Stuvia-2674399-summary-how-democracies-die-by-ziblatt-en-levitsky-exam-qs-universiteit-antwerpen.docx

Ziblatt (2018) + exam Q's Introduction ============ - Havard professors of comparative politics Steven Levitsky and Daniell Ziblatt start with a discussion of US democracy. They believe there is a cause of concern that US democracy is under threat eventhough the US has a strong and r...

Ziblatt (2018) + exam Q's Introduction ============ - Havard professors of comparative politics Steven Levitsky and Daniell Ziblatt start with a discussion of US democracy. They believe there is a cause of concern that US democracy is under threat eventhough the US has a strong and rich middle class, a solid constitution, with its values of freedom and equality instilled in its people. They base this concern on their historical analysis of democracies that died before. - Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that when most people think of democracies dying, they think of it as "at the hands of men with guns". They, however note that the death of democracies are recently happening much more as a longer and sometimes more stealthy "[process of democratic decline]". Here Levitsky and Ziblatt take [Venezuela under Hugo Chavez] in the late 90's/early 2000's as example. Hugo Chavez started as an anti-elite outsider candidate promising democracy and fighting corruption among others. A promise he didn't completely falter on at the first. However as the years went on he showed more and more authoritarian traits like stalling an election where he was forecasted to lose his presidency, - Levitsky and Ziblatt developed some tools to prevent a process of democratic backsliding: A "Litmus test" to prevent would-be authoritarians from coming to powers and a shared conscience between parties on how to tackle would be authoritarians. Even rival parties have to team up to isolate would be authoritarians. This still requires political courage. Something the republican party failed at with electing Donald Trump, someone who appeared to not respect democratic norms. However, to backtrack. Trump is not the cause of democratic backsliding, heightening political polarization -which have been happening since the 1980's- is, according to Levitsky and Ziblatt. 1.Fateful alliances =================== - Summarized excerpt: In the 1920's, right after the end of the German empire and start of the Weimar Republic, there was a prodemocratic coalition of Catholics, Liberals, and Social Democrats in Germany. However in the 1930's the center fell prey to infighting and the Communists and Nazis grew in popularity. But it got worse as the great depression of the 1930s also hit. The government collapsed. WWI hero Paul von Hindenburg took advantage of a constitutional article that gave him the power to appoint chancellors without them being elected to make a government. After a few short lived governments that couldn't reach majorities in the house, a group of conservatives with Hindenburg decided to go for a popular outsider at the time: Adolf Hitler. They thought they could easily control him *"We've engaged him for ourselves....Within two months, we will have pushed \[him\] so far into a corner that he'll squeal."* A more profound miscalculation is hard to imagine. Almost the identical situation happened with Mussolini where the king -under pressure- decided to invite him as prime-minister to form a cabinet. - These two cases show, just as with Hugo Chavez[^2^](#fn2){#fnref2.footnote-ref}, that established politicians often want to co-opt an extremist outsider thinking that they can control him, fullfilling establishment goals, while presenting as a new government that can solve the current crisis. However, the opposite is true, since it gives them the [legitimacy] they wanted in the first place. Levitsky and Ziblatt also note that countries that avoided democratic backsliding is not because of its citizens being more pro-democratic but because of [political party co-operation in identifying and isolating the extremist outsider]. Political parties are democracy's gatekeepers. - Levitsky and Ziblatt argue for a [political process of identifying, isolating and defeating] these extremist outsiders: - [Process of identifying] would be authoritarians: some follow a clear anti-democratic pattern; Mussolini, Chavez and Hitler [all partook in attempted coups]. However a lot of potential authoritarians don't. That is why Levitsky and Ziblatt propose the **four-point warning system** or **Litmus Test**[^3^](#fn3){#fnref3.footnote-ref} **for autocrats** which helps identify would be authoritarians or anti-democratic politicians. They drew inspiration from old political scientist [Juan Linz] who built the Litmus test: - A politician who put into question any democratic principle (e.g. integrity of elections). - A politician who has denied the legitimacy of any political opponent. - A politician who has encouraged violence. - A politician who has indicated to thread on civil liberties of other actors in society (e.g. the media or political opponents). - [Isolating (and defeating) authoritarian politicians] is harder to do since anyone should have the right to run for office. However there are things that parties can do such as: - Expelling any would-be authoritatarian extremists in the party even if that means that you miss out on free votes. - [Forming an alliance] ("united democratic fronts") [with rival parties] to keep out authoritarian parties. - In Chapters 2 and 3 Levitsky and Ziblatt examine how American democracy has kept extremist candidates at bay because American democracy did experience its share of would-be autocrats according to Levitsky and Ziblatt. But such candidates were prevented from assuming power by [the gatekeeping function of political parties]. Until the 1960's, when changes were made to the voting system. 2.Gatekeeping in America ======================== - In Chapters 2 and 3 Levitsky and Ziblatt examine how American democracy has kept extremist candidates at bay (until the 1960's) because American democracy did experience its share of would-be autocrats according to Levitsky and Ziblatt. They name politicians such as: - Politician and governor Huey Long in the 1920's who smeared and supressed his opponents. - Father Charles Coughlin in the 1930's who garnered millions of listeners to his radio broadcasts accusing Franklin D. Roosevelt to be influenced by Jews and communists, he also praised Hitler and Mussolini. - Joseph McCarthy, which will be extensively covered in later chapter. - George Wallace, governor of Alabama in the 1960's who was a staunch segregationist and opposed the civil rights movement. He won a large share of the votes in the primaries by appealing to white voters who felt threatened by social change and racial equality. He also denounced the government and the media. He also used violent language to intimidate his opponents. - Levitsky and Ziblatt go on to talk about the Republican convention of 1920 where Repiublican leadership had to choose nominees for president. Eventhough it was behind closed doors and not very democrat, they always chose safe candidates. This was the gatekeeping function back then and goes back the founding of the US republic. Namely the founders grappled with the dilemma (which is still a dilemma today) of letting the people choose, elect someone for president but [they did not completely trust the people's ability to judge a candidate's fitness to serve as president] since public support is easily garnered with fear and ignorance. - An answer to this dilemma for them was the establishment of the [electoral college] as the first gatekeeper. The electorates are smart degree holding people with requisite qualification that could in the end override the people's wishes. However, the system was flawed as it doesn't prevent someone from assuming nomination, but more importantly; it was a time before parties, a system the founding fathers didn't predict. Once parties came to the forefront in the early 1800s, the electorates became party loyalists thus surrendering its gatekeeping function. [Ever since then, parties became the gatekeepers of American democracy] because they select presidential candidates by endorsing and funding them. - As was clear in earlier example with Republican convention choosing presidential nominees, they weren't particularly democratic with insiders or "organisation men" determining who would get nominated behind closed doors. Eventhough it was a strong gatekeeping mechanism to keep antidemocratic politicians from assuming power (e.g. Henry - However the convention system ended after the insiders of the Democratic convention appointed an unpopular