Summary Class 5 Neo-Neo Debate PDF

Class 5. Neo-realism, neo-liberalism and the Neo-Neo Debate Starter: the behaviorist turn in IR The Behaviouralist turn gave a novel methodological approach to the study of social sciences (and of IR). It became dominant in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In contrast with the ‘traditional’ approach, the be...

Class 5. Neo-realism, neo-liberalism and the Neo-Neo Debate Starter: the behaviorist turn in IR The Behaviouralist turn gave a novel methodological approach to the study of social sciences (and of IR). It became dominant in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In contrast with the ‘traditional’ approach, the behavioralist approach endeavored to be more ‘scientific’. = in order to explain the world of international relations, behavioralists collected empirical data about international relations, preferably a large amount of data, which could then be used for measurement, classification, generalization and, ultimately, the validation of hypotheses, i.e., scientifically explained patterns of behaviour. Thus, behaviouralists seek to examine the behaviour, actions, and acts of individuals and groups in different social settings and explain this behaviour as it relates to the (international) political system. This differed from previous researchers in IR, who were then called “traditionalists”, as they did not have this mindset of “natural sciences” or “hard sciences” for the explanation of ir: their methods were rather much more similar to philosophy and history. Behaviouralists criticised their predecessors for not being scientific enough, whereby scientific meant to apply the scientific method used in hard sciences for IR as well. The behavioralist revolution transformed social sciences in 1940-1960. It aimed at applying empirical and quantitative methods in social sciences, and, therefore, in international relations (statistics, modelling, etc.), whereas the previous approaches were considered too NORMATIVE. All researchers afterward had to confront themselves with these ideas: either participate to them or criticise them, but could not ignore them. 1 Neo-realism Neo-realists: - individual, relative gains - conflict, not cooperation - States resort to cooperation IF it is in their (security) interests OR because of POWER DIFFERENTIALS - Cooperation is a zero-sum game Difference between ‘classical realism’ and ‘neo-realism’: - the former is a normative approach that focuses on the core political values of national security and state survival and is largely inspired by ancient political thinkers; the latter, which we are going to discuss today, is a more recent IR doctrine. It is a more scientific approach and focuses on the ‘structure’ of the international system. Therefore, it is also known as ‘structural’ realism. - Neo-realism is strongly influenced by the behavioralist approach, as it seeks to apply scientific methods to the theoretical and practical problems posed by the Cold War, that is, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Neo-realism is very deeply connected with the Cold War. The neo-realist approach/theory develops as a response to that special, if not unique, historical situation. Definition of Cold War (from French historian Claude Quétel): “Political, strategic, military as well as ideological and cultural opposition that took place between two antagonistic blocks structured around two superpowers that never entered into direct conflict”. Different stages of the Cold War: - first phase (1945-1953) setting up of the Cold War: the United States and its allies created the NATO military alliance in 1949 in fear of a Soviet attack and called their global policy against Soviet influence containment. - 1956-1961 phase of relative peaceful coexistence; Warsaw Pact created in 1955 in response to NATO. - 1961-1962: phase of acute crises, for example the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. - 1962-1975: the phase of the ‘détente’ (relaxation): the policy of relaxing tensions between the Soviet Union and the West, as promoted by Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Leonid Brezhnev. - 1979-1985, period of elevated tension: the United States increased diplomatic military, and economic pressures on the Soviet Union, at a time when it was already suffering from 2  economic stagnation. In the mid-1980s, the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the liberalizing reforms of glasnost ("openness") and perestroika ("reorganization") and ended Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. - 1985-1991: end of the Cold War. One the leading contemporary neorealist thinker is undoubtedly Kenneth Waltz (1924-2013). He was a Professor at Columbia University and his books “Man, the State and War” and “Theory of international Politics” are key texts of international relations from a neorealist point of view. Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lz_EnqamQwU What determines the way in which states behave in the international arena? He proposes a ‘scientific’ vision of international relations = He changes the terms of the debate: from a focus on ‘human nature’ to a focus on numbers, game theory and a rational outlook on reality. Because states live in an anarchical system, they fear each other and cannot predict each other’s behavior; any state could attack another state at any time. For Waltz, all states share one goal: SURVIVAL and that is the product of anarchy in the formal sense, meaning absence of government. He also thinks that anarchy results in a power balancing determined solely by relative military power (culture, religion etc. are all irrelevant; all types of states will behave the same way). So, how can we best understand states’ behavior in a condition of anarchy? Billiard table metaphor: the billiard table represents the international system. Balls represent individual states. When