Multi-Family Dwellings, Hotel, and Motel Fires PDF

Multi-Family Dwellings, Hotel, and Motel Fires Fig. 9-0. Oklahoma City FD fights a multi-alarm fire involving an apartment complex under construction. *Source:* Photo courtesy of Oklahoma City (OK) Fire Department Introduction A *multi-family dwelling* (MFD) is a structure designed to be occup...

Multi-Family Dwellings, Hotel, and Motel Fires Fig. 9-0. Oklahoma City FD fights a multi-alarm fire involving an apartment complex under construction. *Source:* Photo courtesy of Oklahoma City (OK) Fire Department Introduction A *multi-family dwelling* (MFD) is a structure designed to be occupied by more than one family as the primary living space. *MFDs have potentialfor massive loss of life.* Many are often over­ loaded with considerably more occupants than designed or accounted for officially. MFDs include smaller structures like duplexes, triplexes, fourplexes, condominiums, and townhomes. These often have an open-center stairwell; however, some are subdivided and have been remodeled without adherence to building codes. Larger MFDs include old and new law tenements, row frames/row houses, low-density housing, and center hall and garden-style apartments (figs. 9-1 and 9-2). Some are specific to certain regions, like a brownstone in New York or New Jersey, while others are generic and can be found in many places throughout North America. Construction can be balloon frame, conventional platform, legacy, or lightweight. Again, the key is to know the buildings in your area. *The life loss potential is astronomical. Pre-planning and drilling in* *your MFDs is vital if you plan to save lives.* *Garden apartments* are designed to have the door to each individual unit open to the out­ side. Multi-story garden apartments will typically have exterior open walkways and stairwells that serve one section/side of the building. Some have exterior partially enclosed hallways that lead to upper units (fig. 9-3).  *Center hall apartments* are designed to have the door to each individual unit open to an interior enclosed hallway. Stairwells to upper floors are enclosed and separated, feeding each floor (fig. 9-4). Unlike a stand-alone apartment building, an *apartment complex* is a series of MFD build­ ings located in close proximity to each other, under one management company, with multiple access points and passageways into the area for parking and walking. To compound matters, apartment complexes are, by definition, *complex.* Confusion and lack of pre-planning can create a bottleneck of companies and delay access to the fire building (fig. 9-5).   These facilities are often gated and may have hydrants located deep in the complex. Blocked fire lanes, parked cars, awnings, dumpsters, and narrow passages make apparatus access to fires in these areas challenging. Companies can commonly access the wrong driveway into the complex, and hose stretches can be long and complicated. The buildings in apartment com­ plexes can be either center hall or garden style, or a combination of both. Pre-planning is vital to successful operations in apartment complexes. In this chapter, we will also examine low-rise hotels and motels. Hotels and motels are designed to provide temporary living accommodations, yet can have long-term residents as well. A *hotel* is a center hall type of structure comprised typically of multiple stories with enclosed stairwells and interior hallways that access guest rooms (fig. 9-6). These can also have an atrium-style interior with an open center and doors to individual rooms that open into the inner atrium space, accessed by open interior hallways. The majority of atrium hotels are mid- to high-rise. A *motel* is a garden-style building with doors opening to the outside atmosphere, often next to parking. Motels typically do not have the extravagance of amenities found in larger hotels. These are designed for travelers needing temporary overnight respite (fig. 9-7). The term *motel* originated with the Motel Inn of San Luis Obispo, originally called the Mile­ stone Mo-Tel, which was constructed in 1925 by Arthur Heineman. In conceiving of a name for  his hotel, Heineman abbreviated motor hotel to mo-tel after he could not fit the words *Mile­* *stone Motor Hotel* on his rooftop.^1^ From a firefighting and command standpoint, center hall construction is the most lethal, as occupants must enter secondary and tertiary enclosed exit routes (enclosed halls and stair­ wells) to escape. These fires commonly extend beyond the unit of origin and can fill these exit routes with heavy smoke and fire. Quickly accessing the fire to contain it, open hallways, and maintain egress for occupants is vital. **Common pitfalls exist across North America regarding MFD fires:** Lack of pre-planning and training Improper size-up/access problems Inadequate victim profile/underestimating the potential Lack of tactical supervision (divisions/groups) Use of two-out crews with confirmed VP (victim profile) Difficulty in containing attic fires Lack of sufficient medical capabilities The following sections look at examples and, more importantly, solutions to these common pitfalls of MFDs. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Apartment Fire with Three Rescues CHIEF ROBBY BERGERSON, WACO (TX) FIRE DEPARTMENT On a March morning at 9:00 a.m., fire dispatch transmitted a commercial structure fire assignment for an apartment fire with people trapped at 3530 W. Waco Drive, send­ ing five engines, two ladders, and two battalion chiefs, along with a private ambulance and EMS supervisor to the scene. Dispatch relayed that they were receiving multiple 9-1-1 calls reporting the fire. Knowing that the first-due battalion chief was on the far-west side of the city just clearing a large trash fire, I self-assigned from headquar­ ters, recognizing that I would arrive with the first-due company Engine 6. While en route, I confirmed with dispatch how many people were trapped, and in which apartment. Two occupants were reported trapped in apartment C. Engine 6 and I (Chief 2), arrived simultaneously in just under three minutes with heavy smoke showing from the first floor of a two-story garden-style apartment building. The living room window of the fire apartment had just self-vented, and flames were now visible. I assumed Waco Drive Command and announced a "confirmed victim profile" and that we would be in an offensive strategy. Engine 6, already deploying a 1%\" hoseline, was assigned to initiate fire attack at the task level. This apartment complex, built in 1975, had eight units per building, with four units accessible by each exterior door leading to interior apartment entry doors, and an interior stairwell to the second-floor units. Upon exiting, the occupant of the fire apartment left the door to the apartment on fire open, which caused heavy smoke and heat to block the exit of two apartments upstairs, because the stairwell was filled with