MFC Ch5: Size-Up, Risk/Gain Management, and Communications PDF

Size-Up, Risk/Gain Management, and Communications Fig. 5-0. Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District works a house fire. *Source.* Photo courtesy of Sacramento (CA) Metro Fire Introduction *Predictable is preventable.* Size-up, risk management, and communications are intertwined. To adequately a...

Size-Up, Risk/Gain Management, and Communications Fig. 5-0. Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District works a house fire. *Source.* Photo courtesy of Sacramento (CA) Metro Fire Introduction *Predictable is preventable.* Size-up, risk management, and communications are intertwined. To adequately assess risk, officers must be able to continuously communicate changing conditions to each other from different geographic areas of the same incident. The ongoing mental act of size-up is brought to life through the physical act of communicating. Both have specific key points that have proven effective. We will also present assessing gain, which is what we are saving. The most important thing we can save is human life. This is our job, and what we have sworn to do. At the same time, we must bring our troops home safe from every call while fulfilling our duty to the public. Risk and gain are at constant odds for the IC, and communication is vital to risk and gain management. Size-up has several stages. First, training and pre-planning provide the IC and tactical offi­ cers a framework from which to maximize discretionary time benefits. Here, before the shift ever begins, endless wells of information can be processed prior to an incident to maximize strategic and tactical advantage. Second, at shift change, many other factors and variables are available and changing, increasing the IC's situational awareness and analysis prior to a dis­ patch. These factors change and continue to remain dynamic throughout the shift or tour. Third, the dispatch comes. Discretionary time is instantly minimized, if not eliminated, and the IC and tactical officers are plagued with physiological obstacles like auditory exclusion, tunnel vision, adrenaline dumps, heightened blood pressures and pulses, and limited capacity to process information while constantly being bombarded with changing conditions, commu­ nications, widening spans of control, and unknown factors that are constantly looming. Fourth, upon arrival, the scene presents itself. More injections come, including visual stimuli like the building, smoke, flames, companies, occupants, bystanders, law enforcement, and exposures. More communications flood multiple radio frequencies and the combination of useless and inconsequential information is interspersed with critical, life-saving information. The IC must remain ahead of an incident and somehow outpace this event that is growing, evolving, and becoming more complex as each second ticks by. Meanwhile, the crews deploying into the unknown face the same physiological obstacles, as well as physical ones like thermal insult, trauma, asphyxiation, and cumbersome personal protective equipment (PPE) and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) that make risk assessment, size-up, and communications even more daunting. As the incident continues, escalation causes physical and mental fatigue of the troops. Auditory exclusion and tunnel vision increase. The building has been under demolition, and gravity, hydraulic mining, and forcible entry continue to erode structural integrity. Everything is in a constant state of change: smoke, fire, building, troops, incoming resources, information, and the incident action plan. Meanwhile, time stops for no one. We cannot put time in staging to stop it or call another alarm of time to get more of it. Hopefully, conditions present the illusion of becoming stable. Yet the combination of weak­ ened and burned-out structural members, the weight of tons of water, and the constant tug of gravity makes for a dubious stabilized situation at best. Too many have succumbed in this phase of the fire, during overhaul, after exiting the structure for another bottle, or even to con­ duct an interview. Finally, with all members safe and accounted for, we begin the review process. We identify what we did well, not so well, what we need to improve, and lessons learned. This happens informally within companies, semi-formally within the alarm, and perhaps more formally if warranted throughout the department or region---usually due to something going bad. The worse it goes, the wider the swath of things we want to learn. We learn, train, adjust, and repeat. This is the cycle, the big picture that requires constant size-up and continual communication. Each of the phases has specific tools and pitfalls that must be learned to not repeat the past, let alone prepare for the future. WISDOM FROM THE MASTERS Situational Awareness CHIEF STEPHEN MARSAR, FDNY Situational awareness (SA) is a concept that has been used in the military and avia­ tion fields for over a century. SA is generally defined as knowing where you are and what is going on around you, allowing individuals and organizations to be more alert and informed and to make better decisions. A relatively new concept adopted by the fire service, SA includes the important element of reality. After conducting the ini­ tial scene size-up, SA should kick in and be applied to tell us if things are getting better or worse---not based on how we wish it to be, but, rather, based on reality. While size-up tells us what we have, what is going on, what resources are required, what delays or difficulties we have, and what may be likely to happen next, SA uti­ lizes reality as a benchmark that allows firefighters, officers, and chiefs to recognize when things are not getting better or not going well. Some of those elements may include the fire and smoke conditions, radio reports, and even listening to our sixth sense. For example, at a fire scene firefighters and commanders expect the incident to get better as the firefight progresses. As the initial attack is being performed and we locate the seat of the fire and apply water, we expect to see the smoke get lighter in volume, velocity, and density. We expect radio reports that the primary and secondary searches are in progress or completed (and either positive or negative for victims and fire exten­ sion). We expect the building to be opened up and salvage and overhaul to begin. How­ ever, if command is not receiving those messages, they cannot assume that those tactics are being employed and are getting done without complications. Sometimes no radio reports can be just as dangerous as numerous radio reports being received at the same time. Is there nothing going on, or are the troops so heavily engaged that they simply failed to report the conditions they're encountering due to being laser-focused on the tasks at hand? Should the IC prompt them, or should the IC give the members a chance to do their jobs and get back to them in a reasonable period of time? What is that reasonable period of time? It may be different for each individual or department. However, the IC cannot assume that the lack of communication means that things are going well. That may simply not be the reality. Conversely, if the IC is getting reports of great headway being made from the interior but the smoke and fire conditions that they see are not getting better, then that is not the reality. In that case, other steps must be taken immediately, rather than hoping that things will get better shortly. Tactical supervisors bridge this gap very effectively. Size-Up versus Arrival Reports t® *Size-up* is the mental process of rapidly gathering information, assessing risk, gain, available resources, strategic, and tactical options, and developing an initial incident action plan. Size-up is *the* most critical element to safe, effective, and efficient operations. Beginning operations on any incident without an accurate and proficient mental size-up is like building a house on sand without a plan. You will not have a strong foundation from which to build, and your operations will be extremely unstable. Conversely, an *arrival report* happens *after* a mental size-up and is the first-due company or chief officers initial radio report to incoming units to communicate arrival, conditions, actions, and needs, including the assumption or passing of command for subsequent resources responding. 77ze *challenge with size-up is that you must make potentially life-and-death decisions with lim­* *ited information in a compressed timeframe.* In the emergency environment, you will rarely have all the information and time needed to make the *perfect* decision. Rather, you must make the *best* decision possible, with the limited information currently at hand, then adjust as condi­ tions change or more information, resources, or options become available. The term size-up is mistakenly considered synonymous with an arrival report. This common misconception leads to officers who fail to think before they talk on the radio, thus resulting in thinking out loud with the pressure to sound competent on the radio rather than take a few seconds to truly mentally process the situation before them. The radio vernacular "push to talk" regarding radio operations is not supposed to be "push to *think"\\* Yet, officers do it every day. Arrival reports with a lot of "uuuh's," "ummm's," and "at this time's" peppered in the trans­ mission are usually giveaways that the officer speaking has not performed a mental size-up before keying the mic. *Think* before you talk. When incident operations are predicated upon inaccurate information or assumptions, bad things usually happen. Unlike a verbal arrival or on-scene report, a size-up is a mental process that begins *well before* the incident is ever dispatched and must continuously be emphasized until units have left the scene. And size-up is everyone's job, *especially* the IC and tactical super­ visors. That said, most firefighters with their heads down, working at the task level, are not sizing up; they are working, doing, engaging, and focused on the task at hand. *Accurate and continual size-up saves civilian andfirefighter lives, prevents injuries, and min­* *imizes losses.* A fire with an unsupported mansard on a strip mall may be overlooked by task-level crews, but a heads-up tactical supervisor or company officer may identify the col­ lapse potential due to fire in the overhead of the scabbed-on facade. Individuals and officers, no matter how experienced or savvy, will not perform adequate ongoing size-up at the task level. When your head is down, stretching a line, breaching a door, doing a search, cutting a hole, throwing a ladder, donning an SCBA, pumping an engine, treating a patient, or entering a hazmat scene in a Level A suit, you are *not* in a good position to size up. You are working with little regard for anything beyond your immediate field of view, within arm's reach, and you are likely not hearing the radio, either (fig. 5-1). *Tunnel vision* kicks in when you only see what is immediately in front of you, missing criti­ cal visual signs of changing conditions regarding smoke and fire, construction features, access and egress points, victims, bystanders, overhead lines, hazardous materials, and so on. This  becomes exacerbated by heavy smoke conditions inside or outside the building. *Auditory exclu­* *sion* is equally perilous. When performing tasks, especially with an SCBA facemask donned, radio traffic is commonly missed by task-level personnel working. External factors like back­ ground noise, air horns, sirens, pumping engines, revving saws, screaming bystanders, and roaring flames are just a few of the common obstacles to effective hearing and listening. To compound the issue, many officers are task-saturated due to the amount of work to be done, the lack of staffing to do the work, or the habit and nature to gravitate to the work. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Nothing Showing Means Nothing CAPTAIN NICK PAPA, NEW BRITAIN (CT) FIRE DEPARTMENT On a cold, winter morning, just prior to shift-change, the tones dropped for a structure fire, reported as smoke showing from the building. The address was only a few blocks from the firehouse, within a densely populated neighborhood we regularly frequent. While en route, no further details were provided verbally over the radio or written in the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) notes on the apparatus mobile data terminal (MDT). As we pulled past the 3-story balloon-frame 6-family multiple-dwelling, no indication of fire was noted from our 3-sided view through the cab of the engine. These occupancies have a center, front stairway, directly accessing two Railroad Flat apartments (configured with all rooms aligned like the cars of a train) on each floor, a conversion of the ventilation profile---shifting from a bidirectional flow to the ideal unidirectional flow, the front apartment door becoming a full intake and the vented window in the fire room becoming a full exhaust. This prompted a more effective and efficient air exchange and enabled conditions to improve more rapidly. After moving into the back bedroom and completing extinguishment, the nozzle firefighter imme­ diately began hydraulically venting, creating a negative pressure and accelerating the removal of smoke while increasing the intake of fresh air. These actions greatly enhanced the tenability of the space, which not only provided us and the ladder com­ pany inside team with relief to facilitate our operations, but, more importantly, increased the survivability of any occupants that would have been trapped. While this operation was nothing more than a bread and butter room-and-contents fire and may appear insignificant from the surface, it highlights the importance of possessing positional discipline, operational doctrine, and brilliance in the basics. Because we had maintained our readiness and conducted ourselves as if there was a fire inside the building until proven otherwise, we were able to act decisively and swiftly. This level of diligence is critical, as the changes to the fire environment can create conditions where no glaring signs are detectable when we arrive. Due to our consistent and progressive training, in conjunction with clear standard operating pro­ cedures (outlining unit and riding assignments, as well as the execution of critical tasks), we were well prepared to address the situation implicitly and instinctively. By controlling the openings within the building, as well as our performance, and com­ municating directly between the ladder company, the ventilation was coordinated in support of the fire attack and the search, which ultimately had the best possible impact on the fireground. Training and Pre-Planning *It is by scoring many points that one wins the war* *beforehand in the temple of rehearsal of battle.* To enhance the ability of you and your team to perform size-up, much work can be done well before the incident is ever dispatched. The investment of time and effort *before* the incident will yield tremendous dividends by allowing you to have set established factors that are already baked into your decision-making and give you a tremendous tactical advantage. Size-up starts during training and pre-planning. During a drill, the astute officer will size up the capabilities of the crew (experience, training, confidence, skills, aptitude, fitness level, initiative, technical expertise, etc.). A battalion chief (BC) can learn the time it takes a particular engine to get out of the barn, make a water supply connection, stretch a pre-connect on a house fire, dead load on an apartment fire, or high-rise pack to an upper-floor fire condition. The truck companies  Special hazards, including batteries, electrical vaults, heavy machinery, high-piled storage, rack systems, or special processes Hazardous materials stored on site Forcible entry challenges, including bars, doors, security fencing, alarm systems, and dogs Security personnel, building engineers, private fire protection, and communications interface on site Length of stretch for different access points for fire attack Best means of performing fire attack, search, and ventilation for fires of varying loca­ tions and sizes Location of manager office, and/or onsite residence or manager/maintenance personnel Location of all utility shutoffs, including electrical, gas, water, and utility companies serving the building/facility HVAC and elevator systems and control rooms Confirmed victim profile scenarios Past history of incidents at the address Other pre-incident size-up considerations for the start of shift or tour and throughout your shift may include: Weather Traffic Road closures and detours Construction Water mains or other utilities shut down Fire hydrants sparsely available Holidays Special events Company closures for training, special events, inspections, maintenance, and so on Short staffing Personnel not normally assigned to the company Normal occupancy loads Changes in occupancy load due to recent trends like COVID-19, the economy, people working from home, and so on When combining pre-planning with realistic on-site training and a solid team, the wise and forward-thinking IC will have a tremendous strategic advantage. The officers and crews will also gain confidence and think of several permutations of situations and tactical consider­ Command of Personnel companies are staffed and when, if, or how personnel maybe moved. Policy or standard oper­ ating guidelines (SOGs) may also dictate the means in which companies are staffed. It may be seniority alone or a combination of seniority and other training and certification qualifica­ tions. The point is that when a member is assigned to a company and you are not comfortable with their skills or attitude, you should address it at the beginning of shift, within whatever authority you have. It was 7 a.m. and my BC shift began. The crews' shift change was at 8 a.m. My first priority was to check the roster of my battalion and make any necessary adjustments prior to shift change at 8 a.m. for the captains and their crews. This meant checking for any personnel who were not certified and qualified to ride a particular apparatus. I did also have management discretion, within reason, per policy and MOU. I noticed that both regularly assigned captains at my battalion house were off and their overtime replacements were filled in on the engine and truck. It was clear that the captain on the truck was not the best choice, given history I had with him on a previous incident. In addi­ tion, my concern was that he normally worked a slow engine house and that a busy truck like this may be more than he bargained for. Having had a previous issue with him (and to use risk manager guru Gordon Graham's philosophy that "predictable is preventable"), I chose to swap the captains. They were at the same house, just swapping engine and truck roles. As expected, I clicked the mouse on the staffing program and I hadn't even had the chance to call the captain in my office to notify him that he was moved to the engine when he came storming into my office, red-faced and shaking with rage. "How dare you move me! You can't do that. Why did you move me? I'm going to call the union!" I remained seated and calmly said, "First, calm down. Second, close the door. And third, have a seat if you would like to discuss this." He begrudgingly obliged. I continued, "It is perfectly within my province to move you. The union will agree. So, the real question is why I moved you. You are certainly entitled to an answer. My question is, do you want the truth?" "Yes," he responded. I continued further. "Remember when you and I worked the airshow together 18 months ago and a vegetation fire started and was moving rapidly toward approximately 10,000 spectators and six Air Force Thunderbird F-16's?" He acknowledged it so I continued. "Well, when I directed you to assist with fire attack, your response was 'you don't need us, looks like you got it,' do you remember that?" He agreed. "Well captain, that's not going to happen today when one of our engines needs a hole cut to relieve smoke and heat and you respond by saying, 'no, ya don't need it,' because my job is to put the right people in the right seats to accomplish the mission and keep everyone safe. Any questions?" He had none and didn't mention it again for the next 24 hours. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) tracks line-of-duty deaths (LODDs) of firefighters. The physiological causes like heart attack, asphyxiation, trauma, ther­ mal insult, or vehicle accidents dominate the pie charts. **SOGs or not following the ones you have.** We must have a playbook and follow it. Deviate when needed based upon the operational core values. All champion football teams have a play­ book and a quarterback who knows when to call an audible. That's what an FD must do: have modern, relevant SOGs executed by officers who know when to call an audible. Not every pos­ sibility can be forecasted and planned upon in an SOG. That said, we must be on the same page for the common and predictable stuff. The key is smart officers who know when to deviate to make operations more safe, effective, or efficient. In chapter 4, we introduced the tactical gap as the space between the strategic level IC and the task level crews working. This is where the battle is won or lost. The wider the tactical gap, the more of the NIOSH 5 will fall in. To bridge the tactical gap, we must assign tactical super­ visors. They prevent the NIOSH 5 from coming into alignment by performing ongoing risk assessment, reducing radio traffic by increasing face-to-face communications, continually accounting for crews with active eyes-on, hands-on accountability, and reducing the IC's span of control. In July of 2022, the Leadership Under Fire Team published "A Human Factors Review of NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Reporting." This report does an excellent job of expanding upon the NIOSH LODD reports and 5 factors and shows how human elements come into play during these events. We encourage you to read this report. The tactical gap is largely plagued with human factors that impact decision-making. This report is an excellent resource to better understand them.  Once dispatched, your size-up continues, building upon the training, pre-planning, team build­ ing, and situational awareness throughout your shift. You should immediately be aware if nor­ mally responding companies to this alarm are out of position or causing delays, and the potential for unfamiliar crews arriving to someone else's first-due. That said, several triggers for additional resources can occur en route that we will address here. The first concern once you have mapped your route is victim profile (VP). If dispatch does not report everyone out or any other victim profile, ask them on the radio while responding. Ideally, this should be part of your dispatch center's SOGs. If you do have a confirmed VP, then call an additional medic unit or transporting ambulance. A good rule of thumb is one ambu­ lance per fire victim known, plus 1. This gives each fire victim a separate ambulance (critical for burn patients and multiple caregivers in the rear with the patient). The added ambulance is for unknown victims or firefighters. *Always have one transporting ambulance available on* *scene.* Multiple callers and an obvious column of smoke can confirm a working fire (fig. 5-5); how­ ever, you and your team must not have to be convinced to gain the utmost respect and readi­ ness for the call's potential. Whether multiple calls with a huge column, or one caller with no column, no one can rest until we have units on scene to confirm conditions at the *correct* loca­ tion. Fires are commonly dispatched to locations where the reporting party (RP) is calling from what may be behind, across the street, adjacent to, or in the vicinity of the actual fire. Some are even second-hand callers, so take nothing for granted. Fig. 5-5. Crews see large column on the way to a commercial fire. *Source.