IPC2602 Study Guide (PDF)

2 THEME 2 2 The theories of foreign policy OBJECTIVES FOR THEME 2 After you have completed this theme you must be able to do the following: Discuss the relevant classical and contemporary theories in international political dynamics. D...

2 THEME 2 2 The theories of foreign policy OBJECTIVES FOR THEME 2 After you have completed this theme you must be able to do the following: Discuss the relevant classical and contemporary theories in international political dynamics. Discuss the purpose of the various international relations theories. Understand why international political theory is necessary. Discuss realism. Discuss liberalism. Discuss the Dell theory of conflict prevention. Discuss complex theory and complex interdependence theory. KEY CONCEPTS The purpose of theories, realism, liberalism, the Dell theory of conflict preven- tion, complex theory, complex interdependence theory, postcolonial/decolonial theory, balance of power, alliances, liberal internationalism. STUDY UNIT: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORIES 2.1 INTRODUCTION The purpose of this study unit is to introduce you to international political theories and their relevance, use and importance in international political dynamics. After you have completed this study unit you will be able to discuss the importance of theories, how they are conceived, their relevance and application in relation to foreign policy. You will know some of the important theories that are the subject of intense debates among scholars and practitioners of international relations. You will also appreciate some of the debates and the leading thinkers and some of the literature they have produced. This study unit should whet your intellectual appetite to learn more about the theories discussed here and many others not covered in this module. Before we get into the theories themselves, it is important to set the context of the relationship between international political dynamics, theories and foreign policy. International political dynamics, a subfield of international relations, is primarily about change in the international political system. There are myriad sources of changes. Some of the changes have to do with security of states; for example, the occurrence or prevention of wars. These changes impact on how states conceptualise and implement their foreign policies. In the 21st century, security concerns among states are no longer confined to conventional wars. They include weapons of mass destruction and cyber threat capabilities some of which are not exclusively in the hands of states. Non-state actors operating within territories of states and, in some IPC2602/17  instances, without the consent of those states, have gained access to powerful weapons. Some of the international political changes arise from within states where domestic policies have impact on other states and some arise from outside the state but they have an impact on the internal political dynamics of states themselves. Some of the changes are economic in nature as they involve commercial relationships between states and non-state actors such as multinational corporations. The concerns of states to improve the wellbeing of citizens involve negotiation, threats and inducements in relation to other states and non-state actors about the rules of trade and investments. Some issues that are of mutually beneficial interest are coordinated by states in multilateral platforms. At the heart of headline news that tell us about international political events and changes, such as the few examples we have just mentioned and others not mentioned here, is how human beings conceive of their status and primary role in their local societies as well as internationally. Differences of conception have over centuries in various geographical parts of the world produced different sets of relationships within and among societies. These relationships have, in the main, found articulation through state interactions although, increasingly, societies across the world are able to interact and form relationships outside the authority of states. The relationships that societies and states have produced over the years include the following: conflict and cooperation; conquest and freedom; free trade and protectionism; war and peace. The study of International Political Dynamics introduces important questions for students of International Relations, especially those who focus on foreign policy. How to make sense of the changes? Where do you look to interpret and understand the causes and consequences of actions of states and non-state actors that make headline news on a daily basis? Why have states or non-state actors behaved or are behaving in a particular way? Why would states or non-state actors, facing similar situations, behave differently? Is it possible to anticipate future behaviour of states? What kind of foreign policy instruments are suitable under what circumstances? One way to better appreciate the issues raised by these questions is by employing International Relations Theories. Let us start with the basics. What are theories? What do we mean when we refer to theories? How do theories fit in? How do they help us to improve our understanding of changes in the international system? In other words, what are the roles of theories? The next sections will clarify the purpose of theories, their usefulness, and it will introduce you to a few key examples of theories. 2.2 THE PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES International Relations involves the study of a great number of facts about the world. Yet these facts are only relevant when there is a framework to put them in. According to Carr (1961:11), a fact is like a sack; it would not stand up till you have put something in it. That something is theory because it is theory that provides the framework for the study of International Relations (Woods 1996:9). A theory arranges phenomena so that they are seen as mutually dependent. It connects otherwise separate facts. It shows how changes in some of the phenomena necessarily entail changes in others (Waltz 1986:37). A theory is helpful to establish hypotheses. Without a theory we cannot say what it is that needs to be explained, how it might be explained, and which data, how 8  formulated, are to be accepted as evidence for or against the hypotheses. As Waltz (1986:45) puts it: To proceed by looking for association [of facts or phenomena] without at least some glimmering of a theory is like shooting a gun in the general direction of an invisible target. Not only would much ammunition be used up before hitting it, but also, if the bull’s eye were hit, no one would know it! International Relations Theories involve testing hypotheses, proposing causal explanations, describing events and explaining general trends and phenomena, with the aim of constructing a plausible image of the world (Burchill 1996:13). Explaining the purpose of theory, Halliday (1994: 75) made three points. (1) There needs to be some preconception about which facts are significant and which are not. Facts are myriad and do not speak for themselves. (Theory offers the preconception.) (2) Any set of facts, even if accepted as true and as significant, can yield different interpretations. (Theories offer different interpretation by emphasising certain facts above others.) (3) No human agent, whether academic or not, can be content with facts alone. All social activity involves moral questions, of right or wrong, and these cannot, by definition, be decided on facts alone. (Some theories deal with the preferences of agents.) Facts do not speak for themselves; observers give them voice by sorting out those that are relevant from those that are irrelevant, and, in so doing, they bring a theoretical perspective to bear. Theory provides guidelines; it sensitises observers to alternative possibilities; it highlights where levers might be pulled and influence wielded; it links ends to means and strategies to resources; and perhaps most of all, it infuses context and patterns into a welter of seemingly disarrayed and unrelated phenomena (Rosenau 2003:220). In addition to using theory to gain a deeper understanding of facts or phenomena, other scholars believe that International Relations Theory can influence foreign policy makers or practitioners in international relations. For example, Brown (2016:40) believes it is about improving the practice of international relations. 2.3 WHY ARE THERE MANY THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS? There are many theories of International Relations because not one theory is capable of helping us to understand all the dynamism in international politics. Different theorists would formulate theories based on what they consider to be important relationships between facts or even perceptions of foreign policy makers. Over the years, scholars have differed over which theory is best or what constitutes theory at all. Here are additional reasons why there are many theories and why it is important to try to study as many as possible. The following reasons apply to scholars who wish to formulate theories: The proliferation of theories allows the discipline of International Relations to explain changes in world politics as seen from a variety of different cultural, economic, gendered, political, ethnic, and social locations (Dunne, Kurki & Smith 2016:10). IPC2602/1 9  The events and issues that comprise international relations can only be interpreted and understood by reference to a conceptual framework. The theories of International Relations provide us with many choices of conceptual frameworks (Burchill 1986:14). One aim of studying a wide variety of International Relations Theories is to make international politics more intelligible and better understood. In other words, to make better sense of the institutions, events and processes that exist in the contemporary world (Burchill 1986:13). Different theories call upon facts in different ways. The same facts can tell a number of stories and lead to any one of a variety of conclusions (Woods 1996:9). The infinite material of any realm can be organised in endlessly different ways (Waltz 1986:36). Burchill (1996:13) sums up the role of theories: they provide an intellectual order to the subject matter of International Relations. They enable us to conceptualise and contextualise both past and contemporary events. In the end, Burchill (1996:23) suggests that the usefulness – or lack thereof – of theories can be evaluated against one or more of the following six criteria: A theory’s understanding of an issue or process The explanatory power of the theory The theory’s success in predicting events The theory’s intellectual consistency and coherence The scope of the theory The theory’s capacity for critical self-reflection and intellectual engagement with