toxic smoke and heat. and effectively allowed for this incident of over 11 resources to be resolved with a man­ ageable span of control of 4:1 (fig. 9-8). MFDs are not always easy to size up. Apartment complexes, in particular, create challenges, as described previously. Most civilian rescues happen at night, and the ability to see smoke coming from deep inside an apartment complex creates challenges. Often, 9-1-1 calls are made from apartment units adjacent to the involved unit and could have an entirely different street address. Apartment complexes are commonly found on corners of city blocks and can have two dif­ ferent street names and associated addresses. In addition, the streets inside the complex could have their own names that are different from the main surface street names that are more commonly known by crews. **Water supply is often a problem, considering the following common issues:** Engine companies sometimes race to be first in, and the first two companies go into the complex without having laid a stick of supply line. Limited access creates further prob­ lems, as the first truck may also dive into the complex. If no supply was laid, this can create significant delays in establishing a patent water supply. The first company goes into the complex with a wet lay, preventing subsequent compa­ nies from accessing the complex. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Apartments Under Construction CHIEF DAN SHAW, FAIRFAX COUNTY (VA) FIRE with, "what was that again, Chief?" Understandable, because we have never seen a foe like this that was so advanced and unphased by our firefighting efforts.  Fig. 9-9. The radiant heat from this fire created massive exposure problems. *Source.* Photo courtesy of Fairfax County (VA) Fire Eventually, from a change in the wind direction and a concerted fire attack effort, the fire was brought under control, but not before 5 five-story lightweight wood residential-over-commercial structures, 14 townhouses under construction, and 28 vehicles (in all, encompassing over 700,000 square feet of structures) were destroyed. We learned many lessons from this event and they continue to resonate today. We are a very successful "forward laying, one to two hoseline fire with a couple of rooms off in a residential structure" firefighting department. This is like many fire departments, given that every 64 seconds a residential structure fire occurs in the U.S. It is easy to be lulled into a level of security and success, but when your foe changes so drastically, you must recognize and meet the challenge head-on. The key element to even hoping to be successful in an event like this is that you must train for this event. How many of your personnel have a plan to tackle this fire? How often do you train on the rapid hook-up and implementa­ tion of your elevated master streams? Remember, the way we train will directly equate to how we will operate and perform on the fireground. Don't think a water supply group supervisor is only applicable in rural/non-hydrant fires! When a fire demands incredible amounts of water to suppress it, it is vital to dedicate one person, preferably a chief officer, to be consumed with assessing, plan­ ning, and executing a water supply plan in concert with the IC. Victim Profile/Underestimating the Potential Since house fires are our most common structure fire for most of North America, they lull us into a rut, and we get into habits that are not as effective on other fires. They often create dan­ gerous situations and near misses, or worse. We must recognize that MFDs have a much greater life hazard than a house fire. If a fire in an MFD has one known victim reported, it is likely that a total of *three* will be discovered, according to FRS.^2^ Even a duplex, by definition, can have twice as many occupants as a single-family home. Apartments, row houses, tenements and the like all have massive potential for life loss. alarm/resources prior to arriving to remain ahead of the incident power curve. You can always cancel them if not needed, but you will want them instantaneously if you *do* need them. Err on the side of the victims. Some triggers to consider include: Confirmed victim profile Visible column of smoke Multiple callers reporting the fire from inside or outside the building/complex buildings, tenements, row houses and the like should be considered high victim profiles 24 hours a day. Economic pressures and trends in living conditions have created multiple fami­ lies living in a 500-square-foot apartment. Many people are working from home, and many others have chosen not to work and are staying home during the day. plex. The fire was dispatched at 10:30 a.m. on a weekday. Crews arrived to report a working apartment fire and initiated fire attack and search. As I arrived and assumed command, I backed into a parking space to stay out of the way. A sheriff deputy walked up to the window of my battalion chief (BC) buggy and casually said, "Yeah, he's inside." I responded, "Who's inside?" Just then, M109 pulled out a severely burned, unconscious, non-breathing mid-20s male victim. Their medic unit was parked half a block away. Had I known we had a confirmed victim en route, I would have called an additional transporting medic unit. Tactical Supervision (Divisions/Groups) Another bad habit created from house fires is the lack of establishing divisions and groups early in the fire when confronting an MFD. This creates a tactical gap and causes the IC to get behind the incident power curve much more quickly than on a single-family house. As we have stated previously, the first company officer to an interior assignment is likely not the best choice to be a tactical supervisor due to task saturation; however, waiting too long will create more problems. Depending on the size and scope of the incident, you may need all your company officers to go to work at the task level with their companies. In that case, the second chief is a good choice to assume the hot division. They must be in full PPE and SCBA. This occurred on an apartment fire early one morning involving a two-story garden-style apartment building. Heavy fire involved several units on the second floor and the attic above. As the first arriving chief on the second alarm, I was assigned accountability officer. The second chief on the first alarm was assigned safety officer, and no divisions or groups were established. The IC had a span of control of approximately 15:1, with more companies responding. As the accountability officer, I went to all the apparatus and retrieved the FATS passports. One problem was that most of the passports were inaccurate and did not reflect the actual firefighters on the rigs that shift. Another problem was that it took a long time to determine where each company was located. Finally, the companies kept moving and the dynamics of their natural course of movement made any accountability obsolete. By the time I