MH 1947 2019 Original dgmt precise PDF

The information given in this document is not to be communicated either directly or indirectly to the press or to any person not holding an official position i n the service of the Government of India/ State Government of the Union of India. PROMOTION EXAM PART D...

The information given in this document is not to be communicated either directly or indirectly to the press or to any person not holding an official position i n the service of the Government of India/ State Government of the Union of India. PROMOTION EXAM PART D MIL HISTORY 2019-20 COMPILED & PUBLISHED BY THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF MILITARY TRAINING (MT-2) INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS OF MoD (ARMY)  MILITARY HISTORY CAMPAIGNS AND BIOGRABHICAL STUDIES FOR PROMOTION EXAMINATION PART D : 2019-20 Campaign / Prescribed Books Recommended Books Biography Official History of Ops in J&K (1947-48) The Pak Army 1947-48: by Dr SN Prasad Pakistan‟s Official Report on Indo Pak 1947-48 Kashmir Ops by Maj Gen Thunder Over Kashmir by Maurice Shaukat Riza Cohen Biography Fd Marshal Carriappa : His Life and Time by Brig khanduri Fd Marshal Carriappa DISCLAIMER An effort has been made to concise the books and make a precis. The quotes and maps used in the precis are extracted from the prescribed books part of the syllabus. This precis is not all encompassing and students need to refer to the prescribed books on Mil History for comprehensive prep.  INDEX Ser Chapter Pages No From To 1. Syllabus i ii 2. Chapter-I : The State of Jammu and Kashmir (a) Section 1 : Historical Background 01 01 (b) Section 2 : Terrain Analysis 02 05 (c) Section 3 : Communications 06 07 (d) Section 4 : Stratrgic Importance 08 08 (e) Section 5 : The Administrative and Military Setup 09 09 2. Chapter-II : Post Independence Devp in Jammu & Kashmir (a) Section 6 : Tribal Invansion 10 10 (b) Section 7 : Operation Gulmarg 11 14 (c) Section 8 : Accession to India and Fly IN of the Army 15 18 3. Chapter-III : Build Up and Initial Operations (a) Section 9 : Initial Actions by Indian Forces 19 24 (b) Section 10 : 161Brigade Operations to Relieve Poonch 25 28 4. Chapter-IV : Relief Operations in Jammu Sector (a) Section 11 : Review of the Situation 29 32 (b) Section 12 : Strategic Planning 33 38 5. Chapter-V : Planning at Army Headquarters 39 41 6. Chapter-VI (a) Section 13 : The Loss of Jhangar (Dec 1947) 42 43 (b) Section 14 : The Defence of Poonch 44 44 (c) Section 15 : Own Operations in Chhamb and Akhnur Areas 45 47 (d) Section 16 : The Fall of Jhangar 48 52 7. Chapter-VII : The Battle for Naushera (Jan-Feb 48) (a) Section 17 : Preliminary Operations and the battle for the 53 54 line of Communication. (b) Section 18 : Operation Satyanas and Cheeta 55 58 (c) Section 19 : Operation Kipper 59 63 (d) Section 20 : Battle of Naushera 64 69 8. Chapter-VIII : Recapture of Jhangar (a) Section 21 : General 70 71 (b) Section 22 : Second Phase of Operations 72 75 (c) Section 23 : Third Phase of Operations – Operation Vijay 76 86 9. Chapter-IX : The Handwara Sector – Advance to Tithwal 87 94 10. Chapter-X : Limited Success on the URI Front 95 97 (a) Section 24 : Threat to the Line of Communication and URI 98 100 (b) Section 25 : Planning for Advance towards Domel 101 102 (c) Section 26 : Thrust towards Pandu and Chakothi 103 105 (d) Section 27 : Southern Advance 106 106 (e) Section 28 : Haji Pir Pass Failure 107 108 11. Chapter-XI : Enemy Counter Offensive on URI Front (Jun- 109 109 Jul 1948) (a) Section 29 : Mir Kalsi and Keran 110 111 (b) Section 30 : Setback along the Kishanganga 112 112 (c) Section 31 : Review and Adjustments 113 113 (d) Section 32 : Stiff Fighting in Tithwal 114 114 (e) Section 33 : The Loss of Pandu 115 115 (f) Section 34 : Stablising the Indian Defences 116 117  2 Ser Chapter Pages No From To 12. Chapter-XII : Operations of the Jammu Division (Apr-Jul 48) 118 119 (a) Section 35 : Capture of Chingas and Rajauri 120 123 (b) Section 36 : Operations Birbal and Operation Hat 124 127 (c) Section 37 : Other Operations 128 131 13. Chapter-XIII : „Operation Easy‟ –The Relief of Poonch(Jan- 132 133 Nov 48 (a) Section 38 : Op Gulab – The First Link up with Poonch 134 138 (b) Section 39 : Operation for Relief of Poonch 139 140 (c) Section 40 : Prelim Ops : Capture of Pt 7710, Pir Badesar, Pir 141 145 Kalewa, Ramgarh Fort and Bhimbar Gali (d) Section 41 : The Final Relief of Poonch 146 151 14. Chapter-XIV : Fierce Fight from Chhamb to Tithwal 152 152 (a) Section 42 : Bitter Fight Chhamb to Tithwal Sector 153 154 (b) Section 43 : Shelling of URI Area 155 156 (c) Section 44 : Operations by the Poonch Brigade 157 158 (d) Section 45 : Operations in Jhangar Sector 159 159 (e) Section 46 : Operations in Chhamb 160 161 15. Chapter-XV : Enemy Advent In The North (a) Section 47 : Fall of Gilgit 162 164 (b) Section 48 : Fall of Skardu 165 168 (c) Section 49 : Raiders Capture Drass and Kargil 169 172 16. Chapter-XVI : Re-Capture of Gurais (a) Section 50 : Importance of Gurais 173 174 (b) Section 51 : Re-Capture of Gurais (OP ERAZE) 175 178 17. Chapter-XVII : Defence of Leh 179 185 18. Chapter-XVIII : Recapture of Drass and Kargil (a) Section 52 : Clearence through Zojila 186 192 (b) Section 53 : Re-Capture of Drass and Kargil 193 196 19. Chapter-XIX : Conclusion and Review 197 199 20. Excerpts from “Raiders in Kashmir‟ By Maj Gen(Retd) Akbar 200 203 Khan, DSO, Pakistan Army 21. Excepts of an Interview with Col (Retd) Shamsher Singh of 1 204 207 Patiala (Now 15 PUNJAB) 22. Excerpts of an Interview with Col (Retd) SDS Jamwal of 208 209 7 Cavalry 23. Brief Analysis of the application of the Principles of War in the 210 210 Operations 24. Chronological Sequence of Events 211 215 25. Assimilation Exercise 216 219 Biography : Fd Marshall KM Cariappa 26. Early Child hood 220 220 27. Making of an Officer and a Gentlemen 221 221 28. From Commission to Command of a Bn 222 222 29. Staff Appointment Post Command of a Bn 223 223 30. Command of a Brigade 224 225 31. The Challenges Posed By Partition and Indianisation of Armed 226 227 Forces  3 Ser Chapter Pages No From To 32. Grooming for Higher Responsibilities 228 229 33. The Commander-in-Chief 230 232 34. Changes/Improvements carried out by KMC on being Appointed 233 234 the C-in-C 35. Journey Beyond Retirement 235 235 36. A Failed Attempt at joining Politics 236 237 37. Wisdom of Two Nation Theory 238 238 38. Belated Recognition 239 239 39. Most Imp lessons learnt from the life of KMC 240 240  i SYLLABI FOR PROMOTION EXAMINATION PART 'D' MILITARY HISTORY (WRITTEN) Ser Subject Total Pass Time Syllabus Remarks/ No Marks Marks Allowed Recommended Study 1. Military 500 200 3 hr Aim. The aim of Military History paper is to 1. The topics for History test the candidates‟ ability to draw lessons from Military History paper would the prescribed campaigns and biographical be promulgated by DGMT studies and apply these to contemporary and (MT-2) in a block of four future war situations. years. This would also include the books to be read DETAILS OF for each topic. The topics to SYLLABUS be changed each year. The topics of Military History 1. Military Campaign. The study would be revised after every should including the following :- four years. (a) Broad study of strategy. 2. Philosophy of (b) Military Geography of the Selection. The philosophy of area. selecting the topic would be (c) Military Combat Analysis. as under :- Force (a) The topic levels of the belligerents, their Selected should be political and military aims. commensurate to (d) Battle / Campaign t h e knowledge level Analysis. and service maturity Application of principles of war and there should be including analysis of the following progressive issues:- introduction to (i) Doctrine and tactics at operations at each tactical / succeeding level. operational level. (ii) Analysis of adopted (b) Lessons. tactics. (iii) Application of Officers at each level art of war at tactical level. shouldd r a w lessons (iv) Application of new which they can apply technology (concepts, weapons, immediate or in the ammunition and equipment) and immediate future,in its effect on the outcome of the their respective tactical battles / campaign. service levels. (v) Lessons learnt and 3. Selection of their applicability in today's Topic. context and military environment. One campaign (Indian (vi) Unconventional and Out Scenario) and one related of box thinking. biography. (vii) Application of force 4. Reference material multipliers. (e) Administration and issued by DGMT (MT-2). Operational Logi stics. (i) Administration and logistics aspects of the campaign and battles that influenced plans and courses of events. (ii) Ingenuity in administration & logistics and its application in today‟s context. (f) Human Element. Leadership traits and techniques of tactical commanders that affected the outcome of the tactical battles including amplification of the following issues:-  ii Ser Subject Total Pass Time Syllabus Remarks/ Recommended No Marks Marks Allowed Study 2. Biographical Study. To include the fwg :- (a) Personality traits and eadership qualities and how these affected the outcome of campaign fought by them. (b) Leadership traits and techniques displayed as junior leader and tactical commander (Company Commander, Battalion Commander and Brigade Commander) that affected the tactical battles. (c) Application of leadership traits in our present conditions /context. (d) Comparison with opposing commanders / other leaders of prescribed campaign. (e) Assessment / Analysis of the contribution of the personalities to the successful outcome of campaign. (f) Unconventional / Out of the box thinking. (g) Doctrine, concepts and tactics propagated. (h) Command and battle management techniques a t u n i t / t a c t i c s l e v e l a n d t h e i r relevance in today's context.  