contending theories. Of course, no one, even if armed with what we can consider the best theories, can claim to have all the answers to questions listed in the introduction (section 1) about changes in international politics. But that does not mean that international developments do not warrant these questions. It also does not mean that there must be no attempt to answer them. It is impossible to predict with precision changes in international politics. Nor is it always the case that international developments can be fully understood and the motives of actors fully explained. Foreign policy decisions are sometimes about confronting the unknown. In 2002, Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defence in George W Bush’s administration, coined the phrase “known unknown”, which became famous after he tried to explain to unconvinced journalists that US planned attacks on Baghdad were linked to knowledge that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed weapons of mass destruction that were to be used for terrorist purposes against the United States and its allies. The US foreign policy decision to attack Baghdad was part of the “War on Terror” following terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. Reports had suggested there was no link between the US military attack and Iraq’s supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction. During a press briefing at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld (2012:xv) responded to critical political journalists: Reports that say something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me be- cause as we know, there are known knowns: there are always things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns: that is to say we know there are some things [we know] we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks through- 10  out the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tends to be the difficult one. Rumsfeld’s “known unknowns” was later proven to be a euphemism for using unreliable information to launch a military attack on Iraq. An investigation found that the United States and Britain had acted hastily to launch a military attack on Iraq, capturing and killing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, and effecting regime change. An inquiry into Britain’s participation in the military invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and Prime Minister Tony Blair’s motivation for the invasion of another sovereign state, found that it was based on unreliable intelligence information that claimed that the Hussein regime possessed chemical weapons. The Chilcot Inquiry concluded: The widespread perception that the September 2002 dossier [a document presented by British Prime Minister Tony Blair to the House of Commons] overstated the firmness of evidence about Iraq’s capabilities and intentions [to produce weapons of mass destruction] in order to influence opinion and ‘make the case’ for [military] action to disarm Iraq has produced a damaging legacy, including undermining the trust and confidence in government statements, particularly those which rely on intelligence which cannot be independently verified (Chilcot 2016:131). There is, however, merit in the idea that states never possess perfect information when they formulate foreign policies. Nor do they always act on perfect information. As Mearsheimer (2011:127) points out, states sometimes guess wrong and end up doing themselves serious harm. Uncertainty is one of the key and permanent features in international foreign policy making and execution. Regardless of the difficulties of acting on imperfect knowledge with unpredictable outcomes, the practice of international politics has bequeathed scholars with lessons. Out of these have emerged theories and perspectives to explain certain types or patterns of actions or behaviours of actors in the international political arena. Understanding of some of the theories is, therefore, important if we are to improve our understanding of International Political Dynamics within the field of International Relations. The use of theories to explain aspects of International Political Dynamics, particularly foreign policy, is necessarily an attempt to link evidence with International Political Theory. As Richard Herrmann (2002:119) explains: [The] study of International Relations includes diverse theories purporting to explain substantive patterns in world politics. The field is so characterised by different perspectives on how to defend these claims. One strategy, of course, is to connect the concepts that constitute a theory to observable indicators, spell out what expectations to follow from the theory, and then demonstrate whether these expectations materialise or not. Clearly, there is not one theory that can help us understand everything. No theory is all-encompassing and perfect. However, although theories have explanatory power, they have limits too. The limitations from which theories suffer are mitigated by the existence of a multiplicity of theories. It would, of course, be difficult to study all theories. The menu is too long. Different theories proffer different emphases in understanding International Political Dynamics. As Smith (2016:9) explains in the introduction to International Relations Theories – Discipline and Diversity: “This IPC2602/111  diversity has generated different answers to perennial questions in International Relations about actors, issues, causes, and consequences”. This study unit introduces you to five theories, among those that have been the major focus of intense debates among scholars of International Relations. Some of the theories – realism and liberalism – belong to the so-called classical category in that they can be regarded as founding theories of International Relations. Others – the Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention (Dell Theory), complex theory and complex interdependence theory and post-colonial/decolonial theory – are relatively recent and aim to keep up with the need to explain the continuing changes in international politics. Realism’s main argument is that the international system is anarchic and states always seek to maximise power to preserve themselves and avert the ever-present possibility of being attacked by other states. Liberalism focuses on the propensity of states to cooperate under a rules-based international order. The Dell theory emphasises the primacy of commercial relationships among nations that determine peaceful cooperation. You will be introduced to complex theory pioneered by James Rosenau in his book Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization (2003). In terms of this theory, the international system is a complex whole consisting of agents whose ability to adopt and co-evolve with the system to ensure its stability under different circumstances is as important as agents whose actions can upset the system. Nothing in terms of this theory is taken for granted and everything matters (Rosenau 2003:212;216). You will be introduced to complex interdependence theory that Robert Koehane and Joseph Nye explained in their book Power and Interdependence (2012) deals with the myriad of agenda-setting complex systems well beyond realism’s military concerns in international politics. Post-Colonial/Decolonial Theory is derived from the realisation that formerly colonised societies emerged to formulate independent foreign policies after centuries of colonial occupations that were followed by satellite (proxy) status during the Cold War era. EXERCISE 2.1 Define International Political Theory. (1) What is International Political Theory? (2) Why are theories necessary in International Relations? (3) How can we evaluate the usefulness of International Relations Theories? (4) Why are there many theories of International Relations? (5) What are examples of International Relations theories? 2.4 REALISM AND BALANCE OF POWER The theory of Realism and Balance of Power can be traced back to Thucydides in the fifth century BC, who explained the policy to Tissaphernes, King of the Persians as one holding “the balance evenly between the two contending powers”, Athens and Sparta. This was during the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC), a Greek war fought by the Delian League led by Athens against the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. The war was caused by the rise of Athens and the fear this instilled in Sparta. It led Sparta to attempt to balance the rise of Athens. This build up to the war was described as “Thucydides’s Trap”, after the historian Thucydides. In recent times, 12  the “Thucydides’s Trap” has been used to speculate the likely outcome of the tension between the China and the United States. The question is whether the economic rise of China threatens the US in the manner Sparta felt threatened by Athens (Allison, 2017: xiv-xv). Since the Peloponnesian War, realism developed on the strengths of the writings of Thomas Hobbes, the 17th century British philosopher, who popularised the idea of human beings in a state of nature, in terms of which they are inherently prone to go war with one another. Indeed, modern realists treat Hobbes as the midwife of realism. Although his writings, particularly Leviathan, was concerned mostly with civil war, they would be interpreted and given wider meaning to account for much of the anarchy – and war – in international politics. In Leviathan, Hobbes (1968:185) wrote about the consequences of an overarching power, saying it left a gap that was the cause of war: Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such warre, as is of every man, against everyman… Of the consequences of lack of security, he wrote (1968:186): Whatsoever is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to everyman; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than with their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. The repercussions for state of nature go beyond lack of security and war and have implications for the economy too. Hobbes (1968:186) explained: In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently to Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no instruments of moving, and removing such things of the Earth; no account of Time; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. One of the proponents of realism and balance of power is Kenneth N Waltz. He took Hobbes’s theory further to the international level, beyond the Hobbesian individual who was unrestrained before the establishment of the Commonwealth – Hobbes’s peaceful institutional mechanism. In his book Man, the State and War: A theoretical analysis (2001), Waltz emphasises the primacy of the state in international politics and how states interact with each other in the context of anarchy, in other words, in the absence of a supranational government to