Commercial Fires - MFC Chapter 10 PDF

10 Commercial Fires Fig. 10-0. Los Angeles City Fire Department works a commercial fire. *Source.* Photo courtesy of Los Angeles City (CA) Fire Department Introduction Commercial buildings come in all kinds of shapes, sizes, configurations, construction types, uses, eras, hybrids, and purposes...

10 Commercial Fires Fig. 10-0. Los Angeles City Fire Department works a commercial fire. *Source.* Photo courtesy of Los Angeles City (CA) Fire Department Introduction Commercial buildings come in all kinds of shapes, sizes, configurations, construction types, uses, eras, hybrids, and purposes. Commercial structure fires require an entirely different mindset from the IC and the rest of the response team of officers. The most common pitfail is treating a commercial building like a residential fire. Commercial fires are much less forgiv­ ing of errors, and when the habits of house fires are applied to a commercial structure, we can end up behind the power curve very quickly. While most firefighter injuries and fatalities occur in residential structures, there is a greater potential for larger numbers of firefighter injuries and fatalities to occur on a single commercial fire. Typically, the greatest life hazard on most commercial fires is us, the firefighters. The IC must train and prepare the troops to come into commercial structure fires with tre­ mendous sobriety regarding the potential risks involved. VP, tactics, risk, recon, resources, time, and ICS all have different characteristics. This chapter aims to give you clarity on the risks and requirements of commercial building fires. Commercial Structure Fire Definition and Hazards **There are countless definitions of commercial structures. For example:** * Any structure which is not a residential structure, including but not limited to shopping* *centers, offices, nursing homes, and similar structures.^1^* * A structure designed or used for human habitation, or human occupancyfor industrial,* *educational, assembly, professional or commercial purposes.* * A commercial building definition is one in which at least 50% of itsfloor space is usedfor* *commercial activities, such as retail, the providing of services, orfood service (restaurants* *and the like).* Neither the NFPAnor the International Building Code (IBC) lists the term "commercial" in any of their occupancy classifications. *NFPA101: The Life Safety Code, NFPA 5000: The Building* *Construction and Safety Code,* and the IBC use the occupancy classifications in figure 10-1. For the purposes of this text, a *commercial structure* is defined as a building designed and used primarily for business, or a combination of business and residential. Examples include, but are not limited to, the following: Taxpayers (mixed use) Strip malls Restaurants Big-box Mega-box (regional malls) Retail stores Office buildings Warehouses Storage facilities We will include and discuss assemblies later in this chapter, as they have many of the same hazards and challenges, including large life loss potential. As you can see from figure 10-1, assemblies are further characterized by the number of people allowed to legally occupy the building. +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | NFPA 101 and 5000 Occupancy | IBC Occupancy Classification | | Classification | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Assembly | Assembly | | | | | | (divided into subcategories A-1, | | | A-2, A-3, A-4, and A-5) | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Ambulatory Health Care | Business | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Educational | Educational | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Day Care | Educational or Institutional | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Health Care | Institutional | | | | | | (divided into subcategories | | | 1-1,I-2,1-3, and I-4) | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Detention and Correctional | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Residential Board and Care | Institutional or Residential | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | One- and Two-Family Dwelling | Residential | | | | | | (divided into subcategories R-1, | | | R-2, R-3, and R-4) | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Lodging or Rooming House | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Hotels and Dormitory | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Apartment | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Mercantile | Mercantile | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Business | Business | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Industrial | Factory and Industrial | | | | | | (divided into subcategories F-1 | | | and F-2) | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Storage | Storage | | | | | | (divided into subcategories S-1 | | | and S-2) | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | No equivalent occupancy | High Hazard | | classification | | | | (divided into subcategories H-1, | | (see surrounding paragraphs for | H-2, H-3, H-4, and H-5) | | additional information) | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | No equivalent occupancy | Utility and Miscellaneous | | classification | | | | | | (see surrounding paragraphs for | | | additional information) | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ Fig. 10-1. NFPA and IBC building classifications^3^ Construction of these buildings can be any type, era, size, and combination of materials and uses. As mentioned in previous chapters, pre-planning can save firefighter and civilian lives alike. While most firefighter and civilian injuries and deaths are in residences, commercial build­ ings create potential for extreme life loss per fire. The Ghost Ship Fire on December 2, 2016 killed 36 civilians in Oakland, CA. The occupancy was in a commercial warehouse that was zoned for industrial purposes, but a concert was being hosted there. Residential and entertain­ ment purposes were illegal. The warehouse had been illegally converted into an artist collec­ tive with living spaces. This was the deadliest building fire in America since the Station Nightclub Fire in 2003 that killed 100 people. The Sofa Superstore Fire in Charleston, SC claimed the lives of 9 firefighters on June 18,2007. This was the deadliest loss of firefighters since the 9/11 attacks. On May 16, 2020, the Boyd Street Incident in Los Angeles, CA severely injured 12 firefighters. The stakes are high. As the first-due officer, company officer acting as the IC, or the chief who assumes com­ mand for the duration, you must respect commercial fires and teach your members to do the same. **These buildings are wrought with hazards, including but not limited to:** Excessive fire loading Excess flammable liquids beyond permitting Hazardous materials without proper placarding and labeling Illegal remodeling against code Illegal storage of materials High-piled storage racks Security gates, bars, and doors Roll up doors Older and dilapidated construction Lightweight and truss roof assemblies Excess dead loading on the roof Unsupported mansards and facades Loading docks Basements, chases, and freight elevators Access and egress issues Boarded-up doors and windows Sudden collapse of roofs and walls Sudden fire increase, including deflagration Lack of adequate water supply Lack of fixed protection systems or systems that are shut down CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Boyd Street Incident IC Perspective and Overview The LAFD's Boyd Street Incident was a major emergency structure fire on Saturday, May 16,2020. The incident occurred in the heart of downtown LA's industrial/com- mercial district, also adjacent to the skid row area of Los Angeles. For the last few years, the downtown LA area has seen a marked increase in structure fire activity, primarily due to the large homeless population living in and around com­ mercial buildings. A typical scenario is a rubbish fire or tent fire adjacent to a com­ mercial building extending into the building. Depending on the time of day or night, a fire might be very well developed before fire resources arrive. The fire occurred on a Saturday afternoon and was our third fire of the day (for Bat­ talion 1). As a result, the typical weekend training routine had been interrupted because of this busier-than-normal fire tempo combined with staffing and other routine duties. I had been assigned to Battalion 1 for two months before the incident, having been transferred from my first assignment as a newly promoted battalion chief in Battalion 10 in the San Fernando Valley. The training plan was to visit each station in the bat­ talion and conduct Mayday drills beginning with my single-engine companies and eventually getting to my task force houses (two engines and a truck). This plan had been in place since the previous weekend, when I had conducted a Mayday drill with Engine 4 and Rescue Ambulances 4 and 804 (advanced life support \[ALS\] and basic life support \[BLS\] ambulances, respectively). At 18:26 hours, our Metro Fire Communications Center (MFC) dispatched a category B assignment to 357 E. Boyd Street. The first units arrived on scene within 2 minutes and 27 seconds, and the Battalion 1 command team (myself and my emergency inci­ dent technician \[EIT\]) arrived 30 seconds thereafter. Initial companies noted smoke in the area but no obvious loom up, so they dispersed in different directions to see if they could find the source. Truck 9 was the first to find the fire building and took an appropriate outside spot directly across from the address. The truck captain assumed command, gave an arrival report, and deployed his resources offensively. He sent his truck company to the roof for ventilation and his two engine companies on fire attack and backup fire attack. As he was doing this, we arrived on scene. We selected our command post location, just east of the address and across the street from the intersection (fig. 10-2). We transitioned command and continued placing resources in the offensive mode. At the same time, my EIT proceeded to the rear of our rig to set up for a potential extended operation. The initial impression was that we had a fairly incipient fire inside this one-story commercial building due to the current time of day and light-to-moderate lazy smoke in an area known for storing textiles and other consumer goods. This appeared to be "just another one of the many commercial fires we were all used to." The first thing I noticed that seemed odd was a thunderous and resounding rum­ bling noise that sounded akin to a military jet on full after-burner (I used to work on a military airfield). The sound was very noticeable, but I initially did not associ­ ate it with the relatively mild to moderate smoke conditions I saw and the fairly rou­ tine fire communications on the tactical channel. As resources continued to arrive on scene, I began surrounding the fire by placing companies on all four exposure buildings. At approximately five minutes, all the resources from the first alarm arrived on scene and received an assignment. I asked the fire attack team to provide me with a CAN report by asking them to tell me, "What was the occupancy doing business as?" and "What was the fire load like inside?" Unfortunately, I was never given an answer and did not follow up because the conditions quickly deteriorated. I ordered additional resources for a rapid intervention component and to have addi­ tional companies in staging. The loud sound kept growing to the point of interfering  with communications and vibrating the entire street. Finally, around the minute mark, an enormous after-burner-like, clean-burning, bright orange fireball engulfed the whole street. The fireball completely enveloped the aerial ladder and the truck itself for a prolonged period. It also mushroomed towards the sky in what I would estimate was at least 60' up and out of the