Intro to International Politics PDF

lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Intro to international politics International Politics (Washington University in St. Louis) Scan to open on Studocu Studocu is not sponsored or endorsed by any college or university Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim (glamgear...

lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Intro to international politics International Politics (Washington University in St. Louis) Scan to open on Studocu Studocu is not sponsored or endorsed by any college or university Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Comparative relations vs. international relations Approaches to study of IR - International Relations Theory: explain conflict and cooperation in an anarchic system - analytic study of diplomatic and/or economic history - quantitative empirical work - experiential work Three key concepts central to IR theory - interest: national interests that can be consistent or inconsistent with each other States with opposing interests need to bargain. - interactions: world politics is about strategy Strategy interaction central to IR Concept of a “best response” strategy - institutions - sets of rules Thought to facilitate cooperation Hans Morgenthau: “intentions don’t matter for much in world politics” What actor matter in IR? The states viewed as primary actors Since the end of the cold war, more focus on non-state actors Much focus on international organizations IR was long defined by debate over importance and the role of IOs. IOs can only get funding from states. What makes states special relative other actors: sovereignty 1648 Peace of Westphalia – The Peace of Westphalia was a series of treaties signed in 1648 that ended the Thirty Years' War and the Dutch War of Independence, and established the foundation for modern international relations: Established territorial sovereignty The Peace of Westphalia established the concept of territorial sovereignty among European nations. Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Established the balance of power The Peace of Westphalia established the principle that a balance of power would be used to prevent inter-state aggression. States have sovereign jurisdiction within their borders What does this really matter? Conscription, taxes! (Not just military forces) Key sources of power: resources and human capital State capacity is the ability to control and extract these resources Europe developed this capacity by fighting wars Charles tilly: “war made the state and the state made war” Military revolution New research focuses on leaders to understand IR Rationalist: what are leaders incentives? Leaders want to stay in power! Avoid punishment (they think of the consequence of losing power) Regime type matters IR is fundamentally about conflict and cooperation When and why do we see one rather than the other? WWI Bargaining & Cooperation Bargaining theory Bargaining occurs when actors have zero-sum interests, any improvement in my situation implies you do worse. Canonical example: divide the dollar or pie Conflict over territory in south Asia eg. China vs. Vietnam; France vs. Germany Eg. Sino Vietnamese boundary/ island dispute Interests opposed: a zero-sum bargaining problem  Why not negotiate a deal and avoid 50000 casualties and more material costs? Cooperation occurs when actors have a shared interest in outcome - mutually better off from agreement At least one actor is better off, no one else worse off Adam Smith and the benefits of trade, benefit from specialization Mercantilism Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Eg. Turkey, Anarchy Sharp difference between domestic and international politic Domestic politics characterized by hierarchy International politics characterized by anarchy Many refer to international politics as a self-help system Consequences of anarchy  Realists: Prisoners’ dilemma Individual incentives ruin collective welfare liberals: The stag hunt Coordination problem: solve shared problem, or go it alone? A metaphor for the problem of international cooperation Paradigms & assumptions – Neorealism Realists emphasize “self-help” as a consequence of anarchy - They view world politics as more zero-sum than positive-sum East Asia (Kang’s reading) Eurocentrism in international relations theory The current international system reflects European history - why: Europe’s rise during 16th/17th century IR theory has Eurocentric focus in two ways: 1. Anarchy as ordering principle 2. Focus on material power balances Where did these ideas come from? - multipolarity Are they general or contingent in important ways? Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Westphalian sovereignty emerged in Europe as a principle --The idea that all states are similar or equal units Balance of power -states want to ensure they cannot be dominated -balance against most powerful state with alliances -Britain on top in 19th century, but others challenge -- the rise of Germany -- the power potential of Russia How was historical east Asia different? A tributary system – what is this? - a hegemonic power – China - hegemon has material preponderance and legitimacy, Legitimacy also comes from social recognition by other states - balance of power considerations pretty minimal - when Japan challenges, it intends to rule from China Tributary relations formalized by two institutions: 1. investiture: superior state’s recognition and granting of titles 2. tribute missions: diplomatic envoys to and from hegemon The rise of China – debates - what does this mean for contemporary east Asia? - is Europe’s past east Asia’s future? - could east Asia return to the hegemonic system of the past? - what should the us do? Kang proposes that: 1. we should also look at other East Asia countries, how they respond to the rise of China 2. East Asia is more peaceful than expected, though some are American allies Most countries want to maintain good relationship with both China and the us. They (American allies like Japan and Korea) share some interest with us, but not all Both are stronger than them (YouTube: The essential stability of east Asia David kang) Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Belt and road initiative 1. international: counteract the power of allies of American in the east asia, to gain central position in east asia 2. domestic: excess manufacturing products and resources Chap 3: Causes of War Why state want to bear massive costs of war (human deaths, economic effects, etc)? Why not negotiate? - Diplomacy costs much less than armed conflict - Why not settle close to the outcome of a prospective war? Cardiovascular disease is the most common cause of the deaths globally rather than war. How common is war? Statistically, Interstate war is a rare event. However, there are periods in which it is plagues in the system. Eg. WWII, USSR causes incredible number of casualties Conflict more broadly defined is more common. Intrastate wars are more common than interstate. Intrastate (within border) Internationalized intrastate Interstate (between states) Extrastate A bargaining theory of why states fight Bargaining and status quo A has the incentive to challenge the status quo Value of war = war outcome – cost Ultimatum bargaining game B can make an offer to A within a bargaining range. Eg. 50-50 split -- Assumes that both are rational states who know the war outcome and costs of war Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Why fight? Three routes to war Q: negotiating an agreement based on capabilities / interests would cost much less, so why do states fights? Rationalist explanations of why war: 1. Private information – capabilities not known, incentives to hide this information 2. Commitment problems: sth makes commitment to not fight incredible States gain power overtime over adversary 3. Issue indivisibility: Territory is not always divisible – social or political reasons 1. Private information Risk-return tradeoff: the potential return rises with an increase in risk the concept refers to situations where states or actors possess incomplete or hidden information about each other’s capabilities or intentions. This can lead to risk-taking in decision-making, particularly when engaging in conflicts or negotiations. The "risk-return trade-off" highlights that:  More risk can lead to higher potential rewards: When one party is uncertain about the other’s strength or willingness to fight, they may take a gamble by going to war or escalating tensions, hoping to gain a significant advantage or achieve better terms in negotiation.  More risk also increases the chance of loss: Just as higher potential gains are on the table, the chances of suffering significant setbacks or losses are equally elevated. This creates a delicate Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 balance where parties must weigh the potential rewards against the risks of miscalculation due to private or incomplete information. In international relations, this often leads to "costly signals," where states take actions (such as military mobilization) to demonstrate their strength or resolve, trying to shift the perceived risk-return balance in their favor. By taking costly actions, a state shows that it is serious, which can prevent a conflict if the other side realizes the risk of continuing to challenge it. How can states convey capabilities/ interests? - states have incentives to hold the information as an advantage, to look like a strong type; adversary do not believe in that– this is a costless way of showing capabilities, it does not work; pulling outcome (both sides act in the same way) - Costly signals: action a weak type would or could not do, it must be costly enough so that weak state wouldn’t bother doing it. Eg. Send naval vessels, aircraft - Military mobilization an obvious costly signal - Speech? When could it be costly? Audience cost theory, may affect election 2. Commitment problems Why might credible commitment not be