guarantee their security. The absence of “common power”, according to Hobbes’s conception, lead us to permanent state of war. To illustrate the problem of lack of security for the state, a situation that drives them to arm themselves, Waltz (2001:201) makes the following example: A man attacked by would-be thieves on Main Street may fairly hope that the police will either thwart the attackers of recover the loot. The chances of get- IPC2602/113  ting away with crime are sufficiently small to reduce such incidents well below the point at which the ordinary citizens begin to carry arms. This, however, does not apply at state level. States do not enjoy even an imperfect guarantee of their security unless they set out to provide it themselves. If security is something the state wants, then this desire, together with the conditions in which all states exist, imposes certain requirements on a foreign policy that pretends to be rational. The requirements are imposed by automatic sanction: Departure from the rational model imperils the survival of the state. But the actions of one state to provide for its own security are dependent on the actions of other states (Waltz 2001:201). While not overlooking the past, which provides light on some problems, realism accepts change as the first law of history. The political realist accepts that the necessity for facing problems on their merits and in the context of the ways that other actors on the world scene are dealing them – one of these ways being through choices on the basis of national interests, rather than by relationship to some blueprint or a series of reference points which are more ideal (Padelford & Lincoln 1962:241). 2.4.1 Balance of power From the theory of realism, emerges the concept of balance of power. The influence of a realist thinker, Hans Morgenthau, on realism was mainly on his development of insights on the balance of power. In his book Power Among Nations (1966), Morgenthau argued that the “balance of power” was a universal concept applied in natural sciences, economics and political science. It signifies stability within a system composed of a number of autonomous forces. Whenever the equilibrium (balance) is disturbed either by an outside force or by a change in one or the other elements composing the system, the system shows a tendency to re-establish either the original or a new equilibrium. The equilibrium exists in the human body. When the body suffers an injury or a pathological transformation of one of its organs, the equilibrium is disturbed, and the body tries to overcome the disturbance by re-establishing the equilibrium either on the same or a different level from the one that it obtained before the disturbance occurred. The same concept is used in social sciences, such as economics, with reference to relations between savings and investments, exports and imports, supply and demand, costs and prices (Morgenthau 1966:162). In the political sphere, two assumptions are at the foundation of all equilibriums. First, that the elements to be balanced are necessary for society or are entitled to exist. Second, that without a state of equilibrium among them, one element will gain ascendency over the others, encroach upon their interests and rights, and may ultimately destroy them. Consequently, it is the purpose of all such equilibriums to maintain the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements composing it. The ultimate goal is stability and preservation of all elements in the system. If the goal were stability alone, it could be achieved by allowing one element to destroy or overwhelm the others and take their place. Equilibrium must therefore aim at preventing any element from gaining ascendancy over the others. The means employed to maintain the equilibrium consist of allowing the different elements to pursue their opposing tendencies up to the point where the tendency is not strong 14  enough to overcome the tendency of the others, but strong enough to prevent the others from overcoming its own (Morgenthau 1966:163). In the specific case of the nation-state, the power that needs to be balanced is that of another state. It also means nation-states are constantly calculating their relative power positions in the international system to balance each other by way of forming alliances. The problem, though, is that in Morgenthau’s conception, the nations could never be sure of the precise power that their supposed competitors possess. (Fast forward to the 21st century: we will remember US Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s “unknown knowns” in the previous section?). In the earlier epoch, Morgenthau (1966:199) theorised thus about uncertainty of power: This uncertainty is … immeasurably magnified when the weights in one or the other or in both scales are composed not of single units but alliances. Then it becomes necessary to compute not only one’s own and the opponent’s national power and to correlate one with the other, but to perform the same operation on the national power of one’s allies and those of the opponent [before deciding on the right foreign policy action]. The risk of guessing is greatly aggravated when one must assess the power of nations belonging to different civilisations. It is difficult enough to evaluate the power of Great Britain or of France. It is much more difficult to make a correct assessment of the power of China, Japan, or even the Soviet Union. The crowning uncertainty, however, lies in the fact that one cannot always be sure who are one’s own allies and who are the opponent’s. Alignments by virtue of alliance treaties are not always identical with the alliances that oppose each other in the actual contest of war. Realism builds into its theoretical postulations the measure of uncertainty that inevitably makes the international system descriptively anarchic. But it remains the theory of realism that to secure themselves; states form coalitions to balance potential attacks from those they fear have power to destroy them. Balancing is the key strategy that states employ when a rival takes steps to increase its share of world power. Those states that feel threatened can build up their own capabilities. This is referred to as internal balancing. Or they can join with others to form an alliance against the dominating state. This process is called external balancing. This is what happened to Japan and Germany whose domineering tendencies elicited a coalition that eventually defeated them in World War II (Mearsheimer 2011:126). 2.4.2 Formation of alliances Common to the desire of all sates is the wish to survive, to thwart potential or perceived threats, states play a game of survival in which they form coalitions to have an advantage over others. If some states seek an advantage over others, they combine; if other states want to counteract this advantage, they in turn combine (Waltz 2001:204). If the advantage sought is measured in terms of power to destroy or damage another country, then the strengthened state refrains from the effort to increase its strength only at the risk of its survival. Pursuing a balance-of-power is still a matter of choice, but the alternatives are those of probable suicide on the one hand and the active playing of the power-politics on the other. The cardinal rule of the game, according to Waltz, is often taken to be: Do whatever you must to win it. Waltz uses Hobbes’s conception of power as the capacity to produce an intended effect (Waltz 2001:205). IPC2602/115  Waltz’s theory is based on the assumption that states act rationality. This assumption is not without faults. What does acting rationally mean? Mearsheimer (2011:127) explains: To assume states are rational is to say that they are aware of the external envi- ronment and they think intelligently about how to maximise their prospects for survival. In particular, they try to gauge the preferences of other states and how their own behaviour is likely to affect the actions of other states, as well as how the behaviour of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy. When they look at different strategies that they have to choose between, they assess the likelihood of success as well as the costs and benefits of each other. Finally, states pay attention not only to the immediate consequences of their actions, but to the long-term effects as well. Nevertheless, rational states miscalculate from time to time because they invariably make important decisions on the basis of imperfect information – “known unknowns”. They hardly ever have complete information about any situation they confront, which forces them to make educated guesses. This is due in part to the fact that potential adversaries have incentives to misrepresent their own strength or weakness, and to conceal their true aim. But even if disinformation were not a problem, states are often unsure about the resolve of opposing forces as well as their allies, and it is often hard to know beforehand how one’s own military forces, as well as those of the adversaries, will perform on the battlefield. Therefore, rational states sometimes guess wrong and end up doing themselves serious harm. Mearsheimer points to Waltz’s own admission that dominant powers have behaved badly and have consequently lived troubled lives. These are not the cases of states miscalculating in a way that does not make strategic sense. These are actions of states acting foolishly by ignoring relevant information or paying attention to largely irrelevant information (Mearsheimer 2011:127). 2.4.3 The scaffolding of the international order Although the states have acted foolishly in the past and might continue to do so in future, realism is credited for explaining the world we live in today. One of the proponents of realism – and its balance of power variant – is the American diplomat and scholar, Henry Kissinger. Opining on the virtues of the balance of power with a broad sweep covering more than a thousand years right up to the 21st Century, Kissinger (2014:12) observed that the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the religious wars in Europe was brought about by the balance of power. The treaty was aimed at thwarting potential universalisation of one set of values propounded by a particular state at the expense of another. Explaining the significance of Westphalia, Kissinger (2014:27) observed: For more than a thousand years, in the mainstream of modern Europe statecraft order has derived from equilibrium, and identity from resistance to universal rule. The Westphalian concept of state sovereignty (brought into being by balance of power between competing states) took multiplicity as its starting point and drew a variety of multiple societies, each accepted as a reality, into a common search for order. By the mid-19th century, this international system was in place on every continent; it remains [in the 21st century] the scaffolding of international order as it now exists. 