Chapter 4: General Findings: Foreign Policy Crises PDF

General Findings: Foreign Policy Crises What have we learned about the Crisis-Con ict domain of world poli- tics—in particular, about the closely related but distinct phenomena, international and foreign policy crisis and interstate protracted con- ict? The ICB Project uncovered abundant evidence relating to its ve objectives, which were noted earlier in this book: 1. to illuminate foreign policy crises and international crises (interna- tional political earthquakes) since the end of World War I, along seven attributes and 10 dimensions; 2. to create and apply concepts, indicators, indexes, and scales to facilitate the measurement of severity and impact of crises as inter- national political earthquakes; 3. to discover which is the most and least stable of four structures of the global system during the past century—bipolarity, multipolar- ity, bipolycentrism, and unipolycentrism; 4. to enhance our knowledge and understanding of crisis manage- ment via qualitative case studies of how foreign policy-national security decision-makers coped with high or rising stress during the past near-century; and 5. to present a novel test of the validity of Neo-Realism as the optimal paradigm for the eld of World Politics among the many compet- ing claimants. © The Author(s) 2018 83 M. Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Con ict in the International System, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57156-0_4 84 M. BRECHER The most important nding, for both intellectual insights and for- eign policy choices by decision-makers of states attempting to cope with interstate crises, is that the evidence from 29 crises, below, many very important and highly stressful for decision-makers, seriously challenges two long-established beliefs about state behavior during interstate crises- international political earthquakes: fl fl fl fi fi rst, that high stress seriously undermines the quality of foreign pol- icy-national security decision-making—it does not; and fi fi CHAPTER 4 second, that the great diversity of crises and crisis actors leads to great diversity in crisis management behavior—it does not. Both of these conventional views are fundamentally awed, as will be evident in the qualitative case-study ndings presented below. So too were the related perceptions and foreign policies that derived from these two beliefs. dataset: 29 foreign Policy crises The qualitative, case study ndings in this book are derived from 29 in- depth studies of foreign policy crises for states which occurred within 23 international crises from 1935– 1936 to 2002–2003: they are listed here in chronological sequence, along with the international crisis of which they are an integral part, and the international system structure and region in which they occurred: Ethiopia, Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War 1935–1936, (multipolarity, Africa); Italy, Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War 1935–1936, (multipolarity, Africa); U.K., Munich Crisis 1938 (multipolarity, Europe); Netherlands, Fall of Western Europe 1939–1940 (multipolarity, Europe); USA, Berlin Blockade 1948–1949, (bipolarity, Europe); USSR, Berlin Blockade 1948– 1949, (bipolarity, Europe); Italy, Trieste II 1953 (bipolarity, Europe); Guatemala, Guatemala 1953–1954 (bipolarity, Americas); Hungary, Hungarian Uprising 1956 (bipolarity, Europe); 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 85 USA, Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval 1958 (bipolarity, Middle East); USA, Berlin Wall 1961 (bipolarity, Europe); India, China/India Border War 1962 (bipolarity, Asia); USA, Dominican Intervention 1965 (bipolycentrism, Americas); Zambia, Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 1965–1966 (bipolycentrism, Africa); Israel, June-Six-Day War 1967 (bipolycentrism, Middle East); USSR, Prague Spring 1968 (bipolycentrism, Europe); USA, Black September/Syria-Jordan Confrontation 1970 (bipolycen- fl fi fi trism, Middle East); India, Bangladesh War 1971, (bipolycentrism, Asia); Pakistan, Bangladesh War 1971, (bipolycentrism, Asia); Israel, October-Yom Kippur War 1973 (bipolycentrism, Middle East); USA, Nuclear Alert 1973 (bipolycentrism, Middle East); Syria, Lebanon Civil War 1975–1976 (bipolycentrism, Middle East); Argentina, Falklands-Malvinas 1982 (bipolycentrism, Americas); Iraq, Gulf War I 1990–1991, (unipolycentrism, Middle East); USA, Gulf War I 1990–1991, (unipolycentrism, Middle East) Yugoslavia (FRY), Kosovo 1999 (unipolycentrism, Europe); NATO, Kosovo 1999 (unipolycentrism, Europe); Iraq, Iraq Régime Change/Gulf War II 2002–2003 (unipolycentrism, Middle East); USA, Iraq Régime Change/Gulf War II 2002–2003 (unipolycentrism, Middle East). The ndings from these 29 foreign policy crises served as the database for the following qualitative analysis of state behavior during the high- stress crisis period of international political earthquakes from 1935–1936 to 2002–2003. context diMensions An array of dimensions is represented in this cluster of cases: Geography—Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, Inter- Region; Time—eight of the nine decades of the post-WW I era; System Structure—multipolarity, bipolarity, bipolycentrism, unipolycentrism; 86 M. BRECHER Con ict Setting—protracted con ict, non-con ict; Bloc Alignment—inter-bloc, intra-bloc, non-bloc; Peace–War Setting—non-war, pre-war, war; (intra-war crises [IWCs] are excluded); Intensity of Violence—no violence, minor clashes, serious clashes, war; Power Level— major powers, middle powers, minor powers, mixed major/minor power, mixed middle/minor power; Economic Level—developed, developing, developed–developing; Political Regime—civil authoritarian, military, democracy, democracycivil authoritarian, democracy-military. The ndings below will focus mainly on key attributes of crisis actors, framed in the form of research questions: fl fl fi fi fl What was the catalyst or trigger to the onset of a state’s foreign policy crisis? Who was the triggering entity? How long did a crisis last, that is, what was its duration? How many decisions did the crisis actor make in the peak stress crisis period? Who were the decision-makers? What was their psychological framework for de ning the situation, that is, their attitudinal prism? What was the most basic value(s) that they perceived to be at risk? Can any patterns be discerned? First, I turn to the contentious issue of the preferred method for analyzing these ndings. Methodology in case studies: an unresolved deBate The question of case-selection criteria and the larger topic of methodology in qualitative research has been the object of continuing debate in politi- cal science, especially in the past 25 years. King, Keohane, and Verba [KKV] crystallized the criticism of single or few case studies as a valid basis for generalization and theory construction, in their Designing Social Inquiry: Scienti c Inference in Qualitative Research (1994, Chap. 4). Several scholars responded with criticism of the King, Keohane, and Verba volume: their articles are reprinted in Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (2004). 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 87 For the purpose of evaluating the qualitative case-study ndings below, the relevant issue is whether the case selection for this study of international political earthquakes meets the optimal criteria for quali- tative research. The King, Keohane, and Verba volume provides several instances of defective qualitative research design. fi Multicollinearity—any situation where it is possible to predict one explanatory variable from one or more of the remaining explana- tory variables, that is, perfect correlation between two explanatory variables. A set of 29 cases demonstrate that fi 2. fi More explanations (inferences) than cases. KKV argue that the num- ber of observations (cases) must be larger than the number of explanations. They criticize Alexander George’s method of ‘struc- tured focused comparison’ because it might lead to more expla- nations than observations. The large number of observations in this study of international political earthquakes (29), with a much smaller number of possible explanatory variables (10), clearly over- comes this problem. fi 1. no such perfect corre- lation exists between any 2 of the 10 explanatory variables. 3. A suf cient number of observations—KKV emphasize the need to enlarge the number of observations, that is, cases (N) as much as possible. It is doubtful that any other project in International Relations/World Politics is based on a larger number of in-depth cases (29). 4. Limiting the number of explanatory variables—‘not to explain a lot with a lot.’ As long as the number of explanatory variables is sig- ni cantly lower than the number of observations, which is the case in this project (10 and 29), this criterion is met. 5. Randomness and intentional selection—KKV contend that, in a rel- atively small N of existing observations (cases) for qualitative study, random selection can cause serious problems, notably a risk of missing crucial cases. Further, they argue that an intentional selec- tion after some knowledge of the cases has been acquired, to avoid selection bias, is a better method of selection. This is the selection method exercised in this project. 6. Avoiding selection bias—KKV emphasize that it is important to avoid a selection of a cluster of cases that con rm the favorite hypothesis, although other cases might disprove it. The large N of observations—for a qualitative study (29) and the variation in 88 M. BRECHER a much smaller number of explanatory variables (10)—overcome this problem. 7. Selection bias on the dependent variable. This too does not pose a problem in this project: coping with high stresscrisis management behavior might vary between the observations and the number of cases. Moreover, the qualitative segment of this inquiry into international crises during the past near-century (late 1918–end 2015 meets the KKV rules for intentional selection of observations). Rule 1 Rule 2 fi fi fi selecting observations on the explanatory variables—to ensure variation in the values of the explanatory variables; this require- ment is met. selecting a range of values of the dependent variable—to avoid selection of cases with no variation on the value of the dependent variable; this requirement, too, is met. In sum, the research design and case selection in this inquiry meet the criteria of King– Keohane–Verba for optimal qualitative research in politi- cal science. The problem of indeterminate research design is not present in this project. The intentional selection of a large number of cases, the smaller number of explanatory variables, and variation in both the explanatory and dependent variables meet all the requirements speci ed by KKV for a superior qualitative research design. Two relevant chapters in the Brady and Collier volume discuss the issues of case selection and selection bias. Both Rogowski and Collier et al. argue in favor of selecting cases with extreme values on the depend- ent variable: these abnormal cases, they contend, can refute a theory or re ne a theory, and account for the difference between selection bias across cases and within one case. This opposition to the King–Keohane– Verba premises is relevant only when choosing a single case study or a very small N of cases, but it is not relevant to qualitative research in this inquiry, with its substantively larger N Dataset, 29 cases. Critics of the King–Keohane–Verba approach to qualitative research, in Brady and Collier, Preface, Chaps. 