building. As the fireball engulfed my crews, I broadcasted a Mayday tone, ordering everyone out of the building in preparation to transition to a defensive mode (fig. 10-3). Per our SOGs, my EIT ordered additional resources. At the same time, I began requesting a personnel accountability report and company accountability report (PAR/CAR) from one of the captains that was able to make it outside of the interior of the building and was asking for help. From the vantage of my command post, I could see the crews completely engulfed in flames but had no idea who had made it out of the building and who was unaccounted for. I remember thinking, "They are certainly dead, and we are probably next." The captain talking to me on the tactical channel gave me a body count, trying to deter­ mine which company the injured members were from. Ultimately, he was able to account for both engine companies and two ambulance crew members who were inside the building when it went up in flames, but was not able to give me any information on the truck company. While sounding the tones, I remember Command 22 (our assistant chief) rounding the corner. He tapped me on the shoulder and said, "You run the Mayday, and I'll take the fire." As the next couple of resources arrived on scene, I remember thinking that I needed to build out both a medical unit for our injured members and a rapid interven­ tion group in case anybody was trapped. When the next company checked in, I had to decide the priority assignment. I knew I had at least eight injured firefighters outside and a truck company that was unaccounted for. I prioritized the injured firefighters outside first to avoid delaying their treatment and transportation. Fortunately, all the firefighters were able to exit the building. Still, it weighs heavily that I might have had to delay a trapped firefighter rescue to provide immediate care for the burned fire­ fighters outside the building. I remained in charge of operations for the remainder of the fire until a knockdown was declared, at which point I was relieved and I went to the hospital to check on my guys. It was approximately 0130 hours the next morning. Tactical lessons learned: The main fire building was a long, skinny building nestled between two taller buildings (a two-story and a six-story), limiting roof access and, more impor­ tantly, the ventilation team's egress options to just the building's Alpha side. Two rolling steel doors occupied the entirety of the Alpha side of the building, eliminating any ideal spot to throw a ground ladder or the aerial ladder (creating an access/egress hazard). Having a well-thought-out and rehearsed Mayday procedure with your com­ mand team is vital. If you are working with an overtime member, reviewing your Mayday procedures with them should be your priority. I always make it a point to challenge my captain H's and captain I's on how they will run a Mayday. I have them show me everything from how they will set up their radios to how they will document and track resources, what they will order additional, and how they will deploy their resources as they arrive on scene. Incident command lessons learned: The importance of an officer, especially a chief officer, thoroughly understand­ ing the roles and responsibilities within the incident command system is imperative. During extreme stress, this intimate knowledge will help you identify and prioritize your most significant problems and what group or division you will build to address them. Not to sound cliche, but regularly practicing broadcasting the Mayday tones and drilling with other companies (teaching) was the most important thing I did to prepare for this unplanned event. When everything was quickly unfolding and time seemed compressed, I remem­ ber vividly thinking, "This is not happening," and seeing in my mind's eye my hands going through the motions of sounding the tones from the previous Saturday's company drill. Then, when the pressure was on, I fell back to muscle memory from my recent training. Our command rigs have a plasticized Mayday script. Many of our members memorize the script and assume that, if faced with a Mayday, they will simply regurgitate the script and everything will be alright. Unfortunately, the incident I encountered did not match any of the talking points in the script. These scripts are prompts for things that will most likely occur and that you should think of. It is more important to prepare by quickly recognizing the challenges, prioritiz­ ing, and addressing the problem(s) in front of you, and giving the person(s) in need the proper leadership, guidance, and hope to hang on while the rescue team is on their way. Techniques I applied: When sounding emergency tones or broadcasting vital communications, I have always practiced keying both microphones (tactical and command channels) and communicating on two channels simultaneously. For more details and photos, see the Boyd Street Incident Green Sheet in Appendix B. Commercial Structure Fire Watch Out Situations  Several warning signs on commercial fires should be considered commercial structure fire watch out situations that are mirrored from the Wildland 18 Watch Out Situations. These are in addition to the LAFD structure fire watch out situations in chapter 5 (fig. 10-4). Each is listed below with an explanation: 1. **Inadequate size-up (360° when possible) and recon not performed.** This will be evident by the lack of a sufficient arrival report. If the first-arriving company officer/IC and subsequent chief assuming command do not take note verbally of the size, construc­ tion, and potential use of the building, there is likelihood that this is being treated like a house fire without adequate pause to repeat to all responding units that this is a com­ mercial structure with more potential risks. If the fire is not clearly visible, reconnais­ sance is appropriate before over-committing members inside the structure. 2. **Night operations.** Overhead powerlines, construction features, remodels, modifications, placards, and hazards of all kinds are missed during night operations. The inability to get apparatus around the structure to provide lighting will further complicate visibility. Combined with heavy smoke conditions, night operations at commercial fires are always wrought with greater hazard and accident potential. 3\. **Boarded up and/or heavy security bars and doors.** Commercial building egress is challenging enough without the addition of boarded up doors, windows, and security bars. The front, A side of a commercial building may seem open and accessible. The C side rear often tells a completely different story. For this reason, RICs must access all sides of a commercial building to soften the structure and gain access to hard-to-reach areas. 4\. **Unfamiliar with building, have not pre-planned.** Because some fire departments do not perform pre-planning, and commercial occupancies change, this can be a moving target. That said, get out and walk your commercial buildings as often as possible. You will notice changes and trends that may make a huge difference. 5\. **Command has not announced a clear priority, strategy, or tactical objectives and/** **or there is a lack of incident alignment between them.** Remember, the incident is successful from the top down. You must be in the right priority/strategy before you can maintain alignment in the tactics and tasks. Often, commercial fires are in the wrong priority and strategy because everyone is in groupthink, whereby no one challenges what the team is doing. Look up and ask yourself, "What is our priority here? Are we in the right strategy to support it? What is my risk versus gain? Is a combination strategy a possibility? Should we switch to a defensive strategy?" 6\. **Communications overload on the tactical channel.** Like setting up divisions and groups or calling additional alarms *before* you get behind the curve, the same applies to utilizing additional tactical channels. If you have the capability and the SOGs to do so, consider adding additional tactical channels for your divisions/groups if the primary tactical frequency is overloaded with radio traffic. Countless Maydays have been missed because of this issue. 7\. **Unable to contact crews inside the building due to a repeater issue or construction** **type.** Heavy concrete and reinforced buildings, basements, and security rooms can make repeaters ineffective. You may have to switch to a simplex or direct channel to regain adequate communications with your interior crews. This was the case in a Kaiser Permanente Hospital that was less than a mile from my battalion office. Our pre-plan for that building was to switch to a direct channel upon arrival, thus bypassing the repeater system. As the IC, I spoke to my crews inside on the direct channel and to incoming units on the repeated tactical channel. 8\. **Water supply not established or available.** Insufficient water from the system can have a significant impact on your strategy and tactics. Dead-end hydrants and some water systems may not be able to adequately supply your fire, depending upon the size and flow requirements. 9\. **Limited access around the perimeter.** Overhangs, awnings, fencing, storage, equip­ ment, and a host of other challenges can prevent getting around the building and access to certain areas. 10\. **Attacking the fire from a downwind position.** This may seem obvious, but it has happened. Like a house fire, crews often go to the front door of a commercial building even if it is downwind. This is an example of a residential habit on a commercial fire. Unlike a house, attacking a commercial fire at the closest point to the seat of the fire is likely the most effective and expeditious, rather than a long interior stretch where conditions may deteriorate rapidly during the stretch. 11\. **Little to no visibility without knowing where the fire is located.** Commercial fires are unforgiving and do not have the readily escapable compartments that residences do. If you do not see visible flames upon arrival, proceed with caution. Even light smoke from the outside of a large commercial building can have a well-seated fire deep inside the structure. This may lull you into a false sense of security as you advance into a structure because the heat may be concealed in the overhead, behind closed doors, or below you. 12\. **Excess hazardous materials, flammable liquids, high-piled storage, and/or excess** **fire load.** In some commercial buildings, these are normal contents, such as textiles plants, paper processing facilities, manufacturing facilities, automobile repair shops, swimming pool supply stores, and paint suppliers, to name a few. That is the point. These commercial buildings are not offices, small retailers, compartmentalized strip malls, restaurants, and so on. These present greater hazards and challenges. Beware of getting ambushed (such as with the Boyd Street Incident). 13\. **Primary access is under an unsupported mansard.** This was the case on the 65th Street Fire in Sacramento. The mansard collapsed just after firefighters evacuated, pinning their hoselines in place. 14\. **Conditions worsening during interior attack.** Conditions in residences typically improve relatively quickly, as access can be made easily when compared to commercial buildings, and required fire flow is much lower than in a commercial structure. In many cases, firefighters at the task level do not recognize worsening conditions, especially above and below them. Mentally, they want the same knockdown that they have experi­ enced many times and most likely recently from their last house fire. When they don't get it, they get emotionally involved and stay in the fight too long despite worsening condi­ tions. This was the case on an old Main Street USA strip mall that we were losing. I was Division C and when the IC switched to a defensive strategy, the crews were furious. I was able to convince command that a combination strategy would minimize risk while saving the rest of the building and narrowly avoided a mutiny of the IC by the crews who made the fire personal. 