candidate Hubert Humphrey after the assassination of Robert F Kennedy in '63 and unpopular Lyndon B Jonhon's handling of the Vietnam war. Before his assassination, Kennedy took a somewhat antiwar position and Hubert Humbhrey was a Lyndon B johnson associate thus his appointment made the public lose faith in the old system. This lead to a march on the convention with protests and violence on the convention floor. - The defeat of Humprhey in the presidential election lead to an overhaul of the convention system in 1972 where both parties adopted a system of [binding presidential primaries] where candidates were directly chosen by voters. However Democratic party leadership did not want to give up the gate-keeping system that fast. In the 80's a system of [superdelegates][^4^](#fn4){#fnref4.footnote-ref} was in place; between 15 and 20% of the delegates had to be governors, mayors, senators and representatives that can freely choose their preferred democratic nominee for president in primaries as a counterbalance to the public as a mechanism to fend off anti-democratic candidates. The GOP opted out of a system of superdelegates. - Prominent political scientists at the time did critique the new binding primary system for their absent gatekeeping function. However, minority candidates at the time set the stage so the fears dissipated slowly. However, circumventing the party establishment was still not completely done for. Money still plays a big role in American Ch.3 The great Republican Abdication ==================================== - In Chapter three Levitsky and Ziblatt explain the Trump situation. After the convention system changed into a binding primary system, more outsider ran for office, but in particular those with money and fame, circumventing Hadley's invisible primary. The invisible primary died with Trump. However other factors also contributed to a diminishing of the powers of establishment gatekeepers and to the rise of Trump: - the supreme's Court 2010 Citizens United ruling made it easier for outside candidates -like for example Bernie Sanders resp. Herman Cain - to get funded by small donations on the internet resp. by finding billionaire financiers. - The rise of alternative media or the "news entertainment complex" e.g. Fox News, which gave more recognition to extremist characters because they increase viewership- and social media which makes name recognition something much easier to accomplish. It is in particular the news entertainment complex that circumvented Hadley's invisible primary; Trump didn't have endorsements from influential republican politicians and funding from party leadership, but what he did have was support from right-wing media figures like Sean Hannity and Ann Coulter. Trump's controversies also elevated him to free coverage from traditional unsympathetic media outlets. One can say that by 2016 the gatekeepers of the invisible primary left the building entirely (money in politics does not however). - Despite that Trump's rhetoric was described by many of his supporters as "mere words" he did meet all four criteria of the Litmus test for autocrats: - The first -- a politician who puts democratic principles in question- Trump tested positive for by suggesting that millions of illegal immigrants and dead people would be mobilised to vote for Clinton and later in his campaign made the unprecedented suggestion that he might not accept the results of the 2016 election. - The second -- questioning the legitimacy and status (criminal, unpatriotic, a threat) of political opponents- which he did by suggesting that Obama was not an American national, that he was born in Kenya. Even more, that he was a muslim, which many of his supporters see as "unamerican", and that Hillary Clinton was a criminal. The saying "crooked Hillary Clinton" is all too well known. - The third -inciting violence- are a few examples: *"If you see somebody getting ready to throw a tomato, knock the crap out of them, would ya? Seriously. Just knock the hell out of them. I promise you I will pay the legal fees. I promise."* (February 1, 2016, Iowa). *"We had some people, some rough guys like we have right in here. And they started punching back. It was a beautiful thing. I mean, they started punching back. In the good old days, this doesn't happen, because they used to treat them very, very rough. And when they protested once, you know, they would not do it so easily again. But today, they walk in and they put their hand up and put the wrong finger in the air at everybody, and they get away with murder, because we've become weak."* (March 9, 2016, North Carolina) - Fourth: curbing civil liberties of actors in society, such as the media. In 2016 he described the media as "among the most dishonest groups of people I've ever met". He also barred certain media groups from the White House. - Excluding Richard Nixon, no presidential candidate even met one of the four criteria. However, the republican party did bare to nothing to stop Trump give the clear four-point warnings, much less working with rivals to stop the antidemocratic demagogue. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that when Trump entered the general election in 2016, - Instead, most Republicans "ended up holding the party line" meaning normalizing Trump's candidacy and making it into a standard two-party race. Any small event can weigh heavily, for example a surfaced video that paints a candidate in a bad light. With it being forecasted as a close race, without any leading Republican indicating there was anything dangerous about their candidate, Trump won. - In chapter 4 Levitsky and Ziblatt discuss the role of institutions such as courts and in chapter 5 discuss norms - mutual toleration and institutional forbearance- in preserving democracy. Ch. 4 Subverting Democracy ========================== - Levitsky and Ziblatt use Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori in 1990s Peru as an example of how democratic breakdown happens as a gradual process whereby conflict escalates between an outsider, Fujimori, and the political establishment, in this case congress (where the opposition had a majority), the supreme court whose members were mostly picked by said opposition, and the media. Essentially an escalating tit-for-tat between a demagogic[^5^](#fn5){#fnref5.footnote-ref} leader and a threatened political establishment. - Fujimori was a university administrator with little political experience who ran for office and surprisingly got a large share of the vote. He ran on a platform of economic reform and anti-terrorism -- the country - Fujimori began to bypass congress by using executive decrees where he among others freed thousands of prisoners and made statements such as "Are we really a democracy?" i.e. he started to show real authoritarianism. The court accused him of "antidemocratic authoritarianism" and went on with articles of impeachment, all the while the media began to depict him as a Japanese emperor. [However this only made Fujimori double down], in a speech he said "I am not going to stop until I have broken all of the taboos that are left, one by one they are going to fall". He sent a massive package of 126 decrees which include far reaching antiterrorism measures that threatened civil liberties. Congress objected and instead passed legislation to curb Fujimori's power. This conflict eventually led to Fujimori dissolving congress and the constitution with the help of the military. - Levitsky and Ziblatt put emphasis in this anecdote on the role of "words" in the process of democratic breakdown. - Another point is that authoritarians like Fujimori are often unused to the slow working of democratic systems and find it frustrating to work with. This is why they will try to [take over the courts], society's "referees" by appointing or packing them with loyalists (court packing), blackmailing uncooperative judges and bribing supreme court justices, as happened under Fujimori. This was a very quiet and secret process, a large amount of judges and public prosecutors were on Fujimori's payroll. The remaining justices that wouldn't be bribed could later on be impeached and the courts packed. As happened with Chavez, he packed the supreme court from twenty to thirty-two, essentially creating a new court. Over the next years, not a single Supreme court ruling went against the government. - Once the courts are under loyalist control, the authoritarian is both shielded and can use the courts to target rival politicians, businesses and media outlets. Most elected autocrats begin with offering public figures and the media favourable positions or quietly bribing them off. This is what Fujimori