PHIL 230 Final Exam Review PDF Study Guide

lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 Exam structure: - 6/9 Short Answer questions (3-6 sentences per answer) 5 points each - 2/4 Essay Prompt answers (similar prompts to paper except less expectatio...

lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 Exam structure: - 6/9 Short Answer questions (3-6 sentences per answer) 5 points each - 2/4 Essay Prompt answers (similar prompts to paper except less expectations) Moral Relativism vs Moral Objectivism - Cultural relativism: all moral truths are relative to cultures → moral code of society - Subjective relativism: all moral truths are relative to particular individuals → moral beliefs - Moral objectivism: there are at least some objective, universal truths in ethics (tied to Enoch reading “Why I am an Objectivist and you are too” from Metaethics section) - Structurally sound argument: - Premises must be true and conclusion logically follows from the premises - A conclusion follows from a set of premises if it’s impossible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true - If the conclusion logically follows true premises, then the argument is valid - Moral relativism makes cultures morally infallible, renders cross-cultural moral disagreement unintelligible, and moral progress within a culture impossible. - There are certain practices that are widely accepted as immoral (killing), and criticising a particular cultural practice doesn't necessarily amount to criticizing the culture as a whole. Our Obligations to Others Peter Singer - Famine, Affluence, and Mortality - Main Argument: “If you can prevent something bad from hapening, without sacri cing anything nearly as important, it’’s wrong not to do so.” - Therefore, someone living in a uence should donate until the point of marginal utility (until donating doesnt cause you signi cant harm/as much as humanly possible). - Takes no account of: 1) Proximity from the bad thing you could prevent 2) Number of others who could also prevent a bad thing - These conditions are not moral passes. - The soundness of singer’s argument (if sound) requires a drastic revision of our moral scheme. → We should condemn those who indulge in luxury instead of giving to relief - We ought morally to be working full time to relieve great su ering of the sort that occurs as a result of famine and disasters; preventing as much as we can without sacri cing something of comparable importance. - The Greater Moral Evil Rule (GME): youre morally permitted to keep your belongings only if youd be sacri cing something of equal value. - Moral equality demands equal consideration of interests; like amount of su ering are of equal moral signi cance, no matter who is experiencing them. John Arthur - World Hunger and Moral Obligation: The Case Against Singer - Main argument: there are other morally signi cant factors in our obligations such as entitlements (rights and desert). 1) Rights (Kidney) - You have an extre kidney, your life doesnt depend on it but someone else’s might. However, you have a right to your kidney, and to your body generally, and that right isnt outweighed. - Negative rights: non-interference (bodily rights, etc) - Positive rights: recipience (right to healthcare, education, etc) - Rights and duty to help others are di erent kinds of morally signi cant factors and are individually signi cant. 2) Desert (food shortage) - Industrious farmer works hard to produce a surplus of food, lazy neighbour doesnt. → GME says industrious farmer ought to give surplus to lazy neighbour. - Industrious farmer deserves their surplus, and this justi cation isnt outweighed by neighbour’s laziness. - Positive: thing deserved is a bene t (bonus) - Negative: thing deserved is a harm (punishment) - Desert and a duty to help are di erent kinds of morally signi cant factors. Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 - Duty to help, rights, and desert are each independently morally signi cant, each has weight. - GME is too strong: not the case that you are necessarily acting wrongly if not helping others. - Moderate GME: “if you can prevent something bad from hapening, without substantial cost to yourself, it’s wrong not to do so.” → Can still blame people who waste money on trivia, but not those who dont make large sacri ces to distant strangers. Moral problems: Tradeo s Philipa Foot - The problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect - Save a pregnant persons life at the cost of an unborn human. - Raise level of education, raise suicide rate - “Scapegoat” Vs “Runaway tram” → Both cases choice is between killing 1 and 5, however runaway tram seems permissible but scapegoat doesn't. → Same with “life saving drug” scenario and “serum” scenario, why does life saving drug seem morally permissible but not serum? - Doctrine of Double E ect (DDE) - “It is sometimes permissible to knowingly bring about (or allow) some bad e ect in the course of achieving some good goal, even though it would not have been permissible to bring about that bad e ect as one’s intended means to that good goal.” → What you intend to do Vs. Merely foreseen consequences - “Strategic Bomber” Vs “Terror Bomber” - Terror: intends to drop bombs, kill children, terrorize, in order to weaken enemy. - Strategic: intends to drop bombs, possible consequences of killing children and terrorizing, in order to weaken enemy. - DDE would explain that strategic bomber is morally permissible becuase it isnt intended to kill children, does say it’s okay but allows for the possibility of it being permissible. - Foot argues against DDE: 1) Distinction between what you intend, and the foreseen consequences of what you intend, can be less than clear. 