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CHAPTER 3 Realism 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Introduction: Elements of Realism Classical Realism 3.2.1 Thucydides 3.2.2 Machiavelli 3.2.3 Hobbes and the Security Dilemma 3.2.4 Morgenthau and Classical Realism Schelling and Strategic Realism Waltz and Neorealism 3.5 68 70 70 72 3.6 3.7 3.8 74 3.9 76 79 82...

CHAPTER 3 Realism 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Introduction: Elements of Realism Classical Realism 3.2.1 Thucydides 3.2.2 Machiavelli 3.2.3 Hobbes and the Security Dilemma 3.2.4 Morgenthau and Classical Realism Schelling and Strategic Realism Waltz and Neorealism 3.5 68 70 70 72 3.6 3.7 3.8 74 3.9 76 79 82 Mearsheimer, Stability Theory, and Hegemony Neoclassical Realism Rethinking the Balance of Power Research Prospects and Programme Integrating International and Domestic Factors KEY POINTS QUESTIONS GUIDE TO FURTHER READING 88 93 95 96 98 100 101 102 Summary This chapter sketches the realist tradition in IR. The point of departure for the chapter is that realism is more accurately described as a research programme or as a theoretical tradition than as a coherent theory. The chapter takes note of an important dichotomy in realist thought between classical realism and contemporary realism, including strategic as well as structural approaches. Classical realists emphasize the normative aspects of realism as well as the empirical aspects. Most contemporary realists pursue a social scientific analysis of the structures and processes of world politics, but they are inclined to ignore norms and values. The chapter discusses and critiques both classical and social scientific strands of realist thought and it shows that realists often disagree among themselves. It examines a recent theoretical debate among realist IR scholars concerning the relevance of the balance of power concept. The concluding section assesses the way different realist theories treat international and domestic factors. 68 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES 3.1 Introduction: Elements of Realism Basic realist ideas and assumptions are: (1) a pessimistic view of human nature; (2) a conviction that international relations are necessarily conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately resolved by force; (3) a high regard for the values of national security and state survival; and (4) a basic scepticism that there can be progress in international politics which is comparable to that in domestic political life. These pervasive ideas and assumptions steer the thought of most leading realist IR theorists, past and present. In realist thought, humans are characterized as being preoccupied with their own well-being in their competitive relations with each other. They desire to be in the driver’s seat. They do not wish to be taken advantage of. This pessimistic view of human nature is strongly evident in the IR theory of Hans Morgenthau (1965, 1985), who was the leading classical realist thinker of the twentieth century. He sees men and women as having a ‘will to power’. That is particularly evident in politics and especially international politics: ‘Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action’ (Morgenthau 1965: 195). Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and indeed all classical realists share that view to a greater or lesser extent. They believe that the acquisition and possession of power, and the deployment and uses of power, are central preoccupations of political activity. International politics is thus portrayed as—above all else—‘power politics’: an arena of rivalry, conflict, and war between states in which the same basic problems of defending the national interest and ensuring the survival of the state, and the security of its people, repeat themselves over and over again. Realists thus share a core assumption that the international state system is anarch ical—i.e., a system with no higher, overarching authority; there is no world government. The state is the pre-eminent actor in world politics. International relations are primarily relations of states. All other actors in world politics—individuals, international organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc.—are either far less important or unimportant. The main point of foreign policy is to advance and defend the interests of the state. But states are not equal. On the contrary, there is an international hierarchy of power among states. The most important states in world politics are the great powers. International relations are understood by realists as primarily a struggle between the great powers for domination and security. Lesser and weaker powers are of secondary importance. They can only realistically adjust their policies and adapt their relations in response to the demands and expectations of the great powers. The normative core of realism is national security and state survival: these are the values that drive realist doctrine and realist foreign policy. The state is considered to be essential for the good life of its citizens: without a state to guarantee the means and conditions of security, human life is bound to be, in the famous phrase of Thomas Hobbes REALISM (1946: 82), ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. The state is thus seen as a protector of its territory, of the population, and of their distinctive and valued way of life. The national interest is the final arbiter in judging foreign policy. The fact that all states must pursue their own national interest means that other countries and governments can never be relied upon or completely trusted. All international agreements are provisional and conditional on the willingness of states to observe them. That makes treaties and all other conventions, customs, rules, laws, and so on between states merely expedient arrangements which can and will be set aside if they conflict with the vital interests of states. There are no international obligations in the legal or ethical sense of the word—i.e., bonds of mutual duty—between independent states. The only fundamental responsibility of statespeople is to advance and to defend the national interest by whatever means. That is nowhere stated more brutally than by Machiavelli in his famous book, The Prince (see Box 3.3). However, most realists also argue that a balance of power between great powers presents a way of limiting war. Only when power faces power is it possible to secure some order in the international sphere. Realists here echo the ancient Latin dictum Si vis pacem, para bellum, ‘If you want peace, prepare for war’. They also echo the Old Testament saying that there is nothing new under the sun. According to realist theory, the fundamental characteristics of international relations remain the same: groups (primarily states) struggle for security and domination in an anarchic international system. That means that there can be no progressive change in world politics comparable to the developments that characterize domestic political life (Wight 1966a). That also means that realist IR theory is considered to be valid not only at particular times and places but at all times, everywhere, because the foregoing basic facts of world politics never change. There are