did, at the impeachment trial, the necessary votes were there but three opposition members were bought off. He also bought off almost every major news channel. - The [persecution of opposition politicians] has also changed, whereas old school dictators would often jail, exile or even kill their rivals, temporary autocrats hide behind a veneer of legality. Like Erdogan, who fined the opposing biggest news independent news company with an amount that almost exceeded their net worth for tax evasion. In Putin's case, Putin was someone who targeted big business aswell because they had the opportunity to finance opposition. In 2000, Putin summoned twenty-one of Russia's wealthiest businessmen where he told them that they're free to make money under his watch aslong as they stayed out of politics. Even the richest could not escape. Mikhail Khodorkovsky was head of Yukos oil. As a liberal he disliked Putin and had financed many opposition politicians. He was deposed for tax evasion. Another, Boris Berezovsky the largest shareholder of a large television station had a bogus fraud case levied against him. He fled the country and his junior partner was appointed. - Lastly, elected autocrats try to change the rules of the game by [reforming the electoral system]. In Malaysia and Hungary they did this by something called Gerrymandering: changing the way electoral districts are structured so that in a FPTP system districts are favoured to go to a particular party. Eventhough only a small majority of Malaysians were "malay", the party in power still got 70% of the vote. In Hungary they changed the constitution after a 2/3rds majority in the 2010 election, rewriting electoral districts. Eventhough they faced losses in the election after, they could still hold on to a larger share of the vote than they should have. Gedownload door: panidabunmak \| panidabunmak\@gmail.com - Levitsky and Ziblatt close the chapter by noting that autocrats sometimes use (self-devised) external shocks such as economic crises, natural disasters and security threats (war or terrorist, insurgency or terrorist attacks) to cement their power. Most constitutions allow for expanded executive powers during times of crisis. Levitsky and Ziblatt note that politicians tend to enjoy much greater public support during national crises, citing president Bush after 9/11 as an example. His approval rating soared from 53 percent to almost 90 percent. This also makes that other politicians are less likely to stand up to a president with that high approval rating. The people themselves also report to be more readily able to give up certain civil rights for the "greater good". Levitsky and Ziblatt give Ferdinand Marco's rule of the Phillipines in the 1970's as example. Facing only a couple insurgents, Marcos devised a series of terrorist attacks (40 injured, 1 death) and a sham assassination attempt on his defence secretary with the goal of calling in martial law to extend his rule as president, which succeeded. Another well known example is the Reichstag Fire which at the time was blamed on communists. Adolf Hitler used this as a way to enforce emergency powers. Same with Putin and the Chechen^7^ apartment bombings in Moscow (more than 300 dead) in 1999. Some evidence points to Russia's own secret service having planted the bombs. Putin consequently launched a war on Chechnya boosting his approval rating. Ch. 5 The Guardrails of Democracy ================================= - In Chapter 5 Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that the US constitution is not an inherent effective tool for protecting democracy. Many Latin-American countries and US colonies faithfully copied the US model; its constitution, its bicameral congress and its supreme court yet still had many autocratic leaders: Ferdinand Marcos of the Phillipines, Juan Péron of Argentina. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that the constitution has different interpretations and that there are always gaps and ambiguities inherent in the constitutions and legal system. There are for example [very little constitutional safeguards] against [filling independent security agencies] such as the [FBI] with loyalists, only a "thin tissue of convention" is there i.e. [unwritten rules]. (The constitution also has different interpretations to different people.) - It is these unwritten rules, shared codes of conduct, according to Levitsky and Ziblatt that are the soft guardrails of democracy. Particularly important among these are mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. - **Mutual toleration** is the democratic norm where politicians recognize their opposition as legitimate rivals for powers where they respect their right to exist, compete and govern. Despite how common sense this norm sounds like, mutual toleration is still fairly modern. In medieval monarchies, opposition was often seen as treason. Even in the early days of the American republic both sides in America's early political system -John Adam's Federalists and Thomas Jefferson's Republicans- saw eachother as a threat to the republic. One side accused the other of being British Tories, the other as traitors to Revolutionary France, with which the US was almost at war with. Each side passed laws to persecute the other. It took decades for the parties to come to the conclusion that they could be rivals instead of enemies. Same with 1931 Spain who just underwent its first democratic transition. The country was torn between the catholic conservatives CEDA and the socialists. CEDA saw the socialists as bolshevizing foreign agents and the socialists grouped CEDA with the far right monarchists who were plotting to overtrow the republic. When CEDA won in the next elections in 1933 tensions increased and the socialists formed a parallel government which CEDA brutally repressed. This made spain sink into a violent conflict with bombings, political assassination and church burnings. - **Institutional forbearance** (institutional restraint) is the democratic norm where politicians avoid actions that respect the letter of the law but violate its spirit i.e. politicians doing whatever is in their legal right but wouldn't respect the political system or separation of powers. This norm goes back to the late medieval monarchies where kings could rule with "divine right". However, to be godly requires wisdom and self-restraint. One of the most powerful precedents of institutional forbearance is the two-term limit on the presidency. Since George - These two norms reinforce each other, be it positively or negatively. A politician who recognizes the legitimacy of rivals where they respect their right to exist, compete and govern is usually also less likely to violate norms that goes against the spirit of laws. An example of a positive reinforcement would be a republican congress that approves a democratic president's SC pick. This reinforces each party's belief that the other side is tolerable promoting a virtuous circle. A negative reinforcement would a "cycle of escalating constitutional brinksmanship." As Eric Nelson, political scientist wrote. Nelson offers the collapse Charles I's monarchy in 1640s England as an example which was a consequence of the battle between the parliament under Cromwell and the king with the Church of England. The constitution stipulated that the parliament was the only entity to collect taxes. Since they saw Charles I inching closer and closer to absolutism they demanded certain criteria to be fulfilled by the crown before it gets funded, one of these criteria was a virtual dismantling of the Church of England. This demand was norm-breaking. As a response, [Charles responded with a norm violation himself]: he dissolved parliament. 