2) Whether an e ect is directly intended, or merely foreseen, can seem morally irrelevant. 3) Fails to explain our verdicts about certain cases. - Negative duties: duties to refrain from harming people in various ways (killing, stealing, etc) - Positive duties: duties to aid or bene t others in various ways (rescuing, helping, etc) - Core claim: negative duties are in general stronger than positive duties - DDE plays little to no role in explaining our moral judgements about cases where the interests of human beings con ict. ❖ In contrast, distinction between avoiding harm and providing aid (negative vs positive rights) plays a signi cant role, and can explain the kind of data examined in Foot’s argument. Judith Jarvis Thomson - Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem - Why is it morally permissible to kill the 1 to save the 5 in cases like “Trolley”, but not in cases like “Transplant”. → Trolley: con ict of negative duties, choose duty with the least harm (duty to not kill 5 outweighs duty to not kill 1) → Transplant: negative vs positive duty, negative duty not to kill 1 con icts with positive duty to save 5, negative outweighs - so not morally permissible to kill the 1 - “Passenger case” Vs “Footbridge case” → Passenger: if Frank turns trolley, he de ects an existing threat from the larger group onto the smaller group. → Footbridge: if George pushes the large man, he brings a di erent threat to bear on the smaller group. - “Health Pebble”: it is permissible to de ect the health pebble if and only if the one has no more claim on it than any of the ve does. (this same thing applies to “Passenger”) → Morally permissible to de ect pebble if 1 has no more claim than 5, but not morally permissible in footbridge. - Thomson’s respons: Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 - In Passenger, if Frank turns the Trolley, he does something to it (de ects) - In Footbridge, if George pushes man onto tracks, he does something to him (brings di erent threat into the picture)’ Abortion Don Marquis - Why Abortion is Immoral - Anti-abortionist: fetuses are genetically humans. It’s always prima facie wrong to take a human life. So, abortion is always prima facie wrong. → Too broad, predicts that it’s wrong to kill cancer cells. - Pro-choice: fetuses are not persons (rational/social beings). It’s always prima facie wrong to kill only persons. So, it is not the case that abortion is always prima facie wrong. → Too narrow, predicts that it’s not wrong to kill infants or people with cognitive disabilities. * At what point does a fetus become a person? - If whatever it is that makes it wrong to kill an adult human is also true of a human fetus, then abortion is wrong. → Loss of the victim of the value of their future - Explains why we regard killing as the worst of crimes, people who are dying often believe the loss of a future of value is what makes death bad. - Future like ours argument (FLO): 1) Depriving a being of the value of a future like ours makes killing wrong. 2) Killing a fetus deprives it of that value. 3) So, abortion is morally wrong. - Shows only that abortion is presumtively wrong. But persumption is strong - killing adult comparison. - Open-ended because it is not a necessary condition but a su cient condition. - Objections: - Contrary to Marquis, it’s not the case that depriving a being of the value of a future like ours is wrong. For if that were true, then contraception would be wrong. But it isnt. - Reply: Marquis account would entail that contraception is wrong only if something - some being - were denied a valuable future by contraception. But no being is denied such a future by contraception. Judith Jarvis Thomson - A Defense of Abortion - Denies the premise that it is always wrong to kill something with a right to life. (violinist thought experiment) * You have a right to control your own body, and this right can outweigh a person’s right to life. - You have a right to control your own body, and this right outweighs the violinists right to life. So, it is permissible to unplug, killing the violinist. → However, in this case it is involuntary (analagous to rape cases) - The right to life doesnt necessarily entail a moral requirement, on the part of others, to give you the bare minimum you need for continued life. → Even if a fetus has a right to life, that doesnt mean that, necessarily, the mother is morally required to allow the fetus continued use of her body. - “Trapped” (tiny house, growing child) thought experiment - Right to self-defense outweighs the rapidly growing child’s right to life, permissible to kill the child to save your life. - In cases where fetus poses a threat to woman’s life, she is morally permitted to defend her life, even if doing so involves the fetus’ death. - The right to life doesnt necesarilly entail an obligation, on the part of others, to refrain from killing you → even if fetus has right to life, doesnt mean that, necessarily, a woman is obligated to refrain from ending itt’s life, if doing so is necessary to save her own. - “People-seeds” (mesh window frames) thought experiments - You own a house so you have control over what you let stay, outweighs the people-seeds right to life. → In at least some cases where pregnancy is due to voluntary sexual activity, a woman’s right to control her own body outweighs the fetus’ right to life. So, in such cases (accidental) abortion is permissible. Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 1) Even if we grant that fetus is a person, and so has a right to life, it doesnt follow that abortion is always wrong. 2) Abortion can be permissible in cases where pregnancy is due to voluntary or non-voluntary sexual activity, or where abortion is necessary to save a woman’s life. 3) There may be possible cases where abortion is wrong (minor inconvenience). 4) Thomson doesnt engage with Marquis, only disagrees with conclusion. Consequentialism Jeremy Bentham - The Principle of Utility - Whether act is right or wrong depends only on it’s consequences. → Best overall consequence is always favourable - Maximize goodness: same kind of action may be right in some circumstances, but wrong in others. → Doesnt specify a theory of value - Utilitarianism: for an action (A) to be right in circumstances (C) is for A to produce greatest net well-being, compared to all relevant alternative actions that agent could perform in C. - Theory of value: well-being is the only thing that has intrinsic value - Relevant well-being of everyone a ected by the action. - Both immediate and long-term consequences matter, most claim it’s the actual, not expected, consequences that matter. - To determine if action is right, we cant just take net e ect, also have to weigh consequences of all alternative actions. - Hedonism: well-being consists in happiness/pleasure John Stuart Mill - In Defense of Utilitarianism and Robert Nozick - The Experience Machine - Need to be able to compare amounts of well-being, and to know how to measure said amounts. - Bentham and Mill endorse a hedonist account of well-being; happiness and pleasure are only things that are intrinsically good - Mill’s “Proof ” that happiness is good: 1) The only evidence that an object is visible is that people see it, same with sound. 2) Likewise, the only evidence that something is desirable is that people desire it. 3) Everyone desires their own happiness 4) Everyones happiness is desired → All other desires are a means to achieve happiness, fundamental desire for happiness - Desirable is not only that you are able to desire it, but also that it merits desire. * 1 to 2 seems implausible since we can desire things that are not desirable/dont merit desire - Comparing amounts of pleasures and pains: - Bentham: pleasures/pains di er only in quality → Quantity of pleasure/pain determined by: - Intensity, duration, propinquity, certainty/uncertainty - Mill: pleasures/pains di er in quantity and quality - Di erent kinds of pleasures: - Basic animalistic pleasures like food, drink, sex - Pleasures that only humans experience - Mill’s test for higher quality pleasures: 1) Consider everyone who has experienced both A and B and has the competences required to fully appreciate both. 2) If all or most of them prefer A over B, then A is of higher quality. - This account is imprecise, cant assign numerical values to amounts of pleasure and pain, but we can still make rough comparisons. - The experience machine: teaches us that something matters to us in addition to experience - that something matters to us beyond how our lives feel from the inside. → Implies that actually performing the action is important - Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 - Di culties with Utilitarianism: - Demandingness on Deliberation: according to Utilitariansim, to know whether an action is morally right, we need to do four things: 1) Add up all the bene ts (well-being) it produces. 2) Add up all the harm (ill-being) it produces. 3) Determine the balance of bene t to harm. 4) See whether the balance is greater than that of any other available action. - To decide hwo to act, we need to know a huge amount of information; we need to know all the options we face and their results, we need to know overall value that each of our options would yield, and then we ned to compare these values to see which option yields the best outcome. - Demandingness on Motivation: must we always strategically aim to bring about the absolute best consequences? A plausible moral theory is one that most of us can live by. But asking us to be constantly benevolent, never taking more than a moment or two for ourselves - how may of us can be so altruistic? → Utilitarianism o ers, above all, a standard of rightness (a theory of right action), and not a decision procedure. - Demandingness on Action: even if we dont always have to deliberate with an ete to doing whats absolutely best, and even if we dont always have to have saintly, benevolent motivations, utilitarianism still says that we always have to act so as to maximize goodness/well-being in the world. And whenever we dont do this, we do something morally wrong. → The fact that the implications of a moral theory are burdensome isnt a decisive strike against it. - Impartiality: (virtue?) the well-being of a celebrity or a billionaire is no more important than that of a severely impoverished person. From the moral point of view, everyone counts equally; no one’s interests are more important than anyone else’s. - Morality sometimes seems to