IR Midterm Review PDF

Week One - Realism COURSE OVERVIEW Main Theories: Realism: Self-interested states competing for power or security. ○ The international system is anarchical ○ States are the central actors in the system and their main goals are survival ○ States fear each other and max...

Week One - Realism COURSE OVERVIEW Main Theories: Realism: Self-interested states competing for power or security. ○ The international system is anarchical ○ States are the central actors in the system and their main goals are survival ○ States fear each other and maximize their relative power positions over each other Liberalism: Focus on economic considerations and collective norms. ○ State preferences reflect the interests of a coalition of social actors. Constructivism: State behavior shaped by elite beliefs and social identities. ○ Interests and preferences are shaped by learning and interaction. ○ Actors influence the characteristics of the international system. realist’s foreign policy is to understand what a state is capable and incapable of, based on observing how political/military power is distributed in the world. II. Reading Summaries 1. Walt, Stephen M. “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” ○ theories are essential for making sense of the complex and often chaotic world of international relations. i. Policymakers, whether they acknowledge it or not, rely on theoretical frameworks to guide their decisions. ○ The Democratic Peace Theory: democracies are less likely to go to war with one another, is a significant liberal argument supported by various empirical studies. ○ Walt's Guidelines for World Peace: i. Leaders should heed realism's lessons on national interests. ii. Great powers must respect weaker nations' resolve. iii. Caution in initiating wars is essential. iv. Citizens should elect peace-oriented leaders. 2. Walt - Why Foreign-Policy Realists Oppose the War in Gaza ○ Foreign policy realists are often thought to disregard morality, but they recognize and care about ethical considerations in global politics. ○ Realists understand that states often commit brutal acts when pursuing their interests, but that doesn’t mean they approve of such actions. ○ Realists oppose the war due to: i. Limits of military power. ii. Nationalism's importance – undermines the US’s global position by weakening support from the Middle East 1. Israel’s actions bring no strategic benefits to the U.S., and unconditional support for Israel has worsened relations with Iran  2. U.S. complicity in Israel’s actions undermines America's global position and exposes the hypocrisy in its commitment to a “rules-based order.” iii. Costs outweigh strategic benefits. 1. U.S. involvement in the war is costly, diverting attention and resources from other pressing global issues, including relations with key allies, policy in Ukraine, and climate change. Week Two - Realism vs. Liberalism Course Overview Liberal Institutionalism: ○ focuses on the role of international institutions in promoting cooperation by addressing issues like cheating. Despite mitigating cheating, institutions struggle to address concerns over relative gains, making long-term cooperation difficult. ○ Key Assumptions: International institutions prevent cheating by increasing the number of transactions between states and monitoring behavior. They promote cooperation through reciprocity and reputational concerns. However, institutions cannot fully address concerns over relative gains, which remain a major barrier to cooperation. ○ Facilitating Cooperation: International institutions can increase the number of transactions between particular states over time. International institutions can increase the amount of information available to participants in cooperative agreements so that close monitoring is possible. It increases the likelihood that cheaters will be caught. ○ Challenges: Relative Gains: Even with absolute gains, states fear that others may gain more, leading to a long-term shift in the balance of power (e.g., US-China trade disputes). Cooperation is difficult because one state often gains more than the other, shifting the balance of power over time. Cheating: In an anarchic system, states fear cheating due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms. Institutions Prevent Cheating: International institutions help reduce cheating by increasing transactions, monitoring, and fostering cooperation through reciprocity and reputation. An international institution  ○ set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other ○ prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior Why is cooperation so hard to achieve in the international system? ○ Concerns over relative gains: if both states will benefit from cooperation, one state is likely to gain more from the cooperation than the other ○ Cheating: no state can be sure that other states will keep the promise This is due to anarchy (enforcement problem) Reading Summaries 1. Walt’s View on Supporting Ukraine ○ Summary: i. In “The Morality of Ukraine’s War Is Very Murky” (2024), Walt explores the ethical complexity surrounding the Ukraine conflict, cautioning against oversimplified moral judgments. ii. In “NATO Should Not Accept Ukraine—for Ukraine’s Sake” (2024), Walt argues that NATO membership for Ukraine would escalate tensions with Russia, ultimately harming Ukraine more than helping it. ○ Key Points: i. Moral ambiguity in the Ukraine conflict. ii. Potential risks of Ukraine’s NATO membership for its own security. 2. Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin. “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” ○ importance of institutions in shaping state behavior and facilitating cooperation, particularly in situations where states have significant common interests. ○ institutions can influence outcomes by providing information, establishing norms, and creating expectations about state behavior. ○ they assert that while power dynamics are crucial, institutions still matter significantly in shaping interactions and outcomes among states. ○ Main arguments: i. institutions can mitigate the concerns over relative gains 1. by providing information about distributional outcomes a. Through bargaining 2. drawing reciprocity a. Likely to form when distributional information is available 3. extending the time horizon of interactions among states a. Cooperation is more likely 3. Mearsheimer’s False Promise (1995) ○ Summary: i. Mearsheimer critiques post-Cold War optimism about international institutions, arguing that they do little to promote peace. He emphasizes that NATO should have either dissolved or restructured after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  ii. Critique of International Institutions: Mearsheimer argues that international institutions, such as NATO, do little to promote peace and should have restructured or dissolved after the Cold War. iii. NATO Expansion: He links NATO’s expansion to causing the current conflict in Ukraine, questioning its post-Cold War relevance. ○ Key Points: i. Skepticism about the effectiveness of international institutions. ii. Realist perspective on NATO’s role after the Cold War. iii. concludes that international institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world. iv. Concerns over relative gains makes cooperation difficult v. International institutions cannot mitigate such concerns 1. But they can help with cheating. III. Extra Notes Realists argue international institutions are a reflection of the existing distribution of power among states. They do not have independent influence but rather serve the interests of powerful states. Cheating and relative gains are not a problem in a domestic environment (enforcement and survival). ○ Unlike the international world. Relative Gains: ○ The concerns over relative gains are likely greatest in World 2, where States A and B are equally powerful. In this scenario, any deal made could directly impact the relative power balance between the two states. ○ The degree to which concerns over relative gains hinder cooperation may depend on the environment where states try to cooperate Week Three - Liberalism and Rational Theory Course Overview Key Points on Liberal Institutionalism: ○ Cooperation occurs despite challenges when: i. There is a mutuality of interest (shared goals between states). ii. The shadow of the future influences behavior (the expectation of future interactions encourages cooperation). iii. The number of participants is manageable (fewer players make cooperation easier). ○ Game Theory illustrates different outcomes of cooperation, including: i. Prisoner's Dilemma:  1. Two states must choose between cooperation and defection (betrayal), without knowing what the other will choose. 2. If both cooperate, they receive a moderate benefit; if both defect, they receive a lesser benefit. 3. Cooperation is better but hard to achieve because states fear defection. 4. Cold War arms race between the U.S. and Soviet Union—each had the incentive to build more weapons (defect), even though both would be better off reducing arms (cooperate). ii. Stag Hunt: 1. Cooperation is more likely if trust exists. 2. two players can either cooperate to hunt a stag (which requires mutual cooperation for a high payoff) or defect to hunt a rabbit (which provides a lower payoff but can be done alone) 3. Cooperation is the best outcome, but there’s a risk that the other player will choose the safer option 4. Paris Climate Agreement—countries can cooperate to reduce emissions (benefit all) or defect by focusing on their own economic gains (short-term benefits but long-term global harm). iii. Chicken: 1. two players drive towards each other, and each must decide whether to swerve or continue straight. a. If one swerves and the other does not, the one who swerves is seen as a "chicken" (loser), while the other wins. b. If both swerve, they both avoid disaster but neither wins. c. goal is to convince the other party to cooperate (swerve) while maintaining a strong stance (not swerving), but mutual defection leads to disaster. d. Cuban Missile Crisis—both the U.S. and Soviet Union had to decide whether to escalate (defect) or back down (cooperate), with the risk of nuclear war if both defected. iv. Deadlock: 1. Cooperation may be less likely due to conflicting interests or irrationality. 2. both players believe that mutual cooperation is worse than mutual defection 3. there is no incentive to cooperate because defection is always the better option, even though mutual defection leads to a less ideal outcome than if cooperation were possible. II. Reading Summaries Axelrod and Keohane, Cooperation ○ Focus: How is achieving cooperation under anarchy (in international politics) distinguished from achieving cooperation under hierarchy (in domestic politics)?  ○ The authors explore why cooperation occurs despite the difficulties. ○ Conditions for cooperation include 1. mutuality of interest 1. The players of the game identify whether there is a mutual interest in cooperation a. it depends not only on my interest but also on others’ 2. Game theories. 