1 CHAPTER - I THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR SECTION 1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is remotely nestled in the mountains to the North of the Indian sub continent. While the difficult terrain of the region afforded a natural protection, its aesthetic appeal attracted the attention of many a conqueror in the annals of its history. 2. Early Period. The region formed a part of Ashoka‟s empire and was later ruled by Kanishka. It passed into the rule of the Huns in the sixth century before becoming a part of the Ujjain Empire. It remained prone to capture by a series of conquerors. 3. Medieval Period. Kashmir was ruled by the Mughals till the fall of the Mughal Empire. After a period of tyranny under Afghan rule, it formed a part of the empire of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Modern History 4. British Period. When the Sikhs were defeated by the British in 1846, the state was ceded to Maharaja Gulab Singh who acknowledged the supremacy of the British. The monarch consolidated the state by quelling fiefdoms in remote areas. 5. Thus, Kashmir retains unique transcultural characteristics borne out of the historical vicissitudes of its rule. 6. Post Partition Period. The highlights of this critical period culminating in the first major military conflict of Independent India were: - (a) The monarch of the state Maharaja Hari Singh favoured an independent state despite being advised by Lord Mountbatten to align with either India or Pakistan. (b) Pakistan eyed control of the state based on religious affinity and the „Two Nation‟ theory. (c) Sheikh Abdullah projected the aspirations for democracy and secularism. 7. In this predicament, Maharaja Hari Singh signed standstill agreements with the dominions of India and Pakistan. 8. When Pakistan resorted to pressure tactics followed by use of tribesmen for the capture of the state in Oct 47, the ruler signed the Instrument of Accession ceding the state to India.  2 SECTION 2: TERRAIN ANALYSIS Appendix „A‟. - Map of Jammu and Kashmir. General 9. The terrain in Jammu and Kashmir is almost entirely mountainous. With the low hills in the southern region of Jammu, the land gradually rises until it reaches the inaccessible and snow bound Karakoram Ranges bordering Tibet. There is a small portion of Jammu which is akin to the plains of Punjab. However during 1947-48, this area did not witness significant military activity. Apart from its size, the State was important because of its strategic location. Even before the birth of Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir was surrounded on almost three sides by foreign states. Today, its importance has been accentuated by recent international developments. To the East of the State lay Tibet; to its North lay Chinese Turkistan or Sin kiang (Xinjiang); to the West lay Afghanistan; to the south-west and south was Pakistan; and to the south and south-east lay the states of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh of India. Not only the State's topography, but also its climate, economy, social organization and cultural heritage were determined by the mountains. They had also outlined the administrative divisions of the State from early times. From the western border of Spiti, the Great Himalayan Range threw off an important spur to the south - the Pir Panjal Range. This ran for about 480 km to the West, roughly parallel to the parent range, up to Baramula and Uri, and the gorge of the Jhelum. Only the Chenab cut through this range near Kishtwar. The Eastern half of the Pir Panjal Range divided the drainage of the Chenab from those of the Beas and the Ravi. Administratively it divided Lahul from Kulu, and further west, Kishtwar and Padar from Chamba. Continuing across the Chenab, it formed the Southern wall of the Kashmir Valley, separating it from Jammu and the outer hills containing Akhnoor, Kotli, Mirpur, Bhimbar, Naushera, Rajauri and Punch. The height of the range was about 4572 metres and passes were few was the Rohtang Pass (3978 meters) joining Kulu to Lahul, another the Banihal (about 2743 metres) carrying the motor road from Jammu to Srinagar, the PirPanjal Pass (3494 metres) from Rajauri into the Valley, and the Nilkanta Pass (3636 metres) from Punch to Gulmarg. After throwing Pir Panjal to left, the main Himalayan ranges continued in North Western direction. Beyond greater Himalayan ranges lay Ladakh & Baltistan. A map of the region is attached as Appendix A. 10. The state of Jammu and Kashmir can be divided into three geographical regions as under:- (a) The Northern Region. This is the area of Gilgit, Bunji, Skardu, Kargil and Ladakh and is situated between the Karakoram Ranges in the North and the Zoji La range, a part of the outer Himalayan Ranges, in the South. This area is akin to Tibet and is drained by the River Indus. It enters this territory from the East, runs throughout its length and makes its exit from the South West into the North West Frontier Province. While the Gilgit area to the West was occupied by predominantly Muslim population, the Buddhists formed the majority of the population East of Kargil.  3 (b) The Kashmir Valley. The heartland of the state, the Kashmir valley is flanked by the Himalayan ranges in the North and the Pir Panjal ranges to its South. It is drained by two prominent rivers, namely the Jhelum and the Kishanganga. The Jhelum passes through Wular Lake, the largest of the lakes in Kashmir which runs 19 kms in length and 8 km in width. The town of Srinagar lies along both the banks of the Jhelum River. (c) The Southern Region. This region comprises of the hills south of the Pir Panjal ranges. It is drained by the upper reaches of the River Chenab. The hills gradually rise from the plains of Jammu and Akhnur and are interspersed with numerous rivers and nullahs. Towards the East of the region, around Jammu, the people were mostly Hindus and are called Dogras. To the West, they had largely converted to Islam and were known as Chibs around Bhimbar and Mirpur. They were called Sudhans in the area of Poonch. Military Significance 11. A significant aspect of terrain in Jammu and Kashmir is the complete divergence of the three regions from each other. Separated by high and virtually inaccessible mountain ranges, operations in each of the sub divisions had to be launched independently of the other. Thus, the command, control and logistical infrastructure had also to be built up independently. 12. Northern Region. India had very minimal access to Gilgit across the long and difficult foot track along the Indus valley which could be easily blocked at a number of places. While an air transported operation could have been launched, ground link up by forces over land was essential to sustain it. The same was well- nigh impossible. Skardu and Kargil were tactically important areas dominating the Gilgit - Leh axis. These could deny and delay operations for the capture of Leh. In Ladakh, Leh formed the focal point of operations as the other areas were untraversed and inaccessible. 13. The Kashmir Valley. The severity of the winter greatly restricted the period of effective military operations from June to December. The areas around Srinagar facilitated the use of armoured cars as there were a number of flat areas and reasonably good roads to sustain the loads. However, in other areas purely Infantry oriented operations had to be launched. The Jhelum and the Kishanganga valleys were the main avenues of operations for both sides. Flanked by dominating hill features, these were effectively utilised as such. Control of the Uri Bowl facilitated move towards Poonch over the Haji Pir Pass. 14. The Southern Region. The region formed a corridor between the Pir Panjal ranges in the North and East and Pakistan to its West. The undulating nature of terrain facilitated trans border raids from Pakistan. It also could provide sanctuaries and hides for large bodies of troops which could be used to effectively encircle the communication centres. Considerable delay could be imposed by destruction of ferry sites and bridges. The main axis of communication being parallel and close to the border could be cut off with ease. The terrain favoured operations by small and tactically dispersed forces, a characteristic which was  4 effectively exploited by the Pakistani forces in the initial few months of the campaign. The remoteness of Poonch from Jammu especially in view of the poor state of communications necessitated that operations for its relief be speedily followed up with measures to open and maintain the road axis and sustained logistical back up. 5 Appendix „A‟ - Map of Jammu and Kashmir. Ref Para 9 of Section 2  6 SECTION 3: COMMUNICATIONS Introduction 15. All major communications to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 emanated from the West through the province of West Punjab, later Pakistan, thus increasing its vulnerability to being cut off from that direction. 16. Roads. (a) From the West. Two roads entered the Jammu and Kashmir State at Domel. These were as under: - (i) Road Wah – Abottabad – Manshera – Garhi – Habibullah – Domel. This road emanating from Wah on the Grand Trunk route from Peshawar to Lahore was a two way, black top road and was the most frequently used route to Kashmir. (ii) Road Rawalpindi – Murree – Kohala – Domel. This road was subjected to landslides and had a number of hairpin bends. (iii) From Domel. The road from Domel to Srinagar was aligned along the Jhelum valley passing via Chinari – Chakothi – Uri – Mahura - Baramulla – Srinagar. (b) From the South. (i) Road Wazirabad - Sialkot – Suchetgarh – Jammu – Udhampur – Kud – Ramban – Banihal – Anantnag – Srinagar. This road was impassable from December to April due to closure of the Banihal Pass. Even otherwise it was a difficult route and was prone to landslides. (ii) Road Pathankot – Madhopur – Kathua – Samba – Jammu. Unsurfaced road given to interruptions during the monsoons due to numerous bridgeless tributaries of the River Ravi and other streams. 