possible? Cannot commit to keep agreement in the future Key reasons why commitment problems rise: 1. changing distribution of power Eg. WWI, Germany afraid of the rise of Russian power in the future, 1913, prefer to cut its force now - preventive war Bargaining ranges don’t overlap 2. first strike advantage Cult of offensive 3. agreement changes power distribution Territory control increases bargaining power, discontinuous shift in power Like territory agreement on economic or population center. Eg. Israel’s use of territory after six-day war Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Israeli possession of strategic Golan heights Construction of multiple lines of defense Development of settlement 3. Issue indivisibility - Bargaining model of war assumes issue is infinitely divisible (above graph) - Division can arguably destroy the value of territory. Likely due to domestic politics Due to religious and cultural value, dividing land is destructive to what makes it so valuable in the first. sth cannot be compromised. World War I and the Causes of War World War I – most influential event for theories of war Why? It has it all in a sense. Great power politics Power transition dynamics Offensive/defensive balance debates Alliance politics do they prefer or provoke Misperception How does Van Evera’s narrative relate to theory we covered? The actors of WWI: By august 1914, there are two alliances blocs formed in Europe. - Central power: Austria-Hungary, Germany and ottomans - Allied power: Britain, Russia, and France Italy joins after being promised a bunch of territories United States joins in April 1917 The cult of the offensive Idea that military technology and doctrine favors offensive If war starts, the initiator greatly advantaged – first strike advantage Small timing advantages can make large differences Why does this help to push Europe towards war in 1914 Made states optimistic about duration of prospective war Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Made everyone eager to not be slow to mobilize and attack Put a premium on the secrecy of plans How can these factors affect the bargaining range? Eg. Underestimate the costs of the war due to first strike advantage, so after the shift of power, the bargaining range do not overlap 相信很容易就能搞定战争， 以及拿到好结果 Consequences of offense dominance 1. Elevates importance of striking first: commitment problems Eg. Quantify the loses of delay each day Widespread obsession with timing and speed of mobilization 2. Shifting distribution of power: Windows German/Austrian worries about Russia’s increasing relative power Worries about increasing power: commitment problems 3. Elevates importance of secrecy: Informational problems Russian decision to mobilize against Germany and Austria - because wanting to keep timing advantage - believed they can keep it secret Many attempts to conceal and misrepresent Lack of information makes you assume the worst Did informational asymmetry make the war outcome unclear?  In the end, the idea that the offense was dominant was wrong European leaders far off in predicting what war would be like Some rationalist explanations for war in WWI Elevate one to explain key events Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Multiple mechanisms can work in a complex multi actor war like WWI Van Evera was not writing with the bargaining model of war in mind Systemic instability and conflict Systemic effects on conflict IR theory traditionally emphasizes the system Realists: distribution of power across system, focus on great powers Liberals: liberal international order/ institutions How should these factors affect territorial conflict? What would a state change its behavior given these ideas? Why do crisis & instability influence conflict onset? Great power instability and conflict onset Territorial claims remain a prominent source of conflicts How can instability among major powers influence conflicts? Systemic instability & bargaining model of a war Factors affected: 1. less anticipated involvement of great power - lower the cost of the war 2. commitment problems - Increased uncertainty of intervention of the great power Systemic instability and claim-timing Dominant great power has broad security interests Protection of status quo e.g. US in the western hemisphere Territorial conflict and civil war are destabilizing Dominant great power (and its allies) seek to deter conflict During systemic crisis, the ability and interest to intervene over local disputes lower Hegemon occupied with systemic crisis, not lower order security threats Revisionist great powers and systemic crisis Not all great powers opposed to perturbations in the systems eg. Russia Great powers not atop existing order might encourage claims Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Supporting revisionist claims less costly during systemic crisis Dominant great power and allies occupied with systemic crisis Incentives for revisionist great power to encourage claims heighten during systemic crisis