratory; or with a federal agency like the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP). At that point, you’ll join millions of others working in the tens-of-thousands of agencies that make up the criminal justice system in this country. When you join the ranks of a criminal justice agency, you will bring with you a set of moral values—beliefs about right and wrong. Your values developed over time and have been shaped and inﬂuenced by your parents and friends; the community in which you were raised; your religious beliefs; and the law (Braswell, 2015). Additionally, one’s values may take two forms: terminal and instrumental (Rokeach, 1973). Terminal values refer to socially acceptable end-states or goals, such as trust or safety, and are close to the center of one’s core beliefs, whereas instrumental values are the preferred means, such as honesty or courage, to achieve socially acceptable ends (Conroy, 1979; Rokeach, 1973). Thus, the presumption here is that humans engage in speciﬁc modes of conduct to achieve desired end-states of being. For example, to be able to trust one another (an end- state) we do not lie, cheat, or steal from one another (preferred means). Milton Rokeach has argued that values are arranged into a value system that he described as “an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states along a 18 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS CASE STUDY 1.1 Discovering Personal Values After graduating from high school, I began working full time quit my job and enrolled full-time at a regional university as an automobile mechanic in a “mom-and-pop” service where I then spent the next five years earning a bachelor’s station (I had been working there part-time for about 18 and a master’s degree in criminal justice. I then pursued a months). I “clocked-in” six days a week at 2:00 p.m. and doctorate (Ph.D.) in sociology at a large research university “clocked-out” at 10:00 p.m. After a year or so on the job, I in another state, which took another four years. Why did I realized that, long term, I could never really be happy doing do this? Because as I made my way through college and this work. The reason for my dissatisfaction was probably began to “find myself,” I realized that serving others and that the all-boys Catholic high school from which I’d gradu- being independent were core values of mine. It thus made ated had as one of its goals to “create men for others” who sense for me to become a professor, as doing so would allow would “strive to be competent, religious, loving, open to me to serve others by helping educate young people and growth, and committed to justice.” Servicing cars to make train their minds, while also enjoying the enormous inde- my boss money while being paid just over the then-minimum pendence that came with the job. No more “punching wage hardly seemed to fit the bill. So, after three years, I clocks” for me! continuum of importance” (Rokeach, 1973, p. 15). Finally, some scholars have contended that the number of values of primary interest to people is small, but nonetheless enhances decision-making by providing socially approved standards against which one compares one’s actions (Ellwanger, 2015). Two of my values include service to others (an instru- mental value) and independence (a terminal value). But realizing this took some time and effort on my part, as explained in Case Study 1.1. Personal values are important, as they establish priorities in your life relating to career, marriage, children, politics, etc. They also will be the measure used to “take stock” of your life at various points and decide if it’s turning out the way you wanted. When what you do for a living and how you behave while doing it are in harmony with your values, you’ll feel satisﬁed. When there is disjuncture between them, you’ll feel that something is wrong, become increasingly unhappy, and may decide that a change is necessary (Ellwanger, 2015). THE NATURE AND SOURCE OF PRACTITIONER VALUES There’s an extensive line of research that explores the values of criminal justice practitio- ners and their impact on job performance. For example, Ellwanger (2015) has suggested that newly hired criminal justice practitioners (e.g., police ofﬁcers) bring with them speciﬁc values that those choosing careers outside the criminal justice ﬁeld do not neces- sarily possess. This occurs, in part, because criminal justice agencies actively screen for certain values (e.g., loyalty, conformity) held by prospective employees, and occupa- tional socialization reinforces these values, modiﬁes others, and replaces still others. What remains is a value system that ﬁnds expression in the practitioner’s attitudes and behavior. In effect, this system is imported into the agency. If this value-predisposition perspective is correct, which values are of importance for criminal justice practitioners? Research has identiﬁed several of them and described their sources (see Ellwanger, 2015). For example, conservativism and conformity are two key terminal values held by criminal justice practitioners, especially the police. Empirical The Nature and Source of Prac titioner Values 19 research shows that police work typically attracts individuals from a local area