Regionalism in International Affairs PDF

Part Four Structures and processes In this part of the book we want to introduce you is a structure and what is a process is largely a matter to the main underlying structures and processes in of debate, but it may help to say that, together, these contemporary world pol...

Part Four Structures and processes In this part of the book we want to introduce you is a structure and what is a process is largely a matter to the main underlying structures and processes in of debate, but it may help to say that, together, these contemporary world politics. There will obviously be provide the setting in which the issues dealt with in some overlap between this part and the next, since the next part of the book will be played out. All the the division between structures and processes and features examined in this part will be important for international issues is largely one of perspective. For the resolution of the issues we deal with in Part Five, us, the difference is that by structures and processes since they comprise both the main structures of world we mean relatively stable features of world politics politics that these issues surround and the main pro- that are more enduring and constant than the issues cesses that will determine their fate. addressed in Part Five. We have two aims in this part. Our second aim is that these structures and pro- Our first aim is to provide a good overview of cesses will help you to think about globalization by some of the most important structures and processes forcing you to ask again whether or not it is a quali- in world politics at the beginning of the twenty-first tatively different form of world politics than hitherto. century. We have therefore chosen a series of ways of Does globalization require or represent an overthrow thinking about world politics that draw attention to of the structures and processes that have been central these underlying features. Again, we realize that what in world politics to date? iStock.com/123ArtistImages  Chapter 23 Regionalism in international affairs edward best · thomas christiansen Framing Questions Has there been a uniform process of regional cooperation and integration across all continents? What have been the driving forces in the establishment of various forms of regional cooperation? To what extent does cooperation at the regional level change the nature of international politics? Reader’s Guide attention to the unique circumstances that shaped the emergence of the European Union. The chapter This chapter provides an overview of the different charts the global trend towards the establishment of regional arrangements that have emerged around the regional mechanisms of cooperation and integration globe. It begins by clarifying the various concepts and since 1945 while also highlighting the challenges fac- definitions associated with this phenomenon. It then ing such developments. It demonstrates that the real outlines the main driving forces for the rise of region- significance of these mechanisms is determined by alism in recent decades and examines relevant devel- specific intra-regional dynamics and the relationships opments in the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Europe. among global powers, as much as by the nature of It highlights both the similarities and the differences their interaction with international organizations and among the various regional arrangements, drawing other aspects of global politics. 366 edward best · thomas christiansen Introduction Regionalism has become a pervasive feature of inter- raise for international relations have some elements in national affairs. According to the World Trade common. However, this chapter looks only at region- Organization (WTO), 287 regional trade agreements alism in the international context: the range of spe- were in force as of 1 May 2018 (WTO 2018b). Regional cial relationships among neighbouring countries that peacekeeping forces have become active in multiple represent more than normal diplomatic relations but parts of the world. In the last several decades regional- in which the component parts retain legal personality ism has become one of the forces challenging the tra- under international law (see Box 23.1). ditional centrality of states in international relations. The first section of this chapter presents some basic The word ‘region’ and its derivatives denote one concepts, dimensions, and debates. The second section distinguishable part of some larger geographical area. places regional cooperation in a global context and Yet these terms are used in different ways. On the one reviews selected developments in the Americas, Africa, hand, regions are territories within a state, occasion- and Asia. The final section looks at the European Union ally crossing state borders. On the other, regions are (EU), where integration has, so far uniquely, gone particular areas of the world, comprising a number of beyond a regional organization to produce a new form different sovereign states. The issues that both usages of regional governance. Regional cooperation and regional integration Regionalism’s various dimensions necessitate a clarifi- no harmonization of domestic rules nor any obligation cation of terms. The term regionalization is often used for common action in international affairs. Political to refer to ‘the growth of societal integration within a cooperation entails mutual support and commitment region and... the often undirected processes of social regarding the implementation of certain values and and economic interaction’ (Hurrell 1995: 39). Such pro- practices within the countries. Cooperation in foreign cesses produce interdependence and may also consti- and security policy means that governments systemati- tute deepening perceptions of common interests and cally inform and consult each other, try to adopt com- identity, including self-awareness as a region. Yet the mon positions in international organizations, and may very nature and membership of regions may be con- even implement joint actions elsewhere. There are no tested, and different forms of interaction exist among necessary connections among these different areas of the various dimensions and dynamics of regional- cooperation. And none of this has any consequence ism. Regional agreements cover different mixtures for the international status of participating countries of economic, social, political, and security concerns. beyond normal obligations under international law. Moreover, there are different forms of interaction Formal regional integration refers to processes by between ‘regionalization’ and the various ways in which which states go beyond the removal of obstacles to inter- states may promote regional cohesion. In some cases, action among their countries to create a regional space state-led actions have been responsible for an increase subject to some distinct common rules. With regard to in ‘real’ interaction. In others, the development of ties economic integration, several degrees of ambition are has been more one of ‘market-led integration’. usually distinguished: free trade area, customs union, A distinction is often made between ‘cooperation’ common market, and economic and monetary union. and ‘integration’ when considering the different kinds From a customs union ‘up’, in addition to removing of arrangements that may be agreed among countries. barriers to trade among themselves, the countries must Regional cooperation has various forms. Functional not only adopt some measures of positive integration cooperation refers to limited arrangements that are (i.e. harmonization of rules), but must also act with agreed among states in order to work together in partic- a single voice internationally, at the very least in tar- ular areas, for example in transport, energy, or health. iff policy. Such processes may result in a new level of Economic cooperation refers to agreements that foresee governance above the nation-states, although this does some degree of commercial preferentialism, but with not mean creation of a new ‘super-state’.  