Probability of blowback 反击 lower – dominant power occupied Regional great powers and claim-making Regional powers play an important role in managing Five sources of instability/ systemic turmoil 1. domestic instability within great powers. Eg. 1848 2. great power wars eg. WWI, 1866 3. Major (post-war) reorganizations/ treaties, eg. 1815-16 or 1919-20 4. breakup of empires, eg. 1990-91 5. great power proxy conflicts, eg. Balkan crises Chapter 4: Domestics politics and war Eg. Falkland island conflict between Britain and Argentina Unitary actors and war Three explanations for wars: Private information, commitment problems, issue indivisibility Each modifies the bargaining model of war Unitary actor assumption (states are just black boxes, ignore the domestic politics) The idea that we can view the states as one strategic actor – realist view Useful assumption but sometimes problematic Rally effect and the bargaining range Some costs are offset by the benefits of rally effect – dangerous Less bargaining range Will think wars are beneficial, no reason to maintain democracy and peace Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 If you are wishing a rally effect, you also hope the war gets a decisive outcome Support for wars decline as causalities increase National interest vs. particular interest Diversionary incentive: Temptation to spark international wars in order to rally public support at home (Divert attention to international wars) War is costly, but costs and benefits not distributed equally Particular interests only matter if they have influence. Interest group Military War is costly, so why does the public go along with it? Idea that voters rarely benefit from war not new Collective action Can individuals with a mutual common interest cooperate? Members need to cooperate to achieve collective outcomes, but they do not have incentives. No one is pivotal (whether one can change the outcome). Eg. Voting Free rider problems Especially problematic when group interest is in public good – non excludable eg. National security, clean air I will enjoy a public good regardless of whether I help make it happen My incentive is to not pay the cost and to defect from cooperation, especially if I am not pivotal Dealing with collective action Some additional incentive or benefit necessary. Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Coercion Selective incentive (reward participants with private goods) Different dynamics depending on size of group eg. Peer effects, peer costs How noticeable are individual contributions Often interest groups stand to benefit much more than public Public is at disadvantage; economic elites have more influence on the outcome Interest group alignments Democratic peace Scholars propose both monadic and dyadic versions "monadic" forms of this theory (democracies are in general more peaceful in their international relations); "dyadic" forms of this theory (democracies do not go to war with other democracies) The monadic version without empirical support Democracies do not tend to fight each other – dyadic relation Does democracy really drive observed patterns? Normative explanations Relies on democratic norms of conflict resolution States externalize their domestical practices Why do democracies fight autocracies? The norm only applies to like-minded states in the system Consistent with a logic of appropriateness Appropriately applied to democratic leaders, but cannot be applied to non- democratic leaders How does this explain why states fight rather than negotiate? Norms explain why states do not fight, lack of common norms explains why they fight? Institutional explanations How might democratic institutions affect bargaining? Informational explanation from bargaining model How can democratic institutions matter? Transparency might reduce informational asymmetries Free press Accountability to public/voters Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Audience costs theory: leaders’ statements costly signals (leaders fear the consequences of failing the war, and undermine public support, they have to pay this cost) Negative repercussion for failing to follow through on a threat or to honor a commitment How are audience costs theory generated? Leader issues threat to another country over dispute Second leader can either back down or refuse to First leader decides whether to follow through on threat. Evidence for or against audience costs is hard to obtain These costs we never see. Rational assumptions Why don’t democracies fight each other according to ACT They are able to communicate resolve 决心 to each other Democracies should tend to fight only when resolved However, why punish blufÏng 吓唬 What about the risk-return tradeoff What if the public disagrees with the threat? Variation among authoritarian regimes Much variety among authoritarian regimes Topology of authoritarian Civilian audience or leader Military audience or leader Non-personalist Machine Junta Personalist Boss Strongman Personalist leader (unconstrained) eg. 