recommend partiality; shouldnt you care about your own children more than other people’s children? Shouldnt you care about your friends more than strangers? Shouldnt you privilege their interests? - No Intrinsic Wrongness/Problem of Injustice: an action’s rightness or wrongness depends always and only on its consequences. So no actions are right or wrong irrespective of their consequences. If an action maxiizes goodness, then its right - nothing is o the table. Kantian Ethics Immanuel Kant - The Moral Law and Autonomy of the Will - Good Will: - “It is impossible to conceive of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without quali cation, except a good will.” - A good will is the only thing thats unconditionally good: → Ex: happiness is only good if person experiencing has a good will. - Good will is intrinsically good, apart from any e ects it may produce - full value in itself - What makes a good will good? → Conformity with moral law - The Categorical Imperative: - Imperatives: commands; imply “ought” claims - Hypothetical: tell us what we ought to do, given that certain other conditions apply (if/then) - Categorical: tell us what to do, unconditionally - The moral law is the only categorical imperative → Categorical because we give it to ourselves, constitutive of our rational nature; were governed by moral, bound by it just by virtue of being rational animals. - Maxims: reasons for acting (principle, rule) - Maxims include three components: Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 1) Description of the physical act you’re performing 2) Description of circumstances in which youre performing the act 3) Purpose or end of your action - General ACE form: “I will do act A, in circumstances C, for end E. - Every action has a maxim, whether or not you explicitly think of it. - Two formulations: 1) Formula of Universal Law (FUL): - “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” - You should act only for those reasons which have the following characteristic: → you can act for that reason while at the same time wishing that it be a law that everyone in your circumstances adopt that same reason. - “False promise” (thought experiment) 1) Formulare maxim that captures your reason for acting as you propose. 2) Recast your maxim as a universal law governing all rational agents 3) Consider whether the universalization of your maxim is even conceivable. 4) If it is, then ask yourself whether you could rationally will that the maxim become universal law. If you could, then your action is ok. - Ex: You cant make a false promise, because then youd be creating a situation in which everyone can make false promises to you - doesnt follow rationally. - A maxim could fail 3 or 4, if it does, then the act is wrong; if it doesnt, then act is right. - Tells us what morality forbids you from doing, it doesnt tell you what you positively ought to do, leaves open range of permissible options. Joshua Glasgow - Kant’s principle of Universal Law - Whether an agent’s will is good is independent of the e ects of the action. - Intuitive idea: our moral evaluations focus on agents intentions, rather than on their outward behaviour, or the consequences of their behaviour. - Hypothetical imperatives are excapable; but moral principles, or duties, are not; obligate you independently of subjective ends. - Two kinds of duties: I. Narrow duties: derived from contradiction in conception; duties that an agent has no leeway in deciding when, how, and in what circumstances, they comply with them. II. Wide duties: derived from a contradiction in willing; duties that allow latitude in deciding when, how, adn in what circumstances the agent will ful ll them. - Problems: formula for universal law might generate erroneous results in some cases; - “Model trains” problem → impossible that everyone buys but nobody sells - So universalizing maxim involves a contradiction in conception; buying model trains and not selling is wrong. - “Problem of relevant descriptions” → Bank rober problem 1) Until we know how to properly describe our actions we will get erroneous results 2) Because one action can have di erent maxims, one action can get di erent, contradictory results on universalizability. 3) FUL doesnt yield determinate results, if theres no determinate maxim for each action. * Kant says that experience and observation are irrelevant Onora O’Neill - Kant on Treating People as Ends in Themselves 2) Humanity as an End in (Humanity Formula) - “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether your own person or others, never merely as a means but always at the same time as an end” Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 - Humanity in your own person and in others consists in the capacity to set and pursue ends. → Can never treat someone (their humanity) as only a means - To use someone as mere means is to involve them in a scheme of action in which they could not in principle consent. → doesnt forbid using people as means; only as mere means - Using people as means: teacher and student or waiter and customer - Using people as mere means: intentional deceiver or nurse lying to patient (paper 2) → Deceiving about a maxim, if a person doesn't know the real maxim than they cant in principle consent. - Whenever we use others (humanity in their persons) as mere means, we do something wrong: - Such acts are always, without exception, forbidden according