Lecture8-HelpingCooperation-2023-Student-2.pptx

Situational determinants of altruism  Diffusion of responsibility  Pluralistic ignorance  Cost of helping/not helping Altruistic views  Empathy DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY Feeling of responsibility diminishes as the number of bystanders increases The epileptic seizure study Proportion of hel...

Situational determinants of altruism  Diffusion of responsibility  Pluralistic ignorance  Cost of helping/not helping Altruistic views  Empathy DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY Feeling of responsibility diminishes as the number of bystanders increases The epileptic seizure study Proportion of help decreases and time delay to help increases with increasing number of bystanders EPILEPTIC SEIZURE STUDY DARLEY & LATANÉ (1968) EPILEPTIC SEIZURE STUDY EPILEPTIC SEIZURE STUDY PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE People who are unsure how to act in a situation will use others’ behaviors to guide their actions Based on Festinger’s social comparison theory  we use other people as guides when we are unsure of the appropriate behavior SMOKE-FILLED ROOM DARLEY & LATANÉ (1968) Only 10% intervened. Most stayed past 6 minutes 75% sought help Situational determinants of altruism  Diffusion of responsibility  Pluralistic ignorance  Cost of helping/not helping Altruistic views  Empathy BYSTANDER-CALCULUS MODEL (THE AROUSAL: COST-REWARD MODEL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERVENTION: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. DOVIDIO,- JOHN-F; PILIAVIN,- JANE-A; GAERTNER,-SAMUEL-L; SCHROEDER,DAVID-A; CLARK,-RUSSELL-D III. BOOK SOURCE: CLARK, MARGARET S. (ED). (1991). PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR. REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 12. (PP. 86-118). THOUSAND OAKS, CA, US: SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC.) Physiological Arousal  Aroused by suffering and distress of others  Influenced by clarity and emergency (interpretation) of the situation Intensity  Among those who witness an emergency; Individuals with higher arousal (e.g., faster heart rate) are more likely to help than those with lower arousal (e.g., slower heart rate) STUPID LADDER EXPERIMENT (THE ATTRIBUTION OF AROUSAL AND EMERGENCY HELPING: A BIDIRECTIONAL PROCESS. STERLING,-BRUCE; GAERTNER,-SAMUEL-L. JOURNAL-OF-EXPERIMENTAL-SOCIALPSYCHOLOGY. 1984 NOV; VOL 20(6): 586-596.) Interact via intercom with another subject (a confederate)  Develop bond with partner Do various levels of push-ups  Produce different levels of physiological arousal Heard partner mutter spilling a glass of water, footsteps searching for a towel, a loud bang, “This stupid ladder” STUPID LADDER EXPERIMENT (THE ATTRIBUTION OF AROUSAL AND EMERGENCY HELPING: A BIDIRECTIONAL PROCESS. STERLING,-BRUCE; GAERTNER,-SAMUEL-L. JOURNAL-OF-EXPERIMENTAL-SOCIALPSYCHOLOGY. 1984 NOV; VOL 20(6): 586-596.) Oh, my head! Low arousal This stupid ladder! BANG! High arousal STUPID LADDER EXPERIMENT High Phy. Arousal Helping Behavior Low Phy. Arousal Clear Emergency Ambiguous Situation STUPID LADDER EXPERIMENT Interaction between interpretation of situation and intensity of arousal Under clear emergency, high arousal induces MORE helping behavior than low arousal  Misattribute physiological arousal (due to exercising) to situation emergency ‑‑> more help Under ambiguous situation, high arousal induces LESS helping behavior than low arousal  Misattribute physiological arousal (due to emergency of the situation) to exercising ‑‑> less help The attribution of arousal and emergency helping: A bidirectional process. Sterling,-Bruce; Gaertner,-Samuel-L. Journal-ofExperimental-Social-Psychology. 1984 Nov; Vol 20(6): 586-596. COSTS OF HELPING & NOT HELPING Empathy costs of not helping  The cost of not helping when feeling empathic concern of the victim Personal costs of not helping  Norm of reciprocity  An expectation that people will help those who have helped them  Norm of social responsibility  An expectation that people will help those dependent upon them Empathy cost of not helping: “It makes me uncomfort able not to help COSTS OF HELPING & NOT HELPING Empathy costs of not helping  The cost of not helping when feeling empathic concern of the victim Personal costs of not helping  Norm of reciprocity  An expectation that people will help those who have helped them  Norm of social responsibility  An expectation that people will help those dependent upon them http://news.mingpao.com/ins/instantnews/web_tc/article/20160624/ s00001/1466743165753 Feeling upset that fire fighters have nothing good to eat Giving away free lunch boxes COSTS OF HELPING & NOT HELPING Empathy costs of not helping  The cost of not helping when feeling empathic concern of the victim Personal costs of not helping  Norm of reciprocity  An expectation that people will help those who have helped them  Norm of social responsibility  An expectation that people will help those dependent upon them Steven 在 IG 發文「我住在中國廣東的叔叔， 15 年前，送給我們一台 PS2 ，因為叔叔知道我們沒有 錢能買玩具，所以他花了一個月的薪水 400 元 ( 約 3,120 港元 ) ，買了當時最夯的 PS2 給我們，收到 禮物我就默默許下心願，一定要報答叔叔的恩情；如 今我做到了，我送他一台全新的 SUV 。」 