Aggressive Command and Tactics for Life Firefighting PDF

Aggressive Command and Tactics for Life Fig. 6-0. FDNY firefighter transfers a young girl to Emergency Medical Services (EMS) for assessment. *Source.* Photo courtesy of by Lloyd Mitchell It is possible that as recently as 15 years ago, a textbook with a chapter titled "Aggressive Com­ mand an...

Aggressive Command and Tactics for Life Fig. 6-0. FDNY firefighter transfers a young girl to Emergency Medical Services (EMS) for assessment. *Source.* Photo courtesy of by Lloyd Mitchell It is possible that as recently as 15 years ago, a textbook with a chapter titled "Aggressive Com­ mand and Tactics for Life\" would not even make it to publisher review. Fortunately, the envi­ ronment and culture of the fire service has changed significantly in a very short period thanks to an era where access to information, research and evidence based practices is compounding. Where the term *aggressive* was once deeply connected to recklessness, today it is more closely associated with anticipation in planning, assertive decisions, and proactive actions. This is how we stay ahead of the incident power curve. Education helps with anticipation and proper positioning at the tactical level through that deeper understanding of the dynamics of our environment. Collectively, we now have a much greater awareness of the degree to which time effects the fireground. Just a decade ago, discussion on tactics for life would surround fire­ fighter safety, risk avoidance, and protective measures in operations. Thanks to advances in technology, funding for research, and the efforts of Underwriter Laboratories, Fire Safety Research Institute (UL FSRI), new tactical considerations for the fire service are being shared with detailed reporting on the impacts of tactics on victims. The objectives of this chapter aim to inform the decisions of today's fire officers using the information of today. Relying purely on experience is not sufficient for the higher-accountability world in which we live, public trust in our profession, and expectations of the positions we hold as officers. This chapter and this text will provide the appropriate blend of experience and evi­ dence that is necessary to support command competence and confidence in the explanation and execution of duties and decisions. One thing is for sure: training saves seconds, seconds save minutes, and minutes save lives. This means everything we do costs time. When we save time, we can save lives. The window of opportunity to save lives shuts faster than ever before. Every firefighter, engineer, apparatus operator, chauffeur, company and chief officer must shave time off their individual evolutions and operations. Whether turn-out time, response routes, staging on scene, deployment of tac­ tics, personal protective equipment (PPE), self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and so on, it all matters. If we shave seconds off individual and company tasks, that will lead to time off tactics, and could add up to enough time to save a life. The only way to shave time off hose stretches, SCBA donning, laddering, vent, enter, isolate, and searching (VEIS), and countless other tasks and tactics is to train! Fire Dynamics While we clearly recognize a difference, it is challenging to explain the specifics between a legacy or traditional fire and one of today. When terminology like "modern fire behavior" or today s fires is used, the focus is put on the fire or era, when in fact the combustion process of fire has remained entirely unchanged. What has changed is the chemical inputs of the fuels, the understanding of ventilation impacts, and the influence of the containers in which fires occur. More than any other influ­ ence, the changes in fuel packages at the chemical level has changed the pace and byproducts of fire (fig. 6-1). The traditional terminology of fire behavior must be eliminated from our vocabulary as it implies that fire behaves. It is unfortunate that this graph was the instruction tool used in textbooks published as late as 2015, more than 5 years after the release of the UL and NIST fire dynamics videos presented in real time the differences in modern and legacy furnishings as fire fuel packages.^1^ The historical fire behavior curve is constructed on the premise of a fuel-controlled fire. This would be an accurate presentation of a fire outside in the open air with a fixed fuel load---a campfire, for example. Fire behavior inside a structure is not a predictable bell curve but a dynamic, supply and demand wave. Only our most recent generations of firefighters have fire dynamics as their initial imprint for fire education. Most of our operating firefighters were indoctrinated under traditional terminology and are having to transition and understand the gravity of the differences. Accurate understanding of the fireground is built on a foundation of an accurate understanding of fire dynamics (fig. 6-2). The greatest change in the modern age is not fire; it is the proliferation of petroleum-based synthetic materials in nearly all products available to the fire. When comparisons of legacy to modern fires or furnishings are made, the difference is the type of materials burning. When this information was first presented to the fire service in 2009 by Underwriters Laboratory, the specificity of that point was not made clear enough. Even though this display made a great impact on the fire service, it did not fully inform it. In 2020, 10 years after the first delivery of real-time, high-definition fire dynamics educa­ tion to the fire service from UL, they did it all over again. You will notice that the terms *legacy* and *modern* are removed, and the current presentation shifts the attention from the era to the modern burn comparison\ actual materials. This ensures that the message is clearer that the difference in fire dynamics is related to materials, not decades (fig. 6-3). To expand on this concept, it helps to know the law of conservation of energy. The law of conservation of energy states that energy can neither be created or destroyed, it can only be transferred from one form to another. When this is the base for comparison between natural and synthetic materials, the differences in burn characteristics become very clear. Natural products like, wood, cotton, and leather are grown over a longer period using natural forms of energy like sunlight, oxygen, soil, and grass. Synthetic materials are primarily petroleum-based, which must be extracted from deposits just to be made available for use. Regardless of the item, a significant amount of supplemental energy and process is put into converting oils to plastics and various forms and fibers in a short production time (fig. 6-4). The difference in energy for development between natural and synthetic materials is mir­ rored in the fire development and energy release rate during the burning process.^2^ The chart in figure 6-4 shows the time, and the videos shown in figure 6-4 (available by scanning the QR code) display the intensity. Using the numbers for this chart drawn from UL single-room burn tests, we can deduce that synthetic materials result in a room reaching flashover 8-10 times faster than those involving natural products. By watching the videos, you will also observe that this is a more explosive and violent process as well. It must be recognized that these changes in the products found in our fire environment have been gradually occurring over the last 50 years. Unfortunately, the necessary modifications of  furnishing burn comparison^23^ -------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------- ------------------------------------- **Natural vs. Synthetic Times to Flashover (mln:sec)** **Experiment** **Room with Natural Furnishings** **Room with Synthetic Furnishings** **1** 29:30 3:40 **2** \>30 4:45 **3** **\>30** 3:20 *e.* \>30 4:50 -------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------- ------------------------------------- Fig. 6-4. Natural versus synthetic table professional development, education, and operations in our profession have only just begun. Every fire we respond to has a head start on our companies---we are, by default, reactive when the call comes in. The changes in our fire environment have a significant head start on our profession. Now that we know this clearly and are informed, anything less than an aggressive approach to improving, preparing, and learning about it would be negligent. The world knows fire by its flame, but the most destructive element of fire is not the flame, it is the heat. Discussion regarding cause and effect of moving a fire from an open-air environ­ ment into a compartment or container usually begins with fuels and ventilation, as we did in this chapter. However, the extent of influence on conditions goes much further. For a stand-alone fire outside, fuel is controlled, ventilation is unlimited, and the intensity of the fire does not affect either, which results in that predictable curve. When a fire is moved into a compartment, the three forms of heat transfer become major influencers on the environment and the avail­ ability of fuels. Additionally, ventilation profiles are dictated by the construction of the con­ tainer and the rate of heat transfer by the fire's development. *Heat transfer* is the exchange of thermal energy to the fuel by the mechanisms of conduc­ tion, convection, and radiation. In an exterior, fuel-controlled fire, that exchange of energy goes into consuming the single fuel and the open-air environment, thus displaying growth, development, and decay on a consistent path. A fire in an enclosed structure does not allow for any transfer of energy to an open environment; it is all transferred into the structure and its contents. Heat energy impacts the ceiling, wall surfaces, and other items inside the struc­ ture, breaking down more fuels in more areas. This is why fire development inside a structure, regardless of fuel type, is more rapid than a fire on the exterior: the enclosure improves the efficiency of energy transfer to available fuels. *Heat release rate* (HRR) is the rate at which heat energy is generated by burning. It wasn't until the early 2000s that the operational fire service began to really take note of heat release rates. This is not the fault of the fire service; it was a technology barrier. Until recently, actual measurements of heat release rates were conducted on very small samples due to the instru­ mentation available, and it was only through calculations that determining heat release rates for larger items of combined materials was possible. It was the 2009 UL videos that provided a real-time visual display of heat release rate differences and enhanced the impact of the num­ bers. One can explain on paper that a small trash can fire produces 300 kW of heat energy and a sofa produces 3 MW, or 10 trash cans of heat energy at once, but seeing is believing. *The law of conservation of energy* explains that energy can neither be created or destroyed, it can only be transferred from one form to another. Dr. Vytenis Babraukas states that HRR is not just a variable of fire, it is "the single most important variable in describing fire hazard."