17. Rail. The only railway to Jammu and Kashmir also came from Sialkot to Jammu. There was a possibility of a narrow gauge rail route from Domel to Srinagar valley but the same was not exploited due to resistance on the part of the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. 18. Air. In 1947 there was not one fully equipped airfield in the whole of the State, although emergency landing strips for light planes were there at Gilgit, Chilas, Srinagar and Jammu. These however, had no concrete runways, navigational aids, fire fighting equipment or refuelling stations. Being exclusively used by the Maharaja‟s private light aircraft they were not geared to receive  7 sustained air traffic. Due to the extremely mountainous terrain, modern communication in Jammu and Kashmir was largely non-existent. 19. Implications on Military Operations. The effect of communications on military operations in 1947-48 was as under: - (a) The communication system favoured launching of operations from the West, that is, through Pakistan. (b) Effective blockade of the state could be imposed by denial of communications from the West. (c) Operations from the South were difficult to sustain due to two major obstacles: - (i) The Banihal Pass. (ii) Numerous weak links on the Road Pathankot – Jammu. This road also ran parallel and close to the Pakistan border and thus could be easily cut off by transborder raids. (d) Due to exclusive dependence on motor transport, the loads to be carried were restricted. Demand on the motor transport was thus very heavy. (e) Air transported operations assumed a major importance in the Kashmir valley for Indian forces. These were rendered difficult due to the following reasons: - (i) Limited availability of air strips. (ii) Poor facilities at the existing airfields. (iii) Limited availability of air transport resources.  8 SECTION 4: STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 20. General. While economic potential of a region is important to grant it a significant place in geo-strategic perceptions, in the case of Kashmir, other factors over rode the insignificance of its economy. 21. Factors of Strategic Importance. The factors which made Kashmir an important issue in 1947-48 were as under: - (a) Location. Kashmir was geo strategically located at the cross roads to Russia, China and India. (b) A foothold in Kashmir meant to the Western powers a foothold in the base of Communism – Soviet Union and China, which at the end of the Second World War were perceived as threats rather than allies. (c) Religious Significance. Kashmir had religious significance to the Muslims. To the Muslims ethnic affinity of a majority of the population dictated that Kashmir be theirs. To the Hindus, Himalayan shrines were revered and sacred over the centuries. (d) Natural Beauty and Habitat. The beautiful Kashmir Valley, called the Switzerland of India, was a prize possession for any ruler. (e) Political and Military Vacuum. The political and military vacuum in Kashmir with a weak and vacillating king was an ideal opportunity for a strong peripheral ruler to exploit the same.  9 SECTION 5: THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY SETUP 22. The administration of the state, both civil and military was headed by the Maharaja. He was the head of the govt as well as the C-in-C of the State Army. The capital of the state was Srinagar in summer and Jammu in winter. The state had four provinces, namely, Jammu, Srinagar, Gilgit and Ladakh, each under a Governor. 23. The military administration comprised an Army HQ at Srinagar and four brigades. After independence, the Army HQ was headed by an Indian Chief of Staff, Brigadier Rajinder Singh of the J&K State Force. The four brigades were:- (a) Jammu Brigade at Jammu. (b) The Kashmir Brigade with the Body Guard Cavalry and 7 J&K Rifles at Srinagar. The other infantry battalions of the Brigade were committed in the Domel – Kohala area. (c) The Mirpur Brigade with HQ at Jhangar. (d) The Poonch Brigade in the Poonch- Rawalkot area. 24. The four brigades had only eight infantry battalions between them with some garrison police companies and animal and mechanical transport. MMGs were integral part of the infantry battalions. The state force had no artillery or armour. There was a wireless link with Rawalpindi, but none with New Delhi. The Force was dependent on local contractors for sup.  10 CHAPTER – II POST INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENTS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR SECTION 6: TRIBAL INVASION Situation on Gaining Independence 25. On 15 Aug 1947, the independent dominions of India and Pakistan were born. Paramountcy of the British Govt on the princely states in the sub continent ceased. Govt of India gave them the option to join either India or Pakistan but not to remain independent. Pakistan felt that they could remain independent if they so desired. This was to foment trouble for India as Jinnah knew that most princely states could either join India or remain independent. 26. Position of J and K State. The Maharaja decided to postpone the decision on the problem of accession, and decided to have a Standstill agreement with both India and Pakistan. 27. The J and K State was not affected initially by the widespread communal killings during partition, but gradually Pakistan began to foment trouble by claiming that the Maharaja‟s Army‟s Dogras were murdering and terrorizing the innocent Muslims of the state. Pakistan also began to threaten the use of their forces to save the Muslims from these supposed atrocities. 28. By the first week of September 47, bands of armed raiders started infiltrating all across the borders of the J and K State with Pakistan, their purpose being to attack and loot members of the Hindu community. The raiders were frequently assisted by Pakistan Army personnel. 29. The raiders succeeded in splitting up and destroying in penny packets the J and K state forces strung all along the border. Situation worsened during months of Sep- Oct 1947 setting the stage for open invasion of J & K from Pakistan. 30. Simultaneous Economic Blockade by Pakistan. The Pakistan‟s Govt tried to ensure the secession of Kashmir to Pakistan by means of imposing an economic blockade on J and K as well. The following measures were imposed to this effect: - (a) Tapping of telegraph / telephone lines being operated by Pakistan. (b) All road and rail communication links between Pakistan and J and K were closed. (c) Supply of Petrol to J and K which was coming from Rawalpindi Depot was halted. (d) Supply of wheat, salt, cloth and other articles from Pakistan to J and K State was halted.  11 SECTION 7: OPERATION GULMARG Appendix „B‟. - Operation Gulmarg - Enemy thrusts 31. Introduction. The invasion of the Kashmir Valley from Pakistan was planned with meticulous care and showed considerable strategic and tactical insight. The plan was first to split up the State‟s Army into tiny groups by means of hit and run attacks all along the long frontier with Pakistan. In trying to control these apparently uncoordinated attacks, the defending force was compelled to distribute itself into garrisons of platoon strength spread very thin indeed along the entire Southern frontier. The terrain was hilly and communications primitive, so this distribution of the State Army into innumerable tiny garrisons meant that it ceased to exist as a strong cohesive force able to offer battle to any strong invader anywhere along the frontier. The main invasion of raiders into J and K that was planned and launched by the Army HQs of Pakistan was called „Operation Gulmarg‟. The planning and preparation for Operation Gulmarg reportedly commenced as early as Aug 1947 as soon as or even prior to the subcontinent‟s independence from British rule. The initial steps involved mustering of a large tribal force for the operation to be later supplemented by regular troops if required. According to the operational plan, as described by Major Kalkat, every Pathan tribe was required to enlist at least one Lashkar of 1000 tribesmen. Separate instructions for their recruitment were issued to the Deputy Commissioners and political agents. After enlistment, these lashkars were to be concentrated at Bannu, Wana, Peshawar, Kohat, Thal and Naushera by the first week of September 1947. The Brigade Commanders at these places were to issue them arms, ammunition and some essential items of clothing, on paper showing these issues against some Pakistan Army units. Each tribal lashkar was also to be provided with a Major, a Captain and ten JCOs of the regular Pakistan Army. The Major was to be the actual commander of the lashkar and act as the 'advisor' of the tribal Malik nominally in command of the unit. The Captain was to act as staff officer, while each of the ten JCOs was to be in charge of a company or group of the Lashkar. These Pakistan regulars were to be Pathans, and to dress and live exactly like the other Pathans in the Lashkar. The entire force was to be commanded by Maj-Gen Akbar Khan, who was given the code name Tariq. He was to be assisted by Brigadier Sher Khan. Their HQ was located in the same building as the C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, and Gen Sir Frank Messervy was, of course, privy to the whole plan. The broad outline plan was as follows: - (a) The Main Thrust. Six lashkars to advance along the main road Muzzafarabad to Srinagar via Domel, Uri and Baramulla with the specific task to capture Srinagar airport and advance beyond to Banihal Pass. (b) Subsidiary Thrust 1. Two lashkars to secure the right flank of the main force by advancing from Haji Pir pass directly to Gulmarg.  12 (c) Subsidiary Thrust 2. A similar force of two lashkars to advance from Tithwal through the Nastachun Pass to capture Sopore, Handwara and Bandipur. (d) Another force of ten lashkars to operate in Poonch, Bhimbar and Rawalkot area with the aim of capturing Poonch, Rajauri and then advance to Jammu. (e) The D day was fixed as 22 Oct 1947, on which date, the various lashkars were to cross into J and K territory. (f) 7 Infantry Division of Pakistan Army concentrated in area Murree- Abbotabad by night of 21 Oct 47, ready to move into J and K to back up the tribal lashkars and consolidate their hold on the valley. (g) One infantry brigade was also held ready in Sialkot to move on to Jammu. 