who are family oriented and have working-class (“blue collar”) economic roots. These individuals tend to see the world in “black or white” terms, have military experience (or come from military families), or come from families with members who are police ofﬁcers. These individuals see their work as being important (i.e., “having a point”) and having social signiﬁcance. Other values include a commitment to make the world a safer place (“the noble cause”), utilitarianism (where the good of the many outweighs the good of the one), and crime ﬁghting (which emphasizes questioning suspicious persons, making arrests, collecting evidence, and conducting interviews) (Ellwanger, 2015). Some schol- ars have even argued that police selection processes—with the polygraphs, drug tests, background investigations, and oral interviews—are speciﬁcally designed to screen out prospects who lack the above-mentioned values (Gaines & Kappler, 2011). You should understand that these values have historical, cultural, economic, and social origins. For example, believing that “catching the bad guys” is important has its ori- gins in individuals’ prior life experiences, their families, and in “long-standing American values that have favored the underdog,” the roots of which “are grounded in the idea that anyone can achieve the American Dream if they work hard enough” (Ellwanger, 2015, p. 52). These values are also the products of the perceived legitimacy of the law as it exists in a democracy and the perceived neutrality of its application. Finally, if the value- predisposition perspective is correct, social inﬂuences—especially those from popular media—affect practitioner values. Again, using the police as an example, media depictions of policing that stress crime ﬁghting by individuals with almost superhuman abilities using sophisticated high-tech forensic devices that allow them to identify criminals and pinpoint their motivations reinforce “crime ﬁghting” as the key role of police ofﬁcers, which in turn attracts individuals with such an orientation (Ellwanger, 2015). Further, media depictions of police ofﬁcers—along with other criminal justice practitioners—using “dirty means” to achieve “just ends” also inﬂuences the type of person drawn to the ﬁeld of criminal justice. The result of all these inﬂuences may be that criminal justice agencies “feel pressured” to recruit and screen prospective employees in a way that retains those having values that approve of crime ﬁghting and efﬁciency, rather than those possessing values that favor due process protections and shielding the innocent from the power of the state. An alternative view of criminal justice practitioner values is the values-learned perspective, which argues that terminal and instrumental values possessed by criminal justice practitioners are not imported into the agency, but are instead learned through a process of socialization and enculturation (Ellwanger, 2015).This perspective suggests that through socialization, an agency “fuses” the practitioner to the organization by providing him or her “the rules, perspectives, prescriptions, techniques, and tools neces- sary to participate in the organization” (Ellwanger, 2015, p. 54). This results in the prac- titioner experiencing an occupational career during which one both learns what is expected of one and “becomes” a practitioner in the sense of that identity becoming crucial to one’s sense of self. The Occupational Career of the Practitioner The occupational career of a criminal justice practitioner consists of several distinct stages (Ellwanger, 2015). The stages include choice, introduction, encounter, and meta- morphosis. “Choice” relates to what the profession has to offer individuals, including the 20 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS perceived importance and meaningfulness of the work, that is, the social beneﬁt it pro- duces, combined with job security and a relatively high salary with respect to the educa- tion requirements of the position. “Introduction” refers to the changes occurring in the recruit as he or she begins training and learning the skills necessary to do the job. Im- portantly, the novice learns what the job is “really like” and may begin experiencing a subtle shift in values during this phase of his or her occupational career. The high ideals and positive values brought to the job may begin to fade, replaced by distrust of the bureaucracy the novice encounters and the group loyalty and solidarity necessary to protect him or her from the hostilities of citizens and the administration of the agency for which he or she is working. The recruit’s views on proper behavior may shift as a result of “war stories” told by academy instructors and ﬁeld training ofﬁcers that may explain how the novice can obtain “freebies,” meet women (or men) while on duty, sleep on duty, and shirk responsibilities (Ford, 2003). “Encounter” describes the novice learning the difference between theory and practice, typically explained by a more senior ofﬁcer responsible for training the novice and evaluating the novice’s ability to do the job. Of note here is that the training ofﬁcer helps redeﬁne the reality of the work for the novice, much of which involves the mundane, and