^3^ He describes HRR as the driving force of fire activity due to the positive feedback of heat trans­ fer breaking down other materials, feeding further heat development. Because of this mecha­ nism, all other fire variables, such as smoke production, presence of toxic gases, and oxygen depletion directly correlate to HRR. To watch the UL videos is to observe in real time how the high-energy investment and rapid production associated with making synthetic products becomes a high-energy release and rapid breakdown when burned. When comparing an exterior fire to an interior fire, the heat release for an exterior fire does not impact environmental temperatures. Due to the contain­ ment of an enclosure, the heat released increases environmental temperature. Increased tem­ peratures in a compartment lead to higher gas pressures, increase the speed of convective currents, and accelerate the pyrolysis process, breaking down more solid fuels to gasses. While there is a visual, nearly explosive representation of these actions in the UL videos, what is not seen is how the fire activity also increases the demand for oxygen to sustain com­ bustion. It is shortsighted to think of ventilation for fire as just air. A fire in a house does not become vent limited and create a vacuum. Oxygen is consumed by fire in the container while heating and expanding other gases; there will be plenty of air in the container, so it is the reduced oxygen percentage in the air that is the limitation. To further complicate this vent limited concept, UL-conducted burns have determined that while the atmospheric 21% oxygen provides for complete combustion of natural products like paper, it is insufficient for synthetic materials. To clarify this, a couch burning in a wide-open parking lot would be vent limited because the demand for oxygen to complete combustion cannot be satisfied by the air around it. To better demonstrate this, consider an acetylene torch. When you first light an acetylene cutting torch, you ignite the acetylene only (fig. 6-5). Even though the flame is in the open air, it is very orange in color, and it gives off soot and smoke, all of which are indicators of incom­ plete combustion. It takes the addition of supplemental oxygen to raise the percentage well beyond that avail­ able in the natural atmosphere to achieve a clean burn and complete combustion (fig. 6-6). Acetylene is a petroleum-based fuel, as are the plastics in our homes. Synthetic products are made from toxic materials that require supplemental energy in pro­ duction, which means that they will release more intense energy levels and toxic byproducts when burned. When Dr. Babraukas explains that the HRR is the most important variable in describing the fire hazard, he is not just speaking to fire damage---he is also referring to fire lethality. Complete combustion is clean, whereas incomplete combustion is a dirty burn, result­ ing in increased particulate smoke, more byproduct gases, and increased carbon monoxide levels, to cite a few toxins. To know that at any time, under any conditions, burning synthetic materials in a structure are in a state of incomplete combustion, is to know they are making the environment in that structure more toxic, fuel-rich, and oxygen-depleted with every pass­ ing second (fig. 6-7).  **a** Fig. 6-6. Acetylene-and- The Exposure Problem This picture is from the 1973 white paper *America Burning.* The picture itself is of a tragedy; a soot silhouette of a child who died in a residential fire. There is no thermal damage anywhere in the picture, only the black byproducts of incomplete combustion. In the soot you can see the details of curls of the child's hair and hand position, as if they are still there sleeping. The caption confirms what we know just by looking at this image. It was smoke, toxic gasses and lack of oxygen that claimed this child's life. The greater tragedy is that it wasn't until 45 years later that a public safety message to sleep with closed doors was developed. Today we not only know better, but we also know more. Advances in technology and fire sciences have connected the anecdotal phrase "fires burn and smoke kills" to empirical evi­ dence of the thermal and toxic threat inside a working structure and the relationship between the two. In 2015, when UL FSRI started the *Study of the Impact of Fire Attack Utilizing Interior* *and Exterior Streams on Firefighter Safety and Occupant Survival,* they initiated research into the effects of tactics on the survivability of unprotected occupants. The lack of previous work in this area once again was not due to a lack of interest, but a lack of technology. It was not until this time that it was feasible to incorporate the instrumentation necessary to measure temperature, pressure, heat flux, gas concentrations like carbon monoxide and oxygen, and moisture content in a live fire environment at multiple locations. UL FSRI researchers even instrumented sections of pig skin to evaluate tissue damage differences. This work continues to develop. In the 2020 Search and Rescue Studies, UL FSRI became the first in the world to utilize new technology to measure hydrogen cyanide concentrations in the live fire environment. The difference between a fire outside and inside a compartment is everything. For centu­ ries, fire service experience has told us that we have a fire problem based on the understand­ ing of observations from outside of fires. The last few decades of evidence from research inside fires has helped us understand that the truth is that we have an exposure problem. While the fire is the source, it is the cumulative, compounding, and dynamic thermal and toxic exposure throughout the structure that is so damaging and deadly. This knowledge is what is now driv­ ing tactical decisions towards mitigating the thermal and toxic threats as soon as possible to improve conditions, and away from the myopic focus on extinguishment alone. Simultaneous versus Sequential The chapter led with the statement that accurate understanding of the fireground is built on a foundation of an accurate understanding of fire dynamics. For more than a century, the foun­ dation of understanding the fireground has been built on fire behavior that follows an order of incipient growth, development, and decay, and a belief that heat is the greatest threat and extinguishment is the priority. Most fire departmental procedures which establish fireground priorities and order of operations will demonstrate these influences; first engine is fire attack, second engine secures water supply and backs up fire attack. Between these first two resources, extinguishment is being initiated, supported, and set up for continuous operation: initial attack, first engine tank supply, back-up hoseline, and establishment of a hydrant source. The reflec­ tion of this procedure is that fire attack follows an order, heat is the greatest threat, and extin­ guishment is the priority. This commitment and order to extinguishment is an example of sequential tactical operations. To clarify the objective of this section of the text, sequential tactical operations are encouraged, and a tactic is often initiated at the task level then sup­ ported with more resources and, when possible, supervised and coordinated by a tactical supervisor. The problem is when the sequential order of a tactical operation unintentionally drives the incident priorities and assignment of incident resources. When the aforementioned order for the tactic office attack becomes the driver of the incident, it isn't until the third unit that a second assignment can be initiated. Today's knowledge and evidence shows that, in a structure fire, the thermal and toxic threats are cumulative, compounding, and dynamic. A greater priority should be placed on the direc­ tion of simultaneous threat mitigation through cooling and compartmentalization. The use of the word simultaneous here does not explicitly mean *occurring at the same time\',* it means to consider and address them together. The last four major studies from UL FSRI have one common tactical consideration. A tactical consideration is an evidence-based concept for the fire service to consider implementing into their department to enhance efficiency, effective­ ness, and increase knowledge to accomplish their mission. From the *Study of the Impact of Fire* *Attack Utilizing Interior and Exterior Streams on Firefighter Safety and Occupant Survival* (2018), *Analysis of the Coordination of Suppression and Ventilation in Single-Family Homes* (2020)/ *Anal­* *ysis of the Coordination of Suppression and Ventilation in Multi-Family Dwellings* (2020)^5^ and the "Study of Fire Service Residential Home Size-Up and Search & Rescue Operations" (2022), the recommendation is "when resources permit, interior search and rescue operations can and should proceed simultaneously regardless of the fire attack selected." As stated, this is not the literal meaning of occurring at the exact same time, as it is under­ stood that arrival order, available staffing, and even state or local regulations are variables. The intent of the language in the tactical consideration and the reason for emphasis is that in many jurisdictions, resources are limited and delayed. The unintended consequence of prior­ itizing extinguishment alone with procedural sequential assignments is that other tactics are not initiated until that checklist is complete. Given the "first engine is fire attack, second engine secure water supply and establish back-up" scenario, it is possible that search would not be initiated until the arrival of the third apparatus. In some organizations, the first two engines are dedicated to attack, supply, and back-up with the first truck company prioritizing ventila­ tion. In this example, the assignment of search may fall to the fourth-arriving unit. By shifting from the sequential procedure language to when resources permit, interior search and rescue operations can and should proceed simultaneously, regardless of the fire attack selected," there is more flexibility in the use of early resources and a greater emphasis on getting firefighters into the structure for search operations. The Fire Department of New York City (FDNY) is the largest fire department in the nation. Due to the size and density of the population served, they successfully execute more rescues and save more civilians from fire every year than any other department in the United States. It is believed by many that the success in the operations of the FDNY is in their size and resource availability. However, most FDNY members will tell you that the majority of fires are extin­ guished with the first line from the first engine and most victims are rescued by the first truck company initiating primary search. In the situations where the truck company locates the fire before fire attack, prioritizing the act of controlling the door to the fire compartment has the greatest impact in mitigating thermal and toxic exposure to all other areas and occupants, sometimes minutes ahead of extinguishment. The FDNY has very detailed sequential proce­ dures for second-, third- and fourth-arriving units with assignments to reinforce and support tactics, but they all fall in line behind the initiation of fire attack and primary search, never at the expense of either. Current fire service research is challenging the current and past prac­ tices of many organizations. With that said, it is also validating some. Many urban departments with a history of responding to high-density residential occupancies have the experience and exposure to situations that demand the prioritization of simultaneously addressing extinguish­ ment and rescue, and their practices reflect this. This has embedded "aggressive command and tactics for life" not only in practice but also department culture. The Firefighter Rescue Survey Launched in 2016, the FRS is a web-based survey tool composed of about 40 questions used to collect data points on civilian rescues on the fireground by firefighters. Through the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS), the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and the United States Fire Administration (USFA), the fire service has decades upon decades of fire loss information. The Firefighter Rescue Survey is the only source collecting and reporting fire saves. As of the publication of this text, the Firefighter Rescue Survey has collected the operational details of how, where, and when from over 3,000 fireground civil­ ian rescues, and the information included in it is incredible. For the 3,005 total recorded res­ cues of civilians on the fireground by firefighters, 1,916 (64%) were still alive at the time of reporting.