16  2.4.4 Realism: linking theory to evidence Having sketched the central ideas about realism, the question arises: how do we know that a particular action by a particular state was or is motivated by realist thinking? That is to say, how do we know that the state in question believes or believed in the use of power to achieve equilibrium or to balance other states? How do we know that its actions are rationally calculated to safeguard its interests by using force in international politics? Remember, in the introduction, we said that it would be difficult to know with precision some answers; however, we also said that, that is not a reason to stop asking the questions and seek answers. We stated that the role of theory is to help us improve our understanding of International Politics. So how is that possible? Hermann (2002:120) proposed two approaches to solve the problem. The first is the objective strategy. It assumes that the external environment can be described by the scholar in terms what are objectively accurate. It then assumes that actors correctly see objective power distribution and incentives in the environment. This strategy leads to the study of the international environment that actors are supposedly able to describe with accuracy. The assumption is that once we are able to describe the environment, we would know what kind of foreign policy action a state will take in relation to a specific issue. The second strategy is called phenomenological strategy. It assumes that the actor’s actions will follow from the actor’s perception. This strategy puts emphasis on the empirical identification of the perceptions and world-views held by actors. It seeks to explain actions by referring to the cognitive understandings and ideas that actors have, rather than searching for primarily explanatory leverage in the objective structure of the environment. This strategy can be executed in part by studying the statements and choices of decision makers to determine predisposition to this or that other strategy (Hermann 2002:125). For realist thinkers, such statement will demonstrate that they believe that they live in an anarchic international system, they have to maximise usage of power to survive and conquer their rivals – real or perceived. REALISM IN SUMMARY Basic premise – human beings are constantly in a state of war Actors in the international system – the state Nature of society and international system – anarchic Main concern – survival or self-preservation through dominance Foreign policy strategy – driven primarily by military considerations Universal concept – equilibrium Intellectual source – Thomas Hobbes (Book: Leviathan, first published in 1651) Influential theorist – Hans Morgenthau (Book: Power Among Nations, first published in 1948) Contemporary theorist – Kenneth Waltz (Book: Man, the State and War, first published in 1959) Linking theory to evidence – 17th century wars, World War I, World War II and the US War on Terror IPC2602/117  EXERCISE 2.2 Consider the following text and answer the questions. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld and the “Parade of Horribles” “In the Autumn of 2002, during a National Security Council meeting on Iraq, I departed from the agenda to read a handwritten list of possible problems, later referred to as the ‘Parade of Horribles’, that I believed could result from an invasion [of Iraq]. Sitting at the table in the Situation Room, with [President George] Bush, [Vice President Dick] Cheney, [Secretary of State Colin] Powell, [National Security Advisor Condoleezza] Rice and [CIA Director George] Tenet, and others in attendance, I went through the items one by one. The list was meant to generate serious, early thinking about the potential risks and what might be done to assess and reduce them…With regard to the risks of invasion, my memo listed a number of problems that were worth thinking about in case they materialised, though they ultimately did not: While the US is engaged in Iraq, another rogue state could take advantage of US pre-occupation – North Korea, Iran, and PRC in the Taiwan Straits. There could be a higher than expected US and coalition deaths from Iraq’s use of weapons of mass destruction against coalition forces in Iraq, Kuwait and/or Israel. US could fail to find WMD (weapons of mass destruction) on the ground in Iraq and be unpersuasive to the world US could fail to manage post-Saddam Hussein Iraq successfully, with the result that it could fracture into two or three pieces, to the detriment of the Middle East and the benefit of Iran…” Source: Donald Rumsfeld (2012 480–481) Questions: (1) Identify the aspects that Rumsfeld note to demonstrate that he is a realist thinker. (2) Would you say that his note is indicative of a policy maker who is a rational- ist? How? (3) Identify an aspect that shows that he believes in the balance of power. Explain. (4) Do you think he is overly concerned about America’s security? (5) Do you get a sense that he fears for America’s security or he is more inter- ested in regime-change? Or is he concerned with both? (6) Which strategy did you use to answer the questions: the objective strategy or the phenomenological strategy? Why was it appropriate in this case? 2.5 LIBERALISM The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of communist Soviet Union heralded what many scholars regarded as the triumph of liberalism. Before we seek to understand the implications of this supposed victory of liberalism, we must define what it actually is. What does the theory liberalism entail? The liberal theory contains both a political element and an economic element. Liberalism is primarily concerned with enhancing 18  the freedom and welfare of individuals. It proposes that humankind can employ reason better to develop a sense of harmony of interests among individuals and groups within a wider community, domestic or international. In the international sphere, these goals are realised through the promotion of liberal democracy (Underhill 1994:27). Liberal democracy is characterised by human rights for individuals, including the political rights to elect or to be elected in a periodic election that determines who becomes the government. In a liberal democracy, there is separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary. It is a political system derived from the interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s liberal thought advocated in his book Perpetual Peace (1795). Although Kant was sceptical of the concept of democracy, he emphasised the importance of the separation of powers that would guarantee the realisation of the public will as opposed to despotism (Behr 2010:133). Within three years of the of end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama, a liberal scholar, published the widely debated book, The End of History and The Last Man (1992). The book criticised realism, the theory we discussed in the previous section. Realism, according to Fukuyama, suffered from being too narrowly focused on self- preservation as the motive for human behaviour. At the level of state, this behaviour resulted in societies that were inherently aggressive towards one another. This kind of observation about the motivation of human behaviour failed to consider the history and the ideological evolution of human beings. (Fukuyama 1992:254). The ultimate ground for war among states was Plato’s concept of thymos (the desire for recognition), not self-preservation, as realism argued. Just as human history began with the bloody battles for pure prestige, so international conflict begins with a struggle for recognition among states, which is the original source of imperialism (Fukuyama 1992:256). Fukuyama also borrowed from Kant’s concept of a universal history. Taking into consideration human’s ideological evolution over time, Fukuyama’s premise allows for the struggle for recognition to be fulfilled in a liberal order that requires neither war not conquest. Whereas in ancient times the desire for recognition on the part of aristocrats led to imperialism and slavery, the early forms of thymos were to a large extent displaced in the modern period by increasingly rational forms of recognition whose ultimate expression was the modern liberal state. Realism did not consider this historical development (Fukuyama 1992:259). The end of the religious wars between Protestants and Catholics that nearly destroyed England in the 17th century is attributed to political liberalism. This civil peace brought about by liberalism should logically have its counterpart in relations between states. Striving for conquest was not a universalistic characteristic of all human societies (Fukuyama 1992:260). The expansion of civil peace had three consequences: first, the desire of states for legitimacy; second, the end of colonial conquests by major powers motivated in part by the adoption of liberal norms of human rights outlined in the Atlantic Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights; third, the peaceful co-existence among liberal democracies; and fourth, the expansion of commerce which, in turn, served as a disincentive for war among liberal states (Fukuyama 1992, Chapter 24). (See the Dell Theory.) Fukuyama took his theory of liberalism further, dividing the world in two parts. The “post-historical” part that has completed its ideological evolution and reached a point where rational forms of recognition have become possible. This part is the one in which liberal democracy has been established. The other part is the one “still IPC2602/1 19  suck” in history, and it thus called “historical”. In other words, it is yet to complete the historical evolution to liberalism. 