that only a few situations will involve “real” work, wherein danger is present and the rookie’s willingness to use force to tamp down the threat is tested. In short, the novice is learning that most of what he or she thought was going to be commonplace, such as ﬁghting crime, is rare. Finally, “metamorphosis” describes the psychological and sociological changes occurring in the new ofﬁcer as he or she reorganizes his or her identity around the new role, which means leaving behind former ties to civilians and becoming increasingly immersed in a new world where practitioners are the primary system of support and former friends, and even family to some degree, are less important. Table 1.3 presents these components along with explanations. The Moral Career of the Practitioner In addition to his or her occupational career, the criminal justice practitioner experi- ences what Lawrence Sherman (1982) calls a moral career: how the practitioner reacts to the values he or she has learned. The practitioner’s moral career involves the TABLE 1.3 The Occupational Career of the Criminal Justice Practitioner Stage Description Values Choice Desire and ability to become a member of Social significance of the position; desire the criminal justice field to fight crime and become a member of an “elite organization” Introduction Learning necessary skills and behavior Loyalty; conformity; solidarity; cynicism required to do the job for bureaucracy; distrust of superiors Encounter Bridging the gap between theory and Distrust of citizens, media, agency practice (doing the job for the first time) administrators; increased cynicism; disenchantment with profession Metamorphosis Individual achieves “full status” as Source of future transmission of learned practitioner and reorganizes sense of self values around the new role Source: Adapted from Ellwanger (2015, p. 56) The Nature and Source of Prac titioner Values 21 individual slowly rejecting the positive values that moved her to join the ﬁeld, while simultaneously beginning to accept and engage in behaviors contrary to agency, legal, and societal standards. Sherman’s notion of a practitioner’s moral career, in short, helps to explain how criminal justice practitioners may become corrupt (“bent”) over time. Sherman argues that one’s moral career consists of contingencies, moral experiences, apologia, and stages. “Contingencies” describe the work environment of practitioners that encourages or discourages adopting unethical (and potentially illegal) behaviors. A variety of factors help to shape contingencies, including level and type of supervision of the practitioner by superiors. Type of work is also important. For example, a police ofﬁcer working un- dercover with limited supervision, all things being equal, would be expected to be more likely than ofﬁcers in other situations to adopt unethical practices that go undetected because of the opportunities and temptations that come with working undercover. “Moral experiences” describe speciﬁc challenges to one’s morality, such as that occurring when one sees a colleague engaging in unethical or illegal conduct. Under such circum- stances, the individual must choose between allowing and/or taking part in the behavior or reporting the colleague and facing ostracism from other members of the ﬁeld. “Apologia” describe rationalizations that develop to explain away unethical or illegal behaviors to reduce the psychological or emotional discomfort they cause. Apologia are situation-speciﬁc and may vary depending on the nature of the behavior being rational- ized. Finally, “stages” describe the overall transformational process of becoming corrupt, of moving from being virtuous and ethical to becoming corrupt. Table 1.4 presents the stages of the practitioner’s moral career. Each of us possesses a core set of values, such as respect, dependability, or forgive- ness, arranged in a hierarchy. Those values, in turn, relate directly to our personal sense of morality, a personal code of ethics. That hierarchy includes the means we use to achieve a desirable end. For example, if we value respect, then when we meet others, we give them due consideration and treat them as worthy of our attention. When you become a criminal justice practitioner, you will not only bring a set of values to the new role you occupy (e.g., probation ofﬁcer), but also learn from others—probation ofﬁcials, police ofﬁcers, or judges—the values that are considered important to being a probation ofﬁcer (or a police ofﬁcer, prosecutor, forensic scientist, etc.). You may ﬁnd that others in the ﬁeld have values like yours, largely because existing recruiting processes actively seek people possessing them. As you begin your occupational career, you’ll be tugged in vari- ous directions and expected to engage in behavior that you may ﬁnd problematic, such TABLE 1.4 The Moral Career of the Criminal Justice Practitioner Stage Experiences Contingencies Factors associated with the type of work being done and level of supervision associated with the work that provide impetus for unethical behavior Moral Experiences Specific situations in which the practitioner’s morality is challenged Apologia Rationalizations for unethical/illegal behaviors Stages The overall