^6^ With so much information flooding in on how fire dynamics and building con­ struction are working against us, the knowledge that firefighters are still consistently saving civilian lives everyday must serve as a beacon of hope for our citizens and a spark of moti­ vation for our firefighters. Much of this chapter has been dedicated to the demonstration of data from research and science-based evidence, but the Firefighter Rescue Survey demonstrates data from real-world experiences. Anecdotally, we can claim that the FDNY is operationally successful with civilian rescues through the simultaneous actions of dedicating a company to fire attack and dedicat­ ing a company to search before any operations are reinforced, but the Firefighter Rescue Survey data set provides an opportunity for tactical actions and victim survivability to be evaluated. The fact that fuel and compartment conditions are progressively accelerating and intensi­ fying fire conditions cannot be debated. What has been questioned is what this means for fire victims. Around 1960, Dr. R. Adams Cowley, known as the father of trauma medicine, coined the concept of the *golden hour* for victims of significant trauma.^7^ This golden hour was rooted in his experience as a physician and the data collected through both civilian and military patient populations, showing that getting a patient to definitive care within 60 minutes of the injury was critical to survival. The supportive documentation of improved outcomes when time to care was reduced through interventions such as improved prehospital care, rapid trans­ port systems like ambulances and helicopters, and even the use of hydraulic rescue tools, were the catalysts for modern shock trauma programs, EMS services, and rescue squads. Prior to the Firefighter Rescue Survey, the fire service had only collected data on civilian fire fatalities and injuries. There has never been a method to report or evaluate condition, intervention, and patient outcome as a process like the work of Dr. Cowley did for trauma patients and care timelinnes. For this reason, our profession has been unable to show how the changes in fire conditions over time have affected fire victims. With that said, the FRS can show current survival rates and, if the work is continued, it can demonstrate trends in the future (fig. 6-8). From the FRS First 3,000 data set, we as a fire service have found that the golden hour for civilian fire victims is about 10 minutes. Fire victims located and removed within 10 minutes of arrival have a survival rate of greater than 50%. After 10 minutes, there is a significant decline. Similar to how EMS utilized the work of Dr. Cowley to support implementation and expansion of interventions that expedite access to definitive care for trauma victims, the fire service must use the FRS information to support operations and training which expedite the location, removal, and EMS access for fire victims.  FRS First 3,000 data set With this 10-minute window of survivability displayed in the FRS data, the UL FSRI tacti­ cal consideration that, when resources permit, interior search and rescue operations can and should proceed simultaneously regardless of the fire attack selected, becomes much clearer. Addressing the thermal threat through fire suppression is extremely critical to improving inte­ rior conditions, but an active nozzle is a tactical intervention that supports interior access. Fig. 6-8. Firefighter Rescue Survey data slide for time versus survival percentage Search and rescue is the tactical intervention with the primary function of locating, removing, and getting victims to EMS care. This is not exclusionary. Fire attack may, and often does, locate victims before search, and search may, and often does, locate the fire before fire attack. But in both cases, management of a secondary duty will never be as efficient as execution of a primary assignment (fig. 6-9). When the FRS data is evaluated on the tactical level, it shows that companies assigned to fire attack make 24% of the reported rescues and crews dedicated to the assignment of pri­ mary search make 57% of the rescues. Combined, these two initial assignments account for 81% of the civilian rescues on the fireground. If they are occurring together, within the first 10 minutes of arrival, fire victims have the greatest odds of survival. Knowing these details, reconsider the first-engine fire attack, second-engine water supply and back-up model provided earlier in the chapter. While this supports and reinforces sup­ pression, it does nothing to improve the likelihood of rescue, because the only crew operating on the interior of those two resources is the single fire attack crew (24%). When sequential order of the tactic of suppression becomes the driver of the incident priorities and resources, primary search (57%) is relegated behind fire attack support and redundancy and by default will be delayed. The increasing time to assignment increases our time to intervention and cuts into our golden 10 minutes. UL FSRI has a very powerful statement in the online training program for "Search and Rescue Tactics in Single-Family Single-Story Residential Structures" which absolutely clarifies that the greatest threat to the unprotected civilian, operating firefighters, and damage of prop­ erty is the passage of time. They conclude that, given all the details of the data they collect, speed in the execution of operations and improving time to task is the most powerful inter­ vention. "Speed is not recklessly moving forward, speed is seeking the shortest amount of time you can make an impact. Speed is taking ownership of the time you can control".^8^ Every second by every firefighter and officer counts. If everyone is operating with minimal wasted time and effort, then we outpace the fireground and can save a life. Crew Locating Victim v Total Recorded Rescues **THE FIRST 3000 RESCUES** Fig. 6-9. Firefighter Rescue Survey data slide crew locating victim It's About Life---The Rescue Mindset As an officer, you may be required to make life-and-death-decisions, with limited information, in a compressed timeframe. You will rarely have all the information, or all the time required to fully process a decision or handle a situation when lives hang in the balance, but you must be capable of rapidly assessing the situation, prioritizing needs, and executing initial actions of available resources. The only way to perform this successfully is through a very clear orga­ nizational expectation and communication of what the priority is. It is unfortunate that, through extensive interaction with departments around the nation, when asked "what is the first priority of the fire service," we find the first point of confusion. On June 25^th^ 2022, Sacramento Metro Fire E42 responded to a law enforcement assist. An estranged dad held his son at knifepoint and was barricaded in a bathroom of an apartment. While sheriff deputies attempted to negotiate, the dad lit the apartment on fire. The sheriffs evacuated and called in E42 into the scene, who balanced the alarm. The sheriffs and E42 worked together to breach the common wall from the next-door apartment. Knowing that the dad was armed with a knife and possibly a gun, E42 went through the wall, undaunted, to find the dad and child in the bath tub, unconscious from the smoke. They successfully pulled them through the wall and they both lived. This is the epitome of the rescue mindset. Maximum risk was taken in an intelligent way for maximum gain. See chapter 16 for more details and a first­ hand account of this incident. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is the federally mandated foundation of command expectations both in performance and terminology. NIMS lists emergency inci­ dent priorities as "save lives, stabilize the incident and protect property and the environment." 'The International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA) Chief Officer and Company Offi­ cer textbooks, which are the foundation for many certification classes, lists emergency inci­ dent priorities as "life safety, incident stabilization and property conservation."^10^ We see in the two most influential sources in the development of organizational and professional command priorities two different priorities: one is life saving and the other is life safety. If the life in both definitions is the unprotected civilian, there is no difference in these priorities. It is when some see the life as that of the unprotected civilians and others define the life as fully protected and trained firefighters where the difference arises. The USFA and NFPA have been collecting data on fires, fire losses, and civilian and fire­ fighter injuries and fatalities since the late 1970s. When the two most recent and comprehen­ sive reports on civilian fire fatalities and firefighter fire fatalities are compared, there is a divergence which cannot be ignored. **NFPA Research U.S. Fire Service Fatalities at Structure Fires: 1977-2018^11^** Since 1977 the number of U.S. firefighter deaths at structure fires has dropped by more than 80%. Over the same period, the annual number of fires has declined by 53%. In the late 1970s, traumatic deaths for firefighters inside structures occurred at a rate of 2.5 deaths per 100,000 structure fires. Since 2015 the overall death rate for firefighters operating inside or on structures has been less than 1 per 100,000 fires. **NFPA Research Firefighter Fatalities in the U.S.---2019^12^** Fires and explosions claimed the lives of 13 firefighters in 2019, with 10 occurring at structure fires and 3 on wildland fires. This is the lowest number of deaths ever reported to this data set and the third time the past four years there have been fewer than 20 fireground deaths. This continues a clear downward trend since data has been collected in 1977, when the number of firefighter fireground deaths annually averaged more than 80 per year. **NFPA Research Home Structure Fires in the U.S.