to this formula. - To treat someone as an end in themselves requires, rst, that we not use them as mere means - that we respect each as a rational person with their own maxims. * Also that, if possible, we seek to foster their plans and maxims, by sharing some of their ends. → We must act on no maxims that use others as mere means, and on some maxims that foster others ends. - “Murder at the door/lying” problem: - If you lie to the murderer, you cant on principle/maxim that murderer could not consent to. (Using murder as mere means - have to tell them truth and possibly let them kill your friend) Rossian Pluralism W.D. Ross - What Makes Right Acts Right? - There can be a plurality of morally signi cant relations in which others stand to you. - Ordinary promise: - Promised to pick up friend at the airport. Consequences of keeping your promise will be at least a little better than breaking it. - Disastrous promise: - Promised to pick up friend at airport. Consequences of keeping promise would be disastrous. - Promise in parity: even/equal consequences - Normally promise-keeping should come before benevolence, but that when and only when the good to be produced by the benevolent act is very great and the promise comparatively trivial, the act of benevolence becomes our duty. → Each of the morally signi cant relations in which others stand to you grounds a prima facie duty, which is more or less incumbent on you, depending on the circumstance. - Prima facie duty: duty “at rst face” or “ rst appearance” (pro tanto duties) - duties to a certian extent/you have a reason to do it - Duty sans phrase: duty without quali cation (all things considered duty) - you ought to do it - Ross’ list of pro tanto duties: 1) Fidelity (keep promises/dont lie) 2) Reparation (right past wrongs) 3) Gratitude (appreciate services rendered) 4) Justice (distribute goods according to merit) 5) Bene cence (improve condition of others) 6) Self-improvement (improve own condition) 7) Non-male cence (dont harm others) - Fundamentally distinct, cant be reduced to another. - No single moral principle, plurality of conditions - Our pro tanto duties are self-evident: → “When we have reached su cient mental maturity and have given su cient attention to the proposition, it is eident without any need of proof, or evidence beyond itself.” - Our all things considered duty in concrete situations, are not self-evident: Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 → We can never know whether something is our all things considered duty, at best, we can have a probable opinion. - Not a matter of mere chance, we are more likely to do our duty if we re ect to the best of our ability on the prima facie rightness or wrongness (pro tanto duties) of the various possible acts. - More important that theory t facts than it be more simple → “Moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just as sense perceptions are the data of natural science.” David McNaughton - An Unconnected Heap of Duties - Objections to Rossian Pluralism - Ross’ pluralism is unsystematic, it gives us only a heap of unconnected duties, with no unifying rationale. → H.W.B. Joseph: “our obligations must have something that uni es them, not just as obligations.” → D.D. Raphael: “Doesn’t meet the need of a philosophical theory - no system” - Ordinary moral thinking appeals to a variety of moral principles, which java no immediately discernable structure. Goal of moral theory is to systematize moral thought. Ross’ theory does not do this; it merely mirrors ordinary moral thinking. → Arbitrary list of common duties that are self-evident. No explanation of why some are on and others arent. 1) No room for rational debate if we disagree, because no explanation for why some items are on the list. 2) If no unifying factor, theory doesnt provide a uniform basis for all of our obligations, no account of what makes right acts right. - McNaughton’s response: - Ross tries to systematize ordinary moral thinking in much the same wau that consequentialists do: - Tries to show that the wide variety of principles deployed in ordinary moral thinking can be derived from a small number of self-evident basic principles. - Just disagrees about how many principles we need - 4,5, and 6, could be under universal bene cence (promote general good) - List isnt arbitrary, very speci c factors for a duty to be on Ross’ list. - Duty gets to be on list if: (1) it cant be derived from any other duty and (2) it's necessary to explain and justify our everyday moral judgements. - Duty is derivative when its a duty only in virtue of some other duty. - Why think there must be something all duties have in common in virtue of which they are duties? Why think all right acts are right for the same reasons? → Plurality of morally signi cant reasons in which we stand to others. Each of our pro tanto duties rests on some such relation. If this is so, then there is something our duties have in common - a relation to others. Virtue Ethics (VE) Aristotle - Nichomachean Ethics (selections) - Aristotle thought that what it is to be a good person and what is fundamentally good are the same thing: Eudaimonia → Better translated as “human ourishing” or “living well” - Fundamental good has three features: - It’s complete: we always choose it for itself, not for something else. - Self-evident: it (by itself) makes a life choiceworthy, a life that has it lacks