Chapter 23 Regionalism in international affairs 367 Box 23.1 Around the world in regional organizations, 2018 (an illustrative and non-exhaustive list) AMERICAS Organization of American States OAS North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement USMCA (signed 2018, to be ratified) Central American Integration System SICA Central American Common Market CACM Caribbean Community CARICOM Andean Community [of Nations] CAN Pacific Alliance PA Common Market of the South MERCOSUR Union of South American Nations UNASUR Community of Latin American and Caribbean States CELAC Latin American Integration Association LAIA AFRICA African Union AU Arab Maghreb Union UMA Community of Sahel–Saharan States CEN–SAD Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS West African Economic and Monetary Union WAEMU Central African Monetary and Economic Community CEMAC Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries CEPGL Economic Community of Central African States ECCAS East African Community EAC Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa COMESA Intergovernmental Authority for Development IGAD Southern African Customs Union SACU Southern African Development Community SADC ASIA Gulf Cooperation Council GCC Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN ASEAN Regional Forum ARF East Asian Summit EAS South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SAARC Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO Economic Cooperation Organization ECO ASIA-PACIFIC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APEC Pacific Economic Cooperation Council PECC Pacific Islands Forum EURASIA Commonwealth of Independent States CIS Eurasian Economic Union EAEU Black Sea Economic Cooperation BSEC EUROPE European Union EU Council of Europe CoE Nordic Council/Council of Ministers Benelux Economic Union Benelux European Free Trade Association EFTA Visegrad Group V4 EURO-ATLANTIC North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE 368 edward best · thomas christiansen While the distinction between cooperation and other regions (to prevent further internecine conflicts) integration does involve some clear and fundamental but also more easily rooted in concrete achievements. choices, it should be treated with caution. Cooperation Moreover, the Communist bloc continued to provide and integration are not mutually exclusive general the sense of common external threat that has histori- approaches for regional governance, but rather options cally shaped European identity, while a shared strong that may be pursued for different sectors and dimen- social norm of obeying ‘the law’ could be extended to sions of regional relations. All regional systems, includ- European Community rules. The early consolidation ing the EU today, contain a mixture of both cooperation of a hard core of supranational law made it easier for and integration. European regionalism to survive later crises, and to The formal institutional arrangements of a regional respond to new realities through more flexible forms system are not necessarily a measure of the real depth of regional cooperation without fatally weakening the or dynamics of a regional integration process. If heart of the integration process. regional goals are complex and long-term (e.g. to create The institutional structure of the European a full common market), states may set up ‘commitment Community has often been imitated in other circum- institutions’ to increase the prospects of effective com- stances that do not favour sustainable deepening of pliance over time (Mattli 1999). States thus accept some integration. In some cases, formally supranational bod- pooling of sovereignty (i.e. the renunciation of autono- ies exist with little real connection to national or trans- mous action and/or the veto), delegation of powers to national life. Conversely, strong formal commitments supranational bodies, and/or ‘legalization’ (Moravcsik may not be required to achieve important results in 1998; Abbott et al. 2000). particular fields under certain conditions. For example, This may result in a multilevel system of gov- the Nordic countries established both a passport union ernance in which the regional union does replace and a common labour market in the 1950s without any nation-states in some functions and a regional polity supranational arrangements (Best 2006). starts to emerge, albeit unevenly and subject to con- Why do states decide to pursue regional integra- testation. This has been the case in post-war Europe, tion, and what dynamics may explain the evolution of due to a unique combination of factors. Europe has regional arrangements? A first theme historically has historically been characterized by a particularly high been the ‘management of independence’: the need for degree of both conflict and cooperation among poli- newly independent states to settle down in their rela- ties in a densely populated continent. Revulsion at the tions (1) among themselves, (2) with the former colo- appalling consequences of national rivalries could still nial power, and (3) with other, often rival, powers. This be accompanied by a sense of underlying shared heri- may be summarized as the process of consolidating tage, as well as by strong economic interdependence international identity and ‘actorness’: how do particu- and social interactions. Nationalist sentiment fell to a lar sets of societies want to participate in international historic low after the Second World War, while super- affairs? Federal union has been the result in some cases. power interventions in 1956 in Hungary and in the In others, regional organizations of one sort or another Suez crisis made evident the limits to the international have been an important instrument for managing this influence of even the largest European countries. All often conflictual process (see Box 23.2 and Opposing this made integration not only more urgent than in Opinions 23.1). Box 23.2 Dynamics of regionalism Management of independence Settling down by newly independent states in their relations among themselves, with the former colonial power, and with other powers. Management of interdependence Regional mechanisms to guarantee peace and security; responses to ‘regionalization’; promotion of cooperation and/or state-led integration. Management of internationalization Regional negotiations in the multilateral system; regional/UN peacekeeping; regional responses to globalization. Pursuit of spheres of interest or influence Sponsorship of regional frameworks by major powers.  Chapter 23 Regionalism in international affairs 369 Opposing Opinions 23.1 Regional cooperation strengthens the state For Against States set up regional organizations to pursue their national Regional institutions develop autonomous powers that interests. Most regional organizations operate on the basis of states find difficult to control. Advanced forms of regional unanimity, meaning that key decisions require the approval of cooperation involve the creation of regional institutions and all member states. Therefore, by definition, whatever a regional the delegation of powers to them. Member states may set up organization does reflects the will of all its member states. Day- such institutions in order to achieve more effective cooperation, to-day running of the organization may be delegated to agencies, while limiting their power through various oversight mecha- and routine decisions taken by some form of majority vote, but nisms. However, over time these institutions have the capacity constitutional-level decisions require all states to agree, even in to develop expertise, legitimacy, and eventually a degree of advanced institutions such as the EU. actorness that makes them independent actors vis-à-vis state governments. Regional cooperation arrangements aid small states, and vice versa. Regional organizations serve the interests of small Regional cooperation deepens the web of international states in particular, because they provide a greater degree of norms that constrain states. By cooperating within regional stability and security compared to a web of bilateral relations in frameworks, states facilitate a normative process that adds which differences in state size and power are more pronounced. another layer of rules and norms limiting their power. These may Both the EU and ASEAN also demonstrate that regional coopera- be informal rules—ways of doing things—that governments have tion is most effective if a number of smaller and medium-sized to abide by in order to achieve their aims, or formal rules and states also play a role in the cooperative arrangement. even binding laws (as in the EU) which require state compliance and are enforced through regional courts. States can better regulate their economies and socie- ties through regional cooperation. On their own, states are Regional cooperation enables international cooperation increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of international trade and among civil society actors, limiting states’ special status as globalized markets. Regional cooperation provides a mechanism diplomatic actors. Even though most regional organizations are for states to regain an element of control over markets, allow- initially intergovernmental creations, other forms of cooperation ing them to regulate cross-border trade and investments more often develop around that of governments: among parliaments, effectively. business associations, trade unions, NGOs, and social move- ments. Such civil society cooperation provides the foundation for the creation of transnational alliances, networks, and com- munities that challenge states’ traditional monopoly over exter- nal representation. 