---2021^13^** It appears that the only reduction in civilian fire deaths over the past decades has been due to a reduction of fires rather than the prevention of harm after a fire is reported. In 2021 the civilian single-family home fire death rate per 1,000 reported home fires was 8.4. This is a 19% increase since 1980. The rate of 9.5 deaths per 1000 reported one or two-family homes was 34% higher in 2021 than in 1980. **NFPA Research Home Structure Fires in the U.S., 2016-2020^14^** While the number of reported home fires and the number of home fire deaths have been cut in half since 1980, both the death and injury rates for civilians are higher now than they were in 1980. The fire service is doing a better job of preventing fires than they are of coping with fires after they start, which is why the fire service needs to understand how these fires happen and how they can be prevented and mitigated. To summarize this information is to conclude that more than 4 decades of data shows us that, when compared to 40 years ago, there has been a significant reduction in the number of fires. When fires do occur, statistically, firefighter lives are safer than they ever have been, and civilian lives are at a greater risk than they ever have been. While we have made tremendous and critical advances in firefighter safety, we must pay equal attention to the mission of saving civilian lives, and this is where the rescue mindset is developed. This does *not* mean that we take unnecessary risk, or that we dive into a fire with little to no chance of finding a civilian while having a high chance of getting hurt. It *does* mean look­ ing at risk and gain in a new way that maximizes both firefighter safety and civilian survival. These are not mutually exclusive objectives. With that said, it is very clear that making things safer on the fireground for firefighters to operate does not equate to making things safer for the unprotected civilian. It has only been since the publication of the 2018 UL FSRI *Study of the* *Impact of Fire Attack Utilizing Interior and Exterior Streams on Firefighter Safety and Occupant* *Survival* and the 2022 release of the First 3000 data set from the Firefighter Rescue Survey that our profession has had access to data on the relationship between fire conditions and occu­ pant and firefighter survivability. We now know that when the mission is to save the lives of unprotected civilians and execute operations with speed and prioritize those tactics that can improve survivability for occupants, the higher standard will inherently mean safer conditions for firefighters. Aggressive Command and Tactics for Life To this point, a solid foundation of fire dynamics has been established to clarify that our fire problem is the compounding effects of the toxic and thermal exposure threat. It has been demonstrated that this environment demands simultaneously addressing extinguishment and search with the initial responding resources. The transition from the initiation of the tasks of fire attack and search by first arriving officers to supporting, supervising, and coordinating tactics with the mission of saving lives by the IC is where aggressive command and tactics for life is defined. Nothing is free on the fireground; there will always be opportunity costs. For every task or tactic you employ, time and resources are paid and not devoted to another objec­ tive. Every decision, action, task, and tactic must be as orchestrated and coordinated as pos­ sible to maximize the impact of those exposure threats. This goes beyond the fireground: checking the rigs at shift change, not after breakfast, ensuring your portable radio batteries are fresh, confirming the radios are on the right chan­ nels, having forcible entry tools ready, ensuring your PPE is set up, and countless other details are the sum of success or failure. As you approach the scene, is careful consideration being given to apparatus placement of trucks, engines, medic units, and rescue companies? Are we blocking medic units from rapid egress? Is a charged 5-inch supply line going to block the trans­ port of an unconscious fire victim? Once on scene, is every firefighter operating at maximum performance regarding SCBA, stretching line, forcing doors, and cutting holes? Are they moving at a fireground pace (moving at a light jog, with purpose), or are they lagging because of lack of fitness, confidence, or leadership? Incident commanders must be active in considering and evaluating all the ways to impact these prior to and on the scene. As UL FSRI so perfectly stated it, "speed is taking ownership of the time you can control." Known Rescues and The Rescue Cycle As presented in the section on simultaneous versus sequential, the fire service is very clear and at times overly committed to the sequence of suppression given a known fire. The order is typ­ ically initiate attack with initial supply, back up attack with additional line, and secure a con­ tinuous supply. If we agree that saving lives is the priority of fire service operations, we should work towards a similar and clear industry standard for the rescue. When training scenarios set a rescue as a single firefighter locating a rigid plastic dummy, dragging them out by a handle and dropping them in the front with no follow up, they set a commitment to failure. This is the reasoning behind the terminology of cycle and the definition of the rescue mindset. Search is a single assignment, rescue is what we are anticipating as a result, and with that comes the demands of removal, triage, transport, and resumption of search. We would fail everyone if we as incident commanders only made an assignment with no plan to execute the result. This would be the equivalent of stretching a dry hoseline with smoke showing because we weren't sure if the fire would be located. The other reason to plan for a rescue cycle and prepare for repetition is from the data pre­ sented in the 2021 Fireground Civilian Rescue Research Project.^15^ During the first quarter of 2021, the Fireground Civilian Rescue Research Project collected and confirmed the rescue of 881 civilians by firefighters from 454 fire incidents. This shows that for fire incidents with a rescue operation, there was an average of almost 2 victims. When the data is further broken down by occupancy type, there is even more valuable pre-incident planning information. There were 293 single family dwelling fires with rescues yielding 461 victims, an average of 1.6 vic­ tims per fireground rescue operations. For multi-family dwellings and apartments, there were 161 incidents with rescues yielding 420 victims, an average of 2.6 victims per fireground rescue operation. Whether we are dispatched to a fire with a report of a trapped victim, or a victim is located during a primary search, we must be planning for multiple victims. In the event you are responding to an apartment fire with a report of victims trapped, consideration should be given to preparing for a potential mass causality incident as presented by FDNY Chief Leeb in chapter 15 (fig. 6-10). Regardless of the number of victims, the rescue operation is not complete until all areas of the structure are cleared and all victims are triaged, treated, and transported or released. The rescue cycle reminds us of this continuous process. The information of a known rescue could be received at any time. Getting this information from dispatch during the response provides Fig. 6-10. The rescue cycle an incredible opportunity in reducing reflex time of additional resources by requesting addi­ tional fire companies and ambulances to support the rescue cycle early. As the responding IC, the dispatch report can prompt you to anticipate quickly establishing the two functional groups of fire attack and rescue and leveraging tactical supervision to reduce radio traffic and accel­ erate the pace of problem solving. Information of a known rescue can also come in the middle of a very active scene when a victim is located on primary search or by an advancing hoseline. While the time to react and availability of resources is much different, the process remains the same. The victim will need to be removed, triaged, treated, and possibly transported, and at the same time search will need to be resumed for the potential of additional victims, while crews now occupied with rescue and medical will need to be backfilled. Tactics For Life Four critical objectives must be successfully employed to give a victim the greatest chance of survival: fire attack, rescue, ventilation, and medical. While all are important, they will be ini­ tiated based upon conditions present (fire, building, SIGNAL, etc.) and resources available. This means not checking boxes for tertiary objectives like utilities, exposures, rapid interven­ tion crew (RIC), or even a hydrant connection. If the first two companies have enough water to rapidly knock down the fire and search, then perhaps a hydrant connection can be com­ pleted by the third engine. If you have a 3-person truck, securing utilities during a known rescue may take that firefighter away from the higher priority. We cannot say it enough. It all starts with FPODP and VP! Notice that the term *objectives* is used, not *tactics* or *assignments.* In an ideal setting, every fire department would have the resources available to formally assign companies to each objec­ tive. The fact is that many departments do not have this luxury and even the largest depart­ ments can't ensure all their resources are arriving fast enough to be deployed simultaneously. Knowing there are four critical objectives on the fireground to support the action of saving lives and knowing resources will at some point be limited, we must start with prioritizing\ objectives and initiating tasks. Tactics are the coordination of tasks, and strategies are the coordination of tactics. Incident command as an organizational chart is built from the top down, but the fireground scene is most often built up from those initial task-level actions taken. For the last several decades of the modern incident command model, a great deal of atten­ tion has been paid to ensuring tactical coordination, and this is very important at the strate­ gic level. As it has been presented in this text, incident command is not suffering at the strategic level, it is suffering at the tactical level, which is where we have identified the gap. Our profes­ sion is more informed than ever on how tasks and tactics impact the survivability of occupants and firefighters. It is incumbent on us as officers that we apply this knowledge. When resources are limited and demands are high, efficiency is the key to success. We have identified the four objectives that are critical to improving survivability: fire attack, rescue, ventilation and med­ ical. The UL FSRI recommends that, "when resources permit, interior search and rescue oper­ ations can and should proceed simultaneously, regardless of the fire attack selected." When we do not have enough companies available to give tactical assignments, we still initiate tasks with individuals because speed is critical and "speed is seeking the shortest amount of time you can make an impact. Speed is taking ownership of the time you can control."