15\. **Resources are inadequate to prolong the fight.** If you are unable to muster enough resources to meet your strategic goal of going into the building, and corresponding tactical objectives, then you must switch to a sustainable strategy and appropriate objectives. 16\. **Vacant, abandoned, or low victim profile.** As stated in this book previously, the VP drives the rest of the incident. A low VP or obviously vacant and/or abandoned building should drive an incident stabilizing priority from the onset. Unless there is a confirmed VP, minimize risk to your troops. They may want to go in and fight fire. Your role as the IC is to take out the emotion and adrenaline and make logical decisions. 17\. **Obvious remodels and modifications look out of code.** Notice the different rooflines, boarded-up windows and doors, and construction features. This building has obviously been tacked upon and remodeled multiple times without proper permitting. This can be a trap for firefighters. 18\. **Crews are fatigued due to weather conditions such as extreme heat or cold.** Fire­ fighters are accustomed to working intensely for short durations of time in normal conditions for their area. While the average ambient temperature for different parts of North America vary, firefighters are acclimated to their particular area. Commercial fires typically are for longer duration than firefighters are accustomed to, and extreme weather conditions can add to their fatigue. Commercial versus Residential Commercial fires are not as common as single-family and multi-family dwelling fires (fig. 10-5). Therefore, the habits born from the more common dwelling fires are often repeated in these larger/more complex structure fires. These habits are often known as performing residential tactics at commercial fires and include, but are not limited to: Not performing recon when appropriate or possible Going at the same speed as a dwelling with higher victim profiles Using small caliber hoselines when larger 2\#\' lines or master streams are needed Companies not checking the rear when possible Remaining on the roof too long Remaining in the building too long Pushing forward when the fire is not easily located or unable to find the seat of the fire As an example, you are dispatched to a large commercial warehouse on a Saturday evening in the summer (fig. 10-6). Signs of inadequate size-up and recon occurring would be the following example transmissions: *Engine 1 on scene. We have heavy smoke visible. Initiating attack with a iWline. Next* *engine bring a water supply.* *Engine 2 on scene. Assuming command. Water supply is complete to Engine 1. Were going* *to pull a second l^3^A\"line.* *Chief 1 on scene. This will be Main Street Command. The ICP is on the A/D corner in the* *parking lot.*  Did you note the following issues? 1\. No one acknowledges or describes the type and size of the building. 2\. The first two lines pulled are *1%\"* on a large warehouse with heavy smoke. Would recon and forcible entry be a higher priority before committing to a small caliber hoseline? Would a 2%\" line be a better choice once forcible entry is made on the D side? 3. The chief/IC never announces the incident priority, strategy, or tactical objectives. All of these issues can cause all incoming companies to automatically go into a residential mindset without even realizing it. Contrast this with the following: *Engine 1 on scene. We have a large 200\'by200\' one-story warehouse. Heavy smoke from* *several roll up doors on the D-Delta side. Light smoke from the A-Alpha side. This is a* *low-moderate victim profile. We will be in an offensive strategy. Engine 1 is going to pull* *a 2W line and begin cutting roll up doors on the D-Delta side. Next in bring a water supply.* *First truck, assist with forcible entry on the D-Delta side roll ups.* Size-Up and Recon o© Once again, lack of or improper risk assessment (size-up) is number one on the NIOSH 5. Com­ mercial fires require much more than a simple three-sided view, and sometimes more than a 360°. Obviously, some commercial buildings are much too large to perform a 360° lap on your feet. And countless obstacles can stand in your way of getting a 360° like fences, gates, equip­ ment, stock, zero-clearance property lines, security measures, and adjacent buildings (fig. 10-7). If possible, have other companies respond from a different direction to see the back of the building or complex. Or, size-up from the roof is a great way to get information.  From the street, the usual FPODP size-up provides an excellent starting point. Look for the following as you arrive on scene: Building (era, use, type, size) Business signs or other indicators of business type and contents (fig. 10-8 and fig. 10-9) Layout, access, and exposures Overhead hazards Placarding Smoke (volume, velocity, density, color) to determine if a contents or structural fire Visible flames and location (seven sides) Notice that looking at the smoke and flames was listed last. This is due to tunnel vision. When you first arrive on scene, if you first focus on smoke and/or flames, it is easy to lose sight of the other previous factors that can be missed or obscured. A good rule of thumb is to look at any structure fire first as though it was not burning. Then you can see construction features and other clues you would otherwise miss when experiencing tunnel vision on the flames. I once missed an entire attached exposure and fire wall because I was focused on the 75-foot- tall flames coming out of the roof of the involved commercial building. Don't let this happen to you! As discussed previously (chapter 5), recon is a very effective process to gain additional infor­ mation that a windshield size-up in the street or parking lot would not offer. Remember, the objective of recon is to find the enemy's location, size, and direction of travel,as well as any TPOs that could serve to provide tactical advantage. It should be swift, and you must be ready for changing conditions and know when to retreat. Recon is most appropriate when you have no visible smoke/flames, light smoke, or a large volume of smoke that does not appear to be coming from any particular area. Stay cautious and ready for conditions to change.  As you perform recon, ensure that you maintain situational awareness as to your entry point, how far you have entered, and what doors or other obstacles you have passed. Knowing the distance you have traveled in the structure will be very important if you happen upon fire. You can tell the IC and engine companies the portal of entry, location of the fire, and distance you have traveled. Depending upon the information and distance, they may or may not follow your path of travel. Possibly, a closer location to the fire provides an alternative location to enter and stretch to attack. Try to minimize flow path and compartmentalize the fire by closing doors. Identify the size of the fire, what is burning (if possible), and the avenue and direction of fire spread. Identify TPOs as you go. Are there fire walls, partitions, fire doors, breezeways, separate attic spaces, and so on? Another means of size-up is from the roof. Even if vertical ventilation is not a tactic appro­ priate for the fire, or not used by your fire department, a crew on the roof may be able to fur­ ther identify a heat signature with a TIC, see excess smoke from HVAC systems or vents, or simply identify a burned belt on an AC unit. If a truck is assigned to the roof for vertical ventilation, a *roof report* (construction, condi­ tions, load) should be given ASAP prior to committing to the vent (fig. 10-10). This will help the IC determine if vertical ventilation is in alignment with the IAP. Between the companies on the ground gaining entry and giving CAN reports and confirming a VP, and the roof divi­ sion giving a roof report, the IC can verify if an offensive strategy can be executed, or if a com­ bination or defensive strategy should be employed. Some commercial facilities have 24-hour on-site engineering or maintenance personnel who may know the situation or have called 9-1-1 prior to your arrival. They often have radios to communicate with each other. During pre-planning, you may find the location to contact such personnel or have access to one of their radios. If you arrive and assume command on a commercial structure fire assignment with either no signs of fire, or light smoke, and your primary objective is recon, then setting up the incident early for several permutations by remaining flexible will pay huge dividends downstream. During recon, do not overcommit your companies. Rather than having all your resources dive into the building and start hunting down the situation, be judicious with your companies. One engine and one truck (or equivalent) should be sent in for recon. One engine can be staged at the primary hydrant, or if your SOG requires that commercial fires be pumped from the hydrant, then stage a second engine at the primary attack pumper to be ready to lay out and pump back, if needed. Other considerations would be a company to the rear to check condi­ tions and a company to the roof to check for signs of fire. If you do have a working fire, you can then assign additional companies based on the report back from recon. This way, you do not over-commit resources to one area then have to pull them out to re-deploy to another area. Restraint at the beginning will pay off. If the company in the rear finds smoke or fire conditions, they may be the best choice to attack the fire, and the engine standing by on the front can then supply the engine in the rear. Or, if the recon crews determine there is fire closer to the rear of the building and it is more accessible from the back, the engine in the rear can attack the fire from that closer, more tac­ tically advantageous position. Cold smoke conditions also provide an opportunity for recon to help you truly size up what you have going on inside the structure. *Cold smoke conditions* occur when a large structure has a large volume of smoke that is lazy (like a fog), often without velocity, that is likely the result of a sprinkler system keeping a fire in check. The smoke will not have the typical characteris­ tics of structure-fire smoke with pressure or turbulence. *This can conceal a larger fire, so always* *be ready to be ambushed in a commercialfire.