1 and 13, have alleged serious aws. First, the KKV volume “does not adequately address the basic weaknesses 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 89 within the mainstream quantitative approach it advocates.” Further, its “treatment of concepts, operationalization and measurement” are “seri- ously incomplete.” Third, the “claims that it provides a general framework for ‘speci c inference in qualitative research’” is rejected. More generally, contributors to the Brady–Collier critique deplore the “failure to recog- nize the distinctive strengths of qualitative methods” and their tendency to “inappropriately view qualitative analysis almost exclusively through the optic of mainstream quantitative methods.” A more forceful criticism of the King–Keohane–Verba approach to qualitative case studies was expressed by George and Bennett (2004: Chap. 1, especially pp. 10–16, and Chap. 8)....we nd it necessary to qualify DSI’s [Designing Social Inquiry’s] argu- ment that there is one ‘logic of inference’.... If...the logic of inference refers to speci c methodological injunctions on such issues as the [nega- tive] value of single-case studies, the procedures for choosing which cases to study, the role of process-tracing, and the relative importance of causal effects...and causal mechanisms as bases for inference and explanation... then we disagree with the overall argument. We also critique DSI for emphasizing almost exclusively the epistemic goal of hypothesis testing...the ‘logic of con rmation,’ neglecting other aspects of theory development such as the formation of new hypotheses or the choice of new questions to study. fi fi fl fi fi fi fi fi Another concern is that DSI pays little attention to problems of causal complexity, particularly equi nality and multiple interaction effects. On the methodological level, we take issue with DSI’s arguments on case selection criteria, the value of single-case studies and ‘no variance’ research designs, the costs and bene ts of increasing the number of cases studied, and the role of process-tracing.... DSI’s arguments on all these methodological issues may be appropriate to statistical methods, but in our view they are ill- suited or even counterproductive in case study approach. (10–15) It will be clear, from the following analysis of 29 international political earthquakes, many of them among the high-pro le, signi cant interstate crises in the past near-century, where I stand in this contentious, and at times acrimonious, methodological debate. 90 M. BRECHER general findings on attriButes of foreign Policy crises Trigger Eight of the nine types of trigger [catalyst] to crisis onset are repre- sented in the group of 29 foreign policy crises since the 1930s that were selected for in-depth research. The largest cluster of triggers was verbal acts (8 cases), e.g., Ethiopia (Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War 1935–1936). This was followed by political and non-violent military acts (5 crises each), e.g., Zambia (Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence [UDI] 1965– 1966), and Argentina (Falklands-Malvinas 1982), respec- tively; 3 cases of indirect violent acts, e.g., Syria (Lebanon Civil War 1975–1976); 3 cases of economic acts; 2 cases of external change; and 1 case in each of two other trigger categories, other nonviolent act, and internal physical or verbal challenge to régime. The most striking nding on crisis triggers is thus pervasive diversity. Triggering Entity The evidence also reveals a very broad range of triggering entities: 12 states (China, Egypt, Germany, India, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Rhodesia, the U.K., the USA, the USSR, and Yugoslavia); multi-state, non-state actor, international organization—League of Nations and United Nations— and military alliance—NATO, as triggering entities. Most of these catalyzed one crisis each, but several were multiple triggering entities: multi-state, 4 cases, e.g., the USA, the U.K., and France triggered a for- eign policy crisis for the USSR (Berlin Blockade 1948–1949); non-state actors, 4 crises, e.g., for the USA (Dominican Intervention 1965); for Iraq and the USSR, 3 crises each, e.g., the former catalyzed a crisis for the USA (Gulf War I 1990–1991), the latter, a crisis for the USA (Berlin Wall 1961); and 3 states catalyzed two crises each, e.g., Germany trig- gered a foreign policy crisis for the U.K. (Munich 1938), Yugoslavia trig- gered a crisis for Italy (Trieste II 1953), and the USA, for Iraq (Gulf War II 2002). In sum, like triggers, the triggering entities in the 29 foreign pol- icy crises exhibit great diversity. 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 91 fi fi fi fi Duration Duration, in this project, is calculated from the beginning of the peak stress crisis period to the end of the entire foreign policy crisis for a state. There was only one short case (1– 14 days) among the 29 foreign policy crises that were explored in depth—the USA in the 1973 Nuclear Alert crisis (1 day). Three cases were of medium duration (15–30 days), e.g., the U.K. (Munich), 19 days. The long (31–182 days) and very long cat- egories (more than 182 days) are more numerous: the former, 17 cases, e.g., India (China–India Border 1962), 138 days; and the latter, 8 cases, e.g., Ethiopia (Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War), 331 days. On this crisis attribute, too, diversity is conspicuous. Several traits of duration are noteworthy. First, the range of for- eign policy crises is vast, from 1 day (the US Nuclear Alert) to 331 days (Ethiopia—Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War). Second, the over whelming majority of the 29 foreign policy crises were long or very long, 59% and 28%, respectively. Parenthetically, this is similar to the distribution of all crises in the ICB Dataset, long (43%) and very long (29%). Third, there is great variation among the crises of individual states: USA (8 cri- ses)—1–322 days; the USSR (2 crises) —114–320 days; Iraq (2 cri- ses)—135–210 days; Italy (2 crises)—57–118 days, etc. Fourth, there is no discernible pattern in the duration of these 29 crises—by region, system structure, con ict setting, power level, economic level, political régime type, or any other crisis dimension. In sum, the most conspicuous trait of duration in this cluster of foreign policy crisis case studies, too, is diversity. Decisions The number of strategic or tactical, that is, important decisions in the high-stress crisis period ranges from 1 (the USA in its 1973 Nuclear Alert crisis, during the October-Yom Kippur War), to 13 (the USSR, in the 1968 Prague Spring crisis). There were 12 cases at the high end of the number of important decisions, including Guatemala in the 1953– 1954 Guatemala crisis, and the USA in the 1965 Dominican Intervention crisis, 11 decisions each; Israel, 10 decisions, in the 1973 October-Yom Kippur crisis-war; the U.K., 9, in the 1938 Munich crisis; 92 M. BRECHER 5 cases with 8 decisions in the high stress crisis period, e.g., Zambia, Rhodesia’s UDI crisis 1965–1966; and 3 cases with 7 decisions, e.g., Italy, Trieste II. There were also crises with 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 decisions. In sum, the number of important decisions, too, reveals great diversity. Decision-Makers fl The number of key decision-makers was small in most of the 29 in- depth cases: 1 preeminent decision-maker in 10 crises, e.g., Mussolini (Italy) and Emperor Haile Selassie (Ethiopia), Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War, Stalin (USSR), Berlin Blockade; 2 principal decision-makers in 4 crises, e.g., Nehru and Defense Minister Krishna Menon (India), China- India Border War; 3 decision-makers in 2 crises, e.g., the USA, Berlin Blockade (President Truman, Secretary of State Marshall and General Clay, Military Governor of the US zone in Germany and Commander of US forces in Europe, 1945–1949); 4 decision-makers in 5 crises, e.g., Pakistan, Bangladesh War 1971 (President-General Yahya Khan, Generals Pirzada and Hamid, and Z.A. Bhutto, a political leader of West Pakistan, later prime minister of the truncated Pakistan). There were 2 cases with 5 decision-makers; 1 case with 6 key decision-makers; 2 cri- ses with 8; 1 with 9; 1 case with 16 decision-makers—the leaders of all 16 members of NATO, in the Kosovo crisiswar 1998–1999; and 1 cri- sis with 21 decision-makers—Israel’s seven party/faction National Unity Government, the June 1967 crisis-war. Moreover, most of the crisis actors (states) in the 29 case studies moved to a larger decision-making group at some point in their crisis, and diversity is conspicuous in this context. In sum, the enlarged decisional forums point to diversity in this crisis actor attribute as well. Attitudinal Prism Diversity is also pronounced in the attitudinal prism of crisis decision- makers, that is, the lens through which their perceptions were ltered, which, in turn, shaped their behavior; for examples, The U.K., Munich 1938—peace was the highest value, appeasement was preferable to war, and Hitler was trustworthy; 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 93 Guatemala, Guatemala 1953–1954—“Yankee imperialism” would not tolerate a socialist régime in the Americas, and US military strength was vastly superior; Hungary, Hungarian Uprising 1956—an internal upheaval was threatening the Communist régime in Hungary, and Moscow’s opposition to basic reform was certain; Israel, October-Yom Kippur War 1973—the awed “Conception” held by Israel’s political and military elites: Egypt would not launch a war against Israel without suf cient air power to dislocate Israel’s air elds, a capability which Egypt lacked; Syria would not initiate war without the active involvement of Egypt; ergo, the frontline Arab states lacked a military option. In sum, there were almost as many attitudinal prisms as the number of crises! Values All but 2 of the 8 types of threatened values uncovered in ICB research are represented in the 29 cases: In uence [14 cases], e.g., the USA (Nuclear Alert crisis, during the October-Yom Kippur Crisis-War), the USSR (Prague Spring), Syria (Lebanon Civil War), and Iraq (Gulf War I); fi fl fi fi fl Territory [5 cases], e.g., Italy (Trieste II); Political [3 cases], e.g., Iraq (Gulf War II); Existence [3 cases], Ethiopia (Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War), the Netherlands (Fall of Western Europe 1939–1940), and Israel (JuneSix-Day War); Economic [2 cases], e.g., Zambia (Rhodesia’s-UDI crisis); and Other [2 cases], U.K. (Munich), and NATO (Kosovo). As evident, threat to in uence was the primary threatened value in almost half of the indepth cases (14 of 29), including most of the US cri- ses. The second most frequent value was a threat to territory, 5 cases—2 in Asia, 2 in Europe, 1 in the Americas. And the core value, existence, was present in slightly more than 10% of the 29 cases, 1 in Africa, 1 in Europe, and 1 in the Middle East. In sum, diversity is pronounced among the values perceived to be at risk, as with all the other actor attributes discussed above. 