10 years later, parliament reopened but the spiral of legislative obstruction and royal overraching led to a full blown war. Charles lost hist life, the English monarchy was dismantled for 10 years until the next king, one with much less powers, took his place. - The most notable democratic breakdown by the degrading of basic norms was that of Chile in the 1970's. Chile had a long lasting democratic era starting from 1891 to 1973, it can be regarded as Latin-America's oldest and most successful democracy sustained by enforced democratic norms. A "culture of compromise" was always present. However the first strain started in the 1960's when the cold War and Cuban Revolution started to take hold of the CIA funded conservative far right party's fear. The socialist candidate Salvador Allende (the first socialist government) won by 36 percent. Democratic norms prescribed that if no presidential - Chapter 6 gives an overview of how norms were upheld in the period beginning from the compromise of 1877 to 1970. Chapter 7 discusses how these norms gradually broke down again in the recent decades as we all know. Ch.6 The Unwritten Rules of American Politics ============================================= - Chapter 6 talks about the **prerogatives** (exclusive right or privilege held by a person or group, in this case; presidents, congress and the SC) by the three powers. - Ziblatt and Levitsky begin with an anecdote of how the norm of institutional forbearance safeguarded American democracy during the American 1930's. In 1933 the great depression reached its deepest point. President Roosevelt proposed to fight the crisis with [unilateral action] to push his progressive New Deal (e.g. Bank holiday). The conservative Supreme Court objected to which Roosevelt [responded] with trying to expand the size of the court, also known as [court packing]. For this however, he faced criticism from all sides, including his own party members. The [norm of forbearance held], even during a crisis as profound as the Great Depression. - Ziblatt and Levitsky grab back to the post civil war situation. They argue that the "Compromise of 1877", the agreement between the parties to [abandon civil and voting rights] for African Americans (racial equality) -which the southern Democrats saw as a threat- laid the foundation for [restoring mutual toleration]. This however came at the cost of racial exclusion and single-party rule in the South. Republicans and Democrats started to see eachother more as rivals which gave rise to the kind of politics that would characterize American democracy for the decades that followed such as the 16^th^ amendment in 1913 which permitted federal income tax and the 19^th^ amendment (1919) which granted women the right to vote. [Mutual toleration encouraged institutional forbearance] which made the US system of checks and balances that made democracy thrive. - Ziblatt and Levitsky go on to talk about [presidential power] which limits are not clearly defined in the constitution, Article II which lays out the formal powers of the president is virtually silent on the president's authority to act unilaterally. Presidents have a variety of tools at their disposal to take unilateral action without congressional approval (executive orders, directives, executive agreements etc.), and can quite easily dodge judicial control (the president can even pardon himself). But, presidents have largely opted not to violate these unwritten norms[^8^](#fn8){#fnref8.footnote-ref}. Even - Ziblatt and Levitsky go on to talk about [forbearance in Congress]. The US senate has the power to [filibuster] and with that delay and or/block any piece of legislation, called "[gridlock]". However, up until 1917 no formal rules were written on the filibuster but there was no need for it, since institutional forbearance was strongly present. This norm was also embedded in norms of [reciprocity], filibustering would namely [endanger future cooperation]. The filibuster was seen as "a weapon of last resort". A modest increase eventually lead to the 1917 cloture rule by which three-fifths of the senate could vote to end the debate. Between 1917 and 1959, the Senate saw an average of one filibuster per congressional term. Another power of congress is [blocking supreme court picks], however the norm is to not interfere with the president's pick. Highly qualified nominees were invariably approved even when senators disagreed with them ideologically. The ultraconservative Antonin Scalia, a Reagan appointee, was approved in 1986 by a vote of 98 to 0, despite the fact that the Democrats had more than enough votes to filibuster. In the 150-year span between 1866 and 2016, the Senate never once prevented the president from filling a Supreme Court seat, until now. The last prerogative of congress is [impeachment]. This can happen as a quickie as happened with president Bucaram on grounds of "mental incapacity" but in the US, impeachment with conviction takes 2/3rds majority in the senate after a normal majority in the house. However, impeachment without conviction still should be a traumatic event that weaken presidents. - Ziblatt and Levitsky point out **three instances when norms were severely tested in American democracy** until 1975 with the Nixon administration : - **President Roosevelt** was heavily reliant on [unilateral action]; he issued an unprecedented amount of executive orders, 3000 to be exact. Secondly [he sought a third term] in office -- the two-term norm was soon after his death enshrined in the constitution as 22^nd^ amendment in 1951. And lastly as earlier mentioned he attempted to [pack the SC]. - The 2^nd^ test was under **McCarthyism** in the 1940's to late 1950's. Joseph Mcarthy was a senator during the beginning of the cold war who led an anti-communist campaign to expose alleged communists inside American society, but in particular in government. He infamously said *"I have here in my hand a list of 205 names that were made known to the Secretary of State and who nevertheless are still working and shaping the policy of the State* Ch.7 The Unravelling ==================== - Chapter 7 gives an overview of how norm breaking has crept inside American politics in the most recent decades. It starts of with the [first time in history blocking] of President Barack Obama's [supreme court pick] (very qualified magistrate and moderate Merrick Garland) -after Antonin Scalia had died-, a radical departure from historical precedent, but Levitsky and Ziblatt note that the roots of the action stem further back, to the 1970's. - Levitsky and Ziblatt take us back to Republican congressman Newt Gingrich's 1978 congressional campaign. Ginrich believed in [hardball politics rejecting established norms of civility and bipartisan cooperation], and was at odds with Republican leadership namely House Minority leader Bob Michel, a moderate Republican. Thanks to new media technology (he appeared on C-SPAN) he broke through calling Congress as "corrupt" and "sick" and questioned his Democratic rivals' patriotism. Democratic Party leader at the time later said of him, *"the things that came out of Gingrich's mouth...we had never \[heard\] that before from either side. Gingrich went so far over the top that the shock factor rendered the opposition frozen for a few years."*. Gingrich purportedly went on to "[train]" his Republican colleagues to use negative words such as pathetic, sick, traitors through audiotapes he distributed. Gingrich was one of the first to nurture and popularise the polarisation there was at the time. He was a kind of late blooming McCarthyite that succeeded. Filibuster use rose sharpedly in the 1980's and peaked under Bill Clinton's presidency where Gingrich had powerful positions. Senate Republicans also pushed for investigations into dubious Clinton scandals, which would linger over the rest of his presidency. It culminated in president Clinton's impeachment over marital affairs (lying under oath), nothing which constitute high crimes or misdemeanors. Gingrich was after his departure in 1999 followed by his partner House majority leader Tom DeLay nicknamed "the Hammer" for his polarisation and routine norm breaking. - However Democrats are also not clean on everything. During Bush's administration, Democrats blocked many of his federal appeals court nominations[^9^](#fn9){#fnref9.footnote-ref} by [filibustering], which was an unprecedented move. - Another pure hardball norm breaking action happened on the state level. It is the norm that [redistricting] (altering voting districts to better fit population sizes) should happen once a decade. Texas Republicans led by House Majority Tom Delay carried out a radical redistricting plan in 2003 that gerrymandered African American voters into a small number of Democratic districts (redistricting in Texas only needs a simple majority in the Texas House and senate, other states are more strict. Texas Republicans gerrymandered Hispanic and Black voters again in 2021 btw). The house at this point was almost exactly even, thus this action ensured the Democratic house defeat in the next congressional election. - Eventhough Obama and his rival McCain showed great respect to eachother. Obama lauding McCain for his contributions, McCain delivering a gracious concession speech, McCain did get a lot of boos from his audience. After Obama's inauguration, his legitimacy was questioned by some conservative authors, later emerging as the "Tea party" - However, Levitsky and Ziblatt note that these attacks were different from previous instances of intolerance (such as with Henry Ford) since many of Republican followers believed them and leading