progression from being ethical to becoming corrupted Source: Adapted from Ellwanger (2015, p. 63) 22 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS as using force or lying, to achieve some greater good. It’s important that you understand there are connections between the values one has, and the means chosen to achieve them. Such connections can be illustrated by examining two views on how the criminal justice system should work and the kinds of behaviors that system enables. VALUES IN ACTION: TWO MODELS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS The values that one brings into one’s role as a criminal justice practitioner has implica- tions for how he or she does his or her job. For example, if a core value held by police ofﬁcers is “conformity,” they may frown on behavior the larger community being policed may accept, such as drinking alcohol in public. One way to try and ensure conformity is through negative sanctions imposed on those engaging in the proscribed behavior. Thus, the ofﬁcer may choose to exercise his or her discretion and arrest people drinking alcohol in public. Indeed, one of the features of so-called broken windows policing is that minor, low-level offenses (such as public consumption of alcohol or social gatherings of small groups on street corners) will not be tolerated and will result in arrests being made (Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, 2013). The idea behind broken-windows polic- ing is that punishing minor violations of the law deters prospective offenders from engag- ing in more serious types of crimes (Kelling & Wilson, 1982). Much like a vacant house where a single broken window left unrepaired leads to further acts of vandalism that continue until the house is destroyed, so too is there a relationship between allowing minor offenses to continue unabated and an increase in more serious crimes. By sanc- tioning minor offenders, the community sends the message to prospective offenders that a single broken window will not go unrepaired (Taylor, 2001). Crime Control Model One illustration of the importance of values in the operation of the criminal justice system is found in The Limits of the Criminal Sanction by Stanford University law profes- sor Herbert L. Packer. In the book, Packer identiﬁes two “models” of the criminal justice system that he labels the “crime control” and “due process” models. The models are “an attempt to abstract two separate value systems that compete for priority in the operation of the criminal process” (emphasis added; Packer, 1968, p. 14). According to Packer, key instrumental and terminal values of the crime control model include the following: Crime repression. The repression of crime and enhancement of public order are the essential functions of the criminal justice system. Order is a basic necessity for a free society. Victims’ rights. The criminal justice system must protect the rights of victims throughout the process. Protecting defendants’ rights is of much less importance. Police powers. The police must have the power to investigate crimes, search and seize evidence, arrest citizens, and convict the guilty. Defendants’ rights minimized. Legal “technicalities” that constrain police powers, such as the exclusionary rule, Miranda warnings, etc., should be eliminated. Values in Ac tion: Two Models of the Criminal Justice Process 23 Efficiency. To maximize its efﬁciency, the criminal justice process should operate like an assembly line, where cases are moved along swiftly to a conclusion. Presumption of guilt. In the event a citizen is arrested and had charges ﬁled against him or her, the defendant should be presumed guilty because the outcomes of police and prosecutorial actions are highly reliable. Establish guilt. The primary aim of the criminal just process is to establish the factual guilt of the accused. Due Process Model Packer’s due process model consists of instrumental and terminal values that, in general, run counter to those found in the crime control model: Fundamental fairness. The primary goal of the criminal justice process is to ensure fundamental fairness in its interactions with defendants. Due process of law is paramount. Protect defendants’ rights. Police, courts, and correctional entities should concen- trate on protecting defendants’ and offenders’ rights, as the Constitution ex- pressly provides for such protections over those accorded to victims. Constrain the police. The power accorded the police should be constrained, as it too often leads to oppression of individual citizens. Accountability. Criminal justice authorities should be held accountable for protect- ing the rights of defendants and offenders, which ensures that due process of law is achieved. Criminal justice as an obstacle course. The criminal justice process should resemble an obstacle course, where procedural safeguards work as much to protect the innocent as to convict the factually guilty. Legal guilt established. Factual guilt is not enough to procure a conviction. Rather, defendants should only be found guilty if the government has properly followed legal procedures governing all stages of the criminal justice process from arrest to conviction. Packer (1968) explained that accepting one