Utilitarianism Lesson 3 PDF

PLVal **PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG VALENZUELA** Tongco Street, Maysan, Valenzuela City **[E T H I C S]** **UTILITARIANISM** **Lesson 3** **I. DEFINITION OF UTILITARIANISM** An ethical theory that argues for the goodness of pleasure and the determination of right behavior based on the usefulness...

PLVal **PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG VALENZUELA** Tongco Street, Maysan, Valenzuela City **[E T H I C S]** **UTILITARIANISM** **Lesson 3** **I. DEFINITION OF UTILITARIANISM** An ethical theory that argues for the goodness of pleasure and the determination of right behavior based on the usefulness of the action's consequences. This means that pleasure is good and that the goodness of an action is determined by its usefulness. Putting these ideas together, utilitarianism claims that one's actions and behavior are good inasmuch as they are directed toward the experience of the greatest pleasure over pain for the greatest number of persons. Its root word is "utility;" which refers to the usefulness of the consequences of one's action and behavior. Jeremy Bentham (1748 -- 1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806 -- 1873) are the two foremost utilitarian thinkers. **II. THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY** In the book, *An Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislation* (1789), Jeremy Bentham begins by arguing that our actions are governed by two *"sovereign masters"* -- which he calls *pleasure* and *pain.* These "masters" are given to us by nature to help us determine what is good or bad and what ought to be done and not; they fasten our choices to their throne. The *principle of utility* is about our subjection to these sovereign masters: pleasure and pain. On one hand, the principle refers to the motivation of our actions as guided by our avoidance of pain and our desire for pleasure. It is like saying that in our everyday actions, we do what is pleasurable and we do not do what is painful. On the other hand, the principle also refers to pleasure as good if, and only if, they produce more happiness than unhappiness. This means that it is not enough to experience pleasure, but to also inquire whether the things we do make us happier. Having identified the tendency for pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the principle of utility, Bentham equates happiness with pleasure. Mill supports Bentham's principle of utility. He reiterates moral good as happiness and, consequently, happiness as pleasure. Mill clarifies that what makes people happy is intended pleasure and what makes us unhappy is the privation of pleasure. The things that produce happiness and pleasure are good; whereas, those that produce unhappiness and pain are bad. Mill argues that we act and do things we find pleasurable and we avoid doing things because they are painful. If we find our actions pleasurable, Mill explains, it is because they are inherently pleasurable in themselves or they eventually lead to the promotion of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Bentham and Mill characterized moral value as utility and understood it as whatever produces happiness or pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The next step is to understand the nature of pleasure and pain to identify a criterion for distinguishing pleasures and to calculate the resultant pleasure or pain; it is in relation to these aforementioned themes that a distinction occurs between Bentham and Mill. What Bentham identified as the natural moral preferability of pleasure, Mill refers to as a *theory of life.* If we consider, for example, what moral agents do and how they assess their actions, then it is hard to deny the pursuit for happiness and the avoidance of pain. For Bentham and Mill, the pursuit for pleasure and the avoidance of pain are not only important principles -- they are in fact the only principle in assessing an action's morality. What kind of pleasure is morally preferable and valuable? Are all pleasures necessarily and ethically good? Does this mean that because eating or exercising is good, it is morally acceptable to eat and exercise excessively? While utilitarian supporters do not condone excessive pleasures while others are suffering, it cannot be justified on utilitarian grounds why some persons indulge in extravagant pleasures at the expense of others. Suppose nobody is suffering, is it morally permissible on utilitarian principles to maximize pleasure by wanton intemperance? While Bentham and Mill agree on the moral value of pleasure, they do not have the same view on these questions. In determining the moral preferability of actions, Bentham provides a framework for evaluating pleasure and pain commonly called *felicific calculus.* Felicific calculus is a common currency framework that calculates the pleasure that some actions can produce. In this framework, an action can be evaluated on the basis of intensity or strength of pleasure; duration or length of the experience of pleasure; certainty, uncertainty, or the likelihood that pleasure will occur; and propinquity, remoteness, or how soon there will be pleasure. These indicators allow us to measure pleasure and pain in an action. However, when we are to evaluate our tendency to choose these actions, we need to consider two more dimensions fecundity or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the opposite kind. Lastly, when considering the number of persons who are affected by pleasure or pain, another dimension is to be considered -- extent. Felicific calculus allows the evaluation of all actions and their resultant pleasure. This means that actions are evaluated on this single