^16^ Tactical coordination is very important as the scene develops, but task interaction is a crit­ ical concept when determining initial actions and ensuring efficiency of resources. The 2018 UL FSRI *Study of the Impact of Fire Attack Utilizing Interior and Exterior Streams on Firefighter* *Safety and Occupant Survival^1^* was the most in-depth study and scientific analysis of fire attack ever conducted. The study highlighted that even though the fire service has almost 200 years of experienced with pressurized fire attack for extinguishment, our understanding of water application as an intervention was limited. In 2021 the NFPA published the first edition of *NFPA* *1700: Guide for Structural Firefighting,* which was prepared by the Technical Committee on Fundamentals of Fire Control Within a Structure Utilizing Fire Dynamics. Within the guide is an entire chapter titled Tactical Considerations for Fire Control and Extinguishment. This language is very important, indicating that extinguishment is the ultimate goal but fire con­ trol is the initial priority. The following picture shows water application at the start of a hallway that leads to a well-involved bedroom (fig. 6-11). Ceiling temperatures in yellow with patches of red are in the 600- to 900-degree range. The light grey areas are around 200 to 300 degrees and black is less than 100. NFPA 1700 refers to this step of fire control as interior advancement. For years it was taught that water should not be applied inside the structure unless flames were visible, because there was concern that this would delay extinguishment and potentially cause water damage Today, we know that the faster we address the thermal and toxic threat environment inside a structure, the faster survivability potential is improved for unprotected civilians and fire­ fighters. This thermal image is a powerful way to show how just one fraction of a second of a Fig. 6-11. Thermal imager view of solid stream water mapping a hallway fire stream of adequate volume and proper placement can immediately reduce temperatures. What are not seen in this picture but which are well articulated in NFPA 1700 are the acces­ sory benefits to this. Firefighters should avoid advancing under a superheated thermal layer without cooling as they advance. Utilizing the reach of the stream to wet ceiling surfaces forward of the crew position means a safer interior progression to the seat of the fire. The flow rate should be appropriate with heat release rates and areas of involvement. The primary goal is to cool hot compartment surfaces, which allows those surfaces to absorb more thermal energy. Water cooling surfaces interferes with the pyrolysis process, which halts flaming com­ bustion, prevents fuel conversion and contribution, and reduces the heat release rate. As surfaces are cooled, deflected water droplets cool hot gases, resulting in gas constric­ tion, dilution, and lift within the compartment, reducing flammability and radiation. NFPA 1700 Chapter 10: Tactical Considerations for Fire Control and Extinguishment A fire stream does more than put out fire, it improves survivability and prevents fire extension as soon as it begins to address the interior environment. A crew advancing a hoseline can also close doors that it passes on the way through the occupancy to limit extension and exposure. At the simplest, most efficient level, in the absence of any other resources, the task of opening a nozzle, if operated by an educated and trained firefighter, can address fire attack (cooling of atmosphere, coating interior exposure surfaces, and extinguishing fire) and to some extent ventilation (gas constriction and lift, introduction of fresh air) at the ground level. While this is a powerful concept, the adage that "ifyou put the fire out everything else gets better" is only a half truth. While the open nozzle can address fire attack and ventilation, it cannot remove occupants (fig. 6-12). This illustration provides a context for what could be expected of the conditions at the end of a hallway like the one in the thermal imager picture. These numbers were documented prior to suppression operations. Like the nozzle discussion, the action of rescuing a victim, when performed by a by an educated firefighter, can have a significant effect on the survivability for the occupant. The data from the "Study of Fire Service Residential Home Size-Up and Search & Rescue Operations" (2022) found that, in some of the experiments, when a victim was located on the floor and their airway was raised to the 3-foot level for the duration of removal, they would have been in a lethal atmosphere and worse-off than had they been left in place during suppression, whereas the data for the victim located on the floor and removed at the 1-foot level improved on the removal. *The 1 ft elevation resulted in negative relative FED, or lower toxic gas exposure compared* *to remainingin place. Conversely, the relative toxic FED increasedfor the occupant in the* *hallway at the 3 ft elevation as the occupant was removed through the smoke layer.^1^\** FED refers to the fractional effective dose. FED can be used to describe the percentage of the population for which conditions become untenable. In the simplest form, the message is that if you can't see, the victim can't breathe. It is a ter­ rible thing to consider how many fire victims were potentially compromised not because of the fire, but during the process of their removal from it. It has been stated repeatedly in this text and will continue that we now know better and, with that, we must operate better. Evidence-based practices drive the medical field, and when our mission in the fire service is to save lives, they must also drive ours. The task of victim removal, if performed by an edu­ cated and trained firefighter, can address rescue (removal) and medical (reduced exposure). Just as an open nozzle cannot remove a victim, a firefighter dragging a victim cannot cool the environment or get smoke and heat to lift. It takes the work of both to provide the greatest opportunity for survival for victims and firefighters. It is ideal to dedicate full crews to performing tactical assignments of fire attack, rescue, medical, and ventilation simultaneously. To reduce the UL FSRI recommendation that "when resources permit, interior search and rescue operations can and should proceed simultane­ ously, regardless of the fire attack selected" to the task level, an initial attack crew of just two members should also plan for and be trained in the need to simultaneously perform fire con­ trol and rescue. If a victim is anticipated or encountered by the initial attack crew, to aban­ don fire attack would abandon protection, and to delay removal would extend exposure (fig-6-13). If one firefighter can keep an open and continuous stream high to cool the environment, gases will constrict and lift, and the water mapping and surface coating will prevent fire exten­ sion into the immediate area. The lifting and cooling will improve conditions for the victim at Fig. 6-13. Firefighter initiating fire control high in the atmosphere to cool the environment and coat surfaces with water the ground level and provide protection for the other firefighter working to remove the victim at the lowest possible level. When resources permit, consideration of tactical coordination is crucial. When resources are limited, consideration of task interaction is critical. Fire Attack, Rescue, Medical, and Ventilation Fire attack is the most common first action taken at structure fires. It has been demonstrated that, given a scenario of locating a victim in an entry or hallway, there is an opportunity for fire control and rescue to occur simultaneously with a two-person crew---but this is a contin­ gency plan, not a primary mode of operation. The data from the Firefighter Rescue Survey shows that only 24% of rescues were made by fire attack. This is not due to lack of effort; the primary duty of fire attack is to quickly locate confine and extinguish the fire. Advancing a hoseline is a requirement of this operation. Fire attack members are typically task-saturated, moving hose and addressing the thermal threat. The footprint they cover is primarily limited to the "ways," or the entryway, hallways and stairways to the fire compartment. To search any­ thing else would delay the primary objective of fire control and extinguishment. To understand that fire attack is likely working less than 25% of the occupancy is to understand why they are only making 24% of the rescues. A dedicated primary search crew is responsible for making 57% of the rescues, documented through the FRS. Unencumbered by a hoseline, with the primary duty of locating and remov­ ing victims, primary search should be covering more areas and have a much higher success rate for rescues. Combined, these two initial assignments account for 81% of the civilian res­ cues on the fireground, once again supporting the UL FSRI recommendation of ensuring they are prioritized as soon as resources permit. Establishing medical early in an incident antici­ pates the potential for a rescue of a civilian and it also is a provision of safety for all fire depart­ ment members operating on the scene. Ventilation as an objective may occur at any time and be provided or restricted by any crew, as it is a very important support function of all fireground operations. Once a specific method is determined, decisions as to the extent of support and supervision can be decided. As the initial company officer or IC, your priority is initiating these actions. As the formal incident commander, it is your responsibility to support, supervise, and coordinate them. It is not enough to make assignments; the incident commander must antic­ ipate outcomes by operating in the "then, and what if." Fire Attack For fire control and extinguishment methodology and tactical considerations, the best resources are the UL FSRI fire stream, water mapping, and coordinated fire attack studies and online UL FSRI Fire Safety Academy Platform, as well as *NFPA1700: Guide for Structural Fire Fight­* *ing)^9^* For the formal incident commander, the objective of fire attack has the most detailed professional expectation and operational definition set by *NFPA 1710: Standardfor the Organi­* *zation and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations and Spe­* *cial Operations to the Public by Career Departments.* NFPA 1710 sets out the baseline performance and support expectations of four occupancy types. NFPA 1710 Chapter 5---Fire Department Services Typical Single Family Dwelling Fire: 2,000 square feet without a basement and no exposures Effective water application rate of 300 GPM from two handlines (attack and back-up) Establishment of an uninterrupted water supply of a minimum of 400 GPM Typical Apartment Fire: 1200 square foot apartment within a three-story garden-style building Effective water application rate of 300 GPM from three handlines (attack,back-up, and exposure) Establishment of two uninterrupted water supplies of a minimum of 400 GPM each Typical Open-Air Strip Shopping Center: 13,000 to 196,000 square feet Effective water application rate of 500 GPM from three handlines (attack, back-up, and exposure) Establishment of two uninterrupted water supplies of a minimum of 500 GPM. High Rise: Any building -with the highest floor greater than 75 feet above the lowest level of fire department vehicle access. Effective water application rate of 500 GPM on the fire floor from two handlines (attack and back-up) Effective water application rate of 250 GPM from one handline on the floor above (exposure) Establishment of an uninterrupted water supply to the building standpipe/sprinkler connection sufficient to support fire attack operations. The single-family dwelling fire is our most common incident, and it supplies our greatest index of experience. For the single-family dwelling fire, the NFPA 1710 performance expecta­ tion is the only one with a single supply and no exposure line. This is least challenging to meet with a standard first alarm assignment. All other occupancies recommend an additional han­ dline be deployed for the exposure potential, and the establishment of two water supplies to the scene. The ultimate responsibility of these expectations being met on the fireground is that of the IC. The professional incident commander is always in the game and anticipating needs in all areas, trying to stay ahead of the incident power curve. The intent of NFPA 1710 is to pro­ vide you a best practices model. Here is an NFPA 1710 "then, what if" example for the IC and the tactic of fire attack for a simulated apartment fire (fig. 6-14): */ am going to ensure fire attack, search, an exposure/* *back up line are initiated for the fire unit 101.