model or the other is a value judgment on our part that is not necessarily guided by logic or scientiﬁc evidence. One can argue that the crime control model emphasizes “conservative” values that stress maintaining order and safeguarding the public good, while the due process model reﬂects values that are associated with “liberals” and stresses placing checks on governmental power and also ensuring fundamental fairness for defendants. Packer also noted that the larger political climate inﬂuences which model is preeminent. For example, during the politically liberal 1960s and into the 1970s, through a series of landmark decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court created signiﬁcant checks on the power of the government to investigate, try, and convict its citizens of crimes. Thus, due process principles and policies were emphasized—and enforced—in the operation of the criminal justice system. Beginning in 1980, with the election of Ronald Reagan as president and con- tinuing through today, the country moved to the political right and, as a result, the values espoused by the crime control model have held sway. Which model is closer to the values that you espouse? 24 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS SUMMARY In this chapter, I introduced you to some foundational notions that will guide the rest of your journey into criminal justice ethics. As you’ve no doubt noticed, philosophy—along with sociology and psychology—have been very inﬂuential in identifying and describing these foundational issues. As your journey continues, I will again call upon these disci- plines to help guide that journey, keeping in mind that your journey will not only be one of self-discovery but also one of understanding the implications of what you discover as a prospective criminal justice practitioner. The chapter began by introducing you to the notion of “morality” and explaining that morality involves a set of rules (“norms”) designed to guide our behavior—to tell us what is “right” and what is “wrong,” acceptable and unacceptable. Sociologists and an- thropologists alike observe that some of these rules are formal, such as laws that are codiﬁed and involve formal social control mechanisms (the police) brought to bear against violators. Other norms are unwritten and are thus more informal and attend to matters ranging from rules about dress, etiquette, or marriage and procreation. These culturally bound rules help members of the group label what is “good” and “bad” be- havior. These rules are also attached to various statuses—the position one occupies in a hierarchy of positions that enjoy diverse levels of power and prestige—that we occupy over our lives. Finally, these rules help to make interaction possible by telling us what to expect of both self and other when meeting people in roles similar to, or different from, ours. I also argued that morality is variable, bound by time and culture. Further, I explained that ethics and morality, often used interchangeably in everyday life, are not the same. Ethics is a subarea within the larger discipline of philosophy and con- cerns itself with a number of different questions, including whether morality even exists (metaethics), how we should behave (normative ethics), how character inﬂuences proper behavior (virtue ethics), how to reasonably address controversial issues such as abortion, climate change, and capital punishment that generate so much conﬂict (applied ethics), and what constitutes appropriate behavior for those working in the professions (professional ethics). I also introduced you to several systems of ethics, including consequentialist, Kantian, religious, and Virtue, along with their guiding principles. These systems have served as the foundations on which Western systems of normative ethics have been built over several millennia, stretching all the way back to ancient Greece. I emphasized that al- though offering different justiﬁcations for how one should behave, these systems are based on reason (as opposed to emotion) and have at their core some semblance of logic. I then explored the role of values in morality and ethics, beginning with Rokeach’s seminal work on values, including what they are, how they are ordered, and the distinct types that exist. I discussed the sources of values seen in criminal justice practitioners and offered two different perspectives on where these values come from—that they are imported into the ﬁeld by those working in it or are learned through occupational so- cialization. Further, I illustrated how one’s values as a criminal justice practitioner may change over time as one’s occupational career and moral career play out. I also argued that values are important because they affect the way criminal justice practitioners go about their routines. I illustrated this point by reviewing the groundbreaking work of Herbert Packer, who characterized the criminal justice process as guided by two compet- ing sets of values—crime control and due process. Key Terms 25 Before moving forward with our journey into criminal justice ethics by learning more about the systems of normative ethics I introduced to you above, Thought Exercise 1.1 asks you to consider the ethical implications of