* Photo courtesy of Sacramento (CA) Metro Fire We were dispatched to a report of smoke coming from an apartment. E103, TR106 and Bat­ talion 7 arrived with no smoke visible from the end unit of a triplex. E103 arrived first and reported "no smoke visible, cancel the assignment." As I arrived with the truck, I assumed com­ mand and replied, "Negative, we have a report of the odor of smoke. Force entry as needed." The first-due company officer missed this report. Once they forced entry, smoke billowed out of the front door. They found a mattress fire in the rear bedroom. Fortunately, no one was in the apartment. Had there been an occupant, they could have easily been unconscious. The company officer was solid. The problem is that, often, first-due company officers miss subtle updates on the mobile data computer (MDC) because they are busy routing in the engi­ neer, looking at pre-plans, looking for hydrants, and potentially strapping on an SCBA. This is where the teamwork comes into play. I was backing that officer up, as I had come to rely upon my company officers to back me up when I missed something. Again, this is a team sport. If your system allows, communicating critical updates to each other on the tactical chan­ nel while responding is vital to getting everyone on the same page. Perhaps one officer knows the building is currently under renovation, is currently vacant, or some other issue that is not on the pre-plan. Consider the lag time between when the fire started to when you were dispatched and the subsequent response time. A fire at night or in a vacant building can easily remain undetected for extended periods of time, allowing the fire to grow. When you add dispatch and response time, the fire will likely have an extreme advantage before you arrive. We tend to think in our own perspective of time. In our minds, the fire is not burning for 10-30 or more minutes before we arrive. The fire started when we were dispatched. Therefore, as we arrive to find a working fire with heavy involvement of the structure, we do not calibrate to adding 10-60 minutes to burn time. We think in terms of response time. This may prove disastrous. Time of day is just as important. Consider potential occupancy loads based upon time of day. According to Firefighter Rescue Survey (FRS), most civilian rescues occur within a three-hour window between 3:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. Traffic congestion during rush hour may warrant additional resources called sooner due to response times being lengthened from traffic. We were dispatched to multiple reports of fire in an elderly care facility at 5:30 p.m. on a weekday. Traffic was heavy. The first-arriving unit was an ambulance reporting light smoke from the street. I balanced it to a second alarm imme­ diately due to multiple factors: the occupancy type and life potential, multiple calls, smoke from the street of a large care facility, and traffic congestion. Weather is a major factor. High winds may warrant calling additional resources early due to fire growth and exposure potential. Conversely, rain and high humidity may conceal smoke and fire conditions. From your pre-planning, consider fixed fire protection systems like standpipes, sprinklers, pumps, and so on. Your SOGs should dictate what company goes to the fire department con­ nection (FDC) in different alarm and structure types. Depending upon the conditions reported upon arrival, an audible may need to be called. Arrival on Scene Lloyd Layman developed the FPODP size-up system in the 1950s. He also developed RECEO-VS for tactical priorities. Both are still relevant today. FPODP is excellent for initial arrival *and* *ongoing size-up* throughout the incident. Begin before you are in front of the building and take note of overhead obstacles, such as power lines which could be involved, and other factors that may impede access or use of aerial devices (fig. 5-6). Addresses can be easily obscured or confusing from the street. Look for power and gas meters along with addresses to ascertain how many units are in the building. Figures 5-7 and 5-8 show multiple addresses and power meters that can help your size-up.  **FPODP stands for:** ** Facts** (What do you know for sure?): Time of day, weather, type of structure, conditions visible, and so on. ** Probabilities** (What is the potential?): Victim profile, exposures, attic involvement, growth potential in acreage for a vegetation fire, number of patients for an MCI, and so on. ** Own situation** (What is your resource level?): I am the first engine on scene with the balance of a residential alarm responding. Or, I am the first chief on scene with two engines on scene and another engine and truck responding. ** Decision** (What are your first overarching priority and strategic decisions?): These three options are utilized for all-risk operations and any type of incident. This is the primary and first decision made by the first officer/IC on go/no go and any boundaries. This should include the overall incident priority (lifesaving, incident stabilization, or prop- erty/environment). ** Plan** (tactical level): Company officers will consider what to do with their crew, like establishing a water supply and whether to assume or pass command. Chief officers will be thinking about setting up the incident command post (ICP), confirming the priority, strategy, and tactical objectives, and calling more alarms/resources. Looking at figure 5-9, the FPODP would be as follows: ** Facts:** Two-story lightweight house with smoke from the rear. ** Probabilities:** Moderate victim profile, room-and-contents fire, could extend into the attic. ** Own situation:** First arriving engine with two engines, one truck and one BC responding. ** Decision:** Lifesaving priority, offensive strategy. ** Plan:** Officer performs a lap, engineer stretches a line to the front door and makes hydrant connection, firefighter forces front door. Add a precautionary ambulance. FPODP is excellent for first-arriving and ongoing mental size-up. You may also arrive as the first chief with a lot of activity and companies already working upon your arrival. The FPODP for fig. 5-10 would be: ** Facts:** One-story duplex with working attic fire through the roof. ** Probabilities:** Moderate victim profile. ** Own situation:** First-arriving chief with two engines, one truck on scene with vertical vent and fire attack underway. ** Decision:** Lifesaving priority, offensive strategy.  ** Plan:** Get companies off the roof now that vent is completed and hole is blowing fire. Complete primary searches. Establish Division A, RIC, and Medical. Add a precautionary ambulance. FIRST Another system of mental size-up for the *first-due* officer is "FIRST," (developed by Battalion Chief Drew DeFazio of the Redmond, WA Fire Department) focusing on just the initial size-up upon arrival: ** Facts** (What do you know for sure?): As with FPODP, these are the obvious factors that are known and seen. ** Intuition** (What do you think could be the potential?): What is your training, gut, and recognized prime decision-making telling you regarding potential victim profile, exten­ sion, avenues, and direction of fire spread, exposures, and potential size? ** Resources** (current resources): Resources currently en route, and those available with additional requests, including the response time. ** Strategy** (life saving, incident stabilization, or property/environment priority and offensive, defensive, or combination strategy): This is your first and most important decision. ** Tactics** (initial tactical and control objectives): For a company officer, this is just the initial task/tactics of the first-in company. Examples would be the firefighter stretches a line while the officer performs a lap and the engineer establishes a water supply. For a chief, this would be tactical objectives like rescue, exposures, confinement, extinguish­ ment, ventilation, etc. Getting the Lap/360° Performing a lap (360°) of the structure is important, if possible. Many older cities and neigh­ borhoods do not allow this option due to attached buildings, terrain, congestion, access, and so on. However, a floor above, roof report, or higher terrain location may accomplish this task. You may not be able to complete a lap due to the construction type. Figures 5-1 la and 5-1 lb show the A and C sides of the same structure, respectively. You are *not* performing a lap on this building. And the C side has serious access issues. An alternative is to get companies to the A and C sides and a company to the roof from the A side. The roof division can give you a size up of all four sides from the roof. As you analyze the structure, make note of construction features like basements, fire walls, partitions, breezeways, bed and bathroom windows, FDCs, and Fig. 5-11a. Note the hotel is attached on both sides. No lap. utility access. In addition, take note of tactical points of opportunity where you may mount a more effective fire attack, VEIS, or cut off the fire from extending. Do not forget the roof. When a company goes to the roof for vertical ventilation on larger multi-family dwellings, commer­ cial buildings, and assemblies, a roof report should be conducted as soon as possible. A *roof* *report* is the statement to the IC from the roof division regarding the construction, conditions, and load (CCL) on the roof. Construction involves possibilities like conventional, lightweight truss, bowstring truss, panelized, etc. Conditions involve the amount of smoke, heat, or flame present. The thermal imaging camera (TIC) is a great tool for this. Load involves the dead load on the roof such as HVAC units. An example of a roof report would be: "Main Street command, roof division with a roof report: panelized roof, heavy smoke in toward the Charlie/Delta corner of the roof, no heat signature, with four large HVAC units." Additionally, according to the International Association of Fire Chiefs' "Rules of Engage­ ment for Structural Firefighting," the incident commander must obtain a 360° size-up of the incident---it does not say they must do it personally. In other words, the lap can be delegated and a tactical supervisor most likely will complete the task, and notifying the IC with their observations actually meets the ICs obligation to obtain the 360° size-up. If possible, perform a lap. You will see tactical points of opportunity such as windows and doors that may indicate the rooms and layout inside (fig 5-12). When possible, a lap can be critical to gaining valuable knowledge of the following: Potential victims Building layout Construction Access/egress points Basements Fire location, avenues, and direction of fire spread potential Obstacles and hazards Exposures Utility shutoffs Tactical points of opportunity *Tactical points of opportunity* (TPOs) are building construction, access, layout, and other physical features that can be leveraged to increase the impact of resources to accomplish tac­ tical objectives. Examples include: Fire walls Breezeways  Stainveils Windows Fire escapes Side/rear doors and roll up doors Alternative access points for apparatus or hose stretches Alternatively, obstacles should be noted and communicated when appropriate. Examples include: Barred or boarded up windows and doors Hoarding conditions or junk that make access and hose stretches more challenging or impossible Vicious dogs Hazardous materials Swimming pools Out buildings Overhead powerlines Exposures Victim Profiling and Survivability Profiling---Related Concepts to Help You Save Lives As firefighters and officers, we are ingrained to think of risk management from the academy. We are constantly trained to wear our PPE properly, don our SCBA quickly, and limit our expo­ sure personally. As incident commanders and tactical supervisors, we are now charged with the lives of many crews simultaneously. They and their families expect us to take care of them and get them home in as-good or better shape than when they showed up at shift change. As a battalion chief, I knew I had 24 members going to a house fire. That was the risk. What I did *not* know was what we had to gain. How many, if any, civilian lives were present? What was the return on investment (ROI). Think of investing your money. The first thing you ask yourself is, "What is my ROI?" That determines the level of risk you are willing to take. The higher the ROI, the higher the risk tolerance. No IC or officer can allow any firefighter to be injured for mere property, especially prop­ erty that is already lost due to contamination, let alone burned beyond recognition. The IC must be thinking and remaining logical in the face of impassioned firefighters who have unknowingly invested emotionally in the fight. Sometimes, this investment is appropriate to the ROI because one or more lives are at stake to be saved. Other times, their emotions and investment are not reasonable because there is no life to save. Today's dwellings are far more occupied than in the past. In addition, dwellings typically have more people occupying them throughout the full 24 hours of the day, not just nights. Between COVID-19, the economy, and more families living together, your chances of having confirmed victims trapped is much higher at all hours. **Strategic pillars of risk management:** Risk a lot to save a lot (save savable lives) Risk nothing to save nothing (life and property that have already been lost) Victim Profiling transfers these strategic pillars into a useful tactical tool in the street. *Victim profiling* (VP) is the practice of determining the presence, status, and location of civilian victims. VP brings strategic risk management to life through a practical, tactical tool for use in the field. This allows us to rapidly assess what we have to gain, what we are willing to risk, and what our priorities, strategy, and tactics should be. *All incidents start with a victim profile.