32. Factors Favouring Operation Gulmarg. The factors, which favoured launching of Operation Gulmarg were as follows: - (a) Communications. As major communications emanated from the West, that is the direction adopted by the aggressor, easy move into the valley was facilitated. (b) Opposition. The combat fitness of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces could not be graded at par with regular forces. Therefore, a minimal degree of resistance was expected by the hostiles. (c) Opposition by Indian Army. Opposition by the Indian Army was not expected due to the following reasons:- (i) Heavy commitments in internal security duties. (ii) Unfavourable time and space due to inadequate communication System. (iii) Initial raids in Sept 1947 evoked no reaction from India. (d) Surprise. Surprise was completely in favour of the aggressor as the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces as well as the administration, being in a state of disarray, were likely to be caught unawares. The intelligence organization in the state was also not effective. (e) Subversion. Subversion of loyalty of a large number of Muslims in the State forces had undermined the fighting potential of these units. This was further reduced due to the dispersed deployment. of the state forces  13 Deployment of Jammu and Kashmir Forces 33. The salient features of deployment of Jammu and Kashmir State Forces were as follows:- (a) The deployment along the 240 miles long border from Suchetgarh to Gilgit was in terms of weak battalions comprising platoon picquets. (b) The deployment thus was in penny packets, strung all along the border, and lacked in depth. (c) The deployment envisaged a police or at the most a para military role. It did not facilitate the defensive role that the state forces were called upon to play later. (d) Reserves were neither available nor earmarked at any place along the border. (e) No second line of defence was prepared along the border. 34. Fall of Domel and Baramulla. (a) Early in the morning of 22 Oct 47, the main column of raiders crossed the frontier from Garhi Habibullah and attacked Muzzaffarabad. (b) The Poonchi Muslims of 4 J and K Infantry located at Muzzafarabad revolted and killed their comrades, thereby exposing the road to Srinagar. (c) Brigadier Rajinder SIngh, the Chief of Staff of J and K Force, on hearing this, rushed with about 200 personnel of the rear parties of battalions with demolition explosives to Uri, to check the onslaught. The Uri bridge, East of the town, was blown up by him to delay the enemy‟s advance. Brigadier Rajinder SIngh was killed in a rear guard action while continuing to delay the raiders at Dewan Mandir. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. He and his men delayed the enemy by four valuable days. (d) The raiders entered Baramulla town on 26 Oct 1947 in the evening and were engaged in loot, plunder and rape. It is reported that many raiders turned back home from there, saying they would return after depositing their loot. The advance to Srinagar was thus held up by a few crucial days. 35. An illustration depicting the enemy thrusts in Operation Gulmarg is attached as Appendix B. 14 Appendix „B‟ - Operation Gulmarg - Enemy thrusts Refer to Para 35 of Section 7  15 SECTION 8: ACCESSION TO INDIA AND FLY IN OF THE ARMY Accession to India 36. By the latter half of Oct 1947 the Govt of India was in close touch with the situation in Kashmir. The Maharaja‟s government sought India‟s help in controlling it. Direct assistance of the Indian Army was ruled out till J&K acceded to India. 37. On 22 Oct 1947, the Maharaja specifically requested for Indian troops to be sent to Kashmir to rescue it from the invaders. The following problems were visualized in fulfilling this requirement: - (a) No plans were made for induction of troops into Kashmir. Srinagar was more than 480 km from the nearest Indian border. (b) Indian troops were committed in refugee operations and internal security duties. (c) With time at a premium, air transport was the only feasible means of transporting troops. Srinagar landing ground was not maintained and fell short of the required standards for landing fully loaded transport aircrafts. (d) There were no depots, ancillary services or lines of communication existing there. 38. The Secretary, Ministry of States, Govt of India, Mr. VP Menon flew to Jammu on 26 Oct 47 and returned with the formal „Instrument of Accession‟ signed by the Maharaja, after which the state became an integral part of the Indian Dominion. Hence, Pakistan should have stopped the invasion of J&K at that point of time, which it did not. Induction of Indian troops 39. Troops had to be mustered and prepared to be sent to Srinagar urgently. The choice fell on 1 Sikh, stationed nearby at Gurgaon, commanded by Lt Col DR Rai. The Operation Instruction issued to Lt Col DR Rai informed him that the State of Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to India but was being invaded by tribesmen from Pakistan. To save the State from the invaders, one battalion was to be flown immediately to Srinagar, and later, in what was described as Phase II of the Operation, a brigade group would be moved to Jammu. Lieut-Colonel Rai's task was to fly to Srinagar early on the morning of 27 Oct 1947 with the troops allotted to him and to secure the aerodrome and civil aviation wireless statio. Later, if possible, he was to drive away the enemy from the neighborhood of Srinagar and aid the local government in maintaining law and order. The troops accompanying him in the morning flight were Tactical Headquarters 1 Sikh, One company 1 Sikh and one composite company of RIA.The remainder of 1 Sikh battalion was to be flown to Srinagar later during the day. So uncertain was the situation in the Valley that Lieut-Colonel Rai was instructed to circle the Srinagar airfield and carefully scan the countryside in case the raiders had already occupied it. If so, he was to  16 fly back and land with his men at Jammu. Such a rider to an Operation Instruction must surely be unique in modem military history, and was an indication of the unique uncertainty, hazards and difficulties facing the Indian troops when they went to Kashmir. Even the details and location of friendly troops in the State on that date were not known to the Army Headquarters (India). The latest information available referred to the situation 36 hours earlier, during which much had happened. However, at 2300 hours on 25 October 1947, the State troops were reported to be located as follows: (a) Kohala-Srinagar Sector. (i) Rampur - One company (80). (ii) Baramula - One company (100). (iii) Mortar section (2 mortars). (iv) Medium machine gun section. (4 medium machine guns). (v) Handwara Two platoons. (vi) Srinagar Brigade Headquarters. (vii) One squadron cavalry (horsed) (100). (b) Punch Sector. (i) Punch Brigade Headquarters. (ii) Hajira - One battalion (400). (iii) Rawalkot - One battalion (300). (iv) Bagh - Two companies (150). (c) Mirpur Sector. (i) Jhangar - Brigade Headquarter. One platoon. (ii) Kotli - One battalion (400). One section medium machine gun. (4 medium machine guns). Two mortar detachments (2 mortars). (iii) Mirpur - One company (100). (iv) Chechian - Two platoons. (v) Bhimbar - One squadron cavalry (horsed). (vi) Naushera - Two companies (150). (vii) Munawwar - One platoon (30). (viii) Tharochi - Two platoons (30 Hindus and 30 Muslims).  17 (d) Jammu Sector. (I) Abhor - One platoon (30). (ii) Chan or - One platoon (30, Hindus and Muslims mixed). (iii) Suchetgarh - One platoon (50). (iv) Pandorian - Two platoons (60, Hindus and Muslims mixed). (v) Kotha - One platoon (30). (vi) Abtal - One platoon (30 mixed). (vii) Basantar Ujh - One company (60). (viii) Sherpur - One company (60). Detachment mortars (2 mortars). (ix) Basoli - One platoon (30). (x) Jammu - Brigade Headquarters. One company (150). 40. The tasks allotted to 1 SIKH were:- (a) Hold Srinagar airfield and civil aviation wireless station at all costs. (b) Ensure immunity of Srinagar air field from enemy action, thereby facilitating further landings. (c) Having achieved this, take measures to push back the raiders from Srinagar. (d) Assist local govt to maintain law and order in Srinagar. Difficulties Faced by Own Forces 41. The difficulties experienced by the Indian Army in the initial stages of launching operations in Kashmir in October 1947 were as follows: - (a) Lack of intelligence on enemy strength and deployment. (b) Non existence of secure land communications. (c) Non availability of maps of the area. (d) Pre-occupation with internal security operations in Punjab and other parts of the country. (e) Pre-occupation with the reorganization of the Army into Indian and Pakistan Army.  18 42. The problems faced in the mustering of units for induction into Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947 were as under: - (a) Widespread deployment of units on internal security duties in northern India. (b) Units were split into platoon and company sized picquets. (c) The dispersed picquets lacked communications and thus it was time consuming to recall them. (d) The troops on internal security duties had to be relieved. This relief was time consuming. (e) Inadequacy of transport to muster the forces. (f) Some units were involved in a last minute change in command as British officers were prohibited from accompanying troops into Jammu and Kashmir.  19 CHAPTER III BUILD UP AND INITIAL OPERATIONS SECTION 9: INITIAL ACTIONS BY INDIAN FORCES Appendices „C‟. Excerpts from the book “Lest we Forget” by Capt Amarinder Singh (Retd). „D‟ - Illustration of the Battle of Badgam. „E‟ - Illustration of the Battle of Shalateng. 