the discretion that is exercised each day by police ofﬁcers, prosecutors, judges, and correctional ofﬁcials. THOUGHT EXERCISE 1.1 ETHICAL ISSUES AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE As you have likely learned in other criminal justice classes, discretion and its exercise are at the heart of how the criminal justice process—the various stages that begin with an arrest and continue post-conviction in American jails and prisons—operates. As a case winds its way through the process, at each stage an official must answer a basic question: What to do with this case? Police officers answer that question when deciding whether to issue a traffic citation to a motorist or arrest someone based either on a complaint filed by another citizen or on a warrant handed down by a court. Prosecutors do so when deciding what charges to bring against a defendant and how many charges to bring. Judges do so when deciding what sentence to give to a defendant who’s either been found guilty at trial or has pled guilty. Probation officers do so when deciding whether to seek revocation of a probation agreement when one of their charges misbehaves. But what, exactly, is discretion? Criminologists Shawn Bushway and Brian Forst have defined discretion in the context of criminal justice as “[the] latitude granted officials to act under a formal set of rules and in a public capacity” (Bushway & Forst, 2011, p. 1). The “rules” to which they refer are procedural laws relating to how crimes can be investigated, evidence seized, suspects arrested and interrogated, charges filed against them, etc. However, they make the point that even the most detailed rules “allow criminal justice personnel to countermand or contradict them” (Bushway & Forst, 2011, p. 1). Thus, there is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between what the rules say and how they are implemented. Bushway and Forst (2011) also point out that discretion may lead to disparity—instances in which similar cases are treated differently or different cases are treated similarly. For example, disparity in sentencing involves judges imposing different sentences on defendants in cases that appear the same on their merits or imposing the same sentence on defendants in cases that appear different on their merits. From the standpoint of ethics, the question is whether such disparity can be rationally justified, not on legal grounds but on moral grounds. For example, is it ethically permissible to punish offenders who have been convicted of distribut- ing “crack” cocaine more harshly than those convicted of distributing powder cocaine? Can the disparity in sentences created by certain types of “three-strikes laws” be justified? What about policies that mandate that individuals suspected of misdemeanor assault in cases of domestic violence be arrested by the police? These questions are a matter of ethics and, as you progress through this book, should be answerable using available information, your capacity to reason, and logic. KEY TERMS Morality 6 Utilitarianism 11 Ethics 7 Deontological ethics 11 Metaethics 7 Categorical imperative 11 Moral relativism 8 Hypothetical imperative 11 Care-based system of ethics 10 Religious ethics 12 Normative ethics 10 Divine Command theory 12 Teleological ethics 11 Virtue ethics 12 Ethical egoism 11 Applied ethics 12 26 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS Professional ethics 15 Moral career 20 Value-predisposition perspective 18 Crime control model 22 Values-learned perspective 19 Due process model 23 Occupational career 19 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Work with one or more partners and your argument(s). Present your results identify an example where morality to the class. Which approach was used and ethics might reach a different con- most/least often? clusion about how one should act in a 3. Find your school’s “code of ethics” for given situation, such as allowing an students and identify what the code abortion in a case of rape or incest. stresses as important—from the per- Present your results to the class. spective of ethics—to the role of “stu- 2. Pair off with another member of the dent” at your college or university. class and pick one area in applied ethics. 4. Can you identify other instances in Next, identify a key issue associated U.S. history when there was discor- with the area and debate the issue with dance between morality and ethics, one of you taking a “pro” side and the besides the discordance involving other taking a “con” side (even better, women’s rights? Explain. take the side with which you disagree 5. Work with a partner to determine if and argue its case). Identify which of there is an overlap between the occupa- the approaches mentioned in the chap- tional career of a criminal justice prac- ter (top/down, pluralist, moral particu- titioner and her moral career. Present larism) the two of you used to inform your ﬁndings to the class. RESOURCES Psychology Today’s website (https://www The American Psychological Association.psychologytoday.com/basics/ethics-and- (APA) has a website that is devoted to pro- morality) has a great list of resources on mo- fessional ethics for psychologists. The site rality and ethics including