also many issues that divide realists. Realism is best seen as a general research programme, the core of which is the shared emphasis on state survival, international anarchy, and the pessimistic view of human nature described above; but which differs in many other respects. Realism has been referred to as a ‘general orientation’ or even a ‘paradigm’ rather than a theory (Donnelly 2000: 6, 75), and scholars distinguish between different kinds of realism (e.g., Donnelly 2000; Elman 2007). The most general distinction is between classical realism and social science realism. Classical realism is one of the ‘traditional’ approaches to IR. At heart, it is a normative approach that focuses on the core political values of national security and state survival. But some classical realists also attempt to identify laws of international politics. These scientific ambitions sometimes clash with the normative element. For instance, as we detail below, this is the case in the influential writings of the American realist Hans Morgenthau. Classical realist thought has been evident in many different historical periods, from ancient Greece right down to the present time. Social science realism, which includes strategic and structural realism as well as neoclassical realism, is basically a scientific approach. It is largely (although not exclusively) American in origin. Indeed, it has been and perhaps still is the most prominent IR theory in the United States, which by far is home to the largest number of IR scholars in the world. 69 70 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES 3.2 Classical Realism What is classical realism? Who are the leading classical realists? What are their key ideas and arguments? No other tradition in international relations can claim as impressive a lineage as realism, including both ancient authors such as Thucydides and Augustine, early modern political theorists such as Machiavelli, Spinoza, and Hobbes, and modern social scientists such as Max Weber (Smith 1986). In this section we examine the international thought of three outstanding classical realists of the past: (1) the ancient Greek historian Thucydides; (2) the Renaissance Italian political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli; and (3) the seventeenth-century English political and legal philosopher Thomas Hobbes. In the next subsection, we shall single out for special treatment the classical realist thought of the twentieth-century German–American IR theorist Hans J. Morgenthau. 3.2.1 Thucydides Thucydides formulated two important realist claims: First, that the structure of the international system affects relations between states, including ultimately war; second, that moral reasoning has little bearing on relations between states (Smith 1986: 9–10). What we call international relations Thucydides saw as the inevitable competition and conflict between ancient Greek city-states (which together composed the cultural– linguistic civilization known as Hellas) and between Hellas and neighbouring non-Greek monarchies and empires, such as Macedonia and Persia. Neither the states of Hellas nor their non-Greek neighbours were in any sense equal (see Box 3.1). On the contrary, they were substantially unequal: there were a few ‘great powers’—such as Athens, Sparta, and the Persian Empire—and many smaller and lesser powers such as the tiny island statelets of the Aegean Sea. That inequality was considered to be inevitable and natural. All states, large and small, must adapt to that given reality of unequal power and BOX 3.1 Key Developments: International relations in ancient Greece The Greeks established the Hellenic League . . . and placed it under the leadership of Sparta and Athens. Despite the semblance of Greek unity during the Persian Wars (492–77 BCE) there were serious conflicts between members of the League, mostly occasioned by the smaller city-states’ fear of Athenian imperialism and expansion. Thus, after the Greek victories over the Persians, Athens’ competitors, led by Sparta, formed a rival organization, the Peloponnesian League, an intricate alliance and collective security system designed to deter further Athenian expansion . . . A bitter competition over trade and naval supremacy between Corinth and Athens led ultimately to the Peloponnesian Wars involving the two military alliances. Holsti (1988: 38–9) REALISM conduct themselves accordingly, or risk destruction. Ancient history is full of examples of states and empires, small and large, which were destroyed. So Thucydides emphasizes the limited choices and the restricted sphere of manoeuvre available to rulers in the conduct of foreign policy. He also emphasizes that decisions have consequences; before any final decision is made, a decision maker should have carefully thought through the likely consequences, bad as well as good. Thucydides thus emphasizes the ethics of caution and prudence in the conduct of foreign policy in an international world of great inequality, of restricted foreign-policy choices, and of everpresent danger as well as opportunity. Foresight, prudence, caution, and judgement are the characteristic political ethics of classical realism that Thucydides and most other classical realists are at pains to distinguish from private morality and the principle of justice. If a country and its government wish to survive and prosper, they had better pay attention to these fundamental political maxims of international relations. In his famous study of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 bce), Thucydides (1972: 407) put his realist philosophy into the mouths of the leaders of Athens—a great power—in their dialogue with the leaders of Melos—a minor power—during a moment of conflict between the two city-states in 416 bce. The Melians made an appeal to the principle of justice, which to them meant that their honour and dignity as an independent city-state should be respected by the powerful Athenians. But, according to Thucydides, justice is of a special kind in international relations. It is not about equal treatment for all, because states are in fact unequal. Rather, it is about recognizing your relative strength or weakness, about knowing your proper place, and about adapting to the natural reality of unequal power. Thucydides, therefore, let the Athenians reply to the Melian appeal as set out in Box 3.2. That is probably the most famous example of the classical realist understanding of international relations as basically an anarchy of separate states that have no real choice except to operate according to the dictates of power politics in which security and survival are the primary values and war is the final arbiter. Thucydides seems to have been the first to perceive classical Hellas as an international system dominated by its great powers. This was the foundation for his justly famous explanation of the BOX 3.2 Key Quotes: Thucydides on the strong and the weak The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept . . . this is the safe rule—to stand up to one’s equals, to behave with deference to one’s superiors, and to treat one’s inferiors with moderation. Think it over again, then, when we have withdrawn from the meeting, and let this be a point that constantly recurs to your minds—that you are discussing the fate of your country, that you have only one country, and that its future for good or ill depends on this one single decision which you are going to make. Thucydides (1972: 406) 71 72 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens. According to Thucydides, ‘What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.’ Gilpin (1981; 1988) has termed this the theory of hegemonic war, that is, ‘the idea that the dynamic of international relations is provided by the differential growth of power among states’ (Gilpin 1988: 591). A number of later wars, including the Thirty Years War (1618–48), the Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815), and the First World War (1914– 18) have been adduced as examples of this. In the Thirty Years War, the incumbent great power was the Habsburg Empire, which was threatened by the growing might of France and by upstarts such as Sweden. The conflict between France and Great Britain led to the Napoleonic Wars, and in the case of the First World War, it was Germany’s rise as a new superpower that made war inevitable, according to the theory of hegemonic war (Gilpin 1988). Elman (2007) terms this body of theory ‘Rise and fall’ realism and Gilpin (1988: 606) goes so far as to claim that Thucydides’s theory has ‘withstood the test of time better than any other generalization in the field of international relations’. Recently scholars have begun to discuss whether the rise of China—and the challenge it poses to the established superpower, the USA—might trigger yet another hegemonic war (Allison 2017). 3.2.2 Machiavelli Power (the Lion) and deception (the Fox) are the two essential means for the conduct of foreign policy, according to the political teachings of Machiavelli (1984: 66). The supreme political value is national liberty (libertas), i.e., political independence. The main responsibility of rulers is always to seek the advantages and to defend the interests of their state and thus ensure its survival. That requires strength; if a state is not strong, it will be a standing invitation for others to prey upon it; the ruler must therefore be a lion. That also requires cunning and—if necessary—ruthlessness in the pursuit of self-interest: the ruler must also be a fox. If rulers are not astute, crafty, and adroit they might fail to notice a menace or threat which, if not guarded against, will harm or destroy them, their regime, and possibly even the state as well. That rulers must be both lions and foxes is at the heart of Machiavelli’s (1984: 66) realist theory. Classical realist IR theory, therefore, is primarily a theory of survival (Wight 1966a). The overriding Machiavellian assumption is that the world is a dangerous place. But it is also an opportune place. If any political leader hopes to survive in such a world, they must always be aware of dangers, anticipate them, and take the necessary precautions against them. And if they hope to prosper, to enrich themselves, and to bask in the glory of their accumulated power and wealth, it is necessary for them to recognize and to exploit the opportunities that present themselves and to do that more quickly, more skilfully, and—if necessary—more ruthlessly than any of their rivals or enemies (see Box 3.3). The conduct of foreign policy is thus an instrumental or ‘Machiavellian’ activity based on the intelligent calculation of one’s power and interests as against the power and interests of rivals and competitors. That shrewd and sober outlook is reflected in some typical Machiavellian maxims of realist statecraft, including the following: be aware of what is happening; do not wait REALISM BOX 3.3 Key Quotes: Machiavelli on the Prince’s obligations A prince . . . cannot observe all those things for which men are considered good, for in order to maintain the state he is often obliged to act against his promise, against charity, against humanity, and against religion. And therefore, it is necessary that he have a mind ready to turn itself according to the way the winds of fortune and the changeability of [political] affairs require . . . as long as it is possible, he should not stray from the good, but he should know how to enter into evil when necessity commands. Machiavelli (1984: 59–60) for things to happen; anticipate the motives and actions of others; do not wait for others to act; act before they do. The prudent state leader acts to ward off any threat posed by their neighbours. He or she should be prepared to engage in pre-emptive war and similar initiatives. The realist state leader is alert to opportunities in any political situation, and is prepared and equipped to exploit them. This is the manly virtú of statecraft that is likely to seduce Fortuna—the goddess of fortune—and ensure political success (Skinner 1981: 32–3). Above all, according to Machiavelli, the responsible state leader must not operate in accordance with the principles of Christian ethics: love thy neighbour, be peaceful, and avoid war except in self-defence or in pursuit of a just cause; be charitable, share your wealth with others, always act in good faith, etc. Machiavelli sees these moral maxims as the height of political foolishness and irresponsibility; if political leaders act in accordance with Christian virtues, they are bound to come to grief and they will lose everything. Not only that, they will sacrifice the property and perhaps the freedom or even the lives of their citizens, who depend upon their statecraft. The implication is clear: if a ruler does not know or respect the maxims of power politics, their statecraft will fail and with it the security and welfare of the citizens who depend absolutely upon it. In other words, political responsibility is different from ordinary, private morality. The fundamental, overriding values are the security and the survival of the state; that is what must guide foreign policy. Machiavelli has been identified as being among the first to put forward and defend the ‘autonomy of politics’ from e.g. ethics and religion, i.e., the notion that political necessity may override any traditional norms of Christian or merely good behaviour. As the English historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin has argued, Machiavelli rejected an overarching system of morality: the values of political life differ fundamentally from the Christian values of charity, mercy, and forgiveness (Oakley 2015: 78–9). Machiavelli’s realist writings are sometimes portrayed (Forde 1992: 64) as ‘manuals on how to thrive in a completely chaotic and immoral world’. But that view is somewhat misleading. The international world has its own morality of power. Rulers have responsibilities not merely to themselves or to their personal regimes but also to their country and its citizens: what Machiavelli, thinking of Florence, refers to as ‘the republic’. This is the civic virtue aspect of Machiavellian realism: rulers have to be both lions and foxes because their people depend upon them for their survival and prosperity. That 73 74 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES dependence of the people upon their ruler, and specifically upon the wisdom of their foreign policy, is owing to the fact that the people’s fate is entangled with the ruler’s fate. That is the normative heart not only of Machiavellian realism but also of classical realism generally. 