1. To what extent do regional organizations strengthen or weaken the capacity of states to achieve their goals in global politics? 2. What does regionalism mean for national sovereignty? 3. Can states’ participation in regional organizations have negative as well as positive consequences for democratic governance in the countries concerned? For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers www.oup.com/he/baylis8e A second set of issues may be grouped as the ‘man- A third theme may be summed up as the ‘management agement of interdependence’. This partly refers to eco- of internationalization’—the interrelationship between nomic and social interaction—whether the adoption of regional arrangements and the rest of the world. The state-led integration schemes intended to increase such debate about the implications of regionalism for multilat- interaction, or of measures to ensure stability where eral processes of liberalization was termed the ‘building- there is market-led integration—but also to issues of blocks-or-stumbling-blocks’ question by Bhagwati (1991). peace and security. Regional organizations can foster Proponents of regionalism as building blocks argue that ‘security communities’ (transnational communities in (1) such arrangements promote internal and international which peoples have dependable expectations of peace- dynamics that enhance the prospects for multilateralism; ful change) by promoting cooperation, establishing (2) regionalism can have important demonstration effects norms of behaviour, and serving as sites of socialization in accustoming actors to the effects of liberalization; (3) and learning (Adler and Barnett 1998). increased numbers of regional arrangements can help 370 edward best · thomas christiansen erode opposition to multilateral liberalization because resurgent in recent years: major powers’ promotion of sectoral vested interests will enjoy less and less protec- regional frameworks to pursue spheres of interest or tion with each new preferential arrangement; (4) regional influence. The prolonged stalemate in the Doha Round agreements are often more to do with strategic or politi- of multilateral trade negotiations has not only seen cal alliances than trade liberalization; and (5) regionalism continued growth in the number of regional free trade has more positive than negative political effects. agreements (FTAs); it has also been accompanied by a Opponents of regionalism are concerned that (1) the new trend towards ‘mega-FTAs’ that cut across geo- net result of preferential regional agreements may be graphical regions. Some see this as offering a new pat- trade diversion; (2) there may be ‘attention diversion’, tern of plurilateral governance of world trade that may with participating countries losing interest in the mul- still contribute to multilateralization. At the same time, tilateral system, or simply an absorption of available these new frameworks may also be seen as a new form of negotiating resources; (3) competing arrangements organizing rivalries among global powers. In fact, devel- may lock in incompatible regulatory structures and opments such as the UK’s proposed withdrawal from the standards; (4) the creation of multiple legal frameworks European Union and the Trump administration’s oppo- and dispute settlement mechanisms may weaken disci- sition to regional trade agreements in North America pline and efficiency; and (5) regionalism may contrib- and the Asia-Pacific (see Box 23.3, ‘Regionalism in the ute to international frictions among competing blocs Americas’, and ‘Regionalism in Asia’) can be seen as (Bergsten 1997; World Bank 2005). evidence of a trend towards states seeking to ‘go it alone’ This final concern overlaps with a fourth, more rather than work through regional arrangements with geopolitical, dimension of regionalism that has been their neighbours. Key Points Regional cooperation is not an isolated, but rather a global phenomenon, though with a high degree of diversity Some regional integration processes are more state-led, while others are more market-led. regarding the drivers, modes, and outcomes of such cooperation. There is a basic difference between cooperation arrangements and integration processes, but both Regionalism has various dimensions—economic, social, political, and security—and takes different forms across the approaches may coexist within a regional system. world. Regional cooperation in a global context Regionalism in the Americas The American continent has been characterized by and security in the 1930s and 1940s. The Pan-American multiple, and often competing, levels of regionalism. Union became the Organization of American States Latin American regionalism has developed against the (OAS) in 1948. An Inter-American System grew up, background of the conflictual consolidation of current including the Inter-American Development Bank and states, in which national sovereignty became a domi- the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. During nant feature of actorhood, and a love–hate relationship the cold war, however, much of the Americas viewed with the US (see Case Study 23.1). There has been par- this system with suspicion as an instrument of US for- tial acceptance of a continental identity as ‘America’, eign policy. but also a widespread perception of an identity as ‘Latin The US policy on regional agreements changed in America’, often in opposition to the US. the mid-1980s. The US began in 1986 to negotiate a Hemispheric regionalism began with the first Pan- free trade agreement with Canada. Negotiations then American Conference in Washington in 1889–90. Nine began between the US, Canada, and Mexico, leading such conferences took place and, after decades of US to the establishment in 1994 of the North American interventionism, produced several agreements on peace Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA was broader  Chapter 23 Regionalism in international affairs 371 Case Study 23.1 Central America: a perpetual pursuit of union? © 123RF/eklervector Central America appears to present a paradox. Despite its few (CACM). Intra-regional trade grew, but the system entered crisis and small countries, with a shared colonial history, a relatively at the end of the 1960s. Efforts at reform in the 1970s were over- high degree of common identity, and apparently everything to taken by political crisis and conflicts. In the 1980s, integration gain from integration, Central America has consistently failed, so became associated with the Central American peace process, far, to achieve the ambitious regional goals it has proclaimed. and in this context, a Central American Parliament was created as Following independence, the Captaincy-General of Guatemala a forum for regional dialogue. In the early 1990s, as internal con- became the Federal Republic of Central America (1823–39), before flicts ended, with the cold war over and a new wave of regional splitting into Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and integration across the world, a new period began with the estab- Costa Rica. Restoration of this union has been a constant theme lishment of the Central American Integration System (SICA). This in integrationist discourse. Yet Central America was more a col- aimed to provide a comprehensive approach to integration, lection of communities than a clearly defined overarching entity. with four subsystems—political, economic, social, and cultural. Local elites resisted leadership by Guatemala, and Costa Rica Panama, Belize, and the Dominican Republic have also become early on showed a tendency to isolationism. Nationalism grew, members. unionism was undermined by conflict, and outside involvement SICA’s institutional system is concentrated on presidential sum- was often unhelpful. A powerful mythology of regional union mits, while the Central American Parliament is directly elected thus coexisted with various sources of division. but has no powers. Costa Rica has not joined. As of 2018, only A Central American Peace Conference in Washington, con- El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua participated in vened in 1907 to help end local conflicts, produced a short-lived the Central American Court of Justice. There have been repeated Central American Court of Justice (1908–18). The Organization discussions of institutional reform. By 2017, intra-regional trade of Central American States (ODECA) was created in 1951, and represented around 31 per cent of exports and 15 per cent of the first organizations of functional