* *Then I am going to have forth arriving Engine 4 lay in a second* *supply line and stretch an exposure line to Unit 201.* *Next, if Engine 4 reports fire in 201 I will make them Division 2 Supervisor* *and start feeding them resources from the second alarm.* This is a practiced Plan A exercise which develops experience in communication, meeting NFPA 1710 best practices, and anticipation of proactively managing span of control; this is not the only plan. Regarding span of control and fire attack, additional consideration must be given to appa­ ratus operators. The base fire attack expectation for an apartment fire from NFPA 1710 is attack, back-up, and exposure handlines and two supply lines. Ensuring proper flow and accountability of multiple handlines is a hands-on, eyes-on task to be supervised by the appa­ ratus operator. This scenario puts their span of control at 5:1 for hose lines. If you add to this the attention demand of crew communications on the radio and monitoring the apparatus overall, that operator is well beyond a manageable span of control given the pressure of the situation. As the incident commander, this must also be considered when establishing divi­ sions with active fire attack. When possible, dedicate a separate source, apparatus, and oper­ ator to that division. If that is not possible, provide assistance to the single attack apparatus operator. An effective tactic with a confirmed victim profile (VP) and no hydrant close by is to have the second-due engine perform a tank transfer to the first engine. This allows the second engine crew to get to the scene faster to assist with rescue and medical as needed, rather than laying in or out and potentially taking more of the second engine's crew away from the labor-intensive scene. This gets much-needed firefighters and water to the scene faster. The caveat is that this is a one- to two-tank knockdown. Obviously, with heavy fire, a patent water supply is import­ ant. Again, as we have said throughout the text, it all starts with size-up and the VP. Search and Rescue At the time of publication, the body of research from UL FSRI into search-and-rescue tech­ niques and tactics is limited to a single study. However, the data in it is significant, as past col­ lection on victim and firefighter survivability in structures is essentially nonexistent. In an open floor plan, proximity to the fire and elevation within the structure are the most critical factors in the severity of thermal and toxic threat exposure. A victim on the floor in the hall­ way just outside of the fire room may have a lesser thermal and toxic exposure than a victim on the top bunk of a bed in a more remote room with an open door to that same hallway, as was shown in the 1-foot, 3-foot, and 5-foot points in figure 6-12. The power of compartmen­ talization has been proven in study after study from UL FSRI, and is reflected in the Firefighter Rescue Survey data, which shows that victims located behind a closed door had an 82% sur­ vival rate. This information is challenging some traditional approaches, and when the tactical considerations from UL FSRI and the Firefighter Rescue Survey are combined, they can be applied to improving and supporting fireground search operations. \"Study of Fire Service Residential Home Size-Up and Search & Rescue Operations" (2022) Tactical Consideration 5.1 has been discussed at length in this chapter already. When presented side by side with the Firefighter Rescue Survey data, the need to quickly initiate both fire attack and search is evident (fig. 6-15). Tactical Consideration 5.2 uses the terminology *window-initiated search* in place of what most in the fire service call *vent-enter-search.* Throughout many of the UL FSRI search-and- rescue experiments, the speed in which areas of the structure were accessed and victims removed or moved to an area of refuge by firefighters initiating searches from windows, as compared to the front door, was significant. The data from the FRS is demonstrating that the UL FSRI finding is consistent with fireground outcomes. Whether the victim is located in the first room entered from the window, the hallway, or the bedroom, or remote from the initial entry, both had a similar survival rate. The key takeaway here is that when conditions allow for a search to be initiated from multiple points or be continued beyond the initial room of entry, it reduces time to task, instead of entering, isolating, and searching single rooms one by one from the exterior at the cost of relocation time (fig. 6-16). Fig. 6-15. UL FSRI Search Tactical Consideration 5.1 **Firefighter Rescue Survey Data:** *If the victim was found byVES, was the victim found in* *the initial room of entry?* \- 81% YES: The victim was located in the Initial room -19% NO: The victim was located in a hallway or room beyond the Initial entry room Survival rate for victims located by V E S \- 61% for victims located in the initial room - 63% for victims located In a hallway or room beyond the initial entry room The importance of this tactical consideration and terminology change is clear. V E S may be limiting our operations, we may not be looking beyond the Initial room enough. Window Initiated searches provide quick access and victim removal from single compartments and beyond with comparative survival rates. Fig. 6-16. UL FSRI Search Tactical Consideration 5.2 Tactical Considerations 5.7 and 5.8 speak specifically to the rescue/removal of the victim. The elevation of a victim in the atmosphere is very important to their exposure. In the illus­ tration, which uses the pre-suppression hallway data points from the search and rescue study, we see that the victim was safer remaining in place when compared to being removed with their airway at the 3-foot level. This will translate to training firefighters that, when conditions are significant, dragging patients to an area of refuge is safer, and compartmentalization may be better than picking them up and running them out the front door. When searches of upper floors are being conducted and the Firefighter Rescue Survey data is considered, even if a search crew entered through the front door and ascended the stairs to conduct the search, laddering the second floor to provide a faster and removal to fresh air for any victims improves surviv­ ability (fig. 6-17). Tactical consideration 5.9 in figure 6-18 will be one of the most difficult for firefighters to consider, as our profession is one that defaults to action. Given the data presented on fire dynamics and the compounding thermal and toxic threat, isolating and protecting victims in place until the fire is controlled and the interior is ventilated may be the best tactic to ensure survivability. While the sample size is small for victims protected in place from the Firefighter Rescue Survey (6%), the survivability rate is higher. This tactical consideration is a reminder **Firefighter Rescue Survey Data:** \> Victims located and removed within 8 minutes of fire department arrival have the greatest chance at survival. \> Victims removed from upper floors by ladders had an 84% survival rate versus 71% by interior stairs \> Victims removed by going up stairs (increasing elevation in the atmosphere) only had a 43% survival rate. The ULFSRI study was limited to a single-story structure. Fire departments must test time to task operations for their organizations and response area to give consideration to the options in managing the impact of elevation and speed on victim exposure and removal pathways. Fig. 6-17. UL FSRI Search Tactical Consideration 5.7 and 5.8 Fig. 6-18. UL FSRI Search Tactical Consideration 5.9 that today the greatest threat on the fireground is exposure, and in many cases, isolation is the most effective intervention against it. From tactical considerations to command expectations, as with fire attack, NFPA 1710 also has deployment recommendations for search and rescue for each of the four occupancy types. NFPA 1710 Chapter 5---Fire Department Services Typical Single Family Dwelling Fire: 2,000 square feet without a basement and no exposures Provision of at least one victim search-and-rescue team with each such team consisting of a minimum of two members. Typical Apartment Fire: 1200-square-foot apartment within a three-story garden-style building Provision of at least two victim search-and-rescue teams with each such team consisting of a minimum of two members. Typical Open-Air Strip Shopping Center: 13,000 to 196,000 square feet Provision of at least two victim search-and-rescue teams with each such team consisting of a minimum of two members. High Rise: Any building with the highest floor greater than 75 feet above the lowest level of fire department vehicle access. Provision of at least two victim search-and-rescue teams with each such team consisting of a minimum of two members. Provision of at least two evacuation management teams to assist and direct building occupants with evacuation or sheltering actions, with each team consisting of a mini­ mum of two members. Like the deployment to support fire attack, NFPA 1710 is recommending the deployment of multiple search teams for all occupancy types beyond the single-family dwelling (fig. 6-19). The critical component to the success of multiple search teams is tactical supervision for the crew(s) performing the searches in the form of a rescue group supervisor (RGS). Tactical supervision for multiple search operations or multiple search points like a *pincer search,* where crews are entering multiple locations for known victims in unknown locations, is critical. In this case, the RGS must coordinate laterally both to ensure fire attack is underway to protect Fig. 6-19. Search group supervisor coordinates window-initiated search crews so overventilation does not increase fire activity, and that medical is standing by to receive victims, once found. Either through a division supervisor of a geographic area or a group supervisor with a focus on managing all searches, a tactical supervisor for search oper­ ations must be anticipating the outcome of search to be a victim located and a rescue. For this reason, regardless of known or unknown victim status, the group supervisor of search opera­ tions should be called rescue group supervisor. In the event of a rescue, the rescue cycle begins, and the RGS works directly/laterally with medical for a rapid patient transfer, as well as com­ mand, to get additional companies to assist with the removal or resume search operations where they were interrupted. An RGS may even be coordinating the support resources of heavy rescue or truck compa­ nies to assist with removal access, such as ground ladders or *window-to-door conversions,* where a window is made into a door for victim removal. Another tactic would be *breach-enter-search* (BES), as described previously when Sacramento Metro Fire E42 went through a common wall to rescue two victims. This is essentially vent-enter-search through a wall. VEIS is not possi­ ble on upper floors in many cases, so BES is an alternative option (fig. 6-20 and fig. 6-21). Medical Fires burn but smoke kills. The U.S. Fire Administration estimates that approximately 80% of fire-related fatalities are the result of smoke inhalation.