3.2.3 Hobbes and the Security Dilemma Thomas Hobbes believed we can gain a fundamental insight into political life if we imagine men and women living in a ‘natural’ condition prior to the invention and institution of the sovereign state. He refers to that pre-civil condition as the ‘state of nature’. For Hobbes (1946: 82), the state of nature is an extremely adverse human circumstance in which there is a permanent ‘state of war’ ‘of every man against every man’; in their natural condition every man, woman, and child is endangered by everybody else, life is constantly at risk, and nobody can be confident about their security and survival for any reasonable length of time. People are living in constant fear of each other (see Box 3.4). Hobbes believes there is an escape route from the state of nature into a civilized human condition, and that is via the creation and maintenance of a sovereign state. The means of escape is by men and women turning their fear of each other into rational joint collaboration with each other to form a security pact that can guarantee each other’s safety. Men and women paradoxically cooperate politically because of their fear of being hurt or killed by their neighbours: they are ‘civilized by fear of death’ (Oakeshott 1975: 36). Their mutual fear and insecurity drive them away from their natural condition: the war of all against all. In other words, they are basically driven to institute a sovereign state not by their reason (intelligence) but, rather, by their passion (emotion). Their intelligence alone is insufficient to propel such action. With the value of peace and order firmly in mind, they willingly and jointly collaborate to create a state with a sovereign government that possesses absolute authority and credible power to protect them from both internal disorders and foreign enemies and threats. In the civil condition— i.e., of peace and order—under the protection of the state, men and women have an opportunity to flourish in relative safety; they no longer live under the constant threat of injury and fear of death. Being secure and at peace, they are now free to prosper. As Hobbes puts it, they can pursue and enjoy ‘felicity’; i.e., happiness, well-being, etc. (see Table 3.1). BOX 3.4 Key Quotes: Hobbes on the state of nature In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building . . . no arts; no letters; no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Hobbes (1946: 82) REALISM TABLE 3.1 Key focus of three classical realists THUCYDIDES MACHIAVELLI HOBBES Political fate Political agility Political will Necessity and security Opportunity and security Security dilemma Political survival Political survival Political survival Safety Civic virtue Peace and felicity However, that statist solution to the problem of the natural condition of humankind automatically poses a serious political problem. A peaceful and civilized life can only be enjoyed within a state and it cannot extend beyond the state or exist between states. The very act of instituting a sovereign state to escape from the fearful state of nature among individuals simultaneously creates another state of nature between states. That poses what is usually referred to as ‘the security dilemma’ in world politics: the achievement of personal security and domestic security through the creation of a state is necessarily accompanied by the condition of national and international insecurity that is rooted in the anarchy of the state system. The term ‘security dilemma’ was first coined by the German–American realist John Herz in his 1951 book Political Realism and Political Idealism but Hobbes had long ago anticipated the idea. There is no escape from the international security dilemma in the way that there is an escape from the personal security dilemma, because there is no possibility of forming a global state or world government. The main point about the international state of nature is that it is a condition of actual or potential war; there can be no permanent or guaranteed peace between sovereign states—no international peace. But there can be domestic peace—peace within the framework of the sovereign state—and the opportunities that only civil peace can provide for men and women to enjoy felicity. The state is organized and equipped for war in order to provide domestic peace for its subjects or citizens. Domestic peace can be realized in this way. International peace is an unrealizable dream and a dangerous illusion. We can summarize the discussion thus far by briefly stating what these three classical realists have in common. First, they agree that the human condition is one of insecurity and conflict that must be addressed and dealt with. Second, they agree that there is a body of political knowledge, or wisdom, to deal with the problem of security, and each of them tries to find the keys to unlock it. Finally, they agree that there is no final escape from this human condition, which is a permanent feature of human life. In other words, although there is a body of political wisdom—which can be identified and stated in the form of political maxims—there are no permanent or final solutions to the problems of politics—including international politics. There can be no enduring peace between states. This pessimistic and unhopeful view is at the heart of the IR theory of the leading classical realist of the twentieth century, Hans J. Morgenthau. 75 76 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES 3.2.4 Morgenthau and Classical Realism According to Morgenthau (1965), men and women are by nature political animals: they are born to pursue power and to enjoy the spoils of power. Morgenthau speaks of the animus dominandi: the human ‘lust’ for power (Morgenthau 1965: 192). The craving for power dictates a search not only for relative advantage but also for a secure political space—i.e., territory—to maintain oneself and to enjoy oneself free from the political dictates of others. The ultimate political space within which security can be arranged and enjoyed is, of course, the independent state. Security beyond the state and between states is impossible. That creates the condition of power politics which is at the heart of Morgenthau’s realism (see Box 3.5). Here, Morgenthau is clearly following Machiavelli and Hobbes. If people desire to enjoy a political space free from the intervention or control of foreigners, they will have to mobilize and deploy their power for that purpose. That is, they will have to organize themselves into a capable and effective state by means of which they can defend their interests. The anarchical system of states invites international conflict which ultimately takes the form of war. To stop or at least constrain this struggle for power among nations, Morgenthau stresses the need for a tempering balance of power among nations, a message echoed by most later realists (see Box 3.6). The struggle between states leads to the problem of justifying the threat or use of force in human relations. Here we arrive at the central normative doctrine of classical realism. Morgenthau follows in the tradition of Thucydides and Machiavelli: there is one morality for the private sphere and another and very