scale regardless of preferences and values. In this sense, pleasure and pain can only quantitatively differ but not qualitatively differ from other experiences of pleasure and pain accordingly. Mill dissents from Bentham's single scale of pleasure. He thinks that the principle of utility must distinguish pleasures qualitatively and not merely quantitatively. For Mill, utilitarianism cannot promote the kind of pleasures appropriate to pigs or to any other animals. He thinks that there are higher intellectual and lower base pleasures. We, as moral agents, are capable of searching and desiring higher intellectual pleasures more than pigs are capable of. We undermine ourselves if we only and primarily desire sensuality; this is because we are capable of searching and desiring higher intellectual pleasures more than pigs are capable of. We undermine ourselves if we only and primarily desire sensuality; this is because we are capable of higher intellectual pleasurable goods. For Mill, crude bestial pleasures, which are appropriate for animals, are degrading to us because we are by nature not easily satisfied by pleasures only for pigs. Human pleasures are qualitatively different from animal pleasures. It is unfair to assume that we merely pursue pleasures appropriate for beasts even if there are instances when we choose to pursue such base pleasures. Contrary to Bentham, Mill argues that quality is more preferable than quantity. An excessive quantity of what is otherwise pleasurable might result in pain. We can consider, for example, our experience of excessive eating or exercising. Whereas eating the right amount of food can be pleasurable, excessive eating may not be. The same is true when exercising. If the quality of pleasure is sometimes more important than quantity, then it is important to consider the standards whereby differences of pleasures can be judged. The test that Mill suggests is simple. In deciding over two comparable pleasures, it is important to experience both and to discover which one is actually more preferred than the other. There is no other way of determining which of the two pleasures is preferable except appealing to the actual preferences and experiences. What Mill discovers anthropologically is that actual choices of knowledgeable persons point that higher intellectual pleasures are preferable than purely sensual appetites. In defending further the comparative choice between intellectual and bestial pleasures, Mill offers an imaginative through experiment. He asks whether a human person would prefer to accept the highly pleasurable life of an animal while at the same time being denied of everything that makes him a person. He thinks that few, if any, would give up human qualities of higher reason for the pleasures of a pig. While it is difficult to understand how Mill was able to compare swinish pleasures with human ones, we can presume that it would be better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Simply put, as human beings, we prefer the pleasures that are actually within our grasp. It is easy to compare extreme types of pleasures as in the case of pigs and humans, but it is difficult to compare pleasures deeply integrated in our way of life. The pleasures of an Ilonggo eating chicken *inasal* and an Igorot eating *pinikpikan* is an example. This cannot be done by simply tasting *inasal* or *pinikpikan.* In the same way, some people prefer *puto* to *bibingka* or liking for the music of *Eraserheads* than that of the *APO Hiking Society.* **III. PRINCIPLE OF THE GREATEST NUMBER** Equating happiness with pleasure does not aim to describe the utilitarian moral agent alone and independently from others. This is not only about our individual pleasures, regardless of how high, intellectual, or in other ways noble it is, but it is also about the pleasure of the greatest number affected by the consequences of our actions. Utilitarianism cannot lead to selfish acts. It is neither about our pleasure nor happiness alone; it cannot be all about us. If we are the only ones satisfied by our actions, it does not constitute a moral good. If we are the only ones who are made happy by our actions, then we cannot be morally good. In this sense, utilitarianism is not dismissive of sacrifices that procure more happiness for others. Therefore, it is necessary for us to consider everyone's happiness, including our own, as the standard by which to evaluate what is moral. Also, it implies that utilitarianism is not at all separate from liberal social practices that aim to improve the quality of life for all persons. Utilitarianism is interested with everyone's happiness, in fact, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Mill identifies the eradication of disease, using technology, and other practical ways as examples of utilitarianism. Consequently, utilitarianism maximizes the total amount of pleasures over displeasure for the greatest number. Utilitarianism is interested with the best consequence for the highest number of people. It is not interested with the intention of the agent. Moral value cannot be discernible in the intention or motivation of the person doing the act; it is based solely and exclusively on the difference it makes on the world's total amount of pleasure and pain. This leads us to question utilitarianism's take of moral rights. If actions are based only on the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is it justifiable to let go of some rights for the sake of the benefit of the majority? **IV. JUSTICE AND MORAL RIGHTS** What is a right? Mill understands *justice* as a respect for rights directed toward society's pursuit for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For him, *rights* are