got back to the ICP with the passports, the effort was all but pointless. If the IC had developed two divisions early, those supervisors would have had the role of accountability and safety officers as part of their tactical assignments. They can see where crews are moving in their areas, account for them in real time through eyes-on/hands-on active accountability, while looking at safety issues the entire time. As the second and third chiefs arrived, we could have filled in behind the initial two division supervisors (company officers) if needed, just as a chief takes over command from an initial IC. Two-out can be over- or underutilized depending on the respective fire department SOG and actual practice in the field. With this in mind, consider the greater potential for victims in MFDs. Fire departments sometimes wait for a two-out or back up crew before initiating a fire attack on an apartment fire, for example. Apartments, as stated above, should be considered occupied 24 hours a day. Even if the involved unit is determined to be unoccupied, it should be assumed that all exposure units are occupied until proven otherwise and be designated as high victim profiles. Therefore, two-out may need to be deferred based upon other conditions and considerations. Like any fire, fires in MFDs will likely travel vertically through everything from balloon frame walls, utility chases, interior stairwells, and dumbwaiters, to heating registers, air ducts, inte­ rior windows, and airshafts. And during most fires, the first objective once a fire is located is to confine the fire from occupants, hallways, stairwells, and other means of egress. Once the fire hits the attic or cockloft area of an MFD, things change from a vertical confinement chal­ lenge to a lateral confinement challenge. Crews may think that they have the fire contained in the living space only to find that it has outflanked them and travelled unknowingly vertically into the attic. Attic fire access can be difficult, especially in older buildings. The astute IC plans on vertical extension on most every fire, especially those in buildings with common attics. The key is to get ahead of the fire and create new tactical areas with supervisors who have clear control objectives to stop lateral spread. Without tactical supervi­ sion, individual crews will act at the task level and not think ahead to find a good TPO to make a stand, such as a firewall. Many times, fire walls are breached; however, they may still provide an anchor point to choke the fire down into a smaller pathway that is easier to contain. Roof division supervisors are particularly insightful in leveraging fire walls from their vantage point (fig-9-10). Medical Capabilities ICS and Communications for Multi-Family Dwellings Duplex, Triplex, Fourplex, and Garden Apartments Often, there is confusion on how to label or refer to the various units in these buildings. What­ ever method you use, have common terminology in your agency/region to prevent confusion. Below are some considerations: First, it helps to refer to a unit and a building differently. For example, a *unit* is a separate living space in the same building that is adjoined to other units under the same roof, often connected by a common attic, wall, or floor. A *building is* a separate occupancy/ structure that is not connected to other structures. For example, a duplex is a single building with two units. A strip mall is a single building with multiple units. Second, we can refer to the unit/building of origin where the fire started as the involved unit/building. The adjacent units/buildings are the exposed units/buildings or expo­ sures. Exposed units can be above, below, or next to the involved unit. Third, the left or right side, in relation to the involved unit/building, can cause confu­ sion. Regardless of where the fire starts, the involved fire unit of origin is typically called the A (Alpha) unit/building as a frame of reference. The exposed units/buildings are labeled as B for the left and D right. If the fire were to extend to another building to the right, that would become the D-l exposure building, the next one over would be D-2, and so on. The building to the left would be the B-l exposure building (fig. 9-11). As with any structure fire, ICS is determined by the formula B+C+R = ICS. Often, a single divi­ sion supervisor can manage a smaller duplex or fire held to one unit of an MFD. As the building gets larger or conditions become more complicated, more supervisors maybe required (fig. 9-12). If a lot of work needs to be done, then waiting for the second chief may be a better option. If the building, conditions, and resources (ICS formula) warrant, you may need to establish more than one division supervisor on the ground using Divisions A/B/C/D as needed.  Fig. 9-11. Because the fire started on the left, that is the involved/Alpha unit. The unit on the right is the exposed/Delta unit *Source.* Illustration courtesy of Sam Wallace One additional challenge is understanding the layout of some MFDs, and which address goes with which door. Many MFDs can present and act like a row house yet be built or con­ verted to be separate apartments. Many large homes are converted into multiplexes. Fig­ ures 9-14a, b, and c show two row houses that have been converted into three apartments each. Addresses and power meters may help size up the number of occupancies under one roof. Figures 9-15a, b, c, d, and e show a four-story apartment building. Three doors to the upper floors empty into the A-side entry outside at the walk-up stairs, and one lower sub-level unit has a separate entrance to the right. Notice how each of the doors has a different address (fig. 9-15b). Each door leads to a separate floor, as seen by the internal stairs. How would you  Fig. 9-14a, b, and c. Remodels can be identified by multiple addresses or meters on a former large single home or row house. Fig. 9-15a, b, c, d, and e. (a) This may appear to be a single-family row house at first; (b) A closer look reveals multiple units; (c) The first-floor unit is at the entry door level; (d) Unit \#1329 leads to the second floor; (e) Unit \#1327 leads to the top floor.  organize this incident if you had a fire in Unit \#1329? This is the second-floor unit (third-floor unit if you count the lower sub-floor unit). Using the template above, you could have Division A supervising all companies on all floors. The Division A supervisor would be busy and posted up at the bottom of the stairs at the sidewalk to see conditions on all floors simultaneously. Division by floor number (Division 1, 2, 3) would handicap the supervisors, as they would be in the smoke and not able to see conditions. More radio traffic may be necessary between Division A and the task-level companies on the floors. The portal for each floor is the exterior doors, hence Division A would work effectively. Townhomes, condominiums and row houses can be organized by a similar ICS template as the one described above. If fire were to extend laterally, you could grow your ICS to Divisions B or D as needed. Each division supervisor would have all the floors (usually two to three) in the occupancy. Since the portal of entry is the outside, divisions would make sense (fig. 9-16).  