different morality for the public sphere. Political ethics allows some actions that would not be tolerated by private morality. Morgenthau is critical of those theorists and practitioners, such as American President Woodrow Wilson, who believed that it was necessary for political ethics to be brought into line with private ethics. Morgenthau considers that outlook to be not only ill-advised but also irresponsible; it is not only mistaken intellectually but also fundamentally wrong morally. It is a gross intellectual mistake because it fails to appreciate the important difference between the public sphere of politics on the one hand, and the private sphere or domestic life on the other hand. According to classical realists, this difference is fundamental. As indicated, Machiavelli made that point by noting that if a ruler operated in accordance with BOX 3.5 Key Quotes: Morgenthau on political morality Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The individual may say for himself: ‘fiat justitia, pereat mundus (let justice be done even if the world perish)’, but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care. Morgenthau (1985: 12) REALISM BOX 3.6 Key Quotes: President Nixon on the balance of power (1970) We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the United States is powerful. I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance. Quoted from Kissinger (1994: 705) Christian private ethics, he or she would come to grief very quickly because political rivals could not be counted on to operate in the same Christian way. Such a policy would be reckless in the extreme, and would constitute an ethical failure because political leaders bear a heavy responsibility for the security and welfare of their country and its people. They are not supposed to expose their people to unnecessary perils or hardships. Sometimes—for example, during crises or emergencies—it may be necessary to carry out foreign policies and engage in international activities that would clearly be wrong according to private morality: spying, lying, cheating, stealing, conspiring, and so on are only a few of the many activities that would be considered at best dubious and at worst evil by the standards of private morality. Sometimes, it may be necessary to trample on human rights for the sake of the national interest: during war, for example. Sometimes, it may be necessary to sacrifice a lesser good for a greater good or to choose the lesser of two evils. That tragic situation is, for realists, virtually a defining feature of international politics, especially during times of war. Here, Morgenthau is reiterating an insight into the ethically compromised nature of statecraft that was noted by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato (1974: 82, 121), who spoke of the ‘noble lie’: ‘Our rulers will probably have to make considerable use of lies and deceit for the good of their subjects.’ The awareness that political ends (e.g., defending the national interest during times of war) must sometimes justify morally questionable or morally tainted means (e.g., the targeting and bombing of cities) leads to situational ethics and the dictates of ‘political wisdom’: prudence, moderation, judgement, resolve, courage, and so on. Those are the cardinal virtues of political ethics. They do not preclude evil actions. Instead, they underline the tragic dimension of international ethics: they recognize the inevitability of moral dilemmas in international politics: that evil actions must sometimes be taken to prevent a greater evil (see Table 3.2). Morgenthau (1985: 4–17) encapsulates his IR theory in ‘six principles of political realism’. These principles, which we briefly summarize, offer statesmen a veritable political manual. This is probably one of the reasons for the remarkable influence of 77 78 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES TABLE 3.2 Morgenthau’s concept of statecraft HUMAN NATURE (BASIC CONDITION) POLITICAL SITUATION (MEANS AND CONTEXT) POLITICAL CONDUCT (GOALS AND VALUES) animus dominandi Power politics Political ethics (prudence, etc.) Self-interest Political power Human necessities (security, etc.) Political circumstances National interest Political skills Balance of power Morgenthau’s thought particularly in American policy circles in the decades after the Second World War. • Politics is rooted in a permanent and unchanging human nature which is basically self-centred, self-regarding, and self-interested. • Politics is ‘an autonomous sphere of action’ and cannot therefore be reduced to morals (as Kantian or liberal theorists are prone to do). • Self-interest is a basic fact of the human condition. International politics is an arena of conflicting state interests. • The ethics of international relations is a political or situational ethics which is very different from private morality. In exercising political responsibility, a political leader may have to violate private morality to defend national security. Not only would that be justifiable, it may be absolutely necessary. • Realists are opposed to the idea that particular nations can impose their ideologies (e.g., democracy) on other nations. It is fundamentally unwise as, ultimately, it could backfire and threaten the crusading country. • Statecraft is a sober and uninspiring activity that involves a profound awareness of human limitations and human imperfections. A number of critics have pointed out that Morgenthau’s realist theory of international politics is characterized by internal contradictions. Morgenthau repeatedly claims to have identified ‘iron laws’ of international politics, which states have to respond to, whether they wish to or not. But at the same time, he repeatedly exhorts statespeople—particularly American statesmen—that they ‘ought’ to follow his maxims of realism. As Robert W. Tucker (1952) observed in an early review of Morgenthau’s book In Defense of the National Interest, the ‘iron laws’ are thus not really iron laws. According to Tucker (1952: 214), Morgenthau tries ‘to do the impossible—that is, to deduce value judgments from what he considers to be international political reality’ (see also Donnelly 2000: 29). This exposes some of the theoretical difficulties that arise from trying to bridge empirical and normative analysis. These weaknesses also characterize the work of other classical realists, including the English diplomat and international relations scholar E. H. Carr and the American REALISM theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (see Smith 1986; see also Chapter 2). This lack of theoretical refinement and internal theoretical consistency was a key reason that classical realism was at the receiving end of a stark criticism especially in the 1960s and 1970s. 3.3 Schelling and Strategic Realism Classical realists—including Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau—provide a normative analysis as well as an empirical analysis of IR. Power is understood to be not only a fact of political life but also a matter of political responsibility. Indeed, power and responsibility are inseparable concepts. For example, the balance of power is not only an empirical statement about the way that world politics are alleged to operate. The balance of power is also a basic value: it is a legitimate goal and a guide to responsible statecraft on the part of the leaders of the great powers. In other words, for classical realists the balance of power is a desirable institution and a good thing to strive for because it upholds the basic values of international peace and security. Since the 1950s and 1960s, new realist approaches have emerged that are a product of the quest for a social science of IR. This new realism is to a large extent a reaction to the difficulties that arose from classical realists’ attempt to, at one and the same time, discover scientific laws and present normative advice on statecraft. Many current realists hold back from providing a normative analysis of world politics because it is deemed to be subjective and thus unscientific. That attitude to the study of values in world politics marks a fundamental divide between classical realists on the one hand and strategic realists, neorealists, and neoclassical realists on the other. In this section, we shall examine strategic realism, which is exemplified by the thought of Thomas Schelling (1980, 1996). Schelling does not pay much attention to the normative aspects of realism, although he does notice their presence in the background. In the next section we shall turn to neorealism, which is associated most closely with Kenneth Waltz (1979). Waltz also tends to ignore the normative aspects of realism in his pursuit of a scientific theory. Strategic realism focuses centrally on foreign-policy decision-making. When state leaders confront basic diplomatic and military issues, they are obliged to think strategically—i.e., instrumentally—if they hope to be successful. Schelling (1980, 1996) seeks to provide analytical tools for strategic thought. He views diplomacy and foreign policy, especially of the great powers and particularly the United States, as a rational– instrumental activity that can be more deeply understood by the application of a form of logical analysis called ‘game theory’. He summarizes his thought as shown in Box 3.7. A central concept that Schelling employs is that of a ‘threat’: his analysis concerns how statespeople can deal rationally with the threat and dangers of nuclear war. For example, writing about nuclear deterrence, Schelling makes the important observation that: the efficacy of . . . [a nuclear] threat may depend on what alternatives are available to the potential enemy, who, if he is not to react like a trapped lion, must be left some tolerable recourse. We have come to realize that a threat of all-out retaliation . . . eliminates lesser courses of action and forces him to choose between extremes . . . [and] may induce him to strike first. Schelling (1980: 6–7) 79 80 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES BOX 3.7 Key Arguments: Schelling on diplomacy Diplomacy is bargaining: it seeks outcomes that, though not ideal for either party, are better for both than some of the alternatives . . . The bargaining can be polite or rude, entail threats as well as offers, assume a status quo or ignore all rights and privileges, and assume mistrust rather than trust. But . . . there must be some common interest, if only in the avoidance of mutual damage, and an awareness of the need to make the other party prefer an outcome acceptable to oneself. With enough military force a country may not need to bargain. Schelling (1980: 168) This is a good example of strategic realism which basically concerns how to employ power intelligently in order to get our military adversary to do what we desire and, more importantly, to avoid doing what we fear. According to strategic realism, ‘choosing between extremes’ is foolish and reckless and is thus ill-advised because of the high levels of danger it involves. Schelling was not the first to think along these lines. The father of game theory, John von Neumann, had already coined the term Mutual Assured Destruction, with the fitting abbreviation MAD, to describe how nuclear weapons increased the cost of war between nuclear powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union (Gartzke and Kroenig 2016: 399). But Schelling, who was an economist by training, revolutionized this line of inquiry by using insights from game theory, and he was to receive the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics for this work. For Schelling, the activity of foreign policy is a rational, enlightened activity. It is technically instrumental and thus free from moral choice. It is not primarily concerned about what is good or what is right. It concerns the question: what is required for our policy to be successful? One of the crucial instruments of foreign policy for a great power such as the United States is that of armed force. Schelling devotes considerable thought to this issue. He observes an important distinction between brute force and coercion: ‘between taking what you want and making someone give it to you’. He continues: brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage . . . that can make someone yield or comply. Schelling (1996: 169–70) He adds that to make the use of our coercive apparatus effective ‘we need to know what an adversary treasures and what scares him’, and we also need to communicate clearly to him ‘what will cause the violence to be inflicted and what will cause it to be withheld’. There should be no misunderstandings. The actors involved should be acutely aware of the dangers (costs) and opportunities (benefits) they face. Schelling goes on to make a fundamentally realist point: for coercion to be effective, it ‘requires that our interests and our opponent’s [interests] are not absolutely opposed . . . coercion requires finding a bargain’. Coercion is a method of bringing an adversary into a bargaining relationship and getting the adversary to do what we want him or her to REALISM BOX 3.8 Key Arguments: Schelling on the diplomacy of violence The power to hurt is nothing new in warfare, but . . . modern technology . . . enhances the importance of war and threats of war as techniques of influence, not of destruction; of coercion and deterrence, not of conquest and defense; of bargaining and intimidation . . . War no longer looks like just a contest of strength. War and the brink of war are more a contest of nerve and risk-taking, of pain and endurance . . . The threat of war has always been somewhere underneath international diplomacy . . . Military strategy can no longer be thought of . . . as the science of military victory. It is now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence . . . Military strategy . . . has become the diplomacy of violence. Schelling (1996: 168, 182) do without having to compel it—i.e., the use of brute force, which is usually far more difficult, far less efficient, and far more dangerous. Schelling (1996: 181) summarizes his analysis of the modern diplomacy of violence in Box 3.8. There are obviously striking similarities between the thoughts of Machiavelli and those of Schelling. However, the strategic realism of Schelling (1980) does not usually probe the ethics of foreign policy; it merely presupposes basic foreign-policy goals without comment. The normative aspects of foreign policy and the justification of intelligent strategy in a dangerous world of nuclear-armed