2.5.1 Foreign policy implications What are liberalism’s implications on foreign policy? How does the level or stage of liberal evolution affect a state’s foreign policy? We learned from the previous section on realism that in an anarchic international system, where there is no ultimate authority, states are always in a constant state of war with each other. What then for liberalism? Fukuyama (1992: 279) makes the following two points: Firstly, the historical half of the world persists in operating according to the realist principles, and the post-historical half must use realist methods when dealing with the part still in history. The relationship between democracies and nondemocracies will still be characterised by mutual distrust and fear, and despite the growing degree of economic interdependence, force will continue to be the ultima ratio in their mutual relations. Secondly, it would seem natural that liberal democracy, which seeks to abol- ish the distinction between masters and slaves by making men the masters of themselves, should have different foreign policy objectives altogether. What will produce peace in the post-historical world will not be the fact that the major states share a common principle of legitimacy. Peace will arise instead out of the specific nature of democratic legitimacy, and its ability to satisfy the human longing for recognition. Fukuyama’s second postulations is based on his interpretation of Kant’s ideas on the individual, the state and the international sphere. Kant’s Perpetual Peace argued that perpetual peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of what he termed the three “definitive articles” of peace. When all nations have accepted the definitive articles, perpetual peace will have been established (Fukuyama 1992:213). The first article requires that the civil constitution of every state must be established and it must be republican. It must be founded on three principles: freedom for all members of society, dependence of everyone upon single common legislation and equality before the law. In addition, Kant argued for a representative government, although he thought this was possible without it being democratic. Kant defined democracy as majoritarianism, which is oppressive to the individual. This was problematic since he believed in a representative government.. His fear for democratic majoritarianism seemed to be based on the absence of an independent judiciary in his theory (Kant 1970:98-101), although liberal scholars who drew from his writings conceived of a modern liberal democracy that includes among its key features an independent judiciary and the rule of law. The second article proposed that liberal states will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific federation or union. Reason, as the highest legislative moral power, absolutely condemns war as a test of right and sets up peace as an immediate duty. According to Kant (1970:104): But peace can neither be inaugurated nor secured without a general agreement between the nations; thus, a particular kind of league, which we might call a 20  pacific federation (foedus pacificum), is required. It would differ from a peace treaty in that the latter terminates one war, whereas the former would seek to end all wars for good. The third definitive article will establish a cosmopolitan law (or right) to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. Kant (1970:106) despised the plunder of the resources of strangers and the enslavement of other people. He advocated for hospitality towards strangers by saying: In this context hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory. He can indeed be turned away, if this can be done without causing his death, but he must not be treated with hostility, so long as he behaves in a peaceful manner in the place he happens to be in. 2.5.2 Versions of Liberal Internationalism Inspired by Kant’s “pacific union” at an international level, liberal theorists have extended liberal theory to Liberal Internationalism. They do not emphasise equilibrium as, for example, Hans Morgenthau has done. Where realists see equilibrium or balance (as Henry Kissinger’s interpretation of the Treaty of Westphalia suggests), liberals (as Fukuyama interpreted the end of hostilities brought by the Treaty of Westphalia) see the inexorable expansion of international interdependence among the people and societies of the world. Because liberal perspectives focus on relationships rather than power, they see more clearly the increasing volume, scope, and complexity of global interactions. These interactions have grown geometrically over time and crystallised in regularities and patterns that constitute widening domestic societies and international institutions (Nau 2012:87). Taking these observations further, G John Ikenberry (2013:Chapter 1) has observed that the liberal agenda was never fixed and has kept evolving. Three versions – 1.0; 2.0; and 3.0 – could be identified since the end of the World War I. Version 1.0 is associated with the ideas of President Woodrow Wilson (president of the US from 1913 to 1921) and the post-World War I international settlement. Wilson had a vision of an international system organised around a global collective security body in which sovereign states would act together to uphold a system of territorial peace. Open trade, national self-determination, and a belief in progressive global change were also important. At the centre of his ideas was the establishment of the League of Nations to provide mechanisms for dispute resolution among states. Wilson’s vision faded when the League of Nations collapsed. The US Senate had refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty that would buttress US participation in the league. Liberal international order was once again revived after World War II as the US sought to lead the allies to build post-war systems. The Atlantic Charter provided the vision. The re-establishment of the League of Nations, which became the United Nations, to regulate inter-state affairs and secure peace characterised the era. The Bretton Woods conference led to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. Thus, emerged a rules-based order underwritten and dominated by the US, which used the institutions to spread liberal ideals under version 2.0 of liberal internationalism. Version 2.0 faced its challenges among which is erosion because the unipolar post-Cold War system gave the US power to controversially violate the sovereignty of other countries. States faced the dilemma that they are no longer the monopoly of security as non-state actors have IPC2602/121  also gained violent capabilities. There are also increasing pressures for reforms of the institutions that underpin version 2.0 to make them more representative. It is in this context that liberal internationalism 3.0 is projected to emerge. This would mean reworking the American-dominated liberal order. International institutions could reflect more global memberships. These would include a reform of the UN, with a reorganised Security Council that expanded permanent membership to rising non-Western countries such as Japan, India, Brazil and South Africa. Bretton Woods institutions – the IMF and the World Bank – would also expand and reapportion rights (Ikenberry 2013:45). 2.5.3 Liberalism: Linking theory to evidence Now, let us apply the approach proposed by Hermann (2002:120) to link liberalism’s claims to evidence. In the first section of the study unit we referred to the need to link theoretical claims to evidence. When objectively described, the international environment ought to substantiate the Kantian liberal claim, as further enunciated by Fukuyama. This would also mean that liberal-oriented leaders would be more interested in cooperation and peace as opposed to war, and evidence should show that liberal states do not go to war. Doyle (1986) conducted a historical study of war and peace, which partly emboldened Fukuyama’s theory. He made two conclusions about the legacy of liberalism. The first is the “pacification of foreign relations among liberal states”. Beginning in the 18th century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant called the “pacific federation” or “pacific union”, had begun to be established among liberal societies. By 1986, more than 40 liberal states made up the union (Doyle 1986: 211, 212 & 221). The second legacy is that peaceful restraint only seemed to work in liberals’ relations with other liberals. Liberal states have fought numerous wars with non-liberal states (Doyle 1986:212). Debate: The excerpt of the following article from Foreign Affairs Journal (14 June 2018) takes an issue with Fukuyama and Ikenberry’s liberal theory. The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom By GRAHAM ALLISON Among the debates that have swept the U.S. foreign policy community since the beginning of the Trump administration, alarm about the fate of the liberal international rules-based order has emerged as one of the few fixed points. From the international relations scholar G. John Ikenberry’s claim that “for seven decades the world has been dominated by a western liberal order” to U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s call in the final days of the Obama administration to “act urgently to defend the liberal international order,” this banner waves atop most discussions of the United States’ role in the world. About this order, the reigning consensus makes three core claims. First, that the liberal order has been the principal cause of the so-called long peace among great powers for the past seven decades. Second, that constructing this order has been the main driver of U.S. engagement in the world over that period. And third, that U.S. President Donald Trump is the primary threat to the liberal order–and thus to world peace. The political scientist Joseph Nye , for example, has written, “The demonstrable success of the order in helping 22  secure and stabilize the world over the past seven decades has led to a strong consensus that defending, deepening, and extending this system has been and continues to be the central task of U.S. foreign policy.” Nye has gone so far as to assert: “I am not worried by the rise of China. I am more worried by the rise of Trump.” Although all these propositions contain some truth, each is more wrong than right. The “long peace” was not the result of a liberal order but the byproduct of the dangerous balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States during the four and a half decades of the Cold War and then of a brief period of U.S. dominance. U.S. engagement in the world has been driven not by the desire to advance liberalism abroad or to build an international order but by the need to do what was necessary to preserve liberal democracy at home. And although Trump is undermining key elements of the current order, he is far from the biggest threat to global stability. These misconceptions about the liberal order’s causes and consequences lead its advocates to call for the United States to strengthen the order by clinging to pillars from the past and rolling back authoritarianism around the globe. Yet rather than seek to return to an imagined past in which the United States molded the world in its image, Washington should limit its efforts to ensuring sufficient order abroad to allow it to concentrate on reconstructing a viable liberal democracy at home. GRAHAM ALLISON is Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. The full article is available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/ myth-liberal-order?cid=nlc-fa_fatoday-20180618. LIBERALISM IN SUMMARY Basic premise – man is driven by desire for recognition Actor in the international system – the state and non-state actors Nature of society and international system – pacific federation Main concern – prosperity through peaceful cooperation Foreign policy strategy – republican constitutionalism expressed