cooperation emerged around imports (Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana this time. Some 25 such bodies now exist, covering everything 2018). Most goods originating in Central American countries from water to electrical energy and creating a complex web of enjoy free circulation within the region. By 2018, a customs union regional interactions. Formal economic integration began in was formally in place between the three countries of the Northern 1960 with the creation of the Central American Common Market Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador). The regional 372 edward best · thomas christiansen agenda has increasingly focused on problems of citizen security, while political cooperation was again undermined by the crisis Question 1: What does this case suggest about the limitations of in Nicaragua in 2018. International support for Central American formal regional bodies in promoting integration? integration is still strong, especially from the EU, but underlying Question 2: How have political differences affected the process of conditions remain challenging. The pursuit of union continues. regional integration and cooperation in Central America? in scope than most regional free trade agreements. In 1990, the Andean presidents also re-launched The treaty covered agriculture and was accompa- their integration process. A Common External Tariff nied by supplementary agreements on labour and the was announced in 1994. The group was renamed the environment, although it contained no supranational Andean Community of Nations (CAN) in 1997, with elements. In October 2018, as US policy changed the aim of consolidating a common market by 2005. dramatically under Donald Trump, a new United Its institutional system is modelled on the European States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) was Community, with elements of formal supranational- signed to replace NAFTA, but US ratification seemed ism. The ‘new’ forms of integration in the Americas uncertain. were seen as fundamentally different, part of broad- A first ‘Summit of the Americas’ was held in Miami based structural reforms aimed at locking in policy in 1994, with the aim of achieving a Free Trade Area of commitments in a context of unilateral and multilat- the Americas (FTAA) as well as deepening cooperation eral liberalization. It also seemed that there might be a on drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, new convergence of hemispheric and Latin American sustainable development, and the environment. By the initiatives. fourth Summit of the Americas in Argentina in 2005, But developments in the 2000s made this prospect however, the political context of Inter-Americanism seem doubtful. The creation of a ‘South American had significantly changed. Community of Nations’ was announced in 2004, Latin American regionalism in the post-war becoming the Union of South American Nations decades was shaped by the model of state-led, import-­ (UNASUR) in 2008. As progress halted towards con- substituting industrialization. To overcome depen- solidating a Free Trade Area of the Americas excluding dence on exports of primary commodities, many Cuba, a Community of Latin American and Caribbean governments in the region believed that a combina- States (CELAC) was created in 2010 among 33 coun- tion of industrial protection and planning would make tries excluding the US and Canada. it possible to reduce manufactured imports. Regional For nearly a decade this seemed to be coloured by integration was a response to the limitations of this a ‘pink tide’ of leftist regimes in the region, as well approach at the national level. The first wave of such as by the influence of ‘twenty-first-century social- regional integration produced the Central American ist’ Venezuela which, together with Cuba, created a Common Market (CACM, 1960), the Latin American radical Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) in 2004. However, Free Trade Association (LAFTA, 1961), and the Andean ALBA was weakened by the blow to Venezuelan influ- Pact (1969), all of which had limited success. ence resulting from the drop in global oil prices, and A second wave of ‘new regionalism’ began in the then by the economic, political, and migration crisis 1980s and took off in the 1990s. The Central American that engulfed the country. Venezuela’s membership in Integration System (SICA) was created in 1991. The MERCOSUR was suspended in 2017. This situation Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) was cre- also led in 2018 to a severe weakening of UNASUR as ated in 1991 by Argentina and Brazil, together with a result of its inaction regarding the Venezuelan crisis. Paraguay and Uruguay. A common market was pro- Meanwhile, conservative governments took over in claimed in 1994, although there remain exceptions. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. MERCOSUR has not adopted a supranational institu- Renewed moves towards broader and deeper tional system but it has comprised important political Latin American integration came to be driven less dimensions. In its early phases this included mutual by political radicalism than by common reaction support for the consolidation of democracy and the against Trump’s protectionism. In 2011, Mexico, ending of rivalry between Argentina and Brazil. Peru, Chile, and Colombia had established a  Chapter 23 Regionalism in international affairs 373 strongly business-oriented Pacific Alliance. A pro- into effect in 2005, and a Common Market Protocol cess of convergence between the Pacific Alliance and came into force in 2010. MERCOSUR began in 2014, leading to a joint summit In the 1970s and 1980s, a variety of other regional in July 2018 at which the eight presidents confirmed organizations emerged, often cutting across the their intention to deepen cooperation and to create previous arrangements. With Nigerian leadership, a free trade zone among the countries, represent- the Economic Community of West African States ing some 90 per cent of Latin American GDP. These (ECOWAS) was created in 1975 between the franco- shifts also affected the pattern of transcontinental phone countries that are also members of WAEMU and agreements. In 2017, President Trump pulled the US the anglophone countries of West Africa. A Preferential out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but this Trade Area, cutting across eastern and southern Africa, was signed in March 2018 by the other 11 countries was created in 1981. This was succeeded in 1994 by the involved, including Mexico, Peru, and Chile. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which in 2015 had 19 member states stretching from Libya to Madagascar. In 1983, the Regionalism in Africa French Central African countries, together with the Contemporary regionalism in Africa emerged with members of the Economic Community of the Great the politics of anti-colonialism, but often on the basis Lakes Countries (created in 1976), as well as São Tomé of pre-existing colonial arrangements. French West and Principe, established the Economic Community of Africa was a federation between 1904 and 1958, and a Central African States (ECCAS). Finally, straddling the common currency known as the CFA franc was created continent from Senegal to Eritrea is the Community of in 1945. After several organizational transformations, Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), established in 1998. Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Some regional organizations in Africa had particu- Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo have become members lar political aspects to their founding. For example, the of the present West African Economic and Monetary aim of the Frontline States (a group of southern African Union (WAEMU). states that opposed South Africa’s apartheid regime) In Central Africa, a monetary union guaranteed to reduce dependence on apartheid South Africa by France and a formal customs union were created in prompted the creation in 1980 of the Southern African 1964. These were transformed into the Economic and Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), This was transformed into the Southern African which took over fully in 1999. This is a monetary union Development Community (SADC) in 1992, of which using the CFA franc (now pegged to the euro) with a post-apartheid South Africa became a member. common monetary policy. Other regional organizations were founded with The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) was a particular special mandate that was later extended. originally created in 1910. An agreement was signed For instance, the Intergovernmental Authority on in 1969 with the independent countries of Botswana, Development (IGAD) in East Africa was founded in Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa, with Namibia 1986 to deal with drought and desertification, but in joining in 1990. This has included a common external 1996 it was given a broader mandate covering conflict tariff and a revenue-sharing mechanism, as well as a prevention and management. Common Monetary Area (except for Botswana) with Sub-regional cultural identity has played a particu- currencies pegged to the South African rand. A new lar role in the development of African regional organi- treaty came into force in 2004. zations, for example in the case of the Arab Maghreb Colonial Kenya and Uganda formed a customs Union (AMU), which came into being in 1989. union in 1917, which Tanzania (then Tanganyika) The first stage of pan-African organization was joined in 1927. After independence, cooperation con- primarily political in nature. The Organization of tinued under the East African Common Services African Unity (OAU), created in 1963, was dedi- Organization. An East African Community was cre- cated to ending colonialism and achieving political ated in 1967, but it collapsed in 1977 as a result of politi- liberation. The continental agenda has subsequently cal differences. Following efforts at re-integration in the broadened. The 1991 Treaty of Abuja, which came 1990s, the present East African Community (EAC) was into force in 1994, established the African Economic established in 2000. A customs union formally came Community (AEC). In 2002, the OAU and AEC 374 edward best · thomas christiansen became the African Union (AU), formally modelled Lanka, and Thailand. Most regionalist activity has on the European Union. The eight Regional Economic taken place in the east. Communities (RECs), the various organizations The establishment of the Association of Southeast mentioned above, are seen as building blocks of the Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 between Indonesia, AU and have had some success in functional coop- Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand was eration. Proposals to reform the AU were adopted in motivated less by a sense of common identity than 2017, and an African Continental Free Trade Area by a realization that failure to prevent conflicts in the (AfCFTA) agreement was signed by 44 of the AU’s region would invite external intervention, which would 55 members in March 2018. However, many obstacles in turn exacerbate intra-regional tensions. No supra- remain. There is little complementarity in economic national elements were foreseen. Regional cooperation structures; formal institutional structures often do was to be built by an ‘ASEAN Way’ based on consulta- not serve their stated functions; and ambitious com- tion, consensual decision-making, and flexibility (see mitments are not matched by implementation capa- Case Study 23.2). On the security front, in the context bilities, while there is weak private sector engagement of Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia and the end (Vanheukelom et al. 2016). of the cold war, a succession of proposals culminated in Some mechanisms for supranational monitoring the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This have emerged, notably the creation in 2001 of the New came into effect in 1994, with the aim of pursuing con- Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (to fidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, and be transformed into the African Union Development eventually conflict resolution. Other steps were taken Agency (AUDA) by a decision of 2018) and the African in response to the creation of Asia-Pacific Economic Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), intended to promote Cooperation (APEC), which had been formed in 1989 Africa’s self-assessment for good governance. on the principle of ‘open regionalism’. APEC was not Regional organizations have also become active in to involve any discrimination vis-à-vis other coun- conflict management, most notably ECOWAS. The tries. Nor did it reflect any distinctive regional identity ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervened so much as ‘the desire of the “non-Asian states” of the in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra Leone and Guinea- region to consolidate links with the “open market-­ Bissau in the 1990s. ECOWAS deployed missions in oriented economies” of East Asia’ (Higgott 1995: 377). Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, Liberia in 2003, and Mali in Asian regionalism is thus evolving on two planes. On 2013. In addition, an African Union Peace and Security the one hand, ASEAN has continued to move towards Council was created in 2003. The AU has since deployed some institutional deepening as a means to preserve its missions in Burundi, the Sudan, Somalia, the Comoros, own position (see Case Study 23.2), while on the other and the Central African Republic. hand, regional agreements reflect rivalries among the major powers and have cut across ASEAN. Competition between China and Japan initially Regionalism in Asia shaped discussion of the nature and membership of Regionalism in Asia has followed quite different pat- regional agreements. By the mid-2000s, China was terns, driven by market forces as much as by interna- proposing an East Asia Free Trade Agreement based tional security concerns. It has been strongly shaped by on ‘ASEAN + 3’ (China, Japan, and South Korea), relations among major Asian powers as well as by these while Japan preferred a Comprehensive Economic powers’ relations with the United States and Russia. Partnership in East Asia based on ‘ASEAN + 6’ (includ- In the south, rivalry between India and Pakistan ing China, Japan, and South Korea as well as India, continues to limit the prospects of the South Asian Australia, and New Zealand). The result was the launch Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), of negotiations in 2012 between ASEAN and its FTA which also includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Indeed, since 2014 New Zealand) for a Regional Comprehensive Economic India has sought to reinvigorate an overlapping Partnership (RCEP). The US was not included. regional body that does not include Pakistan—the However, the United States came to lead a new Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical trans-Pacific initiative in which China did not partici- and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)—composed pate. In 2008, the US—followed by Australia, Peru, and of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Vietnam—began talks on the basis of the Trans-Pacific  Chapter 23 Regionalism in international affairs 375 Case Study 23.2 Regionalism in Southeast Asia—beyond intergovernmentalism? consequently there is no judicial system. The monitoring role of the Secretariat also does not involve ‘naming and shaming’ of laggards, but is limited to communications about aggregate pro- gress towards the AEC’s declared aims. Overall, the member states in ASEAN have set up a system which facilitates a high degree of cooperation and common action while at the same time ensur- ing that each member state’s national interests are safeguarded and cannot be overruled by supranational institutions. Nevertheless, ASEAN has maintained, at least at the symbolic and declaratory level, a high degree of ambition. The ASEAN Charter, adopted at the 2007 summit, formalized further the existing institutional arrangements, set out a number of key principles, and included symbols of an ‘ASEAN identity’ such as an anthem, a flag, a motto, and the designation of 8 August as © LILLIAN SUWANRUMPHA/AFP/Getty Images ASEAN Day. Overall, there has been a remarkable increase in the aspira- Outside Europe, Southeast Asia has been the region that arguably tions of the Southeast Asian countries to develop closer ties, has witnessed the most far-reaching developments in building strengthen their common institutions, and open their markets up cooperative arrangements. ASEAN has a long history going towards each other. Difficulties in making progress towards such back to the 1960s, but from the mid-1990s there has been a aims are unsurprising, given the high degree of diversity among marked push to develop stronger common institutions and agree ASEAN members in terms of size, wealth, and political systems. ambitious aims. In 2003, the ASEAN member states (Indonesia, With regard to the latter, the repression of opposition parties by Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Myanmar, the military junta in Myanmar had been a constant problem for Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) agreed to establish three communi- ASEAN, until the internal reforms leading to free elections and a ties for security, socio-cultural, and economic cooperation by