superpowers are intimated by his argument but largely hidden beneath the surface of his text. Schelling speaks quite readily of the ‘dirty’ and ‘extortionate’ heart of strategic realism. But he does not inquire why that kind of diplomacy could be called ‘dirty’ or ‘extortionate’, and he does not say whether that can be justified. Schelling does not base his instrumental analysis on an underlying political or civic ethics the way that Machiavelli does. The normative values at stake in foreign policy are largely taken for granted. Schelling’s realism is fundamentally different from Machiavelli’s realism in that important respect (see Table 3.3). TABLE 3.3 Realist statecraft: instrumental realism and strategic realism MACHIAVELLI’S RENAISSANCE STATECRAFT SCHELLING’S NUCLEAR STATECRAFT Mode Instrumental realism Strategic realism Means Strength and cunning Intelligence, nerve, and risk-taking Opportunism and luck Logic and art of coercion Goals Security and survival Security and survival Values Civic virtue Value-neutral; non-prescriptive 81 82 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES Strategic realism thus presupposes values and carries normative implications. Unlike classical realism, however, it does not examine them or explore them. For example, Schelling (1980: 4) is well aware that rational behaviour is motivated not only by a conscious calculation of advantages but also by ‘an explicit and internally consistent value system’. But the role of value systems is not investigated by Schelling beyond making it clear that behaviour is related to values, such as vital national interests. Values are taken as given and treated instrumentally. In other words, the fundamental point of behaving the way that Schelling suggests that foreign policymakers ought to behave is not explored, clarified, or even addressed. He provides a strategic analysis but not a normative theory of IR. Here we come to a fundamental difference between Schelling and Machiavelli. For Machiavelli, the point was the survival and flourishing of the nation. Classical realists are explicitly concerned about the basic values at stake in world politics; they provide a political and ethical theory of IR. Most realists today are silent about them and seem to take them more or less for granted without commenting on them or building them into their IR theories. They limit their analyses to political structures and processes and they largely ignore political ends. In recent years, there has been an attempt to systematize the study of effects of nuclear weapons on international relations. The great challenge facing empirical research on nuclear weapons has always been the—otherwise heartening—fact that since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 these weapons have not been used. Recent research tries to solve this challenge by ‘examining observable implications of how nuclear capabilities affect’ e.g., conflict behaviour of states (Gartzke and Kroenig 2016: 400). The point is that nuclear weapons are in a sense ‘used’ on a daily basis as they affect negotiations between states with and without nuclear weapons. This vantage point has allowed scholars to carry out increasingly sophisticated quantitative analysis of the role of nuclear weapons in IR—an approach popularly known as ‘nukes with numbers’ (Gartzke and Kroenig 2016). 3.4 Waltz and Neorealism The leading neorealist thinker is undoubtedly Kenneth Waltz (see Table 3.4). Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (TIP) (1979) seeks to provide a scientific explanation of the international political system. He takes some elements of classical realism as a starting point—e.g., independent states existing and operating in a system of international anarchy. But he departs from that tradition by giving no account of human nature and by ignoring the ethics of statecraft. Waltz’s notion of theory has often been misunderstood, even though he devotes an entire chapter to it in TIP (Wæver 2009; Jackson 2016: 123–4). According to Waltz’s (1979: 8) famous definition, ‘A theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity.’ A theory thus constitutes its own reality and abstracts from the real world in order to make ‘a few big and important things’ in this world easier to understand. A theory, so conceived, cannot be tested up against reality, and it cannot be proven true or false (Waltz 1979: 9). It can also do little to predict specific international outcomes, for two reasons. First, the theory merely identifies a set of structural constraints which mean that certain actions are likely to be REALISM TABLE 3.4 Waltz’s neorealist theory: structure and outcomes INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE INTERNATIONAL OUTCOMES (state units and relations) (effects of state competition) International anarchy Balance of power States as ‘like units’ International recurrence and repetition Unequal state capability International conflict, war Great power relations Bipolarity or multipolarity punished. For instance, international anarchy means that states that fail to strengthen their defence and/or enter alliances risk being conquered or bullied by stronger neighbours. Second, specific predictions require that some of the factors that the theory has abstracted away from are taken into account. For instance, to predict particular foreign-policy decisions, one needs additional knowledge about domestic political processes and possibly about the most important domestic political actors (see Box 3.9). What a theory such as that presented in TIP can do is explain that certain types of outcomes tend to recur within the international system, including that international systems are normally characterized by a balance of power between great powers. In Waltz’s view, the best IR theory is one that focuses centrally on the structure of the system, on its interacting units, and on the continuities and changes of the system. In classical realism, state leaders and their international decisions and actions are at the centre of attention. In many liberal theories, the national level—e.g. the political regime form—is emphasized. Waltz dismisses such theories as ‘reductionist’ and instead proposes what he terms a ‘systemic’ theory. In neorealism, the structure of the system that BOX 3.9 Key Concepts: Waltz on theory Under most circumstances, a theory of international politics is not sufficient, and cannot be made sufficient, for the explanation of foreign policy. An international political theory can explain states’ behaviour only when external pressures dominate the internal disposition of states, which seldom happens. When they do not, a theory of international politics needs help. The help is found outside the theory. Yet it is said that although neorealists admit that unit-level causes are important, they refuse to include them in their accounts. The peculiarity of this criticism is matched by the frequency with which it is made. Obviously, nobody, realist or otherwise, believes that foreign policy and international politics can be understood without considering what goes on inside states. The critics have confused theories and accounts. Accounts, stories about what happens and speculations about why are not theories. Much is included in an account; little is included in