* Cold smoke doesn't typically rise, since there is no convective heat or current to provide lift, so the roof is likely not an effective location to garner additional intel in cold smoke scenarios. Flowing water, audible alarms, water gongs, and water issuing from under doors are all common signs of a likely sprinkler activation or broken pipe or sprinkler head. Victim Profile and Search Generally speaking, the greatest life hazard at a commercial structure fire is the firefighters (fig. 10-11). Unlike a residence, civilians do not hesitate to evacuate a business on fire, nor do they run back into commercial buildings for pictures, pills, and pets. Early warning systems can cause a large number of civilians to evacuate the fire in the incipient phases. Unlike MFDs and assemblies, commercial fires generally have a low-to-moderate VP. That said, you can always have a surprise like the aforementioned Ghost Ship Fire that was in a building classi­ fied as industrial. The Station Nightclub Fire was in an assembly classification building. These were two of the most lethal fires in recent American history. If the fire is after business hours, you may have the benefit of closed occupancies; however, employees can be present. Attempt to make contact with an employee when possible to get the VP. Look for appropriate attire. Fast food restaurants and other retailers will have people in uniform. Look for nametags, aprons, or hats that indicate an employee. In office buildings and doctors' offices, look for business attire and medical scrubs, respec­ tively. Ask if anyone knows where the manager or owner is. If people are lingering outside in the parking lot of an office building, on cell phones with computers and briefcases, they are likely employees of one of the offices. Get intel from them. Crews arrived at a large commercial building to find heavy fire in the overhead of a light­ weight roof assembly. A bogus report of a possible occupant still inside delayed the IC from announcing a defensive strategy and evacuating crews. Shortly thereafter, the roof collapsed, nearly killing eight firefighters. By a miracle, none had significant injuries. A fire occurred in a Tuesday Morning store. Bogus reports of occupants in massage booths of an adjacent parlor caused crews to attempt a search. They were driven out by heavy fire. No one was inside (fig. 10-12). The next day, the manager came to the scene to survey the total loss. When he asked the IC about the fire, he was told that crews were inside the building for a brief period of time to attack the fire. The manager's response was incredibly enlightening. "Why would you go in there? We are going to write it off anyway, and the last thing we need is publicity that a firefighter was killed at a Tuesday Morning store." Go figure. Large commercial buildings like grocery stores, furniture stores, and big-box stores are not realistically going to be searched with heavy fire and smoke inside the structure. They are more likely going to be *evacuated.* There is a big difference. Evacuations occur when firefighters assist occupants in leaving the structure under their own power, and with minimal risk to fire­ fighters. An example would be a confined fire with light smoke in the building.  Search in commercial buildings is either for known victims in targeted areas, or when con­ ditions allow for a search. An example would be search in a cold smoke condition, or an occu­ pant who is trapped by fire calling 9-1-1 from a cell phone inside a bathroom. Absent a confirmed VP by a credible source, heavy fire and smoke in a large commercial building is likely a defen­ sive strategy. Fire Attack and Water Supply Commercial fires often require fire attack from multiple locations. The fire flow required for these larger fires requires multiple access points to prevent bottlenecking of companies into one area. As additional large caliber hoselines are placed in service, the access point can become clogged (fig. 10-13). And, as fires grow, they can go beyond the reach of the initial attack lines and alternative access points can get you closer to the fire or help you take advantage of TPOs and protect uninvolved areas. If you or the crews in your division must stretch a line further than 200 feet into a commercial building to get to the fire, you should consider another portal of entry from which to make the attack with another company. If conditions deteriorate, will crews be able to retreat quickly? Always be ready for rapidly changing conditions. In residences and MFDs, our first objective is to confine a fire to protect occupants and means of egress. This often requires attacking the fire from the unburned area, likely from the front door. Even if we perform transitional attack (offensive attack from a defensive position) on a house fire, we are still attempting to get inside for victims as soon as possible. This requires coordination. Commercial fires are often best attacked at the *closest location to the fire as possible* (fig. 10-14). Commercial structure fires typically require longer, more complex hose stretches with larger caliber hoselines and more firefighters. In addition, access issues and forcible entry challenges further complicate and delay the time it takes to locate and get water on the fire. We arrived to find a well-involved tractor/trailer in the loading dock area on the C side of a large retail store one morning. The fire was starting to get into the business. Initial companies on scene went to the C side and quickly knocked down the fire. Subsequent companies went in the A side main entry and had to stretch a 216\" line over 200 feet into the building before they reached the rear. By the time they wove their way through racks of clothing, multiple door­ ways, around corners, and down halls, they had almost 300 feet of hose on the ground. In that time, how much can the fire grow? This is not to criticize or even imply that the line in the front door was not appropriate. The intent was correct to protect the majority of the uninvolved business. The initial attack and knockdown on the main body of fire was able to keep it from further encroaching on the interior of the building than it already had. Damage inside was relatively minimal (fig. 10-15). There was a person-door immediately adjacent to the rear roll up door where the fire was encroaching. After knockdown, would that person-door have been a better location from which to attack the fire inside? Would it have been a much faster stretch with less hose and exposure to per­ sonnel and prevented crews from potentially getting too far into the building from the A side? Perhaps (fig. 10-16).   Homes and MFDs usually have a window for most every compartment inside the building. Commercial buildings do not. Hallways, corridors, high-piled stock, storage rooms, machin­ ery, basements, remodels, shafts, coolers, and a host of other hazards lie waiting inside com­ mercial occupancies, often with no windows or exits from which a firefighter can make a quick escape if conditions deteriorate. Fire flow on commercial building fires will require the use of multiple hydrants. Supply engines should pump from the hydrant to the attack engines and trucks with elevated master streams (fig. 10-17 and fig. 10-18). This will bolster pressure and flow for the attack pumpers. Often, engines will lay into a commercial fire several hundred feet and begin to attack the fire without an engine at the hydrant to pump. This is another example of using residential tactics on commercial fires. FDCs and sprinkler connections should be pumped by a separate engine than a primary attack engine. This requires a lot of resources and can tax the water system. Err on the side of supplying the attack engine(s) if you have limited resources and cannot support the sprinkler system and the fire flow needs of your crews inside. Consider the presence of fire pumps, on-site building engineers, and contacting the water district if you need more pressure in the system. A water supply group supervisor may be able to coordinate multiple companies, including water tenders, and supervision of relay pumping operations. A separate tactical frequency for the water supply group should be considered in these situations.  As with all fires, your IAP starts with the VP. You must balance the risk to your firefighters with the gain of civilian lives. Your firefighters will want to get in and fight fire, which is what they are trained to do. Realize that you and your tactical supervisors may need to either redi­ rect them or pull them out of a commercial building because of deteriorating conditions. You are staying in the "then/what it" mindset. The "what if?" part of that mindset is what will save your firefighters. Ventilation The IC and tactical supervisors have several options for ventilation on commercial fires that can be more complex and require more coordination than on smaller buildings. These include: Vertical ventilation (offensive and defensive) Horizontal ventilation [~o~ ppv]{.smallcaps} □ HVAC systems Hydraulic ventilation A combination of the above tactics may be utilized, or you may begin with one and end with another as conditions change. As with recon on a commercial structure, you may send a truck to the roof. *Vertical venti­* *lation* is the tactic of opening the roof and/or roof assembly to exhaust heat, gases, and prod­ ucts of combustion up and out of the building. The first priority is to get a roof report (construction, conditions, load) to help you determine if vertical ventilation is an appropriate option or if the roof is untenable. This can help greatly with overall recon in the early stages of the fire to ensure you are in the correct strategic alignment. If vertical vent is the tactic of choice, then the truck officer should be assigned the roof divi­ sion supervisor. Depending upon the size of the roof, you may need more than one truck on the roof. The roof division supervisor will coordinate and supervise these companies for you. They must step back from the noise of the saws cutting and see the bigger picture to remain in the tactical "next" mindset. The roof division supervisor is your safety and accountability officer on the roof and this must be an experienced and well-trained officer. I was fortunate to have extremely experienced, well-trained, and dedicated truck captains for many years. The level of trust I had in them was marrow deep. Roof operations require an even deeper level of understanding regarding construction and the hazards/tactics associated with each type. Like any other supervisor, a roof division supervisor can really drive the incident tactics and potentially the strategy, because they see things you do not see as the IC, especially from the roof. A roof division supervisor can see construction features and the size of the building all at once. They will also likely see exposures unseen from the ground and other hazards like HVAC units, arching power lines, antennas, and other dead loads. The roof can tell you what the fire is doing and the smoke conditions and whether the fire is so advanced that you must switch to a combination or defensive strategy. TPOs like parapet fire walls can also be identi­ fied, which can become significant landmarks and anchor points from which to save a large portion of the building or draw a line from which to mount a combination strategy. Units responded to a reported fire in a strip mall on a Sunday evening. Moderate smoke was visible from the A side upon arrival with heavy fire from the C side. This was a low-moderate VP, as all the businesses were obviously closed. As crews opened the doors to the occupancies, smoke quickly dissipated, there remained heavy smoke from the roof. I assigned the first truck officer to roof division. This was an outside-in fire that began outside the C side wall and went up into the roof assembly. A *rain roof is* a newer roof built over an older existing one, often creating a void space between the two. The fire was burning in the space between the old roof and the rain roof. The challenge for engine companies was accessing the space between the roofs due to the old roof­ ing in place that needed to be breached to get to the void space above. This caused a signifi­ cant delay to getting water on the fire. Meanwhile, roof division began opening the roof. The delay in fire attack caused the fire in the roof assembly to increase, since the ventila­ tion continued. This was the result of a lack of coordination between Division C and roof divi­ sion. Division C did not communicate the challenges with accessing the space for fire attack, and roof division was not communicating with anyone, despite the fact that he had two truck companies on the roof working for him. He did not step back from the work into the tactical space. Meanwhile, Division C saw the fire through the roof and attempted to contact roof division. There was no response from roof division despite multiple attempts. I could see them working and the fire was burning cleanly without any smoke in the living space below. I suspected a rain roof and knew the trucks were extremely experienced. The problem was not that the offi­ cer filling the roof division supervisor role was not experienced. He was a very experienced and capable truck officer. The problem was that he was working overtime that day and had not been trained