civilian government in 2015 were seen by ASEAN members as 2020. Achievements such as the agreement on visa-free travel confirmation that their ‘soft approach’ had succeeded. within ASEAN are noteworthy, but the most ambitious ini- Despite these advances, ASEAN’s limitations in addressing tiative so far has been the commitment to establish an ASEAN regional challenges have been evident in the face of crises such Economic Community (AEC) by the end of 2015. Some advances as the Rohingya conflict and territorial disputes in the South have been made, these ambitions have also demonstrated the China Sea—instances in which ASEAN members were unable to limitations of ASEAN’s commitment to consensus and informal- act collectively. This mixed picture of remarkable achievements ity. Most observers agree that the member states missed the 2015 and significant limitations shows that ASEAN has developed its deadline and that the project remains a ‘work in progress’. own distinctive model of regional cooperation. Some of the language of the AEC is reminiscent of the EU’s blueprint for a single market—the ‘1992 programme’. The ASEAN Question 1: To what extent is the emphasis on consensual deci- Secretariat has begun to monitor progress via ‘scoreboards’ sion-making in ASEAN compatible with the achievement of its of deregulation efforts, approximating the role the European far-reaching objectives? Commission has played in the so-called Open Method of Co-ordination. However, fundamental differences remain: Question 2: How effective has ASEAN been in responding to chal- no legally binding instruments are being used in ASEAN, and lenges from external powers? Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement con- Eurasia and the post-Soviet states cluded by New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, and Brunei. Negotiations began in 2010 for a new Trans-Pacific A shifting pattern of regional agreements in Eurasia Partnership (TPP). The TPP was finally signed in has resulted from the efforts of former Soviet Union October 2015 among 12 countries (Brunei, Chile, republics to settle down in a zone of cooperation and Singapore, New Zealand, US, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, from competition for influence between Russia, China, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan). Although and the EU (quite apart from the United States). President Trump withdrew the US from the TPP in The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) January 2017, continuing support from the remaining was created in 1991 among all the former Soviet repub- signatories ensured that the TPP came into force at the lics except the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and end of 2018. Lithuania) and Georgia (which joined in 1993 but 376 edward best · thomas christiansen withdrew following the 2008 conflict with Russia). A for cooperation without Russia, and was consolidated series of economic agreements with different member- with a new Charter in 2006, bringing together Georgia, ships and names resulted in the establishment in 2015 of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (whereas Belarus the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) among Russia, and Armenia were participating in deeper cooperation Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, based with Russia). Russia became increasingly sensitive to on a customs union and aiming at creation of a single the challenges that seemed to be posed by the NATO market. A Collective Security Treaty was signed in enlargements in 1999 and 2004 (the latter including 1992. In 2002 this became the Collective Security Treaty three former Soviet republics), NATO’s intervention Organization (CSTO), comprising Russia, Belarus, in Kosovo in 1999 despite Russian opposition, and the Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine. Georgia and The evolution of these regional organizations Ukraine seemed to seek membership of both the EU reflects not only relations between the newly indepen- and NATO, while the deployment of EU Common dent states and Russia, the former dominant power, but Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in also relations between Russia and other major powers. Moldova and Georgia reinforced the Russian tendency To the east, they must be understood against the to conflate NATO and the EU. background of rivalries between Russia and China, The EU launched its Eastern Partnership in 2009 with as well as partially shared concerns between those all six countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, two powers as to the role of the US. The ‘Shanghai Georgia, and Armenia), in the wake of the Russia– Five’ mechanism was created by China, Russia, Georgia conflict, amid growing Russian criticism. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in 1996. Tensions came to a head in Ukraine in 2013. The EU had This was transformed in 2002 (with the participa- offered Ukraine an Association Agreement, including tion of Uzbekistan) into the Shanghai Cooperation a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Organization (SCO). India and Pakistan became full Russia placed high importance on Ukrainian participa- members in 2017, while Iran and Mongolia are observ- tion in the Eurasian Customs Union, and the two were ers. In late 2013, China unveiled its Belt and Road not compatible. The Ukrainian government had tried Initiative, a massive programme of infrastructure to maintain a balancing act between the two sides (also investments crossing Asia and reaching into Europe reflecting the cultural and linguistic divisions within and Africa that would promote China’s regional lead- Ukraine). Under pressure from both the EU and Russia, ership to its west. Discussion of links between this in November 2013 Ukraine chose not to sign the agree- initiative and the EAEU in the framework of the SCO ment with the EU, nor to enter the Eurasian Customs began in 2014. As tensions rose after 2014 with the Union. Subsequent events included civil unrest, armed US and the EU, President Putin intensified his own conflict, and Russian annexation of the Crimea. efforts to strengthen Russia’s role to its east. In June This situation is far more complex than simple oppo- 2016, he called for the establishment of a ‘Greater sition between the EU and Russia, or between ‘pro-EU’ Eurasian Partnership’ among the EAEU, China, and ‘pro-Russian’ elements in Ukraine. It shows how India, and other countries. This new Eurasian cooper- frictions between regional cooperation frameworks ation brought the signature of a free trade agreement may escalate and become distorted in areas of historical between China and the EAEU in May 2018, and saw sensitivity and international rivalry. Moreover, it illus- the participation of Chinese troops in massive mili- trates some new dilemmas in European integration. The tary exercises conducted by Russia in September 2018. competition in Ukraine looks uncomfortably like old- To the west, the evolution of sub-regional agree- fashioned rivalry between power blocs (or even ‘alli- ments has occurred in the context of economic and ances’) on the European continent. ‘One of the noble political competition between Russia and the EU, par- aims behind the European Community was to super- ticularly in the ‘shared neighbourhood’: that is, the six sede inter-state rivalries, not to replicate them at a higher countries which were once part of the former Soviet level. Since the end of the cold war, the EU has groped Union and which now participate in the EU’s eastern its way towards a security and defence policy, while still neighbourhood policy instruments (Ukraine, Belarus, maintaining its own international vocation and its own Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia). internal reality as a method of transnational governance The GUAM Organization for Democracy and conceived as an alternative to power politics. The two Economic Development was set up in 1997 as a forum dimensions do not sit easily together’ (Best 2016).  