Republicans endorsed the beliefs. This [decline in mutual toleration led to a degradation of institutional forbearance] during Obama's presidency, but by both parties. While Republicans filibustered on, blocking most of Obama's federal appeals picks, Senate democrats - Other violations of the norm of forbearance during Obama's presidency: - Republicans -under the influence of the Tea party- decided for the first time not to raise the debt ceiling, after they gained control of congress in 2011. Eventhough the debt ceiling has been raised 78 times, 49 under republican presidents and 29 under Democratic presidents (it however was always shown as a "contentious process" even though leaders of both parties always know it is political posturing). Although a last-minute deal prevented a - Obama used an executive order in 2015 to decide over Iran's nuclear program, as said earlier, Obama did decide too many cases using executive order, circumventing the legislative. However, the response was worse. Senate republicans wrote an open letter no Iran's leader insisting that Obama had no authority to negotiate a deal over Iran's nuclear program, treading on the authority of the executive branch. - A third norm-breaking moment was the refusal of President Obama's SC pick in 2016, as mentioned earlier. This was a first in American history. During Hillary Clinton's campaign, Republicans under Ted Cruz also contemplated packing the court in informal statements if Clinton would win. - The authors also note that being Democrat or Republican has become more than a party affiliation, but an [identity]. Levitsky and Ziblatt illustrate this with a poll result. In 1960, political scientists asked how they would feel if their child married someone who identified with another party. About five percent said they would be displeased. In 2010 however, this percentage went up to 35 percent for Democrats and 50 percent for Republicans. Half the country also lives in fear of the opposing political party. - Originally the democrats were southern slave holding white people and the republicans supported abolition. In 1930 during the great depression, one can say that the parties "flipped". The democrats were aligned with Roosevelt's New Deal that benefited the working class, but by then were also supportive of catholic immigrants and African Americans, even though they still supported the conservative whites in the south. The GOP was aligned with conservatives in the west and liberals in the east. Catholics were affiliated about equally to both parties. One can say that the two parties were [internally heterogeneous] at the time. Again the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act under Democratic president Lyndon Johnson fuelled partisanship again, just as how it drew the parties together a century earlier with the compromise of 1877. It [ended single-party rule in the south by the enfranchising of African Americans]. - Levitsky and Ziblatt conclude the chapter by explaining why most norm breaking in the 2000's was done by the Republicans. They conclude that more republicans rely on partisan media outlets (in particular Fox News) than Democrats do. But more importantly, they argue that [republican hardball positions] were mostly [reinforced by wellfunded conservative interest groups] such as ones under the [Koch network] and the [Tea Party]. They instilled into the generation of Republicans that compromise was a dirty word. Another cause of political hardball by Republicans can be found in the theory of "s[tatus anxiety]" where social status and identity feel like to be under existential threat. As Ann Coulter, fox news host chillingly put it, *"The American electorate isn't moving to the left---it's shrinking."*. The danger of casting Democrats as not real Americans is that it's an assault on mutual toleration. Ch.8 Trump Against the Guardrails ================================= - In Chapter 8, LKevitsky and Ziblatt explain how Trump deployed three strategies that have been used by autocratic leaders as discussed in chapter 4: capturing the referees, side-lining key players in the political system (e.g. media) and changing electoral rules to tilt the playing field against opponents: - The first is **capturing the referees**. Shortly after Trump's inauguration he sought guarantees of loyalty from the chiefs of US intelligence agencies (the FBI, CIA and NSA[^11^](#fn11){#fnref11.footnote-ref}). He purportedly summoned [FBI director James Comey] to a one-on-one dinner asking for his loyalty, probably to halt the Russia investigation under his watch. He also appealed to NSA head Michael Rogers and his national security adviser also contacted CIA director Mike Pompeo and the DNI to intervene in James Comey's investigation. Ultimately in an unprecedented move, [Trump fired FBI director James Comey] before his 10 year term was up, never before in FBI's 82 year history (there was a case where a FBI director clearly violated ethical standards), a direct assault on the referees (even though it is investigative law enforcement). After the respected formed FBI director Robert Mueller was appointed as special council to oversee the FBI investigation, the white house tried to dig up dirt on him and calling on Trump to fire him. Trump also attacked judges who ruled against him such as a federal appeals court judge that blocked the administration's travel ban on Muslims. Trump also showed little forbearance (self restraint) by pardoning a disgraced judge Arpaio who was convicted of racially profiling without seeking advice from the justice department, but because it was popular with his base. - The second is **side-lining key players in the political system** such as the media by accusing news channels such as CNN and the New York Times as "fake news" and in 2017 even calling them "the enemy of the American people". Later on he talked about "changing the libel laws" (defamation laws: making false statements about a person or thing) and threatening media companies with antitrust action[^12^](#fn12){#fnref12.footnote-ref} (such as to Jeff Bezos Washington Post and the merger between CNN parent company Time Warner and AT&T). - Lastly, **trying to change the electoral rulebook to tilt the playing field**. In 2017 the Trump administration created the "Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity" chaired by VP Mike Pence to review voter fraud requiring states to hand over voter data, but in reality sought to create stricter voter identity laws (such as requiring valid driver's license and photo ID[^13^](#fn13){#fnref13.footnote-ref}, use homeland security database to look for green card or visa holders to match votes) which would disproportionately impact minority voters who majoritively vote Democrat. In the end, without much cooperation from the states, the commission concluded no or minimal voter fraud. Georgia adopted stricter voter ID laws in 2005 to which an estimated 300,000 Georgia voters lacked the required forms of ID with African Americans five times more likely to lack them as whites. After the law was blocked by a federal circuit court It was upheld by the SC in 2008. This made many other republican states follow suit. Some democrats would call it a "modern day poll tax and literacy test". It only takes a small margin to win over electorates in a first past the post voting system after all. - Levitsky and Ziblatt discuss US democracy's fate during the remainder of Trump's presidency on three factors: - The behaviour of republican leaders. The failure of Roosevelt's court packing and Nixon's failure were made possible by resistance from members of the president's own party. - Presidential approval rating. When public support is high, which happens when Fujimori, Chavez and Erogan launched their assault on democratic institutions, critics such as the media but also judges grow more reluctant to criticise or rule against the government and/or president. Approval rating depends on the state of the economy as well as other contingent events. - The contingent event of a security crisis. There is precedent of security crises leading to presidential powergrabs such as President Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus (presidents can authorize military commanders to arrest people for being disloyal or rebellious without a right to a judicial hearing) during the civil war, Roosevelt's forced incarnation of 120.000 Japanese Americans for being enemies or spies during WW2 without trial, and placed in 10 permanent internment camps, and lastly Bush's PATRIOT act which expanded the use of surveillance and wiretapping, access businesses much easier etc. encroaching on civil liberties and privacy