in international relations Universal concepts – desire for recognition and universal history Intellectual source – Immanuel Kant (Book: Perpetual Peace, first published in 1795) Contemporary theorists – Francis Fukuyama (Book: The End of History and the Last Man, published in 1992) Linking theory to evidence – Establishment of post-war liberal regimes EXERCISE 2.3 Answer the following questions (1) What is liberalism? (2) What are the differences between realism and liberalism? (3) What form of government is informed by liberalism? (4) What kind of foreign policy can be expected among liberal states? IPC2602/123  (5) Provide an example of an international institution established as part of liberal international order? (6) What are the main differences between realism and liberalism? EXERCISE 2.4 Consider this shortened article published by Foreign Policy Journal (10 August 2018) and answer the questions related to realism and liberalism. Meet the Middle East’s Peace of Westphalia Re-enactors Can a series of far-flung, high-level conferences bring peace to the Middle East by applying lessons from 17th-century Europe? BY BORZOU DARAGAHI A group of scholars, mostly affiliated with University of Cambridge and acting with the encouragement of the German government, have quietly gained traction at [reinacting a “Peace of Westphalia” conference for the war-raved Middle East in the twenty-first century] by drawing on lessons from 17th-century Europe. Their goal is to organise a contemporary Peace of Westphalia for the Middle East, on the model of the series of diplomatic meetings that ended the Thirty Years’ War that ravaged what was then Germany. The project has already held eight workshops and conferences in Cambridge, London, Berlin, Munich, and Amman, Jordan, with stakeholders and policymakers involved in the Middle East’s conflicts; the hope is these meetings will eventually pave the way for a final series of conferences that can produce a grand bargain. Among those who have endorsed the project and taken part in its formal discussions are former CIA Director David Petraeus, Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit, United Nations Syria envoy Staffan de Mistura, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, and former Iran nuclear negotiator Seyed Hossein Mousavian. The government of Jordan has been involved in the discussions, and both Royal Court chief Fayez Tarawneh and Prince Faisal, the king’s brother, have taken part in the conferences. Recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly endorsed the project. But if the idea of a grand bargain appeals in the abstract to many Middle Eastern players, the conference organisers are very aware that achieving it in practice will be far more difficult. The original Westphalian conference proves that goodwill won’t be sufficient; in Europe, exhaustion of bloodshed served as the ultimate midwife of peace. Simultaneously arriving at that stage in places as diverse as Iran, Syria, Yemen, the United States, and Israel will be a painstaking process. But the scholars organising today’s Westphalian conferences are certain the process is underway. Scholars and journalists over the years have repeatedly likened the tangle of crisscrossing, overlapping conflicts afflicting the Middle East to the Thirty Years’ War, when the patchwork of Europe’s Protestant and Catholic German states descended into a chaotic conflict abetted by the rival regional powers of the time. Then it was France, Spain, and Sweden battling for leverage and influence. Now, it’s Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and the United States competing, via Sunni and Shiite proxy forces, over a volatile region that stretches from the Bab 24  el-Mandeb to the eastern Mediterranean. Within that that arc of crisis, hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in airstrikes and by gunfire and millions have been displaced. Many more are suffering through deprivation and disease caused by wars that have drained public coffers; ruined hospitals, roads, and schools; and traumatised entire generations. It was that type of devastation during the Thirty Years’ War–exacerbated by the use of mercenary armies – that ultimately prompted diplomats from the Holy Roman Empire, France, Sweden, and some of the German states to convene the talks that ultimately led to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. “The more you look at what’s happening in the Middle East now, the more parallels there are to the Thirty Years’ War,” said Michael Axworthy, a scholar and Iran specialist working on the contemporary Westphalian project. “The sectarian nature of the conflict, the use of proxies. How instability in one country led to instability in other countries and states.” The Westphalian peace talks went on for several years, with an alternating cast of characters, convening in two locations – predominantly Protestant Osnabruck and mostly Catholic Munster – using the local city halls as conference centers. The organisers of the contemporary Westphalian conference have taken the same approach, moving between various cities in Europe and the Middle East. (If it came to holding a series of final conferences, Istanbul or Amman, cities that are in the region but maintain ties to all the main actors, have been proposed as potential sites.) Beyond choosing a suitable location, the original Peace of Westphalia offers other lessons on how to organize such an event. The first is the importance of ensuring that all the disparate parties be physically brought together. Critics of a contemporary conference cite precisely this requirement as a nonstarter. Presumably, invitees would include official delegations from the United States, the EU, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq; delegates from the Syrian regime and opposition; and perhaps the Kurds and Yemeni parties. “There are too many groups that don’t want to sit with each other,” said Joost Hiltermann, the Middle East and North Africa director at the Crisis Group. “Saudi Arabia will not sit with Qatar. Iran will not sit with Israel. You cannot exclude anyone, because they will become spoilers. The grand bargain, though attractive, is not possible at this stage.” Source: Foreign Policy The full article is available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/10/meet- the-middle-easts-peace-of-westphalia-reenactors-iran-saudi-arabia-syria/ amp/? Questions (1) Realist Henry Kissinger argues that the Treaty of Westphalia, which led to modern sovereign states, was brought about as a result of equilibrium (bal- ance of power) and resistance to universal rule. Fukuyama argues that the end of the religious wars signified the triumph of liberalism in 17th century England. Which of the two theories do you think is more plausible and why? (2) Which theory better explains the relationship between the countries men- tioned in this article: realism or liberalism? (3) If we used the lens of Fukuyama’s “history” and “post-history”, how would you categorise any of the countries mentioned in the article? IPC2602/125  (4) Fukuyama’s theory is that liberalism ended the religious wars between in Europe in the 17th century. Do you see the new Peace of Westphalia that has been proposed for the Middle East as an attempt to extent liberalism? (5) Which country (post-history category) has fought a war or wars with which country (history category)? Does this make Fukuyama’s liberal theoretical insights valid? (6) Which countries in the “history” category in this article have implemented hostile foreign policies towards each other? Does this make Fukuyama’s liberal theoretical insights valid? (7) Which country has (post-history) a very good relationship with a country that would be classified as in the “history” category? What does that tell us about the liberal theory? 2.6 DELL THEORY OF CONFLICT PREVENTION In his book The World is Flat: The Globalised World in the Twenty-first Century, Thomas Friedman challenged International Relations scholars. He argued that the intersection between old-time threats like China versus Taiwan and just-in-time supply chains like China plus Taiwan would provide a rich source of study for the field of International Relations (Friedman 2006:516). In essence, he was challenging realism, which believes that states are always in constant watch for rivals and therefore prepare for war, and liberalism, which argues that only countries that are still stuck in history and have not evolved to liberalism are likely to be prone to war. Both the theories we have just discussed cannot explain the China plus Taiwan just-in-time supply chains – the chains that help sustain sound relations among countries that may otherwise have different political systems. Taiwan is a democracy. China is not. Friedman was, in a way, suggesting that the rivalry of states over security concerns have been replaced by the primacy of commerce. He was building on an argument he had made in an earlier book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (2000) in which he argued that to the extent that countries tied their economies and futures to global integration and trade, it would act as a restraint on going to war with their neighbours. He first called his theory the Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention. The theory stipulated that when a country has reached the level of economic development where it had a big enough middle class to support a network of McDonald’s, it became a McDonald’s country. People in McDonald’s countries did not like to fight wars anymore. They preferred to wait in line for burgers. In the World is Flat (2006), Friedman updated his theory by using the analogy of the Dell Computer. He discovered that the final product of a Dell notebook was a result of work carried out in several countries. The Dell computer he bought to establish his theory was specifically codesigned in Austin, Texas (USA) and in Taiwan by Dell Engineers. Dell had six factories around the world – in Limerick, Ireland; Xiamen, China; Eldorado do Sul, Brazil; Nashville, Tennessee; Austin, Texas; and Penang, Malaysia (Friedman 2006:516). The computer’s Intel microprocessor came from an Intel factory either in the Philippines, Costa Rica, Malaysia or China. The memory came from Korean-owned factory in Korea (Samsung), a Taiwanese-owned factory in Taiwan (Nanya), a German-owned factory in Germany (Infeneon) or a Japanese-owned factory in Japan (Elpida). The graphic card was shipped from either a Taiwanese- 26  owned factory in China (MSI) or a Chinese-run factory in China (Foxconn). The cooling fan came from a Taiwanese-owned factory in Taiwan (CCI or Auras). The motherboard came from either a Korean-owned factory in Shanghai (Quanta), or a Taiwanese-owned factory in Taiwan (Compal or Wistron) (Friedman 2006:517). The keyboard came from either a