Unified Command PDF

16 Unified Command Fig. 16-0. Sacramento Metropolitan Fire Battalion Chief and County Sheriff representative initiate unified command. Introduction Whether a medical aid, house fire, high-rise fire, or major disaster, every incident starts at the local level. On the headline-grabbing big ones,...

16 Unified Command Fig. 16-0. Sacramento Metropolitan Fire Battalion Chief and County Sheriff representative initiate unified command. Introduction Whether a medical aid, house fire, high-rise fire, or major disaster, every incident starts at the local level. On the headline-grabbing big ones, some poor responder arrives on scene first and realized, "Oh man, this is way beyond me!" As legendary Los Angeles City Battalion Chief John Mittendorf would say, "Why did I come to work today?" When you arrive on scene and realize that this is a massive incident, take a deep breath, remain calm, and size up your situation using the same FPODP method you would use on a room-and-contents fire in a small house. Set the tone for the incident with the first arrival report. Remember the old saying, "as the first hoseline goes, so goes the rest of the incident." Another way to think is to realize that you have a tremendous opportunity to set the incident on the right foot and keep everyone calm. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Madison Incident CHIEF KILEY KEELEY AND CAPTAIN SHAWN LEMON, SACRAMENTO (CA) METROPOLITAN FIRE DISTRICT (Lemon) As firefighters, we spend much of our time training for the unexpected, as impossible as that may be. We pride ourselves on being flexible problem-solvers, often called upon to assist the communities we serve. As a newer captain within my organi­ zation, I made it a point to develop outside-of-the-box thinking and solid decision-making. To make this possible, we *must* have a strong understanding of our priorities and our capabilities as a unit as well as a department. As leaders within the organization, understanding the importance of gaining situational awareness and developing an action plan that accomplishes desired goals creates the foundation for the rest of the call. A bad foundation can doom an incident before it ever has a chance to succeed. Contrarily, a strong foundation can overcome small mistakes made through­ out an incident and still support a successful outcome. To give some background, Sacramento Metro Fire operates a three-man engine com­ pany with very clear responsibilities. E42 is one of Sac Metro Fire's RIC Engines and is equipped with specialty equipment. This equipment ranges from air monitoring to forcible entry tools that aren't part of the normal compliment. The apartment complex where this call took place is a two-story complex with units on the front and back. This complex has a one-way-in, one-way-out-style parking lot shaped in a U around the structure. In late June, 2022, E42 was given an unexpected opportunity to change the lives of some members of the community, as well as their own. E42 was dispatched early in the morning for a domestic disturbance and were requested, by Sacramento Sheriff's Officers on-scene, to stage near the incident. The crew of E42 responded to a location across the street from a mid-size garden-style apartment complex. An update was given through dispatch that there was a male adult inside an apartment holding his one-year- old child hostage with a knife and was now attempting to start a fire. From that update, the complexity of the call significantly increased. E42 dressed for fire and began reviewing the complex map locating the exact apart­ ment involved. E42 was shortly updated with information that there was a well-developed fire and that crews were now cleared to enter. E42 responded and bal­ anced the call from a domestic disturbance to a full commercial assignment, which adds four engines, three trucks, two battalion chiefs, and one medic. Upon arriving at the entrance of the apartment complex, we were met with our first unexpected situation. SAC Sheriffs had been on scene of this call for over an hour and a heavy police presence blocked the access to the complex, with police cars parked side-by-side running the length of about 100 yards. With the entrance we had commit­ ted to blocked, we made the decision to gain situational awareness on foot, get eyes on the scene and update responding crews as needed. Upon reaching the involved building I found a well-involved first- and second-floor apartment with extension reaching into a common attic. This was located mid-span within the apartment block, providing additional exposures to the Bravo, Charlie, and Delta side. I made contact with officers on scene and updated responding crews of the access issues, development of the fire and requested a second alarm due to the large increase of incident complexity. I was informed by the sheriff officer in charge of the location of the male assailant and the child. They were known to be in the bathroom attached to the master bedroom. This room was part of a shared wall with the apart­ ment on the Delta side. Officers had attempted to make access through the wall, but were unsuccessful. I tasked my firefighter with obtaining a chainsaw from the engine. I updated respond­ ing crews that we had a known location of victims and we were going to be breaching the wall of an adjoining apartment to attempt access. At this point of the incident, the second-arriving engine had made it to the scene, made access through the exit, and was in position for fire attack. With the cover of the sheriffs, we were able to open the wall and use our TICs (thermal imaging cameras) to locate the armed assailant, who was bent over in the bathtub. I again updated command that we had made access and requested additional resources to assist us. Accepting the risk involved, both my firefighter and I made access to the smoked-out bathroom, where we were able locate the armed assailant and the child, both uncon­ scious in the bathtub with the water running. My firefighter reacted quickly and removed the unconscious child from the tub. The child was quickly passed from fire personnel to the officers in the adjoining apartment providing us with cover. My fire­ fighter and I grabbed the unconscious male and quickly developed the plan of moving him, first to the toilet seat next to the tub, and from there, a second move from the toilet to the bottom of the cut hole that was located just above the toilet. At this point, we were met by a second engine company that assisted us in moving the unconscious male to the adjoining apartment. I informed command that all occupants had been removed from the IDLH environment. The focus was now from lifesaving priority to scene stabilization, due to how involved the building still was in active fire. We swapped out our air tanks and returned to com­ mand for an additional assignment. It wasn't until a few weeks later that we received official word that both individuals involved had made a full recovery. This was a very dynamic call; it could have had a very different outcome. I feel our success lay in the freedom to make the decisions that would make a difference, and in no small way was due to the actions and support of the sheriffs department. Emergency scenes often contain some sense of chaos at first, but our training and expe­ rience quickly bring a systematic plan and a sense of calm for mitigating practically any incident. Most of the time, we all begin on the same page with a common dispatch, relevant updates, and there is a common sequence of events that we rely on to help bring that sense of calm and organization. When things start out differently, especially