94 M. BRECHER findings on coPing—crisis ManageMent In general, decision-makers of states confronted with national security cri- ses employ one, some or all of four coping mechanisms to deal with esca- lating stress in the crisis period of a foreign policy crisis. They seek and process information—about their principal adversary’s intentions and capa- bilities, the attitudes of potential allies and patrons, and the adversary’s allies and patrons. They consult their military and bureaucratic special- ists, opposition political leaders, allies, patrons, and international organi- zations. They create an ad hoc, or employ an existing, decisional forum. And they search for, and consider, alternatives prior to making decisions. What does the evidence from the 29 in-depth case studies reveal about coping/crisis management? Information Processing The decision-maker(s) in almost all (27 of 29) cases felt the need for, and sought, information about the crisis that they confronted: decision-mak- ers in almost all of the foreign policy-national security crises manifested a felt need—and engaged in a quest— for more information about: the gravity of the perceived threat, that is, the intent, capability and resolve of their adversary; the time available for response; the probability of war; the extent and reliability of support—military, political, diplomatic and/ or economic—that could be expected from allies, a patron or patrons, and/or international organizations, the options available to cope with the threat, and the most likely outcome of the crisis. fl At the same time, information processing varied; that is, it did not unfold in an identical way, robot-like, by the decision-maker(s) of the target states. Some were more, others less, actively engaged in the search for informa- tion than others. Some were more trustful, others less trustful, of the sources and content of information. Some were more, others less, success- ful in processing often contradictory information. However, the evidence of a near-universally shared attitude to information—a felt need and quest for more—and the processing, as well as the rapid transfer, of information to the most senior decision-makers—is compelling. In this respect, the multiple diversities among crisis attributes and crisis dimensions were irrelevant, for they were subsumed in the commonality of the challenge faced by decision- makers, all of whom experienced escalating stress with the escalation of threat, time pressure, and the higher likelihood of military hostilities. 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 95 Consultation Consultation by decision-makers during the peak stress crisis period of most foreign policy crises was broader and more intense than in the pre- crisis period; that is, its scope and depth correlated with the intensity of the crisis and the stress generated in the precrisis period (low stress) and crisis period (high stress). There were several notable exceptions: Ethiopia and Italy in the 1935–1936 Ethiopian [Abyssinian] crisis-war, the USSR in the Berlin Blockade and the Prague Spring crises, Iraq in Gulf War I and Gulf War II (Iraq Regime Change), and Yugoslavia in the Kosovo crisis. The explanation is simple: in all of these cases, an authoritar- ian regime was in power. In most of them, one person was pre-eminent in terms of decisional in uence and authority—Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, Mussolini in Italy, Stalin in the USSR (in 1948), Saddam Hussein in Iraq (both Gulf War cases), and Milosevic in Yugoslavia, the FRY. The USSR continued to be authoritarian in 1968, but it was the Communist party leadership, not an individual, that held power. In all other cases, the escalation of stress led to a broadening and deepening of the consultation process. Decisional Forum The ndings on decisional forums during the peak stress crisis period of the 29 foreign policy crises are mixed: 15 of the 29 cases exhibit no change from the low-stress pre-crisis period—Ethiopia (1935–1936), Italy (1935–1936 and 1953), the USSR (1948–49 and 1968), the USA (1961, 1973, 1990– 1991 and 2002–2003), India (1971), Pakistan (1971, Argentina (1982), Yugoslavia (1998–1999), and Iraq (1990–1991, 2002– 2003); 9 of the 15 were authoritarian regimes of various types— monarchical, Fascist, Communist, military, and Ba’athist; the other 6 were democratic; 9 cases witnessed an enlarged decisional forum— the U.K. (1938), the Netherlands (1940), India (1962), the USA (1965), Zambia (1966), Israel (1967 and 1973–1974), Syria (1975–1976), and NATO (1998–1999); 7 of the 9 were demo- cratic; and 5 cases experienced a smaller decisional forum—the USA (1948–1949, 1958, and 1970), Guatemala (1954), and Hungary (1956); 4 of 96 M. BRECHER fl fl fi the 5 were democratic (one of them with prominent communist in uence), and 1 was communist. search for, and consideration of, alternatives Because of the centrality of this coping mechanism for crisis decision- making, writ large, the search for, and consideration of, alternatives in all 29 selected foreign policy crises will be reported below. Multipolarity Ethiopia (1935–1936) The emperor was open to—and pursued—sev- eral options during the Ethiopia–Italy crisis-war. One, actively imple- mented by Ethiopia’s ruler, Haile Selassie, was to appeal to the League of Nations and the European powers, especially Britain, for needed diplomatic and great power support in its existence crisis. A second option, which the Emperor was cautious about initiating because of the uncertain loyalty of Ethiopia’s autonomous rases (kings), was to mobilize Ethiopia’s human and material resources to confront the anticipated Italian military assault. A third option, which he also pursued, on the advice of “La Trinité,” his three foreign advisers, was concessions to Italy. Although his preferred option was the status quo ante, war was the least attractive alternative. Thus he did not exclude direct negotiations with Italy but faced unacceptable demands, in essence, total surrender. In the hope of avoiding a full- scale Italian invasion, Haile Selassie accepted—but Mussolini rejected—a British-French concessions plan, drafted without consulting Ethiopia, that would have given part of the vast Ogaden Desert and far-reaching eco- nomic privileges to Italy, drastically reducing Ethiopia’s sovereignty. Italy (1935–1936) Mussolini did not seriously consider any alternative to invasion—he was bent on conquering Ethiopia. His only worry was that the United Kingdom might decide to impose economic sanctions. He gambled, correctly, that Britain would not intervene militarily, which would have been devastating for Italy. He even rejected the very favorable British-French Hoare–Laval Plan of December 9, 1935, in the midst of war, calling on Ethiopia to cede to Italy three areas bordering Italy’s East Africa colonies, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland, and to grant Italy exclu- sive economic rights in large parts of southern Ethiopia. In sum, while 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 97 rejecting, a priori, all alternatives to invasion, he sought the optimal diplomatic tactics to avoid a confrontation with Britain and France. fi United Kingdom (1938) Many options were considered, and several were adopted, by the United Kingdom during the rising stress phase of its Munich crisis period: cooperation with Germany, implemented by Prime Minister Chamberlain at his three summit meetings with Hitler in Germany (at Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich); cooperation with France, expressed in their Joint Proposals of September 18, 1938, signaling Britain’s intention to stand by France and support Czechoslovakia, if invaded by Germany; mobilization of the British navy; the use of Mussolini as a mediator; and ultimately, the sacri ce of Czechoslovakia (appeasement). Netherlands (1939–1940) Many options were adopted and imple- mented (some in its pre-crisis period) : proclaiming a state of war sta- tus in March 1939; mobilization in August; a declaration of neutrality in September; a diplomatic offensive in London, Paris, and Brussels to rein- force its claim to neutrality, beginning in November 1939; and intensi- ed low-level military consultations with France and the United Kingdom, starting in January 1940. During the higher stress crisis period, the Netherlands proclaimed a state of siege, including the cancelation of all leaves in Holland’s army, in April 1940, and set in motion active military steps, notably the blowing up of bridges, in response to the German inva- sion on May 10. Bipolarity United States (1948–1949) Several high-risk alternatives were consid- ered during the United States’ Berlin Blockade crisis period: planned with- drawal from West Berlin, rejected as unworthy; the dispatch of a train with American troops aboard, across East Germany to West Berlin, imple- mented; the use of nuclear weapons, a contingency directive by President Truman, not implemented; and the airlift. The primary US concern was the maintenance of the ow of essential supplies to West Berlin, a short- term goal. The strategic chosen US option, to stay in Berlin at all costs— the airlift was a means to achieve that goal—was not the result of a formal rational choice calculus; rather, it was improvised and intuitive, namely, derived from President Truman’s belief that yielding on West Berlin would have been tantamount to accepting Soviet hegemony in Europe. 98 M. BRECHER USSR (1948–1949) Four options were identi ed during the Soviet Union’s Berlin Blockade crisis period, all high risk: to take over West Berlin with conventional Soviet military forces; to organize mass action in Berlin against the Western powers, which Moscow would then support militarily; to interfere with the airlift; and, fourth, to negotiate with the United States and seek a peaceful agreement that would provide the Soviet Union with a face-saver. The rst option was not seriously considered; the second and third were considered and rejected because of the per- ceived high risk of war with the USA. For Stalin, the optimal way to cope with the Berlin crisis was to make sure that the United States knew the Soviet Union did not intend to escalate the crisis to war— because the “correlation of forces” at the time was perceived then as unfavorable to the USSR. Thus the only perceived feasible alternative, the one Moscow chose, was to negotiate a face-saving agreement with the USA, while the blockade was still in force. fi fi fl fi fi Italy (1953) Several options were considered by Italy during its Trieste crisis period, all tactical, designed to achieve the strategic goal, namely, Italy’s sovereignty over at least Trieste’s Zone A. One was the transfer of administrative authority to Italy in Zone A in incremental steps, along with the mutual Italy–Yugoslavia withdrawal of troops from Trieste and an exchange of guarantees with Yugoslavia. Another was an attempt to work out a de nitive solution at a conference and, if inconclusive, the implementation of the October 8 decision calling for partition of Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia. A third option was to hold a preparatory meeting to search for a solution. Yugoslavia was amenable to three sub- stantive solutions—a plebiscite in the entire territory of Trieste, partition along ethnic lines, and partition along the zonal border, as provided by the October 8 decision. Guatemala (1953–1954) Five options were considered by Guatemala’s Left-wing government at different stages of its peak stress crisis period: rst, to reduce Guatemala’s isolation in Latin America, via a urry of friendly diplomatic initiatives; second, to improve relations with a hostile United States, aimed at ending American support for the Castillo Armas- led rebel movement; third, to enlist UN Security Council support—after the outbreak of violence; fourth, to enhance Guatemala’s military capa- bility by purchasing arms from abroad and an (abortive) attempt to form a militia; and, nally, to reduce the highly visible communist role in the 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 99 Arbenz government, the core issue for its adversaries, the United States and Honduras. All but the last option were adopted and implemented. Hungary (1956) Two polar alternatives were seriously considered by Hungary’s leaders during its crisis period—to crush all demands for liberal reforms by force and repression or to pursue a middle path and to offer concessions without yielding on the party’s monopoly of power. The options of introducing a multiparty political system or withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact or proclaiming neutrality were favored by some but were beyond the pale for party leader Géró in the early stage of the cri- sis period. Even Nagy, his much more popular and relatively liberal suc- cessor, did not favor, though he did consider, inviting Western military intervention or offering military resistance to the Soviet invasion and he did proclaim Hungary’s neutrality on November 1. United States (1958) There was a wide search for strategic and tactical military options but not for basic political alternatives to the use of force during the United States’ crisis period in the Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval. A summit meeting was frowned upon, as were diplomatic initiatives in Lebanon. The US response was characterized by tactical rationality, lead- ing to a rejection of all proposals for military intervention in Iraq or to stimulate a broader Middle East con ict involving Israel and/or Turkey as US proxies. fi fi fl fl United States (1961) The search for, and evaluation of, alternatives by the United States was extensive in its Berlin Wall crisis period—by the Berlin Task Force, created following the Kennedy-Khrushchev Vienna summit in early June, in a study by former Secretary of State Acheson, and by Kennedy himself. The polar alternatives were deterrence that relied on US military power or deterrence via negotiations with the Soviet Union. After the construction of the Wall on August 13, the options considered by the USA ranged from passive acceptance of the new status quo in Germany to re-imposition of the status quo ante by political and eco- nomic retaliation. Other options were available but were not seriously considered: tearing down the barbed wire barriers, imposing an economic embargo on East Germany, and sending more US troops to West Berlin. The ultimate choice was to send a protest note to Moscow, without taking any tangible action. 100 M. BRECHER India (1962) During the pre-war phase of the India–China Crisis, India’s behavior was shaped by a rigid attitudinal prism, namely, that fundamental hostility by China created the border dispute, the need for rm Indian counterforce to China’s in ltration into Indian territory, and the low likelihood of major war; this set of perceptions was not condu- cive to a search for strategic alternatives. With the coming of war, India’s options, hitherto considered inconceivable, were rapidly assessed and chosen under maximal stress—an appeal for US air cover over India’s cit- ies in the east and an implied willingness to enter a military alliance with the long unfriendly superpower, which would have meant abandonment of the hallowed foundation of India’s foreign policy since independence, non-alignment. Bipolycentrism United States (1965) The outbreak of civil war in the Dominican Republic on April 24 and the US perception of American lives and prop- erty in grave danger created very little time to consider alternatives—and only one was considered. On April 28, the United States chose what President Johnson regarded as the only option, military intervention (“we had no choice”). That day, 400 American troops were sent to the Dominican Republic; within 3 weeks, this force grew to 22,000. All for- eign citizens were evacuated. Thereafter, the United States opted for diplomacy—bilateral, inter-American, and UN negotiations—to achieve the “Act of Dominican Reconciliation,” which ended the civil war and the Dominican Republic Crisis on August 31, 1965. Zambia (1965–1966) Despite its predominant perception of constraints on the search for, and consideration of, alternatives, Zambia sought and assessed many options during its Rhodesia Unilateral Declaration of Independence Crisis: development of alternative outlets to the sea, a long-term option for a landlocked state; demands for UK military retali- ation against Rhodesia—pursued insistently but without success; and the option of a “Quick Kill” strategy against Rhodesia, recommended by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and accepted by Zambia’s President Kaunda, which ended the crisis. Israel (1967) Many more options were sought, considered, accepted, and implemented during Israel’s June-Six-Day War peak stress crisis 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 101 fi fi fi fi period, from May 17 to June 6, than during its pre-crisis period: mobi- lization of reserves, partial and then large-scale; diplomacy—an active search for support from the three Western powers, notably the USA; delay, in making a decision, to provide Israel’s armed forces time to prepare for war; deception—acts designed to persuade Egypt that Israel would not re the rst shot; and the initiation of interceptive (pre-emp- tive) war. The high-risk military option, late in the war, to advance on Syria’s capital, Damascus, was considered but rejected; and joint USA- USSR pressure on Israel to cease re was accepted on June 11. USSR (1968) A wide range of options was considered during the Soviet Union’s Prague Spring crisis period: direct political pressure on the com- munist reformers in Prague; economic incentives and sanctions; the perma- nent stationing of Soviet bloc (Warsaw Pact) forces in Czechoslovakia; the use of these forces to restore pro-Soviet communist orthodoxy in Prague; the use of European communist leaders to persuade the Czechoslovak reformers to relent; and military invasion, the chosen option of last resort. United States (1970) Many options were considered by the United States during the crisis period of Black September/Syria-Jordan Confrontation, mostly military and strategic: pressure on Moscow to force Syria to withdraw its troops from Jordan— accepted and implemented; preparation of a credible military option if King Hussein’s regime were overthrown—accepted; direct US military intervention to save King Hussein —rejected; “going public”—rejected because it would make it more dif cult for Syria to retreat; a direct or indirect approach to Syria and/or the USSR and/or the UN Security Council—rejected because uncertain outcomes exceeded any perceived gain; and using the threat of Israeli intervention, by air and, if necessary, by ground forces, as a US proxy —accepted and decisive in forcing Syria’s withdrawal from Jordan and terminating the crisis. India (1971) Until early July, still its pre-crisis period in the Bangladesh Crisis, India pursued a political-diplomatic option, dispatching dip- lomats in May–June to persuade Western powers to press Pakistan to seek a mutually acceptable political solution to the crisis in East Pakistan. When that failed, India adopted the military option, in prin- ciple. Prime Minister Gandhi prepared the ground by visiting Western states—Austria, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, 102 M. BRECHER and the United States—from October 16 to November 13—to convey India’s determination to intervene if Pakistan did not change its policy. India’s military intervention was decisive in terminating Pakistan’s con- trol over East Bengal–East Pakistan. However, the prime minister and her civil servant advisers rejected a proposed high-risk supplementary mil- itary option—to “liberate” the Pakistani-controlled part of Kashmir on the western India/Pakistan front—urged on India’s Cabinet Political Affairs Committee on December 4 by the defense and nance ministers, soon after the full-scale war began. fi fl fi fi Pakistan (1971) The military leaders of Pakistan considered and tried, brie y, a political option in the pre-crisis period of its Bangladesh Crisis, namely, to split East Pakistan’s dominant political party, the Awami League, by offering greater autonomy to an alternative leadership. They responded to East Pakistan’s declaration of independence on March 26 with massive force. The military option remained the sole option pur- sued by Pakistan until the end of the war with India and the loss of East Pakistan. It was also unsuccessful in active attempts to secure military sup- port from its long-time patron, the United States, and its ally, China. Israel (1973) The October 1973 pre-war crisis period, unlike the 1967 pre-war crisis period, lasted only one day. Thus its search for, and consid- eration of, alternatives were overwhelmingly related to military-strategic issues. The rst, high-risk, problem of choice occurred only hours before the war—to launch a pre-emptive air strike against Egypt or to take the rst blow. Prime Minister Meir’s “Kitchen Cabinet” opted for the lat- ter, for political reasons—concern about the need to ensure US weap- ons support, if necessary. During the war, there were several problems of choice between options: to accept or to reject a cease re in place, on October 12—accepted, pro forma; to cross the Suez Canal two days later or to wait—it opted to cross; to accept or reject the rst and second cease re— accepted, so as not to alienate the United States; to relax or not to relax its vise-like encirclement of, and allow the passage of food to, the Egyptian Third Army— accepted for the same reason; and to continue or halt the advance on Damascus—halted because of expected high Israeli casualties. United States (1973) Its Nuclear Alert crisis lasted one day. There was no time to search for, or consider, alternatives, except to respond or not to respond to the Soviet threat of military intervention in the 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 103 October-Yom Kippur War. The only option considered and adopted by the USA was to warn the USSR of its high-risk threat by a demonstra- tive US non-violent military act; it placed all US Strategic Air Forces on DEFCON 3, the highest state of alert, a clear message to Moscow that the United States would respond to Soviet military intervention on the Middle East battle eld. The US crisis ended abruptly, and the October- Yom Kippur War, soon after. Syria (1975–1976): President Assad perceived clear alternatives before several crucial decision points during Syria’s Lebanon Civil War crisis period. The rst was to intervene or not to intervene; he opted to inter- vene indirectly by sending the Syria-controlled Palestine Liberation Army’s [PLA’s] Yarmouk Brigade to prevent the near-certain collapse of the Lebanese-Muslim-Palestinian alliance. The second issue was to inter- vene or not to intervene directly with Syrian troops: the former option was chosen after assurances, especially from Israel, of non-opposition. And, third, Syria considered whether to threaten or not to threaten an attack against PLO forces in Mount Lebanon, the Christian Lebanese heartland, unless they withdrew within 5 days; the former option was chosen. fi fi fi fi fi fi fi Argentina (1982) Several options were considered by Argentina’s mili- tary junta during its Falklands-Malvinas crisis period, despite its com- mitment to “liberating” the UKcontrolled islands. One was mutual withdrawal of Argentine and UK forces from the disputed territory and acceptance of the right of self-determination by the islanders, without a precondition of Argentine sovereignty; this option was accepted and then reneged. Another option was a USA-sponsored mutual withdrawal of forces and an UN- supervised transition to Argentine sovereignty by the end of 1982—accepted by Argentina, but rejected by the United Kingdom. A third option was a cease re, mutual withdrawal, and later talks on the future of the islands—rejected by Argentina, mainly because of the British sinking of the Argentine naval ship, the General Belgrano, with heavy casualties. Unipolycentrism United States (1990–1991) Substantive options were considered at sev- eral crucial decision points in the United States’ Gulf War I crisis period. Following a meeting of the senior US decision-makers, the “Principals,” 