Japanese-owned company in Tianjin, China (Alps), a Taiwanese-owned factory in Shenzhen, China (Sunrex), or a Taiwanese factory in Suzhou, China (Darfon). The LCD was made in either South Korea (Samsung or LG. Philips LCD), Japan (Toshiba or Sharp), or Taiwan (Chi Mei Optoelectronics, Hannstar Display, or AU Optronics). The wireless card came from either an American- owned factory in China (Agere) or Malaysia (Arrow), or a Taiwanese-owned factory in Taiwan (Askey or Gemtek) or China (USI). The modem was made by either a Taiwanese-owned company in China (Asustek or Liteon) or a Chinese-run company in China (Foxconn). The battery came from an American-owned factory in Malaysia (Motorola), a Japanese-owned factory in Mexico or Malaysia or China (Sanyo), or a South Korean or Taiwanese factory in either two countries (SDI or Simplo). The hard disk drive was made by an American-owned factory in Singapore (Seagate), a Japanese-owned company in Thailand (Hitachi or Fujitsu) or a Japanese-owned factory in the Philippines (Toshiba). The CD/DVD drive came from a South Korean-owned company with factories in Indonesia and the Philippines (Samsung); a Japanese-owned factory in China or Malaysia (NECc); a Japanese-owned factory in China (Sony). The notebook carrying bag was made by either an Irish-owned company in China (Tenba) or an American-owned company in China (Targus, Samsonite, or Pacific Design). The power adapter was made by either a Thai-owned factory in Thailand (Delta) or a Taiwanese-, Korean-, or American-owned factory in China (Liteon, Samsung or Mobility). The power cord was made by a British-owned company with factories in China, Malaysia and India (Volex). The removable memory stick was made by either an Israeli-owned company in Israel (M-Systems) or an American-owned company with a factory in Malaysia (Smart Modular). (Friedman 2006:518) called this as supply-chain symphony that was one of the wonders of what he calls a flat world – his other description of an intensively globalised, interconnected economy. The Dell Theory stipulates that no two countries that are both part of a major global supply chain, like Dell’s, will ever fight a war against each other as long as they are both part of the same global supply chain. Because people embedded in major global supply chains do not want to fight old-time wars anymore. They want to make just-in-time deliveries of goods and services – and enjoy the rising standards of living that come with it (Friedman 2006:522). He argued that the theory was put to test in 2004 when Taiwan held parliamentary elections. President Chen Shui-bian’s pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was expected to the win the legislative runoff over the main opposition Nationalist Party that favoured closer ties with Beijing. Chen framed the election as a referendum for independence from mainland China. Voters rejected the DPP for fear that independence could trigger China’s aggression towards Taiwan, thus disrupting supply chains and Taiwan’s economic development. Stressing, but qualifying the Dell Theory, Friedman (2006:527) remarked: What I said about the McDonald’s theory, I would repeat even more strenu- ously with the Dell Theory: It doesn’t make wars obsolete. And it does not guarantee that governments will not engage in wars of choice, even governments that are part of major supply chains. To suggest otherwise would be naïve. It guarantees only that governments whose countries are enmeshed in global IPC2602/127  supply chains will have to think three times, not just twice, about engaging in anything but a war of self-defence. The Dell Theory was at play when in 2002 India and Pakistan – both nuclear powers – escalated rhetorical tension to the extent that the US issued a travel advisory to its citizens visiting India. With India being a warehouse of engineers, designers and scientists that connected to global supply chains and being a host to one engineering site for General Electric, America’s electronics giant, India’s economy stood to suffer if a war escalated. The Confederation of India Industry, a business lobby group, approached the government and asked for the cooling down of rhetoric. Disturbance of supply chains due to wars would take time to re-establish. While Indian business leaders vowed to support any war in self-defence, when war is unavoidable, they did not want unnecessary war. The tension eventually subsided (Friedman 2006:527-529). Although Friedman’s theory is based on his incisive observation of the workings of the global economy, it’s intellectual roots can be traced to Kant’s economic aspect of his liberal theory. In his Perpetual Peace, Kant (1970:114) stated: For the spirit of commerce sooner or later takes hold of every person, and it can- not exist side by side with war. And of all the powers (or means) at the disposal of the power of the state, financial power can probably be relied on the most. Thus, states find themselves compelled to promote the noble cause of peace, though not exactly from the motives of morality. And wherever in the world there is a threat of war breaking out, they will try to prevent it by mediation, just as if they had entered into a permanent league for this purpose, for by the very nature of things, large military alliances can only rarely be formed, and will even more rarely be successful. In this way, nature guarantees perpetual peace by the actual mechanism of human inclinations. And while the likeli- hood of it being attained is not sufficient to enable us to prophesy the future theoretically, it is enough for practical purposes. It makes it our duty to work our way towards this goal, which is more than an empty chimera. Although he was the first to proclaim a discovery of a theory of conflict prevention by elevating the role of commerce above politics, he certainly was not the first to realise the primacy of commerce in contemporary politics. Susan Strange and others have pioneered this kind of thinking. In their book, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares, John Stopford and Susan Strange (with John S Henley) argued the globalisation of production, fast-tracked by declining transport costs have turned the world economy into a division of labour and changes the relationship between states and firms, so that diplomacy is no longer confined to states. States have to have diplomatic relationships with firms and vice versa. The change in international production is significant as it diminishes the power of states to control economic events. States retain considerable negative power to disrupt, manage or distort trade by controlling entry to the territory in which the national market functions. They cannot easily control production which is aimed at a world market and which doesn’t necessarily take place within their frontiers…States’ positive power to harness internal resources is decidedly constrained when they try to influence where and how international production takes place. They find they cannot direct; they can only bargain (Stopford, Strange and Henley (1991:14). 28  THE DELL THEORY IN SUMMARY Basic premise – prosperity outweighs war Actors in the international system – states and firms Nature of society and the international system – cooperative Main concern – rising standards of living Foreign policy strategy – less conflict, more commercial diplomacy Universal concepts – desire to improve living standards Historical source – Immanuel Kant (Book: On Perpetual Peace, first published in 1795) Contemporary theorists – Thomas Friedman (Book: The World is Flat: The globalised world in the twenty-first century, first published in 2005) Linking theory to evidence – Cooperation between China and Taiwan, and between India and Pakistan. 2.7 COMPLEX THEORY AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY In his book, Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization (2003), James Rosenau asked searching questions about the relevance of old theories in the modern era. With the end of the Cold War, the microelectronic revolution, and the onset of globalisation in the economic and cultural realms in mind, he asked whether these processes are good or bad for humankind. This question belongs to the value-based normative category of theories. He further asked: Do the strides in the process of communication sustained by the internet and other technologies expand the dominance of the haves over the have-nots? More importantly, for our purpose in this study unit, he asked: can viable theories be developed with which to value the growing complexities that are rendering the world both more intricate and less stable? To answer these questions, he proposes a fledgling theory of complexity theory that seeks to integrate normative concerns with empirical approaches (Rosenau 2003:206-207). We will not get into the details of the theory here, save to introduce you to its basic elements. The theory is concerned with uncertainties in the global environment. Rosenau observed that the sweet moments when the Berlin Wall came down, apartheid ended in South Africa, and aggression was set back in Kuwait seemed like fleeting and remote fantasies as the challenges of the post-Cold War order has emerged as anything but orderly. He notes: Whatever maybe the arrangements of the emergent epoch that replace the bipolarity of the US-Soviet rivalry, they are at best incipient and ambiguous structures and, at worst, insidious processes marked by fragile governments, financial crises, and wide-ranging terrorist organisations. To make sense of the complexity, the complexity theory has four interconnected foundations. The first (the core) is the complex adaptive system – not a cluster of unrelated events but a system; not a simple system, but a complex one; not a static, unchanging set of arrangements but a complex adaptive system. Such a system is distinguished by a set of interrelate parts, each one of which is potentially capable of being an autonomous agent that, through acting autonomously, can impact on the others, and all of which either engage in a patterned behaviour as they sustain the day-to-day routines or break with the routines when new challenges require new responses and new patterns. The interrelationships of agents are what make the IPC2602/1 29  system. The capacity of agents to cope collectively with the new challenges is what makes the system adaptive. Such then, is the modern urban community, the nation state, and the fragmented global system. The second foundation is that each agent is able to organise itself into a coherent whole and retains the power to impact on the rest of the system. The third foundation is that an agent that is capable of effecting change in the whole system, is also vulnerable to being rendered extinct if it does not adapt to changes effected somewhere else in the system. Flowing from the third foundation, the