Fig. 9-16. The Division A supervisor accounts for all crews inside and on all floors. If the fire were to extend to the D-l exposure, then Division D could be created. *Source.* Illustration courtesy of Sam Wallace We were dispatched to a fire in a townhome on a 115°F day at 2:00 in the afternoon on a summer weekday. E109 arrived first with the following arrival report: *E109 on scene. This is a two-story attached townhome with fire in the attic and smoke on* *the secondfloor. E109 is initiating fire attack. Passing command. Hydrant is 200feet* *behind E109. This is a moderate victim profile.* E109 arrived first and initiated fire attack, passing water supply and command to the next engine. E109 still had a working command until the arrival of the next officer. HM109 (a 4-person truck company) arrived with E109 and split with two members inside for search and two to the roof for vertical ventilation. HM109 captain assumed roof division supervisor. E108 arrived next and assumed IC from E109 captain as *working command.* His engineer assisted with securing a water supply and his firefighter pulled a second line to establish a 2-out crew, per the SOG. I arrived, assumed command from E108, and announced the ICP location. After a brief trans­ fer of command with E108 captain, I announced/confirmed an offensive strategy with low VP (low VP due to companies on scene with primary search underway, could have also been con­ sidered moderate), and that E108 captain would now assume Division A. *All units on scene, this is command. Battalion 7 is on scene. This is an offensive strategy.* *Low victim profile. E108 Captain is Division Alpha. We have a townhome involved. Division* *Alpha is E108. Everyone inside is working for Division Alpha. Objectives are primary and* *fire attack."* E108 captain assumed Division A supervisor, with E109, his crew (E108), half of HM109 (searching), and subsequent arriving units that would be assigned into his division. His objec­ tives were fire attack and search of the involved townhome. E23, HM09 (Team 2), TR23 (Team 1), and E103 each arrived and was assigned to Division A as well.^3^ **Division A: E108 Captain** Boundaries: The inside of the involved two-story townhome, *both floors.* Resources: All crews working inside the involved townhome, both floors: E109, E108, HM109 (Team 2), E23, TR23 (Team 1), E103. Objectives: / Initially, fire attack and search of both floors. / Check for extension and evacuate the attached B-side exposure unit. / After knockdown, transition into salvage and overhaul. / Coordinate vertical ventilation with roof division. / After the fire is under control and roof division exits the roof, if positive pressure or natural ventilation is needed during salvage and overhaul, it should be coordinated through Division A. **Roof Division: HM109 Captain** Boundaries: The roof. Resources: Crews working on the roof: HM109 (Team 1) and TR23 (Team 2). Total of four firefighters. Objectives: Vertical ventilation, including a strip cut to prevent extension into the B-side attached-exposure townhome. Coordinate with Division A. **RIC Group: E24 Captain** Boundaries: The entire incident. Resources: All companies assigned to the function of rapid intervention: E24. Objectives: / Coordinate with Division A for accountability of crews. / Soften the structure without worsening fire conditions. / Secure utilities. / Develop a tactical plan for firefighter rescue based upon current and future conditions. / Establish a RIC cache of equipment readied in case there is need for intervention. / Supervise rescue of downed firefighters if an IWI occurs. **Medical: M65** Boundaries: The entire incident. Resources: All ambulances and other resources assigned to medical treatment and transport. Objectives: Treatment and transport of all civilians and firefighters. This includes establishing a medical area on the A side of the townhome with gurney and medical gear. Medical can often be a simple designation of one ambulance in the early stages of a fire, or it can be composed of a medical group with a supervisor and multiple ambulances and other resources based upon the needs of the incident as it escalates. For this fire, heat exhaustion was a primary concern for crews. If, in the above example, the B-side exposure unit were to become significantly involved in fire and Division A were to get overwhelmed with span of control, we could establish a Divi­ sion B with the second-arriving chief. Otherwise, the second-arriving chief could assume Divi­ sion A from E108, be available for another assignment, or be released back into the system. The second chief could also shadow E108 for mentoring to help develop the E108 captain since he was a newly promoted officer. He did a great job! As with any confirmed rescue, you may have a hybrid ICS template of divisions and a rescue group. Division supervisors would coordinate laterally with the rescue group, and one super­ visor per building may be a relatively simple template to manage. Confirmed Rescues in MFDs As with single-family dwellings, another template would be for known rescues (confirmed victim profile). Here, the primary objectives of fire attack and search are split between the functional fire attack and rescue groups. This would be utilized for smaller MFDs like duplexes, triplexes, fourplexes, townhomes, condominiums, low-density housing, and garden-style apart­ ments that have limited fire but confirmed victim(s). Row houses in which the fire is confined to just one or two units with confirmed victims may also be organized with this template. This was used on the El Camino Fire (described in the preface of this book) which involved a two-story garden-style apartment complex in which we had a child trapped. The incident was organized as follows: fire attack group, rescue group, medical group, and roof division. If you recall from the preface, we had a commercial alarm already responding and on the road, headed to an extinguished sign fire at a Goodwill store. This pulled a very robust alarm with 5 engines, 3 trucks, 2 BCs, and a transporting fire medic unit. While responding, I was notified by dispatch that another fire was being dispatched nearby for an apartment fire with child trapped. We literally had to pass the apartment fire with child trapped, so I directed that initial alarm to divert to the apartment fire, and within seconds we were on the scene of the apartment fire with smoke billowing out of the Charlie side of the complex. One engine continued to the Goodwill to find a man with a cut finger---case closed. Meanwhile, the CAD system dispatched a separate alarm