nothing. - Most-choiceworthy: all other goods are chosen for its sake. - Most things have essential capacities: capacities that make things the kinds of things that they are. → Essential capacity of the eye is the ability to see - A things essential capacities determine it’s function: function of the eye is to see Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 - Living things have essential capacities, and function: 1) Plants: take in nutrition, grow, reproduce (nutritive function) 2) Animals: appetites and sensory perception (+1) (perception function) 3) Humans: theoretical and practical function (+1 and 2) (rational function) - Function argument: I. If X has a function, then what it is for X to do well is for X to perform it’s function excellently. II. Human beings have a special function that sets them apart from other living beings; to engage in rational activity. III. So, what it is for a human being to live well (eudaimonia) is for them to engage in rational activity excellently (or virtuously) - Eudaimonia is “activity expressing virtue”, living a life that demonstrates excellent rational activity. * Engaging in excellent rational activity is both (A) what it is to be a good human being and (B) what is fundamentally good for human beings. - According to Aristotle we ned certain character traits - what he calls “virtues of character” → Possesing these virtues helps us perform the human function well: help us to engage in rational activity excellently/to live virtuously. Ex: Honesty, Justice, Temperance, Courage. - Virtues insofar as they help us engage in rational activity. - We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, etc. - Virtue is a mean between two extremes of excess and de ciency. - Virtue is not something you are born with - you acquire it through habituation. - To acquire virtue: - Must know that act is virtuous - Must do the virtuous act because it is virtuous - Must develop a rm and stable disposition to do virtuous actts (because they are virtuous) so that it becomes ingrained part of your character. Rosalind Hursthouse - Normative Virtue Ethics - Common objection to VE: - Virtue ethics tell us only what sort of person to be, it doesnt tell us what we ought to do/should do. - Hursthouse’s Response: → VE can tell us what to do, because it can o er a de nitionof right action in terms of virtue: - V1: for an action to be right is for it to be what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. → A virtuous agent is one who acts virtuously (i.e. one who has and exercises the virtues) - V2: a virtue is a character trait that… - Rightness VE: for an action to be right is for it to be what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. → How can I know what the virtuous agent would do in some circumstance, if I, myself, am not virtuous? - Hursthouse’s answer: 1) Go ask a virtuous agent for advice 2) Consult the list of virtues - A fullt eshed out VE should give us a list of the virtues, by consulting this list, we can use reason to gure out what a virtuous agent would do in a given circumstance. - V2: virtues are… courage, temperance, honesty, justice, mercy, modesty, kindness, loyalty, compassion. - Con icting virtues: di erent virtues appear to come into con ict in certain circumstances. Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 - Con ict probem: - In certain circumstances, it seems like theres no action that the fully virtuous agent would do. - So, VE implies that theres no right answer to the question “What is the right thing to do? - Hursthouse’s response: 1) Argues that many of these cases involve merely apparent con icts between virtues. - In these cases, theres no genuine con ict between ther virtues and there is an action that the truly virtuous person would perform. - But knowing which action the virtuous agent would perform is sometimes di cult - it requires complex reasoning and life experience. 2) Hursthouse admits there may be some cases that involve genuine con icts between the virtues, but insists this isnt a problem for VE. - In these cases, we can imagine two fully virtuous agents in the same circumstances who perform opposing actions. - Claims that, in such cases, VE implies that there is no single right action. - This isnt a problem for VE; just shows that VE explains how and why genuine moral dilemmas are possible. - Moral dilemmas: are cases in which there is no right action, in the sense that all of the available actions seem wrong. - But, Rightness VE implies that if two fully virtuous agents would perform opposing actions in a given situation, both of those actions are right. - De nition implies that, in cases where there’s a genuine con ict between the virtues, there are multiple right actions - not that there is no right action. → Doesnt explain how genuine dilemmas are possible. - Virtue theorists can reject the possibility of genuine dilemmas: - With respect to con ict problem can claim: - All apparent con icts between virtues are merelly apparent or there are some genuine con icts, but in such cases, any option that a virtuous agent would choose is right (permissible). Ethics of Care Carol Gilligan - In a Different Voice - Two di erent kinds of moral voices; masculin and feminine → feminine focuses on care/inter-relationship - Kholberg focuses on male moral voice - Gilligan focuses on feminine moral voice → Isnt necessarily represented as only women/all women - “Heinz