^20^ The combination of synthetic mate­ rials and incomplete combustion is a one-two punch for dirty and toxic smoke. Carbon mon­ oxide (CO) and hydrogen cyanide (HCN) are the two most common and deadly fire gases. The hemoglobin in our blood cells has an affinity for these two gasses that is over 200 times greater than that of oxygen, so when these gases are available in the air, they will quickly become a systemic problem for the victim. While the need to be prepared to treat burn patients at a fire is still a priority, the root cause of the unconscious or cardiac arrest fire victim is most likely to be the result of the chemical asphyxiation caused by CO or HCN. Limiting exposure through rapid removal to fresh air or isolation behind a closed door to limit the dose is in the scope of the firefighter; triage, treatment, and transport of these victims is medical. The compounding effects of CO and HCN poisoning should prompt an over triage by EMS personnel anticipating  Figs. 6-20 and 6-21. Window area is cut down to the floor and flapped out to create a door-size opening for improved victim removal the potential for initial presentation to decline. Definitive care for these patients may include the need for hyperbaric treatment, and a transportation destination with this capability should be considered. An emerging treatment for hydrogen cyanide poisoning is an antidote called hydroxocobal- amin, or more commonly the trade name CyanoKit. Hydroxocobalamin detoxifies the cyanide and converts it into a form of vitamin B12, removing it from the hemoglobin and allowing for oxygen to attach again. The data from the Firefighter Rescue Survey shows that the difference in survivability for a standard smoke inhalation patient is only *3%,* but in the unconscious, unresponsive, pre-arrest patient, the survival rate is 14% higher for those who received the CyanoKit and 9% higher for those patients with associated severe burns (fig. 6-22). Aggressive command and tactics for life must be a continuum. From the fire floor to trans­ fer of care at the emergency room door, proper care and treatment is the space between. Just as fire attack is supported by a back-up line and a continuous water supply, search is supported with on-scene medical and an available transport unit. When NFPA 1710 is referred to for direc­ tion on the provision of medical on the fireground by occupancy type, for the single-family dwelling there is no recommendation for initial medical. It does recommend that when the single-family dwelling fire incident escalates beyond the initial alarm assignment, or when there is significant risk due to the magnitude of the incident, the IC shall request an EMS crew. All other occupancies have a clearly defined medical recommendation. NFPA 1710 Chapter 5---Fire Department Services Typical Apartment Fire: 1200-square-foot apartment within a three-story garden-style building The establishment of an initial medical care component consisting of at least two members capable of providing immediate on-scene emergency medical support, and transport that provides rapid access to civilians or members potentially needing medical treatment. Typical Open-Air Strip Shopping Center: 13,000 to 196,000 square feet The establishment of an initial medical care component consisting of at least two members capable of providing immediate on-scene emergency medical support, and transport that provides rapid access to civilians or members potentially needing medical treatment. High-Rise: Any building with the highest floor greater than 75 feet above the lowest level of fire department vehicle access The establishment of an initial medical care component consisting of at least two crews (four people total), each with one member trained to the advanced life support (ALS) level capable of providing immediate on-scene emergency medical support, and trans­ port that provides rapid access to civilians or members potentially needing medical treatment. Provision of a minimum of two members to manage member rehabilitation and at least one of the members to be trained to the ALS level. In the absence of a recommendation for medical on scene for a single-family dwelling, it would be consistent with the message of this text that a proactive IC remain ahead of the incident power curve and request EMS at the time of dispatch. In the situation of a known victim, it is the recommendation of this text that an ambulance is requested for each known fire victim plus one unit to ensure the scene is not without medical support. From the NFPA 1710 recommendations, the apartment and the open-air shopping center recommend an EMS crew for treatment and transport, but it is non-specific for the level of care. The high-rise recommendation is two medical crews for patient care to the ALS level and a crew to the ALS level for member rehabilitation. At the incident command level, to understand this as professional best practices would prompt early establishment of a medical group supervisor, possibly with the first-arriving medic unit to coordinate directly with division supervisors, base, and staging. It must be restated that just as fire attack is supported by a back-up line and a continuous water supply, search for occupants is supported with on-scene medical and an available trans­ port unit. Organizations with fire-based EMS services often have these expectations built-in. For organizations reliant on mutual aid or a third-party EMS provider, the fireground in your jurisdiction is your responsibility, and with that the expectations of performance on that scene are your authority. Ensure that operational plans and tactical roles and responsibilities are shared with any entity involved. This includes EMS. Ventilation Before the tactic of ventilation is discussed, the objective needs to be clarified. The most common definition of ventilation in fire textbooks is the removal of heated air, smoke, and fire gases from a structure. When the definition of ventilation is reviewed in EMS textbooks, it is described as the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide through the movement of air between the lungs and the atmosphere. The fire definition of ventilation supports fire; the EMS defini­ tion supports life. Setting a higher standard of operations that support life -will by default improve fire operations. The problem that has been identified with the definition that the pur­ pose of venting is to remove smoke is that it lends itself to a more is better approach. Oxygen is fuel for fires, and uncontrolled or over-venting of a fire without coordinated attack will inten­ sify it, increasing the amount of smoke, carbon dioxide, and hydrogen cyanide it produces. The awareness of the effects of ventilation on enclosed fires began to improve for our profession with the 2010 publication of the UL *Impact of Ventilation on Fire behavior in Legacy and Con­* *temporary Residential Construction.^21^* Since this initial study on the impact on fire behavior, UL FSRI has placed a greater emphasis on the coordination of ventilation and the impact of ventilation on occupant survivability. The most detailed information available at the time of this publication in the "Study of Fire Service Residential Home Size-Up and Search & Rescue Operations" (2023) can help inform everyone operating on the fireground on their abilities to vent for life. If a search crew can isolate a room from the fire and open a window to exchange the smoke in the room for cool, fresh air, or a fire attack crew can flow water on the ceiling ahead of their advance, thus cooling the environment, stopping off gassing, reducing tempera­ tures, and getting smoke conditions to lift by increasing oxygen levels at the floor, then they are both providing lifesaving local ventilation. To look for examples of how focused the fire service is on the action of incident ventilation being centered on the removal of smoke, we need not look any further than NFPA 1710. NFPA1710 Chapter 5---Fire Department Services Typical Single-Family Dwelling Fire: 2,000 square feet without a basement and no exposures Provision of at least one team consisting of a minimum of two members, to raise ground ladders and perform ventilation. Typical Apartment Fire: 1200-square-foot apartment within a three-story garden-style building Provision of at least two teams (four people total), to raise ground ladders and perform ventilation. Typical Open-Air Strip Shopping Center: 13,000 to 196,000 square feet Provision of at least two teams (four people total), to raise ground ladders and perform ventilation. High Rise: Any building with the highest floor greater than 75 feet above the lowest level of fire department vehicle access. Provision of an officer and a minimum of three members (four people total) to conduct vertical ventilation operations. In NFPA 1710 the provision of personnel for ventilation is centered around people and equipment to support vertical ventilation operations.^22^ Vertical ventilation is a highly effec­ tive ventilation tactic that, when coordinated properly, reduces interior temperatures, pro­ vides lift of smoke and gases, and increases oxygen levels at the floor. However, it is not the only tactic. The risk of direction like this in a standard or policy is that when a specific tactic isn't right for the occupancy, fire, or resource availability, the objective is disregarded as well. It once took a mantra that safety is everyone's responsibility to begin to shift the idea of safety on the fireground from being the presence of a safety officer to the execution of safer operations. The fire service may be in a period where a similar message is stressed for ventilation. The objective of ventilation to suppress fire and support life is everyone's responsibility. This may be through the provision or restriction of air movement, and some­ times these opposite acts are occurring at the same time in different locations independently yet meeting the single common objective. Ventilation of a fire room may be coordinated between a company officer on an attack line calling a single outside vent firefighter to take a window. Ventilation may also be intentionally limited by the first firefighter off the truck closing the front door of the house after a quick check for victims to restrict fire growth while the engine is stretching a line. The summary is that making an assignment of venti­ lation to support the strategy of the incident is secondary to seeking opportunities to improve ventilation in a tactical space. When awareness of the provision or restriction of ventilation and its impact is improved at the task level, it will lead to greater coordination and communication of ventilation operations at the tactical level. Clearer communication and coordination of ventilation at the tactical level improves anticipation of outcomes and needs at the strategic level. Prioritizing and Initiating Tactics for Life The following