in the role of a roof division supervisor. He certainly knew what a division supervisor was since he had basic ICS training (ICS 100 and 200); however, this is *not* the same as hands-on training in the role of being tactical on the roof and stepping back from the work and noise to see what is really happening, coordinating laterally with divisions below you, and vertically with the IC. Most truck officers take a lot of pride in being autonomous and not talking on the radio. We could not afford that in this case. When performing vertical ventilation on commercial fires, the roof division will either exe­ cute offensive cuts, defensive cuts, or a combination of both. For example, offensive cuts would be utilized to remove heat and products of combustion to support fire attack and search below (heat cuts). Defensive cutting would be to protect an uninvolved area of the building from a fire that is spreading laterally (strip/trench cuts). Both require coordination with the IC and division supervisors below. *Trench and strip cuts* often require the roof division to write off a portion of the building to get ahead of the fire by removing roofing materials and creating a fire break in the roof from which the fire can escape and be held by hoselines. If the fire is fast-moving and the TPO of a fire wall is present, cutting on the leeward side of the fire wall gives the crews an escape route  and buys them time to support the fire wall, as it slows the fire's progress while engines are below doing the same with hoselines (fig. 10-20). *Horizontal ventilation* is the tactic of opening doors and windows to provide fresh air into the building. This tactic is extremely common and can be accomplished quickly and easily. Simply opening a front door to initiate fire attack is horizontal ventilation. *The challenge is* *that it must also be coordinated and can negatively impact the fire if not communicated.* This can be an assignment given to a company within a division without having to establish a sep­ arate ventilation group. For example, Division 2 on the fire floor or Division A in the front may want ventilation and simply directs a company/crew to open up the building accordingly. The division supervisor is aware and that is really all that matters. TWis the tactic of using fans to pressurize a space with outside air to exhaust smoke, gases, and products of combustion out of the building. PPV can also be coordinated through a com­ pany already assigned to the division. *While the key is to have the fire knocked down significantly* *and an exhaust in place prior to executing the vent, that is easier said than done.* PPV has evolved into a tactic that is likely to be completed after the fire is extinguished and/or during cold-smoke situations. The potential to "blow up the fire" with the induction of air is too risky and has caused many firefighter injuries and contributed to firefighter line-of-duty deaths. *HVAC* systems may be utilized to move/exhaust/isolate air traveling through a building. Utilizing HVAC must be done in coordination with building engineers and division supervi­ sors to prevent introducing smoke to unexposed parts of the building. If the fire is extinguished and you have a large volume of smoke to evacuate, you may establish a ventilation group to coordinate PPV, natural vent, and HVAC systems, or any combination of the three. *Again, the* *ventilation group supervisor and division supervisor whose area will be affected must coordinate* *and communicate.* This is the benefit of tactical supervisors. They are not too task-saturated to communicate and can ensure the safety and accountability is in place much more effectively than an IC trying to do so from the ICP over the radio alone. *Hydraulic ventilation* is the use of water through fog streams to evacuate smoke, heat, and gases from a room. Hydraulic venting can occur in concert with fire attack as crews move through the different compartments and find windows from which to exhaust. This is likely more common in single- and multi-family dwellings, but is always a viable option, especially with limited resources. **Reinforce Fire Mfaiis on *the Leeward Side*** Assemblies The IBC has five Assembly Subcategories: A-l through A-5. For the purposes of this text, an *assembly buildingis* defined as an occupancy designed for large numbers of people to congre­ gate (fig. 10-21). Examples include, but are not limited to, the following: Churches Schools Libraries Night clubs Conference centers Bowling alleys Movie theaters Stadiums  The Ghost Ship Fire CHIEF JAMIE BOWRON, OAKLAND (CA) FIRE DEPARTMENT In the fire service, departments are often defined and known by major incidents that have occurred over the course of their existence. The Oakland Fire Department, over the years, has had many historic and notable incidents that have shaped the fire ser­ vice, from the Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989, the Oakland Hills Fire of 1991, and the Oscar Grant incident in 2009, to the Occupy movement of 2011. It was 2330 hours on December 2,2016, and I was wrapping up paperwork in the bat­ talion office when the crackling of the speaker broke the silence of the fire station. A still alarm came over the air for a warehouse fire with multiple confirming stills on 31st Ave. The voice of a 9-1-1 caller was a young girl describing a warehouse fire with a sense of urgency that you could hear in her voice. I rushed to the BC buggy, putting on my turnout bunkers and radio strap. I responded on Oakland Channel 2 and traveled south on High Street to Foothill, moving as quickly as I could to get into the Fruitvale district. Prior to my arrival, a significant column of smoke could be seen. I heard E13's arrival report of a single-story warehouse with heavy smoke showing. They had secured their own water supply and were going to initiate fire attack. Upon my arrival, I came down 31st Ave, where I did a quick three-point turn, position­ ing my buggy where I could see the Alpha and Bravo sides of the building. My initial assessment of the building was that I had what appeared to be a multi-floor cinder­ block warehouse with heavy smoke showing from all the windows, front door, and through some of the cracks in the grout lines. Post-incident data collection confirmed that it was built in 1930 with a total square footage of around 9,880 square feet. The roof was constructed of wood gables built upon steel trusses with rolled composition roofing material. I immediately struck a second alarm, which would quickly double my resources. The second- and third-due engines on the first alarm, Engine 4 and Engine 17, grabbed hydrants and brought in water to Engine 13.1 ran up to get the quick 360° and make a face-to-face with the engine crews. I told the officer from E17 that I wanted a 2%\" in there due to extensive smoke conditions and the size of the structure. E17 officer would be assigned Division A supervisor. The Alpha side of the building appeared to be the only access and egress to the build­ ing and was heavily covered by various art creations. The Bravo side of the building had a large amount of debris, cars, trailers, pallets, and a fortified chain-link fence. There were three attached business on the D side of the building, which stretched the span of the block. These were identified as the DI, D2, and D3 exposures. Division A was established with E17 as the supervisor and E13 and E4 advancing a 2%", as well as a 1%\", line through the front door of the building. While returning back to the BC buggy to update my status board for accountability, a civilian told me that he had two friends missing. Upon reassessing the survivability profile in such a large building with heavy, pressurized smoke conditions, I determined that a low likelihood of survivability existed. At that point I had three crews committed to the entry with two hose streams in place. I was already considering a defensive strategy, and if some­ one was going to be found, one of those crews would have a high probability of coming across them. The crews were incurring heavy smoke conditions and immense amounts of contents, similar to hoarder conditions, including artwork, pianos, and a labyrinth of contents. It was discovered later that this was an artist collective with heavy contents, and that a dance party was occurring in an upper mezzanine level, in violation of occupancy codes. The fire was found to have started on the first floor, likely due to an overloaded elec­ trical system installed for the audio and visual demands of the event. Makeshift stairs to the upper mezzanine were constructed out of pallets, leading to where the occu­ pants were located. This was an old dairy and the mezzanine was open to the smoke, gases, heat, and products of combustion below. 33 people succumbed to the smoke and gases, and crews were unable to reach them due to fire/smoke and hoarding conditions. There was a large crowd in the street and adjacent fast-food restaurant. This mass of people was calm and quiet, watching in a state of complete shock. No yelling, no screaming, no crying---just silence. This was the time that another individual who appeared to have made it out of the building told me that there was easily 50-70 people inside the building. This information solidified why every civilian standing around the scene was in a state of shock. However, operationally I knew there was no way any more companies were going to be able to squeeze into that single man door on the Alpha side of the building. This was a tremendous weight to carry as the IC---the knowledge of potentially so many civilians trapped, and my crews who were clearly not making enough progress in this large building to reach them. The Division A supervisor reported that he thought they were getting good knockdown. However, I advised them that their knockdown was isolated to their specific area where they were located, and that there was still large volumes of smoke and fire on the B side of the building, starting to extend to the second floor. At this time, second-alarm units started to arrive. E23 was assigned to assume Division B with the tactical objec­ tive to gain access into the Bravo side and ensure that all the debris and material on the B side did not light off, and to keep the fire from further extending to the second floor. A roof division was established with Truck 6 as the supervisor and Truck 2 working for him. They were advised to work together and give me a roof report and report on con­ ditions once they got the roof opened up. The sounds of multiple saws ripped across the incident and crews advised that they had a significant amount of pressurized smoke coming from two large holes towards the Bravo/Charlie and mid-Charlie sides of the building. Division A advised that they were having a hard time making progress and that the building was extremely compartmentalized. This information confirmed what I was seeing from the exterior, with the small portions of the building looking like they were getting some knockdown. A third alarm was struck due to fire growth in the Bravo/ Charlie side of the building, hose advancement diminishing due to hording and com­ partmentalization in the building, and the time spent by crews inside. However, no sooner than the third being struck when I saw the night sky light up. It appeared that conditions changed, and a flash of fire came out the front window. That glow and noise will live with me forever. For a brief second, I thought that the fire had flashed over on Engine 4,13, and 17. I prepared to request a fourth alarm and activate a RIC (E16) as I attempted to contact Division A. The first attempt resulted in negative contact. I transmitted a second time, requesting an update and hoping to receive a response. My mic opened and they advised that they were okay and all members were accounted for. That 15-20 seconds of that incident will live with me forever. I advised them of the change in