to the apartment fire, since our alarm was already shown as responding to the Goodwill fire. The net result was 9 engines, 6 trucks, 4 BCs, and 2 transporting medic units. E106, TR106, and I (Battalion 7) arrived simultaneously. E106 *initiated* fire attack at the task level (Fig. 9-17). TR106 *initiated* search at the task level, announcing they would be all in for rescue? I assumed El Camino Command with the ICP across the street from the complex on the A side. This was an offensive strategy with confirmed VP (fig. 9-17). Companies began to arrive in rapid fire, one after the other. There was a very brief tactical gap between E106, TR106, and I. E101 arrived quickly and I directed the captain to *assume* fire attack group (bridge the tactical gap). His objectives were water supply and to supervise all fire attack operations. He had E106 working for him and any other subsequent companies that were going to be assigned the objective of fire attack or supply as needed. The E101 engineer performed a reverse lay from E106 out to a hydrant several hundred feet away. He was accounted for in a non-IDLH assignment pumping back to the attack engine. E101 firefighter pulled a second attack line off E106 and worked under his captain in the fire attack group. E110 arrived and I assigned that officer to *assume* rescue group supervisor with TR106 and his crew working for him. His objective was search and rescue operations for the whole inci­ dent, including known and unknown victims. M30 arrived and was assigned to set up for treatment and transport on the A side by the ICP. MHO also arrived and joined M30, so we had one medic unit for the known victim and one for any other unknown victims or firefighters. The next objective was vertical ventilation, as this was a second-story fire in the two-story garden-style apartment complex. Fire had extended into the attic and threatened three other apartments through a breezeway. I called the next-due truck company, HM109, to see what his ETA was in anticipation of assigning the officer roof division supervisor. His response was, "seven minutes." This was surprising, as I knew they were close by. I then went directly to TR106 to see if he could split away two members of his crew to per­ form the vertical vent. Normally, if I needed to communicate with TR106,1 would have gone through their boss, the rescue group supervisor. Herein lies a small detail. Rescue group super­ visor, E110 officer, was not in position yet to communicate face-to-face with TR106, as he had just arrived on scene and was not back in the tactical space with TR106 on the C side of the complex. If I went through rescue group supervisor, it would have created much more radio traffic, as he would sh'ZZhave to contact TR106 directly on the radio. I called TR106, "TR106, Command." A short response came, "Truck." I inquired, "Are you able to possibly split and give me vertical ventilation if we need it?" I received no response. TR106 was task-saturated with a VEIS operation and needed all four members to rescue the child from the second floor (fig. 9-18). They never responded.  After a few seconds, HM109 announced, \"HM109 will be on scene shortly, we can perform vertical vent." I then responded, "Copy HM109, you will be roof division upon arrival." Right then, another company arrived, "Command R20 (another 4-person truck) is on scene, do you have an assignment?" I then assigned them vertical ventilation since they were on scene before HM109. The next company, E19 arrived. I assigned them directly to fire attack group (E101 officer) for an assignment. The next two companies, Engines 105 and 20, were directed to come to the ICP for forward staging. This provided two companies that could be immediately assigned to any urgent request from rescue, fire attack, or medical. Also, if we had a Mayday (Heaven forbid) they could form a Rapid intervention group. Just after Engines 105 and 20 arrived, the boy was run out to the waiting gurney (fig. 9-19), transported code 3. The four-year-old boy was on a bed with a wool blanket that filtered the heat from burning his lungs, but not the carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide from rendering him unconscious with a lethal dose of CO in his system, at 23% (fig. 9-20).  This was a result of several miracles. First, we were already responding and passing the apartment fire, which saved two to three minutes. Second, the victim was in the back bedroom. If he had been in his own bedroom, which was fully involved on arrival, he would have died before we arrived on scene. Third, he was under a wool blanket in the summer, which filtered the heat from his lungs. Finally, the crews were trained and didn't hesitate. This was the right crew at the right time. At the time, VES (VEIS) was not a commonly known tactic in our region, yet Engine and Truck 106 were dedicated to training, knew VEIS, and worked flawlessly as a team that day to save a little four-year-old boy's life. Captain Kevin Wegener led the coordi­ nated fire attack with his firefighter, Mike Lowry, while engineer J.P. Santos pumped the engine. TR106 performed VEIS. Firefighter Jeff Karges didn't hesitate. When he took the window for VEIS, he was blasted with hot, black smoke and dove into the window instantly. He felt the little boy under him in the dark and handed him out the window. Rather than close the open door that would have given him more refuge, he immediately handed the little boy out to TR106 Captain Steve Turner, who handed him to firefighter Walter Lewis, who handed him to engi­ neer Brent Barsdale, who ran out to the gurney across the street in seconds, with the little boy over his shoulder. The M30 crew did an outstanding job of intubating the patient and regain­ ing respirations on the way to the hospital. These men are my heroes (fig. 9-21). I believe God got a call from the devil that morning. The devil told God he was going to take this little boy and use a fire to do it. I think God said, "You can try, but I am giving Engine and Truck 106 a two-minute head start." All of the communications on this fire between the IC and companies were on a single tac­ tical channel. I spoke to dispatch on a separate command channel to keep those transmissions off the TAC (tactical channel). At no time during the fire were there any radio transmissions regarding the VEIS, additional hoselines, or any other task-level communications. The division and group supervisors were trained, empowered, and entrusted to bridge the tactical gap and make those decisions as they deemed necessary without having to get permission or check with me, the IC. That would have only slowed down the operations, clogged the tactical chan­ nel with unnecessary radio traffic, and possibly cost the life of a child. Details matter. Remem­ ber, Training + Time = Trust. *Training + Time = Trust* Hotel/Motel Occupant accountability for hotels and motels is critical and should be