43. The sequence of actions of 1 Sikh immediately on landing at Srinagar were as under: - (a) 1 Sikh landed at Srinagar airfield on the morning of 27 October 1947. The battalion strength was about 300 men, being less two companies, though supplemented by one battery of 13 Field Regiment in infantry role. (b) One company was deployed for the defence of Srinagar airfield. (c) The Battalion less two companies advanced towards Pattan, 17 miles from Srinagar, and then to Baramulla, 34 miles from Srinagar. Thus a clear run of 34 miles to Srinagar with only two hours of travelling time by road, was denied to the raiders. (d) A clash with raiders occurred East of Baramulla and 1 Sikh withdrew as the raiders were numerically superior and equipped with modern weapons. (e) On 28 Oct 1947, a second clash took place with the raiders East of Baramulla. (f) 1 Sikh then withdrew to Pattan during which action its Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Rai was killed by a stray bullet. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously. (g) Taking advantage of the defence potential of the ground at Pattan, it was able to beat back further attacks by the raiders. But it sent back an urgent message that it could not hold the numerically superior enemy for long, without reinforcements. 44. Induction of more Troops. By 27 Oct 1947, Army HQ started prep for a large scale campaign. Accordingly, after Phase –I wherein 1 Sikh landed at Srinagar, Phase-II of ops involved imdt mov of one bde gp to Jammu via Pathankot rd and simultaneous desp of rft by air to Srinagar. By 01 Nov 1947, str of Indian tps in J & K was as follows:-  1 KUMAON PREMIMETER 1 SIKH AIRFD 20 OF SRINAGAGR AIRFD (a) Kashmir Valley:- (i) HQ 161 Bde. presently at rampur* remember (ii) 1 Kumaon Rifles. Exclusively responsible for perimeter defences of Srinagar airfield. (iii) Two Companies 4 KUMAON. Brigade reserve at airfield. (iv) 1 PUNJAB. Rd jn at Shaletang. * 1 SIKH, 1 & 4 KUMAON (v) 1 SIKH. 1 coy at airfd. * REMEMBER S AND K IN SIKH (vi) 1 bty (13 Fd Regt, Royal Fd Arty) * SIKH AND PUNJAB (b) Jammu Region:- (i) One bn Inf ( 3 (PARA) Rajput) (ii) One MG coy (1 MAHAR) 45. Excerpts from the book “Lest we Forget” on the initial actions of the Indian Forces are reproduced in Appendix C attached. The Battle of Badgam 46. Course of Battle. The battle of Badgam was fought on 03 Nov 1947. Two companies of 4 KUMAON were deployed on the hill features overlooking Badgam. As no raider activities were reported, one company was withdrawn at about 1400 hours. At about 1430 hours, half an hour prior to the time given for the withdrawal, the Company Commander of the second company, Major Som Nath Sharma reported that his company was under fire from the houses in Badgam village. Shortly, radio communication with Major Sharma was disrupted. Greatly out numbered by the enemy by as much as 7:1, the company of 4 KUMAON held out effectively engaging the enemy. The forward platoons of the company were over run. Maj Sharma held out with the depth platoon. He was later killed by a mortar bomb. The officer was subsequently awarded the Param Vir Chakra. The situation was restored as reinforcements arrived by 1700 hours. Air support was also made available for the operation. An illustration of the operation is attached as Appendix D. 47. Causes of Success. The causes of own success can by analyzed as under:- (a) Though not tasked to fight to the last man and last round, the 4 KUMAON Company did so, averting a running fight with attendant disadvantages. (b) Effective air support was provided which had as much of a psychological effect as fire power effect.  21 (c) Sound leadership by Major Sharma, who realizing the threat to Srinagar airfield on the fall of Badgam decided to hold his position inspite of heavy losses. (d) Injury to the Pathan leader, Khurshed denied him effective control of the operations. This also exposed a weakness of the raiding force which was rendered rudderless once its leader was ineffective. 48. Factors Which Saved Srinagar. To sum up, the factors which saved Srinagar from the onslaught of the raiders in Oct 1947 were as follows: - (a) The delay imposed by the state forces at Muzaffarabad. (b) The delay imposed by Brigadier Rajinder Singh‟s party at Uri. (c) Time wasted by the raiders in their rampage at Baramulla. (d) 1 SIKH‟s delaying action at Baramulla and Pattan. (e) 4 KUMAON‟s heroic stand at Badgam. Battle of Shalateng 49. Introduction. The battle of Badgam ensured security of the Srinagar airfield and facilitated further build up of forces. 161 Infantry Brigade could thus plan for the defence of the Srinagar town as well as advance towards Baramulla for pushing back the raiders. This was planned through what later came to be known as the Battle of Shalateng. An illustration of the operation is attached as Appendix E. 50. Plan of Operation. (a) Forces Available for the Attack. (i) 1 SIKH. (ii) 1 KUMAON. (iii) Two armoured cars of 7 Cavalry in Bandipur area. (b) 1 SIKH was to stay in position and fix the enemy at Srinagar. (c) 1 KUMAON was to infiltrate westwards and position itself to the South of the raiders from the direction of Pattan, and launch an attack on the code word, “Go”. (d) The armoured cars which were to be the main element in the attack were to move from Krahom to Sumbal through Shadipur and join the main  22 Baramulla – Srinagar road at Shalateng. By appearing suddenly in the rear they were to deliver the coup-de-grace. (e) The critical part of the plan was the ability of the armoured cars to negotiate the road between Krahom to Sumbal which had some weak bridges. 51. Course of Battle. The battle progressed as follows: - (a) The armoured cars successfully negotiated the stretch between Krahom and Sumbal and 1 KUMAON was ordered to infiltrate westwards. (b) 1 KUMAON and the armoured cars having reached respective positions, the code-word, “Go” was given. (c) The raiders were caught in the fire from three directions, the armoured cars in the West, 1 KUMAON in the South and 1 SIKH in the East. Air strikes were also carried out on enemy positions. (e) The sudden appearance of the armoured cars in the rear followed by the multi directional attacks broke the enemy‟s will to fight and he broke ranks. (f) The advance was pursued towards Pattan and Baramulla hich was captured the very next day. 52. Liberation of Kashmir Valley & Organization of Srinagar Defence. (a) The defence of Sringar was organized with reinforcements coming in from Jammu, thus relieving 161 Infantry Brigade to advance to Uri. (b) Srinagar garrison was formed with Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh as the Commander. (c) Deployment of the units was as under:- (i) 6 RAJ RIF - Srinagar airfield. (ii) 4 KUMAON - Defence of Srinagar town. (iii) 2 DOGRA - Defence of Baramula. (iv) 1 PUNJAB - Relieved to join 161 Infantry Brigade. (d) Uri was subsequently captured on 13 Nov 1947. With capture of Uri liberation of Kashmir valley was complete. 23 Appendix „D‟ - Illustration of the Battle of Badgam. 24 Appendix E - Illustration of the Battle of Shalateng.  25 SECTION 10: 161 BRIGADE OPERATIONS TO RELIEVE POONCH Appendix „F‟. Map depicting the route from Uri to Poonch. 53. Introduction. Though by the recapture of Uri, the threat to Srinagar was relieved, the situation in Jammu had worsened considerably. In early Oct 47, raids had been carried out on all the J & K state force garrisons on that front. The raids led to large scale uprisings of the turbulent Muslims on the Poonch and Mirpur border who were supplied with arms and ammunition by the raiding force. The Muslim components of the J & K Forces in Poonch – Mirpur sector had deserted and joined the raiders by mid Oct. By this time all state force garrisons in these sectors had been encircled by the enemy. A plan was made for the relief of Poonch garrison. 161 Infantry Brigade was to act as the northern pincer of the overall force employed by Jammu and Kashmir Division for the relief of Poonch in Nov 1947. 50 Para Brigade was to form the southern pincer from Jammu to Naushera and Poonch. 54. Forces Employed – 161 Infantry Brigade. 161 Infantry Brigade employed the following forces for the relief of Poonch:- (a) Tactical Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade. (b) One armoured car troop and one rifle troop of 7 Cavalry. (c) 2 DOGRA. (d) 1 KUMAON. (e) 17 Mountain Battery. (f) Engineers and services elements. (g) One MG pl of 1 MAHAR. 55. Outline Plan of Operations. The outline plan of operations was as under:- (a) The advance was to be made in three groups as under:- (i) First Group - 2 DOGRA. (ii) Second Group - 1 KUMAON. (iii) Third Group - Administrative elements. (b) 2 DOGRA was to move ahead and secure the Haji Pir Pass in the first phase.  26 (c) Beyond the Haji Pir Pass, advance was to be led by the armoured car troop. (d) On reaching Poonch, 1 KUMAON was to join the Poonch garrison while the remainder column was to return to Uri. (e) Civil transport had also been requisitioned for timely move of the troops. (f) The link up was thus expected to be completed in one day. 56. A map depicting the route from Uri to Poonch is attached as Appendix F. 57. Measures for Security. To ensure complete security of the operations, no recce, of the Haji Pir Pass and the road leading to it, was permitted. No warning orders were issued to units and down the chain of command. Stores and heavy baggage of 1 KUMAON earmarked to be inducted at Poonch were brought forward on the pretext of a long stay envisaged at Uri for the battalion. 58. Outline Course of Operations. The advance commenced at 0700 hours on 20 Nov. Progress was slow as the road to Haji Pir had a steep gradient and difficult going with numerous hairpin bends. Against expectations of a speed of 10 miles per hour only 2 miles per hour could be achieved. 2 DOGRA was ordered to debus and secure Haji Pir Pass which it did by last light. Advance commenced at 0700 hours the next day but was halted due to a demolished bridge near village Kahuta, 11 miles from Poonch spanning the Betar Nullah. As the nullah could not be detoured, 1 KUMAON marched forward to Poonch with the stores and equipment of 2 DOGRA. 