Uncle bought me PS2 with his entire monthly income knowing we had no money for toys. I made a wish I would repay him. Now I bought him a new SUV. COSTS OF HELPING & NOT HELPING Empathy costs of not helping  The cost of not helping when feeling empathic concern of the victim Personal costs of not helping  Norm of reciprocity  An expectation that people will help those who have helped them  Norm of social responsibility  An expectation that people will help those dependent upon them Domestic helper got hurt saving young master Cost of NOT helping Cost of Helping Low High Directly help Indirect intervention or High reappraise the situation Depends on Not help Low norms Situational determinants of altruism  Diffusion of responsibility  Pluralistic ignorance  Cost of helping/not helping Altruistic views  Empathy EMPATHY-ALTRUISM MODEL (MOOD EFFECTS OF UNSUCCESSFUL HELPING: ANOTHER TEST OF THE EMPATHY-ALTRUISM HYPOTHESIS. BATSON,-CDANIEL; WEEKS,- JOY-L. PERSONALITY-AND-SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGY-BULLETIN. 1996 FEB; VOL 22(2): 148-157.) (CURRENT STATUS OF THE EMPATHY-ALTRUISM HYPOTHESIS.BATSON,-C-DANIEL; OLESON,-KATHRYN-C. CL ARK, MARGARET S. (ED). (1991). PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR. REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 12. (PP. 62-85). THOUS AND OAKS, CA, US: S AGE PUBLICATIONS, INC) Witnessing others in distress stimulates two reactions:  Distress  Is unpleasant and we are motivated to reduce OUR OWN distress  Egoistic motivation  Empathy  Directs attention towards others’ distress and we are motivated to reduce others's distress  Altruistic motivation Either distress or empathy can motivate helping behavior EMPATHIC JOY (EJ) HYPOTHESIS We enjoy others' relief at being helped  Empathy -- feeling the relief that others feel  We help because we want to feel that others are happy, not just to improve our own mood If we cannot witness the "happy ending", we may not help Altruism reconsidered: The effect of denying feedback on a victim's status to empathic witnesses. Smith,-Kyle-D; Keating,-John-P; Stotland,-Ezra. Journal-of-Personality-and-Social-Psychology. 1989 Oct; Vol 57(4): 641-650. COVER STORY How students perceive others' methods of coping with the university environment One of his or her tasks would be to watch and rate several interviews of freshmen discussing the college adjustment problems The consent form ended with a request that the subject can consider making a videotape discussing personal experiences in adjusting to life on the university campus The subject is the only person who could respond to that interview EMPATHY MANIPULATION Imagine-set   increase empathic emotion While watching the interviews you will see today, try to imagine how the person who is being interviewed feels. Try to take the perspective of the person being interviewed, imagining how he or she feels about what is happening and how it has affected his or her life. In addition to listening to what s/he says, pay attention to the interviewee's tone of voice and facial expressions as cues for how s/he must he feeling. Try not to concern yourself with attending to all of the information presented. Just concentrate on trying to imagine how the person interviewed on the tape feels. Observe-set  While watching the interviews you will see today, please watch exactly what the person on the tape does. Your job will be to watch all of this person's body movements that you can see. Carefully attend to the head movements, bearing, and posture of the person who is being interviewed. You are to notice anything that this person does, whatever it is. Try to he as objective as possible. Do not concern yourself with how the person who is being interviewed feels about the topic of the interview. Just concentrate on trying to watch the interviewee's body movements, objectively. Table 1 Rates of helping Predicted by the Empathic Joy Hypothesis When Empathy and the Potential for Feedback Are Varied From: Smith: J Pers Soc Psychol, Volume 57(4).October 1989.641–650 STIMULUS INTERVIEW A young woman of moderate attractiveness designated as “Subject 042” (she was actually an actress). Disclosed stressors familiar to many firstyear college students.  Felt a great deal of pressure from her father to excel in her coursework, which was much more difficult than she had expected.  Felt isolated and largely without friends on a large campus.  Transition to life in a dormitory made college much more stressful than she had expected.  Confessed that other people seemed to her to be adjusting more easily than she  Wondered if she was the only one feeling overwhelmed. HELPING OPPORTUNITY Helping option  Provide a more detailed response to the problems and coping strategies discussed by Subject 042 (the woman in the tape)  The woman purportedly would read the subject's responses (if any) on her next visit to the lab, scheduled for the following day. Nonhelping option  Watch and rate a videotaped interview of another subject, unrelated to Subject 042, without the possibility of communication with that subject. Subject was told that either option would add to the researchers' understanding of how the subject perceived coping styles in others, and that the choice was being offered because of the necessity that the subject remain interested and involved in the procedure. FEEDBACK MANIPULATION Feedback  If subject decided to offer advice to Subject 042, they would see another videotaped interview with Subject 042 during their second appointment.  