rights. With Donald - Ziblatt and Levitsky close the chapter off with some observations. - Not all norm breaking is inherently bad. They take as example Jimmy Carter's decision to walk (instead of taking the limousine) from the White House to the capitol to show he's the people's president, or Theodore Roosevelt in 1900 having dined with black political leaders, which was not "standard etiquette of white domination". - Trump's consistent norm breaking. For example, nepotism is outlawed for cabinet or agency positions but not White house staff positions, which is why he appointed his daughter Ivanka and her husband Jared Kushner as high-level advisory posts, which is strongly against the spirit of the law. Or norms that reside over public-private interest giving his sons control over his businesses, putting doubt in the integrity of the elections, basic rules of political civility by continuing to attack Hillary Clinton and Obama after election (the unwritten rule is that sitting presidents should not attack their predecessor). But also simply the norm of not lying. politicians typically avoid lying by changing the topic of debate, reframing difficult questions, or only partly answering them, but Trump made the most absurd lies (e.g. he claimed to have the largest electoral college victory since Raegan, or signed more bills in his first six months than any other president (he was well behind several presidents, including George H. W. Bush and Clinton). An independent organisation PolitiFact classified 69 percent of his public statements as false. Lastly the abandonment of the basic norm of respect for the media, other presidents might have scorned the media privately but never publicly. - Trump's consistent norm breaking is dangerous because they are difficult to counter and come to be seen as normal. They take here from the 1993 work \"Defining Deviancy Down" by Daniel Moynihan (the poverty guy). When unwritten rules are violated over and over, [societies have a tendency to "define deviancy down"] or to lower the standard of what is considered normal or acceptable in society. This can apply to political norms as well. Trump has been defining political deviancy down. We as people become overwhelmed and then desensitized. We grow accustomed to what we previously thought to be scandalous. Trump's deviance has also been legitimized by his own party members. Many republicans have condemned Trump's most egrerious statements but still vote with President Trump's policy drafts 90 percent of the time. - In Chapter 9 the authors offer a blueprint for reversing democratic decline in the United States, namely by shoring up the values of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. To do so, the authors suggest among others the need for a diverse coalition of citizens who are united in their defense of democracy, a reform in outside donors and a stop to an appeal to white nationalism. Ch. 9 Saving Democracy ====================== - Levitsky and Ziblatt start the chapter off by making aware that the amount of democracies grew massively the recent decades (1980s till now with peak in 2005) and that for every Turkey, Hungary and Poland there is an Argentina, Chile, Peru, India and Czech Republic. Levitsky and Ziblatt go on to state that the US maintained a broadly prodemocratic foreign policy after the fall of the Berlin Wall (end of cold war). That is in part also why democracies grew so dramatically, thanks to Western support. However, they argue that under Trump the US stopped promoting democracy as a model for other nations. - The authors in 2018 envision three possible outcomes in the wake of Trump: - **Swift democratic recovery.** Either Trump is forced to resign or is not re-elected. Democrats take power and reverse Trump's most egregious policies (this kinda happened with Biden). In that scenario, the Trump period would be taught in schools and recited in historical works as an era of tragic mistakes but where catastrophe was avoided and US democracy was saved. - The second is that Trump and the republican party maintain control and use their position [to cement future white electoral victories] through stricter voter ID laws and possible immigration restrictions, purged voter rolls - The third scenario the authors see as most likely; a future that is increasingly polarized with a further decline of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance. Levitsky and Ziblatt take North Carolina as example which according to them is a mirror of federal politics. It is a classic purple state with a diversified economy and is wealthier, more urban and better educated than most southern states. But it also has intense partisan battles; Republicans impose abortion resitrctions, the well known "Bathroom Bill" that bars transgender people of using the public bathroom that aligns with their gender identity or looks etc. In 2010 (the first time NC was under republican control) the state was redistricted and extremely gerrymandered[^14^](#fn14){#fnref14.footnote-ref}. By 2012, more votes came to democrats but Republicans won 9/13 congressional seats. Later on, Republicans began demanding access to background data on voters and used this information to pass a series of electoral reforms such as stricter vote ID laws, reduced opportunities for early voting and ending pre-registration for sixteen and seventeen year olds, slashed same day registration and massively reduced the amount of polling places. Republicans also voted to shrink the state court of appeals by three seats, effectively stealing three judicial appointments from the next Democratic governor. - In the next section, Levitsky and Ziblatt suggest that Democrats do not fight back dirty as Republicans under a Trump administration. Some political scientist made statements such as "Buck Up, Democrats, and Fight Like Republicans" e.g. by obstructing everything ("appointing not even the lowliest court judge"). However, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that such strategies often play directly into the hands of authoritarians and take the Venezuelan political situation under Chavez as example. Levitsky and Ziblatt also take Colombia under authoritarian Uribe in 2002 where opposition parties did do the right thing. - The first few years of Chavez's presidency were democratic but opponents found his populistic discourse terrifying, afraid Chavez would steer Venezuela toward Cuban socialism. In 2002, opposition leaders backed a military coup which destroyed their image as democrats, later launching a nationwide strike that lasted two months and costs Venezuela \$5 billion. In 2005 they boycotted the congressional elections which only made the *"chavistas"* gain more control. All three strategies led to the erosion of public support and backfired as Chavez by then had an excuse to depict his rivals as antidemocratic. The government had an excuse to purge the military, the police, and the courts, arrest or exile dissidents, and close independent media outlets. - Uribi who was elected in 2002 was not merely a closet authoritarian. His administration immediately attacked and spied on opponents and journalists, tried to weaken the courts and sought to modify the constitution to run for another term. In response, Colombian opposition never answered the attack and focused their efforts on the congress and the courts. This made it more difficult for Uribe to question his opponents' democratic creditions and justify cracking down on them. In 2010 the Colombian supreme court struck down Uribi's bid for a third term as unconstitutional and Colombia's democratic institutions held the line. Gedownload door: panidabunmak \| panidabunmak\@gmail.com - Levitsky and Ziblatt also argue for a building of a broad coalition in support for democracy, an alliance between individuals and groups who otherwise disagree on issues. For example business leaders and Democratic activists. - Levitsky and Ziblatt also argue for elite meetings between leaders that do not share the same viewpoints. This is what happened in authoritarian Chile under Pinochet, after Chile's democracy died in 1973 as discussed in chapter 5: From 1978 onwards, politicians of opposing viewpoints started coming together. What started as dinner invitations grew into regular meetings. Eventually this "group of 24" formed a pact in 1985 which toppled Pinochet and which made Chile transition to a Full Democracy (Pinochet launched a referendum in 1988 deciding if he gets another eight-year term as president. Thanks to the unity of the opposition the "No" vote won with 56%). Leaders developed a practice of informal cooperation which Chileans started to call a "democracy of agreements". Presidents