a player takes a shot, each ball is affected equally by its contacts with others: this is a multi-polar system. Let’s imagine a different billiard table, representing a bipolar system. As well as the equally sized balls, there are now two huge ones. They represent superpowers and it’s these two balls that dominate the whole system. States are like billiard balls: it’s just about billiard balls and their size, reflecting military power. In a multipolar system, all balls affect one another; everyone has influence; but in a bipolar system, the mere fact that the bigger billiard balls exist affect what’s possible for all the other balls. Waltz’s theory helps us understand why a constant feature of international politics is conflict rather than cooperation. Waltz takes some elements of classical and neoclassical realism as a starting point, e.g., the idea that states exist and operate in a system of international anarchy (= absence of government): this is his first principle, the ORDERING Principle: there’s no hierarchy internationally. 3 He tries to provide a ‘scientific’ IR theory: unlike Morgenthau, he gives no account of human nature (remember Morgenthau’s animus dominandi and a pessimistic view of human nature) and does not speak about the ethics of statecraft. Waltz’s most important work is ‘Theory of International Politics’ (1979) in which he seeks to provide a third-image theory: a scientific explanation of the causes of war to be found in the structure of the international system itself (as opposed to first-image and second-image theories – see slides). Balance of power according to Waltz: it describes a situation in which states are continuously making choices to increase their own capabilities while undermining the capabilities of others. This generates a ‘balance’ of sorts as (theoretically) no state is permitted to get too powerful within the international system. In Waltz’s view, the best IR theory is one that focuses centrally on the structure of the system, on its interacting units, and on the continuities and changes of the system = while in classical realism, state leaders and their international decisions and actions were at the center of attention, in neo-realism, by contrast, the structure of the system that is external to the actors, in particular states’ relative distribution of power, is the central analytical focus. Therefore, actors are relatively unimportant because structures compel them to act in certain ways. The focus is on the structure of the system and not on the human beings who create the system or operate the system. Structures determine action. State leaders are ‘prisoners’ of the structure of the state system and its deterministic logic which dictates what they must do in their conduct of foreign policy. In the context of the decentralized structure of anarchy between states, states are alike in all basic functional respects: despite their differences in terms of cultures, ideologies, history, or constitutions, they all perform the same basic tasks. All states must collect taxes, conduct foreign policy etc. States differ significantly only regarding their greatly varying capabilities in performing similar tasks: DIFFERENTIATION PRINCIPLE. Additionally, Waltz operates with the concept of state sovereignty: ‘to say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems’. Thus, according to Waltz, states are in a position to decide for themselves, that is, in a position of independence from other sovereign states: each state is formally the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. But states are equal only in a formal-legal sense. They are often unequal in a substantive or material sense: DISTRIBUTION PRINCIPLE: States differ for the different distribution of power among them. Waltz also operates with the concept of national interest: ‘each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its interests’. But for him, unlike classical realists, national interest operates like 4 an automatic signal commanding state leaders when and where to move. It is not a moral idea that must be defended and promoted.  Waltz sees states as structures that respond to the impersonal constraints and dictates of the international system.  The states that have greater capabilities, or the great powers, are the ones that crucially determine changes in the structure of the international system. The great powers manage the international system. Thus, it is the power differentials between states that explain international relations. International change occurs when great powers rise and fall and the balance of power shifts accordingly. A typical means of such change is great-power war. A balance of power between states can be achieved, but war is always a possibility in an anarchical system. Waltz distinguishes between bipolar systems – such as the one existed during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union – and multipolar systems – such as those existed both before and after the Cold War: - Bipolar systems are more stable according to Waltz, and thus provide a better guarantee of peace and security than multipolar systems: ‘With only two great powers, both can be expected to act to maintain the system’. This is because in maintaining the system, they are maintaining themselves. From this perspective, the Cold War was a period of international stability and peace. - Why are bipolar systems more peaceful and secure than multipolar systems? 