This interview would be recorded after Subject 042 had had time to read their suggestions and to begin applying them to her living situation, if she chose to do so.  The interview would focus on her reactions to their advice and the difference it had made in her adjustment to campus life. No feedback  Subject would have no further contact with Subject 042, whether they decided to offer advice to her or not. DEBRIEFING After the subject had finished, the experimenter scheduled a return appointment for at least 8 days from the date of the initial session (this delay supported the experimenter's story that the subject's partner would have time to return to the lab twice before the subject's next appointment.) When the subject arrived for the second appointment, an experimenter blind to the subject's condition provided the subject with a questionnaire, presented as a procedural formality before continuing the experiment. This posttest included a check on the effectiveness of the feedback manipulation in Session 1 and a check for suspicions. After collecting the posttest, the experimenter conducted a more detailed probe for suspicions and then debriefed the subject. Proportion of Subjects Offering Advice 100% 93% 90% 80% 69% 70% 62% 60% M: Number of words in the message written by the participant 50% 40% 38% 30% 20% 10% 0% Observe No Feedback Imagine Feedback Table 3 Proportion of Subjects Offering Advice to the Confederate Within Instructional-Set and Feedback Conditions From: Smith: J Pers Soc Psychol, Volume 57(4).October 1989.641–650 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship  Ultimatum game  Social norms Social Exchange Theory  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Prisoner’s Dilemma Social Dilemmas  Public goods dilemma  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma  Protocols of play Solving social dilemmas  Communication  Coordination 31 THE ULTIMATUM GAME Two persons, A & B, share a fixed amount of resource, e.g., $20 Person A makes an allocation, e.g., A gets $15, and B gets: $5 Person B either accepts or rejects the allocation  If B accepts, A and B get what A proposes  If B vetoes, A and B get nothing 32 SOCIAL NORMS Equality Norm  Everyone should get the same Equity Norm  One person's input-to-output (cost-toreward) ratio in a relationship should be equal to the other person's inputto-output ratio Needs Norm  Those who need more receive more 33 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Social norms  Public goods dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Prisoner’s Dilemma  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma  Protocols of play Solving social dilemmas  Communication  Coordination 34 SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY The basic premise is to quantify the gains and losses attached to specific interactions and use the resulting quantification to predict and explain behaviors It models exchange relationship like acquaintances, business partners in which people  Want to maximize own gain and do not care about the welfare of others 35 THE GAME OF CHICKEN 36 THE GAME OF CHICKEN 37 THE GAME OF CHICKEN GOLDEN BALL UK SHOW D 38 SOME CONCEPTS The situation can be structured in a behavior matrix The outcomes for each person in each situation can be quantified by outcome values (the numbers in the corners) Interdependence  Both persons' (husband or wife) outcomes are determined by both people's behavior 39 SOME CONCEPTS (2) People guide their behavior according to the hedonistic principle  Maximize pleasure and minimize pain at a minimal cost  Costs may include opportunity cost  Positive outcome a person must forego because of choosing another behavior (alternative)  Essentially it means choosing the outcome with the highest values, or maximizing your own gain 40 The closest the world has come to nuclear war was the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The Soviets had installed nuclear missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles off the coast of the United States. U.S. armed forces were at their highest state of readiness. Soviet field commanders in Cuba were authorized to use tactical nuclear weapons if invaded by the U.S. The fate of millions literally hinged upon President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev to reach a compromise. THE GAME OF NUCLEAR CHICKEN A naval blockade (B), or "quarantine" as it was euphemistically called, to prevent shipment of more missiles, possibly followed by stronger action to induce the Soviet Union to withdraw the missiles already installed. A "surgical" air strike (A) to wipe out the missiles already installed, insofar as possible, perhaps followed by an invasion of the island. Withdrawal (W) of their missiles. Maintenance (M) of their missiles. 