on significantly complex incidents, then our training, experience, communication, and abilities are pushed to the limits. (Keeley) Upon starting the vehicle and exiting the apparatus bay, I heard traffic on the tac channel. This was unusual to hear something so early in the call. It was E42 giving an update that they had a well involved first-floor apartment fire lapping to the second floor. They reported they had two victims inside the fire unit and they were entering a neighboring unit, breaching a wall to rescue the victims. This call was different and would require our members to perform flawlessly due to the significant safety hazards and life risks to the fire department members and to the public. The access, building location, and the significant law enforcement presence would all add complexity. This call was in Battalion 5 (BC5), but close to my battalion, Battalion 7.1 knew that I would be arriving simultaneously to BC5. BC5 arrived and established command, while I went forward to take a division. As I approached the fire unit, heavy fire was rolling out of the lower unit and into the unit above, with additional extension to the attic. Multiple Sacramento Sheriff officers with assault rifles and body armor were all over the scene. They gave me an update that we had an adult male with a knife, holding his infant child. He had barricaded himself in the master bedroom of the apartment and lit items in the room on fire. He then retreated to the bathroom and they had not seen him since. I heard a saw running in the neighboring unit. I sent additional crews from my position into the neighboring unit to assist the rescue while other engines were used to attack the fire on the first and second floors. Searches and evacuations were also in progress in the exposure units. The baby was removed first, unconscious. I provided an update to command, who had already requested multiple ambulances and another alarm. Command was able to remain strategic by allowing tactical division supervisors to run certain aspects of the scene. Next, the adult male was brought out, also unresponsive. Both victims were transported to our burn center in critical condition. The fire was contained to two units, ventilation was completed, and the building was evacuated. No other injuries occurred. While forward task-level and tactical functions were coordinated, we needed a unified command with law enforcement. They had so much more information based on their experience and knowledge of the scene. They had been on scene and in the apartment, and therefore had good intel on items we would only hear of much later. Law sets up their ICP at a remote location, which in this case was about half a mile away. Fire sets the ICP close to the incident to aid in gathering situational awareness and to allow for face-to-face updates when possible. This difference in our practices did not provide for an opportunity to get into true unified command. Members of the fire department and sheriffs department were heroic that morning. Both lives were saved, and only two apartments were destroyed by fire. Many conversations with our agencies have taken place and we are working on plans to over­ come our unified command challenges. Post-incident thoughts: The importance of flexibility. Just like all firefighters, we arrive to fires with the Chiefs trusting and supporting the crews. What can a department do to develop Unified command. After this call it was clear that we had gaps in communica­ Unified Command  Unified Command (UC) incidents still have the potential for the NIOSH 5 to come into align­ ment. In fact, there is greater potential, since multiple agencies must now work together and overcome boundaries and differences in accepted risk, nomenclature, accountability, SOGs, and command systems. The NIOSH 5 can have an even greater potential in UC. The challenges become exponen­ tially increased the more agencies are involved. Just between fire and law, the NIOSH 5 mani­ fest in ways that include, but are not limited to the following: * Risk assessment---*Fire and law enforcement look at risk very differently. A cop's job is to go into an active shooter situation, whereas fire may stage. Conversely, we go into burn­ ing buildings that cops stay out of, and for good reason. We stay in our lanes based upon the job, training, equipment, and inherent risk respective to our missions. * Communications---*We have different terminology, protocol, frequencies, dispatch cen­ ters, and norms. Cops predominantly still use 10-codes, while fire uses clear text. * Accountability---*We have unique means of accounting for each other, including utilizing different names and labels for varying resources. * Incident command---*Law does not utilize ICS as commonly as fire. This creates further issues. However, they will follow our lead. As seen in the above call, there were two separate ICPs. * SOGs---* Obviously, the difference in policy, protocol and SOGs is significant, which means varying priorities, resource allocations, and even the potential for conflicting operations. We responded to a large multi-vehicle crash on a major freeway. There was a report of dozens of vehicles involved before anyone was on scene, including hazardous materials, semi-trucks, and fire (fig. 16-1). We were miles away and could see the plume of smoke. The first-arriving acting captain arrived on scene and gave an amazing arrival report. It was calm, clear, confident, and concise: "Engine 71 on scene of a large multi-vehicle accident with fire and entrapments. Unknown number of vehicles. Engine 71 is assuming Highway 5 Command. Command Post is mobile. Requesting five additional ambulances, five additional engines, two additional trucks, and two water tenders\..." It was amazing. He was as calm as can be. We were all impressed while still responding and knew that he was going to set the incident up for success. It made us step up our focus and professionalism because he set the tone. He would call additional resources, direct them to approach from different on-ramps, and when the battalion chief arrived and assumed com­ mand, the command transfer was smooth. It was clear that this acting captain had trained a lot. He was unphased, as if to say, "Okay, seen this before. Let's get to work." That kind of pro­ fessionalism can only come from dedication and a lot of training. The accident would involve over 30 vehicles, including multiple semi-trucks, hazardous materials spills, extrications, and fire. Five people were killed. Dozens more were transported using the regional MCI protocols. The incident was one of the largest in California and was ultimately divided into a fire/rescue branch, hazmat branch, and medical branch. Safety, infor­ mation, and liaison officers were all part of the command staff. Unified command was estab­ lished between the fire department and California Highway Patrol. It took several days (operational periods) before the freeway was opened again. Countless other agencies responded, from Fish and Game, to Coroner, to County and State OES. This grew to a Type 3 incident requiring significant logistical support and debriefings. It all started with that first-arriving acting captain. He used the principles you have learned in this book to effectively calm the chaos. He performed a mental size-up before giving an arrival report. He stayed ahead of the incident power curve when he called the world to come and help. He gave clear objectives to incoming units, and he established command, all while remaining calm. You never know what the next shift or call will bring. You may be the first to arrive on the next 9/11. Utilizing the methods learned throughout this book will make you successful.  