1. The number of great-power conflicts is fewer, and that reduces the possibilities of great- power war. 2. it is easier to operate an effective system of deterrence because fewer great powers are involved; 3. Because only two powers dominate the system the chances of miscalculation and misadventure are lower. The two rival superpowers can keep their eye steadily fixed on each other without the distraction and confusion that would occur if there were a larger number of great powers. Waltz wants to present a scientific explanation of international politics which is a big step beyond the political and moral theories of classical realism. Although he makes no explicit reference to values or ethics and avoids normative theory, the basic assumptions and concepts he uses and the basic international issues he is concerned with are normative ones. Ultimately, Waltz wants to show how a structural analysis could shed light on the ‘long peace’ that was produced by the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Waltz’ neo-realist approach has been defined as ‘defensive’. In his approach, he recognizes that states must and do seek power to be secure and to survive, but believes that excessive power is counter-productive, because it provokes hostile alliances by other states. It does not 5 make sense to strive for excessive power beyond that which is necessary for security and survival. To explain the “absence of war” during the Cold War, Waltz proposed the “balance of power” model. The structure of the international system often leads to the development of several great powers (hegemonic powers), because States look for allies and gather as blocs. Because these powers are equal, they maintain a relationship of peaceful observation. This is not peace, but the “absence of war”. International peace is just a short break; when it lasts, this is not thanks to collective efforts (treaties, international organisations), but to a fragile balance of power that shapes the international scene. The Cold War corresponds to a situation of balance of power, especially in the stage of peaceful coexistence and détente. As a counter theory to that of Waltz, the theory of offensive realism was developed (mainly) by John Mearsheimer. He departs from a similar premise, that anarchy in the international system compels states to compete over one another for power. However, he argues that states seek hegemony and that they are ultimately more aggressive than Waltz portray them as being. The goal of a country such as the US after the Cold War is to dominate the entire system, because only in that way could it make sure that no other state or combination of states would ever think about attacking it. So, all states seek hegemony, but the planet is too big, there are constraints, and no state would have the necessary power to become the world’s hegemon.  states can only become the hegemon of their own region of the world. Regional hegemons can see to it, however, that there are no other regional hegemons in any other part of the world. They can prevent the emergence and existence of a peer competitor. The US for example: for almost two centuries, the US endeavored to ensure that no great power intervened militarily in the Western hemisphere (the US sphere of influence). US has made a great effort to ensure that there is no regional hegemon in either Europe or East Asia, which are the areas where there are other major powers or great powers, and a potential peer competitor could emerge. If China became a peer competitor, the US could be expected to go to great lengths to contain China’s influence and prevent it from intervening in other regions of the world where American national interests are at stake. Offensive realism thus rests on the assumption that great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal. There will always be conflict over power and a struggle between national states for power and domination in the international system. Offensive realism has been the subject of several lines of criticism: 1. It debunks liberal democratic theory – that is, that democracies are less likely to wage war against each other; 2. It fails to explain peaceful change and cooperation between great powers (e.g., between Great Britain and the US); 6 3. It fails to explain the emergence of the European Union – pooling of sovereignty by states in an international community. Neo-liberal institutionalism Neo-liberal institutionalists: - collective, absolute gains - cooperation is useful for all states - Information sharing through IOs - BUT states have to be INDUCED to cooperate (through IOs) - Cooperation is a positive-sum game The increasing number and the long-lasting lives of international institutions and their growing membership challenge the Neo-Realist interpretation of international relations. In particular when these international institutions affect sovereignty, as is the case of the Convention on the laws of the sea. The prisoner’s dilemma is a non-zero-sum game. From a rational and individual point of view, the best strategy is to betray/accuse/denounce the other. This is so because the best solution, for an individual, is to betray the other without being accused. And because the individual gains are higher in the column corresponding to accusing. Yet, the Pareto optimum (the most satisfying solution, when adopted collectively) consists in remaining silent. According to neo-liberals, including Robert Keohane (After Hegemony, 1984) and Robert Axelrod ("Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy. Strategies and Institutions" 1985), the prisoner’s dilemma illustrates two important points: - it is often in the interest of States to cooperate because a free rider behaviour is counter- productive (see for instance the climate change issue). - Yet, according to neo-liberals, States do not cooperate instinctively, but have to be invited to cooperate (guided towards cooperation). This is what international regimes and international organisations are useful for. According to neo-liberals, States are reluctant to cooperate when they are suspicious and lack information (see the evolution of the game when the prisoners can talk to each other). - Another important mechanism is reputation. As States have to cooperate several times on a wide range of international issues, the repetition of the game creates positive expectations. For neo-liberals, regimes are efficient and robust. They create absolute gains. 