Chapter 23 Regionalism in international affairs 377 Key Points Regionalism in the Americas has developed at multiple levels, with some tension between Inter-Americanism and between Asian powers. It is now being cut across by transcontinental agreements, but these have been weakened Latin American integration reflecting mixed attitudes towards by the withdrawal of the US from the Trans-Pacific the role of the United States. Partnership. An African Union has been established, based on eight Regional Economic Communities that have achieved The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to new regional arrangements in Eurasia as post-Soviet states evolved in significant results in functional cooperation, but deep zones of competing influence between Russia and the EU, or integration remains elusive. between Russia and China. Eurasian cooperation including Asian regionalism has been shaped by security concerns as well as market forces, but it has also been limited by rivalries China became stronger in the context of tensions with the US under President Trump. The process of European integration In Europe, regionalism after 1945 has taken the form of Within this framework, EU institutions (see Table a gradual process of integration leading to the emergence 23.1) have been given considerable powers to adopt of the European Union. In what was initially a purely decisions and manage policies, although the dynamics West European creation born of the desire for recon- of decision-making differ significantly across various ciliation between France and Germany after the Second issue-areas. Important differences exist between the World War, agreement among the ‘original Six’ member more integrated aspects of economic regulation and states in the 1950s involved conferral of Community the more ‘intergovernmental’ areas such as foreign and competence in various areas—the supranational man- defence policy and internal security cooperation. In agement of coal and steel production, the creation and some cases, depending on the decision-making proce- regulation of an internal market, and common policies dure laid out in the treaty, a country may have to accept in trade, competition, agriculture, and transport. Over potentially being overruled by majority decisions time, powers have been extended to include new legisla- taken among the member states in agreement with tive competences in fields such as environmental policy the European Parliament. In other areas, unanimity is and justice and internal security. Since the 1992 Treaty required, giving each state the power to block decisions. on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty, in force from Recognizing the role played both by member 1993), the integration process has also involved new com- states and by supranational institutions is essential to mon policies, notably monetary union, as well as other understanding the nature of European integration. forms of cooperation such as non-binding coordination Furthermore, it should be noted that member states are in economic and employment policy, and more intergov- not just represented by national governments, since a ernmental cooperation in foreign and security policy. host of state, non-state, and transnational actors also From very limited beginnings, in terms of both mem- participate in the processes of domestic preference for- bership and scope, the EU has therefore gradually devel- mation or direct representation of interests in Brussels. oped to become an important political and economic actor The relative openness of the European policy process whose presence has had a significant impact, both inter- means that political groups or economic interests will nationally and domestically. This process of European try to influence EU decision-making if they feel that integration involves developments at multiple levels. The their position is not sufficiently represented by national first, quasi-constitutional level is the agreement on the governments. This is one reason why the EU, initially underlying foundations of European integration through an intergovernmental agreement among states, is the signing and occasional revision of the basic treaties. increasingly seen as a system of multilevel governance, These are the result of Intergovernmental Conferences involving a plurality of actors on different territorial (IGCs), where representatives of national governments levels: supranational, national, and sub-state. negotiate the legal framework within which the EU insti- The prospect of an ever wider European Union has tutions operate. Such treaty changes require ratification in raised serious questions about the nature and direc- each member state and can be seen as the ‘grand bargains’ tion of the integration process. The 2004/2007 enlarge- in the evolution of the EU. ments, bringing in 12 Central, East, and South European 378 edward best · thomas christiansen Table 23.1 Institutions of the EU EU institution Responsibilities Location European Parliament (EP) Directly elected representatives of EU citizens, Strasbourg (plenary sessions); Brussels (MEP offices, scrutinizing the operation of the other committee meetings, and some plenary sessions); institutions, and, in many areas, sharing with Luxembourg (administration) the Council of the EU the power to adopt EU legislation European Council Regular summits of the leaders of the member Brussels states and the Commission, chaired by an elected president, setting the EU’s broad agenda and a forum of last resort to find agreement on divisive issues (NB: distinct from the Council of Europe) Council of the EU Representing the views of national Brussels (some meetings in Luxembourg) governments and adopting, in many areas jointly with the EP, the ultimate shape of EU legislation European Commission Initiating, administering, and overseeing the Brussels and Luxembourg implementation of EU policies and legislation Court of Justice of the EU The EU’s highest court, supported by a Luxembourg General Court: main competences include actions for annulment of EU acts, infringement procedures against member states for failing to comply with obligations, and preliminary rulings on the validity or interpretation of EU law on request from national courts European Central Bank Central bank responsible for setting the Frankfurt am Main interest rates and controlling the money supply of the single European currency, the euro Court of Auditors The EU’s audit office, responsible for auditing Luxembourg revenues and expenditure under the EU budget countries as new members, have generally been seen problems in the aftermath of the 2008 global finan- as a qualitative leap for the EU, which has been further cial crisis and required significant financial assistance enhanced by the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty to prevent them from defaulting and causing even in 2009. greater problems for the financial system in Europe. Despite these far-reaching reforms, the EU has In a situation in which the EU itself had neither the subsequently confronted a series of crises that have legal authority nor the financial means to assist, these challenged its institutional framework and exposed bailouts had to be arranged through complex new limitations in the political will of governments and mechanisms involving other eurozone members as populations to support deeper integration. In addi- well as the IMF. With the immediate danger of default tion to the security situation around Ukraine men- averted, the more long-term response to the crisis has tioned above, four particular challenges are worth also involved new powers for banking supervision noting. First, the eurozone group of countries that through the European Central Bank, greater oversight have adopted the euro as a single currency—a subset of national budgets, and the creation of a new invest- of 19 EU member states—has been suffering since 2009 ment plan by the European Commission. The eurozone with the calamitous prospect of sovereign debt default crisis exposed the risks inherent in the decision taken of several of its members. Countries such as Ireland, in the Maastricht Treaty to unify monetary policy Portugal, Spain, and Greece faced serious economic without corresponding integration of national fiscal  Chapter 23 Regionalism in international affairs 379 policy. Hostile public reactions to the way the crisis Prime Minister David Cameron called a referendum in was managed resulted in large-scale protests and the the UK resulting in a majority vote in favour of leav- electoral success of Eurosceptic parties in both creditor ing the EU. For an organization that had gone through and debtor countries. This has demonstrated a lack of several rounds of enlargement but never witnessed the transnational solidarity that many consider essential to withdrawal of a member state, this development not legitimize significant fiscal transfers and supranational only came as a shock but also had wide-ranging politi- oversight of reforms. cal and economic implications (see Box 23.3). A second crisis confronting the EU has been the ref- Finally, the EU has also had to deal with a growing ugee crisis beginning in 2015. Hundreds of thousands threat to liberal values that are, for some, at the heart of refugees fleeing civil war in Syria and Afghanistan of the European project. Governments in Hungary and have headed through Turkey and the Balkans for the Poland, government parties in Austria (FPÖ) and Italy safety of Western