* Whether a structure fire, vegetation fire, hazmat, MCI, or something else, the victim profile drives everything: gain, risk, priority, strategy, tac­ tics, tasks, resources, and ICS. On a fire, for example, if you arrive and a credible source (sane and sober) tells you everyone is out of the building, then you are likely going to risk less than if they said, "My family is still inside!" Don't be mistaken. Low victim profile is NOT an all clear on the building. Only we, the fire department, determine that. This is simply a starting point from which to drive the priorities, strategy, tactics, and risk that we are willing to take with our troops. **Victim profile has four levels:** ** Low:** A *credible source* (bystander, occupant, dispatch, sane and sober) tells you everyone is out. Ask them, "how do you know?" If they clearly are just guessing or not credible due to mental, alcohol, or drug issues, skip to moderate. If they say, "because I live here," you are going to be much more confident. *Again, this is not an all clear. Only we determine that.* ** Moderate:** There are no sources of additional information. The fire is during the day and no other signs of life nor credible sources are present. Again, in the wake of COVID-19, there is a more likely chance of occupants. That is why it is moderate. If conditions allow, we still search! ** High:** The same structure is now burning at night with a car in the driveway. Or an apartment building is involved. These indicate a higher level of life potential. Today's apartment buildings are almost always occupied. Even if the involved unit is evacuated, the exposed units may be occupied. ** Confirmed:** The opposite of low, here we have a *credible source* that tells us that there are human lives inside the structure. This could be "My baby is trapped" or "My kids are still inside!" Again, ask "How do you know?" Get the SIGNAL With a *confirmed* victim profile, you need more information and you need it *fast* to establish your tactical plan to get to the victims as soon as possible! Rather than just run into the front door, the SIGNAL method can give you the tactical advantage to be as efficient and swift as possible, when seconds count. **When confronted with a confirmed VP, ask the bystander the following** (it should take no longer than 10 seconds): ** Species---**Confirm the victim is human. How many of you have heard "My baby is trapped" and find out the "baby" is a cat? ** Incapacity---**Obese, mentally challenged, deaf, blind, non-ambulatory, and so on. This will help determine the best tactic of choice and if you need more resources to make the rescue. ** Gender---**If you are told it's a male and you find a female, you have more than one victim. According FRS, in house fires where a victim is reported (confirmed VP), on average there is a high probability that there will be *two* victims. In an apartment with a known victim reported, there is a high probability that there will be *three* victims. Generally, female victims tend to go towards life and natural exits (children, elderly parents, and doors) where male victims tend to try to handle the emergency and therefore may be found closer to the point of origin. ** Number---**How many victims? This again will drive resource orders and help medical get ready for treatment and transport. ** Age---**Behavioral patterns are predictable for different age groups during rescue: **♦ Adults---**Between the fire and means of egress (front/back door). At night, in bed. **♦ Teens---**Bathrooms because that is their safe space, and they think the water in the shower will keep them from burning to death. **♦ Children---**Under the beds, in the closet, under covers, under toys---hiding. **♦ Babies---**In the crib. Where is the crib? Parents' room, baby's room? ** Location---**Where were they last seen? Educated guess where they could be? Don't settle for "upstairs," or "inside," or "in the bedroom!" Have them point and be specific. When facing a low or moderate VP, support functions like 2-out and/or rapid intervention should be in place, based upon your SOGs. Conversely, a high or confirmed VP would indicate that 2-out and/or rapid intervention can be deferred until more resources are available. VP will also help you be much more efficient in your tactics. For example, units arrived on scene of a working fire in an apartment that was well-involved and impeding upon other units. The father confirmed the location, age, and status of his son in the back bedroom. This resulted in coordinated fire attack, VEIS, and vertical ventilation. Had the crews not taken the time to get this critical information, they may have searched from the front door after knockdown, which would have undoubtedly taken much longer, and the child would not have survived. *Survivability profiling* (SP) is the educated art of examining a situation and making an informed and intelligent decision based on known events or likely circumstances to determine if civilians can survive the existing smoke and fire conditions, and whether to commit fire­ fighters to lifesaving and/or interior operations.^1^ According to Chief Stephen Marsar from FDNY, "SP helps to quantify the term *Risk Versus Reward* in a realistic, boots on the ground and applicable way. SP does not say that primary searches are not necessary or, that they are not extremely effective. Especially when searching firefighters have good VP information and apply a targeted search tactic (going to where the victims are reported or, expected to be) rather than doing a blind orientated search and hoping to find them. In fact, when the SP concept is applied correctly and the answer is that trapped victims *can* survive the exiting fire and smoke environment, then go for it!" Victim profiling and survivability profiling go hand-in-glove. They are *not* mutually exclu­ sive concepts or efforts. While VP is for the civilians, SP is for the firefighters. Both are needed to form a scale to balance risk versus gain in an intelligent way so we may save those civilians we are capable of saving and not lose firefighters to unnecessary risk. Remember, civilian victims can be in very tenable spaces behind hollow core doors, in bath­ rooms, closets, bedrooms, and so on. Just because it looks well-involved from the outside does *not* mean that the entire interior is untenable for life. What if it was *your* family? That said, we must ask questions of credible sources like other occupants, bystanders, neighbors, and family subsequently arriving (get the SIGNAL). So, we must be more thorough to quickly establish our gain versus risk. Other factors like level of involvement, collapse potential, flashover, and a host of others will determine our ultimate incident action plan and SP may dictate that we cannot accept the risk; however, it all starts with victim profile---what we have to gain. Reconnaissance *Reconnaissance,* also known as "recon" is the act of further surveying the battlefield (commercial building, apartment complex, industrial facility, area, etc.) to better ascertain the enemy (fire, hazmat, threat, etc.) strength, location, routes of travel, and obstacles to access. The objective is to gain more information than a size-up from the street alone would allow. During recon, the goal is *not* to extinguish a fire, for example. The goal is to find where the fire is, how big it is, how it is traveling through the building, what is exposed, and the best means and tactics to initiate attack. Obstacles like long passageways, locked doors, stairwells, and limited access for apparatus should be identified. The length of a possible stretch of attack should be estimated and alternative access points identified if the stretch distance is excessive. Recon allows you to identify TPOs before com­ mitting resources to a more complex operation so you can gain tactical advantage. **As a minimum, tools for recon should include:** Portable radios Forcible entry tools Long-handled tools Thermal imaging camera (TIC) Water can Flashlights Construction Construction is extremely critical to size-up, so much so that we have dedicated several chap­ ters to different construction and occupancy types. Each type has specific construction, com­ mand, and tactical considerations, and key points associated, and we delve into more detail in each, along with case studies. The fundamentals of construction provide a foundation from which to delve into specific types. As an IC, your knowledge and that of your tactical officers specific to the buildings in *your* jurisdiction will prove vital in victim and survivability profiling; making tactical deci­ sions regarding forcible entry, fire attack, search, and ventilation; assessing risk versus gain; predicting the behavior of the building *fire spread and collapse tendencies)-,* and ensuring everyone goes home safe. We *highly* recommend *The Art of Reading Buildings* by John Mittendorf and Dave Dodson (Fire Engineering Books & Videos, 2015), as required reading for any incident commander. In it, the authors detail how the size-up of a building is a function of that building's NFPA 220 type (I-V and much more), era (when it was built), use (occupancy), and size. The book also includes 52 building size-up guides that include tactical concerns regarding fire spread, col­ lapse, ventilation, forcible entry, and search. In addition, specific hazards are listed. Construction types and styles vary greatly throughout America. As mentioned above, era, use, type, and size should be considered. Historically, the fire service has looked at construc­ tion from Uniformed Building Code (UBC) definitions. NFPA 220 (Type I-V construction) cat­ egories were often used as part of initial arrival reports. This alone cannot provide much for size-up, as hybrids of construction are commonplace and many buildings that should not have burned, have. For example, the Roseville Galleria Mall in Central California had a massive fire even though the construction was composed mainly of concrete and steel. From an incident command standpoint, it is most important to know how fire behaves in different buildings and construction types so you can forecast and add that knowledge to your incident action plan (IAP). Some construction is widespread and must be known by all fire service ICs, like balloon frame, in which the studs run continuously from bottom to top, often causing vertical fire extension in walls. Therefore, a basement or cellar fire can vertically extend into the attic of a multi-floor building. Another common type is tilt-up construction, in which the concrete walls are likely to fail when the roof burns for extended periods. Rapid and catastrophic failure due to bowstring truss assembly and hazards associated \'with lightweight trusses with gusset plating should be common knowledge. That said, each region of the United States has trends, and, more specific to your jurisdiction, there are specific buildings and construction that you must be familiar with to ade­ quately size up and forecast. Examples would be brownstone multi-family dwellings in Brooklyn, NY, or McKuen fourplexes in Central California. The point is to know the nomenclature, con­ struction features, and fire behavior characteristics and tactics of choice in *your* area. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND The Senior Nose CHIEF BRETT LOOMIS, CORVALLIS (OR) FIRE DEPARTMENT We had a good save tonight. No\... we had a GREAT save tonight! I'm proud of my crews. Their tenacity. Their commitment. Their drive to get it right. It was a smells-and-bells call. One where we could have said, "We can't find anything, Mr. Smith. If anything changes, call us back." But we didn't. We kept on working. We used some tools of the trade, for sure. But most importantly, we used our brains, senses, and experience to make a difference and save a million-dollar home. The tones dropped around 2230 hours. It started as an odor investigation: "E132 respond to the 3300-block of NW Van Buren Avenue." I listened to the dispatch from my desk. As I signed into the computer to look at the call details, dispatch ramped the incident to a residential structure fire. They filled the box with two more engines, a truck, and medic unit, and the BC (me). It was a report of smoke inside the structure. That neighborhood is tight. Tree-lined streets with parking on one side designed in a time when most families only had one car. Legacy homes built in the early to mid-1900's. Lots of craftsman-style homes. White picket fences surrounding well-manicured yards. Cobblestone pathways and garages off alleyways that a brush engine could barely fit down. The other thing the streets were lined with were power and utility lines. There was no room for a ladder tower in there. I met the Station 1 lieutenant (LT) on the appa­ ratus floor and told him to bring the engine, not the truck (we cross staff between the engine and the truck at headquarters). The town was alive tonight. First good-weather weekend of the year. All the fraterni­ ties were hosting parties, we had a large rave party happening at the fairgrounds along with a paranormal circus. The town was hopping. We had extra staffing on, as did our colleagues at the police department and sheriff's office. We even had the state patrol in town. E132 arrived and reported nothing showing from a two-story craftsman. They were investigating. I arrived about the same time as Station 2's medic, M125.1 established Van Buren Command and assigned the medic crew to assist with the investigation inside. By this time, we had several law enforcement officers on scene and the neigh­ bors were out in force. I directed the next engine to stage on the plug and had the other two engines stage at the next major intersection. E132 reported no visible smoke or fire inside the home. They were chasing an odor. They also reported the home had been evacuated and a primary search completed. I know what you're thinking. Why are you reporting a primary search complete if you have a confirmed evacuated structure? We do that to drive home the point of search­ ing everything, *all the time.* If we practice it on the small incidents, on the large ones it will be second nature. E132 recommended an under control but wanted to keep their medic on scene. The LT also asked me to face-to-face with him. I reported the incident under control, released staging companies, threw my coat and helmet on, and headed into the house. I hadn't taken three steps inside the house, and I said to the LT, "There's something burning in this house." I immediately regretted releasing the staged companies. I should have held one additional company until we knew for sure. The LT said, "I know, Chief. It doesn't smell electrical, but it doesn't smell like burn either. We don't know what it is." I said, "It's wood smoldering. There's some slow burn going on somewhere." The interior of the house was stunning. The house had just gone through a nearly half-a-million-dollar renovation. High vaulted ceilings with beams. A commercial kitchen with a range that was probably near the value of a half-year's salary. Immacu­ late hard wood floors. An outdoor space with a kitchen and a brand-new brick gas fire­ place. Certainly not a place that we want to randomly open walls and ceilings to try and find an odor. I asked the crew about attic spaces. The reply was, "No attic spaces. All vaulted ceil­ ings." "Any issues with power?" I asked. The LT said the occupant reported no power issues. I was thinking about a basement. It's an older neighborhood and most houses were at least built on pier blocks with a crawl space. For whatever reason I didn't ask if they'd found a basement. So, I went for a walk to see the whole house for myself. The smell was strongest in the B/C corner of the house, in the main bedroom on the first floor. I walked through the first floor opening every door on the way towards the D side of the house. By the time I made it to the door to the garage, I lost the smell. The LT joined me in the garage with the owner of the home to check the circuit panel. I saw a door and asked the owner about it. He said, "That's the basement." I felt it first with the back of my hand (old training dies hard), cracked it, and saw nothing and smelled nothing. There were stairs down to a finished, unfurnished basement\... and a crawlspace. Then I walked upstairs to the second floor. Three bedrooms, one with its own bath­ room and two with a Jack and Jill. Just a faint odor upstairs, but still present. I looked in every closet and what did I find? An attic access scuttle. Returning downstairs, the odor was stronger. After pointing out that there was an attic space upstairs and a crawlspace in the basement, the owner shared that there was also an attic access in the main bathroom off the bedroom where the odor was the stron­ gest. I asked the LT to assign two people to check the crawlspace and two more to check both attic spaces, focusing on the one in the bathroom first. I asked the owner to tell me the story that he had told the crew. He said that around 6:00 p.m. he and his wife had had some wine on the new patio. He said that they used the new gas fireplace for about an hour. They turned off the fireplace and then went next door to their daughter's house for a couple of hours. When they came home, he smelled the odor. He tried to find it for about an hour before calling us. He said over  up. Within seconds of making the first set of cuts the nozzle operator said, "There's a fire in here." A couple of minutes after that the wall was opened. And there it was. There was burn hole completely through the plywood from the exterior wall. About a stud bay wide and a foot high. Some discoloration on the studs on both sides. Full depth chart on the R15 insulation (fig. 5-14). No real smoke and certainly no active flame. Slow combustion was still in progress, however, on the perimeter of the hole. All on the shared wall with the exterior gas fireplace. The homeowner said, "You guys just saved my house!" The best feeling of all. We re-examined the exterior fireplace and determined that the contractor had installed it without fire brick. It was a thin layer of decorative brick only. There was a backer board that we could see through the plywood that looked like it was cracked. We could touch the brick with our bare hand and not detect anything unusual. The teaching moment here is that the enemy knows how to infiltrate weaknesses and establish its battlefield. It's our job to outthink the enemy and we did. Had the homeowner ignored the odor or had we swept this incident under the rug, this would have been fire through the roof at 4:00 a.m. Every incident is a learning opportunity and this one was no different. A few of the takeaways here are: **Teamwork---**We all bring different experiences to the job. Don't let your pride get in the way of the mission. Bring in others to help solve the problem. This job was not about me finding the problem. It was me helping to find the problem and, in the process, imparting some of my experiences on my crew. They are now more prepared for an incident like this next time. In this case I was able to contribute to the team to achieve the mission. I can tell you unequivocally that I rely on my company officers and crews to contribute as much, if not more, than they rely on me in these situations. ***The Art of Warfare---***Sun Tzu's philosophies have been applied throughout the world in various conflicts, and the fire service is no different. Know your enemy. Know your battlefield. Know the strategies and tactics of our war against fire. Prepare your fire­ fighters, teach your firefighters, lead your firefighters. Know the tools and weapons of war. Support your warriors in their fight. "The line between disorder and order lies in logistics"---Sun Tzu. **Tools of the trade---**The fire service has some great tools. The pickaxe, forged Halli­ gan tool, New York hook, the list goes on. We also continue to develop amazing tech­ nology, such as thermal imaging cameras, infrared thermometers, and atmospheric monitors, to just name a few. All of these tools, however, are nothing without our most valuable tools: our firefighters with their brains and five senses. The ability to size-up a situation, develop a plan, and act on that plan does not start with an axe or a TIC. It comes with a properly trained and supported firefighter. Show them the unharnessed power they possess as human beings absent of any tools of the trade and you will be amazed at the result. Lt. Colonel Oliver North in an address in 2009 described the cur­ rent day American soldier as "\... trained to use his body like a weapon and his weapon as an extension of his body\..." Imagine if all firefighters trained like that! The crew cleaned up the debris and vacuumed the carpet in the bedroom. I checked out with the LT and shook the hand of each member of the crew and told them what a great job they had done. I thanked the homeowner for his support, and he said to me, "You knew the moment you walked in the door there was a fire. How did you know?" I said, "The firefighters knew it too. They were the first ones to know it. I just helped them find it. It's a team effort." This was a great night. Smoke and Fire Conditions *The Art of Reading Smoke* Fire Engineering DVD training series by Dave Dodson should be fun­ damental study material to any IC and tactical supervisor and more thoroughly augment what we present here. Chief Dodson describes the smoke as, "the fire talking to you and it's telling you the future."^2^ He identifies four critical aspects of smoke: volume, velocity, density, and color. *Volume* is the amount of smoke, relative to the building. *Velocity* is the pressure (speed and flow) in which the smoke is escaping the compartment or structure. This is driven by heat. The more heat, the greater velocity the smoke will emit from the structure. Rapid or boiling smoke is hotter and closer to the seat of the fire. Slow or seeping smoke that is not under pressure is either farther away from the seat of the fire or it has traveled a distance from the fire and is already starting to cool. Turbulent smoke is a telltale sign of high heat and impending flashover, as the inside of the box is heat saturated and unable to absorb any more energy, thus reflecting back the heat and causing turbulent smoke. *Density* is the thickness of the smoke. Smoke is a fuel and can be ignited if conditions are right. Modern smoke is laden with hydrocarbons, and the denser the smoke, the greater poten­ tial for ignition. Dense smoke may be too rich to burn; however, vent point ignition may occur when the smoke reaches the outside environment and comes within its flammable range. *Color* determines the stage of heating. Lighter colored smoke may indicate early-stage heat­ ing as moisture is greater and evaporating. Also, lighter smoke may be due to a longer distance the smoke travels. Smoke succumbs to friction loss like water in that the pressure (velocity) is reduced and color lightened the longer it travels and the tighter passageways it flows through. That said, muddy brown smoke can indicate wooden structural members involved, especially in the overhead. Yellowish gray puffing and sucking can indicate backdraft while thick black can indicate more hydrocarbons, which is highly common in modern fires due to low-mass synthetics. Thin, flame-pushed smoke means the fire is nearby and burning more cleanly. This can be from a window, door, or hole in the roof. Out of the four signs of reading smoke, color is the least reliable predictor of fire progres­ sion and heat conditions. In tightly sealed occupancies, the darker, solid parts of the smoke\ may be filtered out as the smoke pressure forces it out of small openings. For example, if there is light gray or even white smoke coming from a structure but it has volume, velocity, and den­ sity, you may still be dealing with an advanced fire---especially in colder weather, where the smoke is cooled almost immediately upon leaving the structure. Bi-directional flow from a door can indicate the fire is starved for oxygen and any horizontal ventilating may cause rapid fire progression. Vent-point ignition occurs when thick, fuel-laden, hot smoke that is too rich to burn reaches the outside atmosphere and ignites. This indicates high heat, thick laddering of fuel in the smoke, and the potential for rapid fire progression (fig. 5-15). Tunnel vision is easy during size-up. Figure 5-16 draws your eyes to the flames; however, learn to look at other signs, like the window to the left. Is that searchable?  