金正恩 Non-personalist leader (elite-constrained) Leader has military background or not, more likely to nominate military solutions Civilian background – avoid wars, avoid negative outcomes of wars, Junta – leaders can be replaced by someone in their regimes Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Audience cost and authoritarian politics Who are authoritarian leaders’ voters? Regime insiders, eg. Politburo Are leaders account to powerful audience> Personalist dictators – not really Civilian elites in autocracies sensitive to costs of war Military regimes more likely to view the use of force appropriate/beneficial Authoritarian politics and conflicts Democracies are not less conflictual than Machine regimes Military regimes and personalist regimes relatively conflictual Junta, boss, strongman vs. Machine is less conflictual What has this to do with audience costs? – Week Institutions and wars Alliances: commitments that states make to each other Can be either offensive or defensive Defensive: US – Japan (common type) Offensive: Molotov – Ribbentrop pact (uncommon type), join the fight Can be public or secret Usually public (especially since WWII) eg. Sign contracts known by public Advantage of public rather than secret: Deterrence Most alliances have contracts, a few are informal Formal alliance example: NATO Informal alliance example: United States – Israel Alliances: what are they good for? Allow the weak to balance against the strong Classic balance of power Strong states can pledge defense of weaker states Makes deterrence more credible eg. US – South Korea, nuclear power Can solidify spheres of influence eg. Warsaw Pact Lead to more effective defense – resource pooling Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Distinct comparative advantages, eg. US nuclear umbrella Also can facilitate band wagoning for spoils of war Eg. Italy in WWI Alliances and the Bargaining Range Assumptions: 1. No efÏciency problems In reality, EfÏciency problems rise – how alliances fit together in the fighting 2. Credibility of alliances, allies will join the war Why do alliances work? Alliances effect on bargaining range presumes their credibility Just scrapes of paper However, about 75% of alliances commitments honored What can states do to make alliances credible? Economic & military interdependence/vulnerability Alignment of interests might be common knowledge Costly commitments. Eg. Troop deployments or joint drills Audience costs & credibility of alliances Formal public contracts & democratic, non-personalist regimes – audience costs apply more easily, because leaders are more accountable to audiences Collective security and alliances Institutionalize all states’ common interest in avoiding war League of nations the first major attempt (failed, due to US) After WWII, United Nations emerged (still existing) Collective security: an attack on one an attack on all The ultimate deterrent – if credible Collective security a public good: collective action problems Free-rider problem – especially difÏcult when costs are high Powerful states unattractive targets Powerful states pursue own interests, eg. Syria and Russia The United Nations: Promise and Limitations The UN does facilitate cooperation, although not perfectly Outside intervention not a certainty, but more likely Helps to enforce agreements eg. Peacekeepers The UNGA closest to a “global parliament” Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Each country has one vote Great powers cannot block issues from being voted on Binding resolutions must go through the UN Security Council Five Permanent Members – All have a veto – US, UK, China, Russia, … Ensures the buy-in of major powers The Cold War The track record for the UNSC is not uniformly stellar Cold War drought for UNSC resolutions - because opposing sides have veto, 5P are not on the same side, lack of bipartisanship First gulf war (Iraq War) viewed as first great success – UN successfully involved in conflicts US get to the resolution, that approved by China and Russia UN Successes: Peacekeeping Missions Peacekeeping missions an area with successes Requires consent of combatants Can help with commitment problems Can serve as a buffer between combatants Helps with post war elections Some key successes, and some difÏcult cases Who contributes to PKOs peacekeeping operations? The P5 members are not the major contributions Changes in the types of PKOs More enforcement missions post-Cold War How much do PKOs matter? One extra conflict per year ends; another deescalates Consequences of ending a conflict = 2500 battle deaths In Syria, about a third of overall deaths civilian Many more internally displayed persons and refugees 2001: UN stops PKOs? 2013: 3-4 more major conflicts What would more ambitious PKO deployments means? Less deaths, less conflicts Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Chapter 6: Non-state actors and wars Civil War and IR A civil war is an armed conflict that occurs between organized