104 M. BRECHER on October 30, 1990, a strategic decision was made to set in motion a process leading to war against Iraq, at the behest of President Bush, National Security Advisor Scowcroft, Defense Secretary Cheney, and Vice-President Quayle. The rst follow-up tactical issue was whether or not to prepare for a land campaign; the same decision-makers ensured a positive decision. With the rapid advance of USA-led Coalition forces on the battle eld, two other crucial problems of choice demanded attention. First, should US forces enter Baghdad and overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime? This option was rejected on the grounds that it would destabi- lize Iraq and the entire oil-rich Gulf region. Soon after, a related issue arose—when should the war be terminated? It was erroneously believed by American political and military leaders that all Iraq Republican Guard divisions had already been destroyed. Because of an acute fear of regional instability, the option of immediate war termination was cho- sen. Although options were carefully considered on many war–peace and regime change issues, the decision-making process was not thorough or systematic. In short, US decision-makers seriously considered and chose only one strategic option in 1990–1991, to expel Iraq from Kuwait by force. Iraq (1990–1991) Saddam Hussein had three options in the pre-Gulf War I crisis period, while trying to cope with the impending UN dead- line for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait —January 15, 1991. One was withdrawal from Kuwait, total and unconditional, as demanded by the USA-led Coalition, or partial, and in either case, immediate or phased. Another option was to do nothing, calculating that Bush I and the UN Coalition were bluf ng. The third alternative was to wage war, either defensive war or a strike against Saudi oil elds or Israel or both. Hints and rumors of a Saddam Hussein withdrawal continued until the UN deadline, but he made no move in that direction; nor did he initiate war. Rather he chose to do nothing. During the war, he had to consider alternatives in other high-risk choice situations: to accept or reject the (friendly) Soviet plan in late February 1991 to wind down the crisis—he opted in favor and, most important, to accept or reject the USA-led UN Coalition terms for surrender a few days later—he chose to accept those terms as less costly for Iraq than other possible outcomes. fi fi fi fi fi Yugoslavia (1998–1999) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) pursued a limited cooperation with NATO strategy in its Kosovo pre-cri- sis period. Once NATO’s “Operation Allied Force” was launched, the 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 105 FRY chose the option of standing rm, although with conspicuous mili- tary restraint—it avoided attacking NATO troops and ships and avoided alienating Russia, its sole, but not entirely reliable, patron. Those two negative choices were considered the most effective for Yugoslavia, especially because of its awareness of its own military constraints and its ( awed) assumptions about NATO’s fragile unity and cohesion. NATO (1998–1999) No strategic alternatives to sustained bomb- ing were seriously considered by NATO during its Kosovo crisis period because of Miloševic’s intransigence. The rst of two noteworthy tactical options was a phased air campaign, with pauses allowing negotiations, an idea supported by Italy, Greece, and Germany. It was rejected as likely to be ineffective, given the failure of previous negotiations with Miloševic, backed by the threat of force. The ground troops option gained more and more support toward the end of NATO’s crisis period. At a meeting of foreign ministers in Bonn on May 27, 1999, the British government announced that it was ready to commit 50,000 troops if a decision on that option was made. President Clinton responded that he was ready to send ground troops but did not believe it was necessary; it proved not to be. Iraq (2002–2003) Throughout its Gulf War II pre-crisis period (from Bush II’s “Axis of Evil” speech on January 29, 2002 to his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002), Iraq had two options— to stall for time and hope that Washington was bluf ng or to cooperate by complying in full with UN inspections; it declared in September that it would readmit inspectors. There was also an Iraq option of striking American targets in the Persian Gulf and Kuwait before they attacked, but it is not known how seriously this was considered. While the substance of discussions in Baghdad is unknown, its actions indicate that it was not serious about compliance and instead hoped that either the Americans were not serious or military action could be blocked at the UN, as Saddam Hussein was reportedly assured by French and Russian diplomats. Thus, the preeminent option, and the one chosen by Iraq, was do nothing. United States (2002–2003) Probably from 9/11 onward, certainly after January 29, 2002, Bush II never seems to have seriously contem- plated a strategic alternative to regime change in Iraq during the inter- state crisis that led to Gulf War II. Thus the consideration of options 106 M. BRECHER fi fi fi fl focused on how, not whether, to topple Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist regime. The available US tactical options included sponsoring a coup in Iraq, a unilateral or UNsanctioned, USA-led invasion, and applying pressure via the UN over Iraq’s assumed weapons of mass destruc- tion (WMD) programs. Another crucial US tactical choice point was whether or not to seek another UN resolution explicitly authorizing war. Strenuous attempts to do so convinced Bush II that another such reso- lution was not attainable and that he would have to proceed with his “coalition of the willing.” His choice was to invade Iraq, without UN authorization, to achieve regime change with a coalition including forces from many states, notably the UK and France, and two Arab states, Egypt and Syria. What does the evidence on a search for, and consideration of, alternatives in foreign policy crises from 1935 to 2003 reveal? Did national secu- rity–foreign policy decisionmakers seriously consider one, few, or many options while coping with more stressful perceived threat, time pressure, and the higher likelihood of war, in the crisis period than in the pre- crisis period, that is, while confronting challenges under maximal stress? Moreover, did they consider options more frequently in the crisis period than in pre-crisis? One option was considered in 7 interstate crises: by Italy, invasion of Ethiopia; by the United States, military intervention in the Dominican Republic; by Pakistan, resort to force against the East Pakistan secession, Bangladesh; by the United States, which chose to place its strategic air forces on nuclear alert; by the United States, which opted to expel Iraq from Kuwait by force; by Yugoslavia, the choice of military restraint, that is, non-use of force against NATO’s ‘Operation Allied Force’ in the cri- sis-war over Kosovo’s independence; and by the United States, the sole option of achieving regime change in Iraq, by force. Two options (2 cases): India, rst in time, selected a diplomatic option, an attempt to persuade Western major and minor powers to press Pakistan to seek a political solution with the dominant Awami League in East Pakistan; when that failed, India chose a military option—direct Indian military intervention; NATO, too, rst chose the option of diplo- matic persuasion and then the use of force to expel Yugoslavia (the FRY) from Kosovo. 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 107 Several options (20 cases) Multiple options, as noted above, ranged from three to seven: three options (5 cases, e.g., Ethiopia, Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War); four options (4 cases, e.g., the USSR, Berlin Blockade crisis); ve options (4 cases, e.g., Guatemala, Guatemala crisis); six options (5 cases, e.g., the United Kingdom, Munich crisis); and seven options (2 cases, e.g., Hungary, Hungarian Uprising). fi fi fi In sum, there was a substantial search for, and consideration of, options in 20 of the 29 foreign policy crises (70%), often very extensive and very thorough, before strategic and tactical decisions were taken. In two other crises, polar alternatives were seriously debated by the decision-makers. Among the seven cases in which only one strategic option was considered, four can be termed idiosyncratic: two were opportunity crises, triggered by a leader’s glory complex (Mussolini re Ethiopia, 1935–1936) and an ideologically driven foreign policy agenda (the Bush II administration re regime change in Iraq, 2002); and two were urgent immediate responses to a per- ceived “no choice” threat to unprotected citizens and property (US President Johnson and his advisers re Dominican Intervention in 1965) and a per- ceived no-time-to-respond direct challenge to the regional and global bal- ance of power by one superpower to another (the United States re its 1973 Nuclear Alert). Two of the remaining three cases in this group exhibited a perceived fundamental threat of territorial disintegration (Pakistan’s military junta re Bangladesh in 1971 and Serbia’s President Miloševic re the Kosovo secession in 1998– 1999), and a superpower’s perception of basic threat to its deterrence credibility and vital economic interests (the United States in Gulf War I, 1990–1991). And even in these cases, 24% of the cases explored in depth, tactical options, often many, were considered and frequently adopted by the decision-makers. Two other ndings from the case studies are noteworthy. First, coping in the crisis period was more ef cient in the vast majority of cases under high stress than in the low-stress pre-crisis period. Second, decision-makers in dem- ocratic regimes coped with stress better than those in authoritarian regimes. coPing with foreign Policy crises: new evidence confronts conventional wisdoM Thus far, this chapter has presented an array of ndings, notably on the four coping mechanisms that, together, illuminate decision-making in the peak stress crisis period— information processing, consultation, 108 M. BRECHER structure, and size of the decisional forum, and the search for, and consid- eration of, alternatives. As such, these ndings shed light on the general question, how do states cope with high stress? Two related questions also merit careful attention. First, is there a pat- tern of common response to the stress experienced by decision-makers in crises, or is diversity the norm? Second, is the conventional wisdom that high stress has a severe injurious effect on decision-making an accurate portrait of the stress-behavior linkage in foreign policy crises? The following discussion on conventional wisdom versus new evidence will attempt to answer these crucial questions. Earlier in this book attention was focused on 10 dimensions of crisis (geography, time, system structure, con ict setting, bloc alignment, peace– war setting, intensity of violence, power level, economic level, and political regime), and in this chapter on seven attributes of crises and their actors (trigger, triggering entity, duration, decisions, decision-makers, their atti- tudinal prism, and threatened values). The central nding of that empiri- cal analysis was pervasive diversity on all of the dimensions and all of the attributes of international political earthquakes-international crises. fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi Did this conspicuous and documented diversity generate a diverse—or common— response among crisis actors to the challenge posed by crisis esca- lation? Did decisionmakers cope well or badly under high stress? These are important questions, with farreaching policy implications, as well as social-scienti c research interest. An earlier inquiry (Brecher 1993) uncov- ered ndings that challenged conventional wisdom on these questions. Twenty- ve years later, I did an elaborate re-testing of 19 hypotheses on the behavior of decision-makers in almost twice as many foreign policy crises, 29–16. Hypotheses 7, 14, 15, 17, and 18 focus on the effects of Time. All other hypotheses focus on the impact of Stress and are framed in terms of, “the higher the crisis-induced stress...” Cognitive Dimension Hypothesis (H.)1 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the more concerned the decisionmakers will be with the immediate rather than the long-run future. H.2 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the greater the felt need, and consequent quest, for information. 