WISDOM FROM THE MASTERS Murrah Federal Building Bombing---Oklahoma City MARK S. GHILARDUCCI, DIRECTOR OF THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES Throughout my three-plus decades working in public safety, starting as a first responder in the field and working my way up through the ranks, ultimately as the director of the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services, I have utilized ICS exclusively, at every level, to manage a diverse number of incidents, both small and large, one-dimensional, and complex. During my time, I have responded to countless inci­ dents in California and across the country, from fires to earthquakes, search-and-res- cue operations to hazardous material incidents, transportation accidents to multi-casualty incidents. By implementing ICS immediately and building an objective-driven IAP, I have been able to effectively coordinate resources, manage inci­ dents, and ensure that everyone involved in an incident remained on the same page, met designated objectives, and operated safely, with minimal confusion or duplication of effort. Many of the events I responded to started with an initial response of local jurisdic­ tional resources, where we initially approached the scene by establishing a designated IC, developed a quick action plan, and implemented operations. At times, this was all that was needed to effectively manage, coordinate, and mitigate the situation. How­ ever, on other occasions, events grew into incidents requiring the coordination and integration of multiple agencies and resources, often from different organizations or disciplines, but all requiring the need to be on the same page. One such incident that I managed as the IC alongside the chief of the Oklahoma City Fire Department was the US&R operations at the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (fig. 16-2). This was a non-traditional, high-profile, and extremely complicated event, where the incident command system played a crucial role in the success of the incident. Early on, an ICS structure was established to help coordinate and manage the rescue and recov­ ery efforts and the multiple agencies and organizations involved. It provided a stan­ dardized structure for communications, establishment of measurable objectives by operational period, effective decision-making, and resource allocation, which ensured a more efficient and effective use of resources, enhanced victim accountability, and supported personnel safety throughout the multiple-week event. The ICS helped manage the enormity of the event, which included more than 3000 responders over 25 opera­ tional periods, through the establishment of key operational objectives that addressed the continued rescue and recovery of victims; appropriate number and. type of person­ nel assigned; allocation of personnel working both outside and inside the building; evacuation procedures in the event of secondary collapse; establishment of divisions and branches and/or assignment of single specialized resources; establishment of a security perimeter and traffic plan; identification and confirmation of the number of people missing and their work location; search zones and building stabilization pro­ cedures; incident communications plan; a medical and safety plan; and specialized situational awareness such as weather and building schematics. Managing a rapidly evolving incident can be a daunting task, especially when unex­ pected events occur, or the situation requires immediate lifesaving actions (fig. 16-3). The incident command system provides a clear framework for managing resources and is an essential tool that offers structure, flexibility, and organization for any type of incident. This systematic tool can be utilized by a first-arriving engine company or EMS unit to manage a single vehicle accident, as well as for the management of a multi-alarm, multi-agency event, or large-scale multi-jurisdictional/regional disaster. Whether at the incident scene or at the Emergency Operations Center, ICS ensures that everything is well-coordinated and runs smoothly by providing a standardized all-risk incident management concept, built around incident action planning, defined mea­ surable objectives, logistics support, and operational tactics. It allows responders to rapidly integrate into an organizational baseline structure that matches the complex­ ities and demands of the incident or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries or differences in terminology.  A key element of ICS is its considerable internal flexibility. It can expand or contract to meet unique needs or types of incidents. This flexibility makes it a very cost-effective and efficient management tool for both small and large, traditional, and non-traditional situations. I have also utilized ICS to manage multiple non-traditional events, such as two Super Bowls and other similar large-venue events, humanitarian support for migrants crossing along California's southern border, swiftwater rescues, post-fire debris removal operations, security events and civil unrest, and of course, the response to COVID-19. Organized into five functional areas, ICS sets in place a standard organization that includes five functional elements: command, operations, planning, logistics, and admin­ istration/finance, and the establishment of a unified command structure which allows all personnel, agencies, and organizations involved in the response effort to work together under a single command structure with a designated IC. This baseline struc­ ture ensures that any response effort, no matter the cause or type of event, is organized in a consistent manner, is effectively coordinated, and is scalable, meaning that the organization can expand or contract as dictated by the incident's needs. Whether responding to a complicated natural disaster, a structure fire, or a single-patient EMS event, the ICS consistently ensured that I managed the incident effectively, safely, and efficiently (fig. 16-4). Incidents today are often unpredictable and can rapidly evolve into extreme events. Incident managers need to gain the experience to make the right calls and be willing to consider all aspects of information that can determine the coordination and direc­ tion of the incident. Utilizing ICS as your baseline incident management tool, built around situational awareness, event intelligence, input from technical experts, devel­ opment of an action plan, and actionable objectives will minimize tunnel vision and maximize the safe and effective mitigation of an incident, no matter how large and how many agencies respond. The Impact of 9/11 on Unified Command UC has become much more prevalent across America since September 11,2001. On 9/11, Amer­ ica was attacked on a scale and magnitude that had not been seen since Pearl Harbor on Decem­ ber 7, 1941. In addition, FDNY and the city of New York, by sheer size and scope, were not accustomed to calling mutual aid, as they had ample resources to handle day-to-day incidents, and several significant ones. The result was several key lessons learned regarding the national-level of response and need for unified command and coordination of resources on an unprecedented scale. FEMA US&R Sacramento, California Task Force 7 (CA TF-7) responded on September 11, 2001 to New York City, and we spent 11 days at Ground Zero (fig. 16-5). Virtually all the FEMA US&R Task Forces would respond in the weeks following the attacks. Since we responded on the day of the attacks, we had a first-hand experience of how the lack of a NIMS slowed our response