books, articles, includes the APA Code of Professional Ethics. blogs, etc. http://www.apa.org/ethics/resources/ REFERENCES Abbott, A. (1983). Professional ethics. Ameri- Braswell, M. (2015). Ethics, crime, and jus- can Journal of Sociology, 88, 855–885. tice: An introductory note to students. In Amnesty International (2017). Gender-based M. Braswell, B. McCarthy, & B. McCarthy discrimination. Retrieved from http://www (Eds.), Justice, crime and ethics (8th ed.).amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/women- (pp. 3–9). Waltham, MA: Anderson s-rights/gender-based-discrimination Publishing. Asher, L. (2012). Philosophy weekend: Burhi, S. (2015). Difference between morals Rebooting the argument against egoism. and ethics. Retrieved from https:// Retrieved from http://www.litkicks.com/ keydifferences.com/difference-between- RebootingTheArgument morals-and-ethics.html References 27 Bushway, S., & Forst, B. (2011). Discretion in Gaines, L., & Kappler, V. (2011). Policing in criminal justice. In B. Huebner (Ed.), Oxford America (7th ed.). Boston, MA: Elsevier. Bibliographies: Criminology. Retrieved from Gammel, S. (n.d.). Ethics and morality. Re- http://w w w.ox fordbibliog raphies.com/ trieved from http://www.philosophie. view/document/obo-9780195396607/obo- tu-darmstadt.de/media/philosophie_ 9780195396607-0083.xml nanobuero/pdf_2/ethicsportfolio/ethics_ Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy morality bwnewfont.pdf (2013). Broken windows policing. Retrieved Gert, B. (2005). Morality: Its nature and justifica- from http://cebcp.org/evidence-based- tion. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. policing/what-works-in-policing/research- Gert, B., & Gert, J. (2016). The deﬁnition of evidence-review/broken-windows-policing/ morality. In E. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford ency- Center for the Study of Ethics in the Profes- clopedia of philosophy (Spring Edition). Re- sions (n.d.). About the Center. Retrieved trieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/ from http://ethics.iit.edu/about c g i - b i n /e n c y c l o p e d i a /a r c h i n f o. c g i? Cline, A. (2016). What is metaphysics? Re- entry=morality-deﬁnition trieved from http://atheism.about.com/od/ Giddens, A. (1993). Sociology. Chicago: Univer- philosophybranches/p/Metaphysics.htm sity of Chicago Press. Collste, G. (2012). Applied and professional Harrison, L., & Huntington, S. (Eds.) (2000). ethics. Asian Journal of the Humanities, 19, Culture matters: How values shape human 17–33. progress. New York, NY: Basic Books. Conroy, W. (1979). Human values, smoking Held, V. (2006). The ethics of care: Personal, behavior, and public health programs. In political and global. New York, NY: Oxford M. Rokeach (Ed.), Understanding human University Press. values: Individual and societal (pp. 199–256). Held, V. (1993). Feminist morality: Transforming New York, NY: The Free Press. culture, society and politics. Chicago, IL: Uni- Crossman, A. (2016). Sociology concept spotlight: versity of Chicago Press. Achieved status versus ascribed status. Retrieved Hobbes, T. (1994 ) Leviathan (E. Curley, from http://sociology.about.com/b/2011/03/25/ Ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishers. sociology-concept-spotlight-achieved-status- Jackson, J. (1965). Structural characteristics of versus-ascribed-status.htm norms. In I. Steiner & M. Fishbein (Eds.), Dancy, J. (1993). Reasons. Oxford Blackwell. Current studies in social psychology (pp. 301– Dittmer, J. (n.d.). Applied ethics. In J. Fieser & 309). New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and B. Dowden (Eds.), Internet encyclopedia of Winston. philosophy. Retrieved from http://www.iep Kagan, S. (1997). Normative ethics. Boulder,.utm.edu/ap-ethic/ CO: Westview Press. Ellwanger, S. (2015). Learning police ethics. In Kelling, G., & Wilson, J. (1982, March 8). M. Braswell, B. McCarthy, & B. McCarthy Broken windows: The police and neighbor- (Eds.), Justice, crime and ethics (8th ed.) hood safety. The Atlantic. Retrieved from (pp. 47–71). Waltham, MA: Anderson. h t t p : // w w w. l a n t m. l t h. s e / f i l e a d m i n / Farside, T. (2007). The psychology of altruism. fastighetsvetenskap/utbildning/Fastighets The Psychologist, 20, 474–477. vaerderingssystem/BrokenWindowTheory Fieser, J. (n.d.). Ethics. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden.pdf (Eds.), Internet encyclopedia of philosophy. Re- Losavio, M., Siegfried-Spellar, K., & Sloan, J. trieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/ (2016). Why digital forensics isn’t a profes- Fisher, J. (2014). Why are professional ethics sion and how it can become one. Criminal important? Retrieved from https://www Justice Studies, 29, 2–20..quora.com/Why-are-professional-ethics- Mackie, J. (1977). Ethics: Inventing right or important wrong. New York, NY: Penguin Books. Ford, R. (2003). Saying one thing, meaning an- Mastin, L. (2008). Applied ethics. Retrieved other: The role of parables in police train- from http://www.philosophybasics.com/ ing. Police Quarterly, 6, 84–110. branch_ethics.html 28 AN OVERVIEW OF ETHICS May, J. (2011). Egoism, empathy, and self- Turner, B. (1988). Status. 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