59. It was later discovered that the bridge had been destroyed on orders of Lieutenant Colonel Dubey of the State Forces. The presence of 2 DOGRA at Haji Pir the previous night had been thought to be the enemy. The Poonch Brigade of the State Forces was completely unaware of the advance by 161 Infantry Brigade. A platoon of 1 KUMAON was successfully inducted into Poonch and its Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Pritam Singh was placed in command. 1 KUMAON was ambushed at milestone 7 on road Uri-Poonch and the bridge in the area was burnt down by the enemy. This stranded 161 Infantry Brigade for three days after which it returned to Uri. 60. Analysis of the Operations. The salient reasons for the failure of the operations were as under:- (a) Lack of Reconnaissance. Lack of reconnaissance of Road Uri- Pooch led to the plan being based on use of civil vehicles and a too optimistic time frame. (b) Lack of Coordination. There was a lack of coordination of operations by Headquarters JAK Division. Thereby, the Pooch Brigade was not informed of the advance of 161 Infantry Brigade. This led to the fatal  27 decision of demolition of bridge at Kahoka by the state forces at Pooch garrison. (c) Inadequacy of Transport. Inadequacy of service transport capable of undertaking the hard grind to Hajji Pir Pass led to hiring of civil transport incapable of such a movement. This in turn delayed the force until move was undertaken on foot. (d) Over Emphasis on Security. An over emphasis on security led to plans remaining undisclosed even to own troops such as the Poonch Brigade. (e) Lack of Vigilance. Lack of vigilance and observation of basic precautions led to the ambush and burning down of the bridge at Milestone 7. This resulted in a delay of three days in return of 161 Infantry Brigade to Uri. 28 Appendix „F‟ Map depicting the route from Uri to Poonch.  29 CHAPTER - IV RELIEF OPERATIONS IN JAMMU SECTOR SECTION 11 : REVIEW OF THE SITUATION Appendix „G‟ Map of Jammu area. 61. Serious Situation in Jammu Province (a) Hostiles had seized a considerable stretch of territory close to the Pakistan border. (b) In early Oct 47, parties of armed Pakistan ex-servicemen with a varying strength of 10 to 100 carried out a number of raids. The aim was two fold: - (i) Pin down the garrisons of the state forces. (ii) Serve as a feint for the main thrust along the Kohla – Srinagar road. (c) The raiders were successful for the following reasons: - (i) Turbulent Muslims were provoked on the Poonch-Mirpur borders and these were supplied with arms and ammunition. (ii) Muslim components of Jammu and Kashmir forces in Poonch – Mirpur sector deserted with arms and ammunition and joined the raiders on 18 Oct 47. 62. A map of Jammu area is attached as Appendix G. 63. Dispositions of the State Forces (a) Three weak brigades were deployed in Poonch, Mirpur and Jammu sectors. The deployment was as under:- (b) Poonch Sector. (i) Brigade Headquarters - Poonch (ii) 1 Jammu and Kashmir Infantry - Hajira (iii) 9 Jammu and Kashmir Infantry - Rawalkot (iv) Two companies of 7 Jammu and Kashmir Infantry - Bagh  30 (c) Mirpur Sector. In this sector garrisons were dispersed over a large area. The deployment was as under: - (i) Brigade Headquarters and one platoon -Jhangar (ii) Two companies -Naushera (iii) One battalion with four MMGs and two mortars -Kotli (iv) One company -Mirpur (v) Two platoons -Chechian (vi) One squadron of horsed cavalry -Bhimbar (vii) One platoon -Munawwar (viii) Two platoons -Tharochi (d) Jammu Sector. This sector was held by one battalion Group i.e. 5 Jammu and Kashmir Infantry. 64. Despatch of Troops. (a) Saving of Srinagar and Jhelum valley was given top priority. Therefore, the state garrisons at Poonch and Mirpur had to be left unaided for a long period. Measures to protect the line of communication between Pathankot and Jammu were taken. (b) 50 Para Brigade was tasked to keep road Madhopur – Kathua – Jammu – Srinagar open for reinforcements and supplies. This line of communication was important as: - (i) Supply depot for Srinagar was located at Pathankot. (ii) Road Pathankot – Jammu – Srinagar was very vulnerable to raiders attack as about 112 kms of it ran along the Pakistan border. There were bridges embankments and narrow gorges en route. (c) No troops were despatched for Poonch and Mirpur. Bhimbar fell into enemy‟s hands on 28 Oct 47. Supplies were airdropped for Kotli. 65. Action by the Air Force (a) Offensive patrolling was carried out over general area Kotli. Heavy strafing was also carried out at Kotli on 05 Nov 47. (b) Ammunition and supplies were air dropped at Kotli on 07 Nov 47.  31 (c) On 09 Nov, Baramulla, Domel and Poonch area was strafed. (d) Kotli was bombed on 11 and 12 Nov. (e) On 13 Nov, reconnaissance and strafing of Poonch – Mirpur – Palandri was done. The state forces displayed ground signs. Heavy damage was inflicted on the raiders. 66. However, the situation worsened as follows:- (a) Rajauri was captured by the enemy. (b) 30,000 non-Muslims were either killed, abducted or wounded. Another 1500 were slaughtered at Chingas. (c) Jhangar was besieged and Naushera was threatened. (e) Beri Pattan was attacked and the bridge near it was damaged. 67. Offensive Attempted by 50 Para Brigade to relieve Mirpur & Kotli. (a) Aim. The aim of the operation was to move to Jhangar clearing all opposition en route with a view to relieve the garrisons at Mirpur and Kotli. (b) Plan. The operation was to be carried out in two phases as under:- (i) Phase 1. 1 Patiala and one troop ex-7 Light Cavalry were to advance from Jammu at 0400 hours on 13 Nov 47 and prepare a diversion near the broken bridge of Beri Pattan at KM stone 36. (ii) Phase 2. A squadron minus a troop of 7 Light Cavalry, two platoons of 1 MAHAR (MG) and one company 33 Field Ambulance were to leave Jammu at 0600 hours on 13 Nov 47 and cross the Nala by the diversion created and aim to reach Jhangar as fast as possible. (c) Conduct (i) At 1830 hours on 12 Nov 47, the recce patrol of 1 Patiala reported that the bridge at Beri Pattan was blown up and enemy was occupying important heights from Beri Pattan enroute to Naushera. (ii) The plan was changed and the force was told to concentrate at Akhnoor. Thus the advance of 50 Para Brigade on 13 Nov 47 was restricted to Akhnoor. 32 Appendix „G‟ Map of Jammu area.  33 SECTION 12 : STRATEGIC PLANNING 68. The first phase of operations in Kashmir was over by the capture of Uri on 13 Nov. To decide on the future course of action, the Defence committee of the cabinet held a meeting on 14 Nov. The following instructions were conveyed to Army Headquarters: - (a) Deny the Jhelum valley approach to the enemy. (b) Thereafter, replace Indian Army personnel by state troops and police to concentrate them around Srinagar and carry out a sustained and general withdrawal to India as demands for aid to civil power in Kashmir reduce. (c) In view of the withdrawal and poor flying conditions in winter, Jammu-Banihal-Srinagar route should be open in winters. (d) It was necessary to establish a force in Jammu to give required aid to civil power to suppress disorder and protect minorities. (d) It was further necessary to despatch small mobile columns to relieve and evacuate beleaguered garrisons near the Jammu-Uri-Poonch road. The columns were also to evacuate endangered non-Muslims near that road. 69. Winter actions were rendered impossible due to severity of winters and lack of means. Hence no such actions could be carried out at Poonch. SECTION 13 : RELIEF OF NAUSHERA, JHANGAR AND KOTLI General 70. General Butcher, the COAS was confident of accomplishing the tasks as envisaged at the strategic level. However, he was particularly concerned about the situation at Poonch and its relief. The reasons were: - (a) Poonch had a large number of ex-servicemen serving in Pakistan Army who had recently deserted with arms. (b) There were at least 2000 serving soldiers from Poonch in Pakistan Army and a mass desertion was likely. Thus the numbers of hostiles were further likely to increase. (c) Pakistan did not place any physical obstacle along Poonch enabling the raiders to drive motor vehicles right unto the border and easily infiltrate using the hill tracks. (d) In this region, the hostiles could easily use the tribesmen‟s dispersal tactics.  34 (e) For the regular arms it was more difficult to fight with guerillas then with another regular army. The Plan 71. Major General Kalian Singh, GOC, Jammu and Kashmir Division prepared a plan for rapid relief of Naushera, Jhangar, Kotli, Mirpur and Poonch. It was as under: - (a) 50 Para Brigade comprising of 1/2 Punjab, 3 (PARA) Raput, A sqn 7 CAV with other sp elements to move at 0600 hours on 16 Nov 47 speedily on axis Akhnoor– Beri Pattan – Naushera – Jhangar – Kotli and Mirpur. Naushera to be secured on 16 Nov. Firm base to be established at Jhangar on 17 Nov, relieving Kotli on 18 Nov and Mirpur by 20 Nov 47. (b) Two battalions ex 161 Infantry Brigade to strike from Uri on 18 Nov 47 towards Poonch, reaching Poonch on the same day. After reinforcing Poonch garrison, the rest of the brigade to fall back to Uri. (c) 268 Infantry Brigade(then being formed & consisting of 1 Patiala & 1 MADRAS) to take over protection of the following lines of communication with effect from 0600 hours on 17 Nov 47 :- (i) Jammu – Kathua. (ii) Jammu – Bahihal. (iii) Jammu – Beri Pattan. 