42 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship  Ultimatum game  Social norms Social Exchange Theory  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Prisoner’s Dilemma Social Dilemmas  Public goods dilemma  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma  Protocols of play Solving social dilemmas  Communication  Coordination 43 HTTP://SETIS.LIBRARY.USYD.EDU.AU/ STANFORD/ARCHIVES/FALL1997/ ENTRIES/PRISONER-DILEMMA/ Tanya and Cinque have been arrested for robbing the Hibernia Savings Bank and placed in separate isolation cells. Both care much more about their personal freedom than about the welfare of their accomplice. A clever prosecutor makes the following offer to each. "You may choose to confess or remain silent. If you confess and your accomplice remains silent I will drop all charges against you and use your testimony to ensure that your accomplice does serious time. Likewise, if your accomplice confesses while you remain silent, they will go free while you do the time. If you both confess I get two convictions, but I'll see to it that you both get early parole. If you both remain silent, I'll have to settle for token sentences on firearms possession charges. If you wish to confess, you must leave a note with the jailer before my return tomorrow morning." The "dilemma" faced by the prisoners here is that, whatever the other does, each is better off confessing than remaining silent. But the outcome obtained when both confess is worse for each than the outcome they would have obtained had both remained silent. A common view is that the puzzle illustrates a failure of individual rationality. A group whose members pursue rational selfinterest may all end up worse off than a group whose members act contrary to rational self- interest. More generally, if the payoffs are not assumed to represent self-interest, a group whose members rationally pursue any goals may all meet less success than if they had not rationally pursued their goals individually. Puzzles with this structure were devised and discussed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand Corporation's investigations into game theory (which Rand pursued because of possible applications to global nuclear strategy). The title "prisoner's dilemma" and the version with prison sentences as payoffs are due to Albert Tucker, who wanted to make Flood and Dresher's ideas more accessible to an audience of Stanford psychologists. 44 PRISONER’S DILEMMA Proposed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand Corporation's investigations into game theory (which Rand pursued because of possible applications to global nuclear strategy). The title "prisoner's dilemma" and the version with prison sentences as payoffs are due to Albert Tucker, who wanted to make Flood and Dresher's ideas more accessible to an audience of Stanford psychologists. Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of speaking to or exchanging messages with the other. The police admit they don't have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. They plan to sentence both to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the police offer each prisoner a Faustian bargain. If he testifies against his partner, he will go free while the partner will get three years in prison on the main charge. Oh, yes, there is a catch ... If both prisoners testify against each other, both will be sentenced to three years in jail. 45 PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME (PDG) PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME For each player at the individual level, defection always results in a better outcome than cooperation  defection dominates cooperation For both players at the collective level, mutual defection results in a worse outcome than mutual cooperation  mutual cooperation is better than mutual defection 48 PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME Class Teach Choic er e Choic e In general, (1) T > R > P > S, and (2) T + S < 2R Class Payo ff Teach er Payo ff 49 THE TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY A strategy to play iterative PDG  Cooperate on the first trial  On subsequent trials, imitate the opponent's response on the previous trial TFT is a reciprocal strategy It has been shown that when naive subjects play against TFT for many trials, naive subjects will cooperate eventually (after some 150-200 trials) 50 THE TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY (2) TFT is effective in inducing cooperation because it is…     Nice  never the first to defect Can be provoked and cannot be exploited Forgiving  return to cooperation if the other person does so Clear and can easily be understood 51 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Social norms  Public goods dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Prisoner’s Dilemma  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma  Protocols of play Solving social dilemmas  Communication  Coordination 54 SOCIAL DILEMMAS An extension of PDG to the n-person case  Each person is always better off to defect than to cooperate  However, if everyone chooses to defect, the mutual defection outcome is worse than the mutual cooperation outcome In a sense, you are choosing between either to maximize your individual gain versus to maximize your group's interest. 