and ability to coordinate with FDNY. The FEMA system launched the US&R teams; however, there was not a means to coordinate the response with FDNY chiefs and city leaders, so the process of getting to the pile was slow and frustrating. In the days that followed, there would be countless citizens, fire departments, construction workers, and other resources that would self-dispatch into the scene, creating even more chaos. These well-intentioned individuals and groups looked like ants on a hill while they uninten­ tionally created a greater burden to the ability to organize the incident and ensure the IAP was effective. As you can imagine, the scene was massive and required unprecedented command and coordination efforts. In the face of such a disaster, especially not knowing how many of their own were lost, the FDNY members were awesome. They worked tirelessly and many would later succumb to the effects of exposure during their heroic efforts in the years that followed. We had lost brothers as well. The national US&R community is a tight-knit group and we had built friendships through training together with the FDNY Task Force members and through the Fire Department Instructors' Conference (FDIC). As we attempted to engage in the operations, the size and scope of the destruction made our ability to communicate and coordinate with the appropriate leaders extremely challeng­ ing, to say the least. Barriers to communication, lack of defined processes, freelancing, and field personnel not knowing our mission and capabilities all added to the myriad of challenges. Many of our counterparts were buried in the pile. The Special Operations Command (SOC) units responded, and many had died. FDNY is a massive organization and SOC/US&R  members comprise a very small percentage of the total personnel. So, in short, no one knew who we were. One defining moment was when I spotted an FDNY Task Force 1 tent in the sea of human­ ity, equipment, and carnage. I stepped into the tent and thought I saw a ghost. It was my friend, Bobby Athanas from FDNY Rescue 3.1 was sure he was dead. We embraced tightly. He then told me that another dear brother, Dennis Mojica of Rescue 1, had died. This would be the roller coaster of emotions that defined our 11-day deployment. Unified command is all about relationships before the incident. Firefighters and all emer­ gency responders and military personnel know that trust is the key to success. Relationships and trust built *before* an incident will pay huge dividends. In the midst of the chaos, seeing a familiar face in a different uniform brings relief and can be an anchor point from which to build a unified LAP. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 On February 28, 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) was launched. This created the NIMS to galvanize the lessons learned from 9/11 into apian to move forward and be better trained and equipped in the future. The following key components are directly out of HSPD-5:^1^ *Purpose* *To enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing* *a single, comprehensive national incident management system.* *Policy* *To prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters,* *and other emergencies, the United States Government shall establish a single,* *comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. The objective of the United* *States Government is to ensure that all levels of government across the Nation have the* *capability to work efficiently and effectively together, using a national approach to* *domestic incident management. In these efforts, with regard to domestic incidents, the* *United States Government treats crisis management and consequence management as a* *single, integratedfunction, rather than as two separatefunctions.* *Tasking* *The Secretary (of Homeland Security) shall develop, submit for review to the Homeland* *Security Council, and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS). This* *system will provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local* *governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and* *recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide for* *interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, and local capabilities, the NIMS* *will include a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the* *incident command system; multi-agency coordination systems; unified command;* *training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying* *types of resources); qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, and* *reporting of incident information and incident resources.* Other regions of the country, like California, have used unified command on a regular basis for decades. Each fire season, the California Master Mutual Aid System is utilized, which is coordinated by the California Office of Emergency Services (CAL OES). Through CAL OES, fire departments throughout the state respond in mutual aid to major wildfires. Strike teams of engines and other resources commonly will travel hundreds of miles up and down California to respond and fight catastrophic wildfires that threaten and destroy entire communities (fig. 16-6). As a member of a Type 1IMT, I was fortunate to see the full scope of ICS in action on large-scale wildfires. The United States Forest Service (USFS) had utilized unified command and ICS across America. The key to the success of the interoperability of so many different agencies working together was mutual respect and building trust. UC does not have to be reserved for large-scale incidents like 9/11 or a major wildfire. UC is extremely effective on daily Type 4 and 5 incidents, from vehicle accidents to hazardous mate­ rial responses. The scope of this chapter is on such incidents; however, key points of the larger components of NIMS are included. You may have *a Type 5* incident that quickly scales, through unified command, and becomes a Type 3 incident or greater. All incidents begin locally with that first-due officer. So, under­ standing the nuances of UC and how it can quickly grow and how you can set it up with a strong foundation as the initial IC will help to ensure you are successful. The key to successful UC is relationships and training before the event. Trust and relationships must be built between responders of varying agencies well in advance if you expect to have an effective and efficient unified response. That trust can only come from training and time. A Local Example We responded to a report of a hazardous material in the playground of an elementary school. Units arrived, reporting a plastic soda bottle with an unknown substance and report of sev­ eral children feeling sick. This quickly became a hazardous materials response and multi-casualty incident (MCI), simultaneously (fig. 16-7).  Size-up was as follows: Facts: ♦ Elementary school with at least five children complaining of illness. ♦ Possible hazardous material in the C side playground. ♦ Afternoon, clear weather, and 70°F. No wind. Probabilities: ♦ Confirmed VP that may grow in number. ♦ Substance may be a hazardous material, or not. ♦ Parents will quickly descend upon the school for their kids and create an account­ ability problem. Own situation: ♦ Initial response was one engine, one fire medic ambulance, one battalion chief, and a sheriff. Decision: ♦ Lifesaving priority. ♦ Combination strategy. Plan of operations: ♦ Isolate and deny entry to the C side playground. ♦ Triage, treat, and transport patients with appropriate decontamination. ♦ Call hazmat team, additional engine, truck, and five medic ambulances. I balanced the response to include the resources above, and more were added. Sheriffs arrived and I suggested to the senior officer that we enter into UC with the rear of my vehicle as the ICP. He readily agreed. I requested that the school principal join us at the ICP. Our IAP con­ sisted of a life priority, combination strategy, with the following unified incident objectives: 1. Establish an interior perimeter/exclusion zone around the hazardous material (defensive space until arrival of hazmat team) (law/fire/EMS). 