72. Despite observations and disagreements with the plan, Major General Kalian stayed firm on his plans. Execution 73. Advance to Kotli. (a) Beri Pattan was secured by B company, 1 Patiala for advance of column ex-50 Para Brigade. (b) On 16 Nov, 50 Para Brigade reached Beri Pattan and crossed the Nala the next day when the ford was ready. (c) Tactical recce of road Beri Pattan – Naushera revealed many road blocks. But the column pushed on till Naushera. (d) State forces at Naushera had already repulsed the enemy attack on night 16 / 17 Nov. After a brief engagement on 18 Nov, the enemy at Naushera fled.  35 (e) The remaining two companies advanced to Jhangar at 0700 hours on 19 Nov. Jhangar was occupied without opposition but further advance to Kotli was slowed down by numerous road blocks and sniping. Covering fire by armoured cars proved to be helpful in overcoming the opposition en route. (f) Tactical reconnaissance and intelligence reports revealed that Ban bridge South of Kotli was likely to be occupied and approximately two hundred raiders were concentrated at Kotli. On 26 Nov, own troops occupied Kotli garrison. (g) Mirpur could not to be relieved and was evacuated on 25 Nov. (h) Columns from Uri to Poonch were attacked and pushed back by the enemy to Uri and hence the plan of advance from Kotli to Poonch was given up. (j) As the line of communication from Jammu was stretched too far after the fall of Mirpur, it was decided not to hold Kotli but to fall back to Jhangar after evacuating refugees and the state forces at Kotli. 74. Advance to Poonch. (a) Having relieved Naushera, Jhangar and Kotli, operations for the relief of Poonch were envisaged. (b) Plan. (i) 161 Infantry Brigade comprising of 1 (PARA) KUMAON, 2 DOGRA less two companies, two troops ex-7 Light Cavalry, 17 Mountain Battery and one machine gun platoon of 1 MAHAR to proceed for the relief of Poonch from Uri on 20 Nov. (ii) 1 SIKH and a troop of 323 field battery to be left behind for defence of the firm base at Uri. (c) Due to a demolished bridge, a portion of the vehicle column of 200 vehicles got separated from the main force making it prone to enemy delaying actions. (d) On 21 Nov, the main column reached Kathua but found that the bridge at Kathua was destroyed by the state forces mistaking this column for the enemy. (e) This was a terrible set back to the operations as they got engaged in the making of a ford. (f) The Disastrous Ambush. Meanwhile the separated vehicle column faced a road block on 21 Nov during their advance. This road block was well covered by fire. The halted vehicle did not disperse but got  36 cluttered instead, there by posing a good target to the enemy who was occupying important heights in the area and was well prepared. The infantry elements made a futile effort to assault a near-by feature. Owing to the road bends and narrow roads, the armoured cars at the tail could not fetch up to the front. They were also assaulted and damaged. Finally, these armoured cars were used to ferry casualties. A looting party which was hiding all the while in the nala below sprung into action and ransacked the vehicles before setting them on fire. In this ambush, Indian casualties were 16 killed, 14 injured and 24 vehicles damaged /destroyed. (g) After getting news of the ambush, Brigadier Sen ordered 1 (PARA) KUMAON less a company to join the Poonch garrison and the rest to rush back to Uri. This column reached the ambush site on 23 Nov. (h) From Srinagar, two companies of 4 KUMAON were despatched as relief for the ambush victims via Uri. This column left Srinagar at 0330 hours on 22 Nov but reached the ambush site only on 23 Nov alongwith the column of Brigadier Sen. 75. Attack on Uri Picquet. (a) While the Poonch column was facing the mishap, taking advantage , about 900 enemy launched an all out attack on a small picquet isolated across Jhelum, during night 22-23 Nov. Uri garrison, including this picquet was held by 1 SIKH. (b) The selection of the objective by the enemy was remarkable due to the following reasons:- (i) The picquet was isolated across Jhelum with a bridge previously destroyed. Thus any reinforcement could take a minimum of two hours to reach. (ii) Occupation of the picquet was very vital for defence of Uri. (iii) The picquet was not held in strength being manned by one JCO and 20 OR. (c) The troops at this picquet, despite all odds fought valiantly, holding back repeated waves of enemy assaults. (d) No reinforcements could be provided due to heavy commitment. The Quarter Master Platoon consisting of cooks and sweepers under the Quarter Master, Captain Joginder Singh volunteered to assist the picquet. This reinforcement rushed to the picquet with dashing speed and war cries. (e) The stiff resistance by the small picquet and the spirited movements of the reinforcing Quarter Master Platoon, demoralized the enemy and the enemy abandoned leaving behind a 3” Mortar.  37 (f) Thus a vital post was saved by the gallant action of troops of 1 SIKH. 76. Difficulties Faced. (a) The roads Kotli – Jhangar and Poonch – Uri were very narrow and had numerous hair pin bends. The raiders established road blocks and demolished the wooden bridges to seriously affect the move. (b) There was a paucity of troops. 50 Para Brigade was much below its normal strength as the Mussalman companies had gone over to Pakistan. For the advance to Kotli, the Brigade had only five companies which got stretched over 64 kms. Similarly, 1 SIKH alone held Uri. (c) Consequent to the mass desertion by muslim troops of the state forces, the muslim company in Kotli garrison was kept disarmed causing demoralization of the garrison and also reducing the fighting strength. 77. Air Efforts. Efforts of the RIAF during the relief operations were highly commendable. These included the following actions: - (a) Timely and precise drop of supplies, ammunition, arms, spares of arms and equipment. (b) Effective tactical reconnaissance. (c) Highly accurate bombing to an extent of destroying buses and a moving towed mountain gun. (d) Enemy positions were indicated by ground forces and effectively engaged by own aircraft. (e) Despite getting shot at, the pilots accomplished their task gallantly. (f) A large number of sorties were carried out from Air Force stations at Srinagar and Amritsar as the air strip at Jammu was short. 78. Peculiarities. (a) Road blocks were very effectively used by the hostiles. The Indian troops approaching Kotli from the South faced 47 road blocks. (b) The enemy in Kotli area proved to be a poor marksman and poor tactician. Apparently, his force did not include the regular or pathan elements. (c) Acute shortage of troops did not deter own troops from accomplishing assigned tasks. For instance, despite having only two  38 companies left, 50 Para Brigade advanced to Kotli to occupy it as per the task initially assigned. (d) Troops of 1 SIKH displayed exemplary courage, as only 20 people held the post against 900 raiders. (e) 1 SIKH also displayed espirit -de-corps of a high order. When the picquet was attacked and no troops were available for reinforcement, the Quarter Master Platoon comprising mostly of cooks and sweepers volunteered to assist the troops under assault. They rushed to the attacked picquet spiritedly and demoralised the enemy. (f) Peculiarities of the Enemy in Uri Sector. (i) The hostiles were adept at irregular warfare. (ii) He attacked the rear of the Poonch column. (iii) The attack on Uri picquet displayed that the enemy was a keen tactician. His selection of the objective was remarkable. (iv) Intelligence reports revealed that his headquarters was at Lalanka and supplies must have come from Palandri which was 64 km away. This shows an efficient logistics network. Conclusion 79. Before Nov 47, the Indian Army and the Air Force had successfully completed the preliminary task of rescue of Kashmir valley, Jhangar, Naushera and Kotli. Most of these tasks were im-romptu battles. The forthcoming operations were all the more demanding.  39 CHAPTER - V PLANNING AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS The Final Plan 80. Appreciation. Plans at Army Headquarters were finalized by 06 Dec 47. On the basis of these plans, Lieutenant-General Russell, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Delhi and East Punjab Command, issued instructions to Major General Kalian Singh, General Officer Commanding, J&K Force, on 10 Dec 47. Russell‟s appreciation envisaged a three-fold thrust as follows:- (a) Northern Thrust (Kashmir Valley). (i) With the decision to hold Poonch and the impossibility of passing a relieving column over the road Uri-Haji Pir Pass, the initiative returned to 161 Brigade. It was no longer called upon to open the road to Poonch and could thus operate freely again. (ii) The enemy appeared at that time to be in strength around Uri in anticipation of our likely advance from Uri to Poonch. He would soon realise that no attempt was being made to open the road towards Poonch unless a deception plan to keep him of that opinion was arranged. (iii) This situation, skillfully handled, seemed to offer an opportunity of catching the enemy on the wrong foot. (b) Central Thrust (Naushera-Kotli-Poonch). (i) In this sector, there was at that time little enemy interference until Naushera was passed. It was, therefore, essential that every effort should be made to maintain this. Otherwise, picquetting this route would use up a large number of troops. (ii) Enemy resistance was likely to be strong and, as it would be obvious that own forces were trying to make contact with Poonch, surprise would be difficult to achieve. (iii) An alternative deception thrust towards Palandri might keep the enemy guessing for a short time and prove valuable, but the striking force must not be unduly weakened. (iv) An adequate striking force to move North of Kotli, to gain strong contact with forces of the Poonch garrison advancing to meet them. Additional troops for the protection of the line of communication would be required.  