conditions I had experienced for the exterior and, fortunately for them, it must have been isolated in one of the various compartments of the building. Seeing conditions deteriorate in the Bravo/Charlie corner of the building, I made con­ tact with Division B (E23) who advised that they had found a small man-door on the B side. I knew that, once the fire had become established on the second floor, our abil­ ity to extinguish this fire from an offensive attack was finished. Which also meant that any possibility of finding any victims was done as well. From the command post I could see the smoke from the vent holes increase. I asked for a current roof report and the officer advised that the fire had become very established on the second floor. My strategic decision point had been hit. The fire progression was too much for offen­ sive operations. I advised the roof division to grab their crews and get off the roof, and that we were transferring to defensive operations. At that time, I made an announce­ ment on the radio and advised all members off the roof and out of the structure. I did a check with all divisions and fire attack to ensure that all members were out of the building. After 31 minutes of aggressive offensive operations, I received an all clear from all divisions and groups that defensive operations were initiated, and divisions were made for all sides of the building. This was the correct decision for all the members on the fireground---to ensure their safety. It was the decision that confirmed that we would not be successful in finding any of the possible 70 people who might still be inside. Five hours later, the fire was brought under control, but it took us 6 days to respectfully extricate the 36 civilians that lost their life in the Ghost Ship Fire. I wish I would have had more companies available for RIC by calling additional alarms sooner. If we had a Mayday, only E16 was available, which is not adequate. This is the kind of fire that lives with you forever. I hope none of you reading this will ever have this type of experience. The biggest hazard to assemblies is loss of civilian life. This is an exception to the rule that the biggest life hazard at commercial fires is firefighters. As discussed earlier in this chapter, two of the deadliest fires in recent U.S. history are the Ghost Ship Fire on December 2, 2016 that killed 36 civilians in Oakland, CA, and the Station Nightclub Fire in 2003 that killed 100 people. Both were being utilized as assemblies, although illegally. You could arrive to find dozens of people trapped and/or evacuating. Unlike many other commercial-type buildings that have large egress pathways, roll up doors, and multiple exits, a small assembly can easily have many people who are unable to escape and become clogged in the exits. One of the most horrifying images in the history of fires is the people stuck in the doorway of the Station Nightclub. They clogged the doorway, half their torsos sticking out, with countless people behind them who burned alive. Overcrowded nightclubs and illegally converted occupancies can become incredibly cha­ otic scenes of people screaming and dozens or more dying. These spaces are often filled with low-mass synthetic furniture, wall coverings, and decor that make fires grow rapidly. Pre-planning assemblies can save many lives, and being aware of special events in your juris­ diction or first-due area will give you a tactical advantage. A fire in an assembly can rapidly become an MCI in which a separate medical group, or even medical branch, maybe required, with separate tactical channels. Depending upon the scope of the MCI, you may need separate channels for triage, treatment, transport, and medical com­ munications with the hospital. This will be discussed in much more depth in chapter 15. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND I'd like to share stories of two different hospital fires. They were both different, but somehow eventually became very similar. The first was Bronx Lebanon. I was acting battalion chief. We received a Class 3 alarm for Bronx Lebanon Hospital at the change of tours, 18:00 hours. I will admit that the last thing on my mind was that this would be an actual fire. We get inundated with these types of alarms all day. It becomes very difficult to not become complacent. To say what happened next was a complete sur­ prise would be an understatement. I heard the following transmission from the officer of Engine 92: "Engine 92 to nozzle, start a line." "Ladder 27 to 27 OV take the windows in the front of store." There was a luncheonette on the first floor, Bravo side. The fire had started in the kitchen and spread to the dining area. We had a raging fire on the first floor of a fully functioning 11-story Type 1 hospital. My first mistake was that I transmitted a signal 10-75, that's equivalent to a first alarm. The FDNY has a particular code, 10-76-2nd alarm, for fires in commercial high-rises. This would give us the adequate resources to handle all that would be entailed in dealing with these types of fires. The SOP in a high-rise commercial would be: Determine the fire floor Verify the fire floor Control evacuation Gain control of the buildings systems Elevators HVAC Communications Fire pumps Confine and extinguish the fire I hadn't quite made the adjustment in my mind that we were dealing with a high-rise fire. Instead, I was treating it like it was any other fire in a Type 1 building. Fortunately, the fire was on the first floor and not one of the upper floors. Had it been an upper floor, I would have had done the following in concert with the fire safety director. Ask if the fire floor had definitely been determined. Find out what is the extent of the evacuation that has been implemented. Were there any reports of severe life hazards? Inquire as to the status of the elevators and the HVAC system. Determine if there are any access stairs in the vicinity of the reported fire floor. Lastly, what communications have been established between the fire floor and In the midst of the fire attack, the fire safety director approached me with a major decision. There were surgeries being performed. Did I want to stop all surgery proce­ dures? I made a decision to keep all surgeries going and we would shelter-in-place. It worked out well. The fire was extinguished pretty quickly. The magnitude of what had just transpired didn't fully hit me until much later. I will admit that I had, in my mind, associated the signal 10-76 with buildings in Manhat­ tan. It had not occurred to me that it was the building that dictated the code, not the location. The second hospital fire was Montefiore Hospital in the North Bronx. It was a quiet summer day, around noon. We got called to a street box with the only information being "smoke in the area." Again, my guard was down, I was expecting this to be a non­ sense call. While responding, the dispatcher notified me that "EMS is now reporting smoke in the Emergency Room." This got my attention, I was surprised that we hadn't received a class 3 alarm, but nev­ ertheless I was now at least expecting that something was happening. When we arrived on scene, there was a heavy smoke condition with hundreds of people pouring out of the building. I radioed the dispatcher, advising him we needed a 10-75 and that we were using all hands, but I had no idea what we had. This time the dispatcher was 100% on his A Game. He transmitted a 10-76-2nd alarm. I didn't know that he had done this. I did two things right at this one. I normally listen to what is said between the units themselves, internally. I heard the following transmission, but I went with my gut and discounted it. "OV to Command, it's just a rubbish fire." My experience told me that this was much more than a simple rubbish fire and I continued to run the oper­ ation. The transmission that was the game changer is when I heard the officer of the ladder company give this transmission, "Hey Mike, bring the search rope to the base­ ment." Hearing this was an indication that there was a heavy smoke condition in the basement. It turned out that the diesel generators in the basement had a leak and the diesel fuel had spilled out and ignited. We had a pretty good fire condition in the generator room that was semi-contained, and we still had a heavy smoke condition permeating the building. To compound the issue even further, the power was completely knocked out in the entire building. We had people on life support that now had to be moved, which was very labor-intensive. I ordered a foam hoseline to be stretched to extinguish the fire, and then focused on the arduous task of getting the patients out of harm's way. In total, we moved 165 patients, and some of them required up to four persons to move them. Again, I was drawn into the idea that this building was in the Bronx and not Manhat­ tan. I never thought about the 10-76 code. The takeaway from both these operations, which both ended very successfully, is to consider the building and the fire problem and try to match the resources, no matter what the cost. I've seen it many times that once you are behind the power curve, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to catch up. Strip Malls CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Webster Avenue Laundry Incident CAPTAIN DOUG MITCHELL, FIRE DEPARTMENT OF NEW YORK CITY (FDNY) It was just before noon on a crisp day in early March. It was shaping up to be a busy morning and we had been running around, with a variety of responses since our 09:00 change of tours. We were just released from a second-due "odor of smoke," which had turned out to be food left on the stove. As we were taking up from the block, we heard an engine company come over the air and say: "Bronx, we are getting a verbal (FDNY lingo for a civilian who reports an incident directly to the members) reporting smoke in a laundromat on Webster Avenue." The dispatcher gathered a few additional informational tidbits and quickly transmit­ ted the alarm over the air. We were assigned as the first-due truck. This was, however, not our normally assigned first-due box (the first-due truck was still operating in the apartment from the previous food on the stove). The engine that gave the initial verbal promptly transmitted a 10-75, the signal for a working fire. As we made our turn onto Webster Avenue, we noted smoke pushing under pressure from a large one-story commercial occupancy. We arrived as the first-due truck com­ pany and went right to work, the inside team members grabbing ten-foot hooks, the outside team making the roof and heading to the rear, while I tied off our search rope to a street sign in front of the main entrance. Initially, the owner of the store stated that all his employees were accounted for. As the engine was in the process of stretching and flaking out their 216\" hoseline, we entered the store. Knowing that, many times, fires in laundry facilities start in and or around the clothes dryers, and noting heat with the thermal imager in that direction, we made our way toward the rear of the store. This was not before poking a hole in the ceiling with the ten-foot hook just inside the main entrance. We wanted to ensure there was no fire above us in the cockloft (the space between the ceiling and the underside of the roof boards, which can be as large as six feet in some commercial buildings). Moving toward the rear, looking and listening for fire and victims, we encountered light heat but blacked-out smoke conditions. We needed to get a path, the right path, for the engine's advance, and until we found the seat of the fire. This would prove dif­ ficult due to the rows and rows of washing machines.. As we continued to search for the seat of the fire and any potentially trapped civilians, things began to rapidly change. Our roof firefighter informed both the IC and I that there was a significant fire in the rear of the cockloft and it was moving with great speed toward the front of the store (most cocklofts are larger in the front than the rear to create a slight pitch to the roof, allowing for water runoff). They had cut a hole in the flat tar paper roof towards the middle of the building and fire was venting through it. Simultaneously, fire began to now show itself in the rear of the store. I met the engine officer and brought him to a position where he could apply water to the fire. The hoseline was charged in the street and brought into our position. With the line in place, we began to start expanding our search off our search rope when conditions once again changed, with significant heat now over our heads. In the street, members also noted smoke conditions changing, darkening, and increas­ ing in pressure and density. Incident commanders, with fire now venting through the roof nearly three stories into the air and threatening exposures, backed all members out of the fire building. While an aggressive offensive fire attack was initially employed, with advanced fire throughout the cockloft and rollover/flashover type conditions emanating from the store entrance, commanders made the decision to withdraw oper­ ating forces and utilize large caliber streams from a position of safety. This fire even­ tually went to a fourth alarm (fig. 10-23). Every fire provides learning lessons. This fire proved to provide several for all of us: 1. \'First-due\* knowledge: This cannot be stressed enough. While only a few blocks 2. The response: With several apparatus responding from a previous incident and Fig. 10-23. Companies on the A side of the commercial building. *Source.