2. Declare an MCI. Remove, treat, and transport any sick or injured children and/or adults (fire/EMS). 3. Establish an exterior perimeter to prevent any parents or outside people from accessing or leaving the school and compromising student accountability (law). 4. Identify, isolate, and mitigate the hazardous material (fire). 5. Provide appropriate levels of decontamination (fire/EMS). 6. Account for all students who are transported and/or remaining on site (law/fire/EMS). 7. Shelter all uninjured/non-contaminated adults and children in place in the gym by class (law). 8. Give accurate and timely information via news and social media to allay concerns of parents (law/fire). 9. Reunify children and parents (law). 10. Inform and coordinate with county OES for hazmat removal and documentation (fire). By the end of the incident, we transported 29 students to local hospitals. Several ambulances made more than one round trip. Reunification between parents and children was challenging yet performed very efficiently between the school staff and law enforcement. All of the patients were children, and most did not have a complaint other than "feeling funny" which, seemed to be a psychogenic response. The amount and quantity of hazardous material was negligible. This turned out to essentially be a great UC drill. Lessons learned: Law enforcement will follow your lead. They know that the fire department typically has a better working knowledge of ICS. If you suggest UC, they will most likely oblige. Depending upon the nature of the incident, interior and exterior perimeters are crucial to controlling the scene. This is most necessary in an MCI and hazardous materials incident, but could apply elsewhere. Sharing objectives at the ICP between law and fire is vital to getting on the same page. Each IC should have an aid to assist with respective radio traffic. Divisions and groups work especially well in unified command. Here we had the following: ♦ Medical group with objectives of triage, treat, and transport. ♦ Hazmat group with objectives of identify, mitigate, decontaminate. ♦ Law group with the objectives of inner/outer perimeter control and reunification. ♦ PIO with objective of timely and repetitive information. ♦ Rather than a liaison, the school principal was identified as an additional IC and remained at the ICP. This proved vital to clear communications with school faculty and staff, understanding the layout, attendance, and support services available. It also proved vital to accurate parental information dissemination (fig. 16-8). UNIFIED COMMAND  The acronym UNIFIED COMMAND is for the specific nuances of the unified command inci­ dent. Once the UC is established, consider the appropriate SAW-CSS-RECEO-VSS worksheet (high-rise fire, vegetation fire, MCI, hazmat) to establish your incident tactical and control objectives. Structure fires will likely not be in unified command; however, a large vegetation fire may utilize UC between jurisdictions or between law and fire for evacuation. At the very least, an evacuation group may be supervised and staffed by law enforcement. I have used this several times with much success. We responded to a law enforcement assist that involved a barricaded suspect with his child held hostage. This became a Type 3 incident and lasted several days. The UNIFIED COMMAND system worked well. We had unified briefings with sheriffs and the provided them with lad­ ders, lighting, fire standby, and ultimately EMS (fig. 16-9). UNIFIED COMMAND **Understand the situation:** Size up and look beyond your scope/discipline. Unlike the unifo­ cal nature of structure fires, a unified command situation requires you to think of other dis­ ciplines, objectives, and jurisdictions. Look at the total incident from all aspects: fire, EMS, law, highway patrol, hazardous materials, OES, city/county, public works, state, and federal agencies (Coast Guard, Fish and Game, Air Resources, County Health, etc.). **Notify appropriate agencies:** The AHJ is the lead agency, by decree, and has the formal/legal power and responsibility to control and enforce rules, regulations, standards, and other guide­ lines affecting the boundaries of the area under its charge. The AHJ will often determine the priorities and IAP for a particular operation, or at least have representatives on scene to do so. For example, the AHJ for a highway is the state highway patrol. The AHJ for crime within city limits is the police department. The AHJ for structure fires is your FD. The AHJ for hazardous materials incident may be the FD, PD, or local OES. Notify the AHJ and any agencies that may have operational/jurisdictional authority besides yours. If in doubt, give them your size-up and ask if they intend to respond. *Informing* another agency is not the same as *involving* another agency. Just because you call and they respond does not necessarily mean that UC is automatic. Consider the following incident types and agencies: Vegetation fire: Law enforcement for traffic control and evacuation. Again, they may or may not enter into UC with you and simply fill a tactical role (evacuation group); how­ ever, if you have a large fire along a freeway, chances are highway patrol will be in UC with you, for example. Also consider another fire agency like a state fire department or federal agency like the U.S. Forest Service for fires on state/federal lands and forests.  MCI: An active shooter, for example, would obviously be a UC incident with law enforce­ ment. As previously discussed in the case study, if the incident is at a school, Heaven forbid, consider the principal or their designee to join you in UC. The principal is ideal as they have the final say and this will reduce reflex time for decision-making. Hazardous material incident: Law enforcement or the county OES may have authority, depending upon your city charter, even if they do not have response capabilities. A hazardous material release on private property could necessitate a liaison or UC with the site manager. **Identify the need for UC:** Does the incident go beyond just calling additional agencies and escalate to unified command? When in doubt, call for help and ask your boss or counterpart if UC is appropriate. It cannot hurt and will keep you ahead of the incident power curve. Trig­ gers for UC include, but are not limited to: Vegetation fire that crosses jurisdictional boundaries into another city or agency response area. Hazardous materials incident in a waterway, on a highway, or at school or other govern­ ment facility. MCI involving a shooting at a government building or on a highway. Fire or other significant incident in a school. **Find your counterpart:** Find the AHJ representative and the highest-ranking officer/author- ity figure in the other discipline. This will require effort and you may need a runner. Using dis­ patch is not an effective means, unless attempting to find their ICP. **Information exchange:** Give and gather info. Do so in context of their needs. The more you empathize and anticipate their needs, the more they will reciprocate. CAN reports are an excel­ lent tool. **Establish unified command:** Make it official and notify your