a valid claim on society and are justified by utility. Mill expounds that the abovementioned rights referred are related to the interests that serve general happiness. The right to due process, the right to free speech or religion, and others are justified because they contribute to the general good. This means that society is made happier if its citizens are able to live their lives knowing that their interests are protected and that society (as a whole) defends it. Extending this concept to animals, they have rights because of the effect of such principles on the sum total of happiness that follows as a consequence of instituting and protecting their interests. It is not accidental, therefore, that utilitarians are also the staunchest defenders of animal rights. A right is justifiable on utilitarian principles inasmuch as they produce an overall happiness that is greater than the happiness resulting from their implementation. Utilitarians argue that issues of justice carry a very strong emotional import because the category of rights is directly associated with the individual's most vital interests. All of these rights are predicated on the person's right to life. Mill describes: In this context, our participation in government and social interactions can be explained by the principle of utility and be clarified by Mill's consequentialism. Mill further associated utilitarianism with the possession of legal and moral rights. We are treated justly when our legal and moral rights are respected. Mill enumerates different kinds of goods that he characterized as rights and are protected by law. Mill understands that *legal rights* are neither inviolable nor actual, but rights are subject to some expectations: Mill creates a distinction between legal rights and their justification. He points out that when legal rights are not morally justified in accordance to the greatest happiness principle, then these rights need neither be observed, nor be respected. This is like is saying that there are instances when the law is not morally justified and, in this case, even objectionable. Mill seems to be suggesting that it is morally permissible to not follow, even violate, an unjust law. The implication is that those who protest over political policies of a morally objectionable government act in a morally obligatory way. While this is not always preferred, Mill thinks that it is commendable to endure legal punishments for acts of civil disobedience for the sake of promoting a higher moral good. At an instance of conflict between moral and legal rights, Mill points out that *moral rights* take precedence over legal rights. While it can be justified why others violate legal rights, it is an act of injustice to violate an individual's moral rights. However, Mill seems to provide some extenuating circumstances in which some moral rights can be overridden for the sake of the greater general happiness. In the case of wiretapping for example, it seems that one's right to privacy can be sacrificed for the sake of the common good. This means that moral rights are only justifiable by considerations of greater overall happiness. He qualifies moral rights in this way: In this sense, the principle of utility can theoretically obligate us to steal, kill, and the like. We say "theoretically" because this merely constitutes a thought experiment and need not to be actualized. Since what matters in the assessment of what we do is the resultant happiness, then anything may be justified for the sake of producing the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. While there is no such thing as a laudable and praiseworthy injustice, Mill appeals to the utilitarian understanding of justice as an act justified by the greatest happiness principle. There is no right to violate where utility is not served by the social protection of individual interests. While he recognizes how utilitarian principles can sometimes obligate us to perform acts that would regularly be understood as disagreeing individual rights, he argues that this is only possible if it is judged to produce more happiness than unhappiness. In short, Mill's moral rights and considerations of justice are not absolute, but are only justified by their consequences to promote the greatest good of the greatest number. With these understandings of rights in place, Mill explains his understanding of justice and it is with this that we end this section. For Mill, justice can be interpreted in terms of moral rights because justice promotes the greater social good. He explains: **V. SUMMARY** Bentham and Mill see moral good as pleasure, not merely self-gratification, but also the greatest happiness principle or the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. We are compelled to do whatever increases pleasure and decreases pain to the most number of persons, counting each as one and none as more than one. In determining the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, there is no distinction between Bentham and Mill. Bentham suggests his felicific calculus, a framework for quantifying moral valuation. Mill provides a criterion for comparative pleasures. He thinks that persons who experience two different types of pleasures generally prefer higher intellectual pleasures to base sensual ones. Mill provides an adequate discourse on rights despite it being mistakenly argued to be the weakness of utilitarianism. He argues that rights are socially protected interests that are justified by their contribution to the greatest happiness principle. However, he also claims that in extreme circumstances, respect for individual rights can be overridden to promote the better welfare especially in circumstances of conflict valuation.