AQA A-Level Philosophy 7172 Past Paper - June 2019 PDF

AQA A-level Philosophy 7172. A-level exams June 2019 onwards. Version 1.0 26 October 2016 Trotter Cockburn, Catharine (1732), (attrib) ‘A Letter from an anonymous writer to the author of the Minute Philosopher’ Appendix to G Berkeley Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained Zagzebski, Linda (1999)...

AQA A-level Philosophy 7172. A-level exams June 2019 onwards. Version 1.0 26 October 2016 Trotter Cockburn, Catharine (1732), (attrib) ‘A Letter from an anonymous writer to the author of the Minute Philosopher’ Appendix to G Berkeley Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained Zagzebski, Linda (1999), ‘What is Knowledge?’ in John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology 92 –116 3.2 Moral philosophy 3.2.1 Normative ethical theories The meaning of good, bad, right, wrong within each of the three approaches specified below Similarities and differences across the three approaches specified below Utilitarianism The question of what is meant by 'utility' and 'maximising utility', including: Jeremy Bentham's quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism (his utility calculus) John Stuart Mill’s qualitative hedonistic utilitarianism (higher and lower pleasures) and his ‘proof’ of the greatest happiness principle non-hedonistic utilitarianism (including preference utilitarianism) act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Issues, including: whether pleasure is the only good (Nozick's experience machine) fairness and individual liberty/rights (including the risk of the 'tyranny of the majority') problems with calculation (including which beings to include) issues around partiality whether utilitarianism ignores both the moral integrity and the intentions of the individual. Kantian deontological ethics Immanuel Kant’s account of what is meant by a ‘good will’. The distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting out of duty. The distinction between hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives. The first formulation of the categorical imperative (including the distinction between a contradiction in conception and a contradiction in will). The second formulation of the categorical imperative. Issues, including: clashing/competing duties not all universalisable maxims are distinctly moral; not all non-universalisable maxims are immoral the view that consequences of actions determine their moral value Kant ignores the value of certain motives, eg love, friendship, kindness morality is a system of hypothetical, rather than categorical, imperatives (Philippa Foot). Aristotelian virtue ethics ‘The good’ for human beings: the meaning of Eudaimonia as the ‘final end’ and the relationship between Eudaimonia and pleasure. The function argument and the relationship between virtues and function. Visit for the most up-to-date specification, resources, support and administration 13  Aristotle’s account of virtues and vices: virtues as character traits/dispositions; the role of education/habituation in the development of a moral character; the skill analogy; the importance of feelings; the doctrine of the mean and its application to particular virtues. Moral responsibility: voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary actions. The relationship between virtues, actions and reasons and the role of practical reasoning/ practical wisdom. Issues including: whether Aristotelian virtue ethics can give sufficiently clear guidance about how to act clashing/competing virtues the possibility of circularity involved in defining virtuous acts and virtuous persons in terms of each other whether a trait must contribute to Eudaimonia in order to be a virtue; the relationship between the good for the individual and moral good. 3.2.2 Applied ethics Students must be able to apply the content of Normative ethical theories (page 13) and meta- ethics (page 14) to the following issues: stealing simulated killing (within computer games, plays, films etc) eating animals telling lies. 3.2.3 Meta-ethics The origins of moral principles: reason, emotion/attitudes, or society. The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism about ethical language. Moral realism There are mind-independent moral properties/facts. Moral naturalism (cognitivist) – including naturalist forms of utilitarianism (including Bentham) and of virtue ethics. Moral non-naturalism (cognitivist) – including intuitionism and Moore’s ‘open question argument’ against all reductive metaethical theories and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Issues that may arise for the theories above, including: Hume's Fork and A J Ayer's verification principle Hume's argument that moral judgements are not beliefs since beliefs alone could not motivate us Hume's is-ought gap John Mackie's argument from relativity and his arguments from queerness. Moral anti-realism There are no mind-independent moral properties/facts. Error Theory (cognitivist) - Mackie Emotivism (non-cognitivist) – Ayer Prescriptivism (non-cognitivist) – Richard Hare 14 Visit for the most up-to-date specification, resources, support and administration