Interior Firefighting "Watch Out" Situations The Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD) has identified the following "Watch Out" situ­ ations for interior firefighting following the Western Fire in 1998 that claimed the life of Cap­ tain Joseph Dupee. We thank the LAFD for their contributions to this text. The following is from *LAFD Book 101:^3^* *There are eighteen "watch out" situations that have been identified when working in the* *wildland. The failure to recognize "watch outs' by firefighters has on more than one* *occasion caused injury or death to firefighters. With this in mind thefollowing list of twelve* *"watch out\"situations have been developedfor interior structurefirefighting. These were* *situations that were identified as contributingfactors in the LAFD Western Fire Significant* *Incident Report.* *Although not all-inclusive, the following twelve structure "watch outs" should certainly* *provoke communication among members in the hope that it could prevent a similar* *tragedy. Experiencedfirefighters should recognize having been in these situations and* *share the experience so that others might live.* *Interiorfirefighting "watch outs\":* * You have a working fire andyour entry will be delayed. This may occur for any* * Multiple companies have been assigned to enter through one entry. Single door* * Roof division is being driven off as you prepare to go inside. Coordination between* * Air is being drawn in rapidly in zero visibility and the heat is banking down.* * You can hear the fire burning above you but can't see it. The sound of a burning* * You realize you are working underneath a mezzanine. Mezzanines (and more* *confronted with an interior rolling steelfire door (fusible link), make sure to block* *the door open so as to prevent accidental closure due to heat buildup.* *You feel uncomfortable. Listen to your instincts, because they are generally correct.* *Your SCBA alarm bell sounds and you still haven'tfound the fire. Time stamping an* *incident that involves interior operations at a working fire is very important. One of* *the most effective ways to time stamp is to recognize the amount of time it typically* *takes before your low air warning sounds. If in the 10 to 20 minutes it takes for this* *to occur you have been unable to find a working fire in zero visibility, serious* *consideration needs to be given to a change in tactics. In some cases, allowing* *additional ventilation to occur prior to entry will assist in locating the seat of the* *fire and identifying improved access.* *You flow waterfor several minutes and make no progress. Additional and/or larger* *lines are needed if insufficient gallons per minute (GPMs) of water is not reaching* *the fire.* *You hear the sound of roof ventilation being conducted behind you. Conditions on* *the roof including lightweight construction, may require the ventilation teams to* *initiate operations furtherfrom the seat of thefire. Coordination is critical to* *prevent ventilation holes from pulling the fire over the interior companies.* *You are unable to communicate with the incident commander, or your division or* *group supervisor. The incident commander has overall responsibility for both* *resource and situation status. If you are unable to communicate interior conditions* *and the status of your crew, or if you are unable to receive incident status* *information, you need to retreat to a safety zone until communication is* *established.* *You are working with unfamiliar members. Responsible officers must ensure that* *any members not normally assigned to the company are familiar with all standard* *operating guidelines. This information needs to be passed on immediately upon* *reportingfor assignment.* Communications Communication is the conduit from which size-up travels to keep personnel safe and the IAP relevant and functional. Communication problems is one of the NIOSH 5. Almost *every inci­* *dent* will have communication challenges. Communication problems may often take place without us knowing it. For example, companies were dispatched to a commercial fire with all civilians reported out of the structure. This was never relayed to incoming companies. A sub­ sequent collapse occurred with firefighters inside and on top of the building. By the grace of God, none died for what was a vacant structure that was a total loss. In addition, communications will often begin to decay with the first arrival report. The offi­ cer has not practiced mental size-ups and pushes the radio button to think, instead of thinking first and pushing to *talk.* Clear, effective communications start with clear expectations. SOGs, policy, training, and officers all sharing expectations with their crews and each other are critical. *Leader's intent* is a clear, concise statement about what people must do to succeed in their assignments.^4^ It delineates three essential components: 1. **Task---**The objective or goal of the assignment. 2. **Purpose---**Why the assignment needs to be done. 3. **End state---**-How the situation should look when the assignment is successfully completed. The majority of leader's intent can and should be done before an incident ever occurs. Through training and time, trust can be established, and the team can get on the same page. This is a tremendous tactical advantage that can be in place prior to response. Modern incident command is a team sport, requiring all officers and crew members to under­ stand the potential roles they may fill on any given incident. As a BC, my company officers and their crews always knew my standing leader's intent and intent related to a specific incident. For example, standing leader's intent regarding incident command for Battalion 7A was: 1. All company officers will be proficient in fulfilling the role of IC, or tactical division/ group supervisors (task). 2. This will bridge the tactical gap and prevent the NIOSH 5 from coming into alignment on our incidents, thus making operations more safe, effective, efficient, and consistent, whatever type they may be (purpose). 3. All incidents will have a well communicated IAP, ongoing size-up, clear communica­ tions, minimal radio traffic, active accountability, and manageable span of control, while saving the most civilian lives possible and ensuring all members go home upright and in one piece (end state). We have a lot going against us regarding communications, which is why it is such a major factor in operational problems. External factors include: Unclear expectations or not adequately communicating the IAP (from the IC down) Inaccurate information or lack of information Apparatus, siren, and horn noise en route Saws and other on-scene tools revving Engines pumping, Warning devices on aerial apparatus Firefighters yelling and bystanders screaming Radio feedback Too many people trying to talk on one channel Not having or forgetting the portable radio Being on the wrong channel Dead or low batteries \- SCBA Smoke and confined spaces in the structure Weather Communication is one of the biggest problems on any emergency scene (fig. 5-17). Internal factors include: Unclear expectations or not adequately communicating the IAP. Notice this is both external *and* internal. Internally, this is not understanding or valuing what is coming in or from whom. Adrenaline Tunnel vision Auditory exclusion Misinterpretation False assumptions Personal feelings, disagreements, or lack of trust Pride Fear and inexperience **Ideally, functional and effective communications should have six characteristics:** 1. **Clear:** Speak using clear wording and common terminology for your agency or opera­ tional area. Do not use technical jargon, ten codes, or words that are not part of your normal vocabulary. 2. **Complete:** Give complete information. For example, many CAN reports are missing the needs: "E5, Division 3, give me a CAN report." "Division 3, E5, it's hot and we are attacking the fire." These are called "California" reports because CAN without needs is CA. Don't give CA reports, give CAN reports. Another example would be, "There's a wall collapse on the inside courtyard." This has no sender or receiver identified. A more complete transmission would be, "All units from Divi­ sion 3, safety message: We have a wall collapse in the interior courtyard." 3. **Calm:** Do *not* let your emotions get the best of you. Stay calm and professional. Do not escalate and make the situation worse. As the leader goes, so goes the team. You should be known for remaining calm in the chaos and cool under pressure. Take a deep breath before you key the mic to transmit. Practice during realistic training. 4. **Concise:** Say what you have to say in as short a transmission as possible. Some people love to hear themselves talk on the radio. First, ask yourself, "Is this important enough to transmit on the radio?" Then, ensure you remain short and sweet. One way to ensure this is to think before you speak (sound familiar?). 