40 (v) Thus, approximately six or seven battalions and supporting arms would have to be maintained on this difficult line of communication. In addition, supplies, ammunition and stores for the Poonch garrison would have to be passed along this route. (vi) It was, therefore, necessary to have an estimate of the time which would be required to achieve a build-up for this operation, in order to be able to estimate the air supply required for Poonch. (c) Southern Thrust (Akhnoor – Munawwar – Bhimbar) (i) The enemy had been reported active South West of Akhnoor. Bhimbar, being one of their road heads, was likely to be strongly defended. (ii) The fact that the road as it approached Bhimbar ran very close to the Pakistan frontier, was a major limitation. (iii) A mule track existed from Naushera to Bhimbar. Surprise could be achieved if a force on pack could operate against Bhimbar from the North in conjunction with the main advance on Bhimbar from the East. (iv) The value of this operation was very great, as success would automatically give a degree of protection to the central thrust line of communication. With Bhimbar captured as a secure base, Southern protection of the advance to Poonch would be simplified; troops not required to be left in Bhimbar would be passed to the North over the pack route to Naushera, thus increasing the strength available there for operations towards Poonch. 81. Tasks. Based on the above appreciation, Major General Kalian Singh‟s task in general would be to secure the maximum area of Jammu and Kashmir State with a view to relieving Poonch and driving the raiders from the remaining territory. His tasks in particular would be as follows: - (a) To build up a sufficient force on the central thrust line to relieve Poonch town. (b) To advance to Bhimbar. (c) To gain control of the Jhelum valley as far West as possible, inflicting the maximum embarrassment on investors of Poonch from the direction of Uri. 82. Engineer Tasks. (a) The Engineer tasks would be mainly concerned with the improvement of the line of communication and the ferry at Beri Pattan.  41 (b) The scope of the operations forward of the ferry at Beri Pattan would be determined by the forces which could be built up with 70 vehicles per day. 83. Administration. (a) Troops operating on the northern thrust must not exceed 4000, unless adequate logistic arrangements could be provided for. (b) Delhi-East Punjab Command would eventually take over delivery of supplies to Jammu, though protection from Kathua would still remain under the command of General Officer Commanding, Jammu and Kashmir Division. (c) The success of the central thrust would depend on the administrative build-up on this line of communication. It would be necessary to have at Jammu, Akhnoor and Naushera adequate supplies and Petrol, Oil and Lubricants besides ample stocks of ammunition and other stores. (d) The maintenance of Poonch would need close attention. The Royal Indian Air Force estimated that they could make two sorties daily, each delivering 2720 kg. They preferred to fly supplies for Poonch from Jammu. Delhi-East Punjab Commander would, therefore, arrange for supplies for Poonch to be flown from Delhi to Jammu so that the stocks in Jammu were not depleted in meeting the requirements of the troops in Poonch. 84. The strategic objectives and broad plans were now clear, and operations could be launched accordingly.  42 CHAPTER VI THE LOSS OF JHANGAR (DECEMBER 1947) General 85. While Army Headquarters was finalizing the future plans, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir appeared fairly well stabilized. Enemy sniping continued, however, and local skirmishes were a regular feature of the limited operations which lasted from 27 November to 9 December. From 10 December the tempo of' activity increased. The enemy became more aggressive and directed his attacks against the vulnerable Indian line of communication (Jammu-Jhangar), culminating in his capture of Jhangar on 24 December and the fierce but unsuccessful attack on Naushera on 26 December. Indian efforts were largely concentrated on consolidating the position at Uri, warding off enemy attacks on Punch and guarding the vulnerable line of communication. Uri Sector 86. Some 4000 to 6000 raiders were estimated to be operating in Uri sector. Many were reported to include some men from Pakistan's South Waziristan Scouts. The methods employed by these men, including their system of defences, indicated that they had been trained and were being led by professional soldiers. They employed a large number of 3-inch mortars. 161 Infantry Brigade held in strength the forward position at Uri. The following troops constituted the garrison of Uri: (a) Headquarters 161 Brigade. (b) Squadron 7 Cavalry. (c) 1 SIKH. (d) 4 KUMAON. (e) Company 1 (PARA) KUMAON. (f) Company 1/1 PUNJAB (Indian elements). (g) Company 1 MAHAR (medium machine gun) less one platoon. (h) One troop 32 Field Battery. (j) One platoon 32 Assault Field Company. (k) 3 Light Field Ambulances. (l) 4 Field Surgical Team. 87 Some re-grouping of the Uri garrison was carried out and the defence of the perimeter strengthened. I SIKH was withdrawn from the perimeter into reserve, and 4 KUMAON took their place towards the end of November 1947. 2 DOGRA was spread along the line of communication from Baramula to Uri. Srinagar garrison consisted of 6 RAJ RIF and odds and ends of rear parties of 161 Infantry Brigade and State Force elements in the Badamibagh Cantonment.  43 The Bhatgiran Affair 88. A concentration of the raiders was reported on the high hills overlooking Uri from the South-East. The raiders heavily sniped the Uri garrison and posed a threat to the roads leading from Uri towards Srinagar and towards Punch. It was decided to dislodge them from those hills and 1 SIKH (less A coy) moved out at 0700 hrs on 12 December from Uri, led by the CO, Lieut-Colonel Sampuran Bachan Singh. The Sikhs found no difficulty in brushing aside the opposition in the area of the enemy's outer picquets. and reached the main enemy position along the top of the ridge. When the battalion started moving back to Uri by a different route down the hill side, the raiders suddenly opened fire from three sides. The B coy under Major Ajaib Singh, which was leading the way back, was pinned down and was extricated with difficulty after a desperate fight by a platoon of D coy under Jem Nand Singh, a veteran of World War II and the winner of the Victoria Cross. There was confusion and fierce fighting, and heavy losses were inflicted and suffered. Jem Nand Singh earned a Maha Vir Chakra to add to his Victoria Cross, but fell in the battle, riddled by an LMG burst from close quarters. Lieut-Colonel Sampuran Bachan Singh, and Major Ajaib Singh, both received bullet wounds, and the total casualties suffered by 1 SIKH were 1 officer, 2 Junior Commissioned Officers and 57 Other Ranks killed, and 2 officers, 4 JCOs and 55 OR wounded. The battalion was left in no position to undertake any further operations for some time. Enemy casualties were estimated to total about 300 killed and 500 wounded. The withdrawal of 1 SIKH was facilitated by an inspiring example of courage and skill shown by the Boys platoon of 4 KUMAON. This platoon was the only reserve available at Uri when news reached there of this fierce enemy attack on 1 SIKH. The Sikhs withdrew through the platoon, and the raiders following them up suddenly found themselves under murderous fire from well-sited positions. Many of them were mowed down before the rest collected their wits and fled back the way they had come.Some reorganization of 161 Brigade then took place. As the fighting efficiency of 1 SIKH had suffered due to heavy losses in the engagement at Bhatgiran, the battalion was relieved by 6 RAJ RIF and moved to Srinagar for rest. The relief was completed by 22 December, although one of the companies was still detained at Baramula, Srinagar garrison as such was dissolved and Colonel Harbakhsh Singh took ever the command of 1 SIKH in addition to carrying out the duties of Station Commander Srinagar.  44 SECTION 14 : THE DEFENCE OF POONCH 89. Poonch is located in a bowl where the Poonch River is formed by the union of the Suran and Batar rivers. No road communications to the town existed from the Indian side and movement was restricted to the summer track from Uri and a few mountainous tracks from the East. The approaches to the town followed the Poonch river valley which was prone to enemy interference. 90. Enemy. An estimated strength of 3000 hostiles subjected the garrison to machine gun and mortar fire from dominating heights. The enemy had unhindered access to existing roads to Poonch from the West and South for replenishment and build up of forces. 91. The enemy laid a virtual siege of Poonch and attacked it persistently. Own Forces 92. In Nov 47, 1 (PARA) KUMAON less a company reinforced the existing Poonch garrison that was comprised of 2000 state force troops. This force was designated as the Poonch Brigade, under Brig Pritam Singh. 93. Defensive and Consolidatory Measures. (a) Air attacks were directed on enemy concentrations and picquets on the northern side of Poonch from 04 to12 Dec 47. (b) Air dropping of supplies was commenced on 08 Dec 47. (c) An airstrip was constructed using refugee labour. Mountain guns were successfully landed on 13 Dec 47. (d) The guns engaged enemy mortars resulting in the end of enemy shelling of the town. (e) About 30 tons of small arms, ammunition and supplies were landed on 14 Dec and refugee evacuation to Jammu by the returning aircraft began. 94. Operations. (a) On night 12/13 Dec using the available artillery, a hill South of the town was captured after evicting the well entrenched enemy. (b) This resulted in enemy attacks on own picquets which were well sited on features South of the Poonch river and West of the Betar Nala. (c) The attacks were repulsed using artillery fire. 95. The situation stabilised and with the advent of winter, further operations had to be kept on hold.  45 SECTION 15 : OWN OPERATIONS IN CHHAMB AND AKHNUR AREAS 96. The raiders were engaged in driving away Hindus from the area between Akhnoor and Bhimbar. Tens of thousands of refugees crossed the China River to the safety of Jammu. Due to this exodus, the task of guarding the lines of communication was greatly hampered. The need to capture Chhamb was appreciated. 97. Enemy. Approximately 2000 to 3000 r