7 Ex: the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has 191 members in Sept 2024. It is one of the most consensual multilateral agreements to control armaments. Signed in July 1968, it entered into force in 1970. The United-States, Russia, France, Great Britain and China have been for a long time the sole States to possess nuclear weapons. The NPT deals with horizontal proliferation: it aims at: (i) banning the diffusion of nuclear weapons to the States that do not already own some (art 1er); (ii) promoting disarmament processes for States which own nuclear weapons ; (iii) ensuring that all Parties have access to peaceful nuclear technology (art 4). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervises the implementation of the treaty. The treaty establishes principles (to renounce to nuclear weapons in exchange for civilian technology), rules (ban of any transfer of nuclear weapons) and procedures (the Council of the AIEA takes decisions). In May 1995, a conference that aimed at revising the treaty, decided upon an unlimited extension of the agreement. The treaty prevented several States from acquiring nuclear weapons. The NPT ensures international security. No State benefits from the rise of a new nuclear power in its neighbourhood. Several States, including South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Sweden, Ukraine, Byelorussia or Kazakhstan have renounced to the atomic bomb. The NPT helps building trust among Parties. The treaty has enabled the adoption of other regional agreements in the field of nuclear weapons such as the Rarotonga treaties in 1986 in the Pacific region (Australia, New-Zealand, etc.) or the Tlatelolco agreements adopted in 1967 for Latin America. The NPT contributes to stigmatising certain behaviours of States that do not respect the Treaty. It is currently the case of North Korea or Iran. The NPT serves as the basis for international exchanges in the field of peaceful nuclear energy. The NPT warranties the access of Parties to civilian nuclear energy. The Neo-Neo Debate In 1988, another Neo-realist, Joseph Grieco, will respond to Keohane Robert Grieco will take an example of an international regime which was ended although it seemed to work well. Grieco asks: WHY did Nixon decide to put an end to the Bretton Wood system which had worked quite well for roughly 25 years? The Bretton Woods system established the rules for commercial relations among a total of 44 countries after the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement. The end of Bretton Woods was formally agreed in 1976. Robert Gireco asked Keohane: if Nixon decided to end a system which was working quite well, doesn’t this prove that cooperation can come to an end even when it can be rationally effective? How can we explain it? 8 Grieco proposed the following analysis: anarchy does not entail the absence of information: it entails the absence of security (it comes back to Waltz, to some extent). States must look for their situation in the domain of cooperation => this means that, since they have to look for their security, they have to look whether the cooperation with other states profits more to them or more to the partners in the cooperation.  cooperation is not a positive game, where all the players profit: cooperation is a zero- sum game: one state is likely to benefit more from than the other one. Your security can only be achieved thanks to your resources = a state guarantees its security thanks to an amount of military resources at least as important as the other states. => when a state commits itself in a cooperation, it must make sure that this cooperation will not profit the other state more: if the gains of the other states are superior to the first state's ones, then the first state has relative losses, because the other one has superior gains. => a state will not engage in cooperation if the other state wins more. States cannot afford to take this risk, because their security will on the long run be endangered. => cooperation is only possible when the state either wins or when it equals, at max. =/ when it expects to lose, the cooperation will not start or it will come to an end = state will disengage. So for Grieco too, like for Mearsheimer, cooperation is possible but it is harder to achieve and it is likely to last over shorter periods than according to Neo-liberals, who are very optimistic regarding the long-term positive impact of cooperation. Finally, Neo-realists and Neo-liberals came to a compromise. They agreed in saying that the neoliberals are right when saying that cooperation is possible and actually easy to achieve and likely to endure in the economic domain, because it profits the welfare of all the states: absolute gains, even lesser absolute gains, for all the states and their population will profit from them in terms of welfare. They agreed also in saying that realists are right when saying that cooperation is more difficult, and likely to come to an end, in the domain of security, because in security, when your resources end up becoming lower than the other ones’, your security is no longer guaranteed: the other ones gradually become more and more powerful, so it is rational to adopt a self-help, unilateral policy. 