respective resources/people and dispatch centers. Identify and communicate the ICP. **Develop the plan:** Identify joint priority, strategy, and tactical objectives. **Communicate the plan:** Ensure that the priority, strategy, and tactical objectives of the inci­ dent are communicated to everyone and set up a communications plan for strategic and tac­ tical operations. If you do not have common communications, then identify a single PIO and briefing area for media. **Objectives:** Establish groups and/or divisions to manage your objectives. The tactical objec­ tives of the incident must be jointly communicated and in terms that all disciplines understand (i.e., set up rescue task forces for an active shooter incident with the objective of rapid triage and removal of victims in the warm zone). **Map it:** Obtain and share a map/plot plan/site plan/Google Earth image of the incident loca­ tion, including roadways. **Mark it:** Utilize ICS to mark the incident divisions, branches, staging areas, access points, medical treatment areas, helispots, traffic patterns, and so on. Identify inner/outer perimeters, hot/warm/cold zones, and so on. **Accountability:** Ensure all personnel know their job and their boss. Use ICS groups, divisions, and branches for accountability and safety. Consider a safety officer as well. **Needs assessment:** Conduct an operational resource needs assessment and anticipate logis­ tical resource needs such as lighting, feeding, shelter, and so on. **Deploy the plan:** Briefings and CAN reports should be appropriately established through groups/divisions/branches. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND In the early morning of June 24,2021, the Champlain Towers, a multi-story beachfront condominium located in Surfside, Florida collapsed. The collapse was a devastating tragedy, resulting in the loss of 98 lives and injuring many others. The incident shocked the local community, as well as people across the United States and around the world, who followed the ongoing search-and-rescue efforts and mourned the loss of those affected by the disaster (fig. 16-10). During this timeframe I was the assistant fire chief for the Special Operations Division for the City of Miami Fire-Rescue Department. One of the areas of responsibility as the Chief of Special Operations is the US&R, Florida Task Force 2 (FL-TF2). FL-TF2 is one of eight State of Florida nd one of twenty-eight Federal (FEMA) task forces. This team responds to natural (i.e., hurricanes, earthquakes) and man-made (i.e., terrorist events) disasters throughout the country when needed. I've been on the team since early 2001 and I've been a task force leader since 2011. During my tenure I've been deployed to over 30 disasters to include the 9/11, Hurricane Katrina 2005, Haiti Earthquake 2010, Hurri­ cane Florence 2018, Hurricane Michael 2018, Puerto Rico Earthquake 2020, Surfside Building Collapse 2021, Kentucky Flooding 2022, and Hurricane Ian 2022, to name a few. For the Champlain Towers Collapse, I was deployed as one of the task force leaders for FL-TF2. During the first operational period I was asked to be the division/group super­ visor for the 12:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m., Alpha shift. As the division/group supervisor I focused on two objectives: (1) the safety of all the responders working on the building, and (2) move the building as quickly as possible to try to rescue anyone that could be alive (fig. 16-11). There were several concerns that needed to be addressed during the deployment of resources to this disaster. These concerns consisted of the unknown amount of miss­ ing people, tremendous amount of smoke/fire/water, questions of how did the building fall and will the remaining building fall on top of the rescuers, COVID-19 was in full throttle, religious concerns, politics, weather, Category 1 Hurricane approaching, rela­ tionships with those missing in the building, body recovery, tremendous number of personal belongings, and so forth. So, where does one begin? Early on, we created divisions to have accountability of all the teams that were work­ ing the building, but this ended up not being ideal because the footprint was a little  over 1.25 acres. Due to the limited geographical footprint, we ended up deciding to take all the task force squads working on the Alpha shift and create one team. This allowed us to keep communication confusion down and improved coordination of the rescue efforts. For example, FL2 squad 1, FL3 squad 1, and FL4 squad 1 were modified to squads 1 through 15. Each squad would just fill the gap for whichever team was up for rehab. No squad had a set geographical location assigned to them and this allowed for a much higher work rate of speed, and it maximized workflow. The fact that the teams were able to move 22 million pounds of debris in just 21 days is a testament to their dedication, expertise, and hard work (fig. 16-12). Accountability was critical for the safety of all the responders working at the site, and keeping detailed logs of which squads were working and in which location of the building collapse was essential. My biggest worry that constantly gave me tremendous strain was the concern that what was left standing of the 12-story building would fall on top of all the rescuers, especially since the cause of the original collapse was unknown. We worked alongside some of the best structural engineers and safety offi­ cers in the business to come up with what would be a suitable area of operation while trying to be as safe as possible in an unsafe environment (fig. 16-13). As a leader of a major disaster response like the Surfside Building Collapse, it's essen­ tial to consider not only the safety of the responders but also the emotional toll that such an experience can have on them. Responders are exposed to traumatic and often heartbreaking situations, and they may struggle with the aftermath of their work long after the event has ended. Providing support and resources to help responders process their experiences and cope with the emotional impact of their work is critical to ensur­ ing their long-term well-being (fig. 16-14).  These are many of the significant takeaways from the Surfside Building Collapse response: 1. Allowing the family members to come to the site and witness the destruction 2. One team, one mission! Put all the squads in numerical order, squads 1 through 3. Emotional scars\... Responders are also human beings, and it's important to 4. Communicating with the family members of responders and providing resources 5. Always be inclusive, because you don't know what you don't know. Being inclu­ 6. While not everyone can be saved, making a positive impact and trying to 7. Deal with one issue at a time. Dealing with issues as they arise and addressing 8. Try to find some good in everything bad. Finding positives or silver linings, such 9. Make a difference in everything you do. Striving to make a difference and improve This building collapse response took all eight State of Florida Task Forces and five Fed­ eral Task Forces being deployed for 29-days to locate 100% of the missing people. This response was a coordinated effort by all the police departments, first responders, fire departments, search-and-rescue teams, and volunteers to complete the mission. Scaling to a Larger Incident Type  You will initially be in a Type 5 or Type 4 incident. The scope of this book is primarily the Type 5 and 4 incident; however, scaling to a Type 3 incident is more likely than in years past due to the advent of Type 3 IMTs that respond to operational area (county-level) incidents. The IC must know what