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 109 H.3 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the more closed (conceptually rigid) to new information the decision-maker(s) become. H.4 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the more the decision-maker(s) will supplement information by relying on past experience as a guide to choice. H.5 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the more active the information search is likely to become but also more random and unproductive. H.6 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the more information about a crisis tends to be elevated to the top of the decisional pyramid. Decisional Dimension Consultation/Communication H.7 The longer the crisis decision time, the greater the consultation with persons outside the core decisional unit. H.8 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the greater the reliance on extraor- dinary channels of communication. H.9 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the higher the rate of communi- cation with international actors. Decisional Forum H.10 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the smaller the decision group tends to become, that is, the greater the tendency to centralized decision- making. H.11 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the greater the tendency for decisions to be reached by ad hoc groups. H.12 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the greater the tendency to “group-think,” that is, to conformity with group norms. H.13 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the greater the felt need for face-to-face proximity among decision-makers. 110 M. BRECHER H.14 The longer the crisis decision time, the greater the felt need for effec- tive leadership within the decisional unit. H.15 The longer the crisis decision time, the greater the decision-makers’ consensus on the ultimate decision. Alternatives H.16 The higher the crisis-induced stress, the less careful the evaluation of alternatives. H.17 The shorter the crisis decision time, the greater the tendency to prema- ture closure. H.18 The shorter the crisis decision time, the more likely are decisions to be made with inadequate assessment of consequences, that is, with less sensitiv- ity to negative feedback. General H.19 High stress is dysfunctional; that is, cognitive and, therefore, deci- sional performance will be greatly in uenced by psychological biases and will deteriorate markedly. The ndings on the extent of support and non-support, and mixed sup- port, for each hypothesis relating to the cognitive and decisional aspects of coping are provided in numerical form in Table 4.1. The ndings are most instructive. As in the earlier analysis (Brecher 1993), but with a much larger set of cases (29), 9 of the 19 hypotheses, selected from a very large number framed by other researchers, reveal strong support and 1 moderate support, and 4 are strongly discon rmed, as postulated by this writer, that is, 14 of the 19 hypotheses. xTwo of the six cognitive hypotheses, a felt need for information (H.2) and reliance on past experience (H.4), are very strongly sup- ported (27–30 and 21–32, respectively). So too with Hypothesis 6, the rapid transfer of information to the top of the decision-making pyramid (25–31), and the rst part of Hypothesis 5, the search for information will be more active (20–23).4 fl fi fi fi fi xThe three hypotheses on consultation and communication (H.7, H.8, and H.9), too, are strongly supported (19–26, 20–27, and 26–32, respectively). xSo too are two of the six hypotheses on the decisional forum, Hypotheses 13 and 14 (17– 24 and 18–25, respectively), with mod- erate support for Hypothesis 15 (14–18). xThe three hypotheses on the consideration of alternatives (H.16, H.17, and H.18) are rejected, as I argued elsewhere (Brecher 1993), one of them decisively, and two hypotheses, substantively (7–16, 4–22, and 7–15). x Most important, the conventional wisdom that high stress is dysfunc- tional in decisionmaking (H.19) is clearly Not Supported (5–18), as I discovered in Brecher 1993 (Table 4.2). fi fi Some illustrations of the ndings on behavior by states experiencing high stress in a foreign policy crisis highlight their signi cance. The higher the crisis-induced stress, the greater the felt need, and con- sequent quest, for information. In order to enhance the quality of USSR decision-making, rather than yielding to premature closure during the Prague Spring crisis in 1968, a steady ow of delegations to and from Moscow funneled a large body of fresh information to the Soviet decision-makers, on the basis of which options were framed and evaluated and choices made. With slight variations, this was the common information pattern in 27 of the 29 crises dur- ing the period of highest stress. fl The postulate that consultation would be broader and more intense as stress increased: the UK inner cabinet of four consulted the full cabi- net, French leaders, and members of the British Commonwealth at the height of the Munich Crisis before making the fateful U.K. decisions concerning Czechoslovakia in 1938; Prime Minister Meir’s “Kitchen Cabinet” of four consulted the full Israel cabinet of 18 and many others in Israel’s 1973 October-Yom Kippur crisis period. And President Assad broadened the Syrian consultative cir- cle from four to 43 for some crucial decisions relating to its intervention in the Lebanon civil war (1975–1976). There were, as noted, several exceptions: Italy in the Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War (1935– 1936); the USSR in the Berlin Blockade crisis (1948–1949); the United States in the 1958 Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval; the USSR in the 1968 Prague Spring crisis; Pakistan in the 1971 Bangladesh crisis-war; and Iraq in Gulf War I (1990– 1991). All of these exceptions, other than the United States, were authoritarian regimes, civil or military, and in four cases the regime was dominated by one leader—Mussolini (Italy), Stalin (USSR) Yahya Khan (Pakistan), and Saddam Hussein (Iraq). A similar pattern of enlargement is evident in decisional forums dur- ing the high-stress crisis period. While President Truman remained the nal US decision-maker, ad hoc groups and the National Security Council were used to make many US decisions in coping with the 1948–1949 Berlin Blockade crisis. In the 1953 Trieste cri- sis, Italy’s decision-making became more decentralized, with more reliance on Foreign Ministry of cials. In India, the emergency com- mittee of the cabinet emerged as the principal decisional forum at the height of the 1962 China/India border crisis-war. Five of the six exceptions to the broadening of consultations noted earlier apply to the decisional forum as well. 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 117 The predominant trait of the crisis period was extensive search for, and careful evaluation of, alternatives. The United States, as noted, considered a planned withdrawal from Berlin, an armed convoy, and the use of nuclear weapons, apart from the airlift, at the height of the Berlin Blockade crisis. The Soviet Union, too, exhausted an array of options before resorting to military intervention to crush the Prague Spring: political pressure, economic incentives, third-party intermediaries, and stationing troops near the Czechoslovak capital. However, there were exceptions in the search for, and consideration of, alternatives, as noted earlier, notably the states that con- sidered only one alternative in their crisis decision process. A very similar pattern of behavior emerges from an aggregate data analysis of the impact of regime type and issues in 1052 foreign policy crises since the end of World War I. There is robust evidence that “as issues became... more intense, the behavior of crisis actors as witnessed in the choices of primary crisis management technique became more similar regardless of the type of regime” (Trumbore and Boyer 1999). In sum, the evidence in the 29 foreign policy crises selected for this inquiry is compelling on the rst of the two crucial questions posed earlier about coping with high or higher crisis-induced stress: there was a widely shared responseto more severe perceived threat, more time pressure, and perceived higher probability of military hostilities in the crisis period of the two central domains of crisis management—the quest for information and the search for, and consideration of, alternatives—despite the wide- ranging diversity in crisis dimensions and crisis attributes.. fi fi fi fi This nding may seem counter-intuitive to many, for it has long been regarded as a consensual truth among scholars that racial, cultural, his- torical, political, ideological, and socio-economic differences must result in different behavior, including state behavior in foreign policy crises. This linkage is undoubtedly correct in some spheres of human activity— but not all. Despite the cogent and, in some respects, persuasive criticism of Realism from competing interpretations of what moves foreign policy decision-makers and entities to act the way they do, it remains beyond doubt that, throughout history, from the city-states of Greece and their counterparts in the Chinese, Indian, and Middle East systems of antiq- uity, to the principalities of Renaissance Italy and early modern Europe, 118 M. BRECHER the polyglot empires of the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, and the new nationstates of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, auton- omous political entities sought power, that is, sought to attain enlarged relative power, or to undermine an existing balance of power with rivals, notwithstanding their racial, cultural, historical, political regime, and/or other differences. The discovery of a widely shared pattern of coping with high stress in foreign policy crises falls into this category. Stress is a universal phe- nomenon experienced by all humans under certain conditions. So, too, coping with stress is a universal challenge. Decision-makers of all states need to make choices in situations of complexity and incomplete infor- mation. They all attempt to maximize gains and minimize losses, though different cultures may de ne gains and losses differently. They all seek to enhance “national interests,” though the content of those national inter- ests may vary. The evidence uncovered here demonstrates that these uni- versal elements in world politics are more signi cant than diversity among state members of the global system. What is the explanation for the triumph of widely shared elements in coping with crises by states over diversity in the dimensions and attributes of interstate crises? The answer, it is contended here, lies in the concept of commonality. Stress is a shared challenge, an indicator of impending harm and danger. States and political leaders have common traits that outweigh their