consult the leaders of all -left and right- parties before submitting legislation to congress. This made Chile one of Latin America's most stable democracies the last three decades. - Lastly the authors argue for a reform of the republican and democratic party. - The republican party needs to free itself from the clutches of outside donors and right-wing media. This mean diversifying its electoral constituency such that it not only relies on its shrinking white Christian base and abandoning its appeal to white nationalism. There is precedent for that such as the democratization of West Germany after WWII Nazi-Germany. The CDU separated itself from extremism and it was founded on conservative figures such as Konrad Adenauer (popular Weimar Republic politician) who was staunch anti-Nazi. The CDU went on to diversify its base by recruiting both Catholics and protestants which was a big challenge but the trauma of Nazism and WWII convinced them to work together. The CDU shed off its extremists and -with help from the US- became a pillar of Germany's post-war democracy and is still today very large. The CDU may thus offer as a model for the republican party. - The democratic party also has a role to play, namely in appealing to more white non-college educated workingclass voters (but not at the expense of ethnic minorities, the authors do not agree by backing away from "identity politics" (a promotion of ethnic and sexual diversity) as some use derogatively). What's more important to them is [combatting the growing inequality] (stagnant wages for the bottom end of the income distribution, decreased job security, an increase in working hours^16^). Resent fuels polarisation. This includes a change in the [means tested social programs] (where benefits are more in-kind and only distributed to those who meet certain criteria (which creates stigma) such as income, assets, work etc with frequent verification for compliance) to a universal model such as in Northern Europa, which is more in cash benefits and less reliant on criteria, and covers everyone. Finally, democrats should consider offer cheap job training to make blue collar workers easily bridge the gap to newer durable and growing sectors of the economy. Gedownload door: panidabunmak \| panidabunmak\@gmail.com ^16^ Working hours are much higher in the US than in western European countries. Questions (probably too specific ================================ 1. **In the United States party gatekeepers have served an important prodemocratic function, but their influence is also undemocratic. Discuss whether gatekeepers aid or undermine democracy, citing examples of gatekeeping from the text.** 2. **The authors note that unwritten rules of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance are essential to the functioning of democratic systems. Identify three instances from the text where mutual toleration was undermined in democratic systems, and describe how this led to a decline in institutional forbearance in each case.** 3. **In Chapter 6 the authors note a tension in American democracy: that it was founded on the disenfranchisement of African Americans. Describe how American democracy was founded on a policy of racial exclusion, citing examples from the text.** 5. **Despite the high regard in which many Americans hold the Constitution, Levitsky and Ziblatt suggest that the Constitution alone cannot ensure democracy. Discuss why this is the case, citing three examples from the text.** 6. **Supporters of leaders with autocratic tendencies often dismiss those leaders' rhetoric as "mere words." Describe Levitsky and Ziblatt's argument for why words pose a threat to democracy, drawing on examples from the United States and elsewhere.** 8. **Describe how would-be autocrats subvert democracy by capturing "referees," highlighting three examples from the text.** 9. **Levitsky and Ziblatt lay out a "litmus test" for autocratic leaders. Choose two autocrats or potential autocrats and describe how they meet the criteria proposed by the authors, citing examples.** Linked sections =============== - Democracies are less and less dying at the 'hands of men with guns' and more as a process of democratic decline. A good example here is Fujimori. Ziblatt show the different phases: - Authoritarians are usually unused to the slow working of democratic systems and find it frustrating to work with. - First they could try to take over courts, 'society's referees' by packing them with loyalists (court packing), blackmailing or bribing supreme court justices i.e. a quiet and secretive process. - Trump captured the referees by seeking loyalties from US intelligence agencies. For example asking James comey for dinner to stop the Russia investigation. After his refusal he fired Comey on no grounds, never before in FBI history. A direct assault on society's referees. Furthermore, Trump also disgraced federal judges that blocked his executive actions such as the Muslim travel ban. - Once the courts are under loyalist control the authoritarian is shielded and can target rival politicians, businesses and the media by giving them favourable positions. - Trump called them the enemy of the American people, and wanted to change the defamation laws and threatening the media with antitrust action. - This persecution of media or business is also often behind a [veneer of legality] e.g. fining news companies with fines larger than their total revenue for tax evasion or other things. - A last thing they can do is changing the electoral system so they will always keep winning e.g. [gerrymandering] (electoral law) where in a FPTP system districts are more favoured to go to a particular party. This is what happened in Hungary. - In 2017, Trump created the "Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity" to review voter fraud but in reality also sought to create stricter voter identity laws (photo ID which a lot of black Americans don't have). - An example is hugo Chavez who as a candidate in the 90's promised to fight corruption and bring democracy to the forefront. Later on, he slowly started to show non-democratic traits such as stalling an election when he was forecasted to lose, expanding term limits etc until he could be considered an autocrat locking up opposition leaders, Trump is not a cause but a symptom of heightened political polarisation which has been climbing since the 1980's. - Established politicians sometimes think that during political crises they can select a popular but extremist outsider as leader and control them from establishment lines. This way they can continue business as usually under the guise of a new government. However the opposite is often true (Hindenburg chose Hitler after many candidates failed). Not only can they not control them, they give them the legitimacy which they wanted in the first place. Levitsky sees party cooperation over party ideology as democracy's gatekeepers. It's about **identifying and isolating outsiders**. - **Identifying**: some would be authoritarians follow a clear pattern (partaking in coups such as Chavez, Hitler and Mussolini), others don't. That's why Ziblatt and Levitsky propose a Litmus test for autocrats or **four point warning system** to identify would be autocrats: a candidate of politician that put into question democratic principles like integrity of elections(very clear Trump 2016 and 2020), denies the legitimacy of political opponent (Trump-Obama), encourages violence (antifa bs), thread on civil liberties of actors in society (e.g. - In **isolating** would be authoritarians parties show their [functions as gatekeeprs of democracy]: [expelling extremists] identified by the four point warning system from their parties or forming an alliance with rival parties (the leaders of the parties e.g. Mitch McConnel or Ted Cruz backing Clinton), and not 'holding the establishment lines like with Hitler). For example the Belgian catholics in the 1930's who didn't make an alliance with the 'Rexists', a far right catholic party but instead chose to form an alliance with the socialists while denouncing the Rexists. Internally the Catholics also expelled candidates with pro-rexist sympathis. - Establishment of the electoral college as first gatekeeper: founding fathers didn't trust the people's competence as they could easily be swayed by fear or ignorance. They saw rational degree holding delegates that could in the end overrule the people's choices. However it was flawed, as it didn't prevent someone from assuming nomination. It was also a time before political parties where delegates became party loyalists. When this system failed, parties became the gate keepers of American democracy (conventions of party leadership, organisation men behind closed that chose candidates). - This organisation men structure worked: Henry Ford, one of America's riches and most influential men at the - Other factors also helped outsiders diminish establishment gatekeepers such as supreme court case that made billionaire financiering easier and the rise of the 'news entertainment complex' such as Fox News. Extreme characters get more viewership and get name recognition. Trump didn't get endorsed by party establishment (invisible primary) but he got support from right wing media figures(!). - The constitution is not an inherent effective tool for protecting democracy. Many countries that copied the US constitution had many authoritarian leaders or dictators. The constitution has different interpretations and there are always gaps and ambiguities inherent in the constitutions and legal system. For example, there are bar tot no safeguards against filling independent security agencies with loyalists. And it's also virtually silent on the power of the president (to act unilaterally). It rests a lot in unwritten rules. 