will happen to set up the incident to transition to the Type 3 level. Most likely, you will be in unified command with another agency, likely law, before the tran­ sition to a Type 3 team occurs. As you are commanding the incident, your counterparts and/ or bosses will be listening, and once they trigger a Type 3IMT response, you will be notified. This will likely happen by phone. SOGs and policy differ. You may also find yourself as one of several incidents that are happening concurrently. This could be the case with multiple fires due to red-flag weather conditions, arsonists and/or civil unrest, a natural disaster, or a series of manmade disasters. This may trigger a complex or area command format with an emer­ gency operations center. Figure 16-15 shows a possible ICS for a unified command with law enforcement for an MCI. A *complex* is two or more individual incidents located in the same general proximity that is assigned to a single incident commander or unified command to facilitate management. An *area command* is an expansion of the incident command function primarily designed to manage a very large incident that has multiple management teams assigned (fig. 16-16). However, an area command can be established at any time that incidents are close enough that oversight direction is required among incident management teams to ensure conflicts do not arise.^2^ An *emergency operations center* (EOC) is the physical location where the coordination of information and resources to support incident management (on-scene operations) activities normally takes place (fig. 16-17). An EOC may be a temporary facility or located in a more cen­ tral or permanently established facility, perhaps at higher level of organization within a jurisdiction.^3^ If multiple incidents/locations are being managed, an Area Command team may be estab­ lished to coordinate and prioritize resource requests from the various locations/incidents. This could be a Type 3 IMT. The EOC supports the IMT.  Fig. 16-17. The Emergency Operations Center supports the incident management team. *Source.* Photo courtesy of FEMA CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Route 91 Music Festival Shooting The Route 91 Harvest Festival was a large, outdoor concert festival featuring some of the largest names and acts in Country music. Beginning in 2014, the event took place for three consecutive nights on a 17-acre lot located on the south end of the Las Vegas Strip. Growing in popularity each year, the festival hosted as many as 25,000 attendees each night. The location for this event is in the jurisdiction of the Las Vegas Metropol­ itan Police Department (LVMPD) and the Clark County Fire Department (CCFD). The third and final night for the 2017 festival was Sunday, Oct. 1. With more than 22,000 attendees and hundreds of workers on site, the last act was on stage and performing the closeout set. The weekend event had been a huge success. Unfortunately, that real­ ity quickly changed. On the 32nd floor of a resort hotel across the street from the festival, a lone gunman opened fire on the concert venue with multiple high-powered rifles. In a timeframe of about 10 minutes, more than 1,000 rounds rained down on the venue, resulting in a horrific scene. More than 850 people were injured, more than 420 of those had at least one gunshot wound and ultimately 60 people lost their lives. This attack led to a large response from multiple emergency service entities located within the Las Vegas Valley. Within 10 minutes of the initial call alerting police and fire/EMS to the attack, the process to establish a UIC between LVMPD and CCFD had begun. A short time later UC was set up at the police station just down the street from the venue. This transition was not perfect but was functional and only happened because of the mutual training and understanding brought about by years of hard work and relationship-building between the LVMPD and CCFD leadership and members. On the morning of October 2nd, the initial response period ended, and the next oper­ ational period began with LVMPD, CCFD, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) listed as the unified incident commanders. This format lasted for two days. But how did we get to this point, law enforcement and fire service in a functioning UC on a major incident? In November 2008, Mumbai, India suffered a coordinated, multi-point terrorist attack that lasted for four days and resulted in 160 deaths. The scale of this attack caught the attention of law enforcement agencies across the world, including the LVMPD and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Not long after this attack, these two depart­ ments joined up and sent representatives to Mumbai to learn firsthand about the details of the attack and most importantly, lessons learned from Mumbai's law enforcement representatives. The information that came back from that trip ultimately led to the transformation of law enforcement and fire service relationships across southern Nevada. At the time of the Route 91 Harvest Festival attack, LVMPD and the CCFD were sev­ eral years into a collaborative effort to prepare our respective departments and regional counterparts for a large-scale incident of some type. This was no easy task, as resis­ tance from both sides was a significant obstacle to developing, testing, and evaluating potential response procedures and policies. However, given the state of the world and, for that part, our country at the time, having a hostile mass casualty incident (HMCI) take place in our jurisdiction was a matter of when, not if, and everyone knew it. Unfor­ tunately, that reality exists in every town, large or small, urban or rural, across the United States. From 2010 to 2013 there were many meetings, policy drafts, and several dozen train­ ing drills at venues ranging from schools, government buildings, shopping malls, and other soft target locations. As expected, there were several mistakes, bad ideas, and concepts that were exposed during these drills. However, those failures provided oppor­ tunities for mutual discussion and operational improvement by both law enforcement and fire. Ultimately, a policy was solidified by all involved to include support from the labor unions representing responders on both sides. At this point all law enforcement entities and fire departments began training their personnel to respond together under a UC. This also led to LVMPD and CCFD integrating many training aspects from new recruits to supervisory level promotional training, resulting in not only familiarity of procedures, but person-to-person recognition between law enforcement and fire per­ sonnel when the attack happened. This fact was noted by many of those who responded to this incident. Fast forward back to the night of October 1st, 2017. As chaos was unfolding on the Las Vegas Strip, senior leaders from LVMPD and CCFD were descending on the area from all directions. The 17-acre concert venue quickly became a 3.5 square mile crime scene as victims fled in all directions, including to the perimeter of the international airport. Within minutes of the call coming in the first CCFD battalion chief (B2) arrived, estab­ lished command, requested a multiple alarm response, and quickly located a sergeant from LVMPD who was at a major intersection just north of the scene. The sergeant advised B2 that his lieutenant was enroute to the South-Central Area Command police station, six blocks south of their current location, and that location was going to serve as the ICP. With that information, B2 directed Battalion 6 (B6), who was arriving from that direction, to go to that