* Photo courtesy of Fire Department of New York City (FDNY) 3. Apparatus Positioning: Our strong FDNY SOPs ensure that rear-mount and aerial ladder trucks are positioned away from the front of the fire building, open for potential placement of tower ladders and/or large-caliber streams (LCS). Sound tactical SOPs allowed for a simple transition from offensive to defensive operation when deemed warranted by the IC. 4. Operations: Ensure team members that are operating remotely are checked in with at timely intervals. There is also a time-space disconnect from the IC to the companies operating in the IDLH zone (tactical gap). Remember that time does not pass at the same rate for the incident commander in the street as it does for the task-focused company officer. Five minutes in a store searching for fire seems to go rather quickly. Conversely, five minutes for an incident commander seems like an eternity. Have trust in your officers and commanders, ensure communication is maintained, and let each other know the conditions as you see them. 5. Reflex Time: Changes in the modes of attack require forethought and reflex time to put into motion. Ensure that all members are aware of any tactical changes that have been made on the fireground and have positioned themselves accord­ ingly, prior to starting LCS, and so on. 6. Be Critical: There is always room for improvement in all our operations, both on a personal and operational level. Critique yourself and share your experiences: what you were thinking, what did you see and hear, and share what went well and what you would do differently the next time. As firefighters and fire officers, we routinely operate in hostile, rapidly deteriorating environments. Much of our initial tactical decision-making must occur quickly, often with limited information. We must remain adaptable, resilient, and mission-focused. SOPs and SOGs, building knowledge, and clear, concise communication will assist us in our operational successes. As discussed previously in chapters 8 and 9, attic fires are a common occurrence. In the commercial arena, this is especially true in strip malls. *Strip malls* consist of several businesses connected with common walls and a common roof assembly. They are all over North America in practically every town on main street or in commercial areas. They can be legacy or modern lightweight construction, depending on the era built. They have common attics, cocklofts, and often have facades that traverse the entire front of the building (fig. 10-24). These are all common avenues for lateral fire spread (fig. 10-25). The tactical advantage is that even if there is a common attic, party walls will separate the business occupancies. These provide good sep­ aration from which to protect the exposed business living spaces from the primary unit burning. Obviously, if a fire wail is found in the attic of a larger strip mall, this can also be leveraged to provide tactical advantage by providing trench cuts to prevent lateral spread in the attic space. Heat cuts may be needed to relieve pressure to attack teams and buy time to then cut trenches. This must be coordinated with hose teams underneath. Here, your ground-level divi­ sion supervisors and roof division must coordinate.  Upon arrival of a fire in a strip mall, you will find one of three common conditions. First, the fire could be isolated in one business and not appear to have extended into the common attic and/or exposure units. This can be knocked down quickly with the proper-sized hoseline. If the fire is confined to a bathroom, kitchen, or rear office, for example, a 1%\" line may suffice. If the fire is significant, a 2\^6\" line may be the best option, or if you have limited staffing, a quick deck gun blast may buy you time and keep the fire from spreading into the roof assembly. As with all fires, consider the VP first and ensure a water supply is nearby. A second scenario, and perhaps the most common, is heavy fire in the involved business and fire is clearly in the attic/cockloft and spreading laterally. This is common, as these build­ ings often have lower ceilings with heavy fire load in the form of stock, office furniture, and low-mass synthetics. Hazardous materials in businesses like dry cleaners, paint stores, and mom-and-pop hardware stores can also propagate the fire problem. In this condition, consider getting ahead of the fire by placing lines in the B and D side exposure units to cut the fire off from spreading further in the common attic. This will take tactical discipline, as most fire­ fighters will want to immediately put water on the fire they see coming from the involved unit. With heavy fire, that unit should be written off if there is a low VP and no refuge in the back for potential victims. The first lines should go, again, into the exposures on the side that has the most to lose. If you do not have the resources to place lines in both exposure units, the first line should go to the side that has the greatest exposure potential for loss. Figures 10-26 and 10-27 show fire that occurred in a strip mall with a large, supported mansard over the front entries. Note that the fire originated in one unit from the end (fig. 10-26). If the main origin unit is fully involved and getting into the mansard and clearly in the attic, where would you stretch your first line? The B-l exposure to the left is the ideal choice here because there are several more attached businesses that could be lost. There is more to save to the B-side/left of the involved unit. So, your initial line should go there to prevent lateral spread in the attic (fig. 10-27). Note also that the D-l exposure unit to the right is the last occu­ pancy on end *and is vacant.* This further illustrates the need to go to the B-l exposure first in this situation. The third scenario would be fire that has engulfed more than one unit upon arrival and is through the roof and clearly has significant structural involvement and potential for collapse. Here, you should consider getting one or more businesses ahead of the fire as the potential for collapse and the amount of fire will require a significant fire flow. This will take time and resources. By making a stand ahead of the fire, you will give yourself time to get resources in place inside the exposures to truly stop the fire. In the meantime, if you have a patent water supply, a deck gun attack at the fire's edge between the involved unit and exposure units can further slow the fire's progress. Work your way back after you knock down the fire at the edge for the exposure and involved unit. Remember to check the C side and potentially set up a Division C with the objectives of forc­ ible entry and fire attack with a separate water supply. Ensure Divisions A and C coordinate to not have opposing streams. Expect reinforced doors and windows in the rear (fig. 10-28). The first example would be an offensive strategy. The second and third examples would be combination strategies, with the involved units being in the defensive space, and the exposures being in the offensive space. The same considerations can be made in standalone businesses of size when a fire wall is in place. If the building is large enough and has fire walls that can be identified, these can be leveraged to prevent spread by using a coordinated attack with vertical ventilation. The chal­ lenge in these buildings is that you may not have the party wall separation needed that sepa­ rates occupancies as you would in a strip mall. You and your tactical supervisors must be suspicious and watch out for changing conditions. Remember, once the VP is low and/or the building is confirmed evacuated, vacant, or all clear, you really must reconsider what you are saving. Chances are the contents of the business are a loss from the smoke and water, let alone heat and flame. Consider retreating to a combi­ nation strategy, or just switch to a defensive strategy if you have any doubts about containing the fire in a timely manner. Your tactical supervisors will be your eyes and ears and you should notify them that you are considering a strategic change if conditions do not improve.  This was the case in a leather garment factory shop where machinery and raw leather mate­ rials were used to make fashion accessories. The building had no fire walls identifiable. The Division A supervisor had excellent accountability. The fire was knocked down in the work space; however, a stubborn attic fire was burning in the attic and was difficult to access from below. Division A had declared an all clear of the building as secondary searches were com­ plete. This meant that we were in an incident stabilization priority. The life risk now was the multiple companies working inside and on top to access the attic fire. I notified Division A and roof division that I was considering switching to a defensive strategy. If I didn't see significant improvement in conditions, I was going to evacuate and go defensive. The tactical supervisors agreed. Just about then, conditions improved dramatically, and we were able to continue the offensive strategy, put the fire out, and perform salvage and overhaul. Taxpayers and Mixed-Use Occupancies CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Westlake Taxpayer Incident CHIEF KEN COOK, LOS ANGELES CITY (CA) FIRE DEPARTMENT I had only been a chief officer for over a year, but the fire activity had been abundant in the city. The truth was that some of our citizens experiencing homelessness had been lending to our professional development when it came to fires. The probability was force-multiplied when I picked up an overtime day downtown, as the area had seen a significant increase in fires over the past few years. That same evening in late January, a two-story pre-33^2^ center hallway apartment build­ ing erupted into flames in the Westlake district of Los Angeles (fig. 10-29). Around dinner time, more than 100 firefighters responded to the 2800 block of 7th St. in Il's first-in district. We were the second Battalion Command Team on the ticket, and when we arrived, the fire was already well-advanced on the second floor and into the attic. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) had initially warned the fire department of a barricaded suspect at the location. After an intense standoff, the suspect started a fire in a room on the second floor and narrowly escaped from an adjacent window. LAPD made a valiant effort to evacuate the building, but it was feared there were still people trapped inside. As fire department resources arrived, LAPD advised that the suspect was in custody, and with permission from law enforcement, the firefight began. The building was constructed in 1921, situated on the corner of a bustling intersection, with most businesses closing shop for the evening. It had multiple retrofits with the famous kings' row and tie plates giving away its decade. The establishment was a pre-33 taxpayer with residential units and businesses mixed-use on the top floor and com­ mercial occupancies lining the first. In the Westlake district, these businesses were all most people had. A transom window constructed above a door on the Alpha/Bravo corner marked the location of the stairwell leading to a typical T-shaped hallway where initial resources made their attack. At the top of the stairwell, firefighters encountered intense heat and heavy smoke, banked down to the floor. The kind of heat that burns when making minor adjustments to your limbs in your coat. They attempted to advance with little to no progress, even cooling the hallway for a small gain. Indeed, if someone was overcome by smoke in the hallway, they were already dead, but that didn't mean there weren't still lives to save. It was communicated to the IC that there was a lack of suppression efforts or forward movement on the second floor. The IC acknowledged this, but the companies would have to wait to engage without ventilation. As additional resources arrived, an engine company assigned to the first floor to ensure that the fire hadn't started in a basement or a wall at ground level provided the IC with some additional communication that better access may be on the Charlie side---the opposite side of where fire attack was initiating their assault. The immediate concern was opposing hoselines, but this would be the best and only opportunity with no advancement and fire attack ahead of ventilation. The IC directed the fire attack team to back out and ordered the next company to engage from the Charlie side on the second floor. It was the most thoughtful approach, involved to uninvolved, at least in the hall­ way, to cool and suppress the environment---giving occupants the greatest opportu­ nity to survive. A few minutes later, ventilation was initiated from the Charlie side to support the sup­ pression efforts. When the roof team opened the 100-year-old conventional roof, the vent-limited fire found its oxygen and immediately ignited in the attic. Now with the hall­ way, two rooms, and the entire attic ablaze, a request for additional resources was made.  The incident was organized into divisions and groups (i.e., roof division, Division 1, Division 2, medical group, rapid intervention group, and eventually search group). Mul­ tiple companies were deployed to the second floor and began the intense firefight. As the roof team continued to cut, they knew they were no match for the extensive involve­ ment and asked for an additional truck company to the roof. Then, the coordinated attack ensued. As we pulled up to the incident, about 20 minutes in, 30-foot flames raged above the parapet. Fire could be seen from two windows on the Bravo side, as heavy smoke poured out of the adjacent windows. By this time, I knew the IC was probably leaning in a direction to change his strategy, and I knew we only had a few minutes to help him to decide otherwise, if it made sense. As we made our way toward the building, I was impressed with the sight of the Los Angeles City Fire Department going to work. Aerial and ground ladders were strategi­ cally placed, multiple engines tactically maneuvered in the street to provide the most advantageous hoselines, and ambulances were staged, ready to race to the hospital with the possibility of occupants being trapped. But there wasn't enough time to get to the ICP, let alone find it. I momentarily stood in front of the structure, taking in every detail, keyed the mic on command, and said, "IC from Battalion 1, I'm standing in front of the building; I'll take Division 2 if you concur?" He obliged and rattled off my companies. I immediately went to the engineers to see what companies were operating in each portal with access to the second floor. I chose the Charlie side for my ascent, remembering the communication from the later-arriving engine company. As I ascended the staircase, I saw the fire raging in the attic. Smoke was about head-high, and companies were just starting to get a knockdown in two rooms; however, the attic was still fully involved. Most companies were directing their hoselines vertically in the attic from the burned-out rooms, but it wouldn't be effective unless we could get our suppression efforts horizontal. As I stepped foot on the second floor, I immediately heard the sounds of multiple warbling whistles indicating our people had already exhausted their air. I transitioned command over the radio with the engine company managing the division and started to develop a plan for suppression and search of each unit. My priorities were accountability of the assigned companies, their portal of attack, additional sup­ port, and determining which companies needed to replenish their air. I ordered one additional task force and methodically selected each company to rehab based on their remaining air and usage rate. Next, I assessed the risk associated with our offensive attack. Balancing my decision against the resources assigned, the time elapsed, the conditions on the floor and within the attic, and the construction. I chose to stay offensive, communicating our plan to the IC. My general concern was the roof collapsing onto the ceiling joists or heavy equipment in the attic falling through the ceiling. After evaluating the joists in the hallway and surveying the attic, I knew we could safely stay offensive and successfully achieve a knockdown. We began to cut the ceiling joists with chainsaws and strategically placed our inside ladders to develop hoselines in the attic. We coordinated with the ventilation team and started working the fire from uninvolved to involved. Eventually, I notified the IC that roof division had accomplished its mission and communicated we could operate with­ out them on the roof. We set up horizontal ventilation with another truck company. A thorough search fol­ lowed, methodically checking every square inch of the eight units. Remarkably, the closed doors had kept most of the rooms from becoming engulfed by the flames. After an extensive search, we determined that all occupants were out. At 18:05 hours, just 50 minutes from the time of the alarm, we declared a knockdown. Every business on the first floor was saved, as salvage efforts played a huge part. At least four units on the second floor were protected from the heat and flames, most of them being businesses that depended on their contents to stay afloat. The incident was a success; however, without the company's tenacity and willingness to work past the typical work/rest ratio, we wouldn't have been able to complete final extinguishment. The ventilation on the roof was extraordinary and assisted us with providing an environment to make critical decisions about risk and tactical operations to stay offensive. It was assumed we were initially in the rescue profile, and I felt com­ fortable about that. After about 30 minutes of fighting the fire, we reduced our life pro­ file to a property profile. Later the next day, we accompanied four business owners in retrieving their belong­ ings from the second floor, which was especially rewarding. That experience alone encourages me to continue to be highly critical about my decision-making and deter­ mining the level of acceptable risk when deciding between life and property, and the safety of our firefighters. A *taxpayer (mixed-use)* is defined as a building with a retail-type businesses) on the ground floor and residences on the upper floors. Sometimes the upper floors may have offices. The challenge with these buildings is fire load, occupancy, and access. Another term is residential over commercial for these buildings. The fire load on the ground floor may be extreme due to retail stock, such as low-mass syn­ thetics or the possibility of hazardous materials. If the upper floors consist of apartments (most likely), the life loss potential from a fire on the first floor is significant. If a fire were to occur after business hours, at a time when tenants are sleeping in upper floor units, the results could be catastrophic. Access can be challenging, as many times the A side door can be difficult to distinguish from the retail business or restaurant access. The upper floors are normally center hall con­ figuration, which can add to the challenges regarding evacuation, search, and hose stretches. As an IC, you should be thinking about a high VP at the minimum in these buildings, as they are likely occupied 24 hours a day, either in the business below, or the dwellings above, or both. Plan on rescues of entrapped victims and the need for a lot of medical resources. Many of these buildings were built in the early 1900s, comprised of unreinforced masonry that has been reinforced and retrofitted. Most will have a basement and common attics or cocklofts. Concrete Tilt-Up *Concrete tilt-up* buildings are characterized by pre-poured concrete walls that are set and con­ nected to the roof assembly for structural stability. Older tilt-ups from before 1960 are more likely to have conventional roof construction, such as bowstring truss, while post-1960 tilt-up buildings will likely have a more lightweight construction. Panelized or lightweight truss roofs are extremely common on the West Coast and in newer developments (fig. 10-30). The contents and businesses inside these buildings vary dramatically, from furniture stores and carpet and textiles retailers to indoor sporting venues and multi-unit warehouses. The relative ease, speed, and less-expensive manner in which concrete tilt-up buildings are built makes them more common every day. The primary hazard associated with this construction is collapse of the walls. The roof essentially holds the tilted-up walls in vertical plumb position. The concrete walls in tilt-up construction notoriously fall outward when the roof assembly (that holds them together) burns away (fig. 10-31). As the Division C supervisor on a large piano factory fire, I was supervising multiple engine and truck companies. This was at night in the early hours of the morning. The fire had already blown through one fire wall on its way to the next. The roof was burned off 60% of the massive commercial building and this was tilt-up construction. The fire was in an incident stabiliza- tion/combination strategy.  Once I arrived in the rear to assume Division C, I could see fire between the seams of the walls and at the pilasters. This told me that collapse was highly probably. Multiple companies were working in the collapse zone, utilizing *1%\"* handlines, which had absolutely no effect on the fire. In addition, a truck company was operating an aerial master stream, but they were set up extremely close to the structure in the collapse zone. I directed the engines to move 100 feet down to the offensive space, and the truck to break down and move back out of the collapse zone. We then employed offensive tactics of interior handlines and a defensive strip cut overhead to support the next fire wall and prevent the fire from blowing through it as it had done before. The defensive area was written off and the offen­ sive area was saved. This required a lot of direction and coordination, as mission creep was constantly occurring as crews would migrate into or near the collapse zone. Brick and Unreinforced Masonry Brick and unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings consist of brick, masonry, or co