55 TWO TYPES OF SOCIAL DILEMMAS Public goods (PG)  E.G., Public broadcast (TV or radio), recycling, clean air, charities Tragedy of the commons, or common resource pool dilemma (CRP)  E.G., Fishing, logging, grazing, water or energy conservation, internet bandwidth use 56 PUBLIC GOODS Two defining characteristics  Jointness of supply  One person's enjoyment of the public good does not undermine other people's enjoyment of the public good at the same time, i.e., Plenty of supply for everyone  Impossibility of exclusion  Once the PG is provided, regardless of whether you have contributed to the PG, no one can be excluded from enjoying it The free-rider problem  Enjoying the PG without contributing to it 57 CRITICALITY  (Au, 2003; Chen, Au, & Komorita, 1996; de Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; Kerr, 1989, 1992; Rapoport, 1987). A person is in a critical situation if and only if his or her contribution is required to provide the PG (Rapoport, 1987) Such a condition can also be described as a necessary (only if) and sufficient (if) condition. 58 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Social norms  Public goods dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Prisoner’s Dilemma  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma  Protocols of play Solving social dilemmas  Communication  Coordination 59 COMMON RESOURCE POOL DILEMMA  Commons Dilemma (Hardin, 1968); Resource Dilemma (e.g., Budescu, Rapoport & Suleiman, 1990); the Common Pool Resource (CPR) Problem (e.g., Gardner, Ostrom & Walker, 1990) Models the conflicts experienced by a group of self interested individuals who share a finite and limited common desirable good. 60 COMMON RESOURCE POOL DILEMMA A fixed common resource pool of 1000 dollars shared by X individuals Each person makes a request simultaneously If total request <= resource pool size, each person gets what he or she requested If total request > resource pool size, each person gets nothing 61 EXAMPLE: COMMON POOL RESOURCE DILEMMA A total quota of Q = 1000 fish n = 5 fishermen Each fisherman registers a request ri If ∑ri ≤ Q  Each fisherman gets ri If ∑ri > Q  Each fisherman gets 0 62 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Social norms  Public goods dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Prisoner’s Dilemma  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma  Protocols of play Solving social dilemmas  Communication  Coordination 63 SIMULTANEOUS PROTOCOL  All players make decisions at the same time No information regarding other players’ decisions  All players have identical and symmetric information 64 SIMULTANEOUS PROTOCOL EXAMPLE 1 requests 120 requests 100 gets 120 1000 gets 100 Total requests = 870 < 1000 requests 180 gets 180 requests 250 gets 250 requests 220 gets 220 65 SIMULTANEOUS PROTOCOL EXAMPLE 2 requests 150 requests 200 gets 0 1000 gets 0 Total requests = 1020 > 1000 requests 100 gets 0 requests 250 gets 0 requests 320 gets 0 66 CHOOSE A NUMBER GAME 67 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Social norms  Public goods dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Prisoner’s Dilemma  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma  Protocols of play Solving social dilemmas  Communication  Coordination 68 COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS Coordination improves cooperation  The coordination game 69 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Social norms  Public goods dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Prisoner’s Dilemma  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma  Protocols of play Solving social dilemmas  Communication  Coordination 70 COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS Communication improves cooperation  Without communication, people may have unwarranted expectation of others' behaviors which may hinder cooperation  Kelly and Stahelski's triangular hypothesis 71 DAWES, MCTAVISH, & SHAKLEE (1977) Experimental Condition No communication <<work silently for 10 minutes on an Coop Rate irrelevant task, e.g., estimate the percentage of people at certain income levels in Eugene, Oregon>> 30% Communication about topics irrelevant to the game <<discuss an irrelevant topic of 10 minutes>> 32% Communication relevant to the game <<discuss the game for 10 minutes but are not permitted to take a roll call>> 72% Relevant communication with nonbinding announcements of intended choices <<end the 71% discussion with a nonbinding declaration of intended decision>> Discussion on dilemma enhances cooperation and not EXPLANATIONS OF DISCUSSION EFFECT Enhanced understanding of the game Opportunities for coordination of cooperation Altered expectations of others’ likely behaviors Enhanced norms of benevolence Creating local norms of cooperation Humanizing group members Promoting group solidarity Induced commitments to mutually cooperate COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS Cooperative Your Expectation Of Other’s Behavior Competitive Comp Your Own Orientation Coop Implication: if you are competitive, you may mistake others to be competitive as well, even though this may not be right. However your (incorrect) expectation of others being competitive may lead you not to cooperate 74 MIXED-MOTIVE INTERACTIONS Management-labor relationship Social Dilemmas  Ultimatum game  Social norms  Public goods dilemma Social Exchange Theory  Battle of the sexes  Game of Chicken Prisoner’s Dilemma  Criticality  Common resource pool dilemma  Protocols of play Solving social dilemmas  Communication  Coordination 75