location, meet up with the LVMPD lieutenant, and at that point he would transfer command to B6. As previously mentioned, this was not as smooth as anticipated; however, with the arrival of an LVMPD captain and a CCFD deputy chief, who had previously trained together on large-scale events, UC was trans­ ferred to them for the remainder of the initial response period. One of the biggest challenges for the UC in handling this incident is what is known as "echo calls." For more than an hour, 9-1-1 calls were coming in from nearly a half dozen resort properties on the Strip and the airport saying someone was shot at that loca­ tion. Fearing that we were experiencing a multi-point attack, similar to Mumbai, UIC had to send resources to those locations to handle what was reported as "another active shooter." These efforts took almost two hours and dozens of personnel to handle. For­ tunately, there were no other shooters and the gunshot victims at these locations had actually been shot at the concert and fled to these other locations seeking shelter and help. Lessons learned from an incident at a night club about seven weeks prior to the attack were key to the UIC's decision-making process during the attack. In that event, a fight in a night club led to numerous 9-1-1 calls reporting an active shooting situation at various locations, all of which were unfounded. The debrief provided by LVMPD to both law enforcement and fire service on that incident was fresh in everyone's mind as the attack on the concert unfolded. Many lessons were learned as a result of this incident. From incident command to emergency management functions supporting more than 4,200 people in need of some form of assistance, to the massive undertaking of providing for the mental health needs for all involved, and the amazing work done by the medical examiner's office, we all learned a lot. We also realized that our regional, multi-disciplinary, multi-year efforts to prepare for some kind of large incident paid off (fig. 16-18). Lessons Learned 1. Sudden need to debrief a large percentage of your organization. We had over 100 personnel from CCFD on-scene. Our employee assistance program and peer support team were nowhere big enough to handle this impact. The IAFF was a tremendous help, as they sent two teams of personnel to help us. Building  relationships with local groups that provide counseling, trauma yoga, medita­ tion, spiritual needs, or other similar services is strongly advised. 2. The size and magnitude of the family assistance center/reunification center was underestimated. Along with that, we never considered the need for a long-term resiliency center to provide ongoing assistance to survivors before this event. It's been over five years, and our resiliency center is still operating. 3. Support hospitals in times of patient surge from a hostile MCI. We developed and implemented a response model called "Hospital Area Command.\'^1^\' Even though our event produced hundreds of patients, one hospital seeing 200 patients arrive in an hour, the number of patients that can collapse a hospi­ tal's emergency resources is scalable. For example, a small town with a 10-bed emergency room and a staff of 10 will be completely overwhelmed if 50 people are injured during an attack on a local sporting event or other gathering. 4. Continue to build and foster relationships with other response agencies. Use the "One Team, One Fight" mentality. No matter what your job is, law enforcement, fire, EMS, hospital RN, doctor, or respiratory tech, your goal when you go to work is to do your part to save lives. That is our fight, and all those mentioned are on the same team. 5. Continue to work on communications. Hold exercises that involve line-level responders, supervisors, and communication centers. In those exercises, prac­ tice using different radio channels in the ICP and at branch or division/group level operations. Identify and practice ways to disseminate this information during the initial response phase and ongoing operational periods. We found some success by taking pictures on smart phones that were then texted to staff in the field. Summary Unified Command (UC) is a situation that you are more likely to encounter than ever before. The attacks on September 11, 2001 changed the landscape of incident command and coordi­ nation between agencies and jurisdictions. We must train and build relationships with our allied agencies well before an incident occurs. Trust is crucial. This includes law enforcement, EMS, public works, and countless other agencies that you may never have expected. In addi­ tion, state and federal resources may be involved if/when your incident escalates. The acronym UNIFIED COMMAND can be utilized to train and engrain key components of settingup successful UC operations. Communications, like any incident, will make or break success. The UC arena is exponentially more challenging for the NIOSH 5, especially in account­ ability and communications. The principles you have learned throughout this book definitely apply to UC: Perform a thor­ ough, ongoing size-up with FPODP, stay ahead of the incident power curve by calling resources early, bridge the tactical gap with ICS, and so on. If the incident scales to a Type 3 level, understanding the moving parts around you will make you more successful. This includes the use of a Type 3IMT, the EOC, and area command for multiple incidents. Remember, it all starts with the first-arriving responder, who must remain calm and understand that the tone is set with the first arrival report. Take a deep breath, size up your situation, and trust your training. Chapter Review Review Questions 1. Explain why there is greater potential for the presence of the NIOSH 5 at incidents involving unified command. 2. What are the key components of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5? 3. Define the acronym UNIFIED COMMAND. 4. What is the difference between a complex and area command? FESHE Strategy and Tactics (C0279) Related Content The content contained in chapter 16 provides detailed information specific to incidents involv­ ing a unified command structure. While the FESHE CO279 course does not specifically refer­ ence unified command incidents, they involve development of a command structure and NIMS compliance for appropriate coordination of resources. The chapter format supports the CO279 course outline by detailing information on unified command incident operations, communi­ cations, and coordination with regard to ICS/NIMS roles and responsibilities. The information in this chapter can be utilized to support training and educational programs associated with the Emergency Services Delivery Fire Officer III 6.6 and 6.6.1 and Fire Offi­ cer IV 7.6.1 and 7.6.2. For larger-scale incidents and pre-planning, the content in this chapter also supports training and education for Fire Officer III 6.6.3 "Develop a plan for the organiza­ tion given an unmet need for resources that exceed what is available in the organization.\" The chapter content also supports the education and training associated with the Emergency Man­ agement professional qualifications for Fire Officer III 6.8. 1. "Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5," U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Feb­ ruary 28, 2003, Security%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf. 2. FIRESCOPE, *Field Operations Guide---ICS 420-1,* ICS Publication, 2022. 3. FIRESCOPE, *Field Operations Guide.* 4. Greg Cassell et al., "The Clark County (NV) Hospital Area Command Collaboration," *Fire* *Engineering,* May 1, 2023, nv-hospital-area-command-collaboration/\#gref.