9 Glossary Prisoner’s Dilemma In game theory, it describes a situation in which two players each have two options whose outcome depends crucially on the simultaneous choice made by the other, often formulated in terms of two prisoners separately deciding whether to confess to a crime. It is a situation used also to describe problems of cooperation in international relations. Neo-realism This theory analyses how the decentralized and anarchical structure of the state system, in particular the relative distribution of power of states, is the central focus. Structures more or less determine actions. International change occurs when great powers rise and fall and the balance of power shifts accordingly. A typical means of such change is great-power war. Actors are less important because structures compel them to act in certain ways. An ethics of statecraft is this unnecessary. Defensive realism Defensive realism argues that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to maintain moderate policies to attain power and national security. Defensive realism asserts that aggressive expansion as promoted by offensive realists endangers the tendency of states to conform to the balance of power theory, thereby decreasing the primary objective of the state, which they argue is ensuring its security. Offensive realism Offensive realism seeks power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony. For offensive realists, security is scarce. The anarchic nature of the international system compels states to maximize their share of world power and to seek superiority in order to make themselves more secure and thereby increase their odds of survival. The ultimate goal of every major power is to become the hegemon. Balance of power The balance of power is among the most persistent and most widely cited concepts in International Relations. It is essentially about the idea that hegemonic power will always be counterbalanced by a strategic alliance of rivals in order to secure their own survival and sovereignty. Balance of power theory explains the effects of the anarchical self-help system on the behaviour of states, operating when- ever a single state seeks preponderance over the others. States can pursue a policy of balance of power in two ways: by increasing their own power, as when engaging in an armaments race or in the competitive acquisition of territory; or by adding to their own power that of other states, as when embarking upon a policy of formal alliances. The concept has become particularly relevant to the study of world politics after the Second World War and is widely associated with the realist or neo- realist theory of International Relations. To these scholars, the balance of power is ‘an intrinsic feature of international politics’. 10 Hegemony In IR, it is a concept referring to a state’s power relative to that of other states. The term hegemony characterizes the relationship between a great power and the states that it dominates. From the neorealist perspective in particular, a hegemon is a state that can dictate the behaviour of other states because it commands the material resources, both economically and militarily, to do so. A state may be considered a hegemon if it is so powerful economically and militarily that it is a dominant influence on the domestic and foreign policies of other states. Depending on its level of power, a state may be a regional hegemon (e.g., Germany immediately prior to and during the Second World War) or a global hegemon (e.g., many agree, the US in the mid- to late twenty and early twenty-first centuries). Neo-liberalism A renewed liberal approach which seeks to avoid the utopianism of earlier liberalist theory. Neoliberals share the classical liberal ideas about the possibility of progress and change, but they repudiate idealism. They also strive to formulate theories and apply new methods which are scientific. Cooperation In the study of international relations, neoliberalism is a school of thought which holds that international cooperation between states is feasible and sustainable, and that such cooperation can reduce conflict and competition. Neoliberals highlight the role of international institutions and regimes in facilitating cooperation between states. The main reason why international organizations facilitate cooperation is that they provide information, which reduces collective action problems among states in providing public goods and enforcing compliance. Game theory Game theory is the study of the ways in which interacting choices of rational decision-makers (or agents) produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) of those agents, where the outcomes in question might have been intended by none of the agents. Behavioralism A novel methodological approach in the study of social sciences (and of IR) which was dominant in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In contrast with the ‘traditional’ approach, the behavioralist approach endeavored to be more ‘scientific’. To explain the world of international relations, behavioralists collected empirical data about international relations, preferably a large amount of data, which could then be used for measurement, classification, generalization and, ultimately, the validation of hypotheses, i.e., scientifically explained patterns of behavior. Thus, behaviouralists seek to examine the behaviour, actions, and acts of individuals and groups in different social settings and explain this behavior as it relates to the (international) political system. Absolute gains/relative gains Gains are benefits that accrue to participants that cooperate. Relative gain is related to zero- sum game, which indicates that wealth cannot be expanded and the only way a state can become 11 richer is to take wealth from another state (neo-realist approach). Relative gains differ from absolute gain, which is the total effect of a decision on the state or organization, regardless of gains made by others (neo-liberal approach). Referring to a non-zero-sum game, neo-liberals suggest that all states can benefit peacefully and simultaneously by virtue of comparative advantages. In contrast, the neorealist “relative gain” theory is single-minded in weighing the effects of an action towards power balances. Since it is a zero-sum game, states have to compete with each other to increase their own benefits. Non-proliferation Treaty The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. 12