Europe. Even though Europe had (La Lega), and important political movements in other been the destination of migrants arriving across the member states have not only intensified their attacks Mediterranean for many years, European states were on the European Union and its ‘interference’ in the both logistically and politically unprepared for the sud- domestic affairs of individual states, but also champi- den increase in numbers. The response has been the oned a populist assault on civil rights in the name of re-introduction of national border controls and the advancing ‘illiberal democracy’. While EU institutions temporary suspension of key parts of the European asy- have responded to these developments both politically lum regime, raising serious questions about the future and judicially, a decisive response was hampered by the of open borders and free movement inside the Schengen need for consensus in the Council in which these very area comprising the majority of EU member states. governments are also represented. Third, tensions in relations between the United The confluence of these crises from the mid-2010s Kingdom and the EU came to a head in 2016 when onwards constituted a ‘perfect storm’ for the European Box 23.3 ‘Brexit’—the UK votes to leave the European Union On 23 June 2016, the British electorate voted with a 51.9 per cent Article 50 of the EU Treaty lays down the procedures for negoti- majority to leave the European Union. In 2013, Prime Minister ating exit from the EU, including a two-year time limit within which David Cameron had promised an ‘in/out referendum’ on the UK’s complex legal and institutional issues need to be resolved. After the membership of the EU in response to the deep divisions in his popular vote, British leaders first hesitated to ‘trigger’ this official own Conservative Party on the European issue and the rise of process, which led to prolonged uncertainty about the shape of the single-issue UK Independence Party, which had long cam- post-Brexit arrangements, and once the notice had been submitted paigned for the UK to leave the EU. When the Conservatives won to Brussels, progress in the negotiations was sluggish. The p ­ rocess the 2015 elections to the House of Commons, the question of was characterized by a stark difference in positions across the English when and how this referendum would be held quickly rose to Channel. Whereas the remaining EU member states (the ­so-called the top of the British government’s agenda. Cameron engaged EU27) demonstrated a remarkable unity in defending their com- with his European partners in an attempt at re-negotiating the mon interests, there were persistent divisions in the British cabinet, relationship between the UK and the EU, but the number of lim- in the governing Conservative Party, in the UK Parliament, and in ited concessions agreed as part of a ‘deal’ in February 2016 hardly the population in general—divisions which became more stark as featured in the subsequent campaign. the end of the two-year deadline approached. Even after an agree- Advocates of leaving the EU focused largely on three issues: ment on the terms of the withdrawal and a political declaration on the cost of EU membership to the British taxpayer, migration the aims for future cooperation was reached between the British from other EU countries to the UK, and the more diffuse sense government and the European Union, Prime Minister Theresa May of Britain having lost its sovereignty (or independence, or con- was unable to gain support for the Withdrawal Agreement in the UK trol over its destiny) due to membership in the EU. Those want- Parliament in time for the envisaged ‘Brexit day’ of 29 March 2019, ing Britain to remain in turn emphasized the economic risks forcing an extension of the UK’s EU membership until 31 October that would come with leaving the EU: less trade with the UK’s 2019. This delay (and a further one until the end of January 2020) largest export market, reduced growth, and rising unemploy- had the ironic effect that the UK was after all obliged to partici- ment. Those concerns were confirmed almost instantly after pate in the elections to the European Parliament in May 2019, and the ‘Leave’ vote when the British pound lost some 10 per cent more broadly demonstrated the serious challenges a member state against the dollar, and stock markets around the world fell faces—politically, economically, and culturally—when seeking to significantly. leave the European Union. 380 edward best · thomas christiansen Union and it has prompted some observers to openly dis- Key Points cuss the prospect of regional disintegration in Europe. These events have demonstrated clearly the limitations of what has been a largely elite-driven process of insti- The process of integration in post-war Europe was launched in the context of long debates about the creation tutional integration and have shown the potential for of a federal system, but ultimately the choice was made in favour of a gradual path towards an ‘ever closer union’. centrifugal forces to undo past advances in integration. However, the EU not only survived these crises intact, Integration has proceeded by conferring competence for many economic sectors to supranational institutions that but in some ways was actually energized to further can take decisions that are binding on the member states. expand the scope of common policies (e.g. establishment of a banking union and a fiscal surveillance mecha- Over time, more politically sensitive areas, such as monetary policy and internal and external security, have nism) and to strengthen EU institutions (e.g. creation also become the domain of the European Union. of a European Border and Coast Guard and a European Defence Fund). The EU also demonstrated remarkable Successive reforms of the EU treaties have sought to maintain and enhance the legitimacy and efficiency of a unity of purpose in the context of Brexit, vis-à-vis Russia Union that has grown to 28 member states, the latest being in response to its annexation of Crimea, and in dealing the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty at the end of 2009. with the threat of a trade war with the United States. As Since 2009, the EU has had to confront a number of existential crises that challenged the viability of existing a matter of fact, by the time of the European Parliament institutional arrangements and raised questions about the elections in the spring of 2019, regular surveys of public limited popular support for further integration, yet also opinion recorded rising support for the European Union saw the deepening and strengthening of certain aspects of across most member states. European integration. Conclusion Three observations can conclude this overview of the set up, ranging from rather loose and non-binding development of mechanisms of regional cooperation agreements such as the Gulf Cooperation Council to and integration. First, regionalism is a truly global the complex institutional architecture set up by the phenomenon. It is not the case that the entire world European Union, depending on the scope and depth is engulfed in a single process of globalization, or with which members are seeking to address issues of that the world is being divided along simple ideologi- transnational governance. Third, there is no single or cal or civilizational fault-lines. Rather, different parts simple path of regionalism. The ways in which differ- of the globe are looking for different ways to accom- ent regional mechanisms develop are contingent on a modate themselves in the globalized world order, and multitude of factors, both internal and external to the regional arrangements are one important way of doing region. Both the driving forces for more regional inte- so. There is thus no paradox, and even less a contradic- gration and cooperation, and the obstacles that may tion, between regionalism and globalization. Instead, limit those aspirations, vary across the different con- regionalism is one aspect of the process of globaliza- tinents. Even as multilateralism in global politics is tion, and developments in one region inform and affect being challenged, regionalism remains as a global phe- developments in others. Second, within the global nomenon, but so do the differences among the kinds trend towards regionalism there are important dif- of regional arrangements that are being developed in ferences in the types of organizations that are being different parts of the globe. Questions 1. What have been the driving forces behind processes of regional integration and cooperation? 2. What is the relative weight of economic and political factors in explaining the emergence of regional institutions? 3. How have the dynamics of regionalism changed since the 1990s?