2 big unwritte rules: - **Mutual toleration** is the democratic norm where politicians recognize their opposition as legitimate rivals for powers where they respect their right to exist, compete and govern. - The compromise of 1877 to abandon civil and voting rights laid a foundation for restoring mutual toleration after the civil war, eventhough it came at the cost of racial exclusion. This step made Republicans and Democrats see eachother more as rivals instead of enemies. This mutual toleration also encouraged mutual forbearance (respect for the spirit of the law) which made the system of checks and balances of today. - The opposite happened under **mccarhyism** where he used the tactic red baiting: accusing government personnel of having communists ties with no evidence, only unsubstantiated accusations. - **Institutional forbearance** (restraint) is the democratic norm where politicians avoid actions that on one hand respect the letter of the law but would violate its spirit. One very powerful norm that shows this restraint is the two-term limit. No where in the institution it said to respect this. George Washington however showed extreme restraint e.g. sometimes where he signed bills he was 'at variance' with the contents of the bill but signed it out of respect of the legislature. He was also a big proponent of the separation of powers (checks and balances). It was only in 1951 with the 22^Nd^ amendment that this was formalised. Another one was no filibuster cloture rules until 1917 because there was just no need. - Not all norm breaking is inherently bad e.g. Jimmy Carter's decision to walk from the white house to the capital instead of taking the limousine, which is standard etiquette. - Trump broke norms by giving his daughter Ivanka and husband Jared Kushner white house staff positions. It can be viewed as nepotism. Nepotism is outlaw for cabinet positions but not staff positions, which is against the spirit of the law. Other examples is basic rules of civility (not attacking Obama and Hillary Clinton after elections). Norm of not lying e.g. he won the most votes of any president. When unwritten norms are violated over and over, societies have a tendency to 'define deviancy down' i.e. lower the standard of what is considered normal or acceptable in society. We as people become overwhelmed and then desensitized. We have grown accustomed to what we previously though scandalous. - Some political scientists say "Buck Up, Democrats, and Fight Like Republicans" but Ziblatt argues that such strategies often play into the hands of authoritarians because it gives them something to point to. Democrats under Chavez backed a military coups which destroyed their image as democrats. When congress and judicial systems don't give the authoritarian any attention there is no legitimacy. - Levitsky and Ziblatt argue for building bridges to build a coalition in support for democracy e.g. between business leaders and democratic activists. Furthermore, republicans must free itself from billionaire donors and right-wing media. It could model itself after the CDU after the fall of nazi-Germany where it separated itself from extremism and - Democrats shouldn't back away from a promotion of ethnic and sexual diversity. However a focus on growing inequality on bottom wages and decreased job security needs to come. Resentment fuels polarisation. Lastly, a change in social security, away from means tested. Gedownload door: panidabunmak \| panidabunmak\@gmail.com Wil jij €76 per [Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)](http://www.tcpdf.org/) ::: {.section.footnotes} ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. ::: {#fn1} as observed in a country wide survey. The majority of people picked a score of 8 or higher out of 10 rating Venezuela as an autocratic to democratic country.[↩](#fnref1){.footnote-back} ::: 2. ::: {#fn2} the outgoing president Caldera dropped all Chavez's treason charges (Chavez orchestrated many coups before his time as elected Gedownload door: panidabunmak \| panidabunmak\@gmail.com official) to gain popularity. Instead what he could have done is pardoning him after trial. This way Caldera legitimised him.[↩](#fnref2){.footnote-back} ::: 3. ::: {#fn3} The origin of the name Litmus comes from its use in chemistry, an organic substance (from algae) that turns red in acid solution e.g. vinegar and blue in alkaline solutions e.g. water with baking soda. It is used as an acid-base indicator to estimate the acidity of a solution. Later on it slowly was used figuratively to any single factor that somehow established a person's true character. (Not to be known).[↩](#fnref3){.footnote-back} ::: 4. ::: {#fn4} Electorates choose the president and vice president, delegates choose - in line with the people's wishes- the democratic nominee for president.[↩](#fnref4){.footnote-back} ::: 5. ::: {#fn5} A demagogue is a leader who obtains power by means of impassioned appeals to the emotions and prejudices of the public.[↩](#fnref5){.footnote-back} ::: 6. ::: {#fn6} Also known as **Jim Crow laws**, named after a racist show character. Gedownload door: panidabunmak \| panidabunmak\@gmail.com ^7^ Chechnia is a dominantly Muslim Republic in the Russian federation which wanted independence.[↩](#fnref6){.footnote-back} ::: 7. ::: {#fn7} As historian Gordon Wood put it, "If any single person was responsible for establishing the young Republic on a firm footing, it was Washington."[↩](#fnref7){.footnote-back} ::: 8. ::: {#fn8} However, each of the three state powers have the ability to undermine the political system. The president has executive orders, Gedownload door: panidabunmak \| panidabunmak\@gmail.com presidential pardons and court packing, congress has the filibuster (which could obstruct congress itself), and impeachment.[↩](#fnref8){.footnote-back} ::: 9. ::: {#fn9} Federal appeals courts also known as circuit courts hear appeals from district courts e.g. when a lower court finds that voter restriction by Desantis are discriminatory, a federal appeals court will review the case. In some cases the supreme court can still overrule the federal appeals court.[↩](#fnref9){.footnote-back} ::: 10. ::: {#fn10} Examples are an executive order to raise fuel efficiency standards for all cars, ceasing deportation of illegal immigrants who came to the US before the age of sixteen that were in school or the military, and a executive order making federal and state agencies reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and use more renewable energies because congress refused to pass legislation to combat climate change.[↩](#fnref10){.footnote-back} ::: 11. ::: {#fn11} The FBI focuses on enforcing criminal laws and protecting the country from domestic threats, while the CIA and NSA focus on counterterrorism and counterintelligence from foreign adversaries. The CIA relies mainly on human intelligence from agents and informants, while the NSA uses signals intelligence from electronic sources. They all report to the director of national intelligence (DNI).[↩](#fnref11){.footnote-back} ::: 12. ::: {#fn12} Anti-trust is about collusion of free market systems between two or more companies. Gedownload door: panidabunmak \| panidabunmak\@gmail.com[↩](#fnref12){.footnote-back} ::: 13. ::: {#fn13} \% of americans have official government-issued Photo ID while for African Americans this figure is 25%.[↩](#fnref13){.footnote-back} ::: 14. ::: {#fn14} It has been somewhat reduced now after multiple court objections, though still heavily skewed for Republicans.[↩](#fnref14){.footnote-back} ::: :::