5. **Confident:** Speak with confidence in your voice. Just as the IC can either calm the scene or escalate the stress and chaos, so too can professional and confident demeanor instill confidence in the team that it's going to be okay. 6. **Closed:** Close the loop. Ensure that your message was understood and vice versa. Con­ firm transmissions and follow up on crew assignments, safety messages, accountability reports, CAN reports, and so on. It takes too much time to repeat transmissions verba­ tim; however, the key factors should be repeated for the benefit of the entire team. For example, "Division A from E2." "Go ahead E2." \"E2 has advanced 100 feet in with a 1%\" line. We have heavy fire and need vertical ven­ tilation. Also need a second line to assist with fire attack and another crew for search." Rather than repeat the entire transmission verbatim and tie up radio traffic, an efficient response would be, "Division A copies E2 at 100 feet, heavy heat. Requesting additional line, search, and vertical vent." Tactical versus Task Assignments Words matter, just like details matter. When assigning a company or crew to a task, the term should be "initiate" to clarify that they are working at the task level. For example, E5, com­ mand, initiate fire attack on the second floor." This means that the IC wants E5 to pull hose and begin attacking the fire on the second floor, not assume Division 2 or Fire Attack Group Supervisor. Conversely, when assigning an officer to take over a tactical assignment and supervise a division or group, the term "assume" is used to clarify the tactical level. For example, "Engine 2, command, upon arrival, assume Division 2, your objectives are fire attack and search. You have Engine 5 working for you." Radio Channels and Frequencies A *dispatch channel* is the frequency from which incident alarms are initially transmitted to alert units to respond. These are typically not utilized for resources to speak to dispatch, nor each other. A *command channel* is the frequency utilized for resources to speak with dispatch and each other for routine, daily radio traffic. Command channels can also be utilized for the IC to communicate with dispatch and/or tactical supervisors during an incident. A *tactical channel* is a frequency utilized for units assigned to an incident to speak to each other and/or the IC or their tactical supervisor. As communications become more complex due to the nature of an incident, command and tactical channels become overloaded with radio traffic. More channels may be required to divide the radio traffic so frequencies can be opened up and transmissions can be heard. Oth­ erwise, critical transmissions involving a firefighter Mayday, civilian victims found, or other urgent safety messages will not be heard. Such was the case on a Mayday at a warehouse fire. The captain of the downed firefighter could not call a Mayday on the tactical channel due to too much radio traffic. He switched to the command channel to call the Mayday. A *communications plan* is utilized to add additional command and/or tactical channels to an incident to divide the radio traffic among tactical supervisors and functions. Arrival Reports and Assuming and Passing Command Once on scene, the arrival report from the first company officer and/or chief is essentially a form of leader's intent. Again, it must *follow* the mental size-up. *After* you perform a mental size-up, you are much better prepared to give a clear and concise arrival report. This sets the incident off on the right foot. An excellent system for arrival reports is identify, object, conditions, actions, and needs (IOCAN), which can be used for any type of incident. We will show several examples below for varying incident types (fig. 5-18): ** Identify** ♦ Your unit identifier ♦ Location of the incident (if different than the dispatched address). Example: "E3 is on scene at the corrected address of 125 Main Street." ** Object:** What is it? Use clear wording where possible (McDonald's). Include size, con­ struction, and occupancy type. For vegetation fires, include size (in acres), and fuel type (light, moderate, heavy). ♦ "One-story, medium, lightweight house." ♦ "Large, commercial, tilt-up warehouse." ♦ "One-acre grass fire in light, flashy fuels." ♦ "Large industrial facility." ♦ "MLK High School."  **CONDITIONS** What Is It Doing ? **ACTIONS** What Are You Doing ? NEEDS \*What Do You Want The Next-In Companies to Do ? ** Conditions:** What's it doing? Include smoke/fire, victim profile (if known), and expo­ sures. For vegetation fires, include rate of spread (ROS), values at risk, and potential size. For hazmat, give direction of hazard, potential, and exposures. For MCI, give type (trauma, hazmat, medical) and estimated number of patients. ♦ "Heavy fire from the A side windows with moderate victim profile." ♦ "Heavy smoke from the C side, evacuation in progress." ♦ "Moving at a rapid rate of spread toward homes to the north. Potential for 5 acres." ♦ "Unknown white gas from the C side traveling to the south toward Northridge Mall." ♦ "Trauma MCI. Law enforcement on scene reporting 5 victims shot." ** Actions:** What are you doing? Assuming or passing command. Tactics. ICP location if assuming command. ♦ "E3 is passing command, initiating fire attack, and has a water supply." ♦ "E3 is passing command, initiating attack with 216" line from the C side." ♦ "E3 is passing command, initiating fire attack with a progressive lay on the right flank." ♦ "E3 is assuming Main Street Command. ICP is on the A side. Continuing evacuation, isolating, and denying entry to the C side." ♦ "E3 is assuming MLK command, ICP is mobile, initiating triage." ** Needs:** What do you need? Resources/alarms, assignments to incoming companies. ♦ "Next in, assume command, stretch a backup line, calling one ambulance." ♦ "Next in, assume command, bring a water supply to E3. First truck to the C side for forcible entry and search." ♦ "Next in, assume command, and initiate structure defense ahead of the fire. Calling two additional Type 3 engines." ♦ "Balancing to a Level 3 hazmat. Calling two Type 1 hazmat teams, two ambulances, and law enforcement for evacuation." ♦ "Balancing to a trauma MCI. Next in, assist with triage and treatment, calling five additional ambulances, an EMS supervisor, and two additional engines for treatment." An update should be given ASAP. This may be after a lap is complete (if possible, you cannot always get a lap in certain cities or construction types); after you get a victim profile from bystanders/occupants; after you get a face-to-face with other responders (law, EMS, etc.); or you see something new that you didn't before (fire in attic, exposures, basement, power lines down, etc.). **EXAMPLE (house fire):** "E3 update to incoming units. Moderate victim profile. Fire is extend­ ing into the attic. Truck 1, upon arrival, initiate a search." **EXAMPLE (commercial fire):** "E3 update to incoming units. Low victim profile. Fire is extend­ ing into C side from rear loading dock. Truck 2, upon arrival, go to the roof for a roof report." **EXAMPLE (vegetation fire):** "E3 update to incoming units. Fire is anchored on the right flank at Main and Rural Route 2. First mobile attack unit, bump past E3 on the right flank to catch the head of the fire." **EXAMPLE (hazardous materials incident):** "Main Street Command update to incoming units. Approach upwind, from the north." **EXAMPLE (MCI):** "MLK Command, update to incoming units. Law states that threat has been neutralized in the gym." **CAN (conditions, actions, needs) reports** are a derivative of the IOCAN arrival and are a quick effective way to transmit updates throughout the incident. Remember to give the *needs.* This is often forgotten. First Company Officer The first company officer to arrive on scene must decide whether to retain or pass command. If you can prevent injury or save life with your crew, pass command. *You are still in command* *until passed to the next officer on scene.* While you still have command until relieved, you have notified incoming units that you are task-saturated and need the next officer to take command off your shoulders ASAP. This can be identified as working command. In contrast, if the incident is so massive and complex that you will *not* make a difference with your crew, then retain command. You will be better utilized calling additional resources and developing an IAP to start getting ahead of the incident power curve. Often a second com­ pany officer will arrive before the first chief and assume command from the first company officer. This is appropriate when the first officer is, again, task-saturated and working (rescue, fire attack, etc.), having passed command. Your SOGs will drive that operation. First Chief  If another company officer is on scene and has given an accurate arrival report of the situa­ tion, the first chief does not have to regurgitate everything that was already said, thus tying up more radio traffic. If the previous arrival was accurate, then the chief may transmit, "Bat­ talion 7 on scene, confirming EllO's arrival. Battalion 7 will assume Arden Command with the ICP across the street from the A side. Continuing an offensive strategy and moderate victim profile. E110, you are now Division A with the objectives offire attack and search ofthe house. You have TR106 and E109 working for you." Perhaps a correction was needed due to an inaccurate or inadequate arrival by the previ­ ous company officer. For example, E110 arrived at a two-story fire in a balloon-framed house, but transmitted, "El 10 on scene of a house fire. We are going in." The chief may ask for more accurate information en route. Upon arrival, the chief may transmit, "Battalion 7 on scene, this is a two-story house with possible balloon frame construction with fire in the basement and smoke from the attic. Battalion 7 is assuming Arden Command. El 10, confirming you are performing fire attack or search, and do you need a water supply?" Once E110 confirms with a CAN report, Battalion 7 may continue, "Copy, E110 is initiating search and has a patent water supply. Confirming an offensive strategy, moderate victim profile. ICP is located behind El 10. Next engine and truck\... " The first chief officer to arrive and assume command from a company officer has several choices. One is to get a transfer of command from the company officer via radio. This often takes a lot of time and bogs down the incident, tying up radio traffic. The second option is to have the company officer come out and meet the chief at the ICP for a transfer. This may pull the officer away from critical work and the tactical gap will widen. Often, both will miss radio traffic during the face-to-face dialogue. Third is to relegate the company officer back to their crew at the task level. By doing so, the chief has given away the tactical advantage that they had in the brain of the initial IC who had accountability, sized up the risks, and was developing a tactical plan. This results in more radio traffic as the IC starts to ask for CAN reports. An extremely effective option is to make the initial IC a tactical division or group supervi­ sor to rapidly bridge the tactical gap (See chapter 7 for more). This is incident- and SOG-based and may depend upon arrival sequences and the level of task-saturation when the chief arrives. **EXAMPLE:** Upon arrival, the chief would state, "Battalion 7 is on scene, assuming command from Engine 23. The ICP is on the A/B corner across the street. Confirming an offensive strat­ egy and low victim profile. E23 you will assume Division A, with Engine 24 and Truck 5 work­ ing for you. Objectives are fire attack and search." E23 already has active accountability of those resources; therefore, there is no need to regur­ gitate that radio traffic. The chief would have heard the assignments made by the previous IC. By decentralizing and allowing that previous IC to now become tactical, the need for the chief to ask a lot of questions is minimized. Active accountability now rests with the Division A Supervisor. Very little has changed. A heads-up company officer in command can drive the incident and help bridge the Tacti­ cal Gap for the chief at transfer of command. **EXAMPLE:** Upon arrival, the chief would state, "Battalion 7 is on scene, ready to assume command from you, Engine 23." This would be a good choice if the company officer in command is too task-saturated and the chief realizes that the timing is not ideal at the moment. Engine 23 could respond, "Battalion 7, recommend I assume Division A with Engine 24 and Truck 25 working for me. We have fire attack and search of the house. Need an additional hoseline." The point is to bridge the tactical gap ASAP, based upon the conditions and resources at hand. By decentralizing command, the need for radio traffic is minimized, yet accountability is enhanced. Note that in the second example, the chief did not immediately assume command, rather, the chief simply notified the company officer/IC that he had arrived and was *ready to* assume command. This has several benefits in certain circumstances. First, if the scene is cha­ otic and a lot of radio traffic is clogging the radio, the chief may not want to interrupt so the IC can finish an order or operation. Examples would be an apartment fire with multiple victims being rescued, or multiple buildings involved, and the current IC is deploying hoselines on the radio upon the chief's arrival. Second, the incident may be so large and escalating that a face-to-face transfer of com­ mand is more appropriate. An example would be a mass shooting or large commercial build­ ing fire with a second alarm already called. Rather than stay tied to a rigid form or procedure of communicating, the chief arriving to assume command should size up the situation, how best to utilize the current IC (tactical or task), what resources are arriving, and how best to communicate with the company officer who is