actors within a state and that meets some minimum threshold for severity. At the end of the cold war, many predicted widespread peace The post Cold-war era has not been peaceful The intra-state conflict has become increasingly prominent Incorrect to claim that this is a new trend though Debate: overall trend towards peace? Some argue that “violence is declining”- civil war – there is a pike for civil wars This is true for interstate wars Less interstate wars, more intrastate wars (civil wars) Civil war and world politics Why is civil war an international issue? Civil war affects trading partners of a country, economic interconnectedness Eg. Russia intervention in Syria’s civil war, Russia enjoys a historically strong, stable, and friendly relationship with Syria Eg. US civil war, European’s interest in cotton in the south Rebel groups often transnational Transnational territorial claims Bases across borders – groups have foreign bases Outside state support – Proxy eg. Cold wars, us and soviet union are supporting the allies opposing each other  Basic bargaining framework also explain civil war  Governments versus sub-state rebel groups. Issues and civil wars What drives the outbreak of the civil wars? Political grievances Ethnic discrimination eg. Kurds in Turkey Territorial claims Competition for resources eg. Oil, diamonds, look for control of the land and try to extract wealth Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 secessionist conflict (want to build up their own state inside the existing one) eg. PKK eg. Sri Lanka – Tamil Tigers Control over governments Access to economic resources and wealth Competitions for natural resources underground, Not all conflicts escalate to Civil War Eg. Tunisia or Egypt vs. Syria Bargaining failure and civil war Why does civil wars break out? Informational problems what do rebels know that states do not? States do not realize the military capabilities of rebels, asymmetrical of power Asymmetrical warfare Commitment problems A massive problem in civil wars – settlements If take rebels’ mobilization, escalate, military power away, they have little power, fear that states not stick to their commitments Indivisible issues Can the homeland be divided? Civil war and terrorism Civil war and terrorism sometimes happen together. Rebel groups in civil wars also target civilians. What is terrorism? Terrorism: politically motivated violence against noncombatants/ civilians Rather than criminally motivated (like stealing) If both are combatants – classify them into conflicts or other categories Intended to have psychological effects on an audience To inflict fear on larger audience – this can happen everywhere Perpetrated by non-state actors How is terrorism a distinct tactic? Guerilla/ insurgency Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Directly attack government forces (rather than civilians) Guerrillas more closely resemble states’ armies Sizable and organized units and divisions Seek to control defined pieces of territory Terrorism and insurgency not mutually exclusive for a group. Why terrorism? Most attacks not clearly related to groups achieving goals So what do attacks do? Attacks as costly signals? – Informational explanation To show that they are capable and resolved Groups have strong incentive to look strong and resolved Attacks as coercion? – Impose enough pain on targets Civilians cooperate with terrorist rather than collaborate with state Civilians pressure the government, less support for government Strategies of terrorism Strategies first highlighted by Kydd and Walter (2006) 1. Coercion Attrition: signal the opponents that we can continue such attacks regularly over long period of time Intimidation: e.g. If you support the state, then we will kill 50 men in the town 2. Provocation Diversion theory of war Provoke opponents with benefits and negative externalities Disproportionate response of the country Uncertainty of the terrorist’s population – hard to attack for the country Eg. 911 3. Spoiling Spoil the outcome of agreement, distort the trust Terrorists may also attack to spoil, or sabotage, a prospective peace between their target and the moderate leadership from their home society. 4. Outbidding Outbidding other parallel rebel groups 问题整理： Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 已经过完 chapter 5&6 题目，书，notes, slides Introduction: World politics = international relations Use Theory to explain behaviors and outcomes in world politics Interests of different actors: states, politicians, business groups, terrorist organizations, etc. Interactions: bargaining & cooperation, Institutions: set of rules, facilitate cooperation, both domestic and international Level of analysis of IR: international, domestic, transnational (multinational groups) Realism, liberalism, and constructivism Anarchy: absence of central authority in IR (realist assumption) Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])  lOMoARcPSD|47954022 Chap 1. Downloaded by Siham Ibrahim ([email protected])