a theory. Waltz, ‘Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms’, 3–4 83 84 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES is external to the actors, in particular the relative distribution of power, is thus the central analytical focus. Leaders and national level factors are relatively unimportant because structures compel states to act in certain ways. In Waltz’s (1979: 73–4) own words, structures ‘act as a selector . . . by rewarding some behaviors and punishing others’ (see Box 3.10). To that extent, Waltz’s theory is shorn of considerations about actors’ choices. Another way of understanding Waltz’s view of what a theory does is via the notion of ideal types. An ideal type is a mental construct that rescues the observer from drowning in a complex reality by simplifying it. The purpose is to better understand one or more important aspects of reality, such as international anarchy or the balance of power. Ideal types thus do not describe reality but abstract from it to capture its essence (see Waltz 1979: 89–91; Jackson 2016: 124–5). This means that ideal types are not true or false; they are useful or not useful for understanding something. Drawing on insights from microeconomics about how firms respond to the market mechanism under perfect competition, Waltz offers an ideal type about how states respond to international anarchy. If real-world events do not behave in accordance with this ideal type (as often happens, since reality is specific whereas ideal types are general), the job of the IR scholar is to identify the circumstances that made the real-world outcomes differ (Jackson 2016: 159). This notion of theory separates Waltz from many other contemporary realists, who are inspired by the behaviouralist or positivist ideal that theories prove their worth via sustained empirical testing (Wæver 2009: 203–4; Jackson 2016: 228; see Chapter 2). Waltz (1959) had already laid some of the foundations for his systemic theory in his earlier book, Man, the State, and War. The title signals this book’s core contribution, namely to distinguish theories of international relations based on whether they seek answers ‘within man, within the structure of the separate states, [or] within the states system’ (Waltz 1959: 12). In Man, the State, and War, Waltz does not outright dismiss the value of the first two levels and he concedes that it might sometimes be necessary to combine aspects from several levels to accurately understand international relations (e.g., Waltz 1959: 13–14, 160). But he clearly comes down in favour of theories that emphasize system-level attributes and he calls for more systematic efforts to create such theories. His later work in TIP can be seen to take up the challenge of presenting such a third level or, in Waltz’s own terminology, third image theory (see Chapter 2 for this distinction). BOX 3.10 Key Arguments: Waltz on the importance of structure The ruler’s, and later the state’s, interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve the state’s interests; success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state—structural constraints explain why the methods are repeatedly used despite differences in the persons and states who use them. Waltz (1979: 117) REALISM According to Waltz’s neorealist theory, presented in TIP, a basic feature of international relations is the decentralized structure of anarchy between states. States are alike in all basic functional respects—i.e., in spite of their different cultures or ideologies or constitutions or histories, they all perform the same basic tasks. All states have to collect taxes, conduct foreign policy, maintain domestic order, and so on. States differ significantly only in regard to their greatly varying capabilities. In Waltz’s own words, the state units of an international system are ‘distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks . . . the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units’ (Waltz 1979: 97). International change—for instance, a change from multipolarity (a system with more than two great powers) to bipolarity (a system with two great powers)—occurs when great powers rise and fall and the balance of power shifts accordingly. Waltz’s structural theory cannot predict such changes but based on the theory the typical means of change is great-power war. A good example of such fundamental change is the Second World War, which involved the defeat and collapse of Germany and Japan, the decline of Britain and France, and the emergence and domination of the United States and the Soviet Union. The states that are crucially important for determining changes in the structure of the international system are thus the great powers. A balance of power between states can be achieved, but war is always a possibility in an anarchical system. Waltz distinguishes between bipolar systems—such as existed during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union—and multipolar systems—such as existed both before and after the Cold War. Waltz believes that bipolar systems are more stable and thus provide a better guarantee of peace and security than do multipolar systems. ‘With only two great powers, both can be expected to act to maintain the system’ (Waltz 1979: 204). That is because in maintaining the system they are maintaining themselves. According to that view, the Cold War was a period of international stability and peace (see Box 3.11). Unlike Schelling’s strategic realism, Waltz’s neorealist approach does not provide explicit policy guidance to state leaders as they confront the practical problems of world politics. That is presumably because his theory is so abstract that it can tell us little about how statesmen should act under particular circumstances. In Waltz’s own words, neorealism ‘does not tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday’ (Waltz 1979: 121). Waltz’s neorealism thus has little to say about statecraft and diplomacy. His argument is at base a theory in which structure constrains policy. The system works its magic on political actors in two main ways: via socialization and via competition (Waltz 1979: 74). Actors are unlikely to attempt the impossible but if they do so, they, or more particularly their states, are selected out over time, e.g., via warfare and conquest. In this important respect, neorealism is an explicit departure from classical realism, which focuses on the politics and ethics of statecraft (Morgenthau 1985). It is also a departure from Schelling, who assumes rational behaviour of statesmen and focuses centrally on strategic choice. However, just beneath the surface of Waltz’s neorealist text, and occasionally on the surface, there is a recognition of the ethical dimension of international politics which is virtually identical to classical realism. The core concepts that Waltz employs have a 85 86 MAJOR IR THEORIES AND APPROACHES BOX 3.11 Key Developments: John Gaddis’s portrait of the long bipolar peace during the Cold War 1. The post-war bipolar system realistically reflected the facts of where military power resided at the end of World War II . . . 2. The post-1945 bipolar structure was a simple one that did not require sophisticated leadership to maintain it . . . 3. Because of its relatively simple structure, allianc