2. shadow of the future 3. the number of players in the game. ○ while achieving cooperation is complex, it is possible through strategic choices, institutional frameworks, and an understanding of the interplay between interests and perceptions. ○ Shadow of the future: 1. When players expect to interact with each other repeatedly over time, they are more likely to cooperate in the present to ensure mutually beneficial outcomes in the future. 2. It creates incentives. Week Five - States and Preferences Course Overview Conditions that shape shadow of future: ○ Repeated interactions ○ Reliable information The importance of the shadow of the future: ○ Theoretical significance (Prisoner’s Dilemma): i. Even when defection is the Nash Equilibrium, cooperation is possible with a long-term perspective and strategies like tit-for-tat. ○ Empirical relevance: i. In real-world politics, actors often have repeated, long-term interactions, whether cooperative or not. ○ Role of international institutions: i. Institutions extend the shadow of the future through repeated interactions and long-term gains, increasing the likelihood of cooperation. Power in International Relations: ○ In a realist sense: the ability of states to use material resources to get others to do what they otherwise would not do. ○ Types of Power Institutional Power: Control through formal and informal institutions (e.g., Saudi Arabia’s influence via OPEC). Structural Power: ○ a structure defining what kinds of social beings actors are and determining their interests and capability  ○ Power defined by international structures like the UN Security Council. Productive Power: ○ the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope ○ Power derived from shaping discourse and norms (e.g., non-signatories of the Mine Ban Treaty still having influence). Reading Summaries 1. Adebajo, Post-Colonial ○ Research Question: How did the states in the Global South, emerging through decolonization, affect international governance? ○ Main Answer: Former colonies entered the international system where rules were pre-established. Influence was seen in four areas: political decolonization, economic decolonization, global human rights, and global security. ○ These states influenced four areas: Political Decolonization: 1. Non-alignment movement (neutrality between US and Soviet blocs). 2. Support for decolonization and increased representation of the Global South. 3. Bandung Conference (1955): Laid the foundation for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) with principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Economic Decolonization: 1. Creation of organizations like OPEC (13 oil-producing countries). 2. Regional intergration Global Human Rights: 1. Shift from "absolute sovereignty" to "sovereignty as responsibility" (Responsibility to Protect principle). Global Security: 1. International organizations step in when governments can't protect their citizens. 2. Egel and Ward, Hierarchy ○ How do weak states challenge the international status quo? ○ Main Answer: Weak states challenge through positional revisionism (transforming material resources into capital) and subversive revisionism (challenging accepted notions of power). 1. Positional Revisionism: Weak states use material resources to advance their position (e.g., using economic or political capital).  2. Subversive Revisionism: Weak states challenge dominant powers and norms (e.g., the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons vs. P-5). Week Six - Intl. Orgs Course Overview The focus is: whether states’ behaviors/decisions/policies would change due to the influences of international institutions If so, how? ○ Simmons et al. (2005): More states are adopting liberal policies in the international system. Types of liberalization: ○ Economic Liberalization: States implement policies that reduce government control over economic behavior. Emphasis on promoting economic exchanges and marketization. Political Liberalization: States adopt policies that reduce government constraints on political activities. Focus on promoting free political exchanges and establishing rights for political participation (democratization). Current Trends: Growth in democratization and marketization until 2002, followed by a democratic recession. Impact of International Organizations (IOs) on State Policies ○ Affect states when they try to join ○ Affects states when they join Influence of IO Membership: ○ Before Accession: Coercion: Existing members force changes in policy for accession. Competition: Applicants seek membership for higher returns. Learning: Changes in beliefs due to exposure to new evidence. Emulation: Adoption of perceived appropriate views. II. Reading Summary: Chelotti et al., Socialization IGO membership leads to a convergence in states’ foreign policy preferences through a socialization process the regular and sustained interactions that occur within IGOs lead members to adopt similar preferences in world politics from the constructivist perspective, international institutions are social environments where states can transform their identities and interests ○ During accession, imposition and binding obligations are strong and visible. High Compliance During Accession: Increased imposition and binding obligations during this period.  Imposition vs. Socialization: Socialization means preferences become part of state identity, not just temporary adjustments. ○ Testing Mechanisms: Measuring state preferences through UN General Debate statements for a complete picture. Results: ○ EU membership has a statistically significant positive effect on the similarity of member states' foreign policy preferences. ○ preference convergence observed at the time of accession does not diminish over time. Instead, EU member states continue to move toward the EU position.