series of pictures is from Colorado Springs Fire Department (CSFD). This is a metro-sized department with a population of about 600,000 people. They serve everything from urban areas to suburban neighborhoods to urban interfaces. Just as discussed with the FDNY before, do not get lost in CSFD resources. Focus on this residence, these incident prior­ ities, and the fact that three of the essential fireground objectives are being executed simulta­ neously and in coordination by the first two companies. Medical is to be handled in this agency by third party EMS. This first picture (fig. 6-23) is just after arrival of the first engine and truck. This incident was a fire that started on the exterior in the back of the residence, extended into the house, and was exposing the attic through the eaves. While the engine crew is stretching an attack line across the front yard (fire attack), the truck splits (2 members) will assess forcible entry and prepare to search (rescue). The second split (2 members) is going to the roof to vertically ventilate (vent). You can see how charged the occupancy is with smoke pushing from eaves around the entire structure (high heat highly toxic interior conditions). Once teams make entry, the interior confirms the fire is inside the occupancy with difficult conditions. There is no time to delay actions. Until ventilation is performed on the exterior, flowing the nozzle into the upper atmosphere to address the ceiling will initiate interior com­ partment cooling, leading to gas constriction and smoke lift, and supporting attack line advancement and search operations. On the outside, ladders are thrown and access is made to the area suspected to be closest to the fire. This was determined by smoke conditions of the eaves and of the roof vents near the ridgeline. Access to the cutting area is done utilizing the hip of the roof for stability and the hook to provide solid sounding of the roof decking. Once at the ridge, a roof survey can be quickly visualized to confirm fire location and roof stability. The attic space has been heated by the fire in the occupied space and early extension in the eaves. Once the position is chosen, the roof decking is cut and louvered. That high heat wants to go up and the hot, expanded, high-pressure gasses seek the lower atmospheric pressure exterior. This powerful pair of fire dynamics is reflected in the intensity of the pressurized smoke out of the opening. If the operation is stopped here, only the attic space is relieved and there is no improvement or support provided to interior companies in through lift or tempera­ ture reduction (fig. 6-24).  The sounding firefighter drops to a knee, knocking in the lid of the occupancy, now provid­ ing a clear and direct vertical path for the interior of the occupied space to the lower-pressure exterior. When the higher heat and dirtier incomplete combustion smoke from the fire com­ partment makes the exterior, the smoke quickly ignites. This *vent-point ignition* can occur in any place where the combination of heat and fuel in the smoke meets an available oxygen con­ centration to support flaming combustion. Note that a dominant thermal column develops as a result of the intensifying fire over the pressure-driven smoke prior, but increased fire activity and energy is largely channeled up and out (fig. 6-25). You can see in this picture that the overall presentation of the structure is cleaned up and you have free burning out the vent hole, lifting smoke conditions (fig. 6-26). There is no longer pressurized black smoke pushing from the compartment (decreased interior pressure and interrupted convection currents), and the front door is now a complete intake of fresh air (increasing interior oxygen percentage and decreasing temperatures). As seen in figure 6-26, less than a minute after the hole is cut, the truck company vent split is on the ground. On the interior, the engine crew now has very clear access to the fire compartment for extin­ guishment, and from below they can hit the fire in the attic above them. All the area behind the nozzle is protected for the truck company search split, and the inflow of fresh air from the door is improving survivability for any occupants and visibility for operating firefighters. Post-knockdown, the steam created through the heating of water into gas is now observed following the same channel up and out of the vent opening (fig. 6-27). This is a real-world exam­ ple that textbook execution can occur outside of the textbooks. The take-home here is that while CSFD potentially has a bigger first-alarm assignment, the prioritization of the four fire­ ground objectives and initiation of specific actions by eight people made an incredible impact, through leveraging the time we can control in training, preparation and education. Conclusion While our nation is suffering fewer fires, and our operations, education, training, and equip­ ment are making our firefighters safer, when unprotected civilians suffer a fire, they are not suffering any less. We have made great strides in preventing fires and addressing firefighter safety. It is time that we seek to apply those same methods and mission to saving more savable civilian lives, as that is truly the reason we exist. Aggressive command and tactics for life is a thirst for knowledge, passion for training and preparation, anticipation in planning, assertive   decisions in command, and proactive actions. To approach the response to fires with a rescue mindset is to set the highest standard of performance. This is achievable only by chance and luck if you do not explicitly make it the goal, define the direction, and put in the work. The premise of this chapter was to deepen the understanding of the four main objectives and how actions are initiated. It is from this foundation that the direction and organization to support, supervise, and coordinate these actions through an aggressive and decentralized command system is built. Chapter Review Review Questions 1. Explain heat transfer and heat release rates. 2. What are some of the complications of vent-limited fires? 3. Describe sequential and simultaneous operations. 4. Explain the differences in statistical trends associated with firefighter and civilian fire fatalities. 5. Explain how the term *fire control* differs from extinguishment. 6. What percentage of fire fatalities are associated with smoke inhalation? 7. What span of control considerations should be applied to apparatus pump operators? 8. Explain some of the NFPA1710 recommendation differences between the four occupancy types with regard to tactical assignments. FESHE Strategy and Tactics (C0279) Related Content The content contained in this chapter provides detailed information to assist with instruction and education for three expected course outcomes of students in the CO279 Strategy and Tac­ tics course. 1. Discussion of fire behavior as it relates to strategy and tactics. 3\. Identification of the building construction basics and how they interrelate to pre-fire planning, strategy and tactics. 4\. Description of the steps taken during size-up. The intent of developing chapter 6 was to ensure not only that it aligns with section 1 of the CO279 Strategy and Tactics course outline, Fire Chemistry Terms and Concepts, but that this text provides the most current and detailed resource to support it. At time of publication, all available UL FSRI studies and reports were reviewed for content inclusion. Accurate under­ standing of the fireground is built on a foundation of an accurate understanding of fire dynamics. Beyond section 1 of the CO279 Strategy and Tactics course outline, chapter 6 also provides foundational education with regard to sections V Basic Division of Tactics, VI Rescues, VII Exposures, VIII Confinement, and IX Ventilation. NFPA 1021 Job Performance Requirements The information in this chapter can be utilized to support training and educational programs associated with the Emergency Services Delivery Fire Officer IJPR 4.6, 4.6.1, 4.6.2, Fire Offi­ cer IIJPR 5.6,5.6.1, and Fire Officer III 6.6 and 6.6.1. Endnotes 1\. "Fire Dynamics," National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), last modified January 25,2024, fire-dynamics. 2. Bill, "Underwriters Laboratories Fire Safety Research Institute (UL FSRI): New Compari­ son of Natural and Synthetic Home Furnishings," *Firefighter Nation,* October 1st, 2020, synthetic-home-furnishings/\#gref. 3. Vy tenis Babrauskas, "Heat Release Rate: A Brief Primer," Fire Science and Technology Inc.,. 4. John Regan, Julie Bryant, and Craig Weinschenk, *Analysis of the Coordination of Sup­* *pression and Ventilation in Single-Family Homes* (Underwriters Laboratories, 2020), Homes.pdf. 5. Keith Stakes et al., *Analysis of the Coordination of Suppression and Ventilation in Multi-Family* *Dwellings* (Underwriters Laboratories, 2020), public/2021-07/Co ord\_Tactics\_Multi\_Family.pdf 6. Firefighter Rescue Survey, 7. R. A. Cowley, "Resuscitation and Stabilization of Major Multiple Trauma Patients in a Trauma Center Environment," *Clinical Medicine* 83, no. 1 (1976): 16-22. 8. "Search and Rescue Tactics in Single-Family Single-Story Residential Structures," Under­ writers Laboratories Fire Safety Research Institute (UL FSRI): Fire Safety Academy Train­ ing Course, May 16, 2023, in-single-family-single-story-residential-structures. 9. *National Incident Management System,* 3rd ed. (Federal Emergency Management Agency \[FEMA\], 2017), 2017.pdf 10. International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA), *Fire and Emergency Services Com­* *pany Officer,* 6th ed. (Stillwater, Oklahoma: Fire Protection Publications, 2019). 11. Shelby Hall, "Fire Loss in the United States," National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), November 1,2023, fire-statistical-reports/fire-loss-in-the-united-states. 12. Hall, "Fire Loss in the United States." 13. Hall, "Fire Loss in the United States." 14. Hall, "Fire Loss in the United States." 15. Brian E. Brush, "2021 Fireground Civilian Rescue Research Project," Firefighter Rescue Survey, 2021, firegroundcivilianrescueresearchprojpost.pdf. 16. "Search and Rescue Tactics in Single-Family Single-Story Residential Structures," UL FSRI: Fire Safety Academy Training Course. 17. Robin Zevotek, Keith Stakes, and Joseph Willi, *Study of the Impact of Fire Attack Utilizing* *Interior and Exterior Streams on Firefighter Safety and Occupant Survival* (UL FSRI, 2018),. 18. "Study of Fire Service Residential Home Size-Up and Search & Rescue Operations," UL FSRI, May 16, 2022, search-rescue-operations. 19. *National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1700: Guide for Structural Firefighting* (NFPA, 2021),. 20. U.S. Fire Administration, *Fire in the United States 2008-2017* (Federal Amergency Manage­ ment Agency \[FEMA\], November, 2019), publications/fius20th.pdf. 21. Steve Kerber, *Impact of Ventilation on Fire behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residen­* *tial Construction* (UL FSRI, December 14, 2010), public/2021-07/DHS\_2008\_Grant\_Report\_Final.pdf. 22. *NFPA1710: Standardfor the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations,* *Emergency Medical Operations and Special Operations to the Public by Career Departments* (NFPA, 2020),. 23. Los Angeles City Fire Department, "UL FSRI Home Furnishings Comparison Natural vs. Synthetic" YouTube, October 2, 2020, video, 4:13, watch?v=87hAnxuhlg8.