diversity, especially the need to survive and to minimize harm from external foes. And most foreign policy–national security decisionmakers, in coping with crisis-generated stress, act as humans do in all comparable situations of perceived impending harm. In essence, the commonality of statehood, stress, and human response to expected harm overrides variations among states and their national security decision-makers, and generates a widely shared pattern of coping with foreign policy crises.. I turn now to the second speci c question posed early in this chapter: is the impact of high or rising stress on the behavior of foreign pol- icy-national security decision-makers, in interstate crises, negative, neutral, or positive? fi fi fi The quest for, and accumulation of, knowledge on the stress-per- formance linkage of states in foreign policy crises has not been free from controversy. Most visible has been the continuing verbal “war” between political psychologists and rational choice theorists. The former assert 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 119 the innate limitations on rationality, acknowledging, at most, “bounded rationality.” The latter assume a capacity for unquali ed rational calcu- lus by decision-makers. The difference between the contending views is highlighted by the inverted U-shaped curve that relates stress to per- formance. Political psychologists, drawing upon the ndings of research on individual Psychology, claim that, during foreign policy crises, as in all crises confronting humans, high or rising stress leads to diminished performance by decision-makers. In contrast, advocates of rational choice claim that stress level correlates with the importance of the task at hand: attentiveness will increase under high stress and enhance per- formance. Thus the stressperformance link will be at or near the top of the inverted U-shaped curve during the peak phase of stress for decision- makers, that is, the crisis period of a state’s foreign policy crisis. Conventional wisdom among IR scholars on this controversy has been formalized in the last of the 19 hypotheses that were tested above. High stress is dysfunctional; that is, cognitive and, therefore, decisional performance will be greatly in uenced by psychological biases and will deteriorate markedly. This issue has far-reaching practical implications. Are decision-makers able to read correctly the signs of impending crisis and potential escalation to war? Can they calculate the costs and ben- e ts of alternative courses of action, free from the effects of stress—or other cognitive constraints? Can they search for and process information or search for and consider options unhindered by high stress? Are they able to brake the thrust to violence and the adverse consequences of a spiral effect that can lead the adversaries into the unknown arena of war in an era of proliferating weapons of mass destruction? In short, can they cope effectively with higher, often much higher-than-normal, value threat, time pressure, and heightened probability of war so as to achieve their goals without horrendous costs to their adversaries, themselves, their neighbors, far-off lands and peoples, and the global commons, that is, the fragile envi- ronment for all? The classic International Relations scholarly statement on the adverse effects of high and/ or escalating stress was Ole Holsti’s summation almost 40 years ago. A vast body of theory and evidence [from individual psychology] suggests that intense and protracted crises tend to erode rather than enhance... cognitive abilities. 120 M. BRECHER fi fl fi fi Among the more probable casualties of crises and the accompanying high stress are the very abilities that distinguish men from other species: to establish logical links between present actions and future goals; to search effectively for relevant policy options; to create appropriate responses to unexpected events; to communicate complex ideas; to deal effectively with abstractions; to perceive not only blacks and whites, but also to distinguish them from the many subtle shades of grey that fall in between; to distin- guish valid analogies from false ones, and sense from nonsense; and, perhaps, most important of all, to enter into the frame of reference of others. Holsti concluded “Low-to-moderate stress may facilitate better perfor- mance, but high stress degrades it”. (1979: 405, 410) This is a formidable catalog of the assumed high costs of high stress in foreign policy crises and a dismal portrait of human cognitive and deci- sional abilities. If it is accurate, the ability of decision-makers to man- age crises effectively is—and will continue to be— disturbingly de cient. What, then, is the record in the 29 diverse foreign policy crises explored in this book? There was support for the postulate that high stress will be dysfunc- tional in three cases —the behavior of Hungary decision-makers in 1956 (Hungarian Uprising), of Pakistan in 1971 (Bangladesh Crisis-War), and Argentina in 1982 (Falkland/Malvinas crisiswar). In six other cases, the results are not entirely clear: The Netherlands in 1939–1940, when reliable warnings of a German invasion were disbelieved almost until it occurred, on May 10, 1940, though not because of high stress but rather the reverse, leading to a coding of Not Relevant (NR) for Hypothesis 19 in that case; The USSR in 1948, when Stalin left Moscow for a 10-week “vaca- tion” in September 1948 during the Berlin Blockade crisis, not because of high stress, for he coped very well in his determination to avoid war with what he perceived, correctly, to be a more powerful United States in 1948–1949, leading to a coding of Mixed (M) for that case; India’s Nehru, at the height of the 1962 China–India crisis-war, when, perhaps under the impact of high stress, he sought US air cover against a feared Chinese bombardment of Indian cities in eastern India—though, 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 121 in perspective, this quali es as a rational response to correctly perceived high threat, rather than as an irrational response to high stress, leading to a cod- ing of Not Supported (NS) in that case; Iraq’s Saddam Hussein’s behavior in Gulf Wars I and II, when he mis- judged the likely/ unlikely USA resort to war, though there is no evi- dence that his judgment was the result of high stress, leading to a coding of Missing Data (MD) in both cases; and Serbia’s Miloševic’s misjudgment of NATO’s likely/unlikely resort to war in 1999; but, as with Saddam Hussein, there is no evidence that this was a result of high stress, thus a coding of Missing Data (MD). fi fi In the other 20 crises, high stress did not impair overall performance. The evidence that has been cited here regarding the stress-perfor- mance link in foreign policy crises (Hypothesis 19) is reinforced by inde- pendent concluding assessments of authors of ICB in-depth case studies. x United States, in the 1948–1949 Berlin Blockade crisis: “it is rea- sonably clear from the actual historical record... that stress can have positive effects which outweigh the negative effects on the perfor- mance of selected cognitive and decision-making tasks.... On the whole, the American policy-makers stood up to stress well and coped fairly effectively and even creatively with the acute dilem- mas posed by the Soviet ground blockade... [It] was in essence a rational and calculated process of decisionmaking” (Shlaim 1983: 422). x Italy, in the 1953 Trieste II crisis: “crisis actually enlarged the per- ceived range of alternatives and led to a relatively more thorough and imaginative search, as well as to a timely re-evaluation of choice in light of new information... It was precisely during the period of higher stress (October–November 1953)... that Italian decision- makers operated at their best.... Rising stress did not lead to group think... There were no clear instances of premature closure... The increase in stress... cannot be said to have disrupted performance in any signi cant way” (Croci 1991: 330, 439–440). xZambia, in Rhodesia’s 1965–1966 UDI crisis: “the evidence does suggest that crisisinduced stress accounted for some impairment in 122 M. BRECHER the cognitive abilities of decision makers in Zambia. Nevertheless, the degree of deterioration was nothing like as catastrophic as implied in Ole Holsti’s catalog... On the contrary, the level of cognitive perfor- mance... was commendably high” (Anglin 1994: 326–327). x Syria, in the 1975–1976 Lebanon Civil War crisis: three of the four Syria decisions in the crisis period were “rational choice decisions... the outcome of lengthy and exhaustive meetings in which all the high-level political interests participated” (Dawisha 1980: 182). fi fi fi fi fi In light of these ndings, based on in-depth studies of many crises, from different cultures, regions, system structures, power and economic levels, political regimes, and other dimensions of crisis, this crucial hypothesis would seem to be seriously awed. Holsti and George (1975) sensed that their nding of dysfunctional behavior by international crisis decision- makers under high stress, based solely upon the US experience, might not have universal experience and might have “more limited applicability for other nations.” That surmise is correct. More signi cantly, their nding on the stress-performance linkage is not supported by the experience of many developed states as well, including the United Kingdom in the 1938 Munich crisis, Italy over Trieste (1953), the USSR in the Prague Spring crisis (1968), and 6 of the 8 US cases in the group of 29 (it was sup- ported in only one US case, Dominican Intervention (1965), and it was not tested for US behavior in the Berlin Wall crisis). Overall, this piv- otal hypothesis was supported in 5 cases, not supported in 19. What more do these ndings reveal on coping with high or esca- lating international crisis-induced stress? First, there is now powerful evidence in support of the following behavior by decision-makers from diverse cultural and geographic settings, with variations in power, eco- nomic development, size, etc. x Cognitive dimension: decision-makers feel a greater need for infor- mation and enlarge their quest accordingly, and they supplement such information with a growing reliance on personal past experi- ence as a guide to choice among options. x Information processing: their search for information becomes more active, and, as a crisis escalates, information moves swiftly to the senior decision-makers, severely weakening the role of bureaucrats in the decisional process. 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 123 x Consultation: the scope of consultation grows, not declines, under the impact of increasing stress in most foreign policy crises. Decision- makers seek extraordinary channels to communicate bids to adver- saries in the negotiation process during an escalating crisis, and they communicate more with allies, adversaries, and other international actors. xDecisional forum: decision-makers feel a greater need for face-to- face proximity as stress grows, and, as crisis escalates, they feel a greater need for effective leadership from the principal decision- maker(s). xMore important for an understanding of coping with international crisis-induced high or escalating stress is a cluster of negative nd- ings about Alternatives: x Increasing time pressure leads to a less careful evaluation of options— it does not; Decision-making suffers from premature closure, before all alterna- tives are carefully assessed and ranked—it does not; Decisions are reached with an inadequate assessment of conse- quences—they are not, and the most compelling negative nding: High stress is dysfunctional for cognitive performance and, therefore, the decisional process as well—it is not. All of these ndings are qualitatively robust. They point inexorably to the existence of discernible patterns in the behavior of decision-makers during foreign policy and international crises relating to security. In fact, there is an inner logic to the process in which crises erupt, escalate, wind down, and terminate. fi fi fi fi fi To conclude on the core questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, with the two central ndings from the 29 in-depth case studies of foreign policy crises: 1. In contrast with the ndings from individual psychology, high stress does not have a negative effect on the quality of deci- sion-making in foreign policy crises; in fact, the impact is the reverse. 