undoubtedly wanting to get command off his shoulders. Still, other situations may dictate that the chief allow the company officer to remain in com­ mand so they can get additional experience and is on the promotional list. This opportunity for training and mentoring will yield big dividends downstream. As a BC, I routinely had sev­ eral options available upon assuming command and those options predicated my communi­ cations. For example, if the fire was contained in a room or garage of a house upon my arrival, I would often ask the captains in command if they would like to retain command for the expe­ rience. They often obliged. The communication was, "Command, Battalion 7 is on scene. ICP will be located across the parking lot on the A side. Come to the ICP at your convenience." Once the IC arrived at the ICP I would just ask if they would like to retain command. When they did, I would transmit, "All units, E105 is retaining Northrop Command. We are continuing an offen­ sive strategy with low victim profile." When a fire was still escalating upon my arrival, as was often the case, I would typically assign the current company officer/IC to a tactical division position. The hot division or area would be the first one established and the IC would bump up to that forward position (Divi­ sion A, for example). This would allow a continuum of supervision and accountability by the officer who was already supervising the area as the IC anyway. The communication was, "Bat­ talion 7 is on scene, assuming Watt Avenue Command from Engine 103. The ICP is on the A/B corner across the street. Confirming an offensive strategy and high victim profile. E103 you will assume Division A, with Engine 101 and Truck 106 working for you. Objectives are fire attack and search of the apartments facing Watt Avenue." If the incident was much larger, escalating with additional alarms, chances were that the IC was very task-saturated and wanted/needed to get back to their crew. Here, the need to set up a tactical division/group was great, however, with immeasurable tasks needing to be com­ pleted, like multiple hoselines and rescues, the second chief may be the better choice to assume a division role. The communication would be, "Battalion 7 is on scene, assuming Marconi Ave Command, ICP is located across the street on the A/D corner. This is an offensive strategy with confirmed victims trapped on upper floors. E109 captain, re-join your crew. Calling a second alarm." Then crews would be accounted for via radio with CAN reports as conditions allowed, followed by division/group supervisors once established. WISDOM FROM THE MASTERS You're Not Seeing What I'm Seeing CAPTAIN BILL GUSTIN, MIAMI-DADE (FL) FIRE DEPARTMENT Miami-Dade Battalion 5 companies were operating at a fire in a large, old, wood-frame rooming house. Companies were having difficulty locating the fire due to limited vis­ ibility. Eventually, at the 10-minute incident time mark, one company encountered some flame on the floor that appeared to be a pool of accelerant or melted plastic. The company officer advised the IC, Battalion 5, that they had located the fire and were knocking it down. What the company officer didn't tell command was that every time they stopped flow­ ing water, the small fire on the floor would reappear. Something else was odd: How could such a seemingly small fire fill the entire house, from floor to ceiling, with heavy smoke? Shortly thereafter, command ordered all companies out of the house. One of the company officers acknowledged the chief's order with a report that they were making "good headway" and should have the fire under control in a few minutes. Com­ mand replied by saying "that's negative; you're not seeing what I'm seeing. The order has been given; back your company out of the building." What command could see that the company officer could not see is that the smoke was getting progressively darker, more turbulent, and pressurized. Minutes after crews evacuated and were accounted for, they heard a "whoosh" and the rooming house became fully involved. After a defensive attack, crews discovered that the entire floor of the house collapsed into a fully involved basement filled with mattresses and uphol­ stered furniture. Crews had no idea that they were operating directly above a raging fire. The elusive fire that kept reappearing was actually from a hole burned through the floor. Had crews remained in the structure they most likely would have ended up in the burn center or a cemetery. The preceding scenario is not fictitious, it was real. I was there. I was the company officer who requested to remain operating in the building. Two Size-Ups on Every Fire There are two size-ups that must be performed continuously on every fire: the inside size-up of conditions observed by companies operating in the fire building and the out­ side size-up by the IC. If a department's command procedures require the IC to remain in his vehicle or mobile command post, the IC must designate someone to be their eyes on the fire building (tactical supervisor). If the inside size-up and outside size-up are not in agreement, a red flag should go up because somebody has it wrong and it is *almost* *always the companies operating inside, because of their limited perspective.* For example, a company officer reporting on conditions on the floor where they are operating may not be aware that they have fire beneath them on a lower floor or over­ head in an attic. Fire in the concealed space between a rain roof and the original roof will most likely remain undetected by interior companies and first observed by the IC. Similarly, according to Chief Vincent Dunn, FDNY (ret.), "There are six sides to a fire: The four sides plus the floor above and floor below. But a wood-frame building has a seventh side, the combustible exterior walls. Beware of fire spread via the exterior." When an IC orders companies out of a building and a shift to defensive operations, he doesn't want to hear radio transmissions such as, "Just a few more minutes and we'll have it, chief," or, "We're making good headway." Companies who advise the IC on their progress and conditions do so from a limited perspective. They are not seeing what the IC is seeing. I wonder how many firefighters have lost their lives because they chose or were ordered to do the wrong thing for too long. When firefighters are performing a task, such as forcing entry or advancing a hose line, they have skin in the game. As a result, they are not just physically involved, but it is natural for them to be *emotionally* involved. Ego is a powerful motivator and can skew judgement. Ego can cause firefighters to the do the wrong thing for too long, even though it is apparent to the IC that their tactics are no longer effective and the intended benefit is not worth the risk. As a result, they can't bear the thought of failing or being ordered to change tactics. Hence, when they are told by the IC to back out, it is common to reply to the order with a dissertation, justi­ fying why they should remain, such as "We're making good headway" or "We almost got it." This begs the question, in terms of time, exactly how much time is "we almost have it, Chief"---minutes, hours? "Something Isn't Right!" Miami-Dade companies were attempting to locate the source of smoke in second-floor bedrooms above an attached garage. Before ascending, the first-arriving company offi­ cer did the prudent thing; he checked the garage, finding it was perfectly clear with no odor of smoke. Firefighters operating on the second floor were not aware of two criti­ cal factors that could have taken their lives: First, the second floor was supported by light weight, engineered parallel chord wood trusses; Second, the fire was burning below them in the truss void (the space above the one-hour fire-rated garage ceiling and the second floor). Firefighters found smoke that was increasing in density but no heat. Accordingly, their TIC showed no indication of heat. To improve visibility, the companies operating on the second floor requested the venting of second floor windows. The IC, Battalion 13, sensing something wasn't right, ordered the companies on the second floor to back down the stairs to the first floor before venting the windows. When the first window was vented, it was followed by a blast of flame and the sudden collapse of the bedroom floors into the garage. This scenario compels the question: How many firefighters' lives have been saved because the boss acted on gut intuition and pulled his troops out of a dangerous situation? At the horrific Boyd Street fire in May of2020, the LA City Captain directing roof oper­ ations stated that something wasn't right upon reaching the roof. Following are con­ ditions that could lead a fire officer to determine that something isn't right: Inability to locate the fire. Unexpected or unusual fire behavior, such as smoke being sucked back into a Extended incident time with companies making little or no progress. Construction type is prone to collapse or conceals fire. A chimney emitting dark smoke; indicative of smoke from a basement fire Capable, reliably strong companies not making progress. Size-up conditions observed by the incident commander do not agree with Reports from companies operating inside are inconsistent. For example, companies reporting fires on different floors or portions of a building or companies operating on a roof reporting smoke or fire, indicating heavy fire in an attic, whereas inside compa­ nies report clear conditions or just a light haze of smoke. Chief officers, listen carefully to radio reports from company officers; not just *what* they say but *how* they say it. If their transmissions sound distressed or give you an uneasy feeling, trust your gut! It may be time to regroup, reevaluate tactics and strat­ egy, and reassess the level of risk. Command Post Location The ICP must be well communicated to all personnel on scene and en route. This includes sub­ sequent alarms. Staging areas must be well communicated with the staging area manager and a tactical channel for staging must be identified. The location of the ICP is based on the inci­ dent type, conditions, access, weather, time of day, traffic, and the manner in which other appa­ ratus are staged on scene or going to be arriving and staging. For house fires, parking directly across the street in a driveway of another home may work well in parts of the U.S. that have driveways. However, in older cities, it is less likely that a drive­ way will exist. Also, long driveways and those serving multiple set-back residences may pres­ ent unique challenges. A long-standing debate continues between those who remain in the command vehicle, or in a remote ICP behind the command vehicle, versus those who physically move forward to a position directly in front of the building. Again, many of the trends are geographical in nature. The East Coast, or older cities like San Francisco on the West Coast, may not be conducive to a remote ICP due to congestion, sidewalks, and narrow streets and alleys, whereas much of the Midwest and West Coast may have more direct access, wider roads and streets, and more options available. One benefit to remaining more remote is that it prevents the IC from tunnel vision and get­ ting sucked into the task level. In a controlled environment, like the inside of a command vehi­ cle, the noise and distractions of the scene (personnel, bystanders, weather, engines pumping, sirens, horns, saws, screams, etc.) can be minimized. The IC should be able to clearly hear the radio and detect subtleties like personal alert safety system (PASS) devices or vibra-alert noises in the background. Regardless of whether in or out of the command vehicle, or up close or further away, some considerations will help you. First, you do not want to move the ICP, so think ahead. Do not set up too close, where radiant heat, smoke, potential collapse, or other hazardous conditions may change and compromise your position. Second, get the best view you can, within reason. Give the prime real estate to the companies working. Try to see two sides of a building fire, at the corners. The benefit to a decentralized command philosophy is that the ICP and IC vi