fourth foundation stipulates that the complex system is vulnerable to what might be seen as small events (Rosenau 2003:211-217). A complexity perspective acknowledges the non-linearity of both natural and human systems. It posits that human systems are constantly learning, reacting, adapting, and changing even as they persist, as sustaining continuity and change simultaneously. It is a mental set, a cast of minds that does not specify particular outcomes or solutions but that offers guidelines and lever points that can be employed to assess more clearly the specific problem for which comprehension is sought (Rosenau 2003:220). At the heart of this theory is the suggestion that nothing is irrelevant. It is, therefore, important to be observant enough of the agents that constitute systems and their ability, continuously, to effect change in the system, forcing others to adapt. Coming close to this complex theory is complex interdependence, a theory advocated by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (2012) in the fourth edition of their book, Power and Interdependence. Complex interdependence has the following three main characteristics: (1) Multiple channels connect societies, including: informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental elites (face-to-face and through telecommunications); and transnational organisations (such as multinational banks or corporations). These channels can be summarised as interstate, trans-governmental, and transnational relations. Interstate relations are the normal channels assumed by realists. Trans-governmental applies when we relax the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; transnational applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only units. (2) The agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. This absence of hierarchy among issues means, among other things, that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda. Many issues arise from what used to be considered domestic policy, and the distinction between domestic and foreign issues becomes blurred. These issues are being considered in several government departments (not just foreign offices), and at several levels. Inadequate policy coordination on these issues involves significant costs. Different issues generate different coalitions, both within governments and across them, and involve different degrees of conflict. Politics does not stop at the waters’ edge (Nye & Keohane 2012:20). (3) Military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. It may, however, be important in these governments’ relations with governments outside that region, or on other issues. Military force could, for instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues among members of an alliance, yet at the same time be very important for that alliance’s political 30  and military relations with a rival bloc. For the former, relationships this condition of complex interdependence would be met; for the latter, it would not (Keohane & Nye 2012:21). Debate In his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2014), John Mearsheimer challenged the optimism of interdependence theory. His argument against the “make money, not war” thesis of interdependence could also be placed in sharp contrast to the Dell Theory and generally the liberal theory. Make Money, Not War Arguing specifically about China’s economic rise relative to the US, he wrote that advocates of interdependence are wrong to downplay the military rise of China. He stated: “Probably the most frequently heard argument that China’s rise can be peaceful is based on the theory of economic interdependence. This perspective has two components. “First is the claim that China’s economy is inextricably bound to the economies of its potential rivals, including Japan and the United States. This linkage means not only that China and its trading partners depend on each other to keep prospering but also that prosperity in turn depends on peaceful relations among them. A war involving them would have disastrous economic consequences for all the belligerents. It would be tantamount to mutually assured destruction at the economic level. “Second, prosperity is the main goal of modern states. Publics today expect their leaders to deliver economic growth; if they fail, they are likely to be thrown out of office. In some cases there might be significant unrest at home and the regime itself can be threatened. The imperative to get rich means no rational leader would start a war. Indeed, even security competition among the relevant countries is likely to be moderate, not just because leaders prefer to concentrate on maximising their country’s wealth, but also because of the danger that an intense rivalry might inadvertently lead to war. In a world of economically interdependent states, leaders have a marked aversion to conflict, for fear it will put an end to prosperity as well as their political careers. It would be wrong to argue that economic interdependence does not matter at all for the fostering of peace. Leaders do care greatly about their country’s prosperity, and in certain circumstances that concern will help dampen any enthusiasm they might have for war. The key question, however, is whether such calculations are likely to decisively influence policy makers, in a wide variety of circumstances. In other words, will the impact of economic interdependence be weighty enough to serve as a firm basis for peace between China and its potential rival over a long period of time? I believe there are good reasons to doubt that concerns about mutual prosperity will keep Asia peaceful as China grows more powerful. At the most basic level, political calculations often trump economic ones when they come into conflict. “This is certainly true regarding matters of national security, because concerns about survival are invariably at stake in the security realm, and they are more important than worries about prosperity. As emphasised, if you cannot survive, you cannot prosper. It is worth noting in this regard that there was substantial economic interdependence and prosperity among the European great powers before 1914. Nevertheless, World War I happened.” Source: Mearsheimer 2014:407–408 IPC2602/131  EXERCISE 2.5 (1) What does the Dell Theory tell us about the relationship between commerce and politics? (2) What is the main argument of the Dell Theory? (3) What’s the relationship between the Dell Theory and Kant’s liberal idea that he articulated in Perpetual Peace? (4) What are the main features of complex theory? (5) What is the difference between complex interdependence and realism? (6) Having read arguments of John Mearsheimer, would you classify him as a realist or liberal? Provide reasons. 2.8 POSTCOLONIAL AND DECOLONIAL APPROACH The aim of this section is to briefly introduce you to the debates on Postcolonial/ Decolonial Approach to International Relations. These approaches are useful in understanding that International Political Dynamics advocate for alternative ways to study phenomena, with special focus on hitherto overlooked perspectives. It is an important and growing perspective aimed at enriching the field of International Relations by transcending it from its midwives in the United States and Europe. These theories originated from Western scholars and Western experiences. Some of them, especially realism and liberalism, were conceived at the height of colonial oppression. The decoloniality approach, according to Taylor (2012:389), seeks to deliberately reject the idea that there is one (universal and Western) way of knowing and being in the world. The embrace of diversity is vital to the creation of decolonial International Relations because it proposes to take other world views seriously. But diversifying International Relations perspectives on its own is not enough. According to Foneseca (2012:4), decolonisation of International Relation cannot be achieved by including the histories of others or adding certain scholars to the mainstream. It must critique the Western canon’s point of enunciation to open space for understandings from different comprehensions, temporalities, spaces, concepts of governance, human rights and democracy. On the one hand, it must challenge modern international structures, while, on the other hand, claim the means to produce knowledge, to dialogue about that which has been excluded. The Westphalian system, out of which they germinated much of International Relations theories and produced the concept and practice of state sovereignty, was followed ironically by colonialism and the partitioning of Africa. Africa was largely disregarded, its usefulness being a significant issue only as a cite of “scramble”. In his book, The scramble for Africa, Thomas Pakenham (1991:xix) refers to the scramble period as having begun in 1876 and ending in 1912, when European powers had completed partitioning Africa. The continent’s peoples, resources and political institutions were pillaged. The colonial experience was, however, not confined to Africa. Asia and the Americas experienced it too. At the heart of the colonial project were ideas that colonialists held regarding what was “normatively” acceptable or justified. 32  What made colonialism – and its unravelling – possible, were normative ideas. As Jackson (1993:114–115) explains: When old normative ideas and the institutions that embody and express them are displaced by new or contrary ones, a different regime is inaugurated. Some- thing like this process of change was evident in the decolonisation process in parts of Asia and most of Africa, the Caribbean, and Oceania. Previous norms governing independent statehood – which required acquisition of (Western- Style) ‘civilisation’ and demonstrated capacity for self-government on the part of colonial subjects – were abandoned and replaced by new ones that had few conditions attached to them. As a consequence, many colonies that hitherto had little real prospect of soon gaining self-government now had a categorical entitlement to become independent states as soon as possible. They exercised it almost without exception. The change was unambiguous, rapid, and conclusive: within a decade, from about the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the international system was transformed from one that included a large number of legal overseas dependencies of European colonial powers – formal empires – to one in which most colonies had become independent states and the universal end of Western colonialism was clearly in sight. The normative ideas of self-determination not only pre-empted colonialism but also precluded its reform … The change was thus revolutionary and categorical in its characteristics. As Jackson (1993:129) argued, underlying these causes was a fundamental shift of normative ideas and a corresponding change of