stealing drug to save wife” (though-experiment) - Kholberg studied boy’s answers to the questions - Kholberg’s moral development theory (increasing autonomy from 1-6): - Stage 1: punishment and obedience - Stage 2: self-interest - Conventional level (early adolescence) - Stage 3: interpersonal concordance (good husband) - Stage 4: law and order (stealing is illegal and bad) - Postconventional level (moral maturity) - Stage 5: social contract (others pay so we pay) - Stage 6: universal ethical principle (abstract moral reasoning) → Heinz’s wife’s right to life weighs more than druggists right to property - Assymytrey in Kholberg’s ndings for women and men’s di erential scores is biased Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 - Gilligan’s Ethics of Care: - Women arent inferior in their personal or moral development, they simply approach moral problems di erently → they “impose a distinctive construction of moral problems” - Women’s constructions of the abortion dilemma reveal the existence of distinct moral language. → women try to exercise care and avoid hurt - Preconventional level: orientation toward individual survival, caring for the self to exclusion of others (what’s best for me) → Transition from sel shness to responsibility for others - Conventional level: goodness as self-sacri ce (what’s best for them) → Transition from goodness to truth that she’s a person too - Postconventional level: morality of non-violence (what’s best for us) - Transition from one stage to the next is not based on cognitive ability, rather based on comprehension of relationship to self and others. - The di erent ways of thinking about this connection - For Kholberg, moral maturity is a matter of: 1) Developed cognitive capability 2) Questioning conventional morality 3) Discovering individual rights 4) Generalizing this discovery into a principled, formal, and abstract conception of justice. - Gilligan: 1) Sense of self as interdependent with others 2) Orientation toward issues of responsibility and care 3) Sensitivity to context and narrative - According to Gilligan, her abortion study suggests that women impose a distinctive construction of moral problems, seeing them in terms of con icting responsibilities. Nel Noddings - An Ethic of Caring - Masuline/justice ethics: morality as abstract problem solving (fairness, rights, freedom) - Feminine voice/ethics of care: context and individual identity (responsibility, compassion, relation) - Natural Caring: - E ortless caring; caring because we want to care, in acting on behalf of another because we want to, act in accord with natural care → the “I must” accompanies the “I want”. - Ethical Caring: - Caring because “I must” not because “I want”; occurs in response to memory of natural caring; “the memory of our own best moments of caring and being cared for sweeps ober us as a feeling” - as an “I must” response to plight of the other and con icting desire to serve own interests. - Ethical behaviour has its source in the twin sentiments of Natural and Ethical Caring; former feeling directly for the other and latter feeling for and with best self. - Ethical ideal is to approximate one’s “best self” → when we commit to ourselves to obey the “I must” even at it’s wealest and most eeting, we are under the guidance of this ideal. - Obligation: - No obligation to feel initial “I must” in response to the need of the cared-for: → “This impulse arises naturally, at least occasionally, in the absence of pathology” - Obligation to accept the “I must”, to accept the impulse to act on behalf of the present other - to meet the other as “one-aring”. - Obliged to summon the “I must” to consciousness when it doesnt arise naturally. - Must accept rather than object the “I must” because of the value we place on the relatedness of caring, which arises as a product of actual caring and being cared-for and re ection on the goodness of concreting caring situations. - There are no universal principles that specify what we all must do. Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|17359523 PHIL 230 - Final Exam Review Date: Friday, Dec 9 → We must each be guided in our conduct by our individual vision of “best self” - must each be faithful to that personal ideal. - Ideal contains at it’s heart a component that is universal; maintenance of the caring relation. - Limits of Obligation: - Our obligation is limited by relation - Obligated to summon the “I must” only if there’s some possibility of “completion” in the other, capable os responding. - Not obligated to care for starving children in distant countries; not obliged to care fot certain non-human animals. - If our caring can be completed in the other, then we must meet that other as one-caring. In relation to other or addressed by other. → Greater potential for growth if recognized and reciprocated. - Priority of obligations: greater dynamic potential for growth in relation (including the potential for increased reciprocity and mutuality) than greater strength of obligation. - Problem of abortion: as fetus grows, so does potential for obligation to it. Ubuntu Philosophy Thaddeus Metz - Toward an African Moral Theory - Develops a goal of right action informed by “African Ethics”, refers to “values associated with the largely black and bantu-speaking peoples residing in sub-saharan Africa.” - “Ubuntu”: means, roughy, humanness, Downloaded by hiba douche ([email protected])