2. There was a common pattern of coping with international cri- sis-generated high or rising stress, across regions, time, system structures, power levels, economic levels, types of regime, and other dimensions. 124 M. BRECHER The reason is that stress is a shared challenge, an indicator of impending harm and danger. States have common traits that outweigh their diver- sity, especially the need to survive and to minimize harm from external foes. Foreign policy-national security decisionmakers, in coping with crisis-generated stress, act as humans do in comparable situations of per- ceived impending harm. In essence, the commonality of statehood, stress, and human response to expected harm overrides variations among spe- cic states and generates a widely shared pattern of coping in a foreign policy crisis. These ndings compel a fundamental rethinking about how states cope with foreign policy crises, that is, about crisis managemenitn world poli- tics. test of neo-realisM: evidence froM 29 crises The earliest formulation of the Realist paradigm for International Relations can be traced to the internecine strife of the Greek city- state and Indian princely state systems of antiquity (by Thucydides and Kautilya, respectively). It was enriched by several classical Western phi- losophers, notably Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau. Classical Realism continued to be pre-eminent in the rst half of the twentieth century, through the writings of Niebuhr 1932, Carr 1939, 1946, Wolfers 1940, Spykman 1942, Morgenthau 1946, 1948, Wight 1946, and others. Several alternative paradigms have emerged since the 1970s, all challeng- ing Realism on theoretical and empirical grounds, notably neoinstitu- tionalism, critical theory, constructivism, and feminism. The most recent important variant of Realism, neo-(structural) Realism (Waltz 1979, Gilpin 1981, and Mearsheimer 2001), identi ed a causal relationship between the structure of the international system and the unfolding of world politics, including the behavior of its mem- ber-states. This fundamental postulate of neo-Realism was examined in my International Political Earthquakes, 2008, Chap. 12, through a rigorous test of its core thesis. This test focused on the behavior of cri- sis actors, that is, states whose decision-makers identify a foreign policy crisis for their state and confront the value threat, time pressure, and higher-than-normal expectation of war that accompany such a politi- cal earthquake. The logical underpinning of the test was that a discovery of substantive differences in the patterns of crisis behavior during the four fi fi fi fi 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 125 structural eras—multipolarity (late 1918–September 1945), bipolar- ity (late September 1945–end 1962), bipolycentrism (1963–1989), and unipolycentrism (1990 continuing) would indicate strong support for the neo-Realist view that structure shapes world politics, as well as the foreign policy–security behavior of states, its principal actors. However, should an inquiry into the structure–behavior link nd either no or minor differences in the patterns of crisis behavior during the four structural eras, it would seriously undermine the claim of neo-Realism to theoretical primacy. What does the evidence reveal? Evidence from 29 Cases First, as noted above, the most prominent trait of crisis dimensions— geography, time, power level, economic development, and politi- cal régime, among others—and of crisis attributes—trigger, triggering entity, attitudinal prism and values, etc.,—is diversity. Moreover, diversity encompasses both the entire period of this inquiry, from late 1918 to 2017, as well as the four structures of the international system since the end of World War I: there are no distinct patterns of crisis dimensions and crisis attributes among the four structures; rather, diversity is evident within multipolarity, bipolarity, bipolycentrism, and unipolycentrism. The more signi cant test of the neo-Realist thesis is the evidence on how crisis actors (states) coped with higher perceived threat, time pres- sure, and likelihood of war, that is, crisis behavior. The evidence on this test is incontrovertible: for all four coping mechanisms and processes, noted in the above discussion, there was support for 10 hypotheses and, as postulated, discon rmation of 4 hypotheses, that is, 14 of 19 hypotheses generated by other studies of crisis behavior. The extent of support for most hypotheses on many aspects of behav- ior ranges from strong to very strong, in a group of 29 crisis actors in all four system structures. Some of these hypotheses are: Information The higher the crisis-induced stress, The greater the felt need, and quest, for information, 27–0; The greater the reliance on past experience, 21–2; The more active the search for information, 20–3; The more information will be transmitted to senior decision-makers, 25–1. 126 M. BRECHER fi fi fi Consultation: The longer the crisis decision time, The greater the consultation outside the core decisional unit, 19–6; The greater the reliance on extraordinary channels of communication, 19–8; The higher the rate of communication with international actors, 26–2; Decisional Forum: The higher the crisis-induced stress, The greater the felt need for face-to-face proximity among decision-makers, 17–4; The greater the felt need for effective leadership within the decisional unit, 18–5; Alternatives: The higher the crisis-induced stress, the less careful the evaluation of alternatives, rejected by 16–7, as I argued; The shorter the crisis decision time, the greater the tendency to premature closure, rejected by 22–4, as I argued; The shorter the crisis decision time, the more likely decisions will be made with inadequate assessment of consequences, rejected by 15–7, as I argued; Stress: High stress is dysfunctional, cognitive and decisional performance will deteriorate markedly, rejected by 19–5, as I argued. In sum, 13 of the 19 tested hypotheses by other scholars are clearly sup- ported (or clearly rejected, as I argued), some strongly, others very strongly. Even more signi cant, in the context of the neo-Realist theory that struc- ture determines external state behavior, as well as world politics, more gen- erally, there is no discernible pattern of structural differentiation in these ndings: that is, all four system structures in the near-century (late 1918- end of 2017 are amply represented in the majority, often decisive, support for, or postulated rejection of, these 13 hypotheses. Moreover, the absence of any clear structural differentiation is also evident in the cases that do not support the hypotheses. Suf ce it to illustrate the multi-structure distribu- tion of the 29 cases for the 19 hypotheses by noting the system structure 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 127 identity of non-support cases for 4 hypotheses with a large majority sup- port. fi fi fi Hypothesis 7 the longer the crisis decision time, the greater the con- sultation outside the core decisional unit—Supported, 19 cases, Not Supported, 6 cases; (there was missing data for 2 cases, and 2 cases were not tested). The non-support cases comprise the following: Italy (Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War 1935–1936) multipolarity, here- after M; USSR (Berlin Blockade 1948–1949) bipolarity, hereafter B; USA (Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval 1958) B; USSR (Prague Spring 1968) bipolycentrism, hereafter Bipol; Pakistan (Bangladesh War 1971) Bipol; Iraq (Gulf War I 1990–1991) unipolycentrism, hereafter U. In sum, the six non-supporting cases occurred in all four system structures. Hypothesis 8 the longer the crisis decision time, the greater the reliance on extraordinary channels of communication—Supported, 19 cases, Not Supported, 8 cases; (there was missing data for 1 case, and 1 case was not tested). The non-support cases comprise the following: Italy (Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War 1935–1936) M; USSR (Berlin Blockade 1948–1949) B, Italy (Trieste II 1953) B, Guatemala (Guatemala 1953–1954) B, India (Bangladesh War 1971) Bipol, USA (Gulf War I 1990–1991) U, Yugoslavia (Kosovo 1998–1999) U, and USA (Gulf War II 2002–2003) U. In sum, the eight non-supporting cases occurred in all four system struc- tures. Hypothesis 14 the longer the crisis decision time, the greater the felt need for effective leadership within the decisional unit—Supported, 18 cases, Not Supported, ve cases; (there was missing data for 4 cases, and two cases were not tested). The non-support cases comprise the following: 128 M. BRECHER Ethiopia (Ethiopian [Abyssinian] War 1935–1936) M; Italy (Trieste II 1953) B; USA (Dominican Intervention 1965) Bipol, Pakistan (Bangladesh War 1971) Bipol, and Syria (Lebanon Civil War 1975–1976) Bipol. In sum, the ve non-supporting cases occurred in three system structures. Hypothesis 19 High stress is dysfunctional; that is, cognitive and, there- fore, decisional performance...will deteriorate markedly—Supported, ve cases, Not Supported, 19 cases; (there were missing data for 2 cases, 1 case had mixed ndings, 1 case was not tested, and 1 case was not rel- evant). The support cases comprise the following: fi fi fi fi Guatemala (Guatemala 1953–1954) B, Hungary (Hungarian Uprising 1956) B, USA (Dominican Intervention 1965) Bipol, The central nding from this analysis is clear. The Realist theory that system structure determines state behavior in world politics does not accord with reality, certainly not the reality of foreign policy crisis behavior by states. The fact that the foreign policy crisis behavior of states from all system structures exhibits non-support for many hypotheses indicates that crisis behavior is the outcome of several, probably multiple, pressures, and inducements, of which the structure of the international system is, at most, one source, and not necessarily the most in uential cause of crisis behavior. In sum, the most important nding from in-depth research on the stress-behavior relationship is that two long-held beliefs about state behavior during international crises are fundamentally awed: rst, that high stress seriously undermines the quality of foreign pol- icy-national security decision-making and 4 GENERAL FINDINGS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 129 second, that the great diversity of crises and crisis actors leads to great diversity in behavior, not to a shared pattern in crisis management. fi fl fi fl fi Both of these conventional views, derived from the evidence on one state, the USA, are seriously undermined by the multiple qualitative case study ndings above. (Brecher, International Political Earthquakes (2008)) fi fi Pakistan (Bangladesh War 1971) Bipol, and Argentina (Falkland/Malvinas 1982) Bipol. In sum, the ve supporting cases occurred in two system structures.

Chapter 4: General Findings: Foreign Policy Crises PDF

Document Details

Tags

Related

Summary

Full Transcript

Upgrade to continue