coordinated with man­ agement on scene. They can tell you what units are occupied and by whom. This will help with search-and-rescue efforts. While all units involved and exposed must be searched, a follow-up with on-site management can confirm what units had been assigned to potential occupants. Hotels will likely be served by a division for the fire floor and any other floors requiring supervision of multiple crews. Like any structure fire in a larger building, you may choose to employ a rescue group for targeted areas of known victims. They would augment the divisions who have the objectives of fire attack and search as well. Remember, this is a lateral relation­ ship between divisions and groups. Groups and divisions are both led by supervisors, meaning that they are at the same level of authority; therefore, groups work *with* divisions, *not for* divisions. As with any MFD, think ahead regarding medical treatment and transport of victims of hotels and motels. Also, consider Red Cross for any displaced occupants of any MFD fire. Depending on the size and location of the fire, management of any MFD may have vacant units in which your displaced occupants may seek temporary overnight refuge. Motels are likely to be organized by a Division A and Division C ICS template, as the doors open to the outside and even two or three floors can be supervised from the ground on either side of the motel. Larger/Multi-Floor MFDs with More Fire  Once the MFD building becomes larger or center hall with multiple floors, enclosed stairwells, and the fire is larger, a combination of divisions and groups may be appropriate. Neither a single fire attack group supervisor nor a rescue group supervisor alone will be able to size up changing conditions effectively, account for crews on multiple floors, and communicate face-to- face as effectively if they are running up and down multiple stairwells to multiple floors of a large building. The benefit of the enclosed stairwell is that the area provides the tactical division supervi­ sor a tactical space/threshold against the hot zone from which to account for crews coming and going. Like the front door on an A side of a building, the enclosed stairwell door on an upper floor of a multi-story MFD can provide an excellent workspace for the tactical supervisor. This was the template used in a three-story stand-alone center hall apartment building fire on a windy night that broke out at 2:30 a.m. Battalion 7, TR106, E101, E103, E105, E110, E19, R20, HM109, M105, and Battalion 3 were dispatched to an explosion with heavy fire and multiple people trapped at the Garden Plaza Apartments. The apartment building was a symmetrical 200\' x 200\' standalone center hall apartment building with no sprinklers, no standpipes, and carpeted hallways. Each side of four wings of the building had a mid-span lobby access point with interior stairwell that fed all three floors. Each floor was accessed by the interior stair­ well and hallway. Approximately 100 apartments per floor contained one bedroom, with the exception of the corner units that had two bedrooms (fig. 9-22). Pre-planning gives you a tactical advantage that will pay enormous dividends on a dark and stormy night when you have multiple people/families trapped as you arrive first-due and wipe the sleep out of your eyes. *Nowhere is pre-planning more important than on MFDs.* Conventional pre-planning or walk-through drills may not be enough. If you really want to prepare the troops for battle, consider hands-on drills in these buildings and complexes. This provides an exponential tactical advantage, which is what you will need from the arrival of the first companies on scene. To say we trained there before this particular fire would be a gross understatement. We con­ ducted multiple hands-on drills, pulling charged hoselines down hallways filled with theatrical smoke, performed VEIS with mannequins, and pumped engines from hydrants. To add to the tactical advantage, we built a full-scale tabletop model of the building and digital simulations. Now, that may be extreme, but the fact was that we identified this massive life target hazard located directly behind the firehouse. To top it off, the normally first-due engine was tempo­ rarily closed due to staffing shortages that night. The winds were sustained at 25 mph, and a gas leak helped to spread the fire after the explosion. As the IC, I was first to arrive, followed by TR106, which had no water or pump. The disadvantages of the closed engine, lack of water, heavy winds, gas leak, and non-existent protection systems were outmatched by the tactical advantages of having trained so extensively in this structure---thank God! Upon arrival, heavy fire was visible from multiple apartments. Unknown at the time, the fire was started by an Afghanistan War veteran who severed the gas line in his apartment on the third floor and blew the roof off and walls out. We had heavy fire showing from the inte­ rior side of the apartment building as well, high winds driving the fire through the center hall­ ways due to the missing roof and wall, and multiple people trapped, including the severely injured vet (fig. 9-23). All engines and the first truck went to the third floor for fire attack and search from two different stairwells. Due to the amount of labor and tasks to be done simultaneously, the Divi­ sion 3 supervisor was not assigned until the second chief arrived. I needed to bridge the tacti­ cal gap with more direction to the incoming companies. Once Division 3 was established with the second chief, he posted up in the stairwell on the third floor, A side. His objectives were fire attack and search of the third floor. The supervisor must always be in full PPE with SCBA, as was the case on this fire (fig. 9-24). The third chief officer was posted up in the D side stairwell, third floor, and was assigned to supervise the crews going into the third floor from the D side. He worked under the Division 3 supervisor. Another option here would have been to establish Branch 3, with Divisions A and\ D, or just have Divisions A and D, who each had primary operations on the third floor and ter­ tiary operations like salvage and evacuation on the lower floors. I chose a single Division 3 template initially to keep the span of control narrow and radio traffic minimal. We had dozens of potential victims in addition to the ones that were confirmed. I estab­ lished a rescue group with the objective ofVEIS of windows to apartments on the A/D corner, third floor, nearest the fire. The rescue group supervisor coordinated laterally with the Divi­ sion 3 supervisor to prevent redundant or conflicting operations (fig. 9-25).   Exterior-facing windows surrounded the perimeter of the building and were easily accessed by each respective parking lot. Interior-facing windows were accessible from an interior court­ yard that was accessed by one of the four entry points on the four sides of the building. No win­ dows had balconies for refuge of any occupants. Each unit had a window-mounted air conditioner located under the family room window to the apartment. Automatic fire doors were located at each stairwell, providing the TPO to isolate each floor into four quadrants and prevent lateral spread. Another TPO was the legacy construction that was composed of dimen­ sional lumber and a narrow attic space. Two hydrants were located on the A/B and C/D corners and the manager's office faced the A side main entrance, to the right of the lobby. Every single piece of information you just read was known prior to arrival by me and the majority of the officers and firefighters who responded that night. We had a significant tactical advantage due to pre-planning and realistic training prior to the fire. Figure 9-26 shows that the fire had extended past the interior hall to the outer units due to wind and a gas leak. Nearly every officer responding who had trained at that apartment was several steps ahead of the fire as they leveraged their knowledge into tactical advantage, even before arriving. Had we not known the building so well, the results could have been catastrophic. Fire had already extended well into the hallways upon arrival, thus compounding the rescue challenge (fig. 9-27). Fig. 9-27. The fire owned the hallways of this center hall apartment fire. *Source.* Photo courtesy of Gary Lascelles Roof division was composed of two truck companies with the objective of vertical ventila­ tion and preventing lateral spread past the two stairwells on the A and D sides. Division 2 was established with the objectives of evacuation and salvage below the fire floor. RIC was established with the objective of RIC readiness and securing utilities (there was a gas leak on the third floor. *RIC was not established until the third alarm due to the number of con­* *firmed victims.* Figure 9-28 shows the organizational chart for this fire. Expanded Communications Communications on a greater alarm fire will become more complex. While you ideally want to remain on one tactical channel, you have the potential for your tactical channel to get quickly clogged with multiple companies assigned to multiple divisions. This can become an obstacle to a crewmember transmitting a Mayday, victim found, or emergency traffic. In addition, the division supervisors and IC may speak on the channel, which will create even more traffic. You may need more tactical channels as your incident grows. Consider giving each division/ group a separate tactical channel, and/or grouping together divisions and groups onto sepa­ rate channels. If your system does not have enough channels available, you may need to con­ solidate divisions based upon their working relationships to each other. Looking at figure 9-29, the communications plan for the aforementioned center hall apart­ ment fire had all the tactical supervisors and the IC on Command Channel A4 to facilitate lat­ eral communication between tactical supervisors and vertical communications with me at the ICP. The only exception was roof division supervisor, as he did not have two radios. We spoke to each other on Tactical Channel A6 (fig. 9-29). The tactical supervisors above communicated with the companies assigned to them on their respective tactical channels listed. Note that Division 3 (the hot division), roof division, and RIC group were all consolidated on the same tactical channel (A6). This was intentional, so that they could coordinate vertical ventilation and fire attack more efficiently. RIC was also on the primary/hot tactical channel to better track companies on the hot division. If we needed to launch RIC, they would already be on the appropriate tactical channel. The timing of when you expand your communications plan is important so you do not lose companies or make things worse. This must be a strategic decision by the IC, and expanding ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ --------- --------- Division 3 Roof Medical Division 2 RIC Rescue **BC3** **HM109** **M10S** **BC14** **BC9** **BC1** **2402** **A4** **A4** **A4** **A4** **A4** **A6** **A6** **A8** **A9** **A6** **A7** **TR106** **HM109** **AMR101** **E109** **R21** **T2** **E101** **TR17** **M109** **E54** **T6** **E8** **E103** **M8** **E24** **TSO** **E110** **M64** **E24** **E105** **M19** **E20** **E19** **TR23** **T2** ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ --------- --------- Fig. 9-29. Note that each tactical supervisor had a specific tactical channel assigned to them as follows: /Division 3---A6 /Roof division---A6 /Medical group---A8 /Division 2---A9 /RIC group---A6 /Rescue group---A7 to additional channels too early or too late can each create complications. Adding channels too early can happen in two ways. First, your crews maybe in the thick of the battle and have auditory exclusion while fighting fire in low or zero visibility. They may not hear the switch, hear what channel, or see their radios clearly enough to turn the knob or hit a key pad or screen. Secondly, if a Mayday occurs, switching to a separate frequency right away can have a similar effect. This technique is often taught in RIC training, and has merit; however, if done too soon, it can complicate the already tenuous situation. Switching or adding channels can also happen too late. This occurs when the IC calls additional resources and simply is behind the incident power curve, overwhelmed, and doesn't think of it. They are drowning in radio traffic and doesn't have the bandwidth to get help. A good technique to hit the sweet spot of adding/expanding your communications plan and frequencies is when you call an additional alarm and/or expand your incident with more divi- sions/groups. For example, we had four-alarm fire one day, and as additional alarms were called I gave them to specific chiefs, each with a tactical channel. With four divisions, each division supervisor (chief in this case), had their own tactical channel and alarm or resources. Depending upon your communications capabilities, you may request additional channels from dispatch and hold them until needed. As you expand tactical supervisors, give them a channel. Ensure you have a plan/command channel to communicate with your supervisors that is separate from their respective tactical channels. Again, you may be limited by the number of frequencies you have, or the range to which they reach. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Canton Apartments Incident CHIEF MIKE WALKER, OKLAHOMA CITY (OK) FIRE DEPARTMENT Crews from the Oklahoma City Fire Department were dispatched to check smoke coming from a building at 6:33 p.m., early February 2022. The Canton apartment build­ ing was a five-story mid-rise that was still under construction, which was composed of a combination of Type 1, Type 3 and Type 5 construction that totaled 374,507 square feet in size. When the initial response of two engines (E-ll, E-22) and a ladder company (L-22) arrived on the scene, crews observed a "haze of smoke" through the windows on the fifth floor on the southwest portion of the building (A/D). Upon this observation, the remainder of a commercial alarm was requested (two additional engines, one addi­ tional ladder, one heavy rescue, and two battalion chiefs). The on-scene crews then entered the building to locate the source of the smoke and, shortly thereafter, fire was observed coming from the roof in the same general location of the earlier observed smoke. In all, the incident grew to a five-alarm fire consisting of 49 apparatus and 138 fire­ fighters, as well as other support personnel. Despite the department's best efforts, the fire was a total loss. The dollar loss is still being decided at the time of the writ­ ing, but it is estimated to exceed 100 million dollars. Currently, the cause of the fire is believed to have been due to the neutral side of the electrical system being ener­ gized (fig. 9-30).  After a thorough investigation and multiple after-action reviews, the challenges fire­ fighters faced during this incident included: Video footage showed smoke coming from the building for over an hour prior to the initial call to 9-1-1. The sheer size and layout of the building made it extremely difficult to ade­ quately size up the situation. There were multiple areas of origin that were long distances from each other and on opposite sides of firewalls. Though the premises were compliant with applicable fire codes, the fire suppres­ sion systems in the building were not yet operational or had been turned off due to recent subfreezing weather. The wood truss design allowed for wooden void spaces that surrounded the firefighters (ceiling/floor space and walls), thus providing ample fuel for hidden fires to quickly grow. Fiberglass-reinforced Sheetrock (Firerock) posed a significant challenge when crews were opening up ceiling spaces. Major lessons learned: Pre-plans should be completed and updated during the different phases of construction to include: ♦ Temporary FDC location and markings. ♦ Which standpipes are operational and which ones are not. ♦ The operational status of the sprinkler system. Expect limited fire suppression system functionality when the building is under construction and plan on how to override that challenge. Develop specific policies and procedures for this type of construction to include while they are under construction because of the unique challenges they pose. Tools: ♦ The department has invested in electric chainsaws to defeat ♦ The department has purchased tethered drones for each battalion chief ICS: ♦ Utilize a recon group to accomplish size-up within the time of relevance. ♦ To effectively bridge the strategic/tactical gap, consider establishing branches Summary MFDs have some of the greatest potential for life loss. When a fire in an MFD has a confirmed VP, there is a probability that there will be three victims, on average. MFD occupancies include duplexes, triplexes, fourplexes, condominiums, and townhomes. Larger MFDs include old and new law tenements, row frames/row houses, low-density housing, and center hall and garden-style apartments. Some are subdivided and have been remodeled without adherence to building codes. Hotels and motels can also be considered MFDs from a command and tac­ tical standpoint and can be equally lethal. Hotels are typically center hall while motels are generally garden-style. Center hall construction is typically more deadly than garden-style, as exit passages are enclosed and require primary and secondary exit routes, while garden-style units open to the outside atmosphere. Construction can be balloon frame, conventional platform, legacy, or lightweight. Again, the key is to know the buildings in your area. *The life loss potential is astronomical. Pre-planning and drilling in your MFDs is vital if you* *plan to save lives.* Plan on a robust medical group to support operations through treatment and transport of multiple victims. A MCI may even occur. See chapter 15 for more on MCIs. Common pitfalls include lack of pre-planning and training, improper size-up/access prob­ lems, inadequate victim profile/underestimating the potential, lack of tactical supervision, use of two-out crews, difficulty in containing attic fires, and lack of sufficient medical capabilities. ICS can be similar to house fires for smaller buildings like duplexes, triplexes, and condo­ miniums, while larger MFD buildings may require multiple divisions or a combination of divi­ sions and groups when confirmed rescues are involved. For extremely large complexes, branches may be considered. Chapter Review Review Questions 1. Explain some of the challenges and tactical considerations associated with an apartment complex versus a stand-alone apartment building. 2. Describe water supply considerations for responses to multi-family dwellings. 3. The high life hazard of multi-family dwellings presents a potential challenge to the medical capabilities of a fire response. Explain how to proactively address this. 4. Explain the unique challenges associated with row house construction. 5. What are some ways to address the needs of expanded communication associated with working incidents at multi-family dwellings? 6. Provide an example of how you would utilize four or more division/group supervisors given a first-floor fire in a three-story multi-family dwelling fire. FESHE Strategy and Tactics (C0279) Related Content The content contained in chapter 9 provides detailed information to assist with instruction and education for all course objectives with a focus on multi-family dwellings. The chapter format supports the CO279 course outline by speaking specifically to basic division of tactics, rescue, exposures, confinement, ventilation, and salvage for multi-family dwelling fires to include apartments, row house, townhomes, condominiums, hotels, motels and duplex structures. NFPA 1021 Job Performance Requirements The information in this chapter can be utilized to support training and educational programs associated with the Emergency Services Delivery Fire Officer IJPR 4.6, 4.6.1, 4.6.2, Fire Offi­ cer IIJPR 5.6, 5.6.1, and Fire Officer III 6.6 and 6.6.1. Endnotes 1\. Kristin Jackson, "The World's First Motel Rests Upon Its Memories," *The Seattle Times,* April 25,1993,. 2 Brian E. Brush, "2021 Fireground Civilian Rescue Research Project," Firefighter Rescue Survey, 2021, firegroundcivilianrescueresearchprojpost.pdf. 3\. When splitting, truck companies are composed of two 2-person teams. Team 1 is the offi­ cer and saw firefighter. Team